Discussion of the Aristotelian syllogism over the last sixty years has arguably centered on the question whether syllogisms are inferences or implications. But the significance of this debate at times has been taken to concern whether the syllogistic is a logic or a theory, and how it ought to be represented by modern systems.

Largely missing from this discussion has been a study of the few passages in the *Prior Analytics* where Aristotle provides explicit guidance on how to individuate syllogisms. Aristotle asserts that syllogisms in the traditional moods of Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27a14, that the same syllogism can have distinct conclusions at 50a5 and that a syllogism can have several conclusions at 53a5 and 53a10. Scholarly reaction to these passages has been predominantly deflationary. Some hold that Aristotle is discussing the individuation not of any syllogism whatsoever but only of an

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1 For the view that instances of syllogisms are implications, see for example Łukasiewicz (1957), Patzig (1968). For the view that syllogisms are inferences, see for example Austin (1952), Rose (1968), Smiley (1973) and Corcoran (1972).
2 Corcoran (1972 and 1994).
3 Proposals over the years have included viewing the syllogistic as a diagrammatic reasoning system (Euler (1768)), a semantic tableau (Carroll (1887), Beth (1955)), an axiomatic theory (Łukasiewicz (1957), Patzig (1968)), a logic of multiple sorted quantification (Smiley (1962)), a natural deduction system (Corcoran (1972), Smiley (1973)), a connexive logic (McCall (1967)), a fragment of a generalized quantifier theory (van Benthem (1984), van Eijck (1985), Westerståhl (1989)), an inductive construction (Martin (1987), (1997)), a sequent calculus (Crabbé (2003), Tennant (2014)), a relevant logic (Woods and Irvine (2004, 65)), a natural logic (van Benthem (2008)), a metatheory (Pelletier and Hazen (2012)), a linear logic (Englebretsen (1991), Pagnan (2013)), and a dialogical logic (Dutilh Novaes (2015)).
argument with several sub-conclusions, which loosely may be called a syllogism.\(^4\) Others hold that Aristotle is not discussing the individuation of syllogisms at all but merely claiming that the premises of distinct syllogisms can have the same conclusion.\(^5\) I will argue that these deflationary readings are unsatisfactory. Taken together, the passages yield compelling evidence that Aristotle individuates syllogisms by unordered premise pairs. A syllogism then does not have the form of one of the traditional moods, since a mood is a pattern with a fixed premise order and a single conclusion. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of syllogisms sensitive to this textual evidence.

Before proceeding, let me make a point of clarification. I have characterized the scholarly reaction to these passages as sparse and predominantly deflationary. Predominantly, not wholly. In an important precursor to this work, Duerlinger (1968a, 1968b, 1969) offers article-length discussions of some of this textual evidence. Since the view I am putting forward here has on occasion been confused with Duerlinger’s, it may be worth emphasizing from the start some of the similarities and differences. Duerlinger identifies syllogisms with concludent premise pairs. Duerlinger’s thesis and the view offered in this paper share a consequence, namely that syllogisms do not necessarily have a single conclusion and so differ structurally from the traditional moods. But to \textit{individuate} syllogisms by unordered premise pairs is not to \textit{identify} syllogisms with such pairs, and although I will argue that syllogisms differ from moods, I will also offer an interpretation according to which syllogisms have one or more conclusions. I will return

\(^4\) For example, Ross (1949) and Smith (1982), discussed below.
\(^5\) For example, Striker (2009), discussed below.
to these points later, when I discuss in more detail the view that syllogisms are concludent premise pairs.

I will begin by reminding readers of the broad outlines of the syllogistic. Here I will also briefly rehearse the evidence for taking syllogisms to be inferences (§1). I then argue that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs (§§2-4). Together these observations suggest that syllogisms may be fruitfully thought of as inferences from unordered premise pairs to some conclusion or other, and I conclude by briefly discussing a consequence of this thesis for the representation of the syllogistic (§5).

1

Aristotle characterizes syllogisms at APr 1.1 (24b18-22) as follows:6

T1 a syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because they are so. By ‘because these things are so’ I mean ‘resulting through them,’ and by ‘resulting through them’ I mean ‘needing no further term from outside in order for the necessity to come about.’7

This characterization suggests that a syllogism is an ordered pair consisting of a set of suppositions and a set of results. Let me use the lower case letters ‘p’ and ‘s’, with or without a subscript, as variables ranging over propositions. Then we can say that a syllogism would seem to have the form \(\{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}, \{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}\) such that \(\{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}\) and \(\{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}\) stand in a certain relation of acceptability. (I will tweak this claim

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6 I follow Smith’s (1989) translation of the Prior Analytics with occasional alterations.
7 συλλογισμός δὲ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ὧν τεθέντων τινῶν ἐπερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταύτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῶι ταύτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταύτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταύτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἐξοθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
later.) T1 places certain further constraints on what can count as a syllogism. The plural characterization of the suppositions in “certain things having been supposed” suggests that \( n > 1 \). The characterization of the result as “something different from the things supposed” suggests that for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \) and \( 1 \leq j \leq m \), \( \pi_i \neq \sigma_j \). Aristotle characterizes the acceptability relation as obtaining when \{\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_m\} results of necessity through \{\pi_1, ..., \pi_n\}. The nature of the acceptability relation is historically controversial and I will discuss the nature of this relation further below. Finally, it is standardly assumed that a syllogism has a single result and so \( m=1 \). A goal of this paper is to question this assumption. I will turn to this issue in §2. But before beginning this task, let me continue to sketch the broad outlines of the syllogistic. Much of this sketch may be familiar to the reader, but having the details before us will prove fruitful in what follows, especially when in §5 I discuss the representation of the syllogistic.

We have seen that Aristotle characterizes the syllogism in APr 1.1. What Aristotle actually proceeds to do in APr 1.4-6 is to classify tertiary ordered sequences of categorical propositions. Call a *mood* the form of an ordered sequence \( \langle \pi_1, \pi_2, \sigma \rangle \) where each member is a categorical proposition. I will assume a set of term variables \( A, B, C, \ldots \). The assertoric categorical propositions have the forms:

- \( BaA \): pronounced ‘B belongs to every A’
- \( BeA \): B belongs to no A
- \( BiA \): B belongs to some A
- \( BoA \): B belongs to not every A.

The moods are classified into three figures, which have the following canonical format. (I will note in the next section that Aristotle appears to occasionally vary from this format.)
The first two members of the sequence contain the two terms of the third member respectively and a common or middle term: in the first figure, the middle term is in the predicate position of the first member and in the subject position of the second member; in the second and third figures, the middle is the predicate or the subject, respectively, of both of the first two members. So, for example, one of the moods of the first figure, called by its medieval mnemonic, ‘Barbara’, is the pattern:

(Barbara)  
A belongs to every B.  
B belongs to every C.  
So A belongs to every C.

I will use the traditional names for the moods and, as I did above, I will occasionally express a mood as an ordered sequence. So for example, Barbara may be represented as \(\langle AaB, BaC, AaC\rangle\).

The assertoric syllogistic is in part a two-stage classification of moods. Aristotle also presents at length the apodeictic and problematic syllogistic, classifications of moods with modal operators. In the interests of keeping our discussion from ballooning, I will restrict discussion in this paper to the assertoric syllogistic. In chapters 1.4-6 of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle considers various combinations for the three figures and shows which are acceptable and which unacceptable. The acceptable moods of the first figure are taken to be evidentially acceptable: immediately following T1, Aristotle (24b22-23) characterizes these moods as standing “in need of nothing else besides the things taken in order for the necessity to be evident.” The acceptability of the acceptable moods of the second and third figures is established by showing that these moods stand in a certain relation to one of the moods of the first figure—often, that of convertibility. That is to say, Aristotle takes such moods as (one of the first figure moods) Celarent:
\[\langle \text{AeB, BaC, AeC} \rangle\]

as obviously acceptable. He then establishes the acceptability of such moods as Cesare
\[\langle \text{MeN, MaO, NeO} \rangle\]

by converting the first member to

\[\text{NeM}\]

by means of the conversion rule \textit{e-conversion} and then appealing to Celarent, so to derive
\[\text{NeO from NeM and MaO.}\]

Another method to establish the acceptability of the acceptable sequences is indirect proof. For example, the indirect proof of Baroco, from 27\textsuperscript{a}36-b1, is:

\textbf{T2} if M belongs to every N but does not belong to some X, it is necessary for N not to belong to some X. (For if it belongs to every X and M is also predicated of every N, then it is necessary for M to belong to every X; but it was assumed not to belong to some.)

It is controversial how to describe what happens in Aristotle’s indirect proofs. But according to one plausible reading, the above passage assumes the premises of Baroco and shows that its conclusion follows by assuming the negation of one of its premises and using Barbara to derive a contradiction.

I have presented the syllogistic in interpretatively neutral terms of the acceptability of sequences. The historical interpretation and representation of these

\[\text{8 \ πάλιν εἰ τῷ µὲν Ν παντὶ τὸ Μ, τῷ δὲ Ξ τινὶ µὴ ύπάρχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ Ν τινὶ τῶι Ξ µὴ ύπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ παντὶ ύπάρχει, κατηγορεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ Μ παντὸς τοῦ Ν, ἀνάγκη τὸ Μ παντὶ τῶι Ξ ύπάρχειν· ύπέκειται δὲ τινὶ µὴ ύπάρχειν.}\]

\[\text{9 A third method to establish the acceptability of second and third figure moods is exposition. Take the first two members of Darapti, A belongs to every B; and C belongs to every B. Now set out some particular B, say b. Then we may infer from the first member A belongs to b and from the second member C belongs to b. So it follows that A belongs of something to which C also belongs; hence A belongs to some C. For discussion, see Smith (1982). Finally, the unacceptability of the unacceptable sequences is typically established by counter-instance.}\]
sequences, their acceptability and the resulting structure of the syllogistic has arguably reflected the logical concerns of the interpreter’s time. In the 50’s and 60’s, Łukasiewicz (1957) and Patzig (1968) took syllogistic forms to be true generalized conditionals and so instances of these forms, implications. In the early 70’s, by contrast, Corcoran (1974) and Smiley (1973) independently argued that syllogistic forms are valid inference rules and instances of these forms, deductions.

It is now fairly standardly held that syllogisms are inferences. And indeed, the arguments for the reading of syllogisms as implications are unpersuasive. I will assume that syllogisms are inferences, and so I will take the acceptability relation—the relation between a premise set \( \{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n\} \) and a conclusion set \( \{\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_m\} \) in a syllogism—to be inferential. It may seem trivial to note this assumption, given its broad acceptance today, but it will prove fruitful to flag now that syllogisms are inferences, since it will allow us later to distinguish the proposal of the paper from a view that might on the surface otherwise resemble it. The reader might view the next sections as the argument that, even if syllogisms are inferences, they ought not to be interpreted as moods.

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10 If \( p \) and \( q \) are open sentences and \( Q \) a string of universal quantifiers, one for each free variable in \( (p \supset q) \), then \( Q(p \supset q) \) is a universalized conditional. So the syllogistic form of Barbara, on this interpretation, looks like this: For all \( A, B, C \): if \( B \) holds of every \( A \) and \( C \) holds of every \( B \), then \( C \) holds of every \( A \).

11 Łukasiewicz (1957: 1-3, 20-30) and Patzig (1968: 3-4), for example, defend their view that syllogisms are not inferences but implications in part by noting that Aristotle generally presents syllogisms in conditional form. For example, Barbara is stated at 25b37-39 as: “if \( A \) is said of every \( B \) and \( B \) of every \( C \), then it is necessary for \( A \) to be predicated of every \( C \).” But it would be natural in some contexts to express inferences as conditionals where, if the premises hold, then the conclusion follows. Austin (1952), Rose (1968: 25) and Corcoran (1972: 278) all make this observation. Alexander (in An Pr. 373, 29-35) claims that “‘if \( A \), then \( B \)” means the same as ‘\( B \) follows from \( A \)”’. Morison (2011) holds that Aristotle uses conditionals to assert not the syllogism but the conditions under which a syllogism results—namely, the premises in the antecedent—and the conclusion which can be drawn when those conditions obtain.
In this section, I will examine the textual support for the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs. The result, along with the considerations from the preceding section, is that syllogisms are inferences from a given unordered premise pair to some conclusion or other. In going through the evidence for the claim, I will make six ports of call.

I begin with an uncontroversial observation. Aristotle occasionally states moods with non-canonical premise order. For example, Aristotle typically states the major premise first but at APr 1.6, 28a26-29 Aristotle states the major premise of Felapton \( \langle \text{AeB, CaB, AoC} \rangle \) after the minor premise. This phenomenon is well recognized. Examples of this observation in the secondary literature include Lukasiewicz (1957, 34), Rose (1968, ch. 10), Thom (1979, 753) and Morison (2015, 111). Aristotle’s lax approach to premise order is not sloppiness. For it is not merely that Aristotle can mention moods with alternative premise order; he also uses moods within reductio proofs in a way that suggests a tacit permutation rule. For example, the proof of Felapton at APr 1.6, 28a26-28 requires the non-canonical premise order. The medieval memnomatics encode this step with an ‘m’ and Thom (1979, 753) formalizes this rule as follows: “Let \( p \) be a protasis and \( Q, R \) be sequences of protases which do not differ otherwise than in the ordering of their elements. Then, if \( Q/p \) is a thesis so is \( R/p \).”

The authors in the secondary literature who comment on Aristotle’s use of moods with non-canonical premise order, however, do not claim that the syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs but rather endorse some weaker claim. For
example, Thom’s permutation rule allows only that the validity of the mood \( \langle p_1, p_2, s \rangle \) entails that there is a valid mood \( \langle p_2, p_1, s \rangle \). Thom perhaps views Aristotle as advocating a stronger thesis. He (1979, 753) writes: “Aristotle sometimes tacitly permutes theses, stating their premisses at one time in one order, at another in another.” This suggests that the validity of the mood \( \langle p_1, p_2, s \rangle \) entails that there is a valid mood \( \langle p_2, p_1, s \rangle \) which is the same mood as \( \langle p_1, p_2, s \rangle \). To give a second example from the secondary literature, Morison (2015, 111) draws from this evidence the conclusion that “Aristotle did not think the order of premises was important,” which may also suggest that moods with inverted premise order are the same syllogism. Of course, these views are still weaker than my proposal that moods with different *conclusions* can be the same syllogism. So let us turn to the next port of call, Aristotle’s discussion of the subaltern moods.

The five traditional subaltern moods are (in the first figure) Barbari \( \langle PaM, MaS, PiS \rangle \) and Celaront \( \langle PeM, MaS, PoS \rangle \), (in the second figure) Cesaro \( \langle MeP, MaS, PoS \rangle \) and Camestrop \( \langle MaP, MeS, PoS \rangle \) and (in the fourth figure, discussed below) Camenop \( \langle MaP, SeM, PoS \rangle \). These are all derivable from moods in one of the traditional four figures by the additional application of a rule of subalternation to the conclusion of the original mood. So for example, Barbari can be shown to be a valid mood by applying a-i subalternation, the inference from PaS to PiS, to the conclusion of Barbara. Aristotle is committed to the validity of these subaltern syllogisms. Indeed, it would be remarkable, given all that he says, were he to have failed to recognize these syllogisms.\(^{12}\) A charitable reading of their omission is not that Aristotle missed this class of syllogism, but that he

\(^{12}\) For example, Aristotle does not explicitly state a-i subalternation, but Top. 2.1, 109a1-6 suggests that AaB entails AiB.
did not believe these to be a class distinct from syllogisms he does discuss. On this reading, since they share the same premise pair, Barbara and Barbari are not treated as distinct items in the classification of assertoric moods in APr 1.4-6. Notice that the absence of subaltern moods establishes only that, if perhaps distinct syllogisms share the same premise pair, they are not treated as distinct moods in this classification.

This general line of interpretation is venerable. Arnauld and Nicole (1662, 142) write that

people have been satisfied with classifying syllogisms only in terms of the nobler conclusion, which is general. Accordingly they have not counted as a separate syllogism the one in which only a particular conclusion is drawn when a general conclusion is warranted.

By ‘nobler’ Arnauld and Nicole appear to mean the stronger conclusion. Also citing Arnauld and Nicole, Parsons (2014, 16) takes a similar interpretation: “Aristotle has only 19 moods because he is examining which combinations of premises can yield a valid conclusion.” These authors appear to making a weaker claim about the classification of syllogisms, and not the stronger claim I aim to defend about their individuation. There is certainly an emphasis on the premise pairs in the classification of moods in APr 1.4-22. Aristotle typically notes, for a given premise pair, that a conclusion necessarily follows or that no conclusion necessarily follows. In the former case, he then gives a proof for a specific example of such a conclusion. The classification then is on the basis of the quantity and quality of the premises. Aristotle does not classify the moods according to what conclusions are entailed by some set of premises or other. To show that, for a given arrangement of premises, some conclusion or other follows, is sufficient for Aristotle’s aims.
But I wish to go further than the Arnauld and Nicole interpretation and show that sharing the same premises is not a peculiarity of classification but a criterion for counting syllogisms as the same or distinct. There is more direct evidence that syllogisms are individuated by their premises. Aristotle occasionally characterizes two or more moods as the same syllogism or as different syllogisms. Our third port of call is Aristotle’s discussion of the so-called fourth figure moods. In the canonical format for the fourth figure, the middle term is in the predicate position of the second premise and in the subject position of the first premise. So the fourth figure moods have the form \( \langle MxP, SyM, PzS \rangle \). Although Aristotle does not include the fourth figure moods among those discussed in the classification of APr 1.4-6, he does explicitly recognizes their validity. Aristotle appears to view some fourth figure moods as not distinct syllogisms from those already discussed in the classification of APr 1.4-6. In APr 2.1 (53ª3-14) Aristotle recognizes Bramantip \( \langle MaP, SaM, PiS \rangle \), Camenes \( \langle MaP, SeM, PeS \rangle \) and Dimaris \( \langle MiS, PaM, PiS \rangle \). Here is the Smith (1989, 65) translation:

**T3**

Now, seeing that some deductions are universal and others are particular, all the universals always deduce several results; among particular deductions, positive deductions deduce several things, but negatives only deduce their conclusions. For, although the privative <particular> premise does not convert, the other premises convert; and the conclusion is one thing predicated about another, so that the other deductions deduces several things. For example, if A has been proved to belong to every B or to some, then it is also necessary for B to belong to some A; and if A has been proved to belong to no B, then neither does B belong to any A (and this conclusion is different from the previous one). However, if A does not belong to some B, it is not also necessary for B not to belong to some A, since it is possible for it to belong to every.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{13}\) ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ μὲν καθόλου τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἰσίν οἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος, οἱ μὲν καθόλου πάντες αἰεὶ πλείω συλλογίζονται, τῶν δ᾽ ἐν μέρει οἱ μὲν κατηγορικοὶ πλείω, οἱ δ᾽ ἀποφατικοὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα μόνον. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι προτάσεις ἀντιστρέφουσιν, ἢ δὲ στερητικὴ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τὶ κατὰ τινὸς ἔστιν, ὡσθ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι
This passage provides some evidence that Aristotle not only views the items classified in APr 1.4-6 as individuated by premise pairs, as Arnauld and Nicole seem to hold, but that syllogisms themselves are so individuated.

I have two reasons for believing this. First, although he clearly holds that Bramantip is derivable from Barbara by inverting the premises and converting the conclusion, Aristotle does not appear to view Bramantip as itself an argument which includes the conversion rule as an additional premise. Aristotle holds that a syllogism strictly has just two premises. I will defend this claim in §4, and so will not put any weight on this first consideration here.

But here is a second reason for taking this third port of call to support my thesis. Aristotle uses at 53ª5 and 53ª9 in T3 the somewhat peculiar locution pleiō sullogizontai. Liddell and Scott take one meaning of the deponent verb sullogizomai to be ‘to infer by way of syllogism’. With the adverb pleiō, the expression pleiō sullogizontai at 53ª5 and 53ª10 means literally the same as ‘to infer severally by way of syllogism’. The object of sullogizomai is the conclusion so inferred, and Smith (1989, 65) rightly translates the qualified expression as ‘deduce several results’ or ‘deduce several things’. But the subject of the verb is not the premises of the inferences, but the deduction itself. And so Aristotle gives the appearance of claiming that one and the same syllogism can have several distinct conclusions, and not that the premises of one syllogism can also be the premises of another syllogism with a distinct conclusion from the first. For these reasons, Aristotle

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συλλογισμοὶ πλείω συλλογίζονται, οίνον εἰ τὸ Α δέδεικται παντὶ τοῦ Β ἢ τινί, καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῶι Α ἀναγκαῖον ύπάρχειν, καὶ εἰ μηδενὶ τοῦ Β τὸ Α, οὐδὲ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῶι Α, τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔτερον τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν· εἰ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ύπάρχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῶι Α μὴ ύπάρχειν· ἐνδέχεται γάρ παντὶ ύπάρχειν.
does not seem to view Bramantip, Camenes and Dimaris as distinct syllogisms from Barbara, Celarent and Darii, respectively.

This reading of APr 2.1 has precedent. A broadly similar reading plays an important role in Duerlinger’s (1968a: 497–8, 1968b: 231) argument that syllogisms are consequent premise pairs. The line of interpretation is controversial, however, and I will consider alternative readings in §4, and clarify my points of agreement and disagreement with Duerlinger in §5.

But let me lay out all of the textual evidence before discussing objections.

Aristotle also recognizes the two remaining fourth figure moods, Fesapo (MeP, SaM, PoS) and Fresison (MeP, SiM, PoS). Neither of these is equivalent to a first figure mood with inverted premises and a converted conclusion. And Aristotle treats Fesapo and Fresison differently from the fourth figure moods discussed in APr 2.1. The relevant passage is APr 1.7 (29a19-27). Here then is our fourth port of call, again in the Smith (1989) translation:

\[ \text{T4} \]

It is also clear that in all the figures, whenever a deduction does not come about, then when both the terms are positive or privative no necessary result comes about at all; but when one term is positive and the other privative, then when the privative is taken as universal, a deduction of the minor extreme in relation to the major always comes about. For example, if A belongs to every or to some B and B to no C: if the premises are converted, it is necessary for C not to belong to some A. And similarly also in the case of the other figures, for a deduction always comes about through conversion.\[14\]

\[14\] Δήλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀπασί τοῖς σχήμασιν, ὅταν μὴ γίνεται συλλογισμός, κατηγορικών μὲν ἢ στερητικῶν ἄμφοτέρων ὄντων τῶν ὄρων οὐδὲν ὅλως γίνεται ἀναγκαῖον, κατηγορικῷ δὲ καὶ στερητικῷ, καθόλου λιθθέντος τοῦ στερητικοῦ ἀεὶ γίνεται συλλογισμός τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἄκρου πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν A παντὶ τῷ B ἢ τινί, τὸ δὲ B μηδὲν τῷ Γ· ἀντιστρεφομένων γὰρ τῶν προτάσεων ἀνάγκη τὸ Γ τινὶ τῶι A μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ομοίως δὲ καὶ τῶι ἐτέρων σχήματων· ἀεὶ γὰρ γίνεται διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς συλλογισμός.
Fesapo and Fresison are derivable from Ferio by a process that includes converting the premises. However, Aristotle does not claim that for this reason the original premises ‘syllogize severally’. Were syllogisms individuated by ordered premises and a conclusion, we would expect all of the fourth figure syllogisms—Fesapo and Fresison, along with Bramantip, Camenes and Dimaris—to be treated uniformly. But where the premises of Bramantip, Camenes and Dimaris are merely inverted from their correlated first figure moods, converting the premises of Fesapo and Fresison are also converted from their correlated first figure mood. This conversion of premises suffices to yield a distinct syllogism (provided of course that some conclusion or other follows from the converted premises).

Aristotle is nonetheless willing to call Fesapo and Fresison syllogisms. He thus appears to concede that these fourth figure moods, unlike Bramantip, Camenes and Dimaris, fall outside of the classification of APr 1.4-6. And so if a fourth figure mood shares unordered premise pairs with a first figure mood, then Aristotle identifies the first and fourth figure moods; but if a fourth figure mood does not share unordered premise pairs with a first figure mood, then Aristotle treats that fourth figure mood as a syllogism distinct from the moods classified in APr 1.4-6.

I turn to our fifth port of call. At APr 1.42 (50a5-7) Aristotle writes the following, with some variation from the Smith translation:

**T5** Let us not fail to notice that not all the conclusions in the same syllogism are from a single figure, but rather one is through this figure and one is through another.15

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15 Μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ ἡμᾶς ὅτι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς συλλογισμοῖς οὐχ ἀπαντᾷ τὰ συμπεράσματα δι’ ἕνος σχῆματος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν διὰ τούτου τὸ δὲ δι’ ἄλλου.
Here in *T5* Aristotle explicitly discusses the individuation of syllogisms and under what conditions apparently distinct arguments are the same syllogism. He appears to claim that one and the same syllogism can have distinct conclusions. Moreover, one and the same syllogism can be in distinct figures. A natural suggestion is that Aristotle is referencing the fourth figure moods he recognizes in APr 2.1, Bramantip, Camenes and Dimaris. Admittedly, this would be a controversial reading and I will consider an alternative interpretation in §4.

Our sixth and final port of call. So far, we have seen that Aristotle identifies moods classified within APr 1.4-6 which share unordered premise pairs. Camestres ⟨MaN, MeX, NeX⟩ and Cesare ⟨MeN, MaX, NeX⟩ are two second figure moods with inverted premises. Recall, Aristotle typically introduces a mood by noting, for a given arrangement of premise forms, that a conclusion necessarily follows. In APr 1.5 Aristotle introduces Camestres and Cesare together by noting first that there is a deduction in the second figure, where the middle term is the predicate of both premises, provided one term is an a-proposition and the other an e-proposition. Here is the passage in full, again with some variation from the Smith translation.

*T6* When the terms are universal, there will be a syllogism when the middle belongs to all of one term and none of the other, no matter which one the privative is in relation to, but otherwise in no way. For let M be predicated of no N but of every X. Then, since the privative converts, N will belong to no M. But M was assumed to belong to every X, so that N belongs to no X (for this has been proved earlier). Next, if M belongs to every N but to no X, then neither will N belong to any X. For if M belongs to no X, neither does X belong to any M; but M belonged to every N; therefore, X will belong to no N (for the first figure has again come about). And since the privative converts, neither will N belong to any X, so that there will be the same syllogism (*ho autos sullogismos*). (It is also possible to prove these results by leading to an impossibility.) It is evident, then, that a syllogism
comes about when the terms are related in this way, but not a perfect syllogism. (27\textsuperscript{a}3-16)\textsuperscript{16}

Here Aristotle asserts that when the premises share a predicate and one is an a-proposition and the other an e-proposition, there is a syllogism since at least one conclusion follows necessarily. He goes on to show that this is the case by deriving both Cesare and Camestres. He calls Camestres the same syllogism (\textit{ho autos syllogismos}) as Cesare at 27\textsuperscript{a}14. Like the case of Bramantip and Barbara, Aristotle clearly identifies Camestres and Cesare. As in our previous port of call, this is a controversial reading, and I will consider an alternative in §4.

But it may be helpful to the reader to first pause and sum up the evidence considered to this point. I have drawn on Aristotle’s claim that some syllogisms syllogize several results at 53\textsuperscript{a}5 and 53\textsuperscript{a}10 in \textbf{T3}, that distinct conclusions can belong to the same syllogism at 50\textsuperscript{a}5 in \textbf{T5}, and that Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27\textsuperscript{a}14 in \textbf{T6}, as evidence that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs. These passages are among the very few of which I am aware where Aristotle gives explicit guidance on how to individuate syllogisms: 27\textsuperscript{a}14 and 53\textsuperscript{a}18 are the only occurrences in

\textsuperscript{16} καθόλου μὲν ὁσὲν ὄντων ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὅταν τὸ μέσον τοις μὲν παντὶ τοῖς δὲ μηδὲν ὑπάρχῃ, ἂν πρὸς ὄπτερωσύνῃ ὃ ἄν τὸ στρεπτικὸν· ἄλλως δ᾽ ὄουδαμῶς, καθηγορεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸ Μ τοῖς μὲν Ν μηδένος, τοῦ δὲ Σ παντὸς, ἐπει ὅσον ἀντιστρέφει τὸ στρεπτικὸν, οὐδὲν τοῖς Μ ὑπάρξει τὸ Ν· τὸ δὲ γε Μ παντὶ τοῖς Σ ὑπέκειτο· ὅστε τὸ Ν οὐδὲν τοῖς Ξ· τοῦτο γὰρ δεδεικται πρῶτερον. πάλιν εἰ τὸ Μ τοῖς μὲν Ν παντὶ τοῖς δὲ Ξ μηδένι, οὐδὲ τὸ Ξ τοῖς Ν οὐδὲν ὑπάρξει (εἰ γὰρ τὸ Μ οὐδὲν τοῖς Σ, οὐδὲ τὸ Ξ οὐδὲν τοῖς Μ· τὸ δὲ γε Μ παντὶ τοῖς Ν ὑπῆρχεν· τὸ άρα Ξ οὐδὲν τοῖς Ν ὑπάρξει· γεγένηται γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πρώτον σχῆμα)· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀντιστρέφει τὸ στρεπτικὸν, οὐδὲ τὸ Ν οὐδὲν τοῖς Ξ ὑπάρξει, ὅστε ἔσται ὁ ἄυτος συλλογισμὸς. ἔστι δὲ δεικνύναι ταῦτα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄγοντας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἔχοντων τῶν ὁρῶν, φανερὸν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τέλειος·
The interpretation that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs may be surprising, given the long historical association of syllogisms with the traditional moods. In the next section, I will consider several objections. But in this section I will first note that the view is consistent with several other features of the Prior Analytics. First, notice that the view is consonant with the characterization of a syllogism in T1. Recall, Aristotle characterizes a syllogism as “a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something (τι) different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so.” The second occurrence of the indefinite pronoun τις in this characterization (here declined as τι) could be read as referring to an unspecified conclusion. If so, the characterization only requires that the premises of a syllogism entail some conclusion or other. The reader might object that, if the same syllogism can have multiple conclusions, then Aristotle should speak of several results, and T1 should have the neutral plural of τις,

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17 Aristotle uses τὸν αὐτὸν … συλλογισμὸν at 29ª28-29. The passage in which the expression occurs immediately follows T4, at APr 1.7 (29ª27-29): “It is also clear that putting an indeterminate premise in place of a positive particular will produce the same deduction in every figure.” (δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀδιόριστον ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ τοῦ ἐν μέρει τιθέμενον τὸν αὐτὸν ποιήσει συλλογισμὸν ἐν ἀπασί τοῖς σχήμασιν.) Indeterminate propositions lack explicit quantity but we might take them to have hidden universal or particular quantity which must be supplied in context. For example, they seem to be equivalent to particular propositions in this passage but, as Striker (2009, 77) notes, the examples given at 24ª21-22, ‘the science of contraries is the same’ and ‘pleasure is not a good’, seem to be equivalent to universal propositions. Regardless, 29ª27-29 is neutral on the question whether syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs.
But the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs entails only that a syllogism has some conclusion or other, even if there are multiple conclusions available. Nothing we have seen requires that a statement of a syllogism should explicitly draw all available conclusions. I will return to this point in §5.  

The interpretation is also consistent with the various signposts and metalogical observations scattered throughout the Prior Analytics. The two books of this work include a formal study of the assertoric and modal moods, but are largely concerned with two other topics: heuristics, the choice of appropriate premises for desired conclusions, and analytics, the reformulation of given arguments into syllogistic form. Aristotle marks the transitions between these sections with signposts which give good evidence of how he himself views the goals of these sections.

Aristotle never states an explicit aim of specifying the syllogisms—laying out the premises and conclusions of each syllogism. His avowed aim is rather to show what pairs of propositions are the premise pairs of a syllogism. For example, he begins his formal study of the moods with the following exhortation at APr 1.4 (25b26-27).

\begin{quote}
T7 Let us say now through what premises, when, and how every syllogism comes about.  
\end{quote}

Aristotle appears to state three aims here—to state through what premises every syllogism comes about, when every syllogism comes about and how every syllogism comes about. How ought we to take these aims? Aristotle has call-backs to T7 at APr

\[18\] Moreover, T1 might be merely a sufficient condition for being a syllogism, and having at least one conclusion (along with the other criteria) would suffice.

\[19\] Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ἢδη διά τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πώς γίνεται πᾶς συλλογισμός.
1.22 (40\(^b\) 12-14), 1.27 (43\(^a\) 16-19) and 1.32 (46\(^b\) 38-40). Let’s take a closer look at the second of these.

**T8** From what has been said, then, it is clear how every syllogism comes about, both through how many terms and premises and what relationships they are in to one another, and furthermore what sort of problem (*problēma*) is proved in each figure, and what sort in more and what in fewer figures.

Again, Aristotle emphasizes his aim of showing what pairs of propositions are the premise pairs of a syllogism. The goal of laying out the relationships among these propositions may correspond to Aristotle’s stated aim in T7 at 25\(^b\) 27 to explain ‘how’ (*pōs*) syllogisms come about. But is not entirely clear how the three clauses in T7 correspond to achievements claimed in T8. And so it is unclear what the difference are among the three clauses in T7. I doubt that distinct roles for each clause—through what premises every syllogism comes about, when every syllogism comes about and how every syllogism comes about—can be assigned. Indeed, these clauses may well be pleonastic. The most that can confidently be said is that Aristotle aims to show what premises pairs are the premise pairs of a syllogism. This is consistent with taking syllogisms to have multiple available conclusions. Aristotle does show a concern in T8 with the conclusions that can be drawn from concludent premise pairs. As Smith (1989, 114) notes, the expression *problēma* invariably in the Prior Analytics has the sense of “types of categorical sentences … found as conclusions.” But Aristotle takes himself only to have shown what conclusion follows in each figure—that is, what moods, with a strict

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20 Πῶς μὲν οὖν γίνεται πᾶς συλλογισμὸς καὶ διὰ πόσων ὅρων καὶ προτάσεων, καὶ πῶς ἔχοισθι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἐτι δὲ ποίον πρόβλημα ἐν ἕκαστῳ σχήματι καὶ ποίον ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ποίον ἐν ἑλάττωσι δείκνυται, δήλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
premise order and a single conclusion, correspond to syllogisms. And again, this is consistent with taking syllogisms to have multiple available conclusions.

Aristotle goes on to describe how one might seek syllogisms for a given conclusion. A complete specification of syllogisms arguably would serve Aristotle’s purposes here better. For example, if I wanted to derive AiC, I could look for the premises AaB and BaC, an heuristic strategy obscured by the omission of the subaltern mood Barbari from the discussion of APr 1.4-6. So it seems that I must view Aristotle’s discussion of heuristics in APr 1.23-27 as an impoverished method. However, any interpretation of syllogisms faces this difficulty, whether Barbari is regarded as a neglected mood or as a mood corresponding to the same syllogism to which Barbara corresponds. Moreover, Aristotle does not purport to offer an exhaustive heuristic method. Aristotle lays out his aims in the next passage which, immediately following T8, is APr 1.27 (43a19-24).

T9 Now it is time to explain how we may ourselves always be supplied with syllogisms about what is set up, and the route by which we may obtain the principles concerning any particular subject. For surely one ought not only study the origin of deductions, but also have the power to produce them.21

Judging from T9, Aristotle only aims to supply syllogisms and have the power to produce them. He does not aim to have an exhaustive supply of valid inferences from a given premise pair to whatever conclusion follows from those premises. Nor does Aristotle aim to give the reader an unlimited or maximal power of the production of syllogisms. And yet again, this is consistent with taking syllogisms to have multiple available conclusions.

21 Πῶς δ’ εὕπορήσομεν αὐτοὶ πρὸς το τιθέμενον ἀεὶ συλλογισμόν, καὶ διὰ ποίᾳς ὁδοῦ ληφόμεθα τὰς περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἀρχὰς, γὰρ ἣν ηδή λεκτέων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἔσσως δεὶ τὴν γένεσιν θεωρεῖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ ποιεῖν.
Similar comments can be made on Aristotle’s discussion of analysis, or the leading of syllogisms back into one of the moods. Aristotle’s explicit characterization of his aims in this section seems to be to take a given informal argument and present it as one of the moods. Consider his discussion at APr 1.32 (46b40-47a5):

\textbf{T10} \quad \text{We must explain how we can lead syllogisms back into the figures stated previously, for this part of our inquiry still remains. For if we should study the origin of syllogisms, and also should have the power of finding them, and if, moreover, we could resolve those which have already been produced into the figures previously stated, then our initial project would have reached its goal.}^{22}

Not unlike in the case of heuristics discussed above, it may seem that this is an impoverished method: wouldn’t it be better to have more valid inferences from premise pairs to conclusions with which to work, when aiming to formally represent an informal argument? My response to this objection is similar to my response to the objection in the heuristics case. Any interpretation of syllogisms faces difficulties of this sort. For Aristotle’s professed aim in APr 1.4-6, to classify all valid moods, is unfulfilled.

However, this raises an interesting question. On the interpretation I have pushed for, there are striking differences between moods and syllogisms. Aristotle’s explicit aim is to provide an exhaustive list of syllogisms. Yet he proceeds in APr 1.4-6 by classifying assertoric moods. Why does Aristotle proceed in this way? I will return to this question in §5.

\footnote{vore δ’ ἀνάξιομεν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἰς τὰ προειρημένα σχήματα, λεκτέον ἂν εἰ ἐπὶ μετὰ ταῦτα· λοιπὸν γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο τῆς σκέψεως. εἰ γὰρ τὴν τὴν γένεσιν τῶν συλλογισμῶν θεωροῦμεν καὶ τοῦ εὐρίσκειν ἐξομεν δύναμιν, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς γεγενημένους ἀναλύοιμεν εἰς τὰ προειρημένα σχήματα, τέλος ἂν ἔχοι ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσις.}
Let me respond now to a few objections. I have looked at Aristotle’s claims that some syllogisms syllogize several results at 53a5 and 53a10 in T3, that distinct conclusions can belong to the same syllogism at 50a5 in T5, and that Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27a14 in T6. One might take a deflationary view of the evidence in T3, T5 and T6 and hold that, in one way or another, Aristotle means something other than an ordinary syllogism in these passages. For example, one might take Aristotle to intend in some of these passages an extended sense of ‘syllogism’ under which a syllogism is an argument that may contain a string of moods or a mood along with other premises. Some commentators take this reading of the claim that some syllogisms syllogize several results at 53a5 and 53a9-10 in T3. Ross (1949, 425) takes the question here to be “what conclusions, besides the primary conclusion, a syllogism can be held to prove implicitly.” Smith (1989, 183) appears to agree, holding that Aristotle “shows that an additional conclusion can be derived from many deductive forms through conversion.” And many commentators hold that Aristotle is speaking in T5 of a string of moods. For example, Ross (1949, 414) notes that Aristotle means “an extended argument in which more than one syllogism occurs.” Smith (1989, 174) agrees, noting that Aristotle “means an extended deduction which may contain subsidiary deductions in several figures.” Striker (2009, 235) concurs.

Aristotle allows for this extended sense of ‘syllogism’. He considers in APr 1.25 (42b1-26) and 2.18 arguments that consist of a series of syllogisms. Aristotle is willing to call such arguments syllogisms and so they are exceptions to the thesis that syllogisms
have no more than three terms and two premises. But he appears to view these arguments as reducible to, and equivalent with, two-premise moods. So in this sense even these arguments are two premise syllogisms. Aristotle repeats that a syllogism has only three terms at APr 1.28 (44b6), 1.30 (46a6) and APo 1.9 (81b10). And generally Aristotle uses an extended sense of ‘syllogism’ in contexts where it is clear that he is talking about strings of strict syllogisms. For example, in APr 1.25 Aristotle’s intention is to show that, since strings of strict syllogisms are equivalent to syllogisms in one of the figures, they do not fall entirely outside of the classification of moods in APr 1.4-6. In passages where the context is not restricted in this way, then surely the strict sense of ‘syllogism’ is the interpretative default. I will assume that strict syllogisms are the intended sense unless it proves impossible to understand Aristotle’s intention otherwise. Aristotle does not flag that he means syllogism in its extended sense in T3 and T5. And it would be surprising if the extended sense of syllogism is intended in T3 or T5. For these passages do not concern extended argument forms. Rather, Aristotle’s interest in with the relation between fourth figure moods and moods of one the figures classified in APr 1.4-6. So it is unlikely that this deflationary strategy can provide an attractive reading of these passages. Similarly, such a gambit cannot be used to dismiss the evidence in T6. Here too, Aristotle does not seem to be discussing extended arguments; rather, he is comparing the two moods Camestres and Cesare. So the postulation of an extended sense of syllogism is not a general strategy to object to the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs.

Another deflationary strategy would be to take ‘syllogism’ occasionally to be used synecdochically to mean some part of a syllogism. For example, one might take
Aristotle’s intention when he claims that certain syllogisms ‘syllogize severally’ is to assert that certain pairs of premises deduces several conclusions, and so the same unordered premises can be contained in distinct syllogisms. However, Aristotle has the resources to say this, since he can distinguish the premises from the syllogism with the protasis terminology, used throughout the Prior Analytics. Alternatively, one might take ‘syllogism’ to refer occasionally to the conclusion of a syllogism. Such a move would deflate Aristotle’s characterization of Camestres and Cesare as the same syllogism. Striker (2009, 101), for example, takes ‘the same syllogism’ to mean “a [distinct] syllogism with the same conclusion. Here as in many other places Aristotle uses the word ‘syllogism’ both for an entire argument and for its conclusion. His special term for conclusion, [sumperasma], appears only from chapter 8 onwards.” On this reading, Camestres and Cesare share a conclusion but are distinct syllogisms. And the view has the added support that Aristotle might lack the terminological resources when he is writing T6 to distinguish syllogisms from their conclusions. However, the reading at best only handles our sixth port of call, Aristotle’s claim that Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27ª14 in T6. The reading does not handle well our third nor fifth ports of call, Aristotle’s claims respectively that some syllogisms syllogize several results at 53ª5 and 53ª10 in T3, and that distinct conclusions can belong to the same syllogism at 50ª5 in T5. The suggestion that Aristotle lacks the terminology to distinguish a syllogism from its conclusion when writing these passages is highly implausible. Aristotle uses sumperasma as the conclusion of a syllogism at 53ª19, in a passage immediately following T3.
What then motivates these deflationary readings of Aristotle’s claim that 
Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27a14? It is perhaps the belief that, since 
Camestres and Cesare are distinct moods in the classification of APr 1.4-6, they must be 
distinct syllogisms. Such a belief might rest on the assumption that the classification of 
moods is intended to provide a list of syllogisms which is both exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. Were this assumption correct, then the suggestion that Camestres and Cesare 
are really the same syllogism would run counter to Aristotle’s intentions in classifying 
the moods. So let me now discuss this assumption. Aristotle gives the impression that the 
classification in APr 1.4-6 is intended to be exhaustive. For example, as we have seen, he 
anounces his intention to classify all syllogisms (pas sullogismos) at APr 1.4 (25b27, 31) 
in T7 and T8 and elsewhere. By APr 1.23, Aristotle has shown that the syllogisms in the 
three figures can be completed by Barbara and Celarent; he (40b20-23) writes that “it will 
now be evident that this holds for every syllogism without qualification, when every one 
has been proved to come about through some one of these figures.” These and other 
metatheorems require that Aristotle have an exhaustive list of valid syllogisms.

As we have seen, Aristotle recognizes that the method of classification of moods 
in APr 1.4-6 underdetermines valid syllogisms. For Aristotle acknowledges in APr 1.7 
that Fesapo and Fresison are syllogisms left unclassified in APr 1.4.6. It may be that 
Aristotle holds that the classification, when supplemented by these two outliers, is 
exhaustive. If so, he would have been clearer to have flagged the inclusion of these two 
moods in such discussions as APr 1.23. Regardless, it appears to be Aristotle’s intention 
to provide a list of syllogisms that is exhaustive. However, I know of no passage that 
suggests that the classification in APr 1.4-6 is intended to be mutually exclusive. Aristotle
seeks a method to systematically go through every permutation of terms in given pairs of premises, and show which pairs of premises entail some conclusion or other. Nothing in this way of proceeding requires that the resulting list be mutually exclusive. Repetition of a syllogism would not undermine Aristotle’s intentions; it would be merely inefficient. And since I believe that there is good evidence that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs, and so certain pairs of moods, such as Camestres and Cesare, are not distinct syllogisms, I am inclined to believe that the classification of moods in APr 1.4-6 overdetermines the valid syllogisms.

I will bring this section of the paper to a close. In §2, I examined evidence that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs. This evidence includes Aristotle’s claim that some syllogisms syllogize several results at 53ª5 and 53ª10 in T3, that distinct conclusions can belong to the same syllogism at 50ª5 in T5, and that Camestres and Cesare are the same syllogism at 27ª14 in T6. In this section, I have considered several deflationary readings of these passages. The deflationary readings are not well motivated, and so fail to undermine the evidential support the passages provide.

Sections §§2-4 are the main line of the paper’s argument, and this section will not add any further support to the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs. Instead, I will discuss a few consequences of this thesis. The discussion will be too brief to be fully satisfying. But I hope to indicate in broad strokes how the considerations raised in this paper interact with questions about the representation of the syllogistic.
The textual evidence examined above might suggest to the reader one of two potentially misleading interpretations of syllogisms, and I will discuss each in turn. First, one might view syllogisms as concludent premise pairs. On this view, syllogisms are not themselves inferences but are conjunctive propositions which license drawing one or more conclusions. As I noted in §2, Duerlinger (1968a, 1968b) appeals to T3 to defend this line of interpretation. The thesis I am putting forward in this paper, the view that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs, is of course a weaker claim, since syllogisms can be individuated by premise pairs without being identified with such pairs. Although I have argued that T3, T5 and T6 offer good support for the weaker thesis, they offer no support for the stronger thesis. The weaker claim, moreover, is consistent with viewing syllogisms as inferences. And although I merely sketched some of the considerations in favour of this inferential reading in §1, it is now standardly held, I believe it to be correct, and there is no reason to saddle the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs with the denial that syllogisms are inferences. The reader might view one goal of this paper, then, as to revisit some of the textual evidence examined by Duerlinger, along with other textual evidence, in light of more recent interpretative developments.

I turn to the second of the two misleading interpretations of syllogisms. The discussion to this point might suggest to the reader that syllogisms are multiple-succedent sequents. Single-succedent sequents are expressions such as

\[ p_1, \ldots, p_n \vdash s \]
where the antecedent \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \), the premises together, entail the conclusion or succedent, \( s \). A multiple-succedent sequent such as

\[
p_1, \ldots, p_n \vdash s_1, \ldots, s_n
\]

is a generalization of this notion of a sequent. To view syllogisms as such sequents requires an unusual interpretation. The standard informal understanding of sequents takes a conjunctive reading of the antecedent and a disjunctive reading of the succedent, so that the above multiple-succedent sequent has the same interpretation as

if every \( p_i \) is true, then at least one \( s_i \) is true.

Were syllogisms multiple-succedent sequents, they would require a conjunctive reading of the succedent, and so have the same interpretation as

if every \( p_i \) is true, then every \( s_i \) is true.

That is to say, the members of the antecedent together entail all of the members of the succedent.

The suggestions that Aristotle recognizes a multiple conclusion logic and that he understands multiple conclusions conjunctively both have precedent in Malink’s innovative interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion in APr 2.5-7 of circular proof. Malink (2013, 220) presents the general structure of a circular proof as: “\( P_1 \) is proved from \( P_2 \), \( P_2 \) is proved from \( P_3 \), . . ., \( P_{n-1} \) is proved from \( P_n \), and \( P_n \) is proved from \( P_1 \) (\( n \geq 1 \)).” Malink persuasively argues that the \( P_1 \) must be pluralities of propositions in order for Aristotle to give a syllogistic analysis of this argument form. Malink (2013, 246) concludes that “a plurality of propositions can be deduced from another plurality.” Malink notes that the

\[23\] The turnstile is an object language expression here, and not as it is more commonly used, a metalanguage expression.
multiple conclusions must be read conjunctively and holds that such a reading “is arguably more natural.”24 The results of this paper perhaps may be seen as a complement to Malink’s thesis: Aristotle’s recognition of something like a multiple conclusion logic flows not just from the demands of his discussion of circular proof but from his view of the syllogism itself.

However, there would be something potentially misleading in this reading of syllogisms as *themselves* multiple-succedent sequents. The considerations raised in this paper support only the thesis that syllogisms are individuated by unordered premise pairs. As we have just seen, since syllogisms are rightly viewed to be inferences, they are not concluent premise pairs. But neither do all available conclusions need to be explicitly drawn in a syllogistic inference. Rather, syllogisms are inferences from unordered premise pairs to some conclusion or other from among a set of available conclusions. It is in this sense that, for example, Barbara and Barbari are the same syllogism, despite having different conclusions. For this reason, it might be clearer to say that a syllogism *corresponds* to a multiple-succedent sequence. In the terminology introduced in §1, two moods \( \langle \pi_1, \pi_2, \sigma_1 \rangle \) and \( \langle \pi_3, \pi_4, \sigma_2 \rangle \) are the same syllogism only if there is a multiple-succedent sequent \( \langle \{\pi_1, \pi_2\}, \{\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_m\} \rangle \) such that either \( \pi_3=\pi_1 \) and \( \pi_4=\pi_2 \) or \( \pi_3=\pi_2 \) and \( \pi_4=\pi_1 \), and for some \( i \) such that \( 1 \leq i \leq m \), \( \sigma_i=s_i \), and for some \( j \) such that \( 1 \leq j \leq m \), \( \sigma_2=s_j \).25 So, for example, Barbara \( \langle AaB, BaC, AaC \rangle \) and Barbari \( \langle PaM, MaS, \)

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24 On this latter point, compare Tennant (1997).
25 ‘Only if’: there are other constraints, as mentioned in §1, such as the requirement that no conclusion is the same proposition as any of the premises.
PiS) are the same syllogism because they both correspond to \( \langle \{AaB, BaC\}, \{AaC, AiC, \ldots\} \rangle \).

The proposal that syllogisms are related in this way to multiple-succedent sequents might further suggest to the reader that the syllogistic can be fruitfully thought of as a sequent calculus. But the reasoning Aristotle uses to show the acceptability of the second and third figure moods is recalcitrant to representation as a sequent calculus.  

The method of indirect proof (such as that which Aristotle presents in T2) and Aristotle’s proofs for the conversion rules both rely on a reductio rule.  

A characteristic mark of natural deduction systems, in contradistinction to sequent calculi, is the facility to make, track and subsequently discharge arbitrary assumptions.  

This feature is key to Gentzen’s original presentation and is the sense in which such a deduction system is ‘natural’: its employment reflects this aspect of actual reasoning.  

As the work of Smiley (1973), Corcoran (1974), Smith (1982) and others show, it is attractive to represent the argumentation that Aristotle himself employs in APr 1.4-6 by a natural deduction system.

Notice that there results a point of some interest for the interpretation of the syllogistic and its representation by modern systems. Corcoran (1974, 280) takes the interpretation of syllogisms as implications to entail that the syllogistic is not a natural

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26 I do not claim that the valid syllogisms cannot be systematically presented within a sequent calculus. Crabbè (2003) and Tennant (2014) independently represent the syllogistic in this way, although neither aim to follow Aristotle’s own presentation.

27 Aristotle proves e-conversion at 25a5-17 by employing a reductio principle and the square of opposition (or, at least, the contradictory opposition between e- and i-propositions). He goes on to establish the other conversion rules by reductio proofs that employ the established e-conversion.

28 Pelletier (1999) argues that this feature is the mark most characteristic of natural deduction systems.

29 Gentzen’s (1934, 74) professed aim is “to set up a formalism that reflects as accurately as possible the actual logical reasoning involved in mathematical proofs.”
deduction system and therefore not a logic. But there has been growing recognition that a wide range of systems can provide a logical interpretation of the syllogistic. The diversity of representations I mentioned in the opening paragraph of this paper is a testament to the flexibility of Aristotle’s achievement. To give just two recent examples, Martin (1997) interprets the moods as inferences but represents the syllogistic as a construction, with the perfect moods as basic elements. On this reading, the syllogistic has a structure redolent of an axiomatic theory. Pelletier and Hazen (2012, 52) also reject the assimilation of logics with natural deduction systems while presenting the syllogistic as a metatheory. In this paper, I have argued that syllogisms are related to multiple-succedent sequents. As we have seen, although syllogisms correspond to multiple-succedent sequents, the reasoning used in the syllogistic resembles natural deductions. There is no tension here. For the syllogistic directly derives not syllogisms but moods. The question of how to represent the syllogistic is sensitive to the interpretation of moods, but it is an issue that is one step removed from the interpretation of syllogisms.

We now can return to the question I raised at the end of §3. Why does Aristotle attempt to classify all of the syllogisms by going through the moods? To fully answer this question lies outside my present purposes, but let me sketch an answer. Aristotle’s aim is not just to enumerate the moods but to show what moods are valid. Aristotle takes the first figure moods, along with a reductio rule and the conversion rules, as intuitively valid inferences. It is relatively easy to see that the first figure moods are valid. For example, it is arguably easier to appreciate that the ordered premise pair \( \langle AaB, BaC \rangle \) entails \( AaC \) than to see that \( \{AaB, BaC\} \) entails both \( AaC \) and \( AiC \). Moreover, moods can be employed in proofs more straightforwardly than multiple-succedent sequents. The
reasoning used by conversion and reductio proofs are facilitated by using rules that allow us to derive from a pair of lines in the proof a determinate, unique conclusion. The use of moods, and not syllogisms, has these advantages. But to show, for example, that the mood Cesare \(\langle\text{MeN, MaX, NeX}\rangle\) is valid makes it clear that there is a syllogism with unordered premise pairs \(\{\text{MeN, MaX}\}\) and \(\text{NeX}\) among its conclusions. In this way, Aristotle proves that a mood is valid, and thereby establishes a correlated syllogism.

WORKS CITED


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