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General Editors: Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields

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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND IN THE EARLY MODERN AND MODERN AGES

The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 4

Edited by Rebecca Copenhaver

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields

How far back does the history of philosophy of mind extend? In one sense, the entire history of the discipline extends no further than living memory. Construed as a recognized sub-discipline of philosophy, philosophy of mind seems to have entered the academy in a regular way only in the latter half of the twentieth century. At any rate, as an institutional matter, courses listed under the name 'Philosophy of Mind' or 'The Mind-Body Problem' were rare before then and seem not to have become fixtures of the curriculum in Anglo-American universities until the 1960s.[1] More broadly, construed as the systematic self-conscious reflection on the question of how mental states and processes should be conceived in relation to physical states and processes, one might put the date to the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.

One might infer on this basis that a six-volume work on *The History of Philosophy of Mind* extending back to antiquity is bound to be anachronistic: we cannot, after all, assume that our questions were the questions of, say, Democritus, working in Thrace in the fifth century BC, or of Avicenna (Ibn-Sînâ), active in Persia in the twelfth century, or of John Blund, the Oxford- and Paris-trained Chancellor of the see of York from 1234–1248, or, for that matter, of the great German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz (1646–1716). One might on the contrary think it *prima facie* unlikely that thinkers as diverse as these in their disparate times and places would share very many preoccupations either with each other or with us.

Any such immediate inference would be unduly hasty and also potentially misleading. It would be misleading not least because it relies on an unrealistically unified conception of what *we* find engaging in this area: philosophy of mind comprises today a wide range of interests, orientations, and methodologies, some almost purely *a priori* and others almost exclusively empirical. It is potentially misleading in another way as well, heading in the opposite direction. If we presume that the only thinkers who have something useful to say to us are those engaging the questions of mind we find salient, using idioms we find congenial, then we will likely overlook some surprising continuities as well as instructive discontinuities across these figures and periods.

Some issues pertinent to mental activity may prove perennial. Of equal importance, however, are the differences and discontinuities we find when we investigate

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PERSONS AND PASSIONS IN HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Angela M. Coventry

[A]ny kind of form, feeling, perception, emotion, and consciousness, whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: "this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my Self."

– Buddha

1. Hume on the mind

David Hume's primary project was to develop a scientific approach to the human mind. This amounts to a detailed examination of the operations of the mind based on observable facts, careful argumentation, and striking examples drawn from everyday life. This section outlines the major elements of Hume's philosophy of mind: the cognitive faculties of the senses, memory, imagination, reason (or the understanding), and the will, all of which are governed by the three main principles of human nature: the copy principle, the separability principle, and the principles of association.[1]

1.1 A science of human nature

Hume's science is an "accurate anatomy of human nature" that stakes out the "powers and faculties" or parts of the mind and how they are related to each other (T 1.4.6.23/263; EHU 1.13/13). Examination of the mind's cognitive capacities reveals the extent and limits of human knowledge (T Intro.4/xv). The science of the mind applies across domains as logic, morals, criticism, and politics, including natural philosophy, religion, and mathematics, since these too are "judged" by the "powers and faculties" of human minds (T Intro.4/xv). The method of the investigation into the mind is experimental, that is, based on the "experience and observation" of the behavior of people in all of their activities, be it business or

pleasure, when caught up in the ordinary course of their lives (T Intro.7, 10/xvi, xix). Hume recommends "careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations" (T Intro.8/xvii). When these sorts of experiments are "judiciously collected and compar'd," then "we may hope to establish on them a science" (T Intro.10/xix). The science aims for universal principles (T Intro.8/xvii). Hume thinks it likely that "one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which again, may be resolved into one more general and universal" (EHU 1.15/14–5). The goal of simplicity reduces principles "to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes" (EHU 4.1.12/30). This science also does not go beyond experience and observation to explain the "ultimate principles" of human nature or engage in speculative hypotheses (T Intro.8/xvii; AB 1/646). The result is a science of the mind that "will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension" (T Intro.10/xix).

The experimental method had been successfully applied by Newton in natural philosophy and now it is time to apply it to human nature (EHU 1.15/14; T Intro.7/xvi). Hume mentions other thinkers following the experimental approach to human nature, including Bacon, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler (T Intro.7/xvi-xvii; AB 2/646). For example, Bacon advocates experience, observation, and experiment as the routes to scientific knowledge in *The New Organon*. Locke also claims that knowledge is founded in empirical observation and experience. His *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* aims to discover "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge" (ECHU 1.1.2). Knowledge is gained through experience or through thinking about what we experience. Through experience, the mind accumulates ideas when we exercise thought or feel a sensation (ECHU 2.8.8). An idea is "whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself" as "the immediate object of Perception, Thought or Understanding" (ECHU 2.8.8). For Locke, there are ideas of sensation, that is, ideas arising from our sensory faculties, and ideas of reflection, arising from the mental operations such as thinking and willing (ECHU 2.1.3). Some of our ideas are simple – that is, they cannot be analyzed into any other elements (ECHU 2.2.1). Other ideas are complex: the mind actively puts together complex ideas when it repeats, compares, or unites simple ideas.

1.2 Impressions and ideas

Like Locke, Hume claims that all of the contents of the mind are derived from experience and that there are no innate ideas. But there are important differences between the two thinkers. Hume uses the term 'perception' the way Locke uses the term 'idea' to cover the contents of the mind in general. In addition, Locke counts all perceptions – including sensations and thoughts – under the term idea, whereas Hume divides perceptions into impressions and ideas. Impressions are our more lively perceptions, those we have "when we hear, or see, or feel, or love,

or hate, or desire, or will" (EHU 2.3/18). Hume regards this division of perceptions into 'impressions' and 'ideas' as an improvement over Locke's denial of innate principles (EHU 2.9n/22). Hume further divides impressions into impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation derive from our senses. Hume identifies the impressions of reflection as the passions, desires, and emotions. Our passions and emotions are produced either directly or indirectly. Direct passions arise immediately from pain or pleasure and include desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, and volition. Indirect passions such as pride, humility, love, and hatred arise indirectly from feelings of pleasure and pain. Hume discusses these impressions of reflection in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, book 2, 'Of the Passions', and the 'Dissertation on the Passions' (1757).

Ideas are faint "or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones" (EHU 2.5/19). Ideas then are "less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations" (EHU 2.3/18). The difference between impressions and ideas is the difference between feeling and thinking (T 1.1.1.1/2; AB 5/647). Notice that ideas and impressions differ in terms of liveliness, particularly "their degree of force and vivacity" (T 1.1.1.3/2). This distinction is one of degree not kind: impressions can be so weak that they are mistaken for ideas, and ideas so strong (in sleep, fever or madness) that they are indistinguishable from impressions. Hume equates belief with forceful and vivid ideas (EHU 5.2.12/49).[2] The operation of belief accounts for action. Belief can make "an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity," and this allows ideas to have an influence on the passions equal to that of impressions in terms of "actuating" the will to produce action (T 1.3.10.3/119). The will is a causal intermediary between vivid belief and action, "when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (T 2.3.1.1/399).[3]

Hume allows the perceptions of the mind to be simple or complex. He understands simple ideas or impressions to "admit of no distinction or separation" – this means that they cannot be broken down into parts any further (T 1.1.1.2/2). A simple impression would be any impression of sight, smell, taste, sound, touch, or pleasure or pain considered alone by itself. Simple ideas exactly resemble simple impressions. Complex ideas or impressions may be divided into parts. A complex impression is composed of a group of simple impressions. For example, an object such as an apple would appear to the senses as a complex impression composed of a particular color, a certain taste and odor.

Many of our complex ideas never had impressions that correspond to them: one may imagine a city such as New Jerusalem, even though one has never seen it. In addition, many of our complex impressions are never exactly copied in ideas: one may have visited Paris and have an idea of it without that idea exactly representing all of the streets and houses of Paris (T 1.1.1.4/3). Complex ideas need not exactly represent or copy complex impressions, but complex ideas may be divided into parts or a group of simple ideas, which do exactly represent or copy a group of simple impressions. For every simple idea, there is a corresponding simple impression, and for every simple impression a correspondent idea. Hume

thus establishes as a "general proposition," now known as the copy principle, that "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T 1.1.1.7/4). That impressions are prior to ideas is shown by two examples from experience. First, experience shows that one presents objects in order to produce impressions, rather than producing impressions by attempting to excite ideas first (T 1.1.1.8/5). Second, if there is a defect with the sensory faculties, or if the organ of sensation which gives rise to the impressions has not been put into use, the impressions and their correspondent ideas are lost (EHU 2.7/20; T 1.1.1.9/5).

There is an exception to the doctrine that impressions are prior to ideas. In the famous case of the missing shade of blue, Hume imagines that a person, who has enjoyed good sight for thirty odd years, has seen colors of all kinds, except on particular shade of blue. If that person is presented with a graded series of blues, running from the deepest to the lightest and if a particular shade of blue which she has never seen is absent, she will notice a blank in the continuous series and will be able to raise the idea of the particular shade. Hume admits the exception but does not think that it undermines the general maxim because it is an instance that is "particular or singular" (T 1.1.1.10/6; EHU 2.8/21). A possible source for this counterexample comes from Descartes's unpublished work the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. In rule 14, he asks us to consider someone who once perceived all of the primary colors, though he has never seen the intermediate or mixed tints, and concludes that it is possible for the person to construct images of those he had not seen from their likeness to others by a sort of deduction.

Nevertheless, one might think the counterexample falsifies the copy principle (Flew 1986: 21; Bennett 2001: 218–219). For one thing, the counterexample is certainly not a particular and singular instance: we could raise instances of a missing tone or taste or smell, or temperature, and even of missing shades of every color (Bennett 2001: 218). Yet Hume may be able to deal with the counterexample.[4] First, there may be a positive role for the counterexample, as Buckle notes, "because it shows the first instance of the mind generating ideas through habituation" and "becoming accustomed to a series of *resembling* impressions" (Buckle 2001: 138–139). Second, we may be able to explain the exception by appeal to the existence of natural resemblances among simple perceptions. The missing shade of blue is derived from a set of closely resembling impressions. This is explained by the operation of the mind to "vary even simple ideas in a specific discernible qualitative dimension of similarity (such as darker to lighter) when assisted by many surrounding examples arrayed in that dimension" (Garrett 2015: 46). The mind uses an array of resembling shades to fill in the blank within an ordering of simple ideas. On such a view, the copy principle is an empirical, contingent generalization and that "[m]odest deviations" from the principle "are not out of the question" (see also Garrett 1997: 50–55; Stroud 1977: 34).

Hume applies the copy principle to various topics such as abstract ideas, space, time, causality, substance, external world, and personhood. When we find that ideas are ambiguous, he seeks to find the impressions from which these ideas are

derived so we can get clear on the matter. In his *Abstract* Hume writes that "when he suspects that any philosophical term has no idea annexed to it (as is too common) he always asks from what impression that idea is derived? And if no impression can be produced, he concludes that the term is altogether insignificant" (AB 7/648–649).

1.3 Memory and imagination

Ideas function in the faculty of memory and the faculty of imagination. In memory, the ideas may reappear with a degree of vividness that is intermediate between the vividness of an impression and the faintness of an idea. In imagination, ideas can lose their vivacity and reappear as ideas, as faint copies of impressions (T 1.1.3.1/8–9). Ideas in the memory retain some of the original vivacity of the impressions and preserve the order and position of the original impressions. Ideas in the imagination have the opposite characteristics. Ideas of the imagination have lost all of their original vivacity, so ideas in the memory, by contrast, are much more lively and strong. In addition, the memory preserves the "original form" in which objects present themselves, whereas the imagination transposes and changes its ideas as much as it pleases; consider the inventive descriptions of nature in the fables of poems and stories (T 1.1.3–4/10).

A corollary of this capacity of the imagination is the separability principle. The first full statement of the principle is as follows: "that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination" (T 1.1.7.3/18). This ability of the imagination to break apart and recombines ideas is natural given the fact that all ideas are derived from impressions and "that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable" (T 1.1.3.4/10). This principle is also an evident consequence of the simple/complex division. The components of complex ideas are separable into simple elements, and the imagination can recombine them. Simple ideas admit of no distinction, complex ones may be distinguished into parts, so, wherever a difference among ideas is perceived, the imagination can make a separation. In turn, the separability principle underwrites some of Hume's central arguments – for example, his arguments against infinite divisibility and that the causal maxim, "*whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence*" is "neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain" (T 1.3.3.1–3/78–80).

1.4 Association of ideas

The imagination is free to combine ideas as it pleases, but it is generally guided by three principles of association by which one idea naturally introduces another. These principles comprise resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The imagination has a tendency to pass from one idea to another which is resembling, close in time and place, or when "produc'd by it" (T 2.1.4.2/283). The uniting

principles of association should not be considered as an "inseparable connexion" amongst ideas, however, but rather as a "gentle force" connecting our ideas, "a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have [. . .] extraordinary effects" (T 1.1.4.1/10; 1.3.6.13/92; 1.1.4.6/12–13). Hume thinks that "many operations of the human mind depend on the connexion or association" of ideas in the imagination (EHU 3.18). The "very essence" of association is that of "producing an easy transition of ideas" (T 1.4.6.16/260). Constant and repeated experiences produces "facility": this is an easy transition between associated ideas in the imagination. Hume remarks that when "one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction" (T 2.1.4.2/283). Facility is "a very powerful principle of the human mind" that makes associations between certain thoughts and actions easier to produce and this gives us a "tendency or inclination" towards these same thoughts and actions (T 2.3.5.1–3/422–423).

Two other sorts of association go along with the association of ideas: the association of dispositions and the association of passions. The principles of union include resemblance, contiguity, and causation in the association of dispositions. These principles "make us conceive the one idea by an act or operation of the mind, similar to that by which we conceive the other" (T 1.4.2.32/203). This is easily a source of error since "whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded" (T 1.2.5.19/60). The association of ideas and the association of dispositions are both at work in his explanations of the belief in external objects, in space and time, and the idea of a vacuum. The associative principle of resemblance eases the transition in the imagination to create the fiction of the continued existence of external bodies (T 1.4.2.34–35/204) and explains why we falsely think we can have an idea of the vacuum (T 1.2.5.19–21/60–62). The association of dispositions also helps to explain the determinations of property in the case of justice (T 3.2.3.4n/504–505). Resemblance is the sole principle of the association of the passions, or the "reflective impressions." All of our "resembling impressions are connected together" and the experience of an agreeable or disagreeable impression will naturally lead us to experience other agreeable or disagreeable impressions (T 2.1.4.3/283). The association of ideas works together with the association of impressions to produce the passions of pride, humility, love, and hatred.

Many thinkers before Hume had recognized the association of ideas. Hobbes assigns a chapter early in the *Leviathan* to what he called the succession, sequence, series, or consequence or train of imaginations or thoughts in mind. Locke thinks the association of ideas is "a sort of madness" and "a Weakness to which all Men are so liable" (ECHU 2.33.3–4). He offers numerous illustrations of the negative effects of bad associations. Inspired by Cartesian physiology, Malebranche examines the correlation of ideas to traces in the brain and the association of the traces with each other. Our ability to associate from one idea to another is explained by pathways formed in the brain through which the animal spirits can pass more

easily. The "movement of the animal spirits and the traces aroused in the brain arouse ideas on the mind" (ST 2.1.5.1; 101). The more prolonged the impact, the deeper the grooves in the brain and the deeper the connection of ideas in the mind. The animal spirits find the "path of all the traces made at the same half open, continue on them, since it is easier for them to travel those paths than through other parts of the brain" (ST 2.1.5.2; 106). Malebranche thinks the "mutual connection of the brain traces and consequently of the ideas with one another" has great importance for morals, politics all of the sciences related to human beings (ST 2.1.5.2; 105). A proper understanding of the psychophysiology can "guide and preserve" our happiness and the "most perfect state we can attain" for we can live with others "knowing precisely both how to use them for our needs and how to help them in their miseries" (ST 2.1.5; 101).

Likewise, Hume thinks that association secures our happiness: the customary transition in the imagination provides us with information to "employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good or avoiding of evil" (EHU 5.2.21/55).[5] Hume emphasizes the association of ideas "enters into most of his philosophy" and this makes resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect "really *to us* the cement of the universe" (AB 35/662). Our ideas associate, or move from one to another, in our imagination, according to the three natural relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There are also philosophical relations, when the association of ideas are willfully compared, and thus are the basis of our reasoning abilities (T 1.1.5/13–15). As Owen (1999: 11) notes, Hume's "conception of reason explains reasoning in terms of *a subset* of properties of the imagination." Einstein underscored the role of the imagination in our reasoning process and acknowledged a debt to Hume (Schilpp 1949: 53). The imagination is also crucial for the formation of the self.

2. Hume on the self or personal identity

Hume's explanation of the self has two parts: a negative part and positive part. The negative part is Hume's rejection, via the copy principle and the separability principle, of the Cartesian mental substance as the source of identity. The second, more positive part consists in an explanation of the self as a product of principles of association in the faculty of imagination and as the subject of self-concern as it regards passions and action.

2.1 A bundle of perceptions

Hume describes the soul or self as "nothing but a system or train of different perceptions, those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity" (AB 28/657). This account is in contrast to thinkers such as Descartes. Descartes held that the essence of the mind is "thought in general" and that we have a strong sense of a simple identical self that continues to exist and remains the same all through our

life (AB 28/657; T 1.4.6.1/251). Hume denies this. The investigation via the copy principle into the impression from which the idea is to be derived reveals there is no "constant and invariable impression" of the self (T 1.4.6.2/251). The impression of our self is not of a simple, enduring self but of a succession of varying perceptions, including passions and sensations, so it appears impossible to have any such idea of the self (T 1.4.6.2/252).

Not only is there no idea of a perfectly identical self, there is no way to explain how such a self could be related to any of our "particular perceptions" (T 1.4.6.3/252). By the separability principle, if my particular perceptions are distinguishable from other particular perceptions, they may exist separately from them. And in fact, they may be distinguished from other perceptions, so they depend on nothing else for their existence and may exist apart from myself. And if they can exist apart from me, they do not depend on me for their existence. Further, the notion of a mental substance in which our perceptions inhere is unintelligible (AB 28/657). We have no idea of such a substance because there is no impression, spiritual or material, of which it is a copy. Our ideas of bodies are composed of particular perceptions, such as tastes, colors, shapes, and so forth, and thus "our idea of any mind is only that of particular perceptions, without the notion of any thing we call substance" (AB 28/657).

When Hume looks inward for his self, all he can observe is perceptions, "of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure," and he never is able to "catch myself at any time without a perception" (T 1.4.6.3/252). Introspection provides access to the mind's various perceptions – a bunch of different thoughts and feelings that are in a continual state of "flux and movement" – but not to anything in which those perceptions inhere (T 1.4.6.4/252). Our perceptions change quickly, whether it is due to the input of the senses or our even-more variable mental activity, and there is no power of the mind that "remains unalterably the same, even for a single moment" (T 1.4.6.4/253). The mind is "a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations" (T 1.4.6.4/253). There is no single time in which the mind is simple, nor is there any stretch of time in which it is identical. As far as we can tell, there is nothing to the self over and above "a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4/252). In the Abstract to the *Treatise*, Hume describes the account of personal identity as a bundle or "system" of different perceptions "peculiar to himself" (AB 28/657), but it has been shown that the view has been anticipated by thinkers such as Cudworth, Bayle, Berkeley, and Régis (see Raynor 1990 and Thiel 2013: 410f).

2.2 Imagination and identity

There is a natural propensity to view the successive perceptions in our minds as in fact identical, "and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of life" (T 1.4.6.5/253). This is due to the propensity of the imagination to create fictions: we "feign" the existence

of a continued self in order to remove the interruption of our perceptions (T 1.4.6.6/254). Although identity applies only to what is invariable and uninterrupted, there is enough similarity among perceptions to yield a smooth transition between distinct perceptions, so we confuse identity with the notion of related objects and create a fiction of identity. Resemblance produces the smooth transition. When the imagination contemplates an unchanging object, its action is much like what it is when it reflects on successive but related objects. The two actions feel about the same, and the second action requires very little more effort than the first. The relation of resemblance "facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu'd object" (T 1.4.6.6/254). The resemblance of these actions to each other causes the conflation of identity with diversity, ascribing identity (i.e., invariableness and uninterruptedness) to what is obviously a succession and hence diverse. We disguise the absurdity behind such notions as self, soul or substance, which is added to give us a stronger or more unified concept of the self. We invent a fiction, either of "something invariable and uninterrupted" or of "something mysterious and inexplicable connecting the parts beside their relation" (T 1.4.6.6/254–255).

We are more likely to allow identity where there is a "*common end*" or purpose of parts, and more so when there is a sympathy between them (T 1.4.6.11–2/257). Consider the example of a ship many of whose parts have been replaced. The parts serve a common end or purpose, and the end persists even with the variation of the parts. This reference to a common end, "in which the parts conspire," "affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of a body to another" (T 1.4.6/257). This is why we ascribe the identity of plants and animals as things persisting in time; indeed there is "a great analogy" between plants and animals and that of "the identity of a self or person" (T 1.4.6.4/253). In plants and animals, there is also a kind of "sympathy" of the parts to a common end. That is, the parts enter into mutual relations of cause and effect in all their actions. This principle is so powerful that it influences us to judge a living thing to be identical even when all its matter and all of the parts of the figure have changed. For example, a plant or an animal undergoes vast or even complete change over a certain period of time, but we still attribute an identity to the object. This carries over to personal identity. Hume writes: "An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity" (T 1.4.6.12/257). Thus the identity of persons or selves as well as vegetables and animals "is only a fictitious one" (T 1.4.6.12/257).

The "uniting principles" in the imagination responsible for attributions of identity are resemblance and causation (T 1.4.6.16/260). These relations produce a smooth transition in our thought and lead us to create the fiction of personal identity, a single continuous self that is extended through time. Memory produces the relation of resemblance amongst perceptions for ourselves and even for the identity we attribute to others. Memory preserves a considerable part of past

perceptions. A memory is an image of a past perception, and an image by its very nature resembles its original or object. Thus, in contemplating one's own perceptions or another person's, we find a considerable number of resembling perceptions in the chain of thoughts. Then there is an easy transition in the imagination from one of these resembling perceptions to another, which leads one's imagination to make the whole succession of resembling perceptions seem just like the continuance of one object. So memory produces an essential element in the attribution of identity of our own selves and others.

Causation is the second key relation in the production of the idea of personal identity. The "true" idea of the human mind consists of a system of different perceptions that are "link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (T 1.4.6.19/261). Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements, "Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation" (T 1.4.6.19/261). Just as a state remains even though its stock of citizens is constantly turning over, a person's identity is said to be preserved even through changes in his or her dispositions and perceptions. The relation of causation connects the perceptions that make up its parts.

Memory is also responsible for the relation of causation. Without memory, there would be no notion of the "chain of causes and effects which constitute our self or person" (T 1.4.6.20/262). Memory cannot fill in the gaps in our perceptions and hence does not produce our idea of the identity of the person. However, it discovers that relation indirectly by providing the basis for those causal connections that allow us to suppose our continued existence over times that we cannot remember. For philosophers such as Locke who think that memory produces personal identity, it is necessary to explain why we can extend our identity beyond our memory (T 1.4.6.20/262). Locke had claimed that the identity of a person reaches as far as one's consciousness can be "extended backwards to any past Action or Thought" (ECHU 2.27.9). Hume claims that we often cannot extend our consciousness backward to some thoughts, yet because of causal relations between our thoughts, we attribute identity in such cases nonetheless.[6]

Hume applies the same reasoning not just to identity over time but also simplicity at a given time. If the parts of an object are bound together by a close relation, it feels nearly the same as when there is a simple and indivisible object, "and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception" (T 1.4.6.22/263). Because of the resemblance between the feelings resulting from observing a simple and a closely-related complex object, we "feign a principle of union" to account for the simplicity that we attribute to the complex object. This principle is supposed to be "the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object" (T 1.4.6.22/263).

2.3 Self-concern

In addition to the account of personal identity in *Treatise*, book 1, Hume recognizes the identity of persons as it regards passion and action, or "the concern we take in ourselves," the topic of book 2 of the *Treatise* (T 1.4.6.19/253). It is our knowledge of past pleasures and pains that causes us to take a concern in our future pleasures and pains, and this aids us in producing the idea of identity. Self-concern then relates to our past actions and to our future actions. The faculty of memory plays a key role in enabling us to recall and appropriate past actions. The concern for our future self is regulated by sympathy. Sympathy is a principle of human nature that explains how we can come to know and share in the feelings with others (T 2.1.11.2–8/317–320). This principle of sympathy can extend beyond the present moment to anticipate future pains and pleasures so the interests of one's future person can become an actual concern and may influence our current actions (T 2.2.9.13–14/386).[7]

As shown by Thiel (2013: 423–425), personal identity as it relates to self-concern was emphasized by many philosophers, including Hume's friend Lord Kames in his 1751 *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion.* Lord Kames considers the constant vivacious and lively perception of the self that directs our attention to our own interests that is common to all humankind. This sort of perception of one's self is the basis for our identity through the various changes that take place during our lives. Similarly for Hume, the nature of self-concern involves a consciousness of our own self. This consciousness of our own self is an undeniable fact for all human beings, determined by a natural instinct of the mind (T 2.1.5.3/286). In book 2 of the *Treatise* on the topic of the "passions or the concern we take in ourselves," Hume underscores that "the idea or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us and that our consciousness gives us [. . .] lively a conception of our own person" (T 2.1.11.4/317).[8]

Locke's account of personal identity dominated the scene in the eighteenth century, whereas Hume's account had little immediate impact. His view of the self was harshly criticized by Scottish contemporaries such as Stewart, Beattie, and Reid (Thiel 2013: 407f). Reid in the 1764 *Inquiry into the Human Mind* charged that Hume destroyed even his own mind. Thiel (2006: 307), however, has uncovered his more positive influence on the eighteenth century German materialist Hissmann and his position that the soul is subject to constant change, and on the British philosopher Cooper and his account that "we ascribe identity to the self because the changes perceived in our body or self are so gradual that the perceptions are referred to the same self or body as the bearer of those perceptions" in his 1789 *Tracts Ethical, Theological and Political.*

More recently, Hume's failure to detect a substantial self has been convincing to a variety of philosophers. Kripke (1980: 155) for example claims that "Descartes' notion seems to have been rendered dubious ever since Hume's critique of the notion of a Cartesian self." Kripke (1982: 121–123) finds such Humean ideas

echoed in Wittgenstein's 1921 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Searle (2004: 37, 203) thinks that Hume made "devastating criticisms of the Cartesian account of self and personal identity" and that "many other philosophers follow Hume" in supposing there is no such thing as the self of that kind.[9] According to Thiel (2013: 32), Hume provides the "most important" contribution to the eighteenth century British debate on personal identity. He suggests that Hume's view "continues to engage" partly due to its importance and partly because of the difficulties associated with interpreting the text (2013: 383). The next section examines the ongoing relevance of Hume on the mind and self or personal identity.

3. Hume on the mind and self: some prospects and problems

It is commonplace to recognize Hume as a pioneer or precursor of cognitive science: the interdisciplinary study of the mind that combines philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, biology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and artificial intelligence, which emerged in the 1950s. Hatfield (1990) locates Hume as a key figure in the history of cognitive science (see also Traiger 1999; Brook 2007). The framework of cognitive science has shed light on interpretive issues in Hume scholarship and his work has been shown as compatible with, or useful to, a variety of advances in cognitive science.

3.1 The cognitive sciences

Kemp Smith's 1941 *The Philosophy of David Hume* emphasized Hume's positive naturalistic program, but it was Stroud's 1977 influential book *Hume* that gave prominence to the reading of Hume as a naturalist primarily concerned with the continuities between philosophy and science. Twenty years later Garrett regards the rise of cognitive science "an apt moment to investigate Hume's cognitive psychology" in his landmark work *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy*. He claims that attention to Hume's cognitive psychology "can shed considerable light on the real meaning of Hume's most central philosophical claims and arguments, which have often been misinterpreted as a result of ignorance of the theories of cognition in which they are embedded" (1997: 40; 2015: 333; see also Morris 2008: 467). One such instance is the so-called Humean problem of induction: on this reading, Hume is not interested in showing that such inferences are not justified, *contra* the traditional interpretation. Rather, Hume is concerned with "the causation of causal inferences – a question within cognitive psychology – rather than the justification of such inferences, which is a question in epistemology" (1997: 94). Collier (1999, 2005, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) has demonstrated how many aspects of Hume's philosophy – such as his views on abstract ideas, external objects, passions, religion, and aesthetics – compare favorably with the results of cognitive science. Prinz's *Emotional Construction of Morals* (2007)

extends and revises Hume on passions and moral value using the resources of cognitive science.

Initially, Hume was treated as an early functionalist and a forerunner to artificial intelligence. In fact, according to Dennett, functionalism before artificial intelligence, and ever since, is defined primarily by their relation to what Dennett (1978: 122) calls "Hume's problem" or what is now known as the "homunculus problem." Hume attempted to provide a mechanical model of the mind with dynamic interaction between impressions and ideas. Hume's problem arises because "nothing is intrinsically a representation of anything; something is a representation only for or to someone" (1978: 101). Humean impressions and ideas must be perceptions not just for a mind but *to a mind.* And Dennett thinks Hume's mechanisms of association are a "notorious non-solution to the problem" (1978: 101). According to Dennett (1978: 122–123) and Haugeland (1984: 44), Hume's problem can only be solved with advances in artificial intelligence and "the notion of data structures." Hume lacked the notion of an "automatic computing machine," and so "he failed to articulate a plausible mental mechanism" (Traiger 1994: 304). Some scholars have attempted answers to Hume's problem.[10] Others reject this functionalist interpretation of Hume altogether (see Traiger 1994). Functionalism aspires to completely explain the nature of the mind whereas a distinctive feature of Hume's science of human nature is to show the "limits of human reflection on human cognitive faculties" (Traiger 1994: 312). This suggests that Hume's legacy in cognitive science is perhaps better linked to research that emphasizes the ways in which human reason falls short of ideal rationality and locating those areas where it would seem that we can and cannot have "assurance and conviction" (Traiger 1994: 313).[11]

One of the first explicit efforts to show that results in cognitive science provides evidence in favor of Hume's views can be found in Bower (1984). Bower (1984: 234) vindicates Hume's copy principle as a "contemporary information processing model" based on experimental work in 1970s cognitive psychology about mental imagery in memory. Biro (1985) draws on Humean insights to provide answers to common problems with the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), one of the more dominant models of the mind to emerge in the cognitive sciences. Fodor (2003: 134) even suggests that "Hume's *Treatise* is the foundational document of cognitive science" because "it made explicit, for the first time, the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of the mind; in effect, on the basis of the Theory of Ideas." Fodor (2003: 2) thinks that Hume's account of the mind anticipates in many respects "the one that informs current work in cognitive science." Other cognitive scientists identify Hume in the tradition of embodied cognition. This research program emphasizes the formative role the environment plays in the development of cognitive processes. Jacobson (2013: 7) has argued for a view of the mind emerging from cognitive neuroscience that takes the mind to "sample" its environment in opposition to the RTM model and traces this view of the mind to Hume. Froese (2009)

classifies Hume as a type of enactivist, an approach to the mind that emphasizes the dynamic interaction between a cognitive organism and its environment.

In *Descartes' Error*, Damasio emphasizes fundamental respects in which Hume's mind anticipated modern neuroscience. In the work Damasio explores the neurobiology of reason and emotion. He draws from Hume's distinction between the force and vivacity of impressions and ideas to explain how thought consists mostly of images. In memory recall, we reconstitute images "side by side with the images formed upon stimulation from the exterior" (Damasio 1994: 108). The interior images are fainter and less vivid than those produced by the exterior. Later in the book Damasio (1994: 200) links Hume's insistence on the essential role of feeling within human reasoning to his somatic marker hypothesis for decision-making. Somatic markers are special instances of feelings that structure the decision space by tagging some options with negative or positive affect to increase the efficiency and accuracy of the decision-making process (Damasio 1994: 173; see Morris 2008: 470f). Churchland in the 2011 work *Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality* explores the intersection between the neurophysiology of the brain and ethics and Hume's ideas on passions and morals are foundational to her work. Hume has left a similarly rich and diverse legacy in the self.

3.2 Self-doubts

Hume's positive account of the self has proved vexing to those who have struggled to understand it. First, it admits of a variety of interpretations. Standardly, Hume is understood as *a bundle theorist* who held that the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions linked by the relations of causation and resemblance. A current version of the bundle theory of the self is advanced by Parfit in his *Reasons and Persons* (1984: 211). A few commentators have argued against the interpretation of Hume as a bundle theorist (e.g., Traiger 1988). Strawson (2011) recently argues that Hume is not a bundle theorist. Instead, although all we can know of the mind is the bundle of perceptions, epistemologically speaking, Hume remains committed to an unknowable "essence" of the mind that ties these perceptions together into a real metaphysical unit. In another interpretation, Hume eliminates the self: that is, he rejects the idea of the self altogether. Giles (1993) claims that Hume proposes a "No-Self Theory," that has much in common with Buddhist thought.[12] Recent narrative theories of the self are tied to Hume's fictional self (Gallagher 2003: 337). Narrative accounts see the self as a fictional construction or story and not a distinct mental substance (e.g., Dennett 1992).

These interpretive difficulties are complicated by Hume's admission that the account of personal identity is "very defective," although he never says exactly what the problem is (T App.20/635). In the appendix to the *Treatise*, published with book 3 in late 1740, he rehearses the account of personal identity which conforms with most philosophers, that personal identity "arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception" (T

App.20/635). The problem is that we cannot discover the connections themselves, but only feel a determination of thought to pass from one object to another. His "hopes" for the view "vanish," however, because he cannot explain the principles that "unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness" (T App.20/635). He states two principles that he cannot give up or "render consistent" (T App.21/636). The two principles are that (1) *all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and that (2) *the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences*. There would be no difficulty if either our perceptions did either inhere in something "simple and individual," or if the mind perceived "some real connexion among them" (T App.21/636). Hume hopes that someone in the future can solve the problem (T App.21/636).

There is no general agreement as to what the contradiction between the two principles is supposed to be or how to solve it.[13] Numerous accounts abound in the secondary literature – more than two dozen, according to a recent count by Garrett (2015: 238). Many commentators have noted that the two principles are consistent and that accepting (1) provides an explanation for (2). The two claims taken together are not incompatible but constitute the fundamental grounds for thinking that personal identity arises from associative principles of the imagination rather than from real connections among distinct existences.

The fundamental divide between scholars concerns whether the problem that arises in the Appendix is metaphysical or psychological or both (Butler 2015: 173–175). If the problem is metaphysical, then Hume realizes that he requires the existence of a genuinely independent, enduring self and "confesses to an error that concerns the principle of uniting or bundling perceptions into a single person" (Butler 2015: 173). If the problem is psychological, then the question is whether the associations of resemblance and causation together are enough to produce the idea of the self as unified and persisting through time (Butler 2015: 173). Either way, all commentators generally agree that he assumes the existence of a unified self that is the subject of perceptions. Some scholars locate the real problem with this assumption: that the perceptions come already as members of a particular unified bundle prior to the associating relations of the imagination. Stroud (1977: 138–139) thinks the fact that perceptions present themselves in separate bundles is inexplicable for Hume and that he "leaves completely unintelligible and mysterious the fact that those 'data' are as they are," which explains the appendix woes. Inukai (2007: 267–268) claims that the bundle assumption is problematic for his system because if Hume allows "that there initially exists a unified bundle of perceptions," then this means that our perceptions are no longer "entirely independent in their existence."

What seems evident in the appendix is that Hume finds some problem with his account but that he never really tells us what the difficulty is. His most suggestive remark on the matter is that he cannot explain the principles that "unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness" (T App.21/636). It may be that consciousness clearly seems to be more than a bundle of distinct independent

'perceptions' – that for there to be mental perceptions that make up the bundles means that there is a unified principled consciousness to have them. The problem then is not so much about the existence of the bundle itself or a distinction between individual selves at all or about how he is one self among others – rather it is about how these distinct (and disparate) experiences come together as a unity in our mental world. The worry might be that to be unified in my thought and consciousness is to be unified not simply *in* me but *for* me to provide the unity which we nonetheless experience in our mental lives despite the constant flux of perceptions.

Hume's cognitive psychology about the interaction between the imagination and the passions of pride and humility has the resources to provide a potential resolution to the problem of the unity of consciousness. Certainly, the associative principles of resemblance and causation are not enough by themselves to explain the unity in our conscious experience, but when combined with the passions, an explanation of sorts of the unity of our consciousness emerges.

The passions of pride and humility are simple impressions: this means that cannot be defined or analyzed into parts for they have none. At best he can offer a "description" of the attending "circumstances" that give rise to these simple impressions, revealing the sources of our feelings and the processes by which they operate (T 2.1.2.1/277). Pride and humility presuppose the self.[14] The object of pride and humility is always the "self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T 2.2.1.2/277). Pride and humility invariably direct our attention to ourselves. These passions he says make us "turn our attention to oneself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object" (T 2.1.2.4/278). The self is a product of "an original and natural instinct" and "that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou'd ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious" (T 2.1.5.3/286). Nature has assigned an "emotion" to the idea of the self "which it never fails to produce" (T 2.1.5.6/287).

The idea of the self is never absent from our purview so that, being always front and center, "the present situation of the person is always that of the imagination" (T 2.3.7.8/430). The continuous presence of these associative relations serves to continuously reinforce the vivacity of this self – so that, more nearly than any other idea (even memories) it approaches the vivacity of an impression (T 2.1.11.4/317). This means that each conscious moment is united and involves the feeling of some degree of pride or humility, and this feeling always has reference to some conception of self. Pride and humility are about self-concern and involved with our constant desire for our own personal well-being and the improvement of our own particular situation in our daily affairs. The self has a cognitively important function: our capacity to think practically, to make decisions about the course of our lives depends on our ability to become self-consciously aware of ourselves. Since the self can know itself as an object, the self can respond to its own activity

just as others respond to its activity. This means that the self as an integral part of the unity of consciousness is a pervasive feature of our mind of particular importance for our well-being.

There can be a variety of causes of the passions of pride and humility such as our property, our accomplishments, our natural abilities, our physical appearance, our virtues, our reputation, our health, our friends and relations. Feelings of pride and humility vary according to how we conceive of such things and the circumstances of social situation. Hume's description of the cognitive mechanism by which these passions arise is the double impulse or the double relation of ideas and impressions. That is, the indirect passions arise only when there is an association of one idea with another idea, accompanied by an association of one impression with another impression. Hume illustrates how the association of impressions and ideas works together to give rise to the passion of pride with the example of a beautiful house (T 2.1.2.6/279). Suppose I consider my beautiful house. Since the house is mine, my idea of the house, by the association of ideas, tends to occasion my idea of myself. Now the house also has a positive quality, beauty, and that occasions a particular feeling of pleasure. This pleasure resembles the agreeable impression of pride, and so by the natural association of impressions, tends to occasion that passion.

These indirect passions of pride and humility result from the interaction of the two components of the human mind which Hume distinguishes: the association of ideas and the association of impressions. Hume notes that when "these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility" (T 2.1.5.10/289). When the two kinds of association unite together "in one action" of the mind, then the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render'd so much more easy and natural" (T 2.1.4.4/283–284). Note that Hume emphasizes that our association of ideas and association of impressions unite in one act of consciousness, which then becomes more intense in our awareness, and thus facilitates the transition to other similar states of emotion. In our consciousness, then, both of these aspects of the double impulse are united in a complete act in our consciousness. There is a "necessity for their conjunction" to produce the passions but they can be "easily separated" (T 2.1.2.6/279). For the purposes of drawing up a proper anatomy of human nature, it is important to "infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction" (T 2.1.2.6/279).

Hume then does require some further principle beyond just resemblance and causation to unite these distinct perceptions in our consciousness. That further principle is the association of impressions, which together with the association of ideas unite in our consciousness. The conscious unity of the mind is found in the combination of our ideas and affective states and the interaction between the passions and imagination. The self is a brute natural fact, the "ultimate" object of our concern that is encountered in our experience and is produced continually by

associative relations that operate on the two levels of mental operations: ideas and impressions, thought and feeling.

It seems fitting to conclude by noting this feature of Hume's mind may even be prescient to recent discussions on the unity of consciousness. One influential attempt to characterize the unity of consciousness holds that in unified consciousness, particular or singular experiences are subsumed in a more complex experience. For example, Bayne and Chalmers (2003) say that particular experiences seem to be unified when they are "aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness." More precisely, they explain that two experiences are said to be 'subsumptively unified' "when they are both subsumed by a single state of consciousness" (Bayne and Chalmers 2003: 27). Two subsumptively unified states will have what is called a *conjoint phenomenology* – a phenomenology of having both states at once that subsumes the phenomenology of the individual states: "there is something it is like for the subject to be in [two conscious] states simultaneously" (Bayne and Chalmers 2003: 32).

This account of the unity of consciousness is quite similar to Hume's description of the cognitive mechanism of the double-impulse for the passions of pride and humility. The two types of association operating on two parallel levels combine in one conscious act to form these passions. Both are distinct component aspects of a single united act of conscious perception. Each moment of our consciousness is a unity. The affective feeling of either pride or humility unites in one conscious act with our conception of our self and other related causes. Hume's work on the mind and self may be useful to ongoing discussions of what forms the unity of consciousness might take. His emphasis on the limitations of the human mind may also be relevant for reflections on the degree to which consciousness might be unified or situations when the unity of consciousness might break down.[15]

Conclusion

A distinctive feature of early modern philosophy is the development of many new questions, methods of inquiry, and theories about the mind that remain influential today. Hume's own scientific approach to the human mind in terms of delineating mental faculties and their fundamental governing principles continues to be relevant to contemporary approaches in philosophy of mind. Hume's views on the self also continue to inspire current thinking on the topic as well as spawn a diversity of interpretations. That Hume on mind and self are multifaceted and fruitful enough to inspire such wide-ranging appropriations is a measure of, and a testament to, the depth and range of his contributions.

Notes

1 The following abbreviations will be used in this paper: Hume: 'AB' ('An Abstract of a Book lately published entitled *A Treatise of Human Nature* wherein the chief argument of that book is farther illustrated and explained') taken from 'T' (see below). References

cite the book, chapter, section, and paragraph to the most recent Oxford edition followed by page numbers from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions); 'EHU' (*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. T. L Beauchamp, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 3rd edition, eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). All references cite the book, chapter, section, and paragraph to the most recent Oxford edition followed by page numbers from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions and 'T' (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, eds. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, and eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, second edition, 1978). Locke: 'ECHU' (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. References cite book, chapter, and passage number. Malebranche: 'ST' (*The Search After Truth*, eds. T. Lennon and P. Olscamp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. References cite book, part and chapter numbers).

2 See also T 1.3.7.5/96; 1.3.8.15/105; 1.3.10.3/119–20.

3 'Force and vivacity' is commonly understood as phenomenological intensity (Stroud 1977: 29; Dicker 1998: 5; Owen 1999: 73; Broughton 2006: 45; Noonan 2007: 35). One way to read the distinction is to see force as functional, a forceful perception that has a sustained causal influence, and vivacity as a clear and intense phenomenological perception (Govier, 1972). Another way interprets force and vivacity strictly in functional terms (Everson, 1988). Or one could hold that force and vivacity concern "verisimilitude" or truthlikeness (Waxman, 1993), or that the force and vivacity of impressions involves their sense of "presentedness" (Dauer, 1999). A further alternative reading explores force and vivacity as an "indicator" for believability (Seppalainen and Coventry, 2012).

4 See Stanistreet (2002: 51ff) for discussion.

5 Some scholars claim that Hume assumes the standard Cartesian mechanical model of the imagination in his philosophy. John Wright for example shows the many implications of the mechanical model for Hume on topics such as personal identity, the passions, sympathy, and morals. See Wright (1983: 70, 206, 220, 266) and (2009: X–XI, 51, 122, 254–255). See also Kail (2007: 53–55).

6 See Ainslie (2008: 141f) and Thiel (2013) for a discussion of Hume in relation to Locke on personal identity. For the relation between Locke, Hume, and Shaftesbury, see Winkler (2000).

7 McIntyre (2009: 191–193) explains on Hume's account how those perceptions, thoughts, and actions related to my present self "affect my present feelings and therefore are of interest to me" and how the present self extends its concern to the future as well as the past. See also Pitson (2002: 146ff).

8 Kemp Smith (2005: 74f) declared books 1 and book 2 of the *Treatise* to be apparently contradictory on the topic of personal identity. In book 1, Hume states that there is not a specific impression of the self but yet he relies on such an impression of the self in book 2 of the passions. Passmore complained that Hume never really brings the two sorts of personal identity together in relation with one another (1980: 79). But many scholars such as Baier have sought to show that the self with regard to the passions in book 2 complements and supplements the self in book 1. Baier (1991: 130) writes that for Hume, "the self is dependent on others for its coming to be, for its emotional life, for its self-consciousness, for its self-evaluations." Baillie claims that Hume's negative denial of the self as mental substance in book 1 extends to include a positive account of the self as the subject of passions in book 2. This move "utterly transforms the picture of self and identity" (Baillie, 2000: 35). According to Baillie (2000: 35) what emerges is the "socially constructed self, the object of reflexive concern." One can come to view themselves from a social perspective and one can come to know themselves through

others (Capaldi, 1975: 92–93; Capaldi, 1985). Some commentators think this results in two ideas of the self: the idea of self in 'Of personal identity' at the end of book 1, and the idea of self that is produced by the passions and morals in books 2 and 3. Other commentators claim that there is just one self at work in Hume's philosophy; see Carlson 2009 for discussion.

9 See Pitson (2002: 1, 50f) for a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Hume's self on thinkers such as Nagel and McGinn on the mind/body relation.

10 See Ward (1988) and Biro (2009: 65).

11 Relevant here is Tversky and Kanheman's (1974) research on the common errors which arise from the reliance on cognitive heuristics and biases. Both Traiger (1999) and Morris (2008: 467) point out that Hume anticipates many of the errors and biases identified by Tversky and Kahneman.

12 See also Richards (1978), Leavitt (2004), and Tomhave (2010). Alison Gopnik (2010) has argued that Hume was in a position to learn about Buddhist thought during his time in France.

13 Useful reviews of literature regarding Hume's Appendix worries include Ainslie (2008); Butler (2015); Penelhum, (2000/2003: 99). See also Garrett (1981); Swain (2006); Capaldi (1985); Traiger (1985); Pitson (2000: Ch. 4); and Kail (2007: Part 6).

14 For discussions of pride and self, see Rorty (1990); Chazan (1992); Purviance (1997); King (1999); Ainslie (1999); Postema (2005). Hume's account of pride and humility is indebted to Hobbes and Mandeville. For more on the similarities and difference between Hume and Hobbes and Mandeville, see Taylor (2015: 155f).

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