

Human Consciousness Empirically or Nothing Comes to Mind," *Synthese* 55 (1982): 159.

38. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," p. 87.

39. Frederick Olafson, *Naturalism and the Human Condition: Against Scientism* (London: Routledge, 2001) is a recent attempt to show that scientifically minded, third-personal approaches to the mind involve presuppositions which cannot be accounted for in those terms. As Olafson acknowledges, such an argumentative strategy pervades the Phenomenological tradition. Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are three principal examples.

40. The idea that Dennett's intentional stance cannot account for intentionality in general, i.e., that the intentional stance presupposes some notion of originary intentionality, is argued for in Jennifer Hornsby, "Dennett's Naturalism," in her *Simple Minds: In Defence of Naïve Realism in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); see especially pp. 181–82. Also relevant is John McDowell, "The Content of Perceptual Experience," in his *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). McDowell is generally concerned to defend the distinction between the personal and the subpersonal in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and to argue in particular that Dennett's treatment of perception runs roughshod over this distinction. I have profited greatly from both these papers.

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## CHAPTER 5

# DAVIDSON AND WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWLEDGE, COMMUNICATION, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

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Philosophers concerned about social justice are often accused of making epistemological claims that seem, on the face of it, to be incompatible. On the one hand, they want to claim that knowledge bears the social, subjective fingerprints of the knower, and on the other, that some knowledge claims (presumably, their own) are objectively true and should carry normative weight in debates about social policy. We use the linguistic tools provided by both Davidson and the later Wittgenstein to argue that the appearance of incompatibility arises from various epistemic assumptions that turn out to be, at best, unnecessary.<sup>1</sup> Foundationalism arises as a major culprit here. Famously, neither Wittgenstein nor Davidson understand the transcendental preconditions for human communication and knowledge to be foundational in any way. We argue that the preconditions for communication and knowledge permit (and indeed encourage) the acceptance of both the situated, social nature of knowledge claims and the normative needs of social justice theorizing, at least in part because those very preconditions for communicating and knowing include a strong social element.

The projects of Davidson and Wittgenstein trade on the strengths of both the analytic and Continental approaches. Within the analytic

tradition, for example, the study of language and meaning has been marked by a focus on empirical analysis. The focus within the Continental tradition concerns post-Kantian notions of the transcendental conditions of meaning that are not straightforwardly empirical. While philosophers within the Continental tradition have come to conceive of these conditions as historically contingent, there is agreement that for any given historical epoch there are categories of meaning that structure the very conditions of possibility of empirical analysis. The categories are not themselves available to empirical experience. Of course the nature of the categories is much debated by philosophers who participate in the Continental tradition, and depending on how "historicism" is cashed out, accusations of relativism abound. What Davidson and the later Wittgenstein share is the view that linguistic behavior provides a key to understanding how conditions of meaning can be both transcendental, pragmatic, and historical. Their focus on language is, of course, a result of their analytic inheritance.

We argue that it is their ability to carve out a philosophical space between both the analytic and Continental traditions that permits both Davidson and Wittgenstein to avoid the apparent paradox inherent in making strong social justice claims within a framework of foundationless knowledge.

## SITUATED KNOWLEDGE, NORMATIVE CLAIMS, AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDATIONALISM

In *The Social Construction of What?* Hacking nicely expresses a widespread ambivalence towards the view that the epistemological support of particular knowledge claims is the result of contingent processes. On the one hand, Hacking admits to a desire (which he suspects is widely held) to believe that the best tool of the oppressed is often Truth. He agrees in part with the freedom fighter who argues that "objective truth is called for, as a virtue, when one is fighting tyranny." "The villains," he notes, can never "get away with" stealing the truth "as long as the last words are: 'that simply is not true, liar!'" On the other hand,

Hacking is forced to admit that the vision of particular knowledge-claims as the inevitable result of rationality and progress can serve the interests of dominant groups as well. Hacking notes that some feminist philosophers of science have argued that notions of objectivity and truth are "tools that have been used against [women]" and that the values wrapped up in objectivity and truth "are a gigantic confidence trick" played on the oppressed. Hacking fails, however, to see a way out of this dilemma—pulled both ways, he admits to being "unable to synthesize [his] inclinations."<sup>2</sup>

Focusing on feminist studies of science provides a good backdrop for our discussion. Feminist theorists have been unable to agree upon an epistemic method that would address their need to make strongly normative claims about the problems of sexism in science. Such claims need to rely on some notion of objectivity for underwriting decisions between competing descriptions of science: to make accurate diagnoses of the problematic nature of much scientific investigation. However, feminist diagnoses in science studies have revealed that much of what has passed for objectivity in science is intimately linked to the subjective, social nature of the scientists under investigation, and further, that this problem is not restricted to science—that all knowledge-claims, including those of feminist theorists, bear subjective, social fingerprints. Where then to stand when making claims to objective prescriptions for social justice? The resulting epistemic quandary was articulated most clearly by Sandra Harding in her groundbreaking work *The Science Question in Feminism*.<sup>3</sup>

Since the late 1800s, social scientists concerned about the status of women had been using empirical research methods to diagnose the effects of sexism in various scientific theories, especially the theory of evolution.<sup>4</sup> However, as Harding describes it, by the mid-1980s, feminist theorists had begun to express concern that perhaps the source of social oppression in science was not so much the content of various scientific theories, problematic as that content often was, but also or instead, the foundational claims to objectivity that underwrote scientific research methods.<sup>5</sup> If this were true, then perhaps the scientific notion of objectivity, so intimately tied to empirical foundations, would not be the most reliable tool for feminists who were critical of science. What

role then, if any, could scientific method play in the furtherance of feminist emancipatory projects? Such was the Science Question in Feminism. As Andre Lorde had expressed the question more generally, could we use the "master's tools" to dismantle "the master's house"?

The Science Question upped the level of abstraction within feminist theorizing, shifting the vocabulary away from discussions of scientific practice and toward the epistemic foundations of knowledge and the effects of gender and other social imprints on what it meant to be an *S* that knew *p*. Problems emerged almost immediately—indeed, the rest of Harding's book investigates a number of different feminist approaches to the science question, and the epistemological problems faced by each.<sup>6</sup>

There was one early point of consensus, however, concerning the issue of foundationalism. Most feminist theorists agreed that no matter how the science question would be answered, empirical evidence did not provide an objective, epistemic foundation for scientific or any other knowledge claims, at least not in any straightforward way.<sup>7</sup> On the face of it, Davidson and Wittgenstein would agree with this anti-foundationalist consensus, but of course much depends on the reasons for the position.

Within the traditional accounts of science provided by, for example, Hempel, empirical foundations were conceived as necessary sites for epistemic normativity. One had to be standing on a firm foundation of empirical observations in order to criticize, that is, make normative judgments about the knowledge-claims of others. However, the arguments of Duhem, Quine, Kuhn, and Hanson showed a number of compelling problems with epistemic foundationalism, for example, that observations were theory laden and that theory was undetermined by observations. Building on this work, feminist epistemologists contributed further to the understanding of the social forces affecting epistemic norms.

However, while feminist theorizing has played a critical role in showing that empirical foundations are inherently social—that we can never have a completely objective standpoint—the conceptual need for such a foundation still makes itself felt in many feminist writings on the subject.<sup>8</sup> The foundationalist vocabulary of epistemology was designed

to address, and therefore accept as a reasonable problem, skepticism about knowledge-claims generally. If foundationalism fails, then a certain level of skepticism necessarily enters the epistemological picture. And indeed, many influential feminist theorists argued that skepticism was inevitable within a postfoundationalist epistemology. Harding, for example, has argued that we have to accept the skeptical claim that all knowledge is irredeemably partial—that while a full-blown relativism is incoherent, we can at best obtain objectivity only by degrees.<sup>9</sup> "Strong" objectivity, as she calls it, can be arrived at only by recognizing that knowledge-claims are epistemically relative to the social standpoints of knowers. Unfortunately this level of relativism turns out to be just enough to feed skeptical doubts about the normative claims of feminist theorists themselves, and so the problem of justifying progressive change in science policy, and society more broadly, continues.<sup>10</sup>

Wittgenstein and Davidson show the epistemic vocabulary to be, at best, unnecessary. They both argue that we have no need for epistemic foundations: that objectivity is best seen as a *nonepistemic* concept arising out of language use. Davidson shows that the sorts of doubts encouraged by epistemology, i.e., doubts about the efficacy of conceptual tools such as objectivity and empirical investigation, are in fact belied by our everyday linguistic practices. For Wittgenstein, questioning whether truth or empirical observations are useful tools is to make a conceptual mistake—our form of life is deeply wrapped up in the particular notions of truth we have to work with, and the one cannot be questioned while the other remains fixed. Rather, what "stands fast" for us in our lives and our social and cultural practices are, we might say, codetermined.

The strength of Davidson and Wittgenstein in this context includes their attempts to show that relativism and skepticism only arise within a certain epistemological picture of the world and that while feminists are right to argue that we have no epistemic foundations, the need for such foundations should itself be questioned. Moving back down the ladder of abstraction to the language of the everyday, we see that we have all kinds of normative force to back up our critical political claims. The lesson of Davidson and Wittgenstein is that foundations are part of the language game of epistemology. If they are right, then those of us

concerned about feminism and other social justice issues should leave the epistemic vocabulary behind and begin speaking, once again, in our mother tongue.

## KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS, NORMATIVITY WITHOUT APOLOGY

It is in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and *Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough* that one finds his clearest defense of an epistemological stance that eschews transcendental foundations while permitting, and even encouraging, normative critique.<sup>11</sup> In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein begins by confronting philosophical skepticism on its own terms, but his response to Moore's "Proof of an External World" quickly moves out of the classical analytic approach to skepticism and knowledge.<sup>12</sup> In his analysis of the concepts of "certainty" and "knowledge" Wittgenstein comes up against the limits of rational inquiry. In *Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein presents a vision of critical inquiry within the context of an epistemology without foundations. It is not, Wittgenstein suggests, by appeal to transcendental foundations that we can criticize the failures of our own (and another's) culture, but rather by appeals to traditions that already exist within our cultures, and by pointing towards how our lives might be better for embracing some kinds of values and rejecting others.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein presents a way of understanding the relationship between the justification of epistemological claims and the way we live our lives, in which neither those beliefs that stand fast for us, nor our particular social practices, are privileged. Each, rather, depends crucially on the other—as "the axis around which a body rotates" is neither held in place by, nor holds in place, that body.<sup>13</sup> What it is to give reasons, on this view, is to appeal to that which one is in a "position to know."<sup>14</sup> It is for this reason that Moore's response to the skeptic fails—Moore's assurance that he knows "here is one hand" won't move the skeptic who is, after all, in the same epistemological position as Moore vis-à-vis the evidence for the existence of hands (§ 125). Wittgenstein argues instead that, when brought up in a culture,

we learn, or, better put, "swallow down" what constitutes a legitimate doubt, and how these doubts are in general resolved, at the same time (as part of how) we learn to maneuver around our cultural and physical world (§ 143).

Aside from dissolving skeptical worries, this approach focuses attention on the ways in which the language games of doubt, reason giving, certainty, etc., are *contingent*: they shift and change over time (§ 97ff.); they can be different between different peoples (or people) (§§ 106 and 264); and, indeed, they can be challenged (§§ 609–12). However, it is *not* by appeal to transcendental reasons that everyone must accept, nor to intuitions shared by all, that particular aspects of a form of life can be challenged; rather, it is by a kind of persuasion (§§ 262 and 612). Since in these cases part of what is at issue is what is to count as a reason, what is to be considered evidence, reasons alone cannot determine the outcome.<sup>15</sup>

A concern in these cases is that this image of persuasion is inherently antiliberal; certainly Wittgenstein comparing this kind of persuasion to "what happens when missionaries convert natives"<sup>16</sup> is less than comforting to those who think that political liberalism and public reason reflect important values. However, while of course this kind of persuasion can be antiliberal and morally problematic in all sorts of ways, it need not be. We can, after all, give reasons (though they will only go so far), and some of these reasons will likely be shared, if only because without some basis of shared commitments any communication at all would be impossible. (This important idea, based on the notion of radical interpretation, is discussed often in Wittgenstein, but is taken up more formally by Davidson, as we discuss below.)

The persuasion itself can make use of reasons; not reasons that speak to the choice of, for example, ways of arguing or what to count as evidence, but to issues about the form of life to be adopted more generally. This is the tack Wittgenstein takes in *Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough*.<sup>17</sup> In criticizing Frazer's classic anthropological treatise on cultural interpretation, Wittgenstein points towards contemporary Western culture's own failures. Frazer had interpreted the rituals and ceremonial practice of 'magic' in other cultures as primitive attempts at science—as attempts, in other words, to rationally manipulate the

world. Frazer claimed that because of the standard difficulties in separating correlations from causation, it is very difficult for 'primitive' peoples to realize that their attempts at manipulating the world via magic and ritual are in fact unsuccessful.<sup>18</sup> This approach, Wittgenstein argues, not only fails to do justice to the complexities of the cultures that Frazer describes, but also fails to do justice to the traditions and practices within our own forms of life, and indeed, fails to do justice to the kind of beings we are.

The failure of Frazer, in other words, is not just a failure of interpretation; rather, it is representative, Wittgenstein suggests, of Frazer's failures as a human being. The "narrowness of spiritual life we find in Frazer" (p. 5) is a reflection of Frazer's overconfidence in the power of rational explanation (pp. 4–5). The idea that (rational) explanations are all that is necessary to expunge our desire for "the ceremonial" is, Wittgenstein notes, a "stupid superstition of our time" (pp. 5–6). Better, Wittgenstein suggests, is to acknowledge that we can find "in our souls"<sup>19</sup> the same kinds of experiences that fit in with, and are themselves a part or a reflection of, the ceremonies and rituals of Frazer's account.<sup>20</sup> No hypothesis, no explanation, Wittgenstein suggests, can compete with the impression the rituals and ceremonies that emerge from these parts of ourselves make upon us (p. 5).

Wittgenstein is here asking us to acknowledge, and indeed embrace, parts of ourselves that our current form of life denigrates. The over-ratiocination of contemporary life, the attempt to make all of our actions out to be aiming to achieve particular ends, results in our having to ignore the importance of, for example, ritual and ceremony in our lives. It is for this reason that "Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages" (p. 8). In ignoring the appeal of the ceremonial, Frazer is ignoring the limiting nature of the language-game of rational explanation. And to ignore this is dangerous, not least because it is bound to fail us in key places and ways—as to "someone broken up by love, an explanatory hypothesis won't help much—it will not bring peace" (p. 5).

While reasons may only make sense within particular forms of life, Wittgenstein does not thereby suggest that we are left with a naive relativism. Rather, where reason is (or reasons are) unconvincing, we can make other kinds of appeals, some of which will be, by their very

nature, far more impressive (make more of an impression) than reasons could be. Some of these are obvious; they involve, for example, pointing towards different forms of life and the temptations these might hold (being able to do or say things that are startling from the competing form of life). Some will be less obvious: these might involve displaying in your life, traits that those living other forms of life are forced to find admirable, even where the reasons for living your particular kind of life are inaccessible to them.

The key, though, is that even when one acknowledges the situated nature of knowledge and reason, one is not, on Wittgenstein's view, forced to accept that persuasion must be entirely arbitrary.<sup>21</sup> Just because reasons must come to end doesn't mean that there aren't still some kinds of criteria to which we can appeal. These will of course be loose and subject to interpretation, but they are not thereby arbitrary. After all, we can and do make use of vague criteria—as Wittgenstein notes it is not senseless to tell someone to "stand roughly there."<sup>22</sup> Our powers of persuasion are not, and ought not be, limited to our rational selves; we can, and should, appeal to other parts of ourselves, those parts to which ceremony and ritual speak.

At this point, Wittgenstein's break with the analytic tradition must be obvious. The Cartesian identification of the self with the cognitive and rational and the attendant over-ratiocination and reliance on what can be demonstrated via rational processes, is one of the hallmarks of the analytic tradition. Wittgenstein both rejects the foundationalism that this conception of philosophy had traditionally relied upon, and rejects as well the conclusion that without such foundations, meaningful critique is limited entirely by what all the participants might happen to share and accept. His focus on the structure inherent in the practice of particular ceremonies or rituals within cultural contexts, and the way that these practices are both reflections of and constitutive of important parts of ourselves and of our emotional (and spiritual) lives, emerges not from the analytic tradition, but instead is part of, and formed the basis for, much of the Continental tradition. It is this kind of complexity that made the work of Levi-Strauss, Habermas, Lyotard, and Apel possible, and permits and indeed encourages philosophers concerned with social justice issues to make use of Wittgenstein.<sup>23</sup>

The more obviously analytic side to Davidson's approach focuses on the conceptual points brought out by radical interpretation, though, as we have hinted, his conceptual analysis trades on a more Continental-style appreciation of the transcendental conditions that make interpretation possible.<sup>24</sup> Davidson argues that we can only worry about objectivity, and the reliability of our empirical observations, once we have already made significant use of empirical tools, and assumed a certain amount of objectivity in our observations. According to his principle of charity, we can only begin to question the world (in terms of propositions about that world) once we have established an empirical base of observations against which our critical capacities can make a meaningful contrast.

Following Quine, and also the later Wittgenstein, Davidson asks us to imagine the conceptual apparatus available to an adult who finds herself among speakers of a language with which she has no previous experience, and to which she has no access except through her observations of their behavior, linguistic and otherwise.<sup>25</sup> However hit-and-miss we imagine the success of any such interpretive project to be, the fact that it proceeds at all tells us a number of things about meaning, truth, and the relationship between language users and the world. Most important, we come to understand that the radical interpreter must hold to the principle of charity—she must acquire a massive empirical base of accurate correlations between her new colleagues, their language, and the world before she can recognize the possibility of error.<sup>26</sup> Like the radical interpreter, the philosopher concerned with social justice can rest assured that meaningful disagreement about our world, including, for example, the social policies of our communities, can only exist against a backdrop of shared, objective knowledge-claims.<sup>27</sup> This backdrop forms the conditions of possibility for our meaningful interpretation and criticism of the knowledge-claims of those who would work to affect oppressive social policy.<sup>28</sup>

Insofar as epistemology is a response to the skeptical fear that we do not have access to a backdrop of objective claims, Davidson's model undermines the need for epistemic vocabulary.<sup>29</sup> Moving away from epistemology and the skepticism and relativism it invites, those concerned with social justice can continue with the, admittedly, messy work left over once the radical interpreter has become like us—a com-

petent speaker of her new language. She, like us, must be vigilant, testing for inconsistencies and error against the holistic backdrop that is our recognition of each other as language users.<sup>30</sup>

Wittgenstein too makes use of radical interpretation<sup>31</sup> and many of his comments about the necessary conditions for the possibility of interpretation inform Davidson's approach.<sup>32</sup> Wittgenstein and Davidson differ, however, insofar as Wittgenstein makes more of the empirical fact of our shared humanity to guarantee and "overwrite" the massive agreement that makes interpretation and subsequent criticism possible.<sup>33</sup> For both Davidson and Wittgenstein, the social nature of language use and reasoning demands that any interpretation of another being *as a language user* must make that being out to be generally rational and correct in its assumptions about the world. Wittgenstein, however, takes much more seriously the possibility that the only reason we are so often successful in attempting to interpret each other in this way is that we are all human. "The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (§ 207). It is only because we share so much of our basic behavioral repertoire by virtue of our shared biological and (and hence social/cultural) histories that we can legitimately expect to understand and be understood by others. In order to understand and be understood, we rely critically, Wittgenstein stresses, not only on our shared rationality (which, as Davidson shows, is a matter of conceptual necessity) but also on our shared *expressive* natures (§ 208). That we share such a nature is not conceptually necessary but historically contingent. Nevertheless, it happens to be true, and it allows us to understand, to be understood, and to coherently criticize and persuade each other where we find differences.<sup>34</sup>

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have discussed how philosophers concerned about social justice encounter an epistemic problem that seems to be straightforwardly intractable. Insofar as feminist theorists, for example, argue that the support of, and evidence for, particular knowledge-claims is the result of



contingent processes, and that under different circumstances, different (and incompatible) knowledge-claims might have been supported, it seems difficult to argue simultaneously that certain knowledge-claims (e.g., those that are sexist) are objectively wrong. Wrong by what standards? our critics are invited to respond. If the standards themselves are a legitimate object of contention, how can it be possible to adjudicate disputes about those standards themselves, let alone those claims supported or not by different standards? A view that holds that there is the possibility of moral progress seems, then, to demand standards (epistemological and moral) that are epistemically objective, that is, independent of particular social/cultural situations.

So how can one make strongly normative claims, especially claims that oppose the interests of dominant groups, while at the same time maintaining that the evidence for particular knowledge-claims, including claims about things like moral values and their interpretation in light of (interpreted) evidence, is contingent upon the particulars of the situations that the knowers find themselves in? As we have shown, the necessary conceptual tools to deal with this problem can be found in Davidson and Wittgenstein. In both cases, a focus on the pragmatic pre-conditions for communication emerges from a linguistic perspective, a hallmark of the so-called analytic tradition in philosophy. But each philosopher breaks with that tradition in key ways that shift attention to the social nature of meaning and the limits of reason giving. This forces the focus away from the conceptual analysis characteristic of analytic philosophy and towards analyses of the particular cultural and social traditions we inherit, and hence towards historically motivated understandings of the use of meanings and knowledge-claims. This latter focus is a central aspect of the Continental tradition. Conversely, while philosophers in the Continental tradition have often been more willing than those in the analytic tradition to acknowledge the contingent nature of our current ways of organizing our lives and the world, it is only by harnessing the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy that we can fully realize the political and moral potential that comes from recognizing the contingent, situated nature of knowledge and rationality.

## NOTES

1. We'd like to thank Paul Crowe for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, especially with regard to our characterization of the Continental tradition.
2. Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
3. Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
4. For a review of some of the earlier and less familiar feminist science literature see Sharyn Clough, *Beyond Epistemology: A Pragmatic Approach to Feminist Science Studies* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), especially ch. 5, and ed. Louise Newman, *Men's Ideas/Women's Realities: Popular Science 1870-1915* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
5. Harding, *Science Question*, p. 9.
6. *Ibid.*
7. What role this set of criticisms leaves for empirical evidence was debated by a number of feminist philosophers, many of whom favored a naturalized, empirically based approach to epistemology, after Quine: e.g., Lynn Hankinson Nelson, *Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Nelson, "A Question of Evidence," *Hypatia* 2, no. 8 (1993): 172-89. See also, Richmond Campbell, "The Virtues of Feminist Empiricism," *Hypatia* 9, no. 1 (1994): 90-115; and Campbell, *Illusions of Paradigm: A Feminist Epistemology Naturalized* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). The problems documented in the current discussion are encountered primarily by those feminist theories that downplay the importance of empiricism.
8. See Sharyn Clough, "A Hasty Retreat from Evidence: The Recalcitrance of Relativism in Feminist Epistemology," *Hypatia* 13, no. 4 (1998): 88-111, for a discussion of the varieties of relativism that haunt the epistemic approaches of feminist philosophers such as Sandra Harding (see Harding's, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991]); and "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is 'Strong Objectivity'?" in *Feminist Epistemologies*, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter [New York: Routledge, 1993]); as well as Evelyn Fox Keller, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Ecology on Language, Gender and Science* (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Helen Longino, "Can There Be a Feminist Science?" *Hypatia* 2, no. 3 (1987): 51-64; and Longino, *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

9. See, for example, Harding, *Whose Science?* and Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint."
10. Cf. the ongoing "Science Wars."
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough*, ed. R. Rhees and (except where noted) trans. R. Rhees and A. C. Miles (Rexford, Nottinghamshire, Eng.: The Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979); Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright and trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969).
12. For a summary of the treatment of this problem within the analytic tradition and a very sympathetic reading of Moore's "Proof of an External World" and "A Defense of Common Sense," see Barry Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
13. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, § 150.
14. *Ibid.*, § 438. See also § 441.
15. Compare Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); see also Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice," in *The Essential Tension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 320–39.
16. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, § 612.
17. In developing this approach to understanding Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer, we benefited greatly from an e-mail correspondence between Jonathan and Victor Krebs (sparked by an unpublished paper Krebs presented at the 1996 Pacific APA).
18. See Wittgenstein, *Remarks*, pp. 2, 12.
19. We follow for this passage the translation of Krebs rather than Miles/Rhees.
20. Wittgenstein, *Remarks*, p. 5.
21. The mistake here is similar to the mistaken interpretation of Kuhn that makes theory choice out to be a matter of 'mob psychology' (see Thomas Kuhn, "Objectivity," op. cit.). While no set of (empirical or theoretical) reasons can be guaranteed to decide between competing theories, theory choice is not arbitrary. Just as Wittgenstein appeals to what remains the same (in this case, what kinds of things people are and the general features of our lives that permit us to 'get by' in the world), so too Kuhn appeals to long-standing values and traditions within the sciences (that can yet be interpreted differently by different people). That both Kuhn and Wittgenstein can be misinterpreted in such similar ways follows from Kuhn's extensive but not always clear use of Wittgensteinian philosophy.
22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1953), §71, see also § 76ff.

23. See, for example, Wendy Lee-Lampshire, "Decisions of Identity: Feminist Subjects and Grammars of Sexuality," *Hypatia* 10, no. 4 (1995): 32–46; and Cressida Heyes, "Philosophical Investigations (in a Feminist Voice)," in *Line Drawings: Defining Women Through Feminist Practice* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
24. Davidson has written little about the connections between his theory of meaning and Continental approaches, such as those found in literary criticism, but the connections have been explored by others. See, for example, Reed Way Dasenbrock, *Literary Theory after Davidson* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); and *Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and Literary Theory* ed. Reed Way Dasenbrock (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). Rorty has drawn many parallels between Davidson and Continental theorists such as Derrida and Heidegger (Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Essays on Heidegger and Others*, vols. 1 and 2 of *Collected Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)).
25. Donald Davidson, "Epistemology Externalized," *Dialectica* 45, nos. 2–3 (1991): 191–202. Donald Davidson, "Three Varieties of Knowledge," in *A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays*, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
26. Many readers of Davidson misinterpret the principle of clarity to be a "cognitive compliment" paid by the radical interpreter to the native speakers of the language within which she has become immersed. Bjørn Ramberg's discussion of Davidson is particularly helpful in making the transcendent nature of the principle clear—the radical interpreter does not have a choice to follow the principle, rather it is a "condition of the possibility of interpretation" (Ramberg, *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 74).
27. Sharyn Clough, "Hasty Retreat."
28. For further discussion of how shared meaning militates against the possibility of conceptual relativism, see Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
29. See especially Davidson's "Afterthoughts" to "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" for a clear statement of his position on the relationship between skepticism and epistemology and his philosophical avoidance of both ([1986] reprinted in *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond)*, ed. Alan Malachowski [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991]).



30. This holistic point helps explain a difference between Davidson and Wittgenstein with respect to Wittgenstein's split between the "ratiocinative" and the "the ceremonial/spiritual/non-rational." Davidson's meaning of holism suggests that both elements of the split exist, at least in principle, on a continuum—all elements on that continuum would have to be empirically accessible to the radical interpreter, even though, in practice, we might find that rational, empirical examination takes a backseat to the sorts of nonrational processes to which Wittgenstein draws our attention in *Remarks*.

31. See, for example, Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 206–207, 243.

32. See James Hopkins for a thorough discussion of Davidson and Wittgenstein on the topic of radical interpretation (Hopkins, "Wittgenstein, Davidson and Radical Interpretation," in *The Philosophy of Donald Davidson* ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, vol. 27 of *The Library of Living Philosophers* [Chicago: Open Court, 1999]).

33. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 207 and 208.

34. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein argues, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (*Philosophical Investigations*, part 2, p. 223).

## CHAPTER 6 HEIDEGGER AND QUINE ON THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF LOGIC FOR PHILOSOPHY

Richard Matthews

*Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so obscure and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into the style of Dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive.<sup>1</sup>*

—David Hume

**O**n the surface of it, two more antithetical philosophers than Martin Heidegger and W. V. O. Quine would be hard to find. For Heidegger there is only one authentic philosophical question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "Why is there anything at all?" In Heidegger's view the insistence upon self-evidence, clarity, and logical rigor inevitably obscure this question and thus constitute the suicide of philosophy.<sup>2</sup> For Heidegger, Quine's pragmatic commitment to an integrated scientific worldview would be a paradigm of the worst kind of Americanism and manipulative-calculative technological reason.<sup>3</sup> For Quine, a naturalized epistemology is the goal of his philosophical work.<sup>4</sup> Heidegger's insistence upon the primacy of the question of the meaning of Being, and his commitment to the use of