Athenaeus of Attalia on the
Psychological Causes of Bodily Health

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I – Introduction

Preserved in what have come to be called the ‘uncertain books’ (libri incerti) of Oribasius’ Medical Collections are four texts on regimen (διατήρησ) attributed to the Pneumatist physician, Athenaeus of Attalia. In these texts, Athenaeus distinguishes two types of exercise or training (γυμνάσια) that are required at each stage of life: training of the body and training of the soul.¹ He says that training of the body includes activities like physical exercises, eating, drinking, bathing and sleep.² Training of the soul, on the other hand, consists of thinking, education, and emotional regulation—what one might otherwise call ‘philosophy.’ While some notion of ‘training of the soul’³ and the related contrast between ‘bodily’ and ‘psychic’ exercise is common in the Socratic tradition from Plato to the Stoics,⁴ Athenaeus is nevertheless the earliest extant medical author to distinguish these kinds of training and to treat them as equally important aspects of regimen.⁵ My aim in this paper is to propose some reasons why he

³ The metaphor is at least as early as Isocrates, Ad Nicoclem, 51.1.
⁵ See n.61 below for a qualification. A soul/body distinction is mentioned in a discussion on phrenitis in Celsus, De medicina 3.18.6-16 (123,13-125,26 Marx), although no psychological advice is given. On Celsus and Athenaeus, see Wellmann, M. (1895). Die Pneumatische Schule
found this distinction useful and to examine how he justified incorporating it into his writings on regimen.

Athenaeus almost certainly adopted the distinction from Plato’s discussion of regimen in the *Timaeus*, a work Athenaeus knew. In the *Timaeus*, Plato claims that well-being (σωτηρία) requires that we “do not exercise the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul, so that they might both be kept in balance and health”—only then can we “become whole [ὀλόκληρος] and altogether healthy.” Athenaeus agrees that regimen requires a balance of both psychological and bodily activities, and in an echo of the *Timaeus* he writes that “one must not overlook any lack of training [ἀγύμναστον] of either the soul or body, so that we may come into old age whole [ὀλόκληροι] and make use of wholeness in all things.”

Yet, Athenaeus also departs from Plato’s advice in the *Timaeus*. For Plato, the aim of psychological and physical training is ultimately “the constant care of what is divine in us,” our rational and immortal soul. Athenaeus’ interests, however, are more mundane. Although he believes that our psychological states can be either beneficial or harmful, what he says they are beneficial for is almost invariably the body. So, he says that children should be accustomed to an easiness of soul, because “relaxation and joy of the soul contribute a great deal to the body’s thriving.” Likewise with intellectual study: children must avoid excessive lessons because it is likely to lead to the corruption of their bodies. In fact, his recommendations almost always follow a pattern in which some form of psychological training is recommended, and then justified by stating how it benefits the body, rather than the soul.

Even what seem to be claims about the importance of psychological training for the development of moral virtue take on a physiological character. For

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7 Gal. *Trem. Palp.* 6 (VII.609-10 K.), reports that Athenaeus plagiarised from *Timaeus*. For the text, see n. 64 below.

8 Plato, *Timaeus* 88b5-c1: μία δὴ σωτηρία πρὸς ἄμφω, μήτε τὴν ψυχήν ἄνευ σώματος κινεῖν μήτε σώμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἵνα ἀμυνομένω γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπω καὶ υγιῆ.

9 Pl. *Ti.* 44b8-c1: “Hence, if there is the right kind of nurture supporting an education, one will become whole and altogether healthy [ὡν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνεται τις ὁρθὴ τροφὴ παιδεύσεως, ὀλόκληρος ύγιής τε παντελῶς … γίγνεται]”.


instance, he says that youth must work hard in both body and soul since the strong desire for sex at this age is able to destroy the development of soul and body. Yet, when he comes to discuss sexual habits in ‘Preparation for Having Children,’ the reasons he gives for controlling sexual desire again focus on its bodily effects: control aids fertility, prevents congenital disease, and saves a woman’s body from becoming malnourished. In each of these cases, Athenaeus’ strategy for incorporating psychological regimen into his advice is to show how it benefits the well-being of the body, while remaining silent about its effect on the soul itself.

Athenaeus not only restricts the aims of psychological training to the body. He also attributes this view to Hippocrates. Another strategy Athenaeus uses to incorporate psychological training into hygiene involves finding parallels in Hippocratic writings which, if interpreted correctly, can be presented as anticipating a view like the one found in the Timaeus. For Athenaeus, it is Hippocrates, not Plato, who is the source of advice concerning hygiene. The project of attributing to Hippocrates something like the views found in the physiological and medical sections of the Timaeus is one of Athenaeus’ legacies to the medical tradition.

Athenaeus’ views, however, only come down to us in fragments, and to provide a reconstruction of his views on regimen from the fragments alone would be incomplete and largely speculative. My aim, therefore, is to try to provide evidence for the narrative I have just sketched by comparing Athenaeus’ references to Hippocrates with their counterparts in Galen’s Hippocratic commentaries (section III). I will try to show that in these texts, we can find evidence of responses to something like Athenaeus’ strategy of harmonizing Plato and Hippocrates. More precisely, what we find in Galen’s commentaries are reports of a dispute concerning the distinction between philosophy and medicine precisely at the boundaries Athenaeus is attempting to blur.

Traces of this dispute, however, are found in texts other than Galen, and they raise fundamental questions about how medical writers at the time of the early Roman Empire understood the doctor’s role in a patient’s mental life. At this time they often classified and treated a range of mental diseases whose causes were claimed to be physiological, but which manifested psychological symptoms. Many of Athenaeus’ near contemporaries also recognized that the state of a patient’s soul could have a detrimental or positive effect on the body. It was

15 Ibid., 39.8 (139,30-36 Raeder).
16 ‘Preparation for Having Children’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 23.2-5 (116,8-20 Raeder). The text is quoted in section III below, 000.
18 See: (i) the Herophileans ap. Soranus, Gynaecia (= Sor. Gyn.) 4.2.1-4 (131,8-132,4 Ilberg); (ii) Aselepiades ap. Plutarch, De tranquillitate animi 17 (Moralia 476a4-6); (iii) Aretaeus, De causis et signis diuturnorum morborum (= Aret. SD) 1.7.8 (= 3.7.8, 46.9-13 Hude); (iv) Sor. Gyn.
also common for medical writers to recommend ‘psychological’ means of calming-down or otherwise distracting a patient who is distressed.\textsuperscript{19} Some of Athenaeus’ medical contemporaries, however, were ambivalent, even hostile, to the core thesis implied in the fragments of Athenaeus on regimen: that doctors should cultivate in their patients dispositions to health-promoting ways of feeling and thinking. Soranus of Ephesus, one of the clearest voices against such educational advice from doctors, writes that advice about education belongs “to the realm of philosophy [φιλοσοφωτέραν τὴν διάταξιν]” and leaves it to other physicians to “break with custom and philosophize [παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν].”\textsuperscript{20} For both Soranus and Athenaeus, the question was not whether a patient’s psychological dispositions and virtues were worth cultivating, but whether it was up to the doctor to do so. Athenaeus believed it was, and I will provide (in section IV) some plausible motivations he may have had for integrating traditionally philosophical topics—intellectual study (μαθήματα), habituation (συνήθεια), and education (παιδεία)—into medicine.

These discussions, however, presuppose an answer to the question of how Athenaeus understood body and soul, and how one might be a cause of health or disease to the other. There are no extant fragments of Athenaeus which discuss this question explicitly. We can, however, look to fragments concerning his views on mental disease to help fill in the gaps. Accordingly, I will begin (in section II) by looking to those fragments where Athenaeus correlates psychological disease with different bodily states.

II – Athenaeus on Mental Disease

Athenaeus is said to have come from Attalia in Pamphylia, a city in Asia Minor on the Black Sea coast, and likely flourished towards the end of the first century BCE.\textsuperscript{21} He is most well-known as the founder of the Pneumatic school of medicine.
medicine, which seems to have had some fame in Rome during the first and second centuries CE. Galen tells us he was a student of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, and from the fragments of his writings which remain, we know he engaged with the work of many other doctors and philosophers: Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides of Pontus, Theophrastus, and Asclepiades. Galen also praises the scope of his work. “Nearly none of the more recent physicians,” he says, “has treated as fully as Athenaeus the whole theory of the medical art.”

The extant fragments span some of this range, including views on the elements, on causation, on embryology, on nutrition and regimen, and on mental disease.

Only three reports concerning Athenaeus’ views on mental disease are extant: one from Caelius Aurelianus on the characterization of lethargy; and two from Galen, one on melancholia and one on phrenitis. All three reports suggest Athenaeus held mental disease to be caused by a bad mixture or dyskrasia of the elementary qualities of the body. I will go through each in turn.

The first fragment comes from Caelius Aurelianus, who places Athenaeus within a dispute about the kind of affection the mind suffers in lethargy (lethargo). The dispute concerned whether lethargic patients show signs of furor mentis (‘madness’) or alienatio mentis (‘mental derangement’).

Athenaeus of Tarsus said [lethargy] is a madness of the mind with sadness, since Asclepiades said in the first book of Acute Diseases among frenitics, delirium with restlessness is produced, among lethargics, with

I revisit this issue in a forthcoming paper on the concept of pneuma in the Pneumatist school. It will be discussed more fully in my Athenaeus of Attalia: Complete Fragments with Translation and Commentary.


25 The discussion occurs in a larger dispute, moderated by Caelius, concerning whether lethargy is a kind of delirium (deliratio) with fever, or stupor (pressura, a state of lowered consciousness). See Caelius Aurelianus, Celereus uel acutae passiones (= Cael. Aurel. Acut.) 2.1.4-8 (CML VI 1, 130,4-134,27 Bendz). On earlier instances of disputes about lethargy, see Jouanna, J. ‘The Typology and Aetiology of Madness in Ancient Greek Medical and Philosophical Writing’, in Harris, W. (2013). Mental Disorders in the Classical World, 97-118.

26 Tarsus and Attalia were both major cities in Roman provinces of Cilicia and Pamphylia. Their proximity may be a source of this confusion. Wellmann claims it is likely ‘Athenaeus Tharsensis’ is a mistake by Caelius, but also entertains the idea that Athenaeus may have worked for a time in Tarsus. See Wellmann, DPnS, 9 n.8.
sleep and grief. Others have said lethargy is delirium with sadness and continual sleep, because the mind [of lethargics] does not extend into madness as Athenaeus says, but as Asclepiades [says] is merely fixed in delirium.\textsuperscript{27}

One difficulty for understanding this dispute involves the distinction between \textit{furor} (‘madness’) and \textit{alienatio} (‘delirium’).\textsuperscript{28} Cælius uses these terms in different senses depending on the context. Sometimes, he presents madness as a species of delirium; other times he presents delirium as a species of madness. He attributes the former view, that madness is a species of delirium, to Asclepiades, who defined ‘delirium’ as any condition in which the physical channels responsible for sensation are overwhelmed. Asclepiades calls this condition ‘madness’ when the delirium is chronic and without fever, and he calls it \textit{phrenitis} when it is acute and with fever.\textsuperscript{29} Cælius attributes the latter view, that delirium is a species of madness, to the Stoics. He says that Stoics considered one kind of madness to be a delirium of the mind (\textit{alienatio mentis}) accompanied with a bodily co-affection, and that they distinguished this kind of madness from folly (\textit{insipientia}), which they considered to be a moral condition whose description makes no reference to the body, but merely describes all morally vicious people (\textit{omnem imprudentem}).\textsuperscript{30}

These two, different ways of characterizing madness imply that Asclepiades and the Stoics are classifying mental disease by different criteria. For Asclepiades, delirium and madness always involve some underlying bodily condition. The question is whether the delirium is acute and with fever (\textit{phrenitis}) or chronic and without (madness). For the Stoics, on the other hand, the question was whether the affection belonged to the soul alone (folly), or whether it also extended to the body (delirium).

\textsuperscript{27} Cæl. Aurel. \textit{Acut.} 2.1.6 (134,1-6 Bendz); Athenæus Tharsensis \textit{fuorem inquit mentis cum maestitudine, siquidem Asclepiades in primo libro Celerum passionum dixerit phreniticis alienationem cum turbore effici, in lethargis cum somno atque tristitia, alii alienationem cum maestitudine et iugi somno esse lethargiam dixerunt, etenim non habent mentem in fuorem extentam, ut Athenæus ait, sed sola in alienatione constitutam, ut Asclepiades.

\textsuperscript{28} See Ahonen, M. (2014). \textit{Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy}, 14 and 33-34; see also Urso, this volume, 000. \textit{Furor} might translate the Greek \textit{μανία}; while \textit{alienatio mentis}, a common phrase in Latin, might translate either \textit{ἐκστασις διανοίας} or simply \textit{ἐκστασις}. \textit{ἐκστασις διανοίας} is absent in Hippocratic texts, but it is found in the definitions of \textit{phrenitis} and of \textit{μανία} in the pseudo-Galenic \textit{Definitiones medicæ} (= \textit{Gal.} \textit{Def. Med.}), a text roughly contemporary with Athenæus. For \textit{φρένιτις}, see \textit{Gal.} \textit{Def. Med.} 234 (XIX.412 K.); for \textit{μανία}, 246 (XIX.416 K.). The meaning of these terms, however, is precisely what is at issue, especially in medical contexts where the definitions were often disputed: even if we could match Greek and Latin terms, that does not guarantee their univocity, which is especially a problem given the variety of ways Cælius says they were used.

\textsuperscript{29} Cæl. Aurel. \textit{Acut.} 1.pr.15 (30,2-6 Bendz); cf. \textit{Tardae vel chronicae passiones} (= Cæl. Aurel. \textit{Chron.}) 1.5.146 (516,19-23 Bendz).

\textsuperscript{30} Cæl. Aurel. \textit{Chron.} 1.5.144 (516,5-7 Bendz). On the Stoic distinction, see Ahonen, \textit{Mental Disorders}, 103-112; and Ahonen, this volume, 000.
Either sense of madness, the Asclepiadean or Stoic, might be attributed to Athenaeus. Caelius says that other physicians’ definitions of lethargy differed from that of Athenaeus “because the mind [of lethargics] does not extend into madness [non habent mentem in furorem extentam] as Athenaeus says, but as Asclepiades is merely fixed in delirium [sola in alienatione constitutam].” At a first glance, this might suggest that Athenaeus was following Asclepiades’ classification of acute and chronic forms of delirium. On this view, both physicians would be in agreement regarding the nature of the terms, and the dispute would be about the duration of the illness. By calling lethargy a kind of madness, Athenaeus would be saying lethargy is a chronic condition of mental disturbance accompanied by maestitudine. Since, however, lethargy was almost universally considered to be an acute disease, other physicians might have disagreed with Athenaeus’ characterization of the condition.

The lack of evidence, however, suggests caution. Caelius is not explicit that the distinction between acute and chronic forms of illness was at issue. Furthermore, it is not clear that Caelius is reporting Athenaeus’ full description of lethargy; he seems only to be picking out that aspect which he took over from Asclepiades and which was inconsistent with the view he endorses.

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31 For the text, see n. 27 above. Caelius does not tell us who these other doctors were.
32 It seems maestitudo and tristitia are being used in the same sense, but Caelius is not explicit. In a later part of this passage, he discusses a definition of lethargy from Leonides the Episynthetic. Wellmann, DPNs, 16-17 associates Leonides with the Pneumatist school, and Caelius reports that Leonides took the terms to mean the same thing: ‘maestitudinem uel tristitiam’ at Cael. Aurel. Chron. 2.1.8 (134,18-19 Bendz). As Caelius presents it, Leonides’ definition of lethargy resembles the one he attributes to Athenaeus, but with more physiological details: “an obtrusion along the passages of the meninges, with madness of mind, also fever and sadness, and distress and a large pulse [obtrusio secundum uias membranarum cum furore mentis atque febre et maestitudine ac pressura et pulsu magno]” (Cael. Aurel. Acut. 2.1.7-8, 134,14-16 Bendz). Caelius criticizes Leonides for including the cause of the disease—the affection of the meninges (obtrusio secundum vias membranarum)—since the cause was disputed and hence unclear (occulta). Caelius also criticizes Leonides for including “sadness or grief [maestitudine or tristitia]” and “madness of the mind [furorem mentis]” with “distress [pressura]”. “since distress implies them [pressura in semet maestitudinem atque furorem continent]”. Leonides, however, may not have meant what Caelius here attributes to him. ‘Pressura’ can mean ‘distress’ or ‘deep sleep’. It may be equivalent to Greek κῶμα (‘deep sleep’); γέφυρα (‘torpor,’ ‘numbness’); perhaps also καταφορά (‘sinking’). For examples, see [Gal.] Def. Med. 235 (XIX.413 K.) and [Gal.] Int. 13.25 (XIV.741 K. = 57,23 Petit). Aretaeus calls lethargy ‘gloom’ (ζόφος) at CA 1.2.1 (5.1.2, 98,9 Hude). The adjective ‘gloomy’ (ζοφώδης) is used in [Gal.] Int. 13.24 to describe melancholia (XIV.741 K. = 57,14 Petit). Caelius also seems to acknowledge this equivocation elsewhere. He mentions people who associate pressura with sleep, but he claims they are wrong and that “distress differs from sleep [differre pressuram a somno]” at Acut. 1.1.16-17 (30,13-27 Bendz). Leonides may have been one of those Caelius has in mind, but he does not say.
33 On lethargy as an acute disease: for example, Celsus, Med. 3.20 (129,2-4 Marx); [Gal.] Def. Med. 135 (XIX.387 K.); Aretaeus CA 2.2, (5.2.2, 98,8 Hude); Cael. Aurel., Acut. 1.2.1 (130,4-8 Bendz).
34 Caelius says Asclepiades did not give a definition of lethargy: “Asclepiades does not define this affection [Asclepiades hanc passionem non definit]” at Acut. 2.1.5 (132,21 Bendz). If what
independent report of Athenaeus’ definition of lethargy, we cannot rule out that the dispute was terminological and that Athenaeus and the others might have been using ‘madness’ and ‘delirium’ in different senses. In fact, Galen warns that “all these so-called Pneumatisms conform to the opinion of the Stoics, so that since Chrysippus accustomed them to dispute about philosophical terms, they do not hesitate to do the same thing about medical ones.”

Galen’s warning, although mentioned in the context of descriptions of the pulse, is general enough to suggest the “love for contentiousness among them (sc. the Pneumatisms) [τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φιλονεικίας]” was not limited to that context; it also suggests the Pneumatisms may have been content to adopt Stoic terminology and concepts, ignoring existing medical ones. Athenaeus may well have believed lethargy to be an acute disease and used the general Stoic term for madness. Without further evidence, the details of the dispute will remain murky.

Although Athenaeus’ positive views are difficult to reconstruct from this dispute, the dispute itself shows that Athenaeus was in dialogue with other doctors about the description and classification of disease types on the basis of mental symptoms. And like other doctors, Athenaeus believed these diseases to have underlying physiological correlates. Evidence about Athenaeus’ views on the physiology of mental disease comes from two reports in Galen, one about the physiology of melancholia, the other about the treatment of phrenitis.

Athenaeus believed melancholia was related to a dyskrasia or bad mixture of the elementary qualities (hot, cold, wet and dry). In On Mixtures, Galen reports that the followers of Athenaeus deny any disease can be characterized as hot and wet but “in every case [disease] is either hot and dry like fever, cold and wet like dropsy, or cold and dry like melancholia.” If Athenaeus’ views are accurately...
represented by his followers, it seems he thought *melancholia* was to be explained in terms similar to any other disease. Galen’s association of *melancholia* with a cold-dry mixture may be an arbitrary example on his part; nevertheless, its inclusion here suggests Athenaeus would agree that health and disease of either soul or the body are associated with mixtures of elementary qualities: health, with a hot and wet mixture (κρᾶσις); disease, with any mixture that deviates from this.⁴⁹

Regarding *phrenitis*, we only have reports about how Athenaeus’ followers treated the disease. Galen reports that they would apply *oxyrrhodinum*, a cooling-agent, to the head; they would remove the hair and occasionally apply other cooling herbs; and if the disease became chronic, they would also apply cupping instruments.⁴⁰ Galen finds this treatment puzzling, since, he says, “the *hēgemonikon* has been injured in those who are delirious, and according to Athenaeus this is in the heart.”⁴¹ This treatment, however, was common. Both Celsus and Aretaeus recommend it is a means of reducing fever,⁴² and Aretaeus says explicitly that the remedy is to be applied to the head “for the sake of refrigeration.”⁴³ It is likely that Athenaeus’ followers, too, performed this treatment as a means of reducing the heat accompanying fever. Such a treatment would also be consistent with Athenaeus’ view that fever is associated with a *dyskrasia* that tends to hot and dry. This leaves open how *phrenitis* would differ from fever if they are both hot and dry, but, on this question, our sources are like fever, cold and wet like dropsy, or cold and dry like melancholia [πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ἀπομαχόμενοι τινες τῶν ἄκρων Ἀθηναίου τοῦ Ἀτταλέως ὁμόσε χωροῦσιν ὀστε κατάστασιν ύγρᾶν καὶ θερμῆν μέμφεσθαι λέγοντες οὔθ ’εὑρεθῆναι τι νόσημα φάσκοντες υγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἡ θερμῆν καὶ ξηρῶν ύπάρχειν ὡς τὸν πυρετόν, ἡ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἀλλὰ ἡ ψυχρῶν ὡς τὴν μελαγχολίαν", tr. Singer (modified).


⁴⁰ Galen, *De metodo medendi* (= Gal. *MM*) 12.21 (X.928-29 K.).


⁴² Celsus, *Med.* 3.18.9 (124,5-8 Marx); Aretaeus, *CA* 1.1.10 (5.1.10, 93,29-94,1 Hude).

⁴³ Aretaeus, *CA* 1.1.10 (5.1.10, 93,29-30 Hude): τέγγειν δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐς ἔμψυξιν. Aretaeus also suggests applying cupping instruments to the head “if the derangement [παραφορή] does not abate at all by any of [the standard means of reducing inflammation (φλεγμονή)]” (96,15-16 Hude). The view that the brain is an organ for refrigeration is Aristotle’s. See e.g. *De partibus animalium* (= *PA*) 2.7, 652b6-23. Athenaeus’ followers, however, need not have held this view. See Lewis, 000.
III – Mental Exercise

The reports concerning Athenaeus’ understanding of mental disease all suggest he assumes a correlation between physiology and mental health. The dispute over Athenaeus’ description of lethargy shows that he thinks the impairment of mental activities is associated with some bodily condition. In the cases of melancholia and phrenitis, he seems to accept the view that they are associated with a dyskrasia of the elementary qualities of the body, although the precise nature of the relationship between the mixture and the soul’s activities are left unexplained. He may think they are related as cause and effect, that they have a common cause, or that impairment of mental activities followed certain mixtures or bodily conditions.

Athenaeus also thinks that the soul’s activities influence those underlying bodily conditions. Specifically, he claims that rational activity is a kind of exercise which has bodily correlates. By rational activities, he means, for instance, studies (μαθήματα), concerns (φροντίδες)\(^{45}\), and concentration (ἐπιμέλεια); and in this context he also mentions specific sciences, such as mathematics, philosophy, grammar and medicine—what he calls more generally ‘culture’ (παιδεία) and ‘rational study’ (μάθησις λογική). When he recommends these activities in a hygienic context, he refers to them as exercises of the soul (γυμνάσια τῆς ψυχῆς)—‘psychic exercises.’ The reason he extends the term ‘exercise’ to rational activity suggests Athenaeus sees an analogy between training that strengthens the body and training which strengthens the soul. Yet, Athenaeus does not say, as one might expect, that the purpose of psychic exercise is psychological health. Rather, he says it is to be done for the sake of the body.

Take, for example, his discussion of regimen for women:

Τὸ κατεψυγμένον τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ κάθυγρον τῆς συστάσεως διορθωτέον τῇ θερμοτέρᾳ καὶ ξηροτέρᾳ διαίτῃ. […] γυμνάσια δ’ ἐπιτρεπτέον τὰ γυναικῶν ἀρμόζοντα, ψυχῆς μὲν τὰ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων αὐταῖς μαθημάτων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν φροντίδων. ὡς εἶπεν ὁ παλαιὸς Ἱπποκράτης: σώματος δὲ διὰ τῆς ταλασιουργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν πόνων. ἐπιθεωρείσθωσαν γὰρ αἱ δὲ δεσπόζουσας τὰς δεσποζομένας, αἱ δ’ ἕγυρος καὶ τρῳφερῶς

\(^{44}\) The treatment of phrenitis, whose aim is to cool the head, certainly hints that it is the excessive heat of fever which causes injury to the hegemonikon, the rational faculty of the soul.


\(^{46}\) On the translation of this term, see below, n. 50.

\(^{47}\) The passage marked as a quotation is taken from Hippocrates, Epidemics 6.5.5 (V.316 L.). I discuss it in detail below, 000-000.
The cold and wet constitution of women should be corrected with a regimen that is drier and hotter. [...] One must encourage exercises [γυμνάσια] that are suitable for women: of the soul, [exercise] by means of the studies proper for women and concerns about the household, since “concern, for people, is the soul’s [way of] talking a walk”; of the body, [exercise] by means of spinning wool and the other work around the house. For, let the governesses observe the women they govern, and those who live softly and luxuriously, those who do the work themselves, how they differ from them with respect to health, pregnancy, and ease of labour, because of the simplicity of their food and the exercise of their body. It is useful therefore “to observe the baker, to stand by and measure out [supplies] with the housekeeper, to go around [the house] examining whether each thing is in the place it is supposed to be. For these seem to me to be something requiring concentration and a walk at the same time. It is also good exercise to mix and knead [dough], and to lay out the bedspreads. If she exercises in this way, then necessarily eating will be more pleasant and she will have a healthier complexion.”

In this text, Athenaeus distinguishes between exercises of the soul and those of the body. The soul’s exercises are described as ‘studies’ (μαθήματα) and ‘concerns’ (φροντίδες), while the body’s are ‘exertions’ (πόνοι). As we will see, Athenaeus adopts this distinction from a passage in the Hippocratic Epidemics 6, but his is almost certainly an idiosyncratic interpretation. There was considerable debate about which activities to assign to the body, and which to the soul. The debate is summarized in Ps.-Plutarch, Fragmenta: πότερον ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἐπιθυμία καὶ λύπη 6: “you are looking for boundary marks between body and soul; but nature has removed them, using all her skill to make one substance out of two” (Sandbach trans).

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the particular exercises he recommends, like observing, measuring, and examining. These activities, he says, are “something requiring concentration (ἐπιμέλεια) and a walk (περίπατος) at the same time,” but it is the way these mental exercises are carried out in this case, by observing the baker, measuring supplies, and examining things around the house, that explains why they involve bodily exercise in addition. One could equally carry them out without physical exercise, but Athenaeus thinks both body and soul should be exercised, and if they can be exercised together, then all the better. What he calls “exercises of the soul,” therefore, involve specifically mental activities. Whatever the effect of this exercise, he thinks it arises independently of the exercise of the body.

Yet, while he recognizes distinct mental and bodily activities, Athenaeus thinks they have the same effect. He recommends mental and bodily exercise in order to correct the “cold and wet constitution of women,” and both are part of a regimen he calls “hotter and drier.” The term ‘exercise’ must mean something like ‘an activity which causes heat and dryness to the body’; and he refers to mental and bodily activities as ‘exercises’ because he thinks they each have this heating and drying effect. At the same time, he refers to “those who live softly and luxurious” in opposition to those who do the work themselves, which suggests ‘exercise’ also has something to do with strength: the soul, like the body, is strengthened by exercise. But the goal of this psychological and physical regimen likely means he does not intend “mental gymnastics” to be taken as a metaphor for an activity which strengthens the mind’s ability to think. Instead, he is using the term ‘exercise’ to refer to an activity which increases the effect of heating and drying. Mental and physical exercises may be distinguished insofar as they are different sources of this effect, but as exercises, Athenaeus considers their effect to be the same.

Athenaeus also claims that two conditions accompany the correction of the body’s constitution—more pleasant eating and improved complexion—and both are associated with the body becoming warmer in other sources. Plutarch, for instance, mentions a contemporary medical view that “exercise, shouting, and anything that increases heat through movement causes one to be more pleased and more eager to eat.” In his commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics 6,

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51 It has been taken this way by Jaeger and Kudlien. See below, 000.
52 Plut. Quaes. Conv. 6.1 (Moralia 687a2-4): “αὐτὸν ἐκαστὸν αὐτὸν γυμνάσια καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ ὅσα τῷ κινεῖν ἔχει τὰ θερμὴν ἴδιων γαστὴν πουεῖ καὶ προθυμότερον”. One is more pleased and more eager because the increase in internal heat causes a greater than normal depletion of nutriment in the body, and so a greater amount of pleasure when restored. Plutarch says youth
Galen discusses the claim that a doctor can induce anger (ὀξυθυμία) and other emotional responses in a patient “for the sake of restoring color and humours.” He interprets the claim to refer to the increase in heat caused by the emotional response. The conditions which Athenaeus says accompany mental exercise are therefore consistent with the conclusion that mental exercise heats the body.

Athenaeus says nothing explicit about the physiology of mental exercise, and other fragments and testimony are equally silent on this question. We are better informed about Athenaeus’ understanding of the soul, and it is tempting to reconstruct Athenaeus’ physiology of mental exercise based on this testimony. Galen and pseudo-Galen report that Athenaeus identifies the soul with pneuma or breath, a corporeal substance distributed throughout the body, which holds the body together. Galen also reports that Athenaeus identifies pneuma with the innate heat responsible for the growth and maintenance of the human body. The movement or exercise of the pneuma could correspond to an increase in the strength of the innate heat, which would lead in turn to the heating of the body. That Athenaeus is committed to something like this view is suggested by fragments in which he associates excessive mental activity with the corruption of the body, and moderate emotional activity with good-nurture. This picture is as close as we get to a physiology of the mental in Athenaeus’ writings, and it is quite possible that he did not give a physiological explanation at all.

Whatever the physiology of mental activities, Athenaeus believes that their effects require regulation. Implicit in the distinction of exercises into psychological and bodily kinds is the claim that both are part of δίαιτα or δίαιτα, and are hungrier and the elderly less hungry for the same reason. See Plutarch, Moralia 686f. Aspasius makes a similar point regarding exercise: “a decent person will try to make foods and drinks pleasant [ἡδέα καὶ τὰ βρώματα καὶ τὰ ποτά] through exercise and exertion [διὰ γυμνασίων καὶ πόνων]” (Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria, CAG XIX.1 156,6-7 Heylbut). Athenaeus associates good appetite and digestion with ‘keener perception’ (εὐαισθητοτέρους) at Orib. Collectiones Medicae 9.5 (8,7-32 Raeder), which could be an alternative reason why mental exercise makes food more pleasant: one can perceive it better. But if this is what he means, it would leave unexplained the connection to the change in the woman’s constitution.

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53 The comment is in Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI (see note 54), although the passage is from Hippocrates, Epidemics 2.4 (68,4-6 Smith = V.126 L.): ἐπιτηθεῖσαν ὀξυθυμίαν ἐμποιεῖσθαι καὶ χρώματος ἀναλήψιος ἕνεκα καὶ ἑγχύμωσιος, καὶ εὐθυμίας, καὶ φόβους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.9 (XVII.B.259-60 K. = 278,10-12 Wenkebach): τὸ τὸ γὰρ τοί τι καὶ <κατὰ> τὸ δεύτερον τῶν Ἐπιδημιῶν ἐδείκνυμι λέγει· «ἐπιτηθεῖσαν ὀξυθυμίαν ἐμποιεῖσθαι καὶ χρωμάτως ἀναλήψιος ἕνεκα καὶ ἑγχύμωσιος».

54 Presumably, as Peter Singer suggests to me, it will have something to do with the activity of the innate heat in the heart, where, according to Galen, Athenaeus located the ἥγεμονικόν. See above, 000.

55 Gal. CC 2.3 (55,18-24 Lyons = 134,15-19 Kalbfleisch); [Gal.] Int. 9 (XIV 698-99 K = 22,10-17 Petit).


57 These effects are attributed by other medical and philosophical writers to variations in the heat of the soul. See n. 61 below.

58 See n. 61 below on Hippocrates, Vict. 2.61.
regimen. Regimen traditionally included the regulation of exercise, in the straightforward sense of bodily exercise, along with foods, drinks, sleep and sexual activity—anything we habitually do that influences the state of our body. Yet, the criterion that more generally determines whether something is a part of regimen or not is the extent to which something which affects our health is under our control in the first place. Like earlier philosophers and doctors, Athenaeus thinks mental activity can influence our bodily health, but he also thinks that mental activities are to some extent voluntary. We can choose when to study and what things to think about, just as we can choose what things to eat or drink and when to sleep. Athenaeus, therefore, thinks doctors should know how to instruct a patient to use and regulate mental activity in order to promote health, just as they regulate traditional aspects of regimen like physical activity, foods and drinks. He recognizes a distinction between the kinds of activities proper to both body and soul; but insofar as both can be regulated, he sees no distinction in their place in a programme of healthy regimen.

Athenaeus, however, does not portray himself as innovating. His strategy for justifying this regimen is to show that mental exercises were recognized by ‘the ancients.’ Hippocrates is his explicit authority in this case, yet Athenaeus wants to show that it was a view held by others as well. While he is not named in the text, a large section of the fragment—nearly a quarter—is taken verbatim from Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus.* Athenaeus could have been plagiarising, but it is

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60 See, e.g., Hippocrates, *De victu* (= Hipp. *Vict.*) 2.61 (VI.574 L. = 184,7-13 Joly-Byl); Plato, *Timeus,* 88a3-7; Aristotle, *De Anima* 1.1, 403a22-24; *Rhetoric* 2.13, 1389b31.

61 Athenaeus is not the first medical writer to incorporate mental activity into regimen because of its physiological effects. The Hippocratic author of *Regimen* also recognized thought (μερίμνης) as a form of exercise, and recommended that it be regulated precisely because it causes heating and drying. But the author of *Regimen* does not adopt any systematic distinction between bodily and psychological exercise or activity. Instead, he distinguishes between ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ exercises: “of exercises, some are natural, others violent ([περὶ δὲ τῶν πόνων ... οἱ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ βίης] (Vict. 2.61, VI.574 L. = 184,7-8 Joly-Byl). See Bartoš, *On Regimen,* 199-201.


63 Xen. *Oec.* 10.10-11: “This was my advice... ‘Look after the baking-maid: stand by the housekeeper when she is serving out stores: go round and see whether everything is in its place’. For I thought that would give her a walk as well as occupation. I also said it was excellent exercise to mix flour and knead dough; and to shake and fold cloaks and bedclothes; such exercise would give her a better appetite, improve her health, and add natural colour to her cheeks [καὶ ἐγὼ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἔφη, συνεβούλευον [...]: ἐπισκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ σιτοποιόν, παραστῆσαι δὲ καὶ στρώσαι τῇ ταμίᾳ, περιέλθειν δὲ ἐπισκοπομεῦνεν καὶ εἰ κατὰ χώραν ἔχει ἤ δὲ ἐκκαθα. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐδόκει μοι ἅμα ἐπιμέλεια εἶναι καὶ περίπατος. ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἔρην εἶναι γυμνᾶσιν καὶ τὸ δεῦσαι καὶ μάζαι καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα ἀνασεῖσαι καὶ συνθεῖναι. γυμναζομένην δὲ ἔρην οὕτως ἂν καὶ ἐσθίειν ἢδον καὶ υγιαίνειν μᾶλλον καὶ εὔχροωτερὰν φαῖνεσθαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ!’” (trans.
more likely that he expects his readers to be familiar with Xenophon’s Socratic writings, and is attempting to position his interpretation of Hippocrates as one that was recognized by Hippocrates’ contemporaries. One reason to make Xenophon’s advice resemble Hippocrates’ is to add support to his interpretation of the passage from *Epidemics* 6. A more effective strategy, however, would be to show that the importance of psychological and bodily training was recognized by all the ancients, a strategy Athenaeus engages in elsewhere. Still, it is not obvious that either Hippocrates or Xenophon held the view Athenaeus ascribes to them, and Athenaeus seems to have been challenged by later interpreters on precisely this point.

The portion of ‘Regimen for Women’ that comes from Xenophon includes all the advice about particular exercises, like inspecting with the baker and laying out the bedspreads, and the reference to pleasant eating and good complexion. At this point in the dialogue, a character named Ischomachus is telling Socrates about the advice he gave to his wife when she asked him how she could look beautiful without wearing makeup. His advice was to do things “that would give her a walk as well as an occupation (ἀμα ἐπιμέλεια εἶναι καὶ περίπατος).” The result, he says, will be “a better appetite, better health and a better complexion.” Athenaeus agrees with this advice, but he changes the text slightly, implying that these tasks involve the exercise of both body and soul (ἀμα ἐπιμελείας εἶναι καὶ περιπάτου). The distinction between exercises of soul and body, however, is not just absent from Xenophon’s text, but it also significantly distorts Xenophon’s advice. The point of Xenophon’s advice is that the occupation of running a house does not involve exercise, and so to be healthy one needs to walk around as well. Athenaeus’ reading of Xenophon, on the other hand, brings him much closer to the kind of soul-body regimen Plato recommends in the *Timaeus*, but which he attributes to Hippocrates.

Athenaeus mentions Hippocrates explicitly as an authority in this passage to justify the importance of mental activity to the health of the body. The aphorism

Marchant, Todd and Henderson).

64 Glenn Most suggests to me that Athenaeus may be reciting Xenophon from memory, and is perhaps unnamed because he is not a medical authority. Galen mentions a similar instance of Athenaeus’ ‘plagiarising’ in *Trem. Palp.* 6 (VII.609-10 K.), where Athenaeus copies a passage from Plato’s *Timaeus*, apparently without attribution: “[Athenaeus] writes: ‘now from this resistance and shaking, tremor and rigor follow, while the whole affection is cold; and the agent itself has this name’, he says, ‘as Plato says somewhere as well’. For he has written Plato’s text itself. The whole [passage from Plato] is as follows […] [ὑπογράφων τε τὸ ῥῖγος ὧδέ πώς φησι· τῇ δὴ μάχῃ καὶ τῷ σεισμῷ τούτῳ τρόμος καὶ ρίγος ἔπεται, ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ πάθος ἄπαν. τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ὅρον αὐτὸ ἔσχεν ὅνομα, ὧς ποι, φησι, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων λέγει. οὔτος γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν εἶρηκε τοῦ Πλάτωνος. ἔχει δὲ ἡ σύμπασα τόνδε τὸν τρόπον…]’

65 Thanks to Chiara Thumiger who originally pointed out to me the importance of this reference to Hippocrates.
he quotes is found at *Epidemics* 6.5.5:

πόνος τοῖς ἁρθροῖς καὶ σαρκὶ σῖτος ὑπὸνος σπλάγχνοις. Ψυχῆς περίπατος φροντίς ἀνθρώποις. 

Exertion for the joints and for flesh food sleep for the viscera. Concern is a soul’s taking a walk for people.

The aphorism is notoriously obscure. Athenaeus only quotes the second sentence, but he seems to have had it all in mind since he adopts the terms “exertion” (πόνος) and “concern (or thought)” (φροντίς) to refer to bodily and mental exercise respectively. This is certainly one way the passage could be read, and in his commentary on it, Galen mentions that some interpreters took both “exertion” (πόνος) and “walk” (περίπατος) to be synonyms for “exercise” (γυμνάσιον), as Athenaeus seems to do; but Galen also tells us there are differing opinions about its interpretation, especially concerning the part quoted by Athenaeus, and he goes out of his way to reject them. Whatever Galen’s reasons for thinking that the view attributed to Hippocrates by earlier interpreters is implausible, it seems that this view, or something close to it, is the view Athenaeus holds. Athenaeus calls thinking a form of exercise, incorporates into regimen and attributes the view to Hippocrates.

Galen says the first part of the passage was relatively uncontentious. Most interpreters, he says, take “exertion” to refer to the strengthening effect of exercise, something like ‘exercise causes strengthening or growth of the joints, food of the flesh, while sleep strengthens the viscera.’ These interpreters have this much in common with Athenaeus. And while it is the majority view, Galen is much less impressed with reading the second part in a similar way:

All the book’s interpreters take “walk” [περίπατον] to mean ‘exercise [γυμνάσιον],’ so that the sentence means: ‘for people, concerns [αἱ φροντίδες] are an exercise.’ They think [Hippocrates] has used the common term ‘walk,’ because the word denotes a form of exercise. Dioscorides, however, who reasonably avoided this interpretation because its style is affected [κακοζήλου δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνείας οὔσης], did not write “περίπατος.”

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67 The best modern study of this passage is Kudlien, F. (1962). ‘Zur Interpretation eines hippokratischen Aphorismus’. *Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften* 46.4, 289–94. It is briefly mentioned by Jaeger, *Paideia*, vol. 3, 30 and 298 n.73. It is also discussed by Deichgräber, K. (1933). *Die Epidemien und das Corpus Hippocraticum*, 53-55, who takes the point to be that thinking is literally the wandering of the soul in the body. In response, Jaeger asserts (without much evidence) that it cannot mean this. For Jaeger, what is new in the Hippocratic aphorism at *Epid. 6.5.5* is the transposition of the concept of exercise from the bodily to the psychological realm. This seems to be how Athenaeus and Galen take it as well (for different reasons), but the claim is not as clear or free of difficulties as any of them make it seem.
Galen prefers Dioscorides’ emended reading because, he thinks, it is absurd to suppose Hippocrates meant thinking is an exercise. Such an interpretation, he says, is κακόζηλος, i.e., said in an affected way. Galen uses this term when he wants to reject a competing interpretation on grounds of its implausibility. In his commentary on *Epidemics* 6.5.14, for example, Galen mentions an interpretation of the aphorism “weaker foods have a short life-time [ὀλιγοχρόνιον βιοτήν].” In this interpretation, the phrase “short life-time” is expanded to mean something like ‘weaker food persists in living [μονὴν ζω ὴν] for a short time’ after it has been ingested, an interpretation Galen thinks is implausible, since it is strange to talk of food having a life-span. The natural way Galen thinks one should understand the claim “weaker foods have a short life-time” is that they provide less sustenance, in other words, that they are used up and expelled rapidly. Galen’s criticism about περίπατος is roughly similar: he seems to agree that if Hippocrates used περίπατος as a synonym for ‘exercise,’ then what Hippocrates wrote would be implausible, and so he adopts Dioscorides’ emendation to avoid this conclusion. He does not say, however, why he thinks the reading would be affected or implausible. It cannot be that he thinks Hippocrates is not thinking about mental training. He clearly agrees that this is what Hippocrates is talking about, a point we will return to shortly. Perhaps, then, he is rejecting the reading on stylistic grounds, but if he is, I do not see what they might have been. What seems reasonably clear, however, is that Galen wants to place some distance between the items in the analogy, between concern and physical exercise, particularly to avoid the conclusion that thinking literally constitutes a kind of physical exercise.

There is one more piece of evidence which places Athenaeus’ use of Hippocrates within the broader context of how ancient medicine adopted themes from ancient psychology. In his remarks that follow the interpretation of *Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11* (XVIIB.263 K. = 280,8-14 Wenkebach): τὸν «περίπατον» ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου πάντες ἠκούσαν οἱ ἐξηγησάμενοι τὸ βιβλίον, ἵνα ὁ λόγος τῇ προσηγορίᾳ κεχρῆσθαι τῇ τοῦ «περιπάτου», δηλούσης τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης εἶδός τι γυμνασίου. κακοζήλου δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνείας οὔσης, εἰκότως αὐτὴν ὁ Διοσκουρίδης φυλαττόμενος, οὐ «περίπατος» ἔγραψεν, ἀλλὰ προσθεὶς τὸ «ν» γράμμα, «περὶ παντός».

According to Hermogenes, κακόζηλος describes a figure of speech that is implausible or unconvincing, either for reasons of impossibility, inconsistency, ugliness, impiety, injustice, or contrariness to nature—something that makes us think, “that does not seem do-able [οὐκ εἰκὸς τόδε πραχθῆναι]” (Herm. Inv. 4.12 Rabe). One example he uses is Hom. *Od.* 9.481 where Odysseus says the Cyclops, Polyphemus, “lobbed the peak of a great mountain [at us] after having snapped it off [ἤκε δ᾽ ἀπορρήξας κορυφὴν ὄρεος μεγάλοιο]”.

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περίπατος, Galen places this passage within a debate about the extent to which medicine is responsible for discussing matters to do with the soul. Not only was the interpretation of this passage contentious, but Galen also alludes to a question about the extent to which this passage belongs to medicine at all. He writes,

But if it should seem to anyone that the phrase belongs to philosophical speculation, not medicine—first, let them consider that it applies to all the rational arts in which one needs to exercise reasoning [ἐν αἷς τὸν λογισμὸν χρή γυμνάζειν], as it has been said by many other physicians, and not a few times by Erasistratus. And furthermore, certain affections occur, some, for instance, which numb the soul’s rational faculty and the faculty of memory, others which are stuporific [καρώδη] and soporific [καταφορικά]. In these cases, one must consider thinking to be beneficial, as in other places he [sc. Hippocrates] taught that anger is useful for good humour and regaining a state in accordance with nature.

Galen offers two reasons why this passage is relevant to medicine. First, he gives a kind of meta-defence, appealing to Erasistratus, that through practice one can improve one’s performance in any rational art. According to this defence, Hippocrates’ claim applies to medicine because, like any rational endeavour, medicine requires thinking, and thinking requires practice. The fact that Galen mentions Erasistratus here, and that this defence seems to imply the unemended reading of the aphorism (in which we are still thinking about ‘mental exercise’), might be evidence that this interpretation of the passage originated with Erasistratus, and that the passage’s relevance for medicine had already been questioned by Athenaeus’ time. Of course, Galen may just be using Erasistratus as an example, but it is tempting to think Galen is entering into an established debate about the boundaries between medicine and philosophy. The second defence appeals to Epidemics 2.4.4, mentioned earlier, which states rousing the emotions can be useful for restoring colour and humours. According to this defence, the soul is relevant to medicine because concerns (αἱ φροντίδες), either

Galen must have in mind Erasistratus’ belief that practice of the rational arts improves their performance, which he discusses in Consuet. 1 (17,1-22 Müller = 12,20-14,7 Schmutte).

72 Note that the parallel given in Wenkebach is almost certainly wrong. Wenkebach gives PHP 7.3 (V.602 K. = 440,20-26 De Lacy) as a parallel to this passage. There, Galen mentions Erasistratus’ views on the anatomy of the nerves and brain and the only thing he says related to the Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11 passage is that Erasistratus had time to make precise dissections ‘when he was old and had leisure to focus on the study of the art’ (440,24-25 Wenkebach). What Galen must have in mind is Erasistratus’ belief that practice of the rational arts improves their performance, which he discusses in Consuet. 1 (17,1-22 Müller = 12,20-14,7 Schmutte).

73 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11 (XVIIB.263-4 K. = 280,20-281,6 Wenkebach): εἰ δὲ τῷ δόξει φιλοσοφοῦ θεωρίας, οὐκ ἵστρικής ὁ λόγος ἔχεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνθυμεσθεν κοινὸν ἁπασῶν εἶναι τὸν λογισμὸν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸν λογισμὸν χρή γυμνάζειν, ὡς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς εἴρηται τῶν ἱστρίων Ἐρασιστράτου τ’ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις. Ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ πάθη τινα γίνεται τὰ μὲν οἷα ναικοῦντα τὸ λογισμικόν καὶ τὸ μημενοντικόν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ καρώδη καὶ καταφορικά, τούτους οὖν ἤητον ὦφελόμενος εἶναι τὰς φροντίδες, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις ἐδιδάσκεται τὰς ὀξυθυμίας εἶναι χρησίμους εἰς εὐχυμίαν τε καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξοδον ἀνάκτησιν.

74 See n. 72.
in the sense of ‘thoughts’ or the more emotional sense of ‘worry’\textsuperscript{75}, have a therapeutic purpose in cases where some affection has numbed the soul’s faculties of reason and memory.

Neither reason matches what Athenaeus’ answer would be to those who think the passage is relevant to philosophy and not medicine. Athenaeus recommended thinking to correct mixture of women, which tends to be cold and wet. Athenaeus, therefore, would have to say that Hippocrates’ claim about the soul is relevant to medicine insofar as the soul’s activities can be used as exercises, in other words that the soul’s physiological effects of heating and drying can be regulated through regimen. We have no fragments in which Athenaeus makes this claim so explicitly; however, it is something Galen says in a passage from \textit{De sanitate tuenda}. And like the discussion of the \textit{Epidemics} 6 passage, it comes up in response to someone who might think it is not for the doctor to deal with matters of psychology:

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\ldots\text{one should not think that it is only the business of the philosopher to shape the character of the soul [ἡθὸς ψυχῆς]; but rather his because of something greater, that is the health of the soul itself, and the doctor’s for the sake of the body’s not readily falling victim to sickness. For indeed [\ldots] an idle intellect, mindlessness and a soul which is completely lacking in spirit often bring about poor colour and atrophia through feebleness of the innate heat. For above all things our connate heat must be preserved within the bounds prescribed by health. And this is preserved by well-balanced exercise that takes place not just in the body, but also in the soul.}\textsuperscript{76}
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Galen does not mention Athenaeus in this passage, but the similarities are striking. That the passage from \textit{Epidemics} 6 appears in Athenaeus’ justification for including the soul in regimen hints that Athenaeus may have had a similar view in mind.

\textsuperscript{75} Galen is ambiguous here. The reference to \textit{Epidemics} 2.4.4 suggests the emotional sense, but Galen has just said that “acts of thinking [διανοήσεις] are called ‘concerns’ [φροντίδες]” (XVIII.263 K. = 280,16-17 Wenkebach) and takes the aphorism in 6.5.5 to mean, “for human kind above all what is to be practiced is reasoning [περὶ παντὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀσκητέον ἐστὶ τὸν λογισμὸν]” (XVIII.263 K. = 280,15-16 Wenkebach).

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Gal. San. Tu.} 1.8.15-16 (VI.40-1 K. = 19,26-20,1 Koch), trans. Singer: καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὅς φιλοσόφος μόνον προσήκει πλάτειν ἥθος ψυχῆς ἐκείνη πάντως γὰρ ἔτερφ τι μεῖξον τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ὑγείαν, ἵτερῳ δὲ υπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ῥάδιος εἰς νόσους ὑπομεταφέρεσθαι τὸ σῶμα. καὶ γὰρ θυμὸς καὶ κλαυθμός καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος φροντὶς ἀγρυπνία τε πολλὴ τε πολλάκις ἀρρωστίᾳ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος. χρὴ δὲ μὲν γὰρ φυλάττειν ἅπαντος μάλλον ἐν ὀροίς ὑγείνοις τὴν σύμφυτον ἑμφύσους τὴν τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος, χρὴ γὰρ φυλάττειν ἅπαντος μάλλον ἐν ὀροίς ὑγείνοις τὴν σύμφυτον ἑμφύσους τὴν τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος.
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IV – Emotion, Habituation, Education

Emotion and Habituation

Athenaeus is also concerned about the physiological effects of the emotions. He thinks the emotions, like thinking, have a direct effect on the body by causing the body to be heated or cooled. They are, therefore, just as much a concern for the physician as foods or drinks, and part of what he is doing in his writing on regimen is explaining when and why they need to be regulated. But regulating emotions is not, like regulating food or drink, or even thinking, simply a matter of telling a patient whether or not to feel a certain way. For Athenaeus, emotions stem from habituation—non-rational, psychological dispositions that determine what excites them. Since emotions can affect the body’s health, he thinks understanding and regulating the dispositions that lead to them are also a part of regimen.

That emotions have physiological effects is evident in Athenaeus’ recommendations for those who are preparing to have children:

Τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ παιδοποιίαν ἰόντας καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι χρή διακείσθαι κράτιστα· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστι τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς εὐσταθούσης καὶ μήτε λύπαις μήτε μερίμναις σὺν πόνοις μήτε ἄλλῳ πάθει κατεχομένης, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν ἀπλῶς ἔλασσομένον· ἀπὸ δ’ τῶν εὐσταθῶν καὶ τῶν ύγιεινῶν υφί, ἄλλα τῶν νοσερῶν, [ψυχῇ καὶ] νοσερά καθ’ ὅλον τε τὸν ὄγκον καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῆς μέρος· διὸ καὶ προδιαιτᾶσθαι χρήσιμον, γυμνασίοις μὲν αὐτάρκης καὶ χωρὶς πάσης κακοπαθείας κεχρημένους, τροφαῖς δ’ εὐκατεργάστοις καὶ εὐχύμοις καὶ εὐτρόφοις καὶ μετρίως ὑγροτέραις καὶ θερμοτέραις, ἀπεχομένους τῶν θερμαντικωτέρων.

Those entering into the production of children should be in a very strong state with respect to soul and body. That is, the soul [must be] tranquil and neither in pain, distress, nor seized with some other passion, while the body [must be] healthy and in no way generally diminished. It is not from those who are tranquil and healthy, but those who are sick that sicknesses arise [in offspring], both in the whole body and in each part of it. For this reason,

77 Accepting Raeder’s deletion of υγιεῖ καὶ after νοσερῶν. The received text, νοσερῶν υγιεῖ καὶ νοσερά is almost certainly wrong. Raeder’s deletion is arbitrary, but the Hippocratic parallel is, I think, good evidence in its favour. It is clear that Daremberg reads the text the same way, but I cannot see how his proposed emendation gets him to the interpretation he wants. He prints: τῶν ὑγιεινῶν υφί μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν νοσερῶν, ύγιῆ [sic] καὶ νοσερά; but he translates it: ‘car ce ne sont pas seulement les gens tranquilles et bien portants qui engendrent des enfants sains, mais les gens malades ont aussi des enfants malades [for it is not only tranquil and healthy people that have healthy children, but sick people also have sick children]’ (Daremberg, Oribase, 107).

in fact, it is useful to prepare by regimen, making use of exercises that are sufficient and separate from any bad passions, and of foods that are easy to digest, productive of good humors, nutritious, and moderately wet and hot, [while] refraining from those that are too hot.

One of the things Athenaeus is doing in this passage is explicitly distinguishing the health of the body from an analogous state of the soul. He refers to being in a very strong state of both soul and body, and then distinguishes between the strong body, which he calls healthy (ὑγιαῖον), and the soul, which he calls calm or tranquil (εὐσταθοῦσα). This distinction is important for his claim that tranquil and healthy people produce healthy offspring, while sick people produce sick offspring. The claim is almost certainly a reference to the Hippocratic Airs Waters Places, which states “the seed comes from every part of the body, healthy from healthy parts, diseased from diseased parts.” There is, however, no reference to the soul in the passage from Airs Waters Places. Athenaeus is incorporating the health of the soul into this Hippocratic claim about the causes of congenital illness, claiming that the psychological states of parents are just as important to health of the offspring as those of the body. He does not, however, say the parent’s psychological health is important because of its effect on the embryo’s own state of mental health or disease. As with mental exercise, he refers the effects of psychological affections to the health or disease of the ὄγκος, the corporeal body, of the offspring.

Because emotions influence the development of offspring, Athenaeus believes it is useful to regulate them through regimen (προδιαιτᾶσθαι χρήσιμον). The specific emotions he mentions, pain (λύπαις) and distress (μερίμναις σὺν πόνοις), are commonly associated with heating and fever. And just as he thinks one who is trying to produce children should regulate their diet by eating foods that produce the appropriate amount of heat and moisture, he also thinks they should only engage in moderate exercises that are free from all bad emotions (χωρὶς ἐξαιροῦσα ὀμολογία

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79 Hippocrates, Aer. 14.5: ὁ γὰρ γόνος πανταχόθεν ἐρχεται τοῦ σώματος, ἀπὸ τε τῶν υγιηρῶν υγιηρὸς, ἀπὸ τε τῶν νοσερῶν νοσερός (II.60 L. = 58,20-22 Diller). Athenaeus does not agree that the seed comes from the whole body. His views on semen are preserved in Galen, De semine (= Gal. Sem.) 2.1.37-50 (IV.602-605 K. = 152,27-156,19 De Lacy). In his commentary Hippocrates’ Airs, Water, Places, Galen reports that Athenaeus appealed to other passages, and was interested in interpreting references to pneuma as references to innate heat. The text survives in an Arabic translation and is currently being edited and translated by Strohmaier for the CMG. I thank him for letting me have access to his draft translation.

80 A similar view is found in Plato, Timaeus 87b4-6. At PHP 5.5.32, Galen attributes the view to Posidonius, who Galen claims “admired what Plato said about the shaping of unborn children” (V.466 K. = 324,1-2 De Lacy = F148 Edelstein-Kidd, tr. De Lacy).

81 It is unclear to what extent these states could even apply to a newborn.

82 See e.g. Hippocrates, De victu 2.61: “By all the thoughts [μερίμνῃ] that come to a man the soul is warmed and dried [θερμαίνεται καὶ ἔξηραίνεται]” (VI.576 L. = 184,12-3 Joly-Byl, tr. Jones). Also, Gal. San. Tu. 1.8.16: “For indeed rage, weeping, anger, distress [λύπη], worry [καταπελτησία], which is greater than it should be […] set off fevers […] (VI.40 K. = 19,31-33 Koch).
πάσης κακοπαθείας). His concern seems to be that too much heat will harm either the chances of producing children or the embryo itself, and so must be regulated.

Other physicians around Athenaeus’ time shared similar beliefs about the physiological effects of emotions on childbearing and pregnancy, and recommended that doctors should calm down their patients when they become agitated for just this reason. Soranus, for instance, recommends that doctors should “comfort the soul [παραμυθεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχήν]” of pregnant women “if the concerns of life [βιωτικαὶ φροντίδες] have disordered it.”

But at some point such therapeutic intervention would become impractical, and Athenaeus seems to be aware of the difficulty involved in having a patient who is in constant need of someone else to regulate his or her emotional states. It would be much better if patients could moderate their own emotional states and behaviours so that they did not have such excessive movements in the first place.

One way to moderate the emotions would be to have patients avoid situations that cause excessive emotional responses. Athenaeus has something like this in mind in the case of exercises for those who are preparing to have children. He recommends that they avoid exercises that involve excessive bad emotions, essentially suggesting that one regulate the external causes of emotions. Another way to regulate patients’ emotions would be to regulate the so to speak internal causes of emotional responses, the dispositions to emotional responses themselves.

The regulation of internal causes of emotions is accomplished by something Athenaeus calls “habituation”:

συνήθεια ἐστὶν ἔξις ψυχῆς ἢ σῶματος ἐν χρόνῳ κατασκευασμένη πρὸς ὑφέλειαν τε καὶ βλάβην ὑγιαινόντων τε καὶ νοσοῦντων· τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἐν χρόνῳ κατασκευασμένα ἀπὸ ταῦτα περί τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τοῦτο ποτὲ μὲν ἐπ’ ὑφέλειαν ποιεῖ τινα, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβην. Not only is it strong in times of health, but it often extends even into times of illness. And a habit that lasts for a long time is like an acquired nature.

Habituation is a state of the soul or body established over time with respect to benefit or harm when we are healthy or sick. For habit over time establishes something through itself in the soul and the body, and this sometimes makes something beneficial, sometimes [something] harmful. Not only is it strong in times of health, but it often extends even into times of illness. And a habit that lasts for a long time is like an acquired nature. For this reason, if any self-mover undergoes a change, it is dangerous and

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83 Sor. Gyn. 1.47.3 (34,29-31 Ilberg).
84 Raeder prints ἐπ’ ὑφέλειαν and ἐπὶ βλάβην, but the text must have been ἐπὶ ὑφέλειᾳ and ἐπὶ βλάβῃ.
introduces disease.

A key part of Athenaeus’ definition of habituation is the notion of stability. Habituation is a state one acquires through consistent habit, and which disposes us to be benefitted or harmed by the things we encounter. He likens it to an acquired nature—something ingrained that determines how we act and respond to things. Just as certain things are naturally good or bad for us, so some things can be become good or bad for us by habit. One’s body, for instance, may take time to get used to certain foods and drinks that at first cause indigestion; but, once one is accustomed to them, continuing the diet will not cause any physiological problems. An abrupt change in diet, however, like a change contrary to nature, will have a deleterious effect on one’s health.

Athenaeus thinks the same applies in the case of the soul. Things which at first rattle the soul because they are unfamiliar will cease to have such an emotional effect once one grows accustomed to them. One’s habitual emotional responses, therefore, in time become stable dispositions which determine what experiences one will react to emotionally and how strong the emotional response will be.

This understanding of habituation implies that stable psychological dispositions have an important role to play in bodily health. If our emotional responses are consistent, then the body itself would become accustomed to those effects and less likely to be injured by them. Even if the body itself becomes ill, so long as we have stable psychological habits, these dispositions are likely to persist and so cause no additional harm.

Athenaeus also recognizes that habituation is a neutral term, since one’s habits can lead to dispositions that “sometimes makes something beneficial, sometimes something harmful.” Habituation in this sense suggests Athenaeus recognized another aspect of habituation—our dispositions to certain behaviours or desires. Habitual desires took on an important role in several discussion of the aetiology of new diseases in the early Imperial period. These diseases included some named conditions, like elephantiasis and hydrophobia. More often, however, they were referred to in common as ‘diseases of regimen.’

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86 Athenaeus makes use of habituation in this sense in ‘On Healthy Regimen’, discussed below. Strabo attributes an anecdote about emotional habituation to Posidonius: “Posidonius says he often observed [barbarians decapitating people], and at first he was disgusted [τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀηδίζεσθαι], but after a while took it lightly due to habituation [μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φέρειν πράξεως διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν]” (Strabo, Geo. 4.4.5 = F274 Edelstein-Kidd). Cf. also Gal. PHP 4.7.7-8 (V.417-18 K. = 282,5-14 De Lacy = F165 Edelstein-Kidd); and Plutarch, De tuenda sanitate praecepta (= Plut. Tu. San.) 3, Moralia 123c10-15.

87 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 730f4-5).

88 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 731b2-3).

89 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 734c1-5): “Change in regimen is able to generate new diseases or do away with others [ἡ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν μεταβολὴ τὰ μὲν νῦν γεννᾶν τὰ δ’ ἀφανίζειν τῶν νοσημάτων σῶκ ἀδύνατός ἐστιν].”
The appearance of new diseases posed a serious problem for those who, like the Stoics and Platonists, maintained a belief in a stable natural order, and the way out of the problem was to attribute responsibility for these diseases not to nature, but to choices in regimen. But these discussions were often moralizing, identifying the moral disposition or virtue of temperance as co-extensive with health, and vices like intemperance, laziness and luxuriousness with disease. Seneca, who likely lived not long after Athenaeus, complained that Rome was plagued by new diseases brought about by all kinds of luxuriousness and pleasure-seeking; and Plutarch, a generation later, concluded that while the effects of nature are constant, humans can nevertheless acquire dispositions to behave in certain ways with respect to food, exercise and baths that will bring about disease. In these discussions, ethics becomes a concern for medicine because of a belief that one’s psychological habituation in the moral sense—one’s disposition to morally good and bad behaviours—somehow tracks the state of ones physiological health. The medical discipline of regimen, then, had come to share certain norms about appropriate behaviours and desires with ethics.

There is no evidence that Athenaeus discussed habitual desires in reference to new diseases, but he does sometimes write as if he shares a belief that disease-promoting and vice-promoting behaviours are co-extensive. As we have seen, in ‘On Regimen for Women,’ he writes that “women who live softly and luxuriously [ὕγρῶς καὶ τρυφερῶς βιοῦσαι]” differ from those who do the work themselves [τὰς αὐτουργούς] “with respect to health, pregnancy, and ease of labour” because of their lifestyle. In ‘On Healthy Regimen’ he calls excessive sexual pleasures “acts of intemperance” [τὰς ἀκολασίας], which cause “the slackening of soul and body.”

One way to avoid such diseases, one might think, is to develop self-control so that one does not give in to one’s desires in the first place. And Athenaeus does say that one should “try to restrain one’s impulses [πειρᾶσθαι δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς καταστέλλειν]” when they could cause harm. But self-control is not practical in every situation. He says some desires are stronger [ἰσχυρότερα] than our ability to control them, and in these cases he recommends diversion, so that one may “be prevented from [being driven] by these impulses” by exhausting oneself through mental and physical exercise. Nor is self-control always the healthiest option, especially if our unfulfilled desires cause enough emotional distress to lead to bodily harm. Soranus, for instance, suggests that sometimes it is better if doctors give patients what they want, even though what they desire is harmful.

90 Seneca, Epistulae 95.18: “Quid alios referam innumerabiles morbos, supplicia luxuriae?”
91 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 732d11-e6): πλησμονὰς δὲ καὶ θρύψεις καὶ ἡδυπαθείας ἐπελθεῖν μετ’ ἀργίας καὶ σχολῆς δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων.
[ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ βλαβερὰ … ἐπιθυμίαις], because the effect on the body of not giving into the desire is worse.\(^95\) While Athenaeus does not mention such a case, it is something he is committed to. If one becomes accustomed to desiring certain things and then cannot obtain them, whether the constraint is self-imposed or external, one would be unaccustomed to the emotional response produced by the constrained desire—a change which is, for Athenaeus, “dangerous and disease-promoting [ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ προσαγωγὸν εἰς νόσον].”

Here morality and medicine may come apart for Athenaeus. While he thinks some dispositions to disease-promoting behaviour are coextensive with moral categories, he nevertheless seems to privilege bodily health over moral health. He is, at least, committed to the same view as Soranus, that in cases where self-control might lead to disease, one should act in a way to avoid it, regardless of the moral consequences. Nevertheless, Athenaeus thinks that the best approach to avoiding diseases of regimen is to habituate one’s emotions and desires to what is beneficial, and to maintain those habits as consistently as possible.\(^96\)

**Education**

Athenaeus’ hygienic advice, however, extends beyond habituation of non-rational drives and desires. He is also concerned about intellectual exercise—the kind of advice he gives to women when he said they should study the theory of how to manage a household. This is also the advice he gives in a fragment on healthy regimen, in which he discusses how body and soul should be regulated from weaning to old age. In this fragment, he gives advice about when a child should go to a schoolteacher, what kind of school-teacher it should have, what subjects it should learn, and what kind of habits it should be raised in. In its paedagogical comprehensiveness, it is unparalleled in any earlier extant medical writers. It also seems to have been heavily criticized by his contemporaries. But these criticisms are helpful for understanding why Athenaeus believed medicine should take such an active role in the cognitive and intellectual development of those in its care.

The passage, from a fragment with the title ‘On Healthy Regimen,’ is long, but it is worth quoting in full:

Allow infants who have just been weaned from milk to live in relaxation and amusement [ἐν ἀνέσει τε ἐᾶν καὶ παιδιᾷ]. Accustom them to an easiness of the soul [τῇ ψυχικῇ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ κατεθίζειν] and to exercises accompanied

\(^95\) Sor. *Gyn.* 1.53.2 (38,29-30 Ilberg): “for [when those who desire something] do not get what they want, the body in fact grows thinner [μὴ τυγχάνουσαι <γὰρ> ὧν θέλουσιν τῇ δυσθυμίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπισχνοῦσιν καὶ τὸ σῶμα]”.

\(^96\) Cf. Plutarch, *De tranquillitate animi* (*Moralia* 476a1-4): “the disposition of the wise man furnishes extreme calm to his bodily affections [τοῖς σωματικοῖς παρέχει γαλήνην], destroying by means of self-control, temperate diet, and moderate exertion [ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ διαίτῃ σώφρονι καὶ μετρίοις πόνοις] the conditions leading to disease”.

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with games and cheerfulness. […] From six and seven years, give boys and girls over to gentle and benevolent elementary teachers. For those who are able to draw young children in [προσαγόμενοι τὰ παιδία] and teach using persuasion and consolation, and who frequently offer praise as well, are successful, and encourage them more and teach them with joy and relaxation. Relaxation and joy of the soul contribute greatly to a well-nurtured body [ἡ δ’ ἄνεσις καὶ χαρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἐντροφίαν σώματος μεγάλα συμβάλλεται]. But those in charge of teaching who are also relentless with their punishments make them servile, fearful and hostile to education [πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις]. For thrashing them, they oblige them to learn and to recall at the same time they are [receiving] the blows, when, in fact, they have become unable to think properly. Nor is it necessary to oppress the new students for the whole day, but give over a greater portion to their amusement. For, in fact, we see among the stronger [children] and those more mature for their age, that those who carefully and ceaselessly attend to their lessons are thoroughly corrupted in their bodies [καταφθειρομένους τοῖς σώμασιν]. Twelve-year-old children are to go at this time to elementary and geometry teachers and to exercise the body [πρὸς τὰ γραμματικοὺς φοιτᾶν ἤδη καὶ γεωμέτρας καὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνάζειν]. It is necessary that their tutors [παιδαγωγοῦς] and supervisors [ἐπιστάτας] be sound-minded, and not completely inexperienced, so that they observe the proper times and appropriate amounts of food, exercise, baths, sleep and other matters that have to do with regimen. [I say this] because most men hire grooms [for their horses] for a good amount of money, choosing ones who are careful and experienced, but the tutor [παιδαγωγοῦς] they appoint for their children is inexperienced and actually useless, and not in fact able to help in matters of life. From fourteen years until twenty-one, more serious training [μαθημάτων ἄσκησις] and practice in mathematics is appropriate, as is instruction and note-taking on the discussions of the philosophers, and of the notes taken, a more earnest rendering. It is useful, or rather necessary, for all men from this age, at the same time as these other subjects, to call on the art of medicine as well, and to listen to its theory, so that they themselves should often have reputable and good counsel about what is useful for well-being [τῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν χρησίμων]. For there is just about no period of time, either at night or during the day, in which we have no need of this art, but even in walking and sitting, anointing and bathing, eating and drinking, sleeping and waking – in all activities throughout the whole length of life and in each way of life, we have need of its counsel for the prevention of harm and it’s advantageous use. Also, to call on a doctor always and in all cases is wearisome and impossible. Thus, in matters concerning the soul [τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχῆν]
This advice sometimes draws on his views concerning the physiological effects of habituation. The majority of it, however, concerns education: the type of education children should receive, when they should receive it, and from whom. Both kinds of advice seem to have been attacked by Athenaeus’ contemporaries because they sound literally schoolmasterly (ὡς παιδαγωγικά): it is the advice of a school-teacher, not a doctor, and it confuses the boundaries between philosophy and medicine.

The first criticism is found in Plutarch’s Advice on healthy regimen (De tuenda sanitate praecepta). Plutarch tells a story about a doctor named Glaucus who reprimanded some philosophers for discussing the topic of healthy regimen (περὶ διαίτης ὑγιεινῆς). Glaucus singled out two of the philosopher’s claims as ridiculous, one about the habituation of the body, the other the habituation of the soul. According to Glaucus, the philosophers claimed that in order to be healthy one must keep their limbs moving, since otherwise the lack of movement would set up a kind of habituation or condition of fever (τιν ἰσολήπτην ἢ μελέτην ἐμποιεῖ πυρετοῦ) due to the concentration of warmth in the limbs. The philosophers also claimed that people should, when already healthy, eat the kind of food they will need to eat when they are sick, since this way they will “habituate their desire at once to be obedient to what is beneficial with satisfaction [τὴν ὀρέξιν ἅμα το ῦ συμφέροντος ἐθίζοντας εἶναι μετ’ εὐκολίας].” Glaucus rejects both claims concerning habituation for the same reason: not because their advice is necessarily bad, but, he says, because the advice they are giving is like something you get from a school-teacher (ὡς παιδαγωγικά) and ‘confuses the boundaries’ (σύγχυσιν ὅρων) of medicine and philosophy. Plutarch is trying to emphasize the all-encompassing nature of philosophy using Glaucus as a foil. For Plutarch, the philosophers should not be blamed for discussing matters of health: “rather they should be blamed if they do not consider it their duty to abolish the boundaries altogether and to make a single field, as it were, of all honourable studies.” And he portrays Glaucus as a doctor whose complaint is that these philosophers merely play at being doctor, discussing a subject they are not qualified to discuss. Yet, even though he uses him as a foil, Plutarch is not implying Glaucus is a bad doctor. As doctor he praises him. Instead, Plutarch is using him as medicine’s plausible representative, and he needs him in this role if his views about the relationship

98 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122b-e). “Paedagogical” may also be a reference to Plato, Republica 3, 406A5-6, which refers to regimen as “that modern medicine which waits on disease like a child [τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων ταύτη τῇ νῦν ἰατρίκῃ].”
99 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122c): ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνελόντες οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς ὅρους ὅσπερ ἐν μίᾳ χόρῳ κοινὸς ἐμφιλοκαλέον, ἀμα τὸ ἥδυ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διόκοντες.
100 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122c).
between medicine and philosophy are to stand in contrast to Plutarch’s own. Glaucus’ criticism of the philosophers could equally apply to Athenaeus’ advice concerning habituation, since Athenaeus suggests that recommending certain psychological habits is part of what physicians ought to do. It seems, therefore, that Athenaeus’ views regarding the relationship between philosophy and medicine, or at least these kinds of views, were up for debate not only between doctors and philosophers, but among doctors themselves.

Evidence for this debate among doctors emerges from a similar criticism regarding habituation and education in Soranus’ Gynaecology. It comes at the end of his discourse on paediatrics (τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον), a discussion which covers a range of topics from cutting the umbilical cord to weaning the infant. He ends his discussion by criticizing those doctors who go beyond what is traditionally paediatrics and branch into what he calls philosophy:

τὸ δὲ πόσων ἐτῶν αὐτὸ γενόμενον παιδαγωγῷ παραδότεον καὶ ποταπῷ τούτῳ καὶ ἢν συνήθειαν αὐτῷ κατασκευαστέον πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς, ὡτε μὴ τρέφεται παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐμφερῶς ζητούμενον τούτῳ οὐ κατ’ ἰατρικάς ἐστὶν ὑποθήκη, στηρισμέναιν δὲ τὴν διάταξιν ἐσχήκην, ὡτε παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον ἐνθάδε τελειούμεν.¹⁰¹

At what age the child should be handed over to a tutor [παιδαγωγῷ παραδότεον], what kind of person [the tutor] should be, in what manner [ἣν συνήθειαν] the child should be prepared by him for the parents if not brought up by them, and any inquiry similar to these are not instructions in accordance with medicine [οὐ κατ’ ἰατρικάς ὑποθήκης]. They rather belong to a more philosophical arrangement of topics [φιλοσοφωτέραν τὴν διάταξιν]. So, we leave it to others to break with custom and philosophize [παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν], while we ourselves here bring to end the discourse on paediatrics [τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον].

The arrangement of topics (τὴν διάταξιν) Soranus mentions are identical to those discussed by Athenaeus in the fragment “On Healthy Regimen.”¹⁰² He believes, however, that the topics treated in this arrangement—education and habituation—are philosophical, not medical, topics. Like Glaucus, Soranus

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¹⁰¹ Sor. Gyn. 2.57.2-3 (93,9-14 Ilberg), trans. Temkin, modified slightly.  
¹⁰² There is a strong case to be made that he has Athenaeus in mind. First, Athenaeus follows the same fixed order of topics Soranus mentions. Second, Soranus emphasizes that he is finishing his “discourse on pediatrics” (τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον) before the point at which other writers on pediatrics do. Not only, therefore, is Soranus stating the existence of abnormally philosophical writings on pediatrics, he would also recognize Athenaeus’ hygienic advice as such. Finally, he does not seem to be referring to philosophers or some other group who wrote works on pediatrics. Whatever group he is calling ‘others’, it is hard to imagine those who “break with custom and philosophize” could refer to anyone other than doctors.
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thinks that for a doctor to engage in the cultivation of intellectual and moral virtues would be to confuse the boundaries between medicine and philosophy, of paediatrics (παιδοτροφία) and education (παιδεία). Traditionally this was true. The arrangement of topics Soranus refers to as a “more philosophical” was codified by Athenaeus’ teacher, the philosopher Posidonius, in the first book of his work On Affections (περὶ παθῶν). Galen reports he “wrote a kind of epitome of Plato’s remarks about children, how they must be brought up and educated [τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι] in order that the affective and irrational part of their soul may exhibit due measure in its motions and obedience to the commands of reason.”\footnote{103} Soranus is right in pointing out that education and habituation are traditionally philosophical topics.

The disagreement, however, is deeper than disciplinary boundaries. It arises from a fundamental difference in their approach to paediatrics and their understanding of its aims. For Soranus, paediatrics ends when a child is weaned and begins teething—the time at which it no longer depends on its mother or wet-nurses for nourishment and must learn to care for itself. The aim of paediatrics is to get the child to this point of development in a state of health. For Athenaeus, this is not the end of paediatrics, but a point at which a child is most vulnerable. As children become more self-reliant, they begin to develop habits, which over time establish dispositions in the soul. Athenaeus says dispositions are only like an acquired nature, but there is an importance difference between a person’s dispositional and natural ‘drives’: unlike natural drives or responses, habitual ones have no inherent aims. Whether they are helpful or harmful is determined by the kinds of activities one habitually engages in. This is why Athenaeus places such importance on the kind of paedagogue one appoints to children, and why he is so critical of those who appoint a paedagogue who is “inexperienced and actually useless.” The paedagogue must be someone who knows “the proper times and appropriate amounts of food, exercise, baths, sleep and other matters that have to do with regimen” so that the child will become habituated to pursuing these as if they were natural. It is also why he places such importance on children’s emotional habituation. A calm emotional disposition makes children less liable to excessive heating and drying, the harmful physiological correlates which accompany emotional distress and so cause harm to the body.

The aim, therefore, of Athenaeus’ paediatric advice is to ensure that as an adult one has the emotional and cognitive abilities required to care for one’s own health. This means caring for a child’s physiological development; but it also means caring for a child’s soul by ensuring the child is habituated to the right kinds of desires and emotional dispositions, and by educating the child in such a way that it can, when grown, distinguish “what is useful for well-being [τῶν εἰς

\footnote{103} Gal. PHP 5.5.32 (V.466 K. = 324,6-10 De Lacy = F148 Edelstein-Kidd). Galen goes on to report that Posidonius believed a child’s rational capacity becomes strong enough to rule the body at fourteen years, the age at which Athenaeus believes a youth should seriously begin their studies and begin to learn medicine.
σωτηρίαν χρησίμων]” from what is not.

V – Conclusion

I have tried to show that the disputes among medical writers in the early Imperial period can give us insight into the types of problems that arose from the integration of philosophical psychology and traditional Hippocratic medicine. These disputes focus not only on the relationship between psychological and bodily health, but on the kinds of reasons medical writers gave for and against expanding the boundaries of medicine to include traditionally philosophical topics like emotional habituation, education and intellectual study. For Athenaeus, these philosophical topics are equally important for medicine, since ultimately the way one thinks and feels has a profound effect on the health of the body. Like Plato in the *Timaeus*, Athenaeus claimed that well-being (σωτηρία) consists of a regimen that includes the training of both body and soul. Yet, he bases this claim on the authority of Hippocrates. This dialectical strategy, perhaps more than any of his individual doctrines, was to be Athenaeus’ lasting contribution to medicine.


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