

should we seek to eliminate compassion from our lives altogether. Compassion does have an important role to play in the lives of the morally exemplary, both in providing a source of motivation that is more resistant to the competing call of self-interest and in enabling the suffering to have their pain recognized by others and promoting trust and cooperation. While compassion should not be the only source of moral motivation then, it does have an important role to play in the life of the morally virtuous.

NOTES

1. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2000, 331) also endorses the first two of Aristotle's three necessary conditions.
2. A similar point is made by Batson (2011, 60).
3. See Bain (2014), Grahek (2007), and Klein (2015).

Chapter Two

Appreciating the Virtues of Compassion

Bradford Cokelet

Compassion is a popular virtue, but one whose value is contested. Philosophers, religious leaders, and parents from divergent traditions, cultures, and time periods converge on the belief that compassion is admirable, worth cultivating in our kids, and socially beneficial, but critics, such as Kant and the Stoics, doubt its ethical importance. They concede that compassion is praiseworthy and pleasant, but they doubt that it is central to the ethical life.

To temper our enthusiasm for compassion and other species of sentimental good will,¹ critics push back in two ways. First, they argue that, while pleasing, a good, compassionate heart is unreliable both as an ethical guide and an ethical motive. Taken as a guide, it can lead us to be objectionably partial or problematically selfless, and, as a motive, its presence and force depends on the whims of fortune. Second, skeptics doubt that a good heart is necessary or sufficient for moral or ethical worth. The motivational dependence on fortune casts doubt on compassion's necessity for moral worth; it seems unfair, for example, to deny full moral worth to the dutiful acts of those who lack a good heart because they were abused or neglected or because they are reasonably downcast or blamelessly depressed. And to question a good heart's sufficiency for moral worth, skeptics argue that it will not always lead us to treat others with due justice and respect. In the face of these points, critics urge us to conclude that, while compassionate people are pleasing to encounter and compassion may be something to encourage and praise, sentimental good will is both unnecessary and insufficient for morally upstanding character. It does not, they contend, stand at the center of the moral life.

In response, defenders of sentimental good will have worked to identify mature or idealized forms of good will that are immune to the detractor's worries about unreliability and objectionable partiality. Many also narrow their focus and weaken their claims a bit, focusing on the idea that having an ethically mature good heart is necessary for full virtue and worth in some specific domains. For example, Nussbaum focuses on the idea that compassion and related forms of "political love" are necessary, but insufficient, if we hope to realize liberal ideals of justice, and care ethicists focus on the idea that one needs a good, caring heart in order to be a good parent, friend, and teacher.² Finally, in response to these weaker and narrower, and therefore harder to deny claims, Kantians have increasingly claimed to be able to make (bounded, peripheral) space for sentimental good will within a Kantian ethical theory. We can call this the Kantian accommodation project.³

I obviously can't hope to adjudicate this larger debate about the ethical importance of sentimental good will in this essay, but it offers an important backdrop for my specific topic, which are the virtues of compassion. Reference to plural virtues of compassion, rather than a single virtue, is intentional: my main thesis is that in order to understand compassion's value and advance debate about its ethical importance we need to recognize that the virtue of compassion involves substantively different dispositions and attitudes in different spheres of life—for example in our personal, professional, and civic lives. In each sphere, compassion is an apt and distinctive form of good-willed responsiveness to the value of living beings and their characteristic struggles to live good lives, but the relevant forms of good-willed responsiveness vary because in different contexts there are different types of living beings involved and different relations between the compassionate person and the being to whom she is compassionate. My focus here will be on compassion in human relations; I will argue that, in different role and relationship contexts, the virtues of compassion involve different forms of good-willed responsiveness to human struggles to live well. For reasons that will become clear in the next section I will refer to my account as the Aristotelian role-differentiated account.

DOMAIN-DIFFERENTIATION AND GOOD-WILLED RESPONSIVENESS

Although I will be criticizing their emotion-focused accounts of compassion in what follows, my account of the virtues of compassion is greatly indebted to the work of Martha Nussbaum (2003; 2013) and Roger Crisp (2003; 2008). My general understanding of compassion as good-willed responsiveness to struggles to live well (in a broadly Aristotelian sense) is inspired by Nussbaum's seminal work on the emotion of compassion. In addition, I share

her skepticism about Kantian attempts to accommodate compassion's importance. Despite my appreciation for Nussbaum's work, however, I will argue that we need to move beyond her account of the *emotions* of compassion if we hope to give an adequate account of the *virtues* of compassion and fully assess the Kantian accommodation project. When turning from the emotions to the virtues of compassion, I will adopt the methodology endorsed by Crisp (2008). He writes: "the best approach to characterizing the emotions and virtues, broadly speaking, is indeed broadly Aristotelian, separating human life and its emotional aspects into different spheres and then offering an account of the central emotion or virtue in the light of that differentiation" (Crisp 2008, 236). Although Crisp does not himself draw this conclusion, I believe that the broadly Aristotelian approach just described leads, quite naturally, to a role-differentiated approach—an approach that sheds light on the way in which the virtues of compassion involve different forms of good will in different role and relationship contexts.

To begin, we can usefully distinguish between someone being a compassionate person in general or on the whole, and someone exhibiting a role or relation specific virtue of compassion. Adriana may be a compassionate mother and teacher but be intolerant and heartless when interacting with, or deciding what will happen to, fellow citizens from specific political, religious, or racial groups. Or she could be a compassionate mother and citizen, but not a compassionate teacher. Second, but relatedly, in many contemporary societies we can usefully distinguish three broad spheres in which we care about people's virtues and vices: the civic, professional, and personal spheres. For example, friendly compassion and parental compassion are both sub-species of personal compassion, while co-worker compassion and boss compassion are sub-species of professional compassion. Now people's character need not be as compartmentalized as this framework suggests,⁴ and we do make judgments about how compassionate people are on the whole,⁵ but this framework is analytically useful. For example, it allows us to articulate the fact that the civic virtue of compassion may be very different from, and exist independently of, various types of professional and personal compassion. Consider, for example, someone who is a compassionate father but not a compassionate citizen or friend. If we stop and think about the dispositions and attitudes he would characteristically exhibit in different contexts and then think about other similar cases, two possibilities spring to mind: first, that there are numerous role and relation specific virtues of compassion, and, second, that these specific virtues are composed of distinct and substantively different dispositions to think, act, and feel. I expect these claims will seem intuitively plausible after reflection on cases, but I will in any case be arguing for them as I develop my account.

According to the Aristotelian role-differentiated account, each virtue of compassion is a form of intelligent and good-willed responsiveness to some-

one's struggle to live well and flourish in a broadly Aristotelian sense. We will soon turn to some specific role contexts and see that the virtue of compassion does involve different forms of good-willed responsiveness to struggles to live well in different contexts. Before we do that though, it will be helpful to introduce some assumptions about human flourishing and the causes of our struggles to live well.

To begin, let us make five relatively contentious assumptions about human flourishing.⁶ First, flourishing normally requires that humans have various worthy objects or ends to which they are coherently devoted or committed and that they successfully embody apt, coherent devotion in their lives. Typical objects of devotion include living things, relationships, traditions, personal projects, ideals, and roles; and I take successful devotion to involve both (i) acting, thinking, feeling, and deliberating in ways that embody devotion and (ii) some hard to specify degree of success in bringing about relevant ends or in instantiating relevant ideals. Second, humans normally want apt love, acceptance, and recognition from some other people or institutions, and human flourishing normally involves receiving some modicum of those goods. Third, successful devotion and social affirmation contribute to flourishing in good part because they ground stable and warranted feelings of self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope. Finally, fourth, I assume that successful devotion normally requires, and is partially explained by, the presence of resilient and warranted feelings of self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope and that these are normally sensitive to the presence or absence of social affirmation.⁷

Next, when we think about human struggles to live well, we can distinguish several sources of these struggles. First, people often struggle because they lack *external* goods such as health, food, friends, and a supportive community. These goods are in some sense external to the self, but they may nonetheless be necessary for people to flourish and for them to be the kinds of people they want to be; people who struggle to enjoy vital external goods often also struggle to fully embody devotion to worthy objects in their lives. For example, if a mother lacks access to food and has to work twelve-hour days in a factory to try to get as much as possible, she may find it hard or impossible to fully embody devotion to her children in her life. She may rightly complain that her lack of external goods renders her unable to be the kind of person or mother that she wants to be. Finally, as this example suggests, agents should not always be held responsible for such *external failures* to live well; normally, if people faultlessly lack external goods, then we shouldn't hold them responsible for the resulting struggles.

In addition to external failures, caused by a lack of external goods, there are *internal failures* caused by factors that are, in some sense, internal to the self. For example, we can distinguish volitional goods such as a wholehearted and resolute will, character goods such as patience, courage, kind-

ness, and compassion, and intellectual goods such as intelligence, knowledge, and practical wisdom. When people's struggles to flourish and embody devotion to worthy objects result from internal defects or the lack of internal goods, we can often attribute the struggles to the people struggling and judge them negatively as a result. For example, people can fail to devote themselves to any objects, fail to devote themselves to worthy objects, fail to resolutely embody devotion to worthy objects, or foolishly fail to determine adequate means or ways to embody devotion. If such failures are *internal failures*, due to volitional, character, or intellectual defects—e.g., weakness of will, cowardice, or practical foolishness—then we will attribute the failures and resulting struggles to the person if the internal defects that generate the problems are also attributable to the person.⁸

With these points about human flourishing and the sources of struggles to live well in mind let us return to the claim that in different role and relationship contexts, virtues of compassion will be constituted by different forms of intelligent and good-willed responsiveness to struggles to live well. Because there is not space to develop a complete and systematic account of various roles, relationships, and domains in which compassion is a virtue, I am going to focus on two specific roles, which support my claim. Specifically, I will assume that compassion is a virtue of citizens and teachers and discuss the differences between these roles and the forms of good-willed responsiveness that constitute compassion in the two contexts. Throughout, I assume that compassion is a virtue of citizens and teachers in the sense that it makes one a better citizen and teacher and that individuals and institutions have strong reasons to value and cultivate civic and pedagogical compassion.

Consider first the civic sphere of life and the idea that compassion is a civic virtue. Applying our general scheme, we can say that civic compassion is a form of intelligent and good-willed responsiveness to one's fellow citizens' struggles to live well and flourish. To make this more determinate, we should think more carefully about the relation between citizens and the kind of good-willed responsiveness we value and that institutions have reason to cultivate. Specifically, notice that we do not expect other citizens to personally help us pick or specify our objects of devotion wisely, to help us embody devotion to those things in our lives, or to provide us with the social affirmation that grounds our self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope. For example, take Juan, who is a devoted Buddhist. His fellow Americans can be good citizens even if they don't help Juan figure out how to successfully devote himself to being a good Buddhist, personally provide him with affirmation when he worries he cannot instantiate the Bodhisattva ideal, or help him figure out how to modernize feudal Buddhist guidelines for monastic and household living. Juan may expect such support from his fellow Buddhists or his friends and family, but not from strangers in other parts of his country. But now imagine that Juan tries to lead a good Buddhist life and

fails because he lacks vital external goods such as health, food, and safety. In this case, a good fellow citizen will dislike the fact that Juan is faultlessly struggling to flourish and will also support efforts to help Juan and others who struggle to attain vital external goods. For example, good citizens will dislike it if kids in their country are struggling because their parents are working too hard to provide them with social affirmation or if their schools are too underfunded to provide them with the teachers and tools that they need to wisely choose objects of devotion. In such cases good citizens need not step in and play the roles that good parents and teachers would, but if they are compassionate, their good-willed responsiveness to struggles to live well will be manifest in (i) their dislike of the fact that others are struggling and (ii) their support for institutional remedies.

Things look very different when we turn our attention to other role and relation contexts, especially ones in the professional and personal spheres. Here the virtues of compassion *do* involve personally helping others to pick or specify their objects of devotion wisely, personally helping them embody devotion to those objects in their lives, and personally giving them the social affirmation that helps ground warranted and stable feelings of self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope. For example, consider a teacher. If we view someone as our teacher, we rely on his or her advice and responses when picking objects of devotion, specifying relevant ends and ideals, assessing our current progress and internal goods, and when trying to find ways to make progress and deal with shortcomings. For all these reasons, our teacher's judgments, attitudes, and actions normally affect our self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope, at least in the bounded area that they teach. With these points in mind we can identify a core feature of pedagogical compassion: it is a valuable form of personal good will that teachers manifest in personal response to (i) student struggles to successfully devote themselves to worthy objects and (ii) student struggles to maintain a stable, warranted sense of self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope in the areas of instruction.

Now that we have reflected on civic and pedagogical compassion, we are in position to identify some general differences in the forms of good-willed responsiveness to struggles that constitute compassion in different role-contexts. Recalling the earlier assumptions about human flourishing and struggles, we can say that in some contexts, such as the teaching one, compassion involves good will manifest in *personalized* support in response to *internal* failures and struggles, including ones that are attributable to the relevant humans. In general we can say that this good will is manifest by the compassionate person's disposition to respond to failures and struggles in way that conveys his or her continued devotion to the target's flourishing. For example, a compassionate teacher will be disposed to notice the student's internal struggles, to buttress and correct the student's sense of self-worth, self-

respect, confidence, and hope in the areas of instruction, and to respond and communicate in a way that will help the student (i) understand her current level of progress and (ii) remain fruitfully but realistically oriented toward future improvement. In other cases, for example the one of citizens, compassion does not involve personalized responsiveness to internal failures and struggles and it need not convey continued devotion to the target's flourishing when the target's struggles are caused by internal factors, which are attributable to the target. Compassionate citizens dislike it when their fellows struggle to flourish, but they need not be personally devoted to helping others do better especially if and when their fellow citizens are responsible for their struggles and failures. So while a compassionate teacher will help a student battle weakness of will and feelings of self-doubt brought on by failures of nerve, Juan's compassionate co-citizens need not provide social affirmation and advice when he struggles to live a good Buddhist life.

EMOTIONS AND THE CRISP-NUSSBAUM DISPUTE

We have just looked at how the virtue of compassion differs in two sample role contexts and identified some of the structural differences between the different virtues of compassion we find in different role contexts. With that discussion in the background, I want to now turn a critical eye to the potentially competing accounts of compassion offered by Nussbaum and Crisp. Both of their accounts focus on the emotion of compassion and ignore the possibility that the nature of the virtue of compassion varies in different role and relationship contexts. Given that many people think the virtue of compassion at least sometimes involves feeling the emotion of compassion, I want to show how the Aristotelian role-differentiated account can accommodate that view, but in what follows I also want to show how limited Crisp's and Nussbaum's accounts are. In general, I will argue that to build an adequate account of the virtues of compassion we should reject their emotion-focused approach in favor of my role-differentiated good-will one.

Before we assess it, we will need an overview of Nussbaum's account of compassion. As mentioned her focus is on the emotion of compassion, not the virtue, and her work on compassion is based on her more general cognitivist account of the emotions; on this more general view, emotions, especially mature human ones, constitutively involve evaluative thoughts. In response to critics, Nussbaum grants that there may be non-cognitive states similar to adult human emotions—for example, some may feel pain on sensing others' pain and such non-cognitive *yellow-feeling* may be similar to compassion—but she holds that adult emotions proper always involve thoughts with intentional content. Next, focusing on compassion in particular, she distinguishes various *species* of compassion that have different types of cognitive content.

Roughly, she holds (i) that brute animals and infants can feel a species of compassion that involves *thoughts* even though they lack the sophisticated conceptual and linguistic competences of adult humans, (ii) that adult human beings can feel a species of compassion that involves robust, logically structured thoughts, and (iii) that among adult human forms of compassion we can distinguish moral and non-moral forms based on the content they contain. Specifically, Nussbaum holds that adult moral compassion is a good-willed emotional response to others' suffering, with three specific thoughts built into it:

1. *Serious*: The suffering in question must be thought to be significant rather than trivial.
2. *Undeserved*: The suffering must be thought to be undeserved.
3. *Personal Entanglement*: The person experiencing compassion must think that the suffering is a significant part of *her own* scheme of goals and ends; it is relevant to her living well and flourishing.⁹

Because we will be most interested in what she says about adult human compassion and how her account relates to an account of the virtue of compassion, I will leave aside most of the objections that philosophers of emotion are likely to lodge to her claims about emotions in general, and focus in on her account of compassion.¹⁰ Crisp, like many other critics writing about the emotion of compassion, doubts that the thoughts listed above are *essential* to the emotion of compassion, but he goes further by offering an alternative account of the emotion, sketching an account of the virtue of compassion, and then giving skeptical grounds for questioning its value.

Crisp's criticisms of Nussbaum focus on her account of the emotion of compassion: he doubts that adult compassion essentially involves any of the thoughts Nussbaum picks out, and he proceeds by giving examples of people who apparently feel compassion without having these thoughts in mind—people who lack the relevant thoughts or who have thoughts that are inconsistent with the ones Nussbaum privileges. For example, to attack *Seriousness* he mentions someone who feels bad when you are in minor pain (Crisp 2008, 235), and to attack *Undeserved* he mentions someone who feels bad about the deserved suffering of a criminal (Crisp 2008, 236). In response to criticisms like these, Nussbaum typically distinguishes between non-cognitive pain felt in response to others' pain (fellow-feeling), non-moral compassion, and moral compassion. She then argues that this typology blunts the criticisms: she would grant, for example, that non-cognitive fellow-feeling needn't involve any of the thoughts listed above, that non-moral compassion involves *Serious* and *Personal Entanglement*, but not *Undeserved*, and that only moral compassion involves all three thoughts.¹¹ Crisp is aware of these moves but questions Nussbaum's reasons for making them (Crisp 2008,

237). He suggests that "what is central to compassion is the non-cognitive element of pain or distress at the pain or distress of others" (Crisp 2008, 240) and he can't see any reason to distinguish moral compassion, non-moral compassion, and fellow-feeling in the way that Nussbaum does. He suggests we focus on non-cognitive pain at others' pain (Nussbaum's non-judgmental fellow-feeling) and think of the virtue of compassion as a disposition to wisely feel that.

Crisp's objections clearly hit the mark if Nussbaum's account is intended as a general account of the mental state or disposition that competent users refer to with the term "compassion," and he rightly raises questions about why we should follow Nussbaum in distinguishing moral compassion, non-moral compassion, and fellow-feeling.¹² As far as I know Nussbaum herself does not address this question, but I imagine her arguing that we should adopt her distinctions and focus on what she calls moral compassion not because the relevant mental states have different psychological properties,¹³ but because the mental state picked out by her quasi-technical term "moral compassion" is *normatively* important. This response is suggested by her use of the normative term "moral" and becomes even more plausible when we attend to the normative claims she makes about compassion.

Nussbaum's account of compassion, as it is developed both in *Upheavals of Thought* and in the more recent *Political Emotions*, is connected to her work on Rawls-inspired political liberalism. Unlike most Kantian liberals, Nussbaum thinks that to stably realize liberal dreams of justice we need to cultivate political love—an umbrella term that covers various forms of sentimental good will, including compassion, mercy, and patriotism. Although she does not put it this way, we can read Nussbaum as giving three reasons for thinking that moral compassion is a part of civic or political virtue. First, compassion depends on our accepting and affirming *our own* dependence, finitude, and sociality, and if we do this we will be able to avoid various forms of misanthropic projective disgust, selfishness, and ill will toward others.¹⁴ Second, compassion motivates the kind of benevolence that is required to instantiate liberal ideals of justice.¹⁵ Finally, third, in some places Nussbaum suggests that compassion plays a vital epistemic role, enabling us to correctly judge how bad various hardships or forms of suffering are for others.¹⁶

Although Nussbaum's term "moral compassion" suggests that her account can shed light on compassion's ethical importance in various contexts, I think she is on strongest ground if she is read as identifying the species of compassion that is a part of civic compassion. With that in mind, let's consider how she might respond to Crisp's criticisms. First, consider his attack on *seriousness*. If I stub my toe and you feel bad for me and offer an ice pack, we might rightly say you feel compassion for me even if your response lacks all cognitive content. But, I think Nussbaum could reply, being pained by

other people's trivial pains is not, intuitively, an important part of civic virtue. Having that sort of fellow-feeling might make us more pleasant to be around, but one would need an argument before concluding that citizens who lack it are failing in their civic duties or are flawed as citizens. In addition, it is intuitively implausible to claim that states should or even may spend resources in order to get their citizens to feel bad about the trivial pains of their fellow citizens and this casts doubt on the importance of fellow-feeling for civic compassion given the assumption that states should or at least may promote civic virtue in their citizens.

These intuitive judgments about *unserious* compassion being inessential to civic virtue are reinforced if we think again about Nussbaum's case for thinking that *some* species of compassion is a part of civic virtue. In effect, she holds that to be a good citizen one must be reliably aware of injustice, be motivated to promote justice, and be motivated to help ensure everyone has the basic goods they need to live a good life. Second, because state stability and the ability to realize liberal ideals of justice require good citizens of that sort, states may and should adopt policies that encourage their citizens to be good. The salient point now is that while Nussbaum makes a serious case for thinking that moral compassion is *necessary* for normal human citizens to be reliably aware of injustice, motivated to promote justice, and motivated to help ensure everyone has the basic goods they need to live a good life,¹⁷ it is hard to imagine someone mounting an analogous case for *unserious* compassion. Good citizens can exhibit those important epistemic and motivational dispositions even if the various trivial pains that their fellow citizens suffer do not pain them. Put otherwise, Crisp's sort of compassion is simply not needed to make a state stable or to enable us to realize liberal ideals of justice.

I believe we should accept similar conclusions about the sympathetic reactions people feel when they are exposed to *deserved* suffering—for example when they visit prisons—but I grant that more argument is needed. Intuitions may be more mixed about the civic importance of compassion for *deserved* suffering—what Nussbaum calls “non-moral compassion”—but I think we should be skeptical about it being a part of civic virtue. To see why, as in the case of fellow-feeling, we can usefully ask whether non-moral compassion is necessary for epistemic access to injustice, motivation to promote or ability to embody justice, state stability, or some other legitimate state interest. I can't fully settle that question here, but I will share some reasons to be skeptical.

First, some will argue that without non-moral compassion citizens will be less likely to be *merciful* when faced with *deserved* suffering than they would be with non-moral compassion. This might be true, but even if it is, we would need an argument before concluding that it is a necessary part of civic virtue or that it should be cultivated by states. For example, if we knew that a

society of merciless citizens with robust moral compassion and a strong sense of justice would be unable to stably realize liberal ideals of justice, then we could conclude that individuals and states should promote whatever non-moral compassion citizens need to be merciful. But the antecedent of that conditional is very contentious and the strength of the conclusion depends on the tenuous empirical claim that we can only or best make citizens merciful by cultivating non-moral compassion.

Second, a defender of non-moral compassion could argue that it is a part of civic virtue because it can improve the behavior of imperfect citizens whose sense of justice is misguided or corrupted. For example, non-moral compassion might have moved German citizens, who were in the grip of the Nazi ideology to act more justly, by moving them to care about the suffering of people whom they falsely took to deserve it.¹⁸ This argument seems to be the strongest one that a defender of non-moral compassion can make, but I am reluctant to conclude that non-moral compassion is an essential part of civic virtue. First, there are lingering empirical questions about (i) how well non-moral compassion will help correct the behavior of people whose sense of justice is misguided or corrupt and (ii) whether this is the only and best available mechanism to mitigate the behavior of the misguided or corrupt. Second, I think we should distinguish the claim that non-moral compassion can help mitigate the impact of contingent and avoidable civic vice from the claim that it is an essential part of civic virtue for human societies. The argument offers questionable support for the former claim, and would need significant amendment before it could even purport to support the latter.¹⁹

Finally, there are reasons to think that non-moral compassion may actually be a civic vice. To see why, notice that robust non-moral compassion will presumably make people reluctant to implement burdensome policies in order to pave the way for justice, even if the policies impose only *deserved* burdens.²⁰ And our increased sympathetic sensitivity to *deserved* suffering may also cause epistemic problems, for example, by making it harder for us to recognize the justice of *deserved* inequalities. In summary, the two most obvious arguments for non-moral compassion being an essential part of civic virtue look weak, and there is a plausible worry about it being a civic vice.

EMOTIONS AND GOOD-WILLED RESPONSIVENESS REVISITED

In the last section, I granted Nussbaum's claim that moral compassion is politically necessary and denied, on her behalf, that the same can be said of fellow-feeling and non-moral compassion. Even if readers have doubts about these conclusions, I think they should now agree that there are good normative reasons to distinguish between fellow-feeling, non-moral compassion, and moral compassion; our inquiry at least shows that it is theoretically

fruitful to distinguish these emotions in order to better understand the civic virtue of compassion. In addition, the argument shows that an Aristotelian role-differentiated account of the virtues of compassion can accommodate the view that the virtues of compassion sometimes involve dispositions to feel compassionate emotions. With that thought in mind, I want to return to the role-differentiated account sketched earlier in the chapter. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that the emotions of compassion are at least not always central or essential to the virtue of compassion. As a result, we need to go beyond the emotion-focused accounts of compassion offered by Nussbaum and Crisp in order to understand the virtues of compassion and in order to appreciate their ethical importance.

To see that the emotion of compassion is peripheral or inessential to the virtue of compassion in some contexts, we need only recall the discussion of pedagogical compassion in section 1. Consider first, Nussbaum's moral compassion. If a teacher is disposed to feel apt moral compassion, she will feel bad for the serious but undeserved struggles that students face in living well when they lack basic external goods like health, food, and a supportive family. Now this may well be a part of pedagogical virtue in teachers who work with unjustly challenged students, but the disposition to feel and act on moral compassion will not ground the sorts of good will in response to struggles to live well that were highlighted earlier. Moral compassion will not itself ensure that a teacher will be personally responsive to the student's internal failures and struggles (which are often not *serious* in Nussbaum's sense) and it will not ground the teacher's continued devotion to the target's flourishing even when the target's struggles are caused by internal factors which are attributable to the target (in these cases the suffering is not always *undeserved*). Moreover, if we think of students and teachers in supportive social environments, it seems obvious that they could embody pedagogical compassion even if they were not disposed to feel moral compassion—and were for that reason sub-par citizens.

Crisp's non-cognitive emotion of compassion might be thought to do better because it does not involve judgments about seriousness or desert. Many students feel pain when they struggle to improve, figure out which ends to pursue, and maintain their self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope. So if a teacher is pained by students' pain and motivated by that (non-cognitive) emotion of compassion, then she might well be moved to help students overcome their struggles. There may be something to that suggestion, but feeling pain at others' pain—what Nussbaum calls fellow-feeling—is too dumb and unreliable to make a teacher compassionate, and pedagogical compassion cannot plausibly be understood as a disposition to feel and act on fellow-feeling.

Adapting Nussbaum's criticism of Kant's non-cognitive account of compassion, we could say that while Crisp's non-cognitive emotion of compas-

sion can sometimes operate like an alarm bell, alerting us to others' struggles, it does not constitute or ground an intelligent and good-willed response to those struggles. The compassionate teacher reacts to student struggles with good-willed responses that personally support *warranted* self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope in the areas of instruction, and this requires more than an impulse to alleviate the pains that students experience. For example, pain is sometimes a useful and appropriate feeling that a compassionate teacher will have to let their student endure or even encourage her students to feel. In addition, student pains may be a signal of struggle in some instances, but compassionate teachers try to *understand* the external and internal struggles of their students and to respond in *wise* ways that will help students overcome the relevant problems and maintain self-worth, confidence, and hope. Crisp's non-cognitive fellow-feeling will not ground these forms of understanding and wisdom. Finally, it is worth noting that compassionate teachers will often respond to student struggles even though the students themselves feel no pain—for example students may think they are excelling when they are not. Fellow-feeling is not even a reliable alarm bell, signaling student struggles.

CONCLUSION: COMPASSION FOR ONESELF AND THE VALUE OF COMPASSION

In this chapter, I have sketched an Aristotelian role-differentiated account of the virtues of compassion and made an initial case for its appeal and superiority to the emotion-focused accounts of compassion developed by Crisp and Nussbaum. In this final section, I want to briefly discuss two further implications of the role-differentiated account.

First, it is worth noticing that the role-differentiated account gives us a way to understand talk of self-compassion and suggestions that self-compassion is a virtue.²¹ According to the Aristotelian role-differentiated account I have sketched, each virtue of compassion is a form of intelligent and good-willed responsiveness to someone's struggle to live well and flourish in a broadly Aristotelian sense so we can understand self-compassion as a form of intelligent and good-willed responsiveness to our own struggles to live well and flourish. Moreover, the discussion of pedagogical compassion in section 1 suggests how we might make our account of self-compassion more determinate. When people notice their own internal failures and struggles to successfully embody devotion to worthy ends in their lives, they are prone to respond in ways that undercut or fail to support warranted self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope. Moreover, awareness of internal struggles and failures can undercut people's devotion to themselves and their living well. For example, feeling bad about oneself and one's shortcomings can lead one

to give up on oneself or even to harbor self-hate and masochistic desires. Self-compassion is plausibly understood as a competing form of good-willed responsiveness to one's internal defects, failures, and struggles to live well. Someone who enjoys the virtue of self-compassion will be able to clearly judge how well he is faring and how well he is embodying devotion to worthy ends in his life without lapsing into despair, fruitless self-criticism, or self-hate. The self-compassionate do not foolishly give up on them. Of course, this is just to gesture at an account of self-compassion, but I believe it further illustrates the explanatory power of the Aristotelian role-differentiated account.

Finally, I want to return to the larger dialectic introduced at the outset of this chapter and the question about whether Kantians can accommodate the value of compassion. In the pivotal seventh chapter of *Upheavals of Thought*, Nussbaum defends the value of compassion and suggests that a broadly Aristotelian normative theory is best placed to account for it. She argues that both Kant and the Stoics fail to accommodate compassion's ethical importance and she traces Kant's failure to (i) his crude non-cognitivist understanding of the emotions and (ii) his failure to recognize the *eudaimonist* forms of value to which compassion aptly responds. As Nussbaum recognizes, Kant does try to accommodate the importance of sentimental good will in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, but she doubts he can do so in adequate fashion. Kant argues that we are obliged to try to develop sympathy and other sentiments related to compassion for three main reasons: they make us aware of others' unhappiness, they motivate us to do something about others' unhappiness, and they help us overcome whatever misanthropy we happen to harbor. Nussbaum's first worry is that no non-cognitive emotion can do the work that Kant wants it to do. As mentioned earlier, she argues that non-cognitive sympathy could operate as an alarm bell that would alert us to the fact that others are suffering but that it could not help us figure out how to respond to that fact with "intelligence and selectivity" (Nussbaum 2001, 382). On Nussbaum's view, by way of contrast, the emotion of compassion includes thoughts about suffering being serious and unwarranted, so she thinks it can serve as a guide to our assessments of what seriously affects people's well-being and what does not. This links up to Nussbaum's second point, which is that Kant's normative theory does not include a plausible account of human flourishing and the role that vital external goods play in our ability to develop "a balanced adult personality, capable of good deliberation and energetic concern for others" (Nussbaum 2001, 389).

I'm not confident that recent attempts to defend Kant's account of sympathy provide grounds to rebuff Nussbaum's attack,²² but I want to leave that issue aside and focus on the way that the Aristotelian role-differentiated account I have sketched augments the worries Kantians need to assuage. Aristotelians characteristically think of humans as dependent, social, rational

animals, and hold that we need virtues, which we cannot develop without luck and social support, in order to be ethical and lead good human lives. Consequently, Aristotelians tend to think that ethical virtue requires us to help others, especially those with whom we are closely related, to enjoy the luck and social support they need to develop virtues and live good lives. Kant, on the other hand, sharply distinguishes moral worth and well-being and characteristically holds that we can achieve full moral worth and perhaps even moral virtue regardless of our access to external goods or social affirmation. He does recognize a duty to beneficence, which calls on us to help others enjoy good luck and social support, but this seems to be only a duty to make sure that people are not unduly tempted to be immoral (either because they are unhappy or because they come to hate humanity). He is wary of attempts to help others be more moral and his benevolence does not seem to involve compassionate responsiveness to people's all too human bouts of self-doubt and weakness.

These points are salient in the present context because the Aristotelian role-differentiated account of compassion pictures compassion as a form of personal good-willed responsiveness to others' struggles to live well and in many cases this will involve responding with good will when the struggles in question are not *tempting* anyone to be immoral and when the struggles that people endure are in some sense attributable to them. Of course, Kant may allow that this sort of interpersonal good will and support is morally *permissible*, but it is not clear how he can count it as a form of ethical virtue or claim that we have a duty to develop the virtues of compassion. To my mind, this is especially interesting because parental, friendly, and pedagogical compassion provide prime examples of people treating others and their humanity as ends in themselves. So the Aristotelian role-differentiated account of compassion seems to raise doubts about Kant's ability to give a satisfying account of the moral ideal often associated with this work. The role-differentiated account thereby challenges Kantians in ways that Nussbaum's account of compassion does not because personal compassion that supports warranted self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope (in people who are struggling to live well) intuitively embodies devotion to people as ends in themselves, in a way that moral compassion for those who lack vital external goods does not. This point is reinforced if we bring to mind the contrast between the civic and pedagogical virtues of compassion in section 1. If Nussbaum is right, then Kantians will have trouble accommodating the value of civic compassion because they don't usually build an account of vital external goods into their theories, but if I am right then they will have additional trouble accommodating the value of various forms of personal and professional compassion because they don't usually recognize that to treat people as ends in themselves we have to personally support their flawed attempts to devote themselves to worthwhile ends. Of course, it is possible

that Kant or contemporary Kantians will be able to assuage both of these worries and accommodate all the various virtues of compassion. My point here is simply that the Aristotelian role-differentiated account will help us advance the debate because it helps us get a better understanding of the virtues that Kantians need to accommodate.

NOTES

1. For example, sympathy, mercy, and loving-kindness.
2. Only a few radicals maintain that sentimental good will is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth or virtue in all domains of life. The exception that proves the rule is Michael Slote, who comes close to arguing that empathy is necessary and sufficient for virtue and moral worth. Tellingly, Slote rejects Hume's concession that the artificial virtue of justice, while in some sense founded on and dependent on sympathy, is not a direct embodiment of mature sentimental good will. In my view, Hume's view is more plausible, both in his concession regarding justice and his argument that natural virtue requires us to develop mature sentiments which deserve approval from both the general point of view and the view of our near and dear. See Slote (2003), Cohen (2006), and Frykholm (2016).
3. See, for example, the exegetical work by Baron and Fahmy (2009) and the contemporary work by Brammer (2010), Tannenbaum (2002), Ebels-Duggan (2008), and Velleman (1999).
4. For example co-workers are often friends. Thanks to Carolyn Price for pointing out the need for nuance here.
5. See Cokerlet (2014) for some ideas about how to ground "on the whole" virtue judgments.
6. My assumptions about human flourishing don't depend on any specific theory of well-being or flourishing. I posit them from the armchair and recognize the need to engage with relevant empirical work elsewhere. In the absence of argument, I assume that Hedonists, Desire-satisfaction theorists, Objective List theorists, Perfectionists, Aristotelian Naturalists, and others can all accept my assumptions and offer competing accounts of why these things are good for humans (or constituents of human flourishing) in current normal conditions.
7. On Theistic views, successful devotion in the absence of social affirmation may be explained by resilient and warranted feelings of self-worth, self-respect, confidence, and hope that are grounded in God's love, acceptance, and recognition.
8. Complicated questions about agency and responsibility arise in this context, but I cannot address them here. For a relevant discussion of attributive responsibility, see Watson (1996).
9. My summary statements borrow from Crisp's (2008) summary of Nussbaum's view.
10. Non-cognitivists in the theory of emotion are bound to question Nussbaum's claim that animals and infants can harbor pre-linguistic thoughts, and some cognitivists will disagree with Nussbaum about the nature of the thoughts or representations that are somehow wedded to compassion. For a sophisticated overview of these issues, see Blackman (2013). In addition to giving a sophisticated defense of the idea that animal emotions can involve evaluative and non-evaluative representations (albeit non-conceptual ones), Blackman's essay opens up questions about how these representations relate to the emotions (e.g., as parts to whole or in a supervenient way).
11. See Nussbaum's response to Deigh in Nussbaum (2004).
12. "Often," Crisp notes, "there is nothing to be gained by multiplying emotions or feelings within a single sphere" (Crisp 2008, 236).
13. This is a reason Crisp considers and rejects for introducing Nussbaum's distinctions: "It is of course true that our concern for another's suffering may disappear if we find that she brought it upon herself. But that is a contingent fact about compassion, not evidence of some different feeling or emotion. Consider the following analogy. Fellow feeling itself is often, though not always, blocked by disgust (which is of course why Nazi propaganda attempted to

arouse the emotion of disgust for Jews and others). This fact can be registered quite satisfactorily without our having to postulate two kinds of fellow feeling, only one of which involves a non-distinguishing requirement" (Crisp 2008, 236-37).

14. Nussbaum (2003, chapter 4); Nussbaum (2013, chapter 7).
15. Nussbaum (2003, 388).
16. Nussbaum (2003, 382, 392). See Cokerlet (2016) for critical discussion.
17. See the account of radical evil in chapter 7 of Nussbaum (2013). I register some doubts about her case in Cokerlet (2016).
18. Cf. the discussion of the dog in Effie Brist in the final pages of Nussbaum (2004).
19. If the defender of non-moral compassion could show that it is necessary to mitigate vices that unavoidably arise in actual human societies, then the argument for non-moral compassion being an essential part of virtue would be strong, but this strategy carries a high burden of empirical proof. Interestingly, Nussbaum adopts something like this strategy in order to defend the importance of political love (including moral compassion). Roughly, she argues that human nature involves a form of radical evil and that we need political love to mitigate the forms of civic vice that unavoidably sprout out of radical evil in actual human societies. Her position thus leaves open the possibility that there are rational aliens who do not need political love in order to realize liberal dreams of justice.
20. Nussbaum gives a salient example: "Suppose Bush's tax cuts are suddenly repealed. Rich person R moans and groans, complaining that he has already spent that money on a ski vacation in Aspen, and really can't afford the change in plans that the Democrats have made necessary. I am sure that R's dog will rush over to him and lick his face, if he or she is a nice sympathetic dog . . . but I will not respond in any such way. 'Too bad for you,' is my response. 'Your extravagance and your overweening demands have already caused us enough trouble, thank you, and you are just getting what you deserve when you are made to live a life more like that of ordinary people, worrying about money and giving up your ski vacation.' My moral analysis blocks the operations of non-moral compassion" (Nussbaum 2004, 483).
21. There is a large body of psychological and self-help literature that suggests the existence of this virtue. See, for example, Neff (2003).
22. See Baron and Fahmy (2009) and Fahmy (2009) for recent Kantian defenses.