

## 8 Souls Within a Soul

### The City-Soul Analogy Revisited\*

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#### Introduction

Readers of the *Republic* have usually seen the passages about the stereotypical characteristics of communities as grounding the city-soul analogy. Plato indeed takes those attributions to be a powerful reason to expect the same types (εἶδη) and manners (ἥθη) in both the city and the individual soul and, hence, to affirm the structural isomorphism of polis and psyche (*Resp.* 435e). This natural reading is considerably challenged by Bernard Williams' "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's 'Republic'" (2001), where it is shown to entail paradoxes that make the analogy flawed. The point lies in the derivation principles that communal stereotypes imply.<sup>1</sup> For while a community is expected to be, say, spirited precisely because all or many or its most prominent members are spirited, it seems that Plato's perfect and imperfect constitutions fail to meet this simple requirement.

In this paper, I will briefly examine Williams' puzzles and lay out their core challenges. Then, I will discuss two of the most prominent attempts to meet them: Lear's psychological interpretation and Ferrari's metaphorical interpretation of the city-soul analogy. As I hope to show, they both entail consequences that run against some of the *Republic's* most important aims or make them plainly unattainable. Finally, by distinguishing psycho-political forces (ἥθη) from psycho-political constitutions (εἶδη), I propose a solution that holds the derivation rules without falling prey to Williams' paradoxes. This solution, we will see, calls for a *prima facie* compelling model of the unity of virtues, that is, a model showing how everyone in Callipolis may possess, in some way, all the virtues.

\* I am deeply grateful to Professor Anthony Preus, under whose mentorship the ideas in this essay came about and developed. Every person—says Coleridge—is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I am glad I had a consummate Aristotelian as a mentor, one that challenged both Plato and my reading of Plato but was always willing to find vestiges of my Plato in his Aristotle. May this text be a humble recognition of his contribution to the formation of a true philosophical κοινὸν, one based on the love of learning, rather than the love of prestige.

### Williams' Puzzles

In “The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s ‘Republic’” Williams targets the city-soul analogy by progressively presenting the puzzles resulting from the derivation rules which, in turn, are elicited from the passages on the stereotypical characteristics of communities. Williams initially argues that if Plato intends those passages to ground what he calls the “analogy of meaning” (i.e., the idea that justice applies to cities and souls, and it instantiates the same εἶδος in both) then he engages in either a pointless or absurd enterprise. If the qualities θυμοειδής, φιλομαθής, φιλοχρήματος (Pl. *Resp.* 435e) are found in cities because they are primarily found in souls, then we do not need to explain how they apply to souls in order to prove that they apply to both city and soul. Presumably, this would be the case of justice as well. The fact that the city’s justice comes from its citizens makes pointless the effort to show how justice applies to the individual—at least in order to prove that justice applies to both city and soul.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, if the examples yield a kind of definition of justice, something like “A thing is just if and only if its constituent parts are just,” then we have an infinite regress.

But, as Williams recognizes, Plato does not intend the derivation rule to yield the common logos of justice. The common logos is, rather, the principle of justice found in the city’s classes doing their job (where the logistic class rules), and ratified when traced back to the individual as each part of the soul doing its job (where the λογιστικόν rules). Although this suffices to evade the charge of infinite regression, it entails other charges that have fatal results for the analogy. Since Plato is interested in sticking to a “whole-part rule” (2001, 159), the derivation rule according to which a city is F *iff* its citizens are F, we have:

- A city is F *iff* its citizens are F.
- The logos of a city’s being F is the same as that of a citizen’s being F (the same εἶδος or F-ness applies to both).

Applying this to the case of justice we have:

1. A city is just *iff* its citizens are just.
2. The logos of a city’s being just is the same as that of a citizen’s being just (the same εἶδος or F-ness applies to both).

Since the logos of justice consists in each element (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδής, and ἐπιθυμητικόν) doing its job—where the λογιστικόν rules, we then have:

3. For the city, to be just involves having a logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic *element*—where the logistic one rules.
4. For the city, to be just involves having logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic *citizens*—where the logistic ones rule.

But (1) and (4) entail a contradiction. For, according to (4), a just city must contain epithymetic citizens and, says Williams, an epithymetic person is surely not just, which means that the city is just despite the majority (they indeed account for the largest class) not being just. We can see the contradiction conversely as well. If (1) holds and the city is just if, and only if, its citizens are just, then the logos of the city's being just must be different from the logos of the individual's being just. In short, if the whole-part rule holds, what he calls the analogy of meaning does not and vice versa.

The tension, Williams observes, underlies the whole of Plato's project in the *Republic*. He invites us to consider the consequences of sticking to the whole-part rule while trying to make out the justice of the non-logistic citizens. If epithymetic citizens share, in some restricted manner, a logistic nature (enough to do their job and recognize the rulers) then, when traced back to the individual soul, we have an awkward consequence: the ἐπιθυμητικόν in the just soul obeys the λογιστικόν by having some λογιστικόν of its own. But if the ἐπιθυμητικόν does not share a logistic nature, and it is weakened and kept in place by the λογιστικόν with the help of the θυμοειδές, we have a very unappealing model when we apply it back to the state: an unjust, uncooperative, and irrational epithymetic class is accordingly repressed by cold-hearted rulers assisted by a highly spirited political police.

The problem cannot be solved, Williams continues, by abandoning the "whole-part rule" and adopting a "predominant section rule": a city is F *iff* its leading, predominant class is F. This is true of the just city, for the guardians are certainly just. It is also true of the imperfect constitutions discussed in Book VIII. And it again takes us to an "ineliminable tension in Plato's use of the analogy" (Williams 2001, 162). In the case of the city, the question is how we are to make sense of the difference between the epithymetic element when appropriately ruled by the logistic guardians, and when led astray, like in the oligarchic or democratic constitutions. For it either shares a logistic nature, by virtue of which the guardians can persuade it into order and structure, or it does not and then epithymetic citizens are not really made just and better by the just constitution: they are at best contained, repressed, as if the just city was not virtuous but only ἐγκρατής (continent). The tension reflects back onto the soul, where we would have ἐπιθυμῖαι that share somewhat in reason, or a model of inner justice that amounts to the repression or even the elimination of ἐπιθυμῖαι.

To be sure, it would still be true that a city is just if, and only if, its leading, predominant class is just, where justice means the same both for city and soul. The logos of justice (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν each doing their job—where the λογιστικόν rules) would require logistic producers and auxiliaries in the city, and logistic appetitive and spirited parts in the soul, with the consequence that everyone in the city would turn out logistic and just. In this case, if the analogy of meaning holds the "predominant section rule" does not, but rather some form of the "whole-part rule." Conversely, if the "predominant section rule" holds, and the just city may contain non-just citizens, then the logos of justice would not require logistic producers and auxiliaries in the city, nor logistic appetitive and spirited parts in the soul, with the consequence that both the city

and the soul would be just even though huge parts of them are not, and can never be, just.

## Two Alternatives

Two alternatives have been proposed to meet the challenge. One of them is to contest Williams' derivation principles on the basis of their excessive formality and, consequently, their failure to grasp the causal-psychological transactions between polis and psyche, which are Plato's real target of analysis. It is not as simple as the city being spirited because all or many or its most prominent members are spirited. The city is spirited because those spirited citizens are successful in shaping the city in their image and, to be sure, that is not the result of a mere logical relation between polis and psyche, but of complex psychological transactions between them: the effective externalization of certain *types* and *manners* (of a whole value-system indeed) onto the polis, and the correlative internalization of those into the souls of private citizens.

This position, conceived and defended by Jonathan Lear in "Inside and Outside the Republic," has the virtue of rendering appealing various aspects of Plato's *Republic* that have been considered terribly unappealing. The banning of traditional poetry from Callipolis, for example, acquires a very interesting flavor: poetry, and culture in general, is the arena where those psychological trade-offs take place, where values are externalized, processed, transformed, and sent back into the individual, who might then become an accomplice of the ruling class in their own domination. If not banned, certain forms of culture need at least to be politically analyzed. Patterns of gender, race, ethnic, and economic domination, or terrible ideas of how a person should look, for example, could be easily identified in mass culture, and even though they are in a way reflecting realities, they are telling lies to a soul that embraces them so deeply as to affect the whole of a person's life (cf. Lear 2001, 190–191; see also Pl. *Resp.* 382b).

However, it is not entirely clear that this position meets Williams' challenge. The process of externalization, if not fully captured by the derivation principles, is still an instance of derivation. And if those principles can be shown to entail contradictions it remains obscure how the externalization of a value-system—appealing though it may seem—is conceptually possible. If Plato's just city is the result of the externalization of a value-system carefully designed by philosopher kings and queens onto the collective soul, and the correlative internalization of it by individual souls, then we still need to account for the fact that a polis is just if, and only if, all or many or its prominent citizens are just, that is, to fully meet Williams' challenge. Moreover, Lear's *Republic* adds one more awkward doctrine to the long list of Plato's awkward doctrines (such as the denial of *akrasia* and the notion of learning as recollection) which scholars do not know very well how to cope with. It is the idea that the polis is an extension of the soul, not just like a soul, that a political regime is a psychological structure, that we are souls within a soul and that "it is ultimately misleading to think of there being merely an analogy between polis and psyche" (Lear 2001, 187–188).

Finding himself in this situation, Ferrari proposes a different way out of Williams' objection (Ferrari 2005, 2009, 407–413). For him, that a collectively F class is comprised of individually F people is neither ruled in nor ruled out by the analogy. As the analogy operates, the just city has a character that is analogous to the just person, namely, that in both each part does its own. But to do our own within the city does not necessarily require us to be just individuals, that is, individuals whose parts, in turn, do their own.

As it stands, Ferrari denies Williams' derivation principles or, rather, accepts them with an important qualification: a city is F if, and only if, its citizens (all or many or its most prominent) are F, but the individual F-ness required for the city to be F is an F-ness "as it relates to the city" (πολιτικήν, *Pl. Resp.* 430c). This can be seen, he argues, through a couple of examples. A courageous auxiliary class requires courageous soldiers. However, a soldier can be courageous facing dangers to the city (a virtue inculcated by the rulers) and, nonetheless, lack the courage to "face down fears of whatever kind, as instructed by his own powers of reason" (Ferrari 2005, 44). Similarly, a just city may require just people, but only insofar as they do their own task (i.e., the task the city requires them to do), not as they instantiate the proper alignment of the tripartite soul.

Ferrari's strategy depends on reinforcing the analogical character of Plato's parallel treatment of polis and psyche, arguing that justice in the polis was never meant to be anything different than an image (εἶδωλον, *Pl. Resp.* 443c)<sup>3</sup> of justice in the soul (2009, 408). Precisely because it is an analogy of elements and structure, and nothing else, it is possible for justice in both city and soul to mean the same and, nonetheless, to require from us different things: a civic quality in one case, and a private quality in the other. For in one of the analogues the individual is the whole, but in the other it is just a part. We should not feel particularly encouraged, Ferrari concludes, to look for privately wise people in a civically wise ruling class. We might very well find them, that is for sure. But a mere analogy, again, can neither rule it in nor rule it out.

However, this interpretation of the analogy disjoints city and soul in such a way that it is difficult to bring them together again. For no matter how frequently a civically just person turns out to be privately just, the relationship between civic and private justice remains purely contingent. And whether or not Plato had been able to prove throughout the *Republic* that a psychic harmony is both necessary and sufficient to act justly in the "vulgar" sense, as Sachs famously put it (1963, 141–158), he certainly did not want the relationship to be a contingent one. Right after tracing back the principle of justice to the soul, Socrates asks Glaucon to try it out with *vulgar cases* (τὰ φορτικά), such as giving back a deposit of silver or gold that has been entrusted, refraining from robbing, stealing, and betraying friends in both public and private, keeping oaths and agreements, refraining from adultery and disrespect for parents, and recognizing the gods (*Pl. Resp.* 442d). The cause of this behavior (τούτων πάντων αἴτιον, 443b), Socrates contends, is no other than the person's inner harmony, that in them each part does its own with regards to ruling or being ruled. An externalization of psychic harmony from the private to the civic sphere is patent in this passage.

The person's private justice, i.e., each part of their soul doing its own, is meant to be the cause of the person's civic justice, i.e., of them doing their own in the civic sphere and, thence, of justice in the city as a whole, i.e., of each class doing its own. It is the same power (δύναμις), Plato wants to say, that which makes both the person and the city just: "Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this power (ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν) which holds such men and cities?" (443b).<sup>4</sup> And that power makes the person as well as the city both privately and civically just.<sup>5</sup>

Such externalization of justice from the private to the civic sphere had already been suggested at the end of Book I, when Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether a band of pirates or robbers with an unjust purpose in common would achieve it if they were utterly unjust to each other. The example is aimed at showing that injustice, whether in a person or group, appears as having the power (τὴν δύναμιν, 351e) to render a thing incapable of cooperating with itself (πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ, 352a) impeding, consequently, the realization of the group objective. The point is confirmed right away when traced back to the individual: if present in a single person (ἐν ἐνί) injustice renders them incapable to act, creating factions within (στ' ασιάζοντα), making them disagree with themselves, and then with the people next to them. Injustice factionalizes the soul, and then factionalizes the person from the political community (352a).

The *Republic* as a whole will show that a band of pirates, engaged as a group in performing unjust acts, will never be thoroughly just in the private sense because if they were, they would never undertake as a group unjust enterprises. After all, they are being driven by a strong appetitive element within that has enslaved both spirit and reason (all their impetus and rational capacity is submitted to the satisfaction of an unnecessary desire), and as a result of their group psychic disharmony they want to and do act unjustly toward others. But they will not be perfectly unjust either, if they want indeed to rob something, "since the completely depraved are completely unjust and unable to act" (352c). We may learn that from Book IX too: the thoroughly tyrannized cities and souls are rendered unfit to act, but before getting to that point they will have hurt everyone around, whether other cities and states in the case of the tyrannical city or parents, relatives, friends, and fellow citizens in the case of the tyrannical soul. The externalization of a tyrannical regime from the soul onto the city is patent here as well. The tyrannized soul who manages to go unpunished tyrannizes a city that, in its turn, tyrannizes other cities: the tyrant needs foreign enemies, so the people feel the need of a leader (566e). The process will not stop until two perfect factions have been created: the tyrannical city and its colonies, that are now its *slaves*. But this situation is unsustainable if the tyrant does not enslave his own fellow citizens, again, until two perfect factions have been created within, the tyrant and its people, that are now his slaves (569c). Unable to trust anyone, friendless, and taken over by fear, both the tyrannized city and its ruling tyrant are unfit to undertake any enterprise, and confine themselves to their destruction at the hands of others or their own. As far as justice and injustice are concerned, Plato intends the same δύναμις to carry effects in both the private and civic spheres. Again, Plato might not have been

successful in proving this point—that is Sachs’ challenge. But not even Sachs denies that Plato does intend that.

If an interpretation leads us to think that there is one justice “as it relates to the city” and there is another “as it relates to the soul” and, furthermore, that a contingent relation obtains between them, we need to ask ourselves if the *Republic* is not being somewhat rarefied by it. For we cannot deny that, for Plato, the aim of the city is to make its citizens virtuous and happy in the inner, private sense, which Ferrari’s solution renders rather impossible. He indeed argues that it is possible for a ruler to rightly grasp what is good for the city but fail to grasp what is good for himself: a conclusion difficult to square with some points made in other dialogues (see Ferrari 2005, 44). How can a person rule others, if they cannot rule themselves, asks Socrates in the *Gorgias* (Pl. *Grg.* 491d). That question would not make much sense were it not the same *δύναμις* that instantiates itself in both city and soul. The point is confirmed in the *Republic*: the tyrant who rules others when he cannot even rule himself is like a weakened, sick body that is forced to compete and fight against other bodies all its life (*Resp.* 579c).

If Ferrari is right, there will always be a fundamental gap between civic and private virtue, between city and soul, that makes the latter unreachable by the citizen’s public sphere. Education and the rule of philosopher kings will fall short to accomplish the task Plato assigns to them, and it will be impossible to defend Plato’s educational system against the charge of propaganda, for it will have no function other than to promote a set of virtues “as they relate to the city,” i.e., as required to make the citizen an accomplice of the ruler’s government upon them. No matter how well the city manages to make citizens behave in politically correct manners, the citizen will always be a potential hazard to the city unless those politically encouraged behaviors do reach the citizen’s soul and make it harmonious.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, if the citizen’s inner harmony is disjointed from the civic virtue and, thence, from the city’s inner harmony, it is not clear that we can meet Sachs’ challenge. Sachs argues that in order to prove that the vulgarly just person is happier than the vulgarly unjust (that is, in order to meet Glaucon’s challenge), it is totally irrelevant to adduce a proof according to which the Platonically just person is happier than the Platonically unjust. The internally harmonious person is happier than the internally discordant, Sachs agrees. But, he asks, how does that eliminate the possibility that a person who is vulgarly unjust be indeed happier than the vulgarly just? It certainly cannot, unless we can establish some connection between, to put it in Ferrari’s terms, the virtues as they relate to the city and the virtues as they relate to the soul stronger than mere regularities in nature. Ferrari’s solution confirms the irrelevance: in order to convince Glaucon that the civically virtuous person, the person who refrains from *πλεονεξία* (greediness), is happier than the civically vicious, Plato contrives an enormous argument that the soul is like the city, and as important as it is that desires and emotions behave well within their soul, it is for them to behave well within the city. The link between behaving well within the city and their private desires and emotions being well governed by reason is reduced to the rather fragile suggestion that, if they do their



part, the inner happiness of the superstructure they belong to will be safeguarded. Glaucon might certainly have retorted: is the happiness of my inner structure, and not only that of the superstructure, equally safeguarded? For Ferrari, the role of the analogy is to provide individuals, both as citizens and persons, with an awareness of how to live in society. As a metaphor, it encourages the person to see the state they live in as an organized whole, just as themselves, rather than to adopt the usual perspective for which the political dimension is exhausted by the relation of the self to others (Ferrari 2005, 79). But this awareness seems too little to deal with Sachs' challenge. It seems, then, that if the analogy is to play a role in the overall argument of the *Republic* that justice is good for itself and for its consequences, we need to account for a relation between city and soul that goes beyond the metaphorical sense.

If we want to avoid these consequences, we need to take a step back and ask ourselves if there is a way to account for Williams' derivation rules that does not imply paradoxes. That account, I argue, can be provided by bringing to the table Plato's doctrine of the unity of virtue. Williams, ignoring the crucial fact that the just city does not require the rulers to merely be logistic, the helpers thymoeidic and the workers epithymetic, but the rulers to be wise, the helpers courageous and everyone in the city moderate, finds Plato's analogy flawed. With the consequence, moreover, that Plato's psycho-political ideal consists in the desires being as strong, the emotions as policing, and the rulers as logistic as possible—it is no surprise that Callipolis had been traditionally seen as a system of perfect repression. But bringing to the table the fact that, in a sense (a sense that needs to be specified), the wise, the courageous, and the moderate are also just, the predicament can be dissolved. It will be true that a city is just if, and only if, all or many or its prominent citizens are just and, on the other hand, it will be true that justice is the same δόναμις in both city and soul.

### **Types and Manners**

Upon a closer inspection, we may see that Williams is misled by the passages about communal stereotypes to think that each class doing its job means for them to merely be wisdom-loving, honor-loving, and gain-loving forces. Ferrari confirms it:

For the just city is not presented as monolithic, unlike Athens, Thrace, or Egypt, but as divided into three classes of sharply divergent character. Indeed, it would be tempting to think of it as a city of Athenian rulers, Thracian soldiers, and Egyptian artisans and farmers. In other words, it is hard to resist asking, as Williams asks: Surely the individual ruler in the just city will have a soul led by its thoughtful part? Surely the individual soldier must have a soul led by its spirited part? And will the individual artisan or farmer not have a soul led by its appetitive part? But as it turns out, the analogy gives no answers to these questions.

(2005, 43)



Since, to be sure, the Athenian ruler, the Thracian soldier, and the Egyptian businessman are monolithic characters, we find them all unjust—even the Athenian ruler, whose monolithic rationality would weaken their thymoeidic and epithymetic nature. *Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant*, here is a principle Plato's inner harmony could very well amount to, as Williams notes (2001, 163). Psychic justice would be a movement toward complete ascetism, toward a sort of psychic homogeneity where desires and emotions are either reduced to a minimum or turned logistic, just as civic justice would require either a very well tamed, and presumably small, epithymetic class, or one that is logistic and just.

But the truth is that no city is monolithic as the passages about the communal stereotypes seem to permit. In *Republic* VIII, Plato says there are as many types of human characters (εἶδη) as political constitutions and, therefore, the characters Plato expects to find in both city and soul are five: aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical, and not three: logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic (*Resp.* 544e).<sup>7</sup> The stereotypical manners (ἥθη) of communities do not reflect their character (εἶδη), i.e., their political constitution, although they certainly make it lean some way or the other. And this goes very well with their being stereotypes: they are true insofar as they reflect a sort of dominating force within the community, but false insofar as they present it as monolithic. Athens surely did not lack honor-loving and gain-loving people, just as Colombia does not lack people who dislike *arepas*. No community, just or unjust, is monolithic, just as no soul, just or unjust, lacks reason, spirit, or desire. This is evident in the fact that a city led by its appetitive part may be oligarchic, democratic, or tyrannical, a city led by its spirited part may be timocratic or democratic, and a city led by its thoughtful part may be aristocratic or democratic. There is no such thing as a logistic or thymoeidic character (εἶδος), although there certainly are logistic and thymoeidic manners (ἥθη) and, hence, characters ruled by logistic or thymoeidic forces. A democracy is the compromising regime ruled by all.

The task of a regime is to arrange the three forces and lay down the governing dynamics of their mutual relations. This is true of Callipolis as well as of the imperfect regimes. In the timocracy, for example, the rational element is not absent, it has just mixed itself up with the spirited one in order to counterbalance the growing influence of the productive forces. The timocratic society is afraid to appoint wise people to the highest positions—on the basis that they are no longer pure and earnest but mixed (μεικτούς, 547e)—and prefers those more spirited and simple-minded, better fit for war than for peace, that is, better fit to repress the productive classes. The rational element is then relegated from office and put to the service of the spirited one: prescriptions toward military excellence, such as the warrior-class' abstention from money-making activities, their communal meals, and devotion to physical training (547d), are still held good. The productive class is now a class of subjects and servants (περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας, 547c).

Similarly, oligarchic and democratic societies are not devoid of reason and spirit. In the oligarchy, the rational and emotional forces are at the service of the appetitive one: laws are first passed to determine a wealth qualification and then enforced through the arms of the state (βία μεθ' ὄπλων, 551b). The submission,

but not the banishment, of the rational and spirited parts is confirmed at the individual level: just as in the oligarchic city any legislative and military activity is performed for the sake of the accumulation of wealth (which by necessity implies the impoverishment and disenfranchisement of many people, 552a), in the individual both rational and spirited forces are “set beside, on the ground, one on either side, and enslaved (καταδουλωσάμενος)” (553d). This does not mean that reason will produce and stop reasoning, and spirit will produce and stop fighting, so that the soul becomes a sort of homogeneously appetitive entity. It means that neither will reason be allowed to reason about, nor spirit allowed to stand for, anything that is not related to money-making. In a similar fashion, the oligarchic state will educate people only insofar as their education contributes to economic growth, and train soldiers only insofar as they fight for the wealth of the nation and against the rebellion of the poor. The ultimate consequence of this process is that profound disenfranchisement which obliges the leading class to rule, fight, and produce (551e–552a), because it becomes incapable of making subalterns obey and of fighting against another state (551d–e). Democracy in its turn, the regime embellished with all the manners (πάσιν ἤθεσιν, 557c), is the compromise consisting in the distribution of a sort of equality among the forces, and the consequent emergence of all kinds of constitutions (πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν, 557d).

But this homogenization is not even completed by the tyranny, hard as it tries. Tyrants, to be sure, purge the wealthy, the brave, and the wise from the city. However, by doing so they are not really annihilating the rational and spirited elements but corrupting them to the point of turning the city into a dysfunctional whole, incapable of any collective action whatsoever. The first thing they corrupt is the city’s productive forces by leaving the wealthy no option other than fleeing the country, while those who cannot leave are severely taxed and impoverished so they do not plot against them (566c–e). Later, they will even use expropriated resources as well as the city’s sacred treasuries in order to not require more and more taxes (568d). Next, they corrupt the spirited element: since they do away with the bravest among those who share power, they are forced to enlist mercenaries and slaves as personal bodyguards (567d–e). Finally, they corrupt the rational element by doing away with those who dare tell them the truth, bringing flatterers to their side: the “wise” people tyrants associate themselves with, according to Euripides (568a).

Since the characters to be found in both city and soul are these five psychopolitical types (and the intermediates between them), and these are not monolithic neither in the individual nor in the city, it is a plain mistake to conceive of Callipolis as a city of Athenian rulers, Thracian soldiers, and Egyptian businessmen, that is, a city with a purely logistic ruling class, a purely thymoeidic army, and a purely epithymetic working class. Given the tendency to equate types and manners, this can only bring to mind a city where perfect philosopher-kings/queens rule, by means of an army of zealous timocrats, a class of potential tyrants. Plato does not want us to ask ourselves the misleading question “Does the individual ruler in the just city have a soul led by its thoughtful part?” for, since the answer is an easy “Yes,” we feel entitled to further ask “Does the individual

soldier have a soul led by its spirited part?,” the answer to which will now be a doubtful “Yes.” But the answer goes from doubtful to completely baffling when we wonder if the individual artisan or farmer has a soul led by its appetitive part. Since the characters to be found are not logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic, of course “the analogy,” as Ferrari puts it, “gives no answers to these questions.” The question Plato asks himself, and expects us to ask ourselves, is whether the just city manages to implant, as far as possible, a just political constitution in each and every citizen, even the thymoeidic and epithymetic ones. The whole point of education and the rule of law is to found this political regime in citizens’ soul, nurturing the best so they have a guardian similar to the philosopher’s (590e–591a), that is, true opinion. So, if Plato so explicitly proposes a regime whose virtue is to encourage the emergence, care, and development of a just regime in each and every citizen’s soul, we must not consider that by an epithymetic class’ “minding its own” Plato means an epithymetic class ruled by their appetites, but an epithymetic class ruled by what in them is akin to wisdom, which is anyway embraced by their souls’ rational part.

The mistake is, to a certain extent, encouraged by the passages about the stereotypical characteristics of communities, for Plato wants us to accept that the same regimes are to be found in both city and soul by adducing the fact—manifest in the existence of communal stereotypes—that the same elements are indeed found in both city and soul. But, given the tendency to overlap types and manners, regimes and elements, we are led to think that just means *logistic* and *Athenian*, while timocratic means *thymoeidic* and *Laconian*. Thus, Plato’s just city appears a logistic, Athenian community that, nonetheless, is comprised of logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic classes. Then, since an angry crowd of sailors is to be sure a crowd of angry sailors (Williams 2001, 158), we rightly infer that it must be inhabited by a huge crowd of thymoeidic and epithymetic people. And finally—going now back from manners to types, from elements to regimes, we think ourselves entitled to infer that those thymoeidic and epithymetic citizens are timocratic (ruled by their spirit) and tyrannical (ruled by their appetites) and, therefore, thoroughly unjust. Precisely because to be thymoeidic is not a type of regime, the thymoeidic person is not by necessity ruled by their spirit, that is, is not by necessity a timocratic one. The logistic is not by necessity just either, or the epithymetic tyrannical. This is also evident by observing the strong emphasis on the virtues that accompanies Plato’s analysis of the roles of the classes, that is, of the classes’ “minding their own.”

### **The Unity of the Virtues**

Two important facts must be highlighted about Plato’s inquiry into the virtues of the city. First, while wisdom is described as full-fledged knowledge, courage and moderation are described in terms of opinion: the preservation through everything of the true and legitimate opinion (δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου, Pl. *Resp.* 430b) about what is to be feared and what is not, in the case of courage; and the existence in both the ruler and the ruled of the same opinion (ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα) as to who

should govern (431d–e), in the case of moderation. Second, justice (the condition of everyone in the city minding their own) is what confers to each those powers, allows their emergence and once emerged, permits their preservation (433b).

These joint facts allow us to see how big a mistake it is to consider an epithymetic person unjust by default. That would be the case if the epithymetic is by necessity led by desire and, therefore, unjust and vicious. But as we saw, being epithymetic is a *manner* in cities (which comes from *like-mannered* souls), not a *type* of arrangement in cities or souls and, thus, it can be virtuous or not. Williams then errs when he says that “an epithymetic man—surely—is not a δίκαιος man” and concludes that the just city cannot make everyone just (meaning justice the same in both city and soul) (2001, 160).

But if the city’s justice is what allows the emergence of a certain power in the epithymetic person, namely, their *doxastic* capacity to embrace a proposition about who should govern in the city and stick to it, then justice is—as Plato later confirms—the cause of the establishment in their soul of a political constitution equipped with a guardian and ruler similar to full-fledged reason (590e). For an opinion about who should rule within their soul will have been formed as well and, since moderation is a virtue that spreads itself across the whole inner citadel (432a), emotions will also adhere, and desires will allegedly follow. The epithymetic person is then moderate *simpliciter* (they will hold an internal agreement as to which element should rule), courageous insofar as their emotions ally with their true beliefs (they will be afraid of desires getting too strong, confident about their possessions being enough to guarantee their well-being, etc.), and wise insofar as in them true beliefs rule. It is the city’s justice, then, that promotes their inner justice, the condition where true opinions rule, emotions enforce, prevent, and drive, and desires provide them with what they need to keep living, and living well: that is, the condition where each element does its own job.

That this condition is favored or affected by the political context the person lives in should not surprise anyone. Societies where consumerism is vastly encouraged, for example, tend to foster desire-satisfaction patterns of conduct. People attach well-being to material possessions and economic success. Since the person’s entire belief-system revolves around this deeply ingrained, core belief (a belief, needless to say, at the service of the appetitive element), desires take control and channel all the intellectual energy to concerns on financial affairs and material possessions. Education will only be important insofar as it guarantees competitiveness in a job market and, therefore, financial stability and acquisitive power. Even if people are poor, they will think that they would be happy could they only afford all those things. Emotions rally now around desires, making people constantly fearful of losing what they have, of not having enough, of not having what others have, and erroneously confident about those things contributing to their happiness.

For thymoeidic people, the city’s justice does the same as far as moderation is concerned. As for their courage, that they devote themselves to military service alone, with no meddling into private businesses or ruling activities, is intended to

favor the preservation of true beliefs about what is to be feared and what is not. These beliefs will be especially concerned with the most supreme of our fears, the fear a soldier needs most to master, the fear of death. The thymoeidic person should believe that the soul is the dearest of our possessions, prior to the body and immortal.

The relation between courage (and virtue in general) and the immortality of the soul is not pulled out of a hat. It is explicitly addressed in *Phaedo*. Is it not sufficient indication—asks Socrates—that a man is not a philosopher, but a lover of the body, that he gets vexed when he is about to die? Does not this person happen to be a lover of wealth and honor, of either of them or both? To be courageous and to consider death a great evil are incompatible things, for a person who considers death a terrible thing will only be able to face it if they are fearful of greater evils (like slavery or misery), and then they would be courageous because of fear (Pl. *Phd.* 68b–69d). Only by holding true beliefs regarding the soul, its priority to the body and its immortal nature, the thymoeidic soldier of Callipolis will be genuinely courageous, that is, will not face death as a result of exchanging fears for fears. To be sure, whereas a person’s resentment to die indicates that they are ruled by honor or wealth and betrays, thence, a thymoeidic or epithymetic nature, this nature by itself does not condemn them to be ruled by honor or wealth and, therefore, to resent to die. For them courage can be fostered by a political regime that, through education and the rule of law (and because in such a regime they, as everyone, mind their own), nurtures true beliefs bringing courage.

Because it is tied down by Callipolis’ education and laws, the soldier’s courage is then a courage as it relates to the city (πολιτικὴν γὰρ, 430c). This *political* courage is not political because it is directed to a different object, as Ferrari thinks (2005, 44): both the philosopher and the soldier are supposed to face down and master the *same* fear, the greatest of our fears, the fear of dying, the latter through opinions inculcated by education and law (there lies its public character) and the former “instructed by his own powers of reason.” This does not mean that they express different δυνάμεις either, for “not only through knowledge, but also through true opinion, human beings can be rendered good and useful to the cities” (Pl. *Meno* 98b–d).

Thymoeidic people in Callipolis are then moderate *simpliciter* (they will hold an internal agreement as to which element should rule), courageous *simpliciter* (they will hold true beliefs regarding what is to be feared and what is not), and wise insofar as in them true opinions rule. It is the city’s justice, then, that promotes the soldier’s inner justice, the condition where true opinions rule, emotions enforce, prevent, and drive, and desires provide with what they need to keep living, and living well: that is, the condition where each element does its own job.

That logistic people in Callipolis can be just seems easier to see, but a reply to Williams’ argument calls for a more detailed description of their soul’s inner workings. Let us recall that Williams points out a fundamental tension between the “whole-part rule” and the analogy of meaning: if everyone in the city is just then justice should mean different things in city and soul. Why? Because the just city contains epithymetic citizens, which are not just. By now, we have established

that this need not be the case, for epithymetic is not a type, but a manner in cities and souls that can be justly or unjustly arranged. But before that, we were confronted with two possible outcomes: either epithymetic citizens are not just (but then desires in the just soul need to be extirpated, annulled, or repressed), or epithymetic citizens are just (and then desires in the just soul have some λογιστικόν of their own).

Let's work on the first outcome: the just person, whether epithymetic, thymoeidic, or logistic, does not need to extirpate, annul, or repress the desires in them, they actually need them. Having observed the difference between types and manners, and how everyone in Callipolis may have in a qualified manner all the virtues, we can see how not even the logistic and just would have developed wisdom had the thymoeidic and epithymetic parts not done their own job and, conversely, how their thymoeidic and epithymetic parts would not have done their own had the person not been wise. This circularity is not vicious. For by having true beliefs ruling in the soul, that is, the element in us that is the smallest and judges not about a particular matter but about the city as whole, we can be called wise.<sup>8</sup> If these beliefs are tied down by the political regime and the surrounding education, culture, and religion (a regime, needless to say, designed and maintained by citizens of unqualified wisdom), we are certainly wise as it relates to the city (πολιτικὴν γέ). And if we reveal a philosophical nature, that very same condition will favor in us the development of full-fledged wisdom, which will make our virtue not dependent upon legal or pedagogical arrangements. At least not those of a particular city, but those of the cosmic city, for "there is a suchlike pattern laid up in heaven for him who wants to see it and who by seeing it turns himself into its citizen (ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν)" (Pl. *Resp.* 592b). We would now be fit to rule. The object of this knowledge, whether in cities or souls, and whether we have it in an unqualified way or only take part of it through education and law, is the Good, the good for whole communities with their logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic elements, both in relation to themselves and other communities (428c–d, 441e, 443e). It is a *koinoniology*, if I may coin the expression, and cosmos, city, and soul are for Plato κοινονία (communities).

Let us now work on the second outcome: if epithymetic citizens are just, then ἐπιθυμία in the just soul should have some λογιστικόν of their own. I agree with Williams that, in a sense, we have reached here the limits of the analogy: we need, as it were, a more powerful magnifying lens. The letters in the city allow us to read the letters in the soul, but here we are trying to read the letters in the single ἐπιθυμία of the soul. The distinction between types and manners does allow us to establish something important in this respect: just as the epithymetic citizens are not logistic but nonetheless just, ἐπιθυμία in the just soul need not be thought as logistic: they can be thought as epithymetic in nature with no contradiction or tension whatsoever. The problem remains, however, of how ἐπιθυμία are tied up by true opinion and wisdom, for Williams is right to point out that, if we follow the analogy to the strictest detail, ἐπιθυμία should have some λογιστικόν of their own. A complete answer is not given in the *Republic*, but there is definitely an attempt to account for this in the *Philebus*, where Socrates distinguishes between



pain, the soul's perception of a bodily disintegration, and desire, the soul's longing for whatever thing would restore the balance (Pl. *Phlb.* 34d–35d). Connected as they are with previous recollections, i.e., the movements of the soul by which it brings to awareness, without the aid of the body, what it has experienced together with the body (34b), desires have a cognitive element and are, then, susceptible to the influx of reason. This is not the place to develop a full-fledged interpretation of the *Philebus* on desire, pleasure, pain, and cognition, but the answer to the last piece of Williams' puzzle is to be found there.

### The Derivation Rules

It holds then with no contradiction that

1. a city is just if, and only if, its citizens are just, and
2. both the city and the citizen's being just consist in each part (reason, spirit, and desire) doing its job.

The solution ultimately depends on Plato's distinction between types and manners, which paves the way to an account of the unity of the virtues of Callipolis' non-logistic citizens. While to be wise, just, courageous, and moderate refer to different *δυνάμεις* within the soul, they are internally linked to each other in such a way that whoever has one has them all. Most of these virtues will be political (tied up by Callipolis' education and law). Book IV provides us with the model of such a unity and difference. Since Plato does not intend the rulers to merely be logistic, the soldiers to merely be thymoeidic, and the producers to merely be epithymetic, but everyone to be just, moderate, courageous, and wise, we can see that all of them, regardless of their manner, are of the same type. This path will remain hidden if we treat logistic, thymoeidic, and epithymetic natures as types and, therefore, as just or unjust by default.

Thus, what Ferrari calls the "three connected errors at work in the most recent scholarly literature" are not such (2005, 55). The *first* error concerns the whole-part and predominant section rules. By demonstrating how the analogy peers into the souls of Callipolis' citizens, I demonstrate that Williams' "whole-part rule," the rule that a city is F if, and only if, its citizens are F, does underlie the city-soul analogy. For it is by no means that the private and civic justice are mere homonyms (which, I have argued, condemns Plato to failure in pretty much every one of the *Republic's* undertakings), but they rather refer to one and the same *δύναμις* in both public and private matters, namely, the capacity—whether doxastic or epistemic, it does not matter for practical purposes—to keep psychological forces apart, each one minding its own. All the citizens in Callipolis are then just *simpliciter*: in them, reason (by either endorsing true beliefs or engaging in active philosophy), spirit, and desire mind their own. The *second* error, to make the analogy peer into the souls of the members of the just city, is not a fruitless pretension. It is only a source of paradox given Williams' misunderstanding of types and manners, elements and regimes. The *third* one, Lear's error, is to refuse to accept



that the analogy is just an analogy, “insisting instead that it also links city and soul by causal relations” (Ferrari 2005, 55). But provided that the wisdom, courage, and moderation of both Callipolis’ soldiers and producers—and, therefore, their justice—are such in relation to the city (which means that their source is true opinions tied down by legal and pedagogical arrangements), causal-psychological transactions between polis and psyche must be admitted to make sense of Plato’s intentions.

Last, we may see that Williams’ “predominant section rule,” the rule that a city is F if, and only if, its leading, most influential, or predominant citizens are F, holds for Callipolis as well. A vast majority of citizens would never develop the virtues had the rulers not engaged in philosophy and, thus, had they not been able to set up laws and design an educational system fitting to that purpose. While this consideration may for some have totalitarian undertones (though I should say anti-Kantian: the autonomy of a pure practical reason is not precisely the value to be politically promoted), the factual truth is that most people would have never developed an awareness of, say, gender discrimination had a reflective system of values not been instilled, by means of law, education, and culture, at the collective level. Most people’s virtue as far as gender discrimination is concerned does not really come as “instructed by their own powers of reason,” but from true beliefs tied down by the political regime and surrounding culture. And yet most people’s failure to appreciate subtle mechanisms of discrimination makes us feel that there are still so many things to do at every level: education, mass culture depictions of gender differences, law, etc. In this respect, as well as in many others, Plato is far more realistic than most philosophers, modern and contemporary. Besides, to deny the rule of predominance is to deny that “cities will have no rest from evils... nor will the human race” until “political power and philosophy entirely coincide” (*Resp.* 437d–e).

## Notes

- 1 The term was coined by Daniel Devereux (see Ferrari 2009, 407, n. 1).
- 2 As an anonymous reviewer acutely pointed out, Williams might have quoted here Aristotle on *πρὸς ἕν* predication: if the city is just because it contains just citizens, then the meanings of justice in the city and justice in the soul are “systematically related, but they are not identical.” A city and its citizens may well be just, but not because they instantiate the same *εἶδος*. The argument at 435e, again, would fail to back up Plato’s “analogy of meaning.”
- 3 I find rather strange that Ferrari cites 443c in support of the idea that justice in the city is an *εἰδωλόν* of justice in the soul. Of course, that would serve his point very well. But in 443c Socrates is clearly referring to the *one person one job* principle that initially drove the construction of the city in speech and that, now, is discovered to be an image of the real justice, expressed by the *everyone minding their own business* principle: “That it is correct for the shoemaker by nature to make shoes and to do nothing else, and for the carpenter to build, and the same for the others, that was a certain image of justice (*εἰδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης*)—because of that it was useful.” The *one person one job* principle is then an imperfect copy, an imitation of the *everyone minding her own business* one, which truly expresses justice in both the city and the soul.
- 4 Translations of the *Republic* are my own.

- 5 There is a sort of resistance to detect the city's civic sense of justice in the sphere of foreign affairs since Vlastos (1968, 665–674). See, for example, Hall: "Psychological justice... could not instantiate the social description of justice because of the different logical status of justice as applied to the individual and to the polis. Applied to the individual, justice as the social description is a relational predicate; applied to the polis, it is a one-place predicate" (1974, 433). Applied to the individual, the civic sense of justice is inter-individual; applied to the states it is not inter-state, but intra-individual! If the same power makes the soul privately and civically just, it should not be different for the city, whose inner harmony must reflect outwards in the form of harmonious foreign relations. No doubt this resistance comes from the drive to affirm the individual vis-à-vis the state or, rather, to not speak of the state as an individual. However, the *Republic* is in a way a reminder that states are subjects of certain psychological attributes, such as virtue and agency and, as such, they act (at least sometimes) as an individual. We may be reminded of Athens' tyrannical behavior in the context of the Delian League. If the city side of the analogy allows us to see in bigger letters the inner harmony that is justice, the soul side allows us to see in smaller letters its huge external effects.
- 6 Williams foresees these consequences in his critique of the analogy. If epithymetic citizens are not logistic and just, then what is the difference between epithymetic citizens in a democracy and in the just city? "Plato has to explain why the working class even in the good city has to be thought of as though they were potentially such persons [violent and passionate]." But if epithymetic citizens in the just city are less violent and passionate than in the democracy, "we are faced with the original problem once more, of what it was in those potentially violent persons that kept them in their place in the good city" (2001, 164).
- 7 "Do you realize, said I, that it is necessary that the *types* of ways for human beings (ἀνθρώπων εἶδη) are as many as [the *types* of ways] for constitutions? Or do you think that constitutions come to be out of oaks or stones, and not from the *manners* (ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν) of those in the cities who, turning as it were the scale, drag otherwise?" (*Pl Resp.* 544d–e). The ways in which cities and souls are arranged correspond to the same *types* (εἶδη), and that is so because constitutions come from the *manners* (ἡθη) of the citizens. Or otherwise: since the same manners are to be found in both cities and souls, the same types of arrangements are to be expected in both. At the end of Book IV, right before the digression of the central books, Socrates has referred in a similar fashion to the types of constitutions in both cities and souls: "It seems to me... that there is one *type* (εἶδος) of virtue, but infinite (ἄπειρα) [*types*] of vice, and that there are four among them which are worth bearing in mind... As many as are the ways of constitutions that are worth a *type*, so many are the ways of the soul likely to be" (*Resp.* 445c).
- 8 It is worth noting that the ruling element does not need to be in full possession, but only to *take part* (μεταλαγχάνειν) of genuine wisdom. A particular feature of this kind of knowledge is to be concerned with the city as a whole (ὅπερ αὐτῆς ὅλης, *Resp.* 428d).

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