Perceptual Reasons*

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We assume that through perceptual experience we have reasons to believe propositions about the external world. When you look at a tomato in good light, you have reasons to believe there is a tomato before you. Perhaps some of those reasons will be *derived*: their status as such is owed to some other, more fundamental reasons. We are interested in *basic* reasons perceptual experience provides: those that are not so derived. The two main theories of (basic[1]) perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it's like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with *bad cases*: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with *good cases*: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one's perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use 'proposition' broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.

Three preliminary points are in order before we turn to the examination and evaluation of these rival views of perceptual reasons. First, we should be clear about which beliefs we have in mind when we ask about the justification of "perceptual beliefs." Our focus throughout is on a paradigm sort of perceptual belief: perceptual beliefs to the effect that there is a K before us, where K is a kind or type of object (for instance, that there is a tomato in front of us). Our inquiry, therefore, is into the reasons perception affords us for such beliefs.[2]

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[1] Throughout, we leave out 'basic', but it should be taken as understood.

[2] Aren't there versions of Factualism according to which we have no reasons for beliefs of this kind—not because they are not justified, but because they are not justified by reasons? Yes. The main argument we offer below against Factualism will not apply to this version of Factualism, simply because this version denies our assumption that there are basic perceptual reasons for beliefs of this sort. However, it is not difficult to

Second, we distinguish, as writers on reasons standardly do (e.g., Schroeder 2008, Raz 1975) between the reasons *we have* and the reasons *there are*. The burning building example makes the distinction vivid. If the building you're in is burning down, there certainly is a reason for you to leave—namely that you'll be burnt to death unless you leave. However, you don't have or possess that reason until you smell the smoke, hear the alarm, etc. Only reasons you have to φ bear directly on whether you are justified in φ-ing. We do not *assume* any general account of reason-possession. As we will see, this is something over which the rival accounts differ.

Third, we assume that justification for perceptual beliefs (in the target class) is determined by the basic perceptual reasons we have, together perhaps with background information. We assume that this connection holds both for propositional as well as doxastic justification. So, in the case of propositional justification, we assume that the degree to which we are justified *to* form these perceptual beliefs is fixed by the perceptual reasons we have, together perhaps with background information. In the case of doxastic justification, we assume that the degree to which a perceptual belief is justified is fixed by the perceptual reasons (if any) that it is based on, again together perhaps with background information.[3]

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To say that according to Propositionalism basic perceptual reasons are propositions is not to say much, for this is true of all of the theories of perceptual reasons examined in this paper, at least modulo some innocuous-seeming ontological bookkeeping. The bookkeeping involves two assumptions: 1) experiences are reasons insofar as facts about those experiences are reasons; 2) facts are true propositions.[4] To formulate Propositionalism as a rival to Phenomenalism and Factualism, we need to be clearer about just what it asserts and how its assertions differ from these views.

In order to compare the views and evaluate them, consider now the following three questions:

Q1: In the good case, what are perceptual reasons about?
Q2: In general, must perceptual reasons be true?
Q3: In general, what does it take for a subject to *have* a perceptual reason?

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devise analogous arguments targeting justified beliefs downstream from perceptual classificatory beliefs. Even Factualists who claim we lack reasons to believe that there is a tomato in front of us will grant that we do have reasons to believe, for instance, that we have the key ingredient for the marinara sauce.

[3] We are ignoring complications about the relationship between doxastic and propositional justification—see, for example, Comesaña (2006).

[4] Some philosophers think that facts are different from true propositions—they are what make true propositions true. This distinction will not matter for our purposes in this paper, insofar as our arguments could be recast to take this position into account. For instance, instead of asking what perceptual reasons are about we could ask what perceptual reasons involve—in the sense in which the fact that Lucas is cute involves Lucas.

Given our assumption that justification for the target beliefs–e.g., there is a tomato before me–is fixed by perceptual reasons perhaps together with background beliefs, the way one answers Q1 – Q3 strongly constrains what one can say about the justification of perceptual beliefs in the good and bad cases. In particular, the answers one gives to Q1-Q3 constrain how strong one takes the justification in the good case to be and whether the justification in the bad case is as strong as it is in the good case. In the sequel, we will evaluate the rival views on precisely the plausibility of their accounts of the good and bad cases.

Phenomenalism gives the following answers to Q1-Q3. To Q1: perceptual reasons in the good case (and the bad case) are facts about the experiences of the subject. Thus, for instance, if a subject in a good case sees a tomato and forms a perceptual belief that there is a tomato in front of her, then her basic perceptual reason is that she has a certain experience. To Q2: yes, perceptual reasons must be true, since they are *facts* about experience. To Q3: in order for a subject to have a perceptual reason, it must simply be true that she is in the relevant phenomenal state. There is therefore no epistemic requirement on reasons-possession. That is, in order to have P as a perceptual reason, the subject need not know or be justified in believing that P.[5]

The Factualist, by contrast, gives the following answers. To Q1: perceptual reasons in the good case are facts about the world, about the perceived objects, and not (or not only) about perceivers. Thus, for instance, if a subject in a good case perceives (and believes) that there is a tomato in front of her, then her perceptual reason for that belief has to do with the tomato. To Q2: yes, in all cases, perceptual reasons must be facts. Matters are more complicated concerning Q3. *McDowellians* think the mere truth of the basic perceptual reason is enough to have it as a reason, and that therefore there is no epistemic requirement on reason-possession. Now the mere truth of *there is a tomato before me* does not seem by itself to ensure that I have that reason (in our relevant sense of 'having' on which having reasons allows reasons to bear on justification). *McDowellians* therefore take basic perceptual reasons to be about the subject and her relation to the world. A basic perceptual reason for a McDowellian would be the fact that one sees that there is a tomato before one, or something of the sort.[6] Non-McDowellian Factualists, such as Williamson,, take reason-possession to require satisfying an epistemic condition: one must know *P* (or at least justifiably believe *P*) in order to have *P* as a reason. For such Factualists, we have the basic perceptual reasons we have by virtue of immediately knowing or being immediately justified in believing them.

Our preferred view, Propositionalism, gives the following answers. To Q1: perceptual reasons are about the world, and in the good case they about the objects perceived. Thus, for instance, if a subject in a good case perceives (and believes) that there is a tomato in front of her, then her basic perceptual reason for that belief is about that tomato. Thus, as far as Q1 goes, Propositionalism sides with Factualism against Phenomenalism. On Q2, Propositionalism departs from both Phenomenalism and Factualism: perceptual reasons can be false. Even if it is not true

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[5] Here and throughout, we use 'in order to' and 'requires' to imply explanatory dependence rather than modal dependence. So, when we say that for the Phenomenalist one need not be justified in believing P for P in order for P to be a reason one has, we mean: if P is a reason one has, this isn't *because* one is justified in believing P.

[6] See McDowell (1993, 2008) and Pritchard (2013).

that there is something the subject perceives which looks like a tomato, the false proposition that that there is such a thing can still be a reason that the subject has according to Propositionalism. Of course, not just *any* false proposition can be a reason that subjects have, according to Propositionalism. This is where the answer to Q3 comes in. Propositionalism embraces an epistemic requirement on reasons-possession. In order for a proposition to be a reason that a subject has, the subject must be *justified* in believing that proposition. Again, only propositions immediately justified can be *basic* reasons.

We have said nothing about just which propositions the Non-McDowellian Factualist or the Propositionalist takes as basic perceptual reasons beyond saying that they are to be about the perceived object in a good case. Given the epistemic condition on reason-possession, it is difficult to see how *there is a tomato before one* could be the basic perceptual reason in virtue of which one is justified in believing there is a tomato before one. If *there is a tomato before one* is a reason one has in virtue of one's being justified in believing it, or in virtue of one's knowing it, then one is not justified in believing it by virtue of having it as a reason. What, then, ought the Non-McDowellian Factualist and the Propositionalist say about the identity of basic perceptual reasons? We take the most plausible account, for both theorists, to be that basic perceptual reasons are propositions about the looks, sounds, smells, etc. of things, or to use a generic term the *appearances* of things. Things' appearances, then, are not features of anyone experience or even of subjects at all. That a certain tomato looks the way it does has no implications for any particular person's experience, and is even compatible with the non-existence of all perceivers. Appearances are objective in the following sense: they are properties of external objects (or external scenes in some cases) and they do not depend for their instantiation on being perceived or even on the existence of perceivers at all. As J.L. Austin famously remarked in *Sense and Sensibilia* "I am not disclosing a fact about myself, but about petrol , when I say that petrol looks like water" (1962, 43). We will return to these issues in section 5.[7]

We can summarize the discussion of our three questions in this table:

	Q1: In good cases, are reasons about the object perceived?	Q2: Can reasons be false?	Q3: Is there an epistemic condition on reason-possession?
Phenomenalism	No	No	No
Factualism	Yes	No	No (McD), Yes (others)
Propositionalism	Yes	Yes	Yes

We'll argue that these patterns of similarity and dissimilarity make Propositionalism the best of the lot. In section 3, we consider and endorse the standard argument from bad cases against Factualism. In section 4, we consider and endorse the standard argument from good cases against

[7] A subject can, of course, be mistaken about what appearance an object has, but objects with different intrinsic properties can still have the same appearance—for instance, a red wall might have the same appearance as a white wall illuminated by red light (or it might not, of course). For a discussion of objective appearances, see Genone (2014).

Phenomenalism. Taken together, these arguments motivate us to find a position that is similar to Phenomenalism in some ways and similar to Factualism in others. In section 5, we develop a form of Propositionalism fits this bill.

3

Factualism has trouble with bad cases. Recall that a good case is one where everything is normal, and perceptual beliefs amount to knowledge. A bad case is one in which the subject is in the same phenomenal state as she is in the good case but in which the perceptual belief is false, either because the perceived object lacks the feature the belief attributes (illusion cases, broadly speaking) or because there is no perceived object at all (hallucination cases). For the moment, we will not treat the illusion and the hallucination cases differently. We turn our attention hallucination cases in section 5). Take, then, a good case where (e.g.) Mary is perceiving a tomato, and a corresponding bad case where she is not. We take it that the following two claims are true:

> **Equal Justification (EJ)**: Mary's belief that there is a tomato in front of her is justified in the good case; and it is equally justified in the bad case.
>
> **Sameness of Basis (SB)**: The fundamental bases on which Mary believes that there is a tomato in front of her are the same in the good and the bad case.

Recall that we are assuming that the degree to which a perceptual belief is (doxastically) justified is fixed by the perceptual reasons (if any) it is based on, perhaps together with background information. We assume any relevant background information is equally justified in both cases. Now, given EJ, Mary's belief in the good case is justified. It must, therefore, be based on a perceptual reason R1. Given EJ, Mary's belief in the bad case is also justified and so is based on a perceptual reason R2. Given SB, R1 must be R2. We really have a single reason, call it "R," across the cases. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons must be facts, and so R must be true in both the good and the bad case. But then what can R be? R cannot be a McDowellian fact such as *Mary's seeing that there is a tomato in front of her.* That is not a fact in the bad case. We claim that whatever the Factualist takes R to be, if it is to be a fact about the external world, there will be some bad case in which R is false and yet EJ and SB continue to be true. R cannot, of course, be a fact that entails there is a tomato in front of Mary. There is no tomato in front of her in the bad case. Nor cannot it be a fact that entails that there is an object before her which looks like a tomato. There are cases in which the object seen doesn't objectively have the look of tomatoes though it seems to the subject to have such a look (because the subject, say, has been drugged, has an astigmatism, etc.) Nor, even, could it be a fact that entails that there is some object Mary is perceiving. For in a hallucination case there is no such object. What is left for a candidate for R? It seems the external world can differ as much as you like between the good and bad cases. The one commonality is phenomenal. If facts are to be our perceptual reasons, then given EJ and SB, these facts have to be facts about our phenomenal states. And this gives us Phenomenalism. As long as

our perceptual reasons must be facts, **EJ** and **SB** constitute a strong argument against Factualism and for Phenomenalism.[8]

The Factualist might hope to reject either **SB** or **EJ**, but the prospects do not look bright. Rejecting **SB** makes Factualism hostage to an empirical question, and one whose answer seems to go decidedly against this move in any case. Rejecting **EJ** might seem more plausible at first sight. But if Mary is not justified in believing that there is a tomato in front of her in the bad case, what is the doxastic attitude that she is justified in holding with respect to that proposition? Certainly not disbelief, and not even suspension. Both of those options would be clearly inferior to belief. The Factualist may instead claim that there is no doxastic attitude that Mary is justified in adopting with respect to the proposition that there is a tomato in front of her, but surely epistemic dilemmas do not come that cheaply. You do not face an epistemic dilemma when, unbeknownst to you, you are looking at a wax tomato that looks just like a real one.[9]

4

Phenomenalism has trouble with the good cases. It is agreed on all hands that, in the good case, Mary is very well justified in believing that there is a tomato in front of her. So, whatever reason she bases her belief on in the good case must be a *strong one*, one that makes her very well justified in the belief. Our worry is that the Phenomenalist's candidate for this reason–a fact about Mary's phenomenal state–just isn't a strong enough reason, if it is a reason at all.

Following Thomas Scanlon (1998), a reason to believe that *p* is a consideration that counts in favor of believing that *p*. A strong reason to believe *p* is a consideration that counts strongly in favor of believing that *p*. Now, does the fact that Mary has an experience with a certain phenomenal character amount to a consideration at all in favor of her believing that there is a tomato in front of her? If so, how strongly does it favor such a belief?

Of course, if certain forms of reliabilism are true, these questions are easy to answer. For instance, they are easily answered on the following view: R is a reason for P whenever R reliably indicates P (or is of a type that reliably indicates P-type propositions); the greater the reliability of the indication, the stronger the support. But such forms of reliabilism are false. There are many people we pass walking to work day after day. We usually have no idea of their names. Just because I see a person named 'Ted' every day as I walk to work does not give me an iota of justification for believing that this person is named 'Ted'. Similarly, the worry is that just because I happen to have experiences with qualitative character T in the presence of tomatoes doesn't by itself give me an iota of justification, when I have experiences with T, to believe that there is a tomato before me.

Putting aside reliabilist views like the above, we take that if phenomenal character is simply a matter of enjoying certain primitive qualitative feels or of perceiving purely mental sense-data, facts about phenomenal character do not weigh *at all* in favor in believing one or another

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[8] In Comesaña and McGrath (forthcoming), we use principles very much like EJ and SB to argue that we can have false practical reasons.

[9] For a development of this objection, see Cohen and Comesaña (forthcoming).

proposition about the world outside us (they simply do not have the right *subject matter* to do so).[10] Of course, such views of phenomenal character are not as popular these days as they used to be. But even if phenomenal character is a matter, in part, of an experience's *presenting* the world in a certain way (cf. Siegel 2010), worries remain. Suppose Mary's experience has a qualitative character it has in virtue of its presenting to her that a tomato is in front of her. It is a highly nontrivial task to explain just what this sort of presentation amounts to. But let's suppose some account can be given of it, which doesn't merely reduce it to facts about reliable causes of primitive qualitative feels or sense-data. Perhaps the experience, because of its presentational content, does favor believing *there is a tomato before me.* But how strong is the favoring? We doubt it is strong enough to ground Mary's very strong justification to believe that a tomato is in front of her. That one has a certain experience presenting something as being the case just isn't a strong reason to believe it is the case. It certainly isn't as strong as the reasons *we* take ourselves to have when we see a tomato in front of us in the grocery store.

Of course, there are further considerations that, added to considerations about Mary's experience, result in an overall consideration that counts strongly in favor of Mary's believing that there is a tomato in front of her. For instance, such further considerations will include propositions about the reliable connection between Mary's phenomenal state and the nearby presence of tomatoes. For the "presentation" theorist, these reliability propositions will assert connections between how experience presents things as being and how things are.

Let's consider how this might go for the "presentation" view of experience. The natural way we can see how the fact that one has an experience presenting that P can team up with one's justification for believing one's experiences are reliable to justify one in believing P is through an inferential structure such as:

> I have an experience presenting that P
> My experiences presenting that such and such reliably indicate that such and such.
> Therefore (probably),
> P.

Now, if the Phenomenalist was claiming that the mere truth of the premises made it the case that the subject has a strong reason to believe P, she would be returning to the problematic reliabilism we discussed above. The second premise must itself be possessed by the subject in a way that it can contribute to justification. Mere truth might seem somewhat plausible for reason-possession in the case of reasons about experience but it surely isn't for reliability reasons such as the second premise. So, in order for the inferential structure to give one a strong reason to believe P, one must be justified in believing the second premise.

What about the first premise? The Phenomenalist wants to say that it is a reason one has simply in virtue of its being true, not in virtue of one's being justified in believing it is true. However, holding fixed the justification of the second premise, it seems the justification one has for the conclusion via the inferential structure varies with how justified one is in believing the first

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[10] The kind of reliabilism advocated in Comesaña (2010) has the resources necessary to avoid the problem just presented, for it insists that beliefs must be based on evidence, and we are free to impose a subject matter constraint on what counts as evidence for a given proposition.

premise. If you have good reasons to doubt that your experience presents to you that a tomato is before you (say because you have reason to doubt this is what tomatoes look like), you seem to derive a correspondingly reduced justification for *there is a tomato before you*. A good explanation for why the strength of the justification conferred by the inferential structure should vary with the justification for the first premise, holding fixed the justification of the second premise, is that the inferential structure provides justification courtesy of the subject's justification for both premises. That is to say: the justification for the target perceptual belief, on the present proposal, derives from the justification for beliefs both about experience and about the connection between experience and reality. Notice: this is no longer Phenomenalism, but Classical Foundationalism.

Now Classical Foundationalism may not be popular any longer, but that's not a decisive reason to think it's false. Can anything else be said? Yes. First, we do not normally (if ever) form our perceptual beliefs on the basis of considerations having to do with our mental states. Moore's observations on what has come to be called the "transparency of experience" are relevant here. We "see through" our phenomenal states, our attention is normally focused on the outside world, not on the mental states through which that world is revealed to us. But for Classical Foundationalism this would need to be part of her basis, if the resulting belief is to be justified. Second, there are familiar worries about the appeal to reliability considerations. Again, it is hard to see how these considerations are among our bases for belief. Perhaps scientific psychology might help show otherwise, but the prospects do not look bright. And, of course, it is not easy to see how we come to be justified in believing the reliability considerations. There are moves to make on the last matter. But, generally, it's the retreat inward–away from the world–that is what is troubling about Classical Foundationalism.

We conclude that Phenomenalism cannot explain how we are well-justified in our perceptual beliefs. At best it represents us as having weak reasons. When the Phenomenalist attempts to make find stronger reasons by adding premises about the reliability of experience, she gives up Phenomenalism in favor of Classical Foundationalism, with its attendant problems.

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Considerations about the justificational similarities between the good case and the bad case doomed Factualism. These same considerations, given the assumption that reasons must be facts, gave us Phenomenalism. On the other hand, considerations about the good case seem to doom Phenomenalism. The thing to do in this situation, we submit, is to give up the assumption that reasons must be facts. We will show how giving up this assumption and embracing Propositionalism enables us to have our cake and eat it too.

In the abstract, our version of Propositionalism is the claim that Mary's reason in both the good and bad case is directed on the external world. It is a proposition about how things are outside Mary. In this respect, Propositionalism avoids the troubles Phenomenalism runs into. Its reasons don't require bridging gaps between considerations about the inner world and conclusions about an outer one; the reasons are already about an outer world. With one possible caveat to be considered below, it is the very same proposition that serves as the perceptual reason in the good

case and the bad case. Thus, the perceptual reason is the same in the good and bad case, and therefore the subject is equally justified in the perceptual belief. In these respects, our Propositionalism avoids the troubles that Factualism runs into.

To see how Propositionalism can pay dividends, we consider its prospects when combined with our favored view account of the subject-matter of perceptual reasons:

> **The Appearances View**: Perceptual reasons in both the good and bad case are propositions about things having certain appearances (about things' having certain looks, sounds, smells, etc.).

We will mostly ignore questions about the details of which propositions about appearances constitute our basic perceptual reasons, for instance, whether higher-level features like *tomato* feature in our basic perceptual reasons, or whether instead these reasons take the form *this looks that way,* where this in turn together with background information about what tomatoes look like gives one justification to believe *this is a tomato.* We take the latter to be more plausible on reflection. [11] To keep things simple we will usually write as if the reason is *this looks like a tomato.* Where the difference matters, in section 6, we will bring these issues to the fore.

For Appearances Propositionalism, just as with Factualism, the reasons in a good case are facts about the object perceived. *That such and such looks like a tomato* is about the object perceived. So, it has at least the same advantages over Phenomenalism that Factualism enjoys. The reason does not need to be combined with considerations bridging the internal to the external. But how does our view fare with respect in respect of the bad case?

Bad cases come in a number of forms, as we have seen. So long as the relevant looks-proposition exists in a given bad case, and so long as the subject is perceptually justified in believing it, the subject in the bad case has the same reason as the subject in the good case. Potential troubles arise for us, however, in hallucination cases when there is no object perceived, as we will now explain.

In hallucination cases, there is no object to "stick" in the proposition *this looks such and such.* Therefore there is no such proposition. But there is such a proposition in the good case, and it is the basic perceptual reason. So the reason in the good case is not the same as the reason in the bad case. S(ame) B(asis), which we used against Factualism, requires us to find the same reason in both cases. Aren't we hoist by our own petard?

It's tempting to reply as follows. The target justified belief is existential. It is the belief that there is a tomato before me. Why can't the reason, in both cases, also be existential? Why couldn't it be: there is something before me that looks like a tomato. If this is the reason, there is no trouble with reasons going missing in hallucination cases. What ties the hands of the Factualist, in explaining perceptual justification in bad cases, is her commitment to reasons as facts. The Propositionalist has no such commitment. She only needs to be sure the relevant propositions, though false, exist. And existential propositions exist equally in both cases. SB can be preserved.

This reply doesn't clinch matters for the Propositionalist, though. Yes, there will be existential reasons in the bad hallucination case (and in the good case). But in the good case,

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[11] See McGrath (forthcoming) for discussions of these matters.

arguably existential looks-reasons are not *basic.* Rather, it seems the reason one ultimately relies on and which is the source of the justification for believing that there is a tomato before one is a reason that is about the tomato in a more direct and intimate way. One's reason seems to be *this thing* looks like a tomato. Thus, one's reason seems to be a fact directly about the particular tomato, i.e., about it but not by virtue of the tomato's satisfying some descriptive material in the fact. However, in the hallucination case, not only does the particular tomato not exist, there is no object at all that the subject is thinking about when she thinks *this looks like a tomato.* And if there is no object this thinking is about, how can the thinking have a proposition as its content? If it doesn't, though, then if we insist reasons must be propositions, it seems we have to concede that the basic perceptual reason cannot be the same in the hallucination case as it is in the good case.

Hallucination cases raise serious questions for Propositionalists. As we've been explaining, one could try to solve it by "going existential," i.e., insisting that in good and bad cases alike the basic perceptual reasons are existential. We think there are better ways to go. Let's agree that our basic perceptual reasons are of the form *this looks like a K.* Now, consider demonstrative thinkings, i.e., episodes of thinking (or believings) in which one employs a demonstrative concept and brings it under predicative a concept. Say that a demonstrative thinking is empty if the demonstrative concept employed is not a concept of any existing object. We distinguish object-independent vs. object-dependent views of the contents of demonstrative thinkings. Object-independent views hold that a demonstrative thinking has the same content whether it is empty or non-empty. If such a view were correct, Appearance Propositionalists could clearly say that in the hallucination case the subject has the same basic reason as in the good case. The reason would be the proposition that serves as the content for the relevant demonstrative thinkings, a non-existential proposition *this looks like a K.*[12] This would preserve SB.

Suppose, instead, that object-dependent views of the content of demonstrative thinkings turn out to be correct. On object-dependent views, the contents of empty demonstrative thinkings are different from those of non-empty ones. In the empty case, the content is perhaps a gappy proposition or a proposition-radical rather than a fully-fledged proposition capable of having a truth-value. Wouldn't the Propositionalist then have to concede that the reasons are different across the good case and the hallucination case? Thus, SB will be jeopardized.

We see two options for the Propositionalist. The first is to concede that, yes, the perceptual reasons are different in the hallucination case but to insist that, despite being different, they are every bit as strong a support for the target perceptual belief as the reasons in a good case. Let us explain. For one thing, they clearly are not merely about the subject's phenomenal state. They remain world-directed, about the world, even if they are gappy or proposition radicals. One might ask how a content <~ *looks like a tomato*> could support the proposition that something looks like a tomato. Good question. However, we would submit that if there is no good account of this to be had, the object-dependent view is false. Here is why. Let's say a singular concept is a concept of the sort that in a good case is directly about a particular object. Clearly, empty thinkings involving singular concepts, whether demonstrative or not, can be very well justified themselves and

[12] What would these propositions be if they were object-independent but still about objects, in the good case, not by virtue of those objects satisfying descriptions? Good question. For attempts at answering it, see Ackerman (1979), Plantinga (1978), and Merricks (forthcoming).

can transmit their justification to existential beliefs. Suppose Jesus-myth theorists are correct and there really was no historical Jesus. Still, we were surely justified in our thinkings which we would express by saying "Jesus lived in Galilee and is thought to have performed miracles", and this justification was transmitted to our beliefs to the effect that "there is someone who lived in Galilee and is thought to have performed miracles." We would submit that we are *every bit* as justified in this existential belief whether or not the Jesus-myth theory turns out to be true. And what transmits this strong justification is the justification we had for the empty singular thinking about "Jesus". So, empty singular thinkings can be well-justified and can transmit this justification to existential beliefs. We would claim the same with respect to the good case and the hallucination case. The demonstrative thinking is equally justified and transmits its justification to the existential belief that there is a tomato before one. Insofar as justification is from reasons, and reasons are contents of beliefs or thinkings, the reason– despite being merely a gappy proposition or proposition radical– manages to provide the strong justification.

What about SB? On the current option, it would be rejected. Something close to it could be retained (the basis across the good and the hallucination cases would certainly be similar). However, we can now see that SB isn't strictly necessary to run the argument against Factualism. An assumption of a similar basis modulo "gaps" due to missing referents for demonstrative thinkings would do the same trick.

The second option is to revise Propositionalism. Reasons are *not* propositions, after all. Rather, reasons are thought-types, i.e., types of thinking episodes. In good cases, one's thinking episode has a proposition as its content; in hallucination cases, it does not. No matter, it is not the content that is the reason. It is the thought-type. According to this revised theory, basic perceptual reasons are thought-types involving the employment of a perceptual demonstrative concept and bringing it under a concept of looks, a type of the form *this looks like a K.*[13] These thought-types are about the external world in this sense: whether their tokens are true or not depends on how things are in the world external to the subject. The thought-type *I am undergoing phenomenal state PHI* by contrast is about the world internal to the subject.

Our main point is that, once we have a good account of empty demonstrative thinkings, Propositionalists can use it to give a plausible account of hallucination cases. For, a good account of empty demonstrative thinkings, among other things, explains how these thinkings can be every bit as well justified whether they are empty or not and allows that they can transmit their justification to existential beliefs just as effectively whether empty or not. We might end up with the slogan "Reasons are Thought Types" rather than "Reasons are Propositions." But the view would have all the advantages of Phenomenalism with respect to the bad cases and all the advantages of Factualism with respect to the good cases. It would also save SB.

Still, isn't all this to concede *some* advantage to the Phenomenalist? She doesn't have to worry about the propositions going missing in the bad case! It is tempting to assume this has to be right. But, on reflection, we can see that the Phenomenalist faces the very same difficulties that the Propositionalist does. Recall that a Phenomenalism on which phenomenal states are irreducible qualia or states of perceiving purely mental sense-data is hopeless. The only form of

[13] What exactly are these thought types? One promising proposal, due to Sainsbury and Tye (2011), takes thought-types to be complexes built up from concepts conceived as enduring abstract particulars.

Phenomenalism that has any promise of providing perceptual reasons is one in which phenomenal states are presentational, on which they present things as being the case. What we have to ask about is whether this sort of Phenomenalism runs into the same problems of missing propositions–facts – that we've seen the Propositionalist runs into. We think it does.

Just as it seems that, if our basic perceptual reasons are propositions about looks, they must be of the form *this thing looks such and such*, so it seems that if our basic perceptual reasons are about our experiences, they must be about our experiences of *this thing as being such and such.* Suppose we rely on facts about experience in forming our beliefs about there being tomatoes in front of us. We surely rely on our experiencing *this thing* as being a tomato, not on our having an experience with an existential presentational content of the order of *there is some thing before me which is a tomato.* So the Phenomenalist, too, needs to answer worries about the relevant experiences going missing in hallucination cases. What is it to have an experience presenting *this as being a K* when there is no such thing as *this*? What is the presentational content of *singular* experiences? To answer this question, the Phenomenalist will re-raise all the questions the Propositionalist raised, except now as questions about the contents of singular experiences rather than demonstrative thinkings: object-dependent vs. object-independent views of the contents of singular experiences, etc.

Let us go back to the comparison between the rival views. We argued that Factualism has two related prima facie advantages over Phenomenalism when it comes to reflection on the good case. First, Factualism, but not Phenomealism, can explain how Mary's basic perceptual reasons are strong reasons, ones that do not need to be supplemented with further background reasons bridging the gap between the inner and the outer world, a supplementation that would bring Phenomenalism closer to Classical Foundationalism. Second, Factualism, but not Phenomenalism, makes plausible assumptions about what Mary bases her beliefs on: considerations about the object seen, not her experience. Our Propositionalism inherits these advantages of Factualism over Phenomenalism. First, that there is something that looks like a tomato in front of her obviously counts in favor of Mary's believing that there is a tomato in front of her. Second, our Propositionalism has no problem with the transparency of experience. According to our view, Mary bases her belief that there is a tomato in front of her on the consideration about the tomato itself, not on any of her mental states.

We also argued that our Propositionalism inherits the advantages of Phenomenalism when it comes to the bad case. Like Phenomenalism, it enables us to retain the Same Basis assumption (or something very close to it) as well as the Same Justification assumption. Hallucination cases impose considerable constraints on just what these perceptual reasons can be, and in particular how they can be singular as they seem to be. We have seen, though, that this problem is just as difficult for the Phenomenalist as for the Propositionalist, and that, given an adequate account of empty singular thought and empty singular experience, the Phenomenalist and the Propositionalist will be equally well placed tackle it.

One might worry that once we agree on *which* perceptual beliefs are immediately justified, there is no substantive difference between Propositionalism and Phenomenalism. True, Phenomenalists have tended to think that immediately justified perceptual beliefs are beliefs such as *there is a tomato before me* rather than beliefs about objective appearances. But there is no reason a Phenomenalist couldn't stray from the mainstream and claim that perceptual beliefs about appearances are the immediately justified ones and beliefs to the effect that *there is a K here* are mediately justified. Suppose, then, that the Propositionalist and the Phenomenalist agree about which perceptual beliefs are immediately justified: beliefs about appearances. Is there a further substantive difference between them? We have Appearances Propositionalism, then, and what me might call Appearances Phenomenalism. Why choose the former?

The key difference between the two views, which remains even after settling on an Apperances approach, is over whether immediate justification by experience counts as justification by virtue of having reasons or not. The Phenomenalist says it does; the Propositionalist demurs.

This difference between the views matters. For reasons, remember, are things that count in favor. That Mary has a certain experience does not count strongly in favor of there being a tomato in front of her. So, Mary's justified belief that there is a tomato before her cannot be accounted for merely by appealing to this reason. The Phenomenalist must supplement it, and she can only supplement it by appealing to reliability considerations. Doing this turns her into a Classical Foundationalist, saddling her the familiar problems of that view–problems of basing: we don't seem to base our perceptual beliefs on beliefs about the reliability of experience or even that we have experiences of certain sorts; and problems of justification: how do we get to be justified in believing our experience is reliable? The key point is that when strong justification comes from reasons, the reasons have to be strong themselves; if they are not, the subject has to make up the difference with background information. When the Phenomenalist does this she becomes a Classical Foundationalist.

How are things better for the Propositionalist? On our Propositionalism, one's basic perceptual reasons–in the visual case–are of the form *this looks such and such.* Now, we fully concede that such a reason by itself does not give one strong support for *there is a tomato before me.* The subject must "make up the difference" with background information. But the background information is clearly there. It is information about what tomatoes look like. There is no peculiarity in explaining why someone might believe there is a tomato before her in part because she knows what tomatoes look like. This is a plausible partial basis for the belief, unlike a belief in the reliability of experience or even in facts about experience. Moreover, we do not take there to be the same serious problems concerning how it is we come to know what tomatoes look like as there are for bridging the gap between the inner and the outer. So, while we fully admit that our Appearances Propositionalism has to bridge a gap between basic perceptual reasons and justified beliefs of the form *there is a K before me,* we think this gap is bridgeable in a way that the gap is not bridgeable for the Classical Foundationalist.

So, our key thought is that where one's justification comes from reasons one has, if the justification is strong, the reasons themselves must strongly support the target proposition. Weak support from the reasons one has cannot give rise to strong justification.

But, still, you might say, we ourselves appeal to the very inner facts the Phenomenalist appeals to when we explain how we can be have strong immediate justification for our basic reasons. So, aren't we being inconsistent? No. Where one's justification comes from having reasons, the strength of the justification depends on the degree of support from the reasons one has. Where one's justification does not come from having reasons, i.e., in cases of immediate justification, it is not at all obvious that the source of justification must itself be a strong reason– i.e., a strong reason *there is*– to believe the target proposition. Reliabilists, of course, insist that if one's satisfying X is what makes it the case that one is immediately justified in believing P, then one's satisfying X has to make P likely in some objective sense. Thus, they choose X to be: *being produced by a reliable belief forming process.* We think such reliabilism is false, as the New Evil Demon example (among others) shows. What must the relation be, then, between one's satisfying X and P if one's satisfying X makes it the case that one is immediately justified in believing P? Externalists might insist on *some* sort of relation to truth. Perhaps it will be, as it is for Burge (2010), Plantinga (1993) and Sosa (2007): *in such and such sorts of environment,* satisfying X makes P objectively likely. Thus, perhaps X = *being produced by a faculty with the evolutionary function of producing true beliefs in such and such environments.* At least one of us thinks there are clear counterexamples to such externalism (versions of NED or Swampman). But even if one did adopt this sort of externalist condition on immediate justification, notice that satisfying X by itself would not be by itself a strong *reason there is* for thinking P is true. For that one satisfies X by itself does not support the claim that one satisfies X in such and such environments.

Experiences are that in virtue of which we have reasons, but they are not the reasons we have.

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