COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICATION
From the communication of separated consciousnesses to the plurality of communicating persons

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In his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl states that the radical reduction entails the suppression of the communicative Us1. Stressing the role of direct empathic connections, Husserl seems to limit drastically the role of communication in the constitution of community and sociality, and through this he seems to neglect or even contradict the contemporary forms and tendencies of the human community, for which mediate, symbolic levels are essential. Does community, in its strong phenomenological sense, actually exclude symbolic communication? If yes, it would be difficult to explain how it reappears at the superior levels of community and sociality. If we admit that a sort of communication is inherent to the basic level of the constitution of community, we have then to rethink the concepts of empathy and positionality, to define the latter simply as analogical or imaginative and to renounce any transcendental dimension of the theory of intersubjectivity, i.e. any non-factual warranty of the giveness of the other. Thus, the question concerning the role of communication in Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity discloses a whole range of problems and paradoxes. It is clear then that the solution cannot simply consist in negotiating a smaller or greater percentage of the domain of communication. The analyses have to be aimed at the very source of the problems; the *phenomenon of community* has to be considered in itself, as a specific kind of objectivity.

The Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity has been criticized for the fact that it belongs exclusively to a philosophy of representation and to a solipsistic consciousness. In this conceptual framework, the other (ego) appears to be *constituted* by a singular ego through the synthesis of the series of its appearances (perceptive or imaginative representations) and by extrapolation (transposition) of its own “sphere of originality”. For this theory of constitution seemed to be essentially related to the concept of objective representation that post-Husserlian phenomenologists have criticized and eventually replaced with another, in which *affectivity* is supposed to open the way to otherness, as we can see in Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry or Jacques Derrida2.

Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution, but the fact that the other and the community that he forms with me and with many others are thought *only* in terms of representation. Even those who discharged the “abstract” objective representation

1 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*.
of Husserl’s function and replaced it with “affectivity” were not finally able to 
overpass the representational framework, because the other has always been 
for me (and vice-versa, I have been for him) only a “picture” (no matter 
whether representative or “affective”), something which simply “stands” 
before my eyes. But this is certainly a reductive way of understanding the 
relation between the I and the other. If we focus our attention on the phenom-
emon of community and not on some interpretations or simplifications of it, 
we realize that it is not sufficient that objective representation or affectivity or 
any other faculty constitute or disclose the other for the I (even if that is a 
necessary starting point). As a multilayered concept, “intersubjectivity”, in 
Husserl’s sense, is a system of transitions from mere appearance to tran-
scendence, from passivity to activity, from cognitive and affective representation 
to volition and action. As soon as we see the relation between the I and the 
other as active, as an influence or intrusion of one consciousness in another, as 
an intention to “move” the other, to determine him to assume or to begin an 
action (a real one, effected in real life), the concept of intersubjectivity changes 
dramatically, even though the “representation” of the other before the I and of the 
I in the eyes of the other remains a necessary interface. Accordingly, consti-
tutive phenomenology has to take into consideration volition, action and 
communication not simply as extensions of the constitution of the thing. 
A reform of the theory of constitution, or rather its enlargement, to encompass 
this new type of “objectivity” (praxis) which would thus offer an adequate 
conceptual framework is strongly recommended.

If we take into account the way in which Husserl connects community and 
communication, we could speak about two distinct periods in his doctrine of 
intersubjectivity: one in which he tries to treat the other on the basis of the 
theory of the constitution of the transcendent spatial object, elaborated in the 
framework of a theory of knowledge which holds the truth as the ultimate 
guide (thus, on a cognitive-representational basis) and another, in which the 
dimension of interaction between egos is privileged. From this point of view, 
the idea of communication contributes essentially to establishing the phe-
nomenological concept of community.

Absolute consciousnesses in communication

In Husserl’s work the topic of intersubjectivity emerges in an early stage in 
the context of the problem of the reduction to “pure subjectivity”5. As early as 
the lectures he gave during the winter semester 1910/11 Husserl envisaged an 
“extension of the phenomenological reduction to intersubjectivity”6 through 
the introduction of intersubjectivity in the thematic field of pure phenome-
nology7. In order to elucidate the possibility of reaching true exteriority and 
objectivity, phenomenology had to deal with the task of passing over the 
domain of absolute (Cartesian) giveness8, and this is achieved through trans-
gressing the prejudice of giveness’ actuality. By accepting other kinds of 
phenomenological giveness, namely presentifications, and by tracing the lines 
of the continuity of the consciousness from what is not to what is actually 
given, Husserl succeeded in extending (and implicitly in redefining) the field
of phenomenological experience as a sphere of a multiplicity of fluxes of consciousness closed in themselves and attached to my own flux of consciousness by the motivational relation of empathy (Einfühlung). Thus he managed to integrate essentially heterogeneous fields of experience, i. e. intersubjectivity, into a universal phenomenological science of experience, which becomes a monadology requiring a transcendental theory of the communication of separated consciousnesses.

Explicitly and, probably, for the first time the topic of communication in relation to that of intersubjectivity appears in a text from 1909\(^7\), where Husserl deals with the “communication” between “absolute consciousnesses”, which thus have to be considered as “not bordered”. His main concern here is the theory of constitution: he tries to explain how a thing in itself can be brought about only on the basis of its direct appearances or of what they entail. It seems that objects that we cannot ever see, objects that cannot ever be given to our senses raise a fundamental problem for this version of his theory. In order to preserve the sense of objectivity as being given or possibly being given, Husserl examines and apparently adopts the hypothesis of an absolute consciousness, which leads the phenomenological analysis to the further idea of a plurality of absolute consciousnesses.

At this stage of Husserl’s thought, an absolute consciousness enters into communication with another absolute consciousness, even in a conscious communication\(^5\). He acknowledges the fact that “a certain communication is always present”\(^9\). This apparently marginal observation is in fact an important idea. A sort of communication exists at every level of the interrelations between consciousnesses. But how is communication between different consciousnesses phenomenologically possible? An affirmative answer to this question would presuppose a direct, immediate access to another consciousness, a direct knowledge of the diversity of the egoic experiences of another person\(^10\). This thesis is explicitly rejected, and the question concerning the (communicative) relation between consciousnesses remains unsolved.

He acknowledges a “conflict”\(^11\) when he realizes that empathy cannot find a confirmation in perception as the objective intention does\(^12\). The hypothesis of a “total consciousness” (God) capable to see inside the consciousness of others is not acceptable, because, on the one hand, it entails the unthinkable idea that the being of God contains every other absolute being and, on the other hand, the problem of empathy is circumvented but not truly solved. God does not need empathy, but the supposed absolute consciousnesses inside the total consciousness still empathize one with another and, moreover, they constitute through an empathizing apperception an identical world for all individuals\(^13\). Husserl realizes in a very early stage of his work that the theory of constitution volition cannot succeed without a theory of intersubjectivity which explains how it is possible\(^14\) for different finite consciousness to communicate with each other and compare their respective objectivities.

In order to avoid the non-sense of direct communication between consciousnesses Husserl insists every time that communication expresses itself in the way in which we speak in a founded manner about objective reality. If we descend from the transcendental level of the communication between absolute
consciousnesses to the level of the reciprocal exchange of meanings on the basis of reciprocal empathy, communication entails a “knowledge” of one’s body, of the bodies of others and of a common world. We should take notice of the fact that the I – you relation is defined basically as “reciprocal knowledge”, or as a “spiritual relation founded in knowledge”.

We can conclude for the moment that communication is in this period reduced to knowledge, that it is nothing but a means for knowledge and its role in the constitution of the community is seen as secondary. In the meanwhile, Husserl kept in mind the problems raised by empathy, namely the “incompatibility of different individual consciousnesses”, and, in Ideas I (1913), he refined and generalized the theory of constitution so that it would grasp in a unique conceptual scheme both objective representation and action. Thus, the theory of constitution cannot be an impediment to the explicitation of the authentic relation I – you, but, on the contrary, the platform on which the phenomenological sense of community can be revealed.

Community, volition and action

Husserl expresses a radically different view in a text written in 1932, a text considered “a beginning, but a fundamental one”. In comparison with his previous essays, this is certainly a new beginning, a new vision of otherness, almost a new theory of intersubjectivity – we might say –, because it is situated in a totally different conceptual framework. The change of paradigm was not obvious because Husserl kept his theory of constitution. What is changed is the fact that representative subjectivity acquires the dimensions of volition and action and becomes a new kind of “subject”: an acting subject.

This major change is made not by simply adding a new stratum of objectivity from the exterior. On the contrary, it starts from the most elementary levels of experience. First of all, experience is not defined as a pure field of data – a certain “interest” always inhabits it. Thus, the “ego of interest” is a key concept. What is experienced is in fact what attracts me (certainly, the ego can also resist to the appeal). A new key is used to distinguish between different phenomenological forms of the same experience: “the function or the non-function related to an activity”. Accordingly, what is experienced can be thematized in different modes: primary, secondary or can simply not be thematized.

Empathic experience has to be described in the same manner. The other is an object of experience and this is why I am “absorbed in him”. I am living his life appresentatively, I am experiencing him as a person in flash, and I am doing that in my perceptual world, in the actual spatial field of my perceptual now. The appresentation of the other presents me the other as himself having a personal life. This can be passive (I see the other, but nothing attracts me to it; it remains in the background of my perceptual life) or active. When it is active, it means that I am consenting and submitting myself to the other person (in the mode of quasi). Living with the other means that I submit myself by appresentation to his experience, to his thinking, to his evaluation, to his action. I become his “accomplice”. I take on his validities, his judgments as if they were mine.
A common world is brought about through the coincidence of the egos and of their fields of appearances.

But *an action, a practical project cannot be taken on*\(^\text{26}\). The volition of the other, given in an appresentation, is not coincident with mine. When I get out from the coincidence of the other ego, my volition remains unaltered and it is the same for volition which ends in an action or is “deposited” in a work. We have here an essential difference between *doxa* and *praxis*\(^\text{27}\). This does not mean that the *doxa* does not have any role in the interplay of active subjects; *doxa* has to be understood in the milieu of *praxis*, it serves action and is reconfigured by it.

The theoretical implications of the distinction between *doxa* and *praxis* go far beyond the clarification of the role of the representation in the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. The fact that Husserl has stressed the role of a common “objective” world for the constitution of community and sociality does not affect the specificity and the irreducibility of volition and, therefore, of action\(^\text{28}\) and does not imply that different volitions can be as convictions or opinions regarding an objective world. The community remains essentially plural, a place of the struggle of different or even opposite volitions. Therefore the Husserlian concepts of *volition* and *action* deserve a closer examination.

*a) Volition*

The subject takes knowledge of himself as the subject of a volition; when he is alive, he has the certainty to be individuated by this volition\(^\text{29}\). The volition which constitutes the self is a volition of an accord, of a harmony between all the manifestations of the self, a struggle for maintaining identical validity against the dispersion of the self and against a lack of coherence in its acts. A theory of temporality is then required if we want to explain the temporal continuity of volition; I suggest not taking this, which implies the affirmation of past volitions and the affirmation of the self, into consideration.

The conservation of the self as a concordant unity of personal acts becomes “true conservation” (wahre Selbsterhaltung) and it is the basis for Husserl’s ethics. Ethics is brought into play when the individual strives to correspond to the idea of the Self, considered as a *telos* which gives the norm for the personal volition\(^\text{30}\).

The ethical idea of the Self considered in accord with others is in fact the first step toward community. The concept of volition becomes thus fundamental not only for the constitution of the individual, but also for the constitution of a community as a *community of individuals*. Seen in this way, human community becomes essentially a *practical community of volition*. The constitution of a community, described analytically as an “enlargement” of the sphere of presence, is, from a structural point of view, a multilayered objectivity. The basic stratum is that of the community between I (as primordial reflexive monad), and the monad constituted in me as a foreign monad\(^\text{31}\). Engaged at a transcendental level in an “intentional communion”, these monads are separated in “reality” in psycho-physical beings which form an effective community. A “world of humans” is constituted at the same time through an infinite...
community of monads. If the archetypal relation I – you seemed to be, at the transcendental level, an opposition, in the sense that the other is a “stranger”, the community of humans is a reciprocal existence of one with another (and its objectifying forms), guided by the striving to harmony. The simple addition of one or several psycho-physical beings to another does not result in a community and even less in humanity. Their coexistence is required in order to make possible “social acts”, i.e. the acts of the self which representatively penetrate into another Self and through which a communication between human beings is established. The action upon another, in the form of communication, founds the community as living together. On the basis of this primitive (elementary) social community and the objective world are constituted different kinds of social communities as sui generis spiritual objectivities with their specific human milieu – “cultural worlds”.

The idea of a plurality of monads, together with that of the constitution of personal unities of a higher degree, raises the question concerning the “fusion”, i.e. the possibility of monads’ fusion with one another. In opposition to Dietrich Mahnke’s interpretation of Leibniz’s monadology, Husserl explicitly rejects the idea of a fusion of monads. Husserl’s monadology is based on the results of an intentional analysis of the data of sensation. Being founded in the unity of a homogenous sensory field, they are also homogenous and necessarily dependent on a central ego. Therefore, they cannot belong to different egos. Also, a consciousness without an ego is, according to this text, impossible. The idea of a rupture of the unitary sensibility in order to constitute two separated unities is in turn excluded. Much more plausible is, for Husserl, the hypothesis of a “monadic plurality”, which has to be considered as “absolute”. A singular pure ego cannot accomplish the task of constituting objective nature; on the contrary, a “pure and universally closed plurality of monadic egos” is required.

Still, the intentional intrication does not exclude the real separation of monads. After the phenomenological reduction I discover also the other transcendental egos envisaged in my world of experience as humans. In my primordial being, the other is constituted as having another primordial being, another personal being which effectuates activities, possesses faculties, experiences and so forth. In the constitution of a common world in the mediate experience accomplished in me through the experience of the other and experience as such, a transcendental absolute consciousness manifests itself. In this, the absolutely being “world”, the universal absolute intersubjectivity is an infinitely open multiplicity of separated transcendental subjects, and it exists isolated from others as humans.

This “transcendental separation” means that each individual (Individuelles), in its own temporality, cannot be identical with another, which also has to be considered as a unique primordiality. The phenomenological analyses developed in pure immanence force us to acknowledge the absolute individuality or, which is the same, the absoluteness of individuality without rejecting the moments of mediation or “communication” inside the original sphere of presence. Described in this manner – which, from a phenomenological point of view, is certainly the most rigorous – the community, more precisely,
the community of distinct personal selves, is also a place for communication and the exercise of the volition. Already in the I – you relation, even if considered as empathic, i. e. as a relation saturated first of all in a mere representation, there is a moment when volition is present, namely as “permanent habitual volition”, as volition of the continuation of the exchange between the two.

Going deep in the constitutive structures of the community, Husserl remarks that the I and the you are necessarily in a “contact situation”, as, for example, when one of them influences the physical or the spiritual world of the other. The wish is prolonged into durable personal relationships (Husserl analyses here especially the master – servant relationship and cooperation in accomplishing a common goal).

At the same time, the members of the community should not be understood exclusively as mere actors. A community has its own flesh; it is built upon bodily interactions. The intimate love, which becomes then a durable practical habitus, effectively puts two persons into direct relation. It entails an active pleasure for the beloved person, for his body and his spirit, but only common aspiration brings stability and durability to that community. Aspiration, in its various forms, constitutes both the life of the self, which is nothing but a unity of aspiration, and that of the most elementary form of community, which thus has to be as a community of aspiration. With this, love becomes “ethical love”. Personal forms of community (community of pleasure, of care, of the common lunch, in short: the family) constitute the basic level of community.

When we speak about this kind of community we should be careful not to transform it into a mere ideal; it has to be dynamic one, one that changes. An omission, momentary egoism, a lack of reason have always put in danger the moral unity and the order of the community. In order to restore them, a “critique” must intervene and must impose (personal or impersonal) duty and responsibility. In the constitutive order of the community should follow the layer of “artificially instituted communities” where duties are voluntarily assumed or imposed by force. However, even in the community of volition which concerns all the citizens of a state of law, a personal link, considered as a chain of volitions or as a unanimity of volitions, is always present.

My volition, at the same time, in a conscious way penetrates into the volition of the other, and the other way round. This is particularly clear in the case of the instauration of a master – servant relationship. There is not juxtaposition, but an intrication of sociality. “In a given sociality, a subjectivity goes forth beyond itself in the interior of another subjectivity.”

b) Action

Phenomenologically, we cannot understand the action of a constituted subject directed toward the transformation of a real object without the elucidation of what it is the meaning of an action inside the primordial ego. “The action finds its foundation in the acting which I experienced ultimately in my flesh, where my action is immediate and because it is immediate.” The problematic of constitution thus has to be pursued at the most elementary level, which is that of primordial immediacy. Firstly, we can find acting in the flesh and this is perceived in the most immediate manner; then, acting mediated by the action, by the movement of the ego, a movement which can be perceived
in a spatio-temporal manner; then, the apperception of the other as perceiving subject, but also as acting subject, as subject which transforms himself and which produces effects. After that, there are other series of mediations of the experienced acting until we have action in the strict sense of the word: action orientated toward the accomplishing of a goal. Husserl used to stress the absolute character of empathic knowledge, and by doing this empathy became a fundamental and self standing type of experience. The model of the interaction between egos was considered to be that of "imaginative transposition", and this was supposed to overcome the abyss between egoic selves. This perspective leaves very little place for communication. In 1932 Husserl clearly stated that active reciprocal empathy does not produce any social unification. It is not a real connection between Me and You which comes about with the presupposition of the Me-You unity of the Us (emerged via habits). These unities are not simply a being together in the world, they are not simply collections of humans, but personal communities, personal reunifications of various types. What is missing in a collection of humans who have an active reciprocal empathic knowledge of each other? Certainly the intention and the volition to express something; it lacks a specific act of reciprocal communication. Thus, communication creates community. This is why a phenomenology of communication becomes both possible and necessary.

**Phenomenology of communication**

A phenomenology of communication has to explain the genesis of the original act of reciprocal communication. Prior to doing this, Husserl describes its intentional structure. This structure is based on reciprocal empathy, more precisely, on actual perceptive reciprocal empathy. Empathy allows me to inscribe myself into the subjective being of the other. The alter ego becomes a You. Being apprehended as another me, the other is seen as a subject, that is, as a depositary of its own acts and powers. He can see, move, push, etc., this object or any other. For me, His acts have the "equivocal character of expression"; they are an external expression of an interiority, an announcement which has an impact on me, even if the other doesn’t have this intention. But communication is not a simple effect that determines the other to do something. If it were so, communication would be nothing other than manipulation. Communication means that I have the intention to communicate and that I am perceived and understood as such by the other. The other, with whom I am related through empathy, understands that I express my interiority. Empathy which is not developed as intention to communicate is not yet communication.

Husserl distinguishes between the effects of communication (the other does this or that, takes in my knowledge, my desire, my volition, etc.) and the mediated acts which make it possible. The specificity of the act of communication resides in the fact that I connect my desire to a verbal expression. The other understands my verbal expression as such and he understands also that I am addressing him. He becomes my interlocutor and I also become his.
Sociality is founded in this stratified activity: through an active perception, which becomes empathy, I direct myself to the other with the intention to motivate (determine) his acts, I address him in order to share with him my knowledge or my practical project, I make him understand what I am telling him when I am addressing him. The actual connection of this interlocutive community underlies any sociality. “The linguistic bond is the fundamental form of communicative unification, the original form of a particular coincidence between me and the other; thus between any individual and any other individual there is unification through what is said.” My volition to communicate, my act bearing a sense, “enters” into the other (given to me in appresentation), who appropriates that sense and answers me.

What really absolves us from solitude and isolation is the bond between active embodied consciousnesses.

Conclusions

As we have seen, volition and action are now fundamental for the understanding of the constitution of the other and of the communities I make with him, and also for the communicative community. In order to understand the constitution of community as a community of volition and action, the theory of constitution had to be adapted. The need to take other’s experiences into account and provide a coherent phenomenological analysis of this specific type of experience put a great pressure on the Cartesian presuppositions of Husserl’s theory of consciousness’ giveness. Accordingly, the theory of constitution had to integrate praxis as a necessary condition for the access to others’ consciousnesses. Therefore, Husserl found a place for conceptual changes that opened a discussion about the possibility of taking in or not the ideas or actions of the other, a phenomenon which is explained much better as a modification of the primordial sphere. Others do not appear simply as others which contribute to the constitution of a thing in a doxic manner. If it were so, they would be only presupposed and they should be identical to me. But, modifying the thing together, we modify ourselves; we modify our primordial ego. Because of the fact that the transformation is common, in every ego it emerges as a unity of common transformation. For everyone who communicates, there are transformations of existence. Communication is thus essentially connected with transformation. Considered in its genuine sense, it occurs in situations where there are actions directed towards the transformation of a thing, which entails a further common transformation of the egos.

Through the introduction of communication and transformation into the discussion about community, phenomenology takes a resolute distance from any of the naturalistic views of the self and of the others. The alternative individualism (atomism) – holism is, evidently, a false one; community and sociality can be thought only on an interactive basis. Volition, action, communication and common transformation becomes thus the four bases of a phenomenological concept of community. Community does not consist either in related individuals or supra-individual objectivities; it is not an object, but a dynamic form of life guided from inside by a teleological Idea.

Husserl succeeds in overcoming the modern distinction between repre-
sentation and volition and he also succeeds in changing the purely ontological (atomistic or holistic) vision of community into a community considered as a “plurality of communicating persons”75. The continuity between I, other and others, between the sphere of proximity and that of distance or mediation is thought systematically and with the preservation of the specificity of each constitutive level. He provides thus not only a comprehensive and complete philosophical concept of community, but also a basis for the study of concrete human interactions. The elucidation of otherness does not only solve a theoretical (ontological or ethical) problem, but it prepares the ground for an adequate understanding of the role played, in its various forms, by political action in contemporary societies and therefore for its transformation in accordance with the exigencies of the present situation of humanity.

Notes

2 This problem is certainly much wider and more complex and therefore beyond the limits of this study. For a brief overview, see Leonard Lawlor, *Thinking through French Phenomenology. The Being of the Question*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2003, p. 147–158.
4 *Hua XIII*, p. XXXV.
8 *Hua XIII*, p. 17.
9 *Ibidem*.
11 *Hua XIII*, Beilage IV <1908 >, p. 8–9.
12 *Hua XIII*, p. 9.
13 *Ibidem*.
14 This is most probably the reason why Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity has, at least in his *Cartesian Meditations*, such a strong transcendental form.
15 *Hua XIII*, p. 17.
16 *Ibidem*.
18 We do not insist here upon the rigorous temporal delimitation of the two stages in Husserl’s development of the problematic of intersubjectivity. On the one hand, such a topic requires an attentive research of Husserl’s published texts and manuscripts in a long period of time, basically from 1908 till the elaboration of *Krisis*), which is not the case in this study. On the other hand, as we already stated, the difficulties related to the representational framework, and also the conceptual findings which permitted their surpassing are detectable in an early stage (in the period of time corresponding to the elaboration of *Ideas I*). Nevertheless, the topic of action is much more visible in the twenties and it is pertinent to relate it with a change of (at least) expression which appears in Husserl’s writings after 1917.
19 “Phänomenologie der Mitteilungsgemeinschaft (Rede als Anrede und Aufnehmen der Rede) gegenüber der blossen Einfühlungsgemeinschaft (blosses Nebeneinander-sein).

Hua XV, p. 461.

Ibidem.

Hua XIII, p. 462.

Ibidem.

Hua XV, p. 462–463.

Hua XV, p. 464.

But that doesn’t mean that doxa has no role in the interplay of active subjects; it is rather to be understood in the framework of praxis.

It is no wonder that Husserlian phenomenology contributed essentially to the instauration of the “actionalist paradigm” in the social sciences, especially through the work of Alfred Schutz, Hannah Arendt and their successors.


CM, § 56, p. 128.

Idem, p. 130

Idem, § 58, p. 131 sqq.

Ibidem.


Idem. p. 133.

Hua XIV, Text No. 10, p. 194.

Hua XIV, Beilage XLI, p. 300. SI, p. 535.

Ibidem.

Idem, p. 300–301.

Idem, p. 302.

Hua XIV, Text No. 13, § 7, p. 265.

Ibidem, p. 266.


Idem, p. 372.

Idem, p. 373.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.

Se rapporter également à l’Appendice XLIV, Hua XV, p. 602–604.

Hua XIV, Text No. 9, § 3, p. 169.


Ibidem, § 5, p. 172.


Ibidem.


discussed in the §§ 3–8 of the above cited text.


Ibidem, p. 182 sqq.

Ibidem, p. 182.

Thus, we distinguish here, with Husserl, between two sorts of communication: explicit and implicit. That means any immediate intentional communication, no matter in what form (speaking, writing, gestures).

Ibidem. (even if his answer is simply a polite one).

Hua XIV, Text No. 10, § 6, p. 200.