predicative expression has as a proper part. Acceptance of such compositionality, however, ought to be turned against AI.2 by the proponent of AI. If, as the proponent of AI maintains, TO EXIST has no first-level occurrences, then no complex predicate (whether modally, temporally or otherwise qualified) that is built up from it can be a first-level predicate. Any such appearance must be dismissed, as with the case of simpler singular existentials, as involving sentences in which TO EXIST occurs in ways which mislead us about logical syntax.

The original version of AI.2 fails, our amended version reduces to AI and AI.2 begs the question. So AI is left intact.

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Translating Kripke’s Pierre

In a previous contribution to this gazette (The Reasoner 1(4) 2007: 8-9), I argued that a plausible solution to Kripke’s puzzle about belief might consist in applying certain restrictions to the translation principle employed in the derivation of the puzzle. To motivate this suggestion I imagined a situation in which Pierre comes to know that the names ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ denote the same city, and reports his discovery thus: “Incroyable! Après tout, Londres est London!” This, I remarked, would not be appropriately translated as “Incredible! After all, London is London!” because the two identity statements have different cognitive content (one is a posteriori, the other a priori). This led me to conclude, admittedly quite sketchily, that “in cases like Pierre’s—i.e. when the speaker is unaware of certain facts about translation between idiolects—our own translation of the speaker’s utterances should be guided, and appropriately constrained […] by a principle of charity which implies, among other things, that we should aim at preserving both the truth-value of the speaker’s assertions, and their cognitive content” (2007: 8-9).

In his recent reply to my paper (The Reasoner 1(5) 2007: 4-5), Professor Goldstein finds fault with this ‘desperate solution’, though it seems to me that some of what he says in fact agrees with it. Thus, concerning my example of Pierre’s discovery of the identity between Londres and London, Prof. Goldstein argues that “pretty clearly, Pierre’s French utterance, properly transcribed, is quotational, viz. “À propos tout, <ce que j’appelais> ‘Londres’ est ‘London’, which would translate unproblematically, since the material within the quotation marks would remain untouched” (Goldstein 2007: 4). So far, our verdict seems to be essentially the same: the name ‘Londres’ is not to be translated as ‘London’ inside this identity statement. Our disagreement appears to concern the motive behind this exception to the standard rule of translation. According to Prof. Goldstein, Pierre’s utterance contains a hidden quotation, and it is this that blocks the standard translation, not certain facts about Pierre’s ignorance or the cognitive content of his utterance.

However, I remain unconvinced. First of all, it is not difficult to imagine similar quotational contexts in which we would normally have no qualms about translating ‘Londres’ as ‘London’. Take for instance the following statement in French: “La ville qu’aujourd’hui nous appelons ‘Londres’ est située sur le site d’un campement Romain ancien, appelé ‘Londinium’.” Its translation in English is: “The city that we nowadays call ‘London’ is situated on the site of an ancient Roman settlement called ‘Londinium’.” Here, too, the context in which ‘Londres’ appears is purely quotational, yet this doesn’t seem to preclude us from giving the name its standard English translation.

That quotation is not the culprit can be determinately established by thinking of slight variations to my initial example, in which the translation of ‘Londres’ as ‘London’ is equally implausible despite there being no hidden quotational context involved. Perhaps the reason why my initial example is likely to raise suspicions of quotationality is that it contains an identity statement (“Londres = London”). As Frege notes in the opening paragraph of his Sinn und Bedeutung, “what one wishes to express with “a = b” seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ name the same thing; and in that case we would be dealing with those signs: a relation between them would be asserted.” Considerations like these motivate the idea that identity is more properly construed as a relation holding between the names of objects than between the objects themselves. And it is this idea that lends plausibility to Prof. Goldstein’s suggestion concerning quotation. But there are other ways of expressing Pierre’s discovery, which appear to avoid this problem. Here’s one of them: “Je viens de découvrir qu’on peut être simultanément à Londres et à London”, which—again, on pain of having Pierre foolishly rejoicing in the discovery of a trivial a priori truth—should be translated without replacing ‘London’ for ‘Londres’, viz. “I’ve just found out that one can be at the same time in Londres and in London.” This is clearly a statement about objects, not names. One can insist, of course, that there is a hidden quotation at play in this context as well, which might be unpacked (following Prof. Goldstein’s suggestion) as “...we can be at the same time in <what I call> ‘Londres’ and ‘London’.”

But the suggestion would be artificial, since virtually all our statements are subject to this kind of paraphrase (“I like <what I call> ‘icecream’.”, or “The sky is <what I call> ‘blue’.”). This would lead to the absurd conclusion that all our statements are in fact quotational.

As if in anticipation of this line of argument, Prof. Goldstein writes: “If you want to insist that the utterance is non-quotational, then you would have to de-
On the Curry-Lob Paradox

On first sight the Curry-Lob Paradox is the most striking of all the semantic paradoxes. Haskel Curry (1942: ‘The Inconsistency of Certain Formal Logics’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 7, pp 115-117) showed how a self-referring sentence in a logic without negation engenders paradox. Thirteen years later H.B. Lob (1955: ‘Solutions of a problem of Leon Henkin’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20, pp 115-118) in a very different context, produced a simpler formulation of the same paradox. Curry-Lob show that if \( S \) is defined as ‘If \( S \) is true then \( p \)’, where \( p \) is any sentence, then every sentence is true. The demonstration of the paradox that I here present, with minor variations, that of Michael Clark (2003: ‘Curry’s Paradox’, Paradoxes from A to Z, Routledge, pp 36-7).

Let \( S \) be the sentence: ‘If \( S \) is true then \( p \).’

\[\begin{align*}
\text{1: } & S \text{ is true} & \text{assumption} \\
\text{2: } & S & 1, T\text{-schema (consequence of } S \text{ being true)} \\
\text{3: } & \text{If } S \text{ is true then } p & 2, \text{ definition} \\
\text{4: } & p & 3,1, \text{Modus Ponens (affirming the antecedent)} \\
\text{5: } & \text{If } S \text{ is true then } p & 1-4, \text{Conditional Proof (from 1 we get 4)} \\
\text{6: } & S & 5, \text{ definition} \\
\text{7: } & S \text{ is true} & 6, T\text{-schema}
\end{align*}\]

We thus have a proof of \( p \), given \( S \), where \( p \) is any sentence whatsoever. Or, equally, we have a proof for every sentence whatsoever given our definition. But then surely something is wrong with our definition of \( S \). And we see right off what it is. We need not appeal to solutions which disallow self reference. \( S \) says of itself that, if true it is inconsistent. For \( S \) says of itself that, if true so is any sentence. But then by starting off with the definition we are starting off with the assumption that \( S \) being a conditional cannot be true unless it is false. Or what amounts to the same, \( S \) has to be false.\(^1\)

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§3

NEWS

Announcement and Call for Papers: New Journal in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

‘Sic et non’, an international e-yearbook for recent arguments in the philosophy of science and epistemology, will be published as an annual supplement to The Reasoner.

Scope of the Journal

This scholarly and peer-reviewed yearbook (published online, in line with its attempt to speed up discussion in the philosophy of science and offered as an annual supplement to The Reasoner) sets out to collect either rebuttals, i.e. to point out non sequiturs, or arguments for a positive thesis in the philosophy of science and epistemology (preferably not older than 3 years). If suitable, some of the papers that were previously published in The Reasoner will appear again in Sic et Non. The argumentationes should be relevant to recent debates and reflect original research. Authors should criticize or argue for one sole argument which typically cannot be materialized as full papers. Submissions should be self-contained and not published previously. The author whose argument has been rebutted is subsequently invited to respond. At that time the discussion is considered as closed to allow for a broad myriad of discussions. The aim is to promote small steps in the general improvement of the philosophy of science and epistemology.

Once accepted by our referees, papers will be immediately put on the journal’s website—a keyword and

\(^1\) I gratefully acknowledge the helpful conversations on the paradox with Michael Clark, Yehuda Gelman and David Widerker.