

*The Ways of Peace:
A Philosophy of Peace as Action*

by J. Gray Cox

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DEDICATION

*To Judy
who has taught me so much of the way of love*

Walk in the light

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CONTENTS

Preface	1
PART I: THE PEACE THAT IS A PROBLEM	
Introduction: What might peace be?	6
1. The Obscured and the Glimmering	8
2. Against Tranquility and Concord	13
3. Peace as Absence	20
4. The Pervasive Presence: Conflict	26
PART II: THE CULTURE OF CONFLICT	
Introduction: How Do We See Differences?	30
5. The Strife of Reason in Defending Claims (And What I learned Near the Broccoli Dip)	33
6. The Fires Inside: Feeling, Passion, Emotion, and Desire	39
7. A World of Fact and Preference: Galilean Science and Instrumental Action	47
8. The Practice of These Preachings: The Institutionalization of Conflict Assumptions	56
PART III: THE CONTEXT OF PEACE: SOCIAL REALITY, UNDERSTANDING, AND ACTION	
Introduction	65
9. How Social Reality Is Intended To Be Understood	68
10. Holism in the Parts	71
11. Participation in the Whole	77
12. The Understanding Required for Peace: Critical Participatory Research	86
13. The Process of Action: Rational Activity as Cultivation	103

PART IV: THE PROCESS OF PEACE

14. The Opening Way	125
15. How Should We Define Peace? The Peace That Is a Way	128
16. Three Ways of Practicing Peace	139
17. The Horizons of Peace: Violence, Faith, and Trans-Historical Objective Values	170

EPILOGUE

18. The Hands of the Future: What Peace Might Disclose	202
Appendix A: Building a Peace Academy	209
Appendix B: Some Resources	212
Notes	219

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Preface

This book is for people who are interested in the problems connected with peace and with questions about how those problems relate to ways we talk and act in our culture. It deals with ways in which peace is related to practices that affect our private lives at home and our public lives throughout the world at large.

There are many things we should cherish dearly and be ready to sacrifice a great deal for—even, at times, our lives. We should not blindly prefer peace at any price—especially if it is the kind of peace which may require us to accept injustice and oppression in order to avoid conflict and violence. But there are many kinds of peace besides the sort under which people suffer when they have been "pacified." We can conceive of peace in many different ways, and these differences are related to a variety of assumptions and practices we can adopt in our culture. This book is about those differences.

Part I describes the ways in which we usually talk about peace. It argues that our conception is fundamentally obscure. We do not know what peace is and we do not know how to promote it. Part II develops an explanation of how peace has been obscured. It has been obscured by a network of beliefs and institutions in our culture. Part III critically evaluates some key parts of this cultural web and argues that there is an alternative cluster of assumptions and practices which we ought to adopt. It is a cluster which is intrinsically better—regardless of whatever it may imply about peace. Part IV argues that it happens to imply that we should think of peace as an activity—a practice we can cultivate at high levels of excellent performance.

This book is intended for a broad audience that includes parents, diplomats, social scientists, lawyers, labor/business mediators, social activists, philosophers, military officers, educators, theologians, and politicians. Its style is meant to provide good reading that is illustrated with meaningful examples. Its arguments aim to be intellectually compelling

without being academic. It is not meant to be lightly breezed through in order to glean a few key ideas or insights, though people who read it that way should find themselves satisfied. It is meant to be read critically and reflectively and it is meant to be read as a whole.

One notion worth reflecting on at the start is the idea that our culture may be hiding or obscuring peace. What does it mean to say that our culture has "hidden" something or "obscured" it?

Think, for a moment, of a field agent who has been trained to scout land for a timber agency. In walking through the woods she can, of course, "miss the forest for the trees." But notice also she can "miss the trees for the lumber." The concepts of board footage, cord wood, and marketable lumber may fit into a conceptual perspective that makes her think about oaks and hemlocks in a distinctive way and makes her actually experience *seeing* the trees differently than you or I would—or than a landscape painter or a Druid would.

To take another example, think of a marriage that has gone completely sour. It may be impossible for either spouse to communicate any feelings of love or generosity. Every issue is viewed in terms of conflict, every gesture is interpreted as a hostile look or a manipulative trick. Even a confession of guilt gets turned around. The response it yields is the thought: "Great. So he's willing to admit he made a mistake. So what is he trying to make *me* take the blame for?"

When things have reached this point, hostility hangs in the air. Every look, word, and gesture gets flung back in anger—regardless of how lovingly it was intended. The spouses have bought into a network of antagonizing habits, perceptions that picture the other as hostile, and categories that conceive of the situation in terms of opposition and conflict. This will obscure the true nature of any genuinely loving gesture the other may try to offer.

Relations between nations can degenerate in a similar way. Before the nuclear bomb was invented, there was a rather straightforward way to resolve a situation like that. Nations that could no longer talk could go to war. But developments in physics, chemistry, and biology have changed things in a radical way and we have entered a new era. It is an era that is often said to require new modes of thought. And this is true.

Modern weaponry has made warfare between superpowers a matter of Mutually Assured Destruction. Prior to our age, governments relied on war as an alternative to negotiation. When mutual consent could not resolve differences, military force served as the ultimate arbiter, the final sanction. But insofar as international conflict has become "MAD," war can no longer

serve this function and we do not know what can. Nations stumble and grope, like sports teams without referees, living in fear that a bruhaha will break out—one in which the playing field and the players will all be destroyed. And the world is becoming more mad each year. Before long a score more nations will find both the means and the motive to use nuclear weapons—as well as chemical and biological ones—to make their enemies face mutually assured destruction.

There is some reason to hope that in the long run these weapons will prove to have been a blessing. Practically speaking, they pose enormous dangers, but in theory, they offer the promise of bringing an end to the wars that have cost humankind so dearly. They offer this promise precisely because they turn war into a god-like Ares who can not award any spoils to the victor—they make war function like an umpire who ends the game by making all players absolute losers. From a theoretical point of view, however, a problem arises: How do you play without umpires? When nations are in deep conflict, how can they settle their disputes without appeal to war?

The easy answer is, of course, diplomacy. In point of fact, most international disputes have been settled this way. But traditional practices of diplomacy were developed in a context in which war remained the final court of appeal. Baron von Clausewitz, a nineteenth century military strategist, characterized the tightness of this connection by saying that war was politics carried on by other means. But it would have been just as accurate to say the reverse was true. Diplomacy was conceived of as "war carried on by other means." New practices need to be developed to deal with these new contexts in which war cannot be carried on at all.

An analogy may help drive the point home. Our Anglo-Saxon legal system of two party advocacy is structured around courts which have police at their disposal. Judges can command armed officer to enforce decisions. Whether legal cases are decided by a judge or settled out of court (as most are) these armed police remain a reality that structures the ways in which lawyer argue and disputes get resolved. An easy way to see the significance of this is to simply try supposing that there were no police. Suppose judges had no one to send off to force people to submit to giving testimony, undergoing arrest, paying fines, or enduring imprisonment. What would happen? The whole practice of law would have to be radically restructured. Even the standard line "Do it or I'll see you in court!" would have to be dropped—or else be used to offer an invitation instead of a threat.

This is something like the situation in which nations are coming to find themselves. It is a situation that traditional diplomacy was not designed to cope with and is unable to deal with effectively.

It is an international situation which poses a very difficult task. Jonathan Schell's description of it in *The Fate of the Earth* is somewhat apocalyptic but essentially correct. We find ourselves in a situation in which nations have to "replace the mechanism by which political decisions, whatever they may be, are reached. In sum, the task is nothing less than to reinvent politics; to reinvent the world."¹

What would such a "reinvented" world be like? How would its politics be performed?

We might say that what is required is a world of "peace" governed by a politics of "non-violence." But what do these two terms mean? They are generally taken to mean simply the lack of armed or violent conflict. Poke the question "What is peace?" at people and about eight times out of ten they will reply: "It is the absence of war." It is not just the non-academic laity who give such a reply. As we shall see, this is the sort of definition rather uniformly adopted by philosophers and social scientists with professional interests in the question.

But picture a born again Socrates sitting near and perking up his ears in response to this answer. You can imagine what he might say:

This question our friend has asked you interests me greatly, and I am glad that you propose to answer it. I too would like to know what peace is, as would all, I think, who truly care to seek to live rightly. But I am not sure I have understood you properly. Do you mean to say that peace is a kind of state or relationship between people in which there is not war?

Yes.

So you define peace by saying what it is not—that is, that it is not war?

Yes.

But then you have not answered our friend's question, it seems, for you have only told us what peace is *not*, whereas the question was: What is it that peace *is*?

Most of us would find it difficult to define peace for Socrates. We might well have as much difficulty as the Greeks of his own day had in trying to define courage, piety, and justice.

This is not because we are dull-witted. It is because central features of our dominant post-Renaissance conceptual scheme radically obscure the nature of peace. To eliminate this obscurity we shall need to think out a reconstruction of our own culture, one that would fundamentally transform our conceptions of reason, social knowledge, and rational action—as well as the institutions and practices that reflect these conceptions and are reflected by them.

Violence has often been used successfully to defend things worth cherishing. In particular, war, despite all its horrors, has on repeated occasions been a vehicle of justice. It has liberated the oppressed and secured the life and culture of peoples threatened with extinction. On our own continent today, war can be argued to have just these merits (though there is a difference of opinion, of course, as to which sides are the ones we should join). Is there an activity of peace which can perform these functions and do so more efficiently and justly than war? When? To what extent?

Realistic answers to these sorts of questions are needed. Yet it is not even clear here as to what "realism" itself means. Is it a matter of being tough minded about what we are willing to do to others or a matter of being courageous about what we will make as personal sacrifices? Is it a matter of accepting the reality of present social norms or disciplining ourselves to deal effectively with long-term problems? Is it a matter of having an accurate picture of the way the world is or a question of sticking fast to moral values that let us see how it truly ought to be?

Our concepts of realism, like our concepts of peace, are rooted in culture and history. They are intimately tied to ways in which we talk about that "little peace and quiet" sought at home, the bigger "peace in our streets" sought in cities, and that "peace with justice" (or "peace and freedom") sought around the globe.

Our concepts of realism and peace have undergone profound changes before and they may do so again. "Realistic" views of family life, race relations, and spheres of influence have changed a great deal in the last two hundred years and they have not yet become stable or non-controversial. Our ideas of peace in these contexts have also shifted in fundamental ways. We no longer understand the peace of wedded bliss in the same way in which we did when "a man's home was his castle." Peace in "our colonies abroad" was different from the kind of peace now sought in the third world.

We need to examine our concepts of reality and peace critically and reflect upon them with care. Both reality and peace stand before us as open questions.

THE PEACE THAT IS A PROBLEM

Part I

INTRODUCTION: WHAT MIGHT PEACE BE?

Too quick a clarity can be superficial. This book seeks to contrast the notion of peace commonly adopted (and acted upon) with a conception of peace as an activity. But to speak of "the notion of peace commonly adopted" is already to jump ahead of ourselves. The word "peace" is used in a wide variety of ways that are connected with diverse assumptions and practices.

Sometimes it is used as a moral category to characterize a virtue that people or societies may have. Just as they may be just and wise, they may also be law-abiding or peaceful. Sometimes it is used as a religious category to describe the profound state of peace that God can provide—or to name an aspect of the divine, as in "the Prince of Peace." Sometimes it is used as a scientific category in social research. There it is often thought of as a state or condition of a social system, a bit like the states of equilibrium that chemists and ecologists study.

Also peace is sometimes employed as a vague composite idea, as a kind of literary theme that resonates deeply without ever achieving neat clarity. "Ahh Peace, eternal peace! What a mystery!" The thought of it may capture the imagination the way "the eternal feminine, the mystery that is Woman" can—and leave a writer at a loss for words. All he can say is what it is *not*. Like "Woman" when she is conceived, in Simone de Beauvoir's phrase, as "the Other," peace then seems to be nothing definite in itself. It can be defined only as that which is not argumentative, not competitive, not

aggressive, and not adventurous. It is indescribably sweet and pure by virtue of what it lacks: violence, vigor, and power.

Peace can be all these things and more. Our notions of it are tied, in the end, to the way we understand the nature of life and the meaning of Being itself.

Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of this century, held that the meaning of Being has been radically obscured in the West. He thought it was wrongly conceived of as a thing or state (instead of as an occurrence or event). He argued that this resulted from—and contributed to—profound and wrenching distortions of experience which pervade the fabric of our language, our institutions, and our culture as a whole. Yet he held that a dim, glimmering grasp of the meaning of Being is present and comprehended by each of us in a kind of "pre-ontological awareness."

At odd times, we seem to perhaps have such an awareness of peace, a sense of what it most truly is. It is a sense we may dimly comprehend and yet find it difficult to articulate.

This peculiar kind of awareness is something for which we have only clues. They are clues to be found in the cracks and crannies of our language, in the unvisited cupboards and the neglected closets of our culture. They are clues a bit like eighteen minutes of blank tape or files with pages torn out, empty spaces which announce the absence of something—something so patently not there that it achieves a kind of presence in this mode of absence.

CHAPTER 1

The Obscured and the Glimmering

Language reveals. Just as a Freudian slip can tell me something about myself, the idiosyncrasies of our ways of talking can tip us off to basic features of our culture.

The words "War and Peace" not only serve as a famous book title, they provide us with a common phrase. Like the minister's pronouncement of "man and wife," "war and peace" trips off the tongue with an habitual ease. We often employ the phrase as though we were contrasting two poles along a single dimension—as though war and peace were symmetrical opposites like left and right or pain and pleasure.

But it would be more accurate to say that we *think* that we think of them in this way. Close inspection shows that there are important asymmetries involved. It may be a mere accident that we habitually give syntactic priority or pride of place to war. (It is perhaps as uncommon to say "peace and war" as to say "woman and man.") But there seem to be good conceptual reasons why this linguistic accident should have happened.

For instance, notice that if people say "Nations are warring" they affirm an all too true fact. But if people say "Nations are peaceing" they commit a grammatical error.

The word "war" is used as a verb; "peace" is not. We sometimes say "Peace!" in an imperative tone, but here we do not use it as a genuine verb any more than we employ a genuine verb when we say "Into you bedroom, young man!" or "Upstairs!" We think of war as an activity in which people can purposefully engage. It is something soldiers can learn how to do. In contrast, we think of peace as a kind of condition or state which is achieved,

or simply occurs. Unlike warring, peace is not thought to be something we can *do*.

We do, of course, speak of states of war as well as acts of war, and we sometimes do speak of peaceful acts. But with war, the notion of the activity is *primary*. We understand the notion of a state of war in terms of this activity, defining such a state as a condition in which acts of war are threatened or performed. But with peace, the reverse is true. We do not have a concept of peace as something done, and insofar as we speak of *peaceful* acts, we understand these in terms of the state of peace which they promote, or at least do not violate.

This asymmetry of activity and state would seem to be connected with a further sort of lopsidedness in the relation between the notions of war and peace. The word "peace" has a broader range of contexts in which its use is natural and is taken to be literal. We commonly talk of wanting to be at peace with ourselves or to have peace in our homes or make peace with our employer or our maker. It is less common to speak of war in such contexts. When we do, the word tends to sound distinctively metaphorical. It is more natural to speak of being in "conflict" or "opposition" with ourselves, our spouses, our employers, or the divine.

Our concept of peace seems broader than our concept of war. Peace is perhaps most typically thought of as a state distinguished not only by the absence of armed conflict between nations, but more generally by the absence of conflicts of all sorts—inner turmoil, confrontation, aggression, personal violence, hostility, and so on. This gap in the contrast between war and peace gets formulated in varying ways. Some people are drawn to think in terms of a linear continuum and *degrees* of peace along it. These degrees may vary with the intensity of the violence, opposition, or instability of the dynamic conflicts present. Other people are tempted to think instead in terms of different *kinds* of peace—social, personal, physical, mental, and so on.

Another index of the asymmetry between war and peace is the temptation to speak of "real peace." People sometimes insist that for genuine peace mere absence of war does not suffice.

It is a striking fact that a halt in warring is often little more than a truce nations arrange to buy time. Then they build up their military and prepare to either engage in armed conflict or use the threat of it to extract demands from opponents. It is just as remark-worthy a fact that countries without civil war are often plagued by injustice, oppression, and simmering unrest. In cases of both sorts it may be that the peace present is best conceived of as war-in-the-making, and not a genuine peace at all. In any case, defining peace as a state in which there is *not* war or conflict can leave

us with an empty feeling, a sense that something is lacking in the definition itself—we await the answer as to what peace *is*.

But what then is the genuine thing? What is real peace in the strong sense of the term?

Instead of characterizing peace as some form of absence, people often speak of it as a state distinguished by harmony or unity or tranquility or concord or something of that sort. This type of definition has an evocative character that makes it attractive. And it may well contain something like the glimmer of insight Heidegger spoke of as a "pre-ontological awareness." But it is a rather dim glimmer that glints in two directions.

On the one hand, it suggests a kind of blessedness that is not in this world, a kind of "peace that passeth understanding." This phrase may mean much to mystics, but most people find it difficult to apply the idea on this side of the veil of tears. Still, we should not simply dismiss the notion. It has its roots in experiences we can share, discuss, and evaluate in relation to other aspects of life. It draws on experiences of states achieved in meditation or bumped into during everyday activities that become tinged with mystery or special meaning—the kind of meaning often best communicated through shared silence.

On the other hand, talk of harmony, unity, and concord can suggest a sense of group solidarity, the bond we feel with family or the best of friends. Parts of such solidarity are the deep meanings which words cannot express but which can be mutually acknowledged in silence. After an evening of intense talk we sit on the porch, quietly sipping coffee... and we understand. We may be unable to name the resonant way in which we feel at one with each other, but the silent harmony into which we fall is tangible. It hangs in the air the way the moonlight fills a garden.

It does no harm to wax poetic here in trying to initially name the nature of such harmony. We could perhaps think of it as a kind of musical "conchord." Or in an etymologically more correct vein, we could pun in French and say the pulse of this music comes from a sharing of the hearts that are "concoeured." This sharing may be the source of the tranquil quiet or resting together in unity.

This notion of peace—the mystic's notion of concord which is so often expressed in poetic terms—offers a glimmering understanding of a third notion, a dynamic one. Instead of thinking of peace as a *state* in which hostile conflict is absent or in which tranquil concord is present, the third way of understanding peace views it as an activity. What kind of activity? The activity of cultivating agreements.

Peace, in this view, is the struggle to solve concrete problems in ways that enable us to agree to work together in the future. It is not a quiet agreeable feeling that descends upon us from beyond. However, the vague notion of concord does capture an intuition of the third conception of peace. Concord brings to mind the agreements we seek in the process of practicing peace. It fits with the etymology of the term peace—in the Roman notion of *pax* and our concept of "pact" as an agreement. But the notion of concord misleadingly suggests that the goal of peace makers is a definite pact, vow, contract, or treaty—some final state of peace we will reach and be able to rest in tranquility. The reality is that what we reach is simply a further stage in the process.

The result of successfully practicing peace is that we reach a point at which we can work together in the future—working together by dealing with new problems and other aspects of the original ones. The notion of agreement is best understood as a verb: "to agree." Agreeing is something we *do*. It is something we must continue to work at. When we get married or sign our first business contract we may not realize this. But we soon learn that marriage vows and business contracts, like all other agreements, are things we must work with, work on, and continue to work out—long after the ink has dried on the pages of the written "agreement."

This insight is at the heart of the third way of understanding peace. In this view, peace is an activity of cultivating the process of agreeing—the agreeing that enables us to continue to work together, cultivating the process of agreeing. The point has been encapsulated in a motto of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The motto emphasizes that peace is not a *state* of tranquility we are trying to reach, but a *process* in which we can engage: "There is no way to peace; peace is the way."

The central aim of this book is to define and elaborate this third way of understanding peace, "the peace that is a way," and to show that it is the one we should adopt.

In some respects, the notion is rather straightforward; in other respects the concept is fraught with difficulties.

We all have some familiarity with the various ways of cultivating agreements and we are used to hearing people who practice them referred to as "peace makers"—especially when the disputes they try to mediate, the deals they try to negotiate, or the problems they try to solve are dealt with successfully. (If these "peace makers" fail we may be tempted to call them "interfering busybodies.")

However, when people try to articulate this notion of peace, a variety of problems emerge. The problems have roots that are set deep in our

culture. And they constantly get in the way. In the remainder of Parts I and II we will see how and why.

One problem is the temptation to keep thinking in war-like terms when we try to express the idea of peace as an activity. A phrase like the one used as a title of a recent book edited by Jim Wallis, *Waging Peace*, may tempt us to "make war on war" and lead us to feel righteous hate of all self-righteous haters. A similar thing may happen when we think about non-violent actions often associated with pacifists and peace makers of non-violent social action—public protest, non-cooperation, and civil disobedience. We may be tempted to view these as methods of struggle and coercion (or even "making war") that simply do not use violent weapons. (Gene Sharp does something like this in *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*.) Or we may even view these as "weapons of the weak" (the way Saul Alinsky does in *Rules for Radicals*).

The net result is that our new notion of "peace" may not really differ very much from the traditional notion of war. It may simply differ in the way that "cold war" and "economic warfare" do—different weapons are used, but the basic structure and definitive features of the activity remain little different. We still have opponents in conflict who are trying to outmaneuver and manipulate each other in order to achieve victory.

There is an alternative way to understand the activity of peace. We may think of it as a process defined not by conflicts that define oppositions but by problems that pose difficulties. We may think of people involved not as opponents seeking victory, but as participants seeking solutions. But to do so, we need to rethink the basic concepts of reason, social reality, and action. For the ones dominant in our culture today militate against the clear conceptualization of such a genuinely different notion of the peace that is a way. Indeed, even our language "militates against" this.

The best way to see how this is so is to begin by looking at the concepts of peace usually employed—and the ways in which they are wed to other basic categories like reason, reality, and action.

CHAPTER 2

Against Tranquility and Concord

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish but wish the things which happen as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.

Epictetus
The Enchiridion # VIII

In 1955 I talked with a Frenchwoman who had suffered cruelly during the war from lack of food and anxieties for her family, but now was living in a comfortable bourgeois fashion with her husband and son. We reviewed the misadventures of those war days, and then she confessed to me with great earnestness that, despite everything, those times had been more satisfying than the present. "My life is so unutterably boring nowadays!" she cried out. "Anything is better than to have nothing at all happen day after day. You know that I do not love war or want it to return. But at least it made me feel alive, as I have not felt alive before or since."

J. Glenn Gray
*The Warriors*¹

C

ontemporary social scientists and philosophers rather uniformly define peace as the absence of war, armed conflict, violence or instability. They do not so much reject the harmony or tranquility notion of peace as ignore it.

They tend to see it as little more than a vague and sentimental expression of a wistful fondness for flowers, butterflies, children, summer days, and symbols of peace like the olive and the dove. Furthermore, they have strong reasons for thinking it is unscientific, unrealistic, and—even worse—morally misguided.

The notion seems unscientific because it is hard to define experimentally. To test if tranquil peace is present we cannot simply take a people's pulses with cardiographs or take the community's pulse with polls. There is no simple way to distinguish the pulse of peace from the pulse of lethargy. Likewise it is hard to distinguish the polled perception of genuine peace from that of the self-deception *en masse*.

In contrast, though incidents of violence can be somewhat difficult to classify neatly, still, third degree burns and dead bodies are comparatively easy to count. It seems that fairly clear measures of the incidence of war could be constructed. So it seems foolish to mush about with studies of tranquility and harmony when we can define peace simply as the absence of war and get to work. We can then operationalize the concept of peace as the absence of fighting, measure occurrences of conflict and peace, and study them with the rigor that the scientific method provides.

Such thoughts lead prominent social scientists like Kenneth Boulding to set aside the harmony and tranquility view. Instead, they focus on "peace in a narrower sense which is easier to understand, more susceptible to specific research, and more susceptible also to recommendations for policy," this narrower sense being, simply, "the concept of peace as the absence of war."²

The notion of peace as tranquility and concord seems not only unscientific but unrealistic as well. Just as it is less "susceptible to specific research" it is less "susceptible also to recommendations for policy." It is hard to see how the at-oneness of true concord can be instituted as the aim of a national policy. Daily public prayer (as in Iran) or regular community meetings (as in China) might promote solidarity, but it seems more likely that concord comes, when it does, as an after-effect—as something resulting from concrete achievements. Like the joy of any chase, it would seem to come to us *as we are seeking something else*.

It also seems perhaps unrealistically naive to cling to a hope that our biological natures fit us for life in a tranquility of harmony and concord. Furthermore, regardless of what the *future* possibilities for a world of

concord may be, the current state of the world may make those possibilities appear so remote as to be, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. With actual wars wreaking carnage all over and with the growing threat of thermonuclear war, realism seems to dictate that we inquire first into how we can secure a world in which the threat of war has been diminished and lives have been preserved—and worry *later* about rendering those lives harmonious and tranquil.

In a critical survey of *Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research*, Juergen Dedring notes that this is a key reason why contemporary researchers define peace as they do:

The traditional assumption that has been that the term "peace" is non-controversial in that it is the counterpart to the state of war; therefore, peace is defined as the absence of war. This conventional conception has recently been reaffirmed vigorously by many peace researchers who consider the prevention of war as the overriding task in the nuclear age.³

Besides seeming unscientific and unrealistic, the concept of peace as tranquility and concord also seems morally misleading. The reason why is related to a bad feature that peace sometimes has: it can be boring.

Tranquility suggests a lack of tension-ridden vigor that many people would say makes life worth living. Harmony, unity, and concord can often amount to little more than a lack of difference, a lack of zest, and a lack of vital life process and growth. Such tranquility may really be little more than the grave but empty peace in which the dead are said to rest.

A system may be peaceable to the point of dullness. For instance, a family without conflict is likely also to lack many of the qualities we regard as desirable in family life, such as creativity. The problem, then, is first to identify an optimum degree or range of strain, and then to make certain that the system is strong enough to withstand it without recourse to war.⁴

Conceived as a lack of conflict and violence, peace may simply be stability—and stagnation. Such stagnation is, when pushed to its extreme form, death itself.

In that sense, we would want to say that peace can be a genuine evil. In this light, the ideal would seem to be to avoid peace and quiet enough to

feel fully alive and yet have enough peace and law abidingness so we do not get killed. We want to have optimum strain without lapsing into war.

But perhaps we should not even add the condition that the strain of conflict should be kept low enough to "make certain the system is strong enough to withstand it without recourse to war." It seems as though there are not only unjust wars, there are also unjust states of peace. To advocate any particular kind of peace is to advocate that things stay as they are, or at least that the currently armed and accepted government authorities remain the armed and accepted authorities.

If we favor peace and oppose war, we are adopting an ideological position. We are committing ourselves to views about who should remain in power and who the legitimate authorities are. Notions of peace would seem to be:

...inescapably bound up with the preservation of the status quo, or the status quo minimally adjusted. So when war or the prospect or threat of war comes to be viewed as an instrument of promising change favoring a future condition... The perceived legitimacy of war and peace, therefore, is itself an ideological weapon favoring one objective or the other.⁵

It would seem that there are societies with whom we ought not to be at peace. They could be said to lack a morally acceptable form of peace, a peace free of oppressive forms of physical and social violence of a structural form.

Furthermore, there is a sense in which a political system which denies people basic human rights or an economic system which denies them basic physical necessities is a system that involves a kind of violence done to people's dignity or welfare. With this concern in mind, the social scientist Johann Galtung has introduced a distinction between "negative" and "positive" peace. It is a difference between peace as a mere absence of war and peace as this *plus* an absence of systematic oppression and "structural" violence.

The distinction at issue here is an important one. Many people now make a point of emphasizing that they seek "peace with justice." But we should make clear that it is a distinction made within the general conception of peace as an absence of war. It simply separates cases of peace with injustice from those of peace without injustice. As Juergen Dedring puts it: "Galtung has not abandoned the traditional concept of peace as an absence of violence; rather, he proposes to refine the idea and to compliment it with a

theorem of a structural violence and positive peace."⁶ In that sense, concepts of "peace with justice" do not make our idea of peace *itself* positive. They simply introduce a new, compound concept that adds the positive notion of justice but leaves us with the original idea of peace itself as an absence of conflict.

One of the things that makes such a compound idea attractive, however, is that it seems that there are important relationships between the presence of justice and the absence of violence. It may well be that justice serves to promote and sustain stable peace. Further, part of justice is generally thought to involve distinctive procedures by which disputes are settled.

In particular, many people suppose that justice requires that disputes be settled by the rule of law rather than by appeals to force. They suppose that, in a just system, disagreements are resolved by principles about which there is a prior and more profound agreement. We may fight things out in the courts, but we agree to do so following due process.

Since the notion of concord involves an element of agreement, this suggests that the harmony/tranquility/concord conception of peace might be developed and elaborated by an appeal to some notion of agreement on principles of just law. Peace, we might say, is the rule of just law. The Hebrew notion of shalom offers one version of such a notion, the liberal tradition of political theory (represented, for instance, in Immanuel Kant's essay on "Perpetual Peace") offers another. The one bases its notion of just law and rightly ordered life on divine revelation, the other bases its notion on principles of reason.

I do not think we should dismiss notions of peace as the rule of law, justice, or just law. But we must acknowledge important problems with them. It would seem that peace can only be the rule of law when the law is obeyed. If it is disobeyed, then the rule of law becomes the rule of legal *force*. When the police or military are required to enforce the law in violent ways, justice may still rule, but peace reigns no more. This indicates that the notion of peace is not strictly identical to the notion of the rule of law. You can have one without the other, so they can not be one and the same thing.

Of course, if there was a way for law or justice to rule without enforcement, then perhaps we might formulate a notion of peace as something strictly identical with the rule of justice or law. This suggestion is worth keeping in mind. After all, it seems that in international relations between nuclear armed superpowers no enforcement of law is possible. It would seem that no appeal to force can very effectively settle disputes between nations whose weapons guarantee mutually assured destruction if

war breaks out. If one threatens to use force, then the other can threaten in reply—and both are left hoping that the other does not call the bluff.

Perhaps then, we ought to search for some notions of peace as the unenforced rule of just law. But whether we can find any coherent notion of this is, of course, an open question.⁷

In any case, it is clear that our common notions of justice are distinct from a mere absence of war. Furthermore, notions of justice are controversial themselves. The early Hebrew notion of justice that was associated with *shalom* will seem sexist to some and ethnocentric to others. Likewise, liberal theorists disagree with others and even among themselves as to what justice is and whether it requires equal opportunities to compete, equal distribution of wealth and prestige, or tolerance of different religions and life styles.

It would seem that when we combine the two conceptions in some idea of "positive" peace, we still have two sets of questions to deal with—questions about the presence or absence of violence and questions about the presence or absence of justice. So it appears, at least initially, that we would be wise to just say that peace as the rule of law really means peace (as the absence of violence) *plus* the rule of law. Why not admit that "peace with justice" is simply that, namely, peace *with* something else which we think of as justice?

In doing so, we can separate the questions about the rightness of a social order from questions about its peacefulness. We can simply acknowledge that, considered in and of itself, "peace can be either good or bad."⁸ This still enables us to keep in mind the point behind proposals for notions of "positive" peace or peace as the rule of just law. We can distinguish cases of peace with justice from cases of peace without it. By doing this, we avoid confusing distinct questions. Also, we avoid thinking that peace itself is an inherent good. We refuse to associate it with tranquility, concord, harmony, unity and other pleasing terms that might lead us to think that the absence of conflict is always best.

These arguments have considerable force. If the tranquility and concord concept is unscientific, unrealistic, and morally misleading, we might do well to follow contemporary philosophers and social scientists in rejecting it.

Furthermore, the arguments represent lines of thought we experience personally as we live issues in everyday life. They are lines of thought that may come upon us when we pause amid time's rhythms and reflect for a moment on one of the experiences that the tranquility and concord notion of peace evokes. There is that familiar and disturbing way in which self-doubt

can creep up on us, lurk about a bit, and then lurch out—leaving us shaking our heads in uncertainty:

Perhaps The Moment in the rose garden was nothing more than a few minutes of alpha waves brought on by peculiar eye movements. Maybe it was a moment of "peace." Still, would an understanding of it really be of much helping settling the Arab/Israeli dispute? Perhaps that moment of tranquil rest had no more moral significance than that of a short nap...

or:

In that moment of mutual silence, what did I really share with my friend? Maybe she did not *really* understand. And perhaps such moments have their place, but I would want a friendship to be filled with *hours* of such silence? It may have just provided a way of deceiving ourselves, enabling us to gloss over profound differences we do not have the courage to face...

For you and me, in ways such as these, doubts can arise about our experiences of harmony, tranquility and concord. The uncertainties we feel raise doubts about the tranquility concept's cognitive status, its realistic merit, and the moral value of it as well. As the magic moment passes, and its charm begins to fade, we may be tempted to shake our head and "come back to reality." As we do, we typically forget the glimmering kind of peace as absence plain and simple—as the absence of conflict or violence.

CHAPTER 3

Peace as Absence

Conceptions of peace as an absence of war, aggression, violence, or conflict clearly have their merits. They permit clarity in scientific research, policy articulation, and moral deliberation. When we talk of conflict, they give us a kind of placeholder. It is a symbol like the zero of mathematics—a placeholder whose meaning lies not in something to which it points, but rather precisely in its not pointing to anything at all.

If the concept of peace as a kind of "conflict zero" helps people figure out ways to avoid nuclear war, terrorism, or torture, then we should applaud their use of it. But conceptions of peace as an absence are attractive for other reasons as well, reasons which are suspiciously profound. The reasons concern dominant ways in which our culture tends to characterize knowledge and human nature—as well as ways in which it institutionalizes distinctively conflict centered views of human activity. The beliefs involved may seem so basic and obvious as to be beyond all reasonable doubt. Indeed, they may seem so obvious as to be beyond argument. We might not care if we can offer no justification for them because they seem to need none. That, in part, is what makes their apparent profundity so suspicious.

But we can consider those sorts of reasons later. There is no need to leap into profundity without first considering questions of a rather straightforward sort—questions which raise important doubts about absence-style definitions of peace.

On the face of it, a very basic rule of logic seems to be violated when peace is defined as some kind of absence. It is a rule first formulated by Aristotle. It forms part of the traditional logic that serves as the nursery school curriculum of Western philosophical reasoning. So we should be

concerned when intellectually capable social scientists violate it without so much as a whisper of hesitation with regard to the rule. We should be taken a bit aback when distinguished philosophers violate it as well.

The rule is simply that definitions should be affirmative rather than negative. This means that they should say what a thing is, rather than simply distinguish it in terms of what it is not. It is a rule we break if we define a woman as "an adult who is *not* a man" or if we define the good as "that which is *not* evil." We also violate the rule if we use a word like "lacks" or "absence" which introduces the negative element in disguise. We may define sanity as "a condition which is *not* mental illness" or define it as "an absence of mental illness," but in both cases the rule is violated. We have said only what sanity is not, and failed to say what it is. Someone who defines peace as "the absence of war" breaks this rule.

We saw earlier that social scientists like Kenneth Boulding do just this. Philosophers such as Raymond Aron do as well. In his massive work, *Peace and War*, he introduces distinctions within the general concept of peace. But he takes the essence of peace to be "the more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units."¹ He might just as well have defined it as a condition in "there are not" such violent modes of rivalry or one in which they are "absent."²

When contemporary social scientists and philosophers violate Aristotle's rule of definition, this should give us pause. But perhaps the thought we should pause for is that peace is an exceptional concept, one to which this rule does not apply.

There is, in fact, a clearly definable class of cases in which the rule is not applicable. However, the rule is, in general, a very good one to follow and it is not clear why our definition of peace should be exempted from it.

The most profound reason why the rule is, from a philosophical point of view, a good one is perhaps also the reason most readily dismissed when definitions are looked at from a pragmatic point of view. Philosophers have traditionally taken the goal of a definition to be to accurately state the essence of an idea—to say what a thing of the type being defined *is*. A definition which is negative rather than affirmative (in the *logical* sense) only tells us what a thing is *not*. It obviously fails to achieve the goal and so is judged fundamentally unsatisfactory. If we define the feminine as that which "is not strong and not rational and not masculine," then we leave it conceived as a vague something else, a kind of "Other" thing which we still do not really comprehend.

But it sometimes does seem as though a little profundity can go a long way. It may be much more difficult to say what a thing is than to say what it

is not. Health and sanity are good examples of this. It seems easier to define physical ailments than physical health, and the same is true—in spades—for the concept of sanity. When our concerns are practical, we are often readily satisfied with a definition that is not affirmative. For example, if we can easily define sanity as an absence of mental illness and find it hard to define it as something substantive or positive in its own right, then it is tempting just to adopt the negative definition and get on with the tasks at hand.

People defend the negative definitions of peace on pragmatic grounds just as they defend the negative definitions of health and sanity. The pressures of the practical can lead us to dismiss any lingering philosophical misgivings and any haunting trace of personal insight. We may dismiss them as little more than moonlight in the rearview mirror.

Yet there is, from a quite pragmatic point of view, a problem with such dismissal. Absence-style definitions can only tell us what to avoid, not what to seek. Medical personnel who employ such definitions are left in the disquieting position of literally having no idea as to how to go about cultivating health or sanity—apart from eliminating certain impediments to it. The same is true of national policy analysts concerned with peace. If they conceive it simply as the absence of war, then they know only what to prevent, not what to promote. They may know they want to stop warring, but they may not know what they want to *start doing instead*. This practical difficulty resembles another, a problem that each of us can experience in our personal lives with a kind of vague frustration.

Picture a rainy day, a late afternoon, and a room full of kids who are screaming and fighting. Ma hangs up the phone, turns down the burners on the stove and rushes in with a touch of disoriented shock. Perhaps she simply shouts "Will you kids stop fighting! But, in the kind of penetrating near scream that can stop children in their tracks—the way "Freeze!" does in a kids' game—she may simply fill the room with the intense plea: "Peace!...Please!"

What happens? The kids freeze. They look at her, waiting, as if to ask: "What do you mean?"—and then it simply dawns on them that she objects to their behavior and they suppose she simply meant: "Stop it!" And then they start it again with a probing glance of sidelong hostility and an exploratory grumble, "It was his fault." And she has a harried urge to shake them and tell them that she does not just want them to stop fighting. She wants the bickering to stop. She is tired of the ill-will and hostility. She wants them to start *doing* something *different*, something peaceful. She seems to have a vague sense of what that something is. It is a sense born of experiences in her own childhood, quiet rainy days when family members were working

together on shared tasks or laughing in common games. But she does not know how to explain. She is not alone in this.

And perhaps there is really nothing much there to explain. That possibility is worth considering. Perhaps such vague intuitions rest on an illusion. In particular, it might be that they rest on a kind of linguistic illusion with which our words bewitch us.

Two analogies will help explain this possibility. First think of an obsessively competitive runner who hears: "Nobody is as fast as he is." He hears this as a challenge and says: "Oh yeah? Well bring him on! I can beat *anybody*! That goes for Nobody as well as everybody else." This crazy runner has misunderstood; he has been deluded by the way he understood the way he understood the word "Nobody." He thinks it refers to somebody when in fact it does not refer at all.

In much the same way, we use the word "nothing" as a noun, and this has suggested to various philosophers (who may have their own obsessions) that there must be something which nothing *is*. Our language permits us to pose the question: "What is nothing?"—and so it seems as though our language should enable us to formulate a correct answer. And many philosophers have been led to speak of nothing, or sometimes Nothing, as though it were something. Yet it is not easy to say how we should characterize it. As Peter Heath has noted:

Nothing is an awe-inspiring and yet essentially undigested concept, highly esteemed by writers of a mystical or existentialist tendency, but by most others regarded with anxiety, nausea, or panic. Nobody seems to know how to deal with it (he would, of course) and plain persons generally are reported to have little difficulty in saying, seeing, hearing, and doing nothing.³

Heath goes on to consider a view that many philosophers have come to hold, namely, that "nothing" refers to nothing at all and there is nothing to say about it and there is nothing that we should worry about this. It is just a word that functions as a kind of placeholder in our talk—the way an otherwise meaningless chip or slip of paper may function as a playing piece in a game.

"Nothing" would seem to belong to a distinct class of terms which *ought* to be defined negatively. They provide legitimate exceptions to Aristotle's rule. They are negative in their very essence. Besides "nothing", examples of this would include *impregnable*, *apolitical*, *nonrational*, and *senseless*. Such terms enable us to talk about there *not* being a thing or else

there being a condition of some thing or person in which there is a *lack* or *absence* of pregnability, politicality, rationality, or sense. It is possible that peace is, like these other concepts, an essentially negative notion. Perhaps the fact that we use it as a noun tricks us into thinking it stands for something positive and substantive—but in reality it is a placeholder concept, the concept of "zero conflict."

There are three good reasons for resisting this suggestion.

First, "peace" has no prefix like "non" or suffix like "less" to suggest that it is an essentially negative notion. Etymologically, the roots of the word tap a notion of agreement common to "pact" and "pax." If anything, this suggests that the harmony view of peace bears further looking into. But, of course, the origins of a word can have little to do with its current meaning as the origins of a checking deposit may have to do with the goods or services it is used to purchase.

A second point is perhaps more significant. If a term's essence has been properly specified, then the definition will be neither too narrow nor too broad. The definition of love as "an emotion which is not hate" is plainly unsatisfactory because it is too broad. It would include frustration, wonder, and a variety of other emotions which are neither hate nor love. If a term is negative in essence, then a negative definition of it will be able to avoid being too broad in this sort of way. But negative definitions of peace—definitions of it as a kind of absence—seem too broad.

For example, suppose that seventy or eighty percent of the nuclear weapons currently in existence were fired off at points around the globe and that the result—over a period of months or years—was the extinction of *homo sapiens*. In the remaining world, there would be no hostility or confrontation, no aggression and no war. Likewise, there would be no illness or insanity. But it would be as bizarre to call this a world of peace as it would be to call it healthy or sane. So definitions of peace as an absence appear to be too broad because they would lead us to call a glowing desert like that peace.

Perhaps we simply need to narrow the definition down a bit by introducing some qualification. We might say, for instance, that peace is the state *in which people are living* AND in which there is an absence of war or conflict. But suppose that *homo sapiens* survived but without culture, returning to a stage of animal existence without language or institutions. It would still be odd to accept that as an example of peace. Perhaps we should add further qualifications, characterizing more specifically how they must be living together.

But at this point, we begin to verge on a rather different conception of peace. We begin to find ourselves saying what it is that people should be doing *instead* of engaging in confrontation or aggression and the like. And at that point we begin to formulate a logically affirmative notion of peace. Well and good. But the question then is: Precisely what should we adopt as our conception of the essence of peace *as a positively distinguishable activity*?

And once we define it thus, we no longer are conceiving peace primarily as an absence. The fact that peace involves an absence of war is no longer a central and essentially definitive feature of it. Once we get clear about what peace *is*, we can expect to find that there is an indefinite number of things that it *is not*—it will exclude war and conflict surely, but also prime numbers, crossword puzzle and lunar eclipses.

A third point is best understood by first noting that while we cannot, Humpty Dumpty fashion, mean whatever we choose by our words, it is still true in an important sense that whatever meaning our words have is meaning we have chosen—meaning we can revise if we see fit. In the case of peace, it would be desirable to formulate a notion of it as a kind of activity which could be distinguished from war in positive ways and which would provide an alternative to the activity of war. In the important (and rapidly growing) number of contexts in which war can no longer serve its traditional function of settling international disputes, it is not clear what *can* serve this function when diplomacy fails. So we might be wise to choose to think of peace in positive terms if we can conceive of an activity which could serve that function.

Of course it might be said that diplomacy should serve this function. When diplomacy fails, the solution is—more diplomacy. And something in some sense like this must be at least part of the truth. But what sort of diplomacy? Surely not the sorts practiced by Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. Would it be the kinds employed by the U.S. State Department in conjunction with the Pentagon and CIA or by the Kremlin in conjunction with the Kremlin?

To sum up, we have reason to think that peace should not be defined negatively because its etymology suggests this, because its negative definitions turn out to be too broad, and because an affirmative definition might be of some practical value in dealing with the nuclear arms race. However, it is clear that the only really telling criticism of the absence-style views of peace would be one offering an alternative that was clearly superior. But in order to adequately formulate such an alternative it is necessary to consider the background assumptions which have led people to adopt the absence view. We need to look at the background assumptions

which make the peace-as-absence view attractive for suspiciously profound reasons—and which make it difficult to conceive of any alternative.

CHAPTER 4

The Pervasive Presence: Conflict

The suggestion that the peace-as-absence view is attractive for suspiciously profound reasons can only be explored by examining some fundamental features of our culture.

We are not gods and we cannot see things whole or view them from the standpoint of eternity. To speak of something like "our culture" is to engage in a series of oversimplifications—oversimplifications which can, of course, be of varying use.

For our purposes, it will help to begin by considering a rather extreme oversimplification which has the merits of brevity, clarity, and an element of familiarity:

In our culture, we conceive of life in evolutionary terms as a competition governed by the survival of the fittest. This conception pervades the ways we have structured our institutions. Every individual and every species is thought to be in conflict with every other. To live is to endure, and to endure the organism must assimilate and grow. It must eat others and prevail over competitors. This is as true in human society as it is in the jungle. To act is to fight for a future. To live is to conflict.

Because our culture conceives of all life activities as forms of conflict, this limits the way we can conceive of peace. Whatever peace is, surely it is at least an absence of conflict. But if conflict is essential to life and each life activity is a form of conflict, then peace—as an absence of conflict—must involve the absence of life activity.

Particular forms of peace must simply be the absence of particular forms of life activities. The most extreme and ultimate form of peace would be the peace in which the dead are supposed to rest.

And what is death? A nothing which is not anything, an essentially negative state—a state that can only be defined as an absence. If Life is War, and Peace is Death, then there is nothing to be said of peace *beyond* the fact that it is an absence of conflict and "War." Because we, in our culture, conceive of life as conflicting in its essence, we can only conceive of peace as an absence.

This way of characterizing our culture greatly over emphasizes the historical influence that the evolutionary metaphor has actually had on our thought and practice. It overlooks implications that the notion of symbiosis has for spelling out that metaphor. It leaves out the important distinctions between non-violent modes of conflict (which might be said to be "peaceful" forms of conflict) and more physically dangerous or morally objectionable ones. It sketches our thought in monochromatic dullness.

But the sketch clarifies the relation between conflict centered views of life and concepts of peace. If we suppose that conflict is an essential and ever present aspect of human activity, then we will find it difficult to conceive of peace as anything beyond a simple absence of conflict. For it is surely *at least* as an absence of conflict. And if conflict is essential to life, then to eliminate the one we must eliminate the other, leaving... nothing, nothing but death. So peace then *at most* can only be an absence of conflict. Limited forms of peace will simply involve limited forms of constraint of life—limited forms of activity we withdraw from in order to avoid the particular forms of conflict associated with them.

We sometimes encounter a simple and extreme version of the conflict view sketched above. There are people who constantly bark that "This is a dog eat dog world" and who act on that assumption. But conflict centered views of human activity can take a variety of forms, and they can have intellectual grounds of a variety of types.

One index of the prevalence of the conflict view of human nature is the centrality it is given in the branch of contemporary research that is referred to as "peace studies," "peace science," or (significantly) "conflict resolution." In a recent article, Walter Isaard, one of the leaders in this field, attempts to provide "A Definition of Peace Science" which he argues is "The

Queen of Social Sciences." He tries to do it by crystallizing theory in this field with a "step-by-step development of a broad conceptual framework."

He introduces the very first step of theory construction in a remarkable way. To build a theory of peace he says: "Begin with a basic production subsystem, with simple conflict among two participants over the joint action."¹ After starting by picturing the simplest and most social primitive interaction as a case of "simple conflict between two participants over the joint action," Isaard then proceeds to add various economic, political, and other aspects to the theory.

From the very first, he takes conflict to be essential to the human activities that provide the subject matter of social sciences in general and of peace science (their "Queen") in particular. Issard's work is representative. His assumption is not arbitrary. There are good reasons why it should seem plausible to suppose that conflict is an invariant feature of human activity.

When we examine the conceptions of rationality, social knowledge and human action that are dominant in our culture, as well as the institutions which elaborate these and reflect them, we find that they provide us with a thick web, a whole network of conflict centered views of human life. This family of conceptions provides reasons for finding the absence-style definitions of peace attractive. To put the point differently, this family of conflict centered views provides profound features of our thought which radically obscure the nature of peace, leading us to define peace in terms of what it is not.

There is not, of course, just *one* single set of assumptions that provide *the* conflict centered view of our culture. There are clusters of views in varying degrees of connection. Many share some common ancestry and have relations of family resemblance and familial interdependence. Ideas and institutions are a bit like people—in a sense, all belong to one great family. Still, we can (for various reasons) choose to write genealogies centered around the origins and interrelations of particular families. And we can group people or ideas and institutions in networks or family trees.

The problem we are interested in—the obscuring of peace—gives us a kind of genealogical perspective. We are interested in the roots of a particular family of ideas and institutions—a family of conflict centered views. This family is extended rather than nuclear and it admits no single test of membership or simple definition. But it does form a reasonably clear focus for our study.

In piecing together an account of this family's characteristic features and forms of interdependence, we will identify a kind of genetic syndrome. And we will find the markings of what may be offered as a kind of diagnosis

of our culture, an account of how and why our culture radically obscures the nature of peace. There will be a fundamental symmetry between this diagnosis and the later constructive account aimed to eliminate the obscurity of peace. For in seeing how peace is systematically obscured, we will see what must be done if we are to eliminate this obscurity. The diagnosis offered in Part II shows that to formulate a conception of peace as a positively distinguished activity (as Part IV will attempt to do) we must reconstruct our conceptions of rationality, social knowledge and human action—and reconstruct the dominant institutions and practices of our culture as well.

THE CULTURE OF CONFLICT

Part II

Civilization is not an incurable disease, but it should never be forgotten that the English people are at present afflicted by it.

Mohandas K. Gandhi¹

INTRODUCTION: HOW DO WE SEE DIFFERENCES?

In our culture, hostility, confrontation, violence, aggression, and war are common. It has been suggested, in fact, that conflict is a growth industry. It is surely an industry that gets plenty of press—not only because of its intrinsic importance and human interest but, further, because of the nature of our media.

Different kinds of events take different lengths of time to happen. The British philosopher R. G. Collingwood argued: "If an historian had no means of apprehending events that occupied more than an hour, he could describe the burning down of a house, but not the building of a house; the assassination of Caesar but not his conquest of Gaul." He added: "We can even say to some extent what kind of differences there would be. In general, making things takes longer than destroying them. The shorter our standard time-phase for an historical event, the more our history will consist of destruction, catastrophes, battle, murder, and sudden death."² The news media of our culture operate with a "standard time-phase" that introduces a bias of just this sort.

The increasing frequency and prominence of conflict makes ours a culture of conflict—in something like the sense in which it is a culture of cars, televisions, cancer and heart disease. But there is a further and more profound respect in which we live in a culture of conflict. It concerns our dominant world view.

What we see depends to a considerable extent, of course, on what there is to be seen. But the *way* we see it depends largely on our assumptions and the way we look. Business people see not only lots of costs and benefits, they tend to see things *as* costs and benefits. Painters tend to see things *as* aesthetic objects. Scientists tend to see things *as* causes and effects. In our culture, how do we tend to see human differences—differences in plans, beliefs, and concerns?

Suppose two people on the bus strike up a conversation about the U.S. role in Central America. One notices that the other is reading a newspaper editorial on U.S. militarism. The talk starts like this:

Daye: You know the Soviets have a huge military investment in Afghanistan.

Knight: But they have deep fears about the security of their borders.

Daye: Well look, we're concerned about the security of *ours* in Central America. And the Soviets are supplying aid to insurgents trying to topple governments that have safeguarded free enterprise and U.S. investments.

Knight: But the CIA is supplying the same kind of aid to Afghani rebels. And the U.S. government has refused to allow a socialist government gain power in Latin America democratically and keep it in the same way, so socialists there have no real alternative except to resort to force and appeal to Eastern bloc countries for aid.

We can imagine various ways in which the conversation might continue. They might, for example, start arguing about the precedent set by Chile or begin to squabble about the legitimacy of Castro's Cuba.

But suppose Daye replied by saying: "Well then, it seems that we are completely agree on all these points so far." Then Knight responds: "Yes. But what is your view of the situation in Bolivia right now?"

If this happened, we might be very tempted to say: "What? I thought you were disagreeing!" It did seem as though they were having an "argument." But notice something. All their claims could be true together.

There is nothing contradictory in believing that the Soviets are aiding Latin Americans *and* the CIA is aiding Afghanis. Daye and Knight might very well have been discovering they were in complete accord.

Still, because they were saying *different* things, it seems only natural to suppose they were engaged in arguing for *conflicting* things.

We tend to see differences as conflicts. In our culture, we have assumptions and practices that commit us to conflict centered views of life. It is not just that we tend to see lots of conflicts around us. Because of these basic assumptions and practices, when we look at things *we tend to see them that way*. We tend to see whatever we look at *as* conflict. In that sense our dominant world view entrenches us in a culture of conflict.

A wide variety of conflict related views have been proposed, promulgated and adopted with varying levels of commitment. We will focus here on central ones in the dominant currents of our culture. They concern things such as reason, social knowledge, and intentional action.

These things might at first seem to have little significant bearing on our views about the place of conflicting human activity. But it turns out that it is just these sort of very basic elements in the chemistry of our civilization that make us prone to react to differences *as* oppositions and conflicts.

CHAPTER 5

The Strife of Reason in Defending Claims (And What I Learned Near the Broccoli Dip)

One key set of conflict related assumptions concern prevailing views of the self, reason, feeling, meaning, and truth. These assumptions have historical roots that reach back through the Middle Ages to the Golden Age of Greece.

The forerunners of the early Greek philosophers were called sophists. Sophists refined the art of verbal combat. They often worked as the Greek equivalents of lawyers and public relations agents. To win court cases and elections they employed a rhetoric for reasoning that was rich with metaphors of physical combat and war.

It is a rhetoric with which we are all familiar. We often employ military and pugilistic terms in reasoning. We "defend positions," "counter-attack," make "charges," offer "ripostes." We adopt "strategies" and "tactics" in order to "win" and emerge as "victors" in argument. We seek to "defeat opponents" by "outmaneuvering" them with alternative "lines of attack" and by "nailing" them when we spot an opening in their defense. These metaphors reflect a distinctive view of what reasoning is, one Aristotle long ago gave the label "eristic," a term whose root—eris—meant strife.

These metaphors do not just ornament our speech. They structure our understanding of what a rational argument is and they guide the ways we reason. They are metaphors we live by. In a discussion of "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Life," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued this point in a forceful way:

It is important to see that we don't just *talk* about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain or lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we *do* in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc—reflects this. It is in this sense that we live by the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.¹

This style of reasoning that Lakoff and Johnson focus on is perhaps especially prominent amongst lawyers and philosophers. Many people have a distaste for the more piercing forms of verbal violence. But they still operate with the eristic concept of reasoning; amicable combat is still combat. It is generally supposed that good reasoning is *critical* reasoning in the pointed sense of the term. Even if we don't always *defend* our views against attacks, we typically suppose that we *should* do so and that our beliefs are rational only insofar as they can be given such a rational defense. In that sense, the eristic view of reason is dominant in our culture.

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the eristic style of reasoning is the only one with which we are familiar. Personal experience drove this point home for me in a rather vivid way.

My experience involved conversation at suburban, middle class cocktail parties—the kind with crackers, cheese, and broccoli dip. The guests would generally divide up into two groups and the one I normally joined would typically get discussions going when someone announced a claim he believed. It might concern politics, sports, or economics or occasionally religion, modern art, or something else of importance. People would choose up sides and begin to argue the point.

It was really rather like a game, and the point of the game was to win points and prestige. To score, people would demand precision in definitions and pick claims apart. They would treat each sentence like a little soldier sent out to the front lines to be shot down. It was supposed that each claim had a clear and definite meaning and it marked out a position that was either held or lost. Each sentence was either true—and a winner—or false.

Part of scoring involved saving face by keeping your feelings masked. When pinned in a particularly untenable position, you bluffed. Feelings were

considered irrelevant to the logic of rational argument and, worse, betrayals of personal weakness.

People would demand reasons for the claims, evidence for the reasons, and sources of documentation for the evidence. They would treat each other as quite separate and autonomous antagonists who were individually responsible for their own words. The disputants would concede a point only under severe fire and only when an honorable retreat of some sort was available. They would remain on the attack until their drink needed a refill or supertime had arrived. It was a lot of fun.

My problems arose when I went for the broccoli dip. Another group would be talking and I would try to join in. But I could not follow the conversation. I could understand each sentence, but I could not follow the discussion.

They would start off talking about a new doctor in town, a dying mother, or a child reaching puberty. They would get excited about it and all would seem to throw in their two cents, and then they would calm down a bit and suddenly be off talking about something else. When I tried to participate, I suddenly felt like a basketball player on the wrong court—dribbling a volleyball under the volleyball net while everyone else stared, nonplussed. I would query: "Just what do you mean by 'a good doctor' here?" and get puzzled expressions. I would insist: "I don't think we've really settled the last point yet because..." and draw blank looks. So far as I could see, these people did not appear to be willing to rationally discuss things. They were simply babbling along in an irrational way.

Two things made me draw back from this conclusion. The first was that these people were typically female (and the first group almost uniformly male). I thought of myself as liberated. I cringed in thinking that this experience might somehow suggest that deep down I really believed half the human race might be irrational. The other thing that gave me pause was this: these women seemed to know what they were doing. They all talked in concert, as though they were following rules. But what rules?

I began to hang around the cheese and crackers and listen with care when women talked in this style. I came round to the following view of these non-eristic conversations.

The point of them was not to win points and prestige. The point was to share and cultivate important information and insights. Value judgments were used to decide how important and relevant a point was. These value judgments were reflected in people's gestures and feelings. Also, feelings and expressive gestures served to provide initial expressions of budding interests and growing understandings of how facts fit together.

Meaning was treated as a communal affair, something the group constructed or gathered and kept a sense of collectively. It was holistic and dynamic. People were not interested in pinning down definitions or dissecting them. The aim was to help ideas grow and mature by letting them take on a life of their own. People would use the first person plural pronoun to try to sum up "what *we* are saying"—instead of insisting on "What *I* meant when *I* said *that*."

Truth was something cultivated and shared as it emerged in this cooperative process. It was not a static flag marking out a position to be taken by a victorious disputant. Sentences were not thought to be "simply true *or* false. People would talk about how there was "some truth" in what one person said and "a lot of truth" in some other remarks—and they would look for connections and try to build upon them.

Furthermore, the conversationalists' self-concepts seemed remarkably interdependent. People were playing fluids roles in a shared activity, rather than staking out their positions and guarding their flanks. They might even voice a view or concern of someone who had not spoken or who was not present because they thought it was important for that voice to be heard—even if the view or concern was not one they themselves shared.

There is not technical term in philosophy that neatly fits this second style of reasoning. For example, the style differs in important ways from the type of method that Socrates practiced, though it also resembles it in key respects. Socrates was a master of sophistry and would sometimes compete in the most strife-filled eristic arguments one could picture. But he often tried to engage in a cooperative cultivating of shared insights. He would engage in an open dialogue in which he tried to serve as a "midwife" who helped new ideas and insights through the birth process. To contrast with "eristic," that kind of open dialogue is sometimes called "maieutic." The word's Greek root is *maieusis*, which means "midwifery."

"Maieutic" will be a useful label to use here not only because it may suggest the idea of open Socratic dialogue but also because the birthing process is an excellent example of a way of dealing with human differences without viewing them as conflicts. A child, its mother, and her helpers are all engaged in an intense, painful process that deals with the most basic human difference of all—the separate integrity of physical bodies. Yet the struggle is not a fight and there are no victors. There is simply cooperative success or failure for all concerned.

In some ways the maieutic style of reasoning described here resembles the style of ethical reasoning that psychologists like Carol Gilligan suggest may be characteristic of women.² However, women often

excel at eristic reasoning and many men excel in maieutic reasoning. In general it is very difficult to generalize about any sex-related differences of any kind. It is unnecessary to attempt to here. The point of describing these two styles of cocktail party conversation is not to demonstrate facts but to illustrate concepts.

The two particular groups of conversationalists provide concrete examples of two distinct sets of assumptions about truth, meaning, feeling's relation to reason, and the individual's relation to the community.

The eristic view adopts the "correspondence theory" of truth. It supposes that truth consists in a relation of correspondence between individual claims (which we can dispute) and a fixed reality (which the claims either match or fail to fit). Further, claims are thought to be governed by the logician's "law of the excluded middle." They must either be true or false. There is no third range of possibilities which provides alternatives. The maieutic view adopts an emergent version of the "coherentist theory" of truth. Truth is an overall characteristic of emergent networks of insights and perceptions of fact in their various relations. Claims are expected to be partially correct and incorrect rather than simply true or false. Truth is thought of as something emergent—something in a process of birthing and growth that can be nourished. Put differently, truth is thought of as something that can be gathered and woven together, or cultivated and harvested.

The eristic style treats meaning as something that comes in atomic units (claims or propositions) which are attached to individual sentences by individual reasoners who are separately responsible for the significance they give to each soldierly sentence. The maieutic style views meaning as a communal project. Significance is viewed as an organic feature of talk—of talk whose sense is shared corporately by the group. The context of a particular speech is thought to play a prominent and crucial role in determining its import. The meanings of sentences and gestures are viewed as interdependent and holistic. They develop over time in ways analogous to biological processes of growth.

On the eristic view, feeling and reason are quite disparate things. At its best, argument is disinterestedly unemotional—apart from a keen desire for victory or, perhaps, truth. Feelings are irrelevant and non-rational responses that obscure reasoning. On the maieutic view, feeling is viewed as continuous with reason. Emotions are viewed as cognitive in character. They are first approximations to sound moral and descriptive judgments and articulate insights. And they are also intrinsic elements of the expression of such judgments or insights once they are fully understood. (On this view, an

emotional detachment when offering a description of a profound truth or a moral dilemma is, on the face of it, evidence that one has not fully understood the truth or the dilemma.)

The eristic style embodies a view of the individual reasoner as an atomic self, a body with a mind of its own which functions as an autonomous and completely independent agent with a private will seeking to realize personal desires such as winning points and prestige. The individual is the basic unit of social reality. "The community" is just a convenient verbal fiction used to talk about a collection or juxtaposition of such real individuals. The maieutic style embodies a view of the self as something defined in terms of the functions it serves in a communal process to which it is internally and organically related. The things a person means, the values she or he holds, and the actions that are performed are inherently communal in character. Individuals are related to one another in community in something like the way that heart and lung and brain are related to one another in a body. They are interdependent; their relations to one another are supposed to be crucially determinative of who each is. On the maieutic view, it would make as much sense to say that the community is a convenient fiction as it would to say that the "human body" is just a convenient verbal fiction used for clumping organs together when we talk of them

In general, the eristic style is characterized by atomism, discreetness, and fixity; the maieutic style is characterized by holism, continuity, and emergence.

Each style rests on a relatively coherent set of assumptions which can be adopted in sophisticated practices of thinking pursued with high degrees of excellence. Skilled lawyers and debaters can provide examples of this for eristic, skilled committee workers and consciousness raisers can do so for maieutic reasoning. We could, of course, ask which form of rationality seems to have the most worthy aims: Is it better to pursue points and prestige or share information and cultivate insights? But this way of evaluating the two styles does not do justice to the eristic one because it could plausibly be argued to be aimed most fundamentally not at individual glorification but at the discerning of truth.

But truth of what kind? It would seem that what we have here are two distinct modes of rationality which need to be evaluated in terms of the plausibility of their assumptions about such things as meaning and truth. In Part III, we can return to a consideration of the merits of such assumptions. For now, let's focus on a thread of thought in our historical traditions closely tied to the eristic view of reasoning but worth considering in detail on its own. It is a view of feeling, emotion and desire—a type of view which takes

these affective elements of life to be a root source of oppositions, something that makes conflict an essential feature of human activity.

CHAPTER 6

The Fires Inside: Feeling, Passion, Emotion, and Desire

A fairly clear and common view of emotions is that they are irrational brute forces that come unbidden. We just "get" them. We get feelings that tear us apart, emotions that leave us torn between reason and desire, and passions that push at each others throats. An emotion is just a "given," a piece of data about ourselves which we must simply accept—passively, rather than actively. It is a "passion" we suffer rather than an action we choose. This view of emotions has been called "the myth of passions."¹ It is a "myth" with a venerable lineage and it has had an enormous influence.

It is one of the central views making up our culture of conflict. A brief history of its development will serve to clarify its key assumptions and the roles they play in our culture. It will also enable us to neatly locate the flaws in the view and to clarify the ways in which we ought to revise our understanding of feeling, emotion, passion, and desire.

Part of the view originated with the Greeks. They saw sexual lust, pride, and anger as brute powers within a person—powers often overcoming his reason and leading to excesses that could twist a life in tragic ruin. The lust of Clytemnestra wrecks the ship of state. Oedipus is blinded by his pride and anger. In the *Iliad*, Achilles cannot bring himself to obey the wise advice of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Aias—advice that would have saved the life of his most beloved Patroklos. He acknowledges that their words seem "spoken after my own mind. Yet still the heart in me swells up in anger"—an anger that cannot be controlled.²

The ideal for the Greeks was not, of course, lack of emotion (apathy), but moderation. Emotions were likened to horses that must be bridled and restrained by reason. They were reactions or "pathe" caused by external events the way a startled jump may be caused by a loud noise or sunburn

caused by solar rays. (This is the origin of the contrast between "passions" and "actions" and our conception of emotions as something we passively undergo.) The Greeks thought we were responsible for the path of anger in the same way we are responsible for the path of sunburn. Some people have thin skins and bad tempers just as some have tender skins that are easily burned. As individuals, we cannot help this: it is part of our heredity. But we can choose to build characters or sunbathers that inure us to the causes of anger and sunburn. Also we can choose to avoid situations in which they are likely to cause us harm. Through such deliberate choice, reason can thus gain a control over emotions—a control that is real though indirect.

In early Christian thought, emotions are likewise likened to horses in need of bridling, the man subject to their power was likened as well to a ship tossed in a gale, and they were seen as the source of conflict of all sorts. James asks:

Where do these wars and battles between yourselves first start? Isn't it precisely in the desires fighting inside your own selves? You want something and you haven't got it and you are prepared to kill. You have an ambition that you cannot satisfy; so you fight to get your way by force.³

Unlike the Greeks, the early disciples thought that the cure for this was not a Reason that would moderate but the Christ who could transform. Through Christ we could be cleansed of the dark world of sin in all its lusts and conflicts, for "God is light: there is no darkness in him at all... If we live our lives in the light, as he is in the light, we are in union with one another and the blood of Jesus, his Son, purifies us all from sin."⁴

But there is a crucial question here which the New Testament did not seem to answer clearly. Can we achieve union with this light of God in this lifetime (through the Christ who is in our midst wherever two or more are gathered) or must we wait in faith and patience for a redemption after death and accept a fate of life in sin and conflict during the interim (because Christ is not of this world)?

The first answer underlay the pacifism of the early Church and was taken up by later sects such as the Quakers. But the second view was adopted by writers such as Augustine and the founders of the medieval Church.

On this second view, the emotion of pride was identified as a cardinal sin and emotions in general were viewed as lusts which were central to our condition of sin. Emotions were a kind of brute given in a double barreled

way. They were given, on one hand, by our carnal nature as animals. But, further, our lusts were grounded in that distinctly human state of original sin devolving upon us from Adam and Eve.

In giving up the earlier hopes for perfection in this world, the proponents of this lust model of human nature conceived of human activity as inherently conflicting:

With the passing of the hope of Christian perfection was coupled the vanishing of the dream of peace on earth. Swords had never been beaten into plowshares and never would...On our earthly pilgrimage we pant after peace, yet are involved in constant strife—with the pagan, with the heretic, with the bad Catholic, and even with the brother in the same household. One may grow weary and exclaim, "Why should I eat out my life in contention? I will return within myself." But even there one will find that the flesh lusts against the spirit. Peace will not come until this corruptible puts on incorruption, and then only for the redeemed, because hell is the perpetuation of unresolved conflicts. Perfect peace is reserved for heaven, where there shall be no hunger nor thirst nor provocation of enemies.⁵

This view led Augustine to develop a doctrine that is now time honored and widely adopted, the "just war doctrine." Godly men could kill others in wars if their cause was righteous and they fight in moral ways. Indeed, in some cases, duty might require us to fight. For if conflict governs this life, then we must forego hope of divine order for now and seek whatever human forms of justice we can muster with the institutions of the armed state.

Constantine tied the spiritual authority of the Church to the temporal power of Rome. Early Christian pacifism was forgotten and the practice of war was justified as a tool of a politics which was the "result of an agreement between imperfect men to make the best of a bad job." It was thus that "the influence of the dogma of original sin led many of the Church Fathers to conclude that political authority was a consequence of man's corrupted nature, a punishment and at the same time a remedy for his sins."⁶ Among the means legitimately employed by this remedying state was war—albeit war carried on in a spirit of love and in accordance with rules and with the intention of righting a wrong and restoring peace.

The influences of the doctrine of original sin and the lust model that went with it were long-lasting. In many religious communities traditional

versions of the lust model of humanity are still held in rather intact form. Perhaps even more importantly, this view is continuous with later, similar ones which have become especially widespread in our own day. After the intellectual revolution we associate with Copernicus and Galileo—after medieval theology had started burning oil and science had replaced it as the central moving force of our intellectual history—the lust model of humanity kept running like a car with a new engine.

In some respects, the work of the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume provides the neatest way to pinpoint the core of these continuities. Impressed by the success of Newton's science, Hume made a clean break with the religious tradition in his *A Treatise on Human Nature*. There he offers "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects."

He depicts human nature as rather like a Newtonian system of bits of matter acting and reacting according to natural laws—only the bits are the "impression" and "ideas" of the mind, images that come in bundles we refer to as perceptions of parents, tables, and fireplaces. Book II, which provides the central third of the work, is a discussion of the passions, and the account he offers is in many ways simply a naturalized and non-pejorative version of the old lust model. He does not see pride as a sin, but he does see it as the foundation of a natural egoism that defines the self.

Hume supposes that feelings of pride enable us to distinguish ourselves from the other bundles of impressions and ideas we take to be other persons or things. I form a concept of myself by feeling proud of the nice clothes, the strong father, and the big house that are mine. I am the being to whom these things belong. This ego or self born of pride is one that the Christians considered worldly and depraved but which Hume takes to be quite natural.

Not only did he think it inevitable and normal, he also thought it essential for the development of morality. I care about other people's welfare because I take pride in my reputation. The just man is one whose character is molded by public opinion. The paradigm of such a man is the just magistrate, someone whose character is formed by the public eye in which he acts. He is a man who seeks an approval in which he can take pride—and someone who is, moreover, an agent of the state which policies itself and employs military might.

In general, Hume agreed with Augustine that our passions govern us. But he thought that this is as it should be and that we should not describe this human condition as a "state of sin."

Further, he held that to speak of a conflict between reason and passion (as the Greeks did) is misleading: "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is and ought to be, only the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."⁷ Reason is but the instrument of an egoistic self pursuing desires and avoiding objects of pain.

Hume goes on immediately to note that "as this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations." In introducing these, he provides a very concise statement of the two central features of our common conception of emotion, "the myth of the passions." Using the word "passion" to refer to emotions of all sorts, he says: "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification."⁸

By saying they are "original," he means that emotions come upon us unchosen as a kind of brute given that is a raw and uninterpreted bit of experience. On the other hand, in saying that emotions contain no "representative quality" he means that they do not refer to anything or provide us with any information. They are inherently non-cognitive. He goes on, in fact, to argue that they cannot conflict with reason because they are a different kind of thing. Reason provides knowledge, emotion does not.

The relationship of this view to the eristic style of reasoning should be clear. Both view emotion as inherently non-rational. The view has an important place in the scheme of post-Renaissance ideas concerning science and action and we will look at its relations to these in the next section. Before going on, however, we should pause to contrast this view of emotion with an alternative, one that is more compatible with the maieutic conception of reasoning. Now that we have the "myth of the passions" neatly stated we can see that it is a myth. It is demonstrably false, and false in ways that will prove quite relevant to the central aim of this book—the task of conceiving peace as a positively distinguished activity.

Emotions are neither brute givens that are passively undergone nor non-cognitive elements of experience. The reason is that they are interpretive or, as philosophers would put it, "intentional."

Emotions typically (perhaps always) involve some bodily tingling or tangling of feeling with a physical immediacy. But an emotion like anger is not simply a buzzing of the blood and a constriction in the chest. It also involves an object, some person or thing we are angry *at*. The same is true of frustration, delight, love, hate, sadness, pride, envy, and fear. In each case the bodily feelings we have do not enter consciousness like unconnected

atoms bounding in a void. We are aware of them only *as interpreted*. We are aware of them only when we consciously—and, in that sense, "intentionally"—think of them as related to something which is their cause or consequence or object in some way. When we have emotions we find that we are always already to understand our feelings in terms of something—however vaguely conceived—which we are sad about, proud of, frustrated with, fearful for, or delighted in. The judgment that some unfortunate state of affairs is actual or likely is not just a frequent appendage to the emotion of sadness or fear. Judgments are intrinsic and essential elements of the emotions themselves.

Perhaps the most compelling way to appreciate this point is to note that it is not just emotions that are interpretive. Every sensation, perception, fleeting image, and bit of experience of every kind is as well. The standard way of explaining this point is to say that our experience of sensation would be blind without the conceptual interpretations that judgments provide. If we were given an uninterpreted and brute visual sensation we would not know what we were seeing. We would not see it *as* a piece of a book or *as* a white patch or *as* a corner of a rectangle or *as* anything at all. In that sense, we would see nothing, i.e., nothing in particular.

Devoid of pre-conceptions or prior intentions, the experience would be devoid of significance. As soon as we experience something *as* one kind of thing rather than another, we have made some judgment of it, categorizing it in some way. We have interpreted it, projecting or "intending" some view of it. (When philosophers say that all experience is "intentional" in this sense they do not mean that it is carefully and deliberately chosen. They simply mean that it is interpreted, whether or purpose or by habit.)

The same point applies to emotions. They are always intentional in the sense that they involve some projected interpretation of experience. This point has two important consequences.

To see the first, suppose that you are feeling something, but are not sure what it is. This happened to me the morning I was given an oral examination for the defense of my dissertation. I had some jumpy flash-of-heat here and constriction-of-muscle there sort of feelings. They were hard to pin down and feel clearly, let alone classify. It seemed that the might be anxiety and a fear of the coming interrogation or that they might, instead, be an eager desire to share the results of my three years of work—and perhaps even shine a bit.

I thought that the orals were likely to go better if I chose the second interpretation, and I did. Doing that gave me sense to the feelings, organized

them, made them more continuous and directed. The jumpiness took form in the bodily gestures of jumping into an explanation. The constrictions of muscles were given shape and rhythm in the grasping of hands and the rising to an erect posture which both aided and expressed concentration on the issues at hand. The flashes of heat took shape as a general alertness and eagerness. I found myself actually having the desire to get on with the exam.

If I had chosen to read the feelings as anxiety and fear, they would have gotten organized in a very different set of ways—as the jump of flight, the constriction of withdrawal, the flash of panic.

For most of our feelings, we have pre-constructed interpretations with which to organize them, and we apply these in a habitual way. As a result we overlook the fact that when we have emotions we are choosing interpretations and making judgments about ourselves and the world. But once we see this is the case, a second important point emerges: emotions are cognitive in character and continuous with more explicit verbal reasoning.

Suppose a door will not unlock. When I feel frustrated at the failure of the key, I am making a cognitive judgment just as much as when I see that a falling tree is breaking the branches of the bush on which it lands. I organize my experience in terms of judgments about what—faulty key or falling tree—is causing what—jammed lock or broken bush. These judgments may be wrong, of course. The point is that they are cognitive judgments and subject to critique and revision in the light of further evidence. My frustration with the key may be revised into anger at my housemate if I discover the lock is not preventing the door from opening but a bolt on the inside is—especially if I suppose she just thoughtlessly locked me out. But if I acquire more information and adopt other beliefs, then the frustration may be revised to jealousy (because I believe there is a man in the house with her) or spirited playfulness (because I think she is putting the finishing touches on a surprise party she is about to spring).

The continuity of reason and emotion does not simply lie in the fact that judgments constitute definitive features of our emotions. The subtlety of feeling can be cultivated. Skill in responding to complex situations with complex emotions can be acquired. And for the people who acquire the knack of this, their emotions serve as a central and often indispensable vehicle of cognitive insight and judgment.

A lawyer unable to follow out "hunches" about a case lacks a basic skill. A personnel officer who has no "intuitions" about people belongs in another line of work. These kinds of feelings about things and people can often go wrong—that is precisely what is meant in saying they are cognitive. They involve judgments that can be refined or revised. They can be adopted

or rejected in explicit verbal judgments. They are not exercises of some mystical power. They are implicit judgments with which we respond to a complex environment, feelings with which we think.

Because emotions are interpretive, they are actively chosen (rather than merely passively undergone) and they are cognitive and continuous with explicit verbal reasoning (rather than non-conceptual and non-rational). But to say that emotions involve chosen interpretations is not to say that they are always the result of deliberate and responsible choice. In our culture they often are not.

In fact, we commonly suppose that emotions cannot be chosen to voluntarily revise because we view them as "passions" that are merely passive reactions to our environment. But we can assume responsibility for our emotions and decide which to have and how to revise them. We can evaluate the hunches they encapsulate or the intuitive judgments they express. In the maieutic style of reasoning, this is done.

It is, of course, possible to make honest errors or even dishonestly deceive ourselves when we choose or revise our emotions. They are clearly cases when choosing to interpret pre-exam feelings as eagerness is a mistake and I hang on to this interpretation only by lying to myself. This is an important kind of point to which we must later return. But now we need to pick up and complete the account of some other key assumptions in our culture of conflict.

CHAPTER 7

A World of Fact and Preference: Galilean Science and Instrumental Action

There are times when people seem to act without purpose, responding blindly with no aim or end in view. There are also times when they seem to act without giving thought to the efficacy of the means they adopt. They know that they want the kid to stop crying but they have simply not paused to consider carefully whether a slap and a shout will still the screams. But it seems that though such behavior is action it is not *rational* action. It seems as though a rational action is one in which we deliberately adopt what we believe is the most efficient instrument or means for causing the end we happen to prefer.

This "instrumentalist" conception of a rational action is wed to a particular conception of knowledge—a scientific one.

The seventeenth century saw the birth of a new view of the way the world is and how it is best known. We associate this view with Galileo. Our theories of the world have changed markedly since that Italian's day. But there is a core view—a *theory of what theories are*—which has persisted and still dominates popularly held conceptions of science. It is a view of what science is about and how it is best done. In our science dominated culture, this is tantamount to saying that it gives us our view of what reality is and how it can be known. Though this view may have little connection with products of contemporary physics—or current histories and philosophies of science—it remains the ruling ideology of contemporary social science.¹ It is a view that commits us to a conflict centered view of human activity.

Before saying how this is so, it is worth noting how it is *not so*. In two ways, quite the opposite is true.

First, in many contexts, the employment of an instrumentalist view of action leads to the prevention of violence and the amelioration of conflict. There is considerable truth in the motto of Salvador Hardin, the mayor in

Isaac Asimov's *Foundation*: "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." Violence is often a blind reaction, an irrational response of frustration and rage. Brute force is often expensive and ineffective. Moreover, cooperation often pays. When we look to our own interests and the long run, we often find it wise to suppose that each of us will benefit most when the interests of others are promoted.

Second, the process of scientific research itself—at least in principle and in the ideal—provides one of our best models of cooperative and emphatically non-conflicting human activity. As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein once noted, "Mathematicians do not fight over proofs—they look and see." When scientists differ in their views they do not reach for their pistols. They reach for their telescopes and test tubes. Scientists suppose that their differences of opinion simply pose shared problems that can be solved cooperatively by appeals to objective tests and standards that are independent of any individual's will or desire. Science—understood as the kind of thing Galileo and Einstein did—marks an extraordinary advance in the methods for resolving differences of opinion. The censorship of the Church and the mind control of the state are set aside. Instead of reliance on the auto-da-fe and the power of the police, people who disagree reason together about public data until they discover the truth.

But science has also provided us with a particular world view in which such cooperative inquiry is severely restricted in its scope. The most important concerns of life are left in a non-cognitive no-man's land where force alone can decide. And it has provided us with an instrumentalist conception of action which portrays the human condition as a state of ineliminable, irremediable conflict.

In the Middle Ages, nature was viewed as the creation of a purposeful God who designed each part of it for some end. It was compared to the Bible and treated as a second text of divine revelation, *The Book of Nature*. A literary, poetic language was used to describe nature in terms of alchemical symbols, metaphors, and analogies. The basic pattern of explanation was purposive or "teleological." And nature itself was believed to be structured in a hierarchy of values.

For example, a plant would be described as having leaves the shape of a liver. Such a fact was explained by viewing it as a means God had used to achieve one of his goals; he used it as a sign to tell men that the plant was designed to cure liver disease. And plants, river deltas (which were created to promote civilization), and metals (like mercury which was thought to cure venereal disease because its sign was the same as that of the houses of ill repute) were all part of a wondrous organic whole which God created to

serve the lower needs of animals, the higher moral ends of man, and—above all—the divine goodness of God himself.

Modern science developed a very different view, one in which nature is conceived of not as a book to be read but as a machine to be manipulated—an instrument to be used. It was thought that this machine might have been originally set in motion by God but that it has been left, in any case, to work itself like a wound-up clock—running on its own according to mechanical laws.

Galileo's new kind of science called for the use of a mathematical language to describe nature. It adopted a different basic pattern of explanation—one that appealed to uniform laws that made one event follow another through "efficient causality." And nature was viewed in completely value neutral terms—as an unfeeling mechanism that was entirely indifferent to the goodness or evil of its events.

For example, to study the laws of motion, Galileo observed metal balls rolling down inclined planes. He did not note the zodiacal sign of the metal or the analogies between its spherical shape and the shape of the eye. He attended to measurable quantities rather than poetic qualities. He determined their weight, speed, and the angle of the incline. Then he looked for mathematical correlations between these quantities. He did so because he believed that "nature speaks mathematics."

What he was looking for were correlations between the initial conditions and the subsequent ones they caused. He had adopted a new concept of cause. Instead of viewing later events as goal that (teleologically) explained why the earlier events occurred as a means, he viewed the earlier events as simple givens—brute facts—which explained why the later events occurred—later events which were blindly but "efficiently" caused. When other scientists began to study geography in this Galilean way, they supposed that the existence of river deltas was not to be *explained* by appeal to God's goal of fostering civilization. Instead, the development of civilization was to be viewed as a kind of accident that the brute reality of river deltas helped *explain*. Given the existence of a delta, the increased probability of civilization could be predicted.

In social science, it has turned out to be extremely difficult to develop predictive theories as simple and powerful as those of physics. In fact, even at this late date, we find distinguished social scientists like Seymour Martin Lipset confessing: "None of the social sciences can predict worth a damn."² But social scientists have not yet given up hope. Like the characters in Samuel Beckett's play *Waiting for Godot*, they are "waiting for their Galileo." They labor in hopes that some genius will provide them with the

kind of simple but powerful explanatory theories that Galilean natural scientists have developed. The standard model for such a theory is Newton's system of laws which explained motion and gravity.

Its explanatory laws of efficient causality were distinguished by four things. First, they were *laws* rather than rules of thumb. They claimed to govern some clearly specifiable types of events universally and without exception. Newton's third law claims that every "action" of one mass on another *always* yields an equal and opposite reaction. Second, they were *causal* laws in the sense that they explained what *made* things work. They did not just describe what happened to be actually true, they also explained what was possible and what was necessary. Third, the laws could be expressed in strict and unambiguous mathematical formula such as "force equals mass times acceleration" or " $F = M \times A$." Fourth, they each belonged to a *system* of laws. With equations that combined them, they could be used to predict and explain a wide variety of things—the ways in which pendulums swing, tides roll, and planets sweep around the sun.

The new, Galilean science was value neutral because it made no reference to purposes (divine or otherwise) in its descriptions and explanations. It was completely indifferent to the moral worth of the events it explained and the laws to which it appealed. There was no consideration as to whether the law of gravity was a good thing, and, if so, what it was good for. It was simply the law.

Judgments of value were extraneous to the knowledge that science could provide. At best they were an irrelevance, at worst an encumbrance that biased research. Nature as known by science was a world of fact and law; values were simply not part of the reality studied by science. Or rather, if they were studied, by social scientists, they were to be treated as mere facts about people—facts to be causally explained. They were not taken to be normative truths, only truths about norms.

For example, a Darwinian might discover what caused people to be sympathetic to others, but this did nothing to show us that we *should* be sympathetic or that group solidarity was a good thing. As scientists, researchers were observers or spectators who sought to mirror nature with their theories. They were not participants who made value judgments about reality or gained ethical knowledge from their study of it.

The view just sketched provides the central ideology of contemporary working social scientists. Most working political scientists, economists, and sociologists seek to use experimental and statistical analysis to discover a simple and powerful set of mathematical functions that can explain social activity in terms of efficient causes. They attempt to make value neutral

studies of the complex mechanism of social reality and them view themselves as disinterested observers.

They have attempted this not only to find out how society works but to learn, also, how to work it. Social science provides a central part of our world view, one that proposes to tell us how to punish criminals, run our schools, distribute health care, and bring an end to war. As an ideology, social science has been an enormous success, one that has laced our culture with a conflict centered view of life—though as a branch of research, it has been a rather dismal failure.

Its Galileo has not arrived. Key terms like "status" and "power" continue to elude clear and unambiguous definitions that could be used to describe society in rigorous, mathematical terms. The quest for value neutral knowledge has come, increasingly, to seem like a hopelessly Quixotic enterprise. Above all, in terms of Galilean standards, "the social sciences are almost or perhaps completely devoid of achievement. For the salient fact about those sciences is the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalizations whatsoever."³ Rules of thumb and statistics that describe—but do not explain—abound. And sociologists have invented formula claiming things like behavior is a function of genetics and environment, formula like " $B = F(G+E)$." But such formula are only pseudo-mathematical. "F" and "+" do not stand for the mathematical operations that can be computed algebraically. They are just a shorthand way of saying that there are important connections between these things.

The one social science which might seem to be an exception, economics, is not—for reasons we will see in Part III. We will also see there *why* Monsieur Galileo has not arrived *and cannot*. But at this stage, the key point to note is that he has been expected, and social scientists' expectations have projected a view of human life in our culture which pictures it as essentially conflicting in nature.

To appreciate this, we need to consider two ways that human beings enter into this picture of science, as things known like other objects in nature and as knowers who act to pursue their ends in rational ways.

As *objects* of scientific knowledge, humans are thought to be the same in principle, as rats and monkeys. Our behavior is to be observed, experimented with, and explained by mathematical theories which have the same sort of structure as those used to account for rodents in the lab and primates in the field. Our behavior is not rationally chosen, it is mechanically caused. Furthermore, from a scientific point of view, there is nothing right or wrong about what we do. There are only various facts about our behavior and various efficient causes and natural laws that explain them.

But as *knowers* we must view ourselves differently. Scientists demand that *their own theories of* human behavior be responsibly and rationally chosen in order to achieve the ends of explanation at which they aim. Despite the way they view their experimental "subjects," scientists are committed to viewing *themselves* as rational actors whose research is to be understood in terms of purposes and means employed to achieve these. When we attempt to *apply* scientific knowledge in *rational* actions, we are committed to viewing ourselves in the same way.

The Galilean world view tells us that reality is a mechanism we must manipulate by intervening in series of causes that produce effects. For our actions to be rational, such intervention must be intentional rather than haphazard. The rationality of such intentions can be assessed in two ways. First, we can ask if it is rational to value the ends which the intervention intends to bring about. Second, we can ask whether the form of the intervention chosen is a rational (or the most rational) way of bringing about these intended effects.

On the first score, science cannot tell us what our values and purposes should be, because it itself is supposed to be value neutral. Economists, for instance, emphasize that they cannot—as economists—tell us whether it would be better to lower inflation or raise employment. (They can only tell us *how* to do one or the other.) Such value judgments do not lie within the domain of scientific knowledge. There is no objective realm of the ideal to which they can be empirically known to correspond—the way judgments of *fact* can be shown to correspond to the realm of the real.

Value judgments can be criticized as irrational in one very limited way. We can demand that they be coherent. Economists put the point by saying that rational actors must have "consistent sets of preferences." By this they mean that if you prefer A to B and prefer B to C then you should prefer A to C. *Whether you ought to value A at all, however, is not thought to be something rationally decidable.*

Or, at least, it is not rationally decidable by science. It is possible, of course, that values may be the object of some other sort of knowledge such as the humanistic studies of art and history and philosophy. But do English professors and philosopher really *know* anything at all? It is not clear. Their intuitions and arguments are notoriously controversial. Disquiet about such lack of consensus has led many humanists themselves to emulate the methods of natural science in order to reach toward some sort of objectivity. In the process, such humanists typically seek to achieve a value neutrality in their work analogous to the scientists'. But this kind of value neutrality then

disqualifies them from providing precisely the kind of knowledge that would fill the gap at issue here—the lacuna of ethical knowledge.

The view widely advocated and which tends to prevail in practice is that for want of any agreed upon method for demonstrating which values are right we must treat values as subjective, as matters of non-rational, individual choice. Judgments of good and bad are considered non-cognitive dispositions of individuals rather than matters of fact. There is no truth about them which can be discovered by science or any other branch of knowledge with a similar legitimacy and objectivity.

However, if we do have some values—be they what they may—science does purport to tell us how to realize them in a rational way. It claims to tell us how the world works, and so it claims to tell us how the things we consider ideal can be made real. Knowledge is power. If we want some satisfying condition (SC) to occur, the laws of science tell us it will follow as a subsequent condition if we adopt as our instrument or means whatever initial conditions (IC) efficiently cause it. Often it turns out that there is more than one way to skin a cat. The choice of means can then itself be assessed rationally by using science to answer factual questions about the causal consequences of the means we are considering. (What are the effects of skinning it one way rather than another?) We can then let value judgments about which consequences are to be preferred get decided by our (hopefully consistent but otherwise non-rational) preferences.

Insofar as we adopt the Galilean view of knowledge and reality sketched here, then we must suppose that rational actors will be instrumental actors. They will be individuals manipulating things—and *other people*—as means to their preferred ends. The extent to which such actors are more or less rational will depend upon the consistency of their preferences and the extent to which they can justify their empirical beliefs about how the world works and about how their chosen means will yield their preferred ends.

People concerned with ecological problems have criticized the Galilean/instrumentalist view of knowledge and action on the grounds that it pictures humans as pitted against nature and seeking to master it—rather than acting as stewards of organic processes which need to be nurtured and cultivated in holistic fashions. Further, some ethical theorists have argued that the instrumentalist model of action—at least in the version of it described here—leads us to misunderstand much of what is really going on in human affairs. But, overall, the view provides us with a rather neat and very attractive account of rational action.

However, it is an account with a widely recognized implication of an unpleasant sort: In a world of scarce means and differing preferences, conflict

is inevitable. And insofar as values are viewed as non-cognitive and subjective, appeals to reason cannot determine who is right.

A typical sort of illustration of the point would be the two islanders and the one coconut. Both want it; only one can have it. The result? Tension, hostility, confrontation, conflict, violence, "war"—all the things of which peace is said to be the absence. This illustration, once abstracted from the tropical details, is precisely the kind of simple production system which Walter Isaard begins the construction of his theory of "peace science, the Queen of the social sciences."

We can see now why Isaard's starting point is so plausible. Conflict can be eased, but cannot be eliminated. Breakthroughs in technology, discoveries of new resources, compromise, symbolic enactments of violence, and a variety of other techniques can be used to prevent the hostilities from getting unpleasantly physical. But the Galilean/instrumentalist view of reality, knowledge, and action commits us to the belief that these steps are but stopgap measures. In individual cases, these steps may resolve specific conflicts, but they can do nothing to eliminate the underlying structural conflict that is an inevitable feature of life. Wherever two or more are gathered, in their midst there shall be differences of preference that place them in opposition—an opposition that reason may ameliorate but never resolve.

Some social scientists try to temper the implications of the Galilean/instrumentalist view by arguing that much human activity does not, as a matter of fact, place us in opposition to others. Kenneth Boulding, for instance, has argued that many activities (like dancing and praying) do not involve us in conflict:

Non-conflict includes such things as eating, drinking, sleeping, working, procreating, reading, learning, walking, traveling, and so on. It constitutes by far the larger proportion of the activities of the human race. Conflict activities are those in which we are conscious that an increase in our welfare may diminish the welfare of others or an increase in the welfare of others may diminish our welfare.⁴

This point seems to be plausible and somewhat comforting. But there are two basic problems with it. A tipoff to the first is provided by Boulding's qualifying phrase. He says that conflict activities are those "in which we are conscious" of differences our choices make in the subsequent welfare of ourselves and others. But our acts constantly affect others. We live in an

intricate ecosystem in which each act of commission or omission has a spreading subsequent influence. In principle, all our actions may be viewed as causes of redistributions of welfare.

When you and I eat meat or drink coffee, we consume resources that might otherwise have fed people in the third world. In turn, when those people in the third world procreate, they place demands on the world's resources which affect the welfare of others around the globe. If a parent of an ill baby chooses to sleep through the night, his decision may well be in conflict with the interests of the other parent who must remain awake and care for the child.

In many cases, conflict may remain latent. We may not be conscious of it and we may not engage in it purposefully. But it still provides an underlying structure of all our activity which results from the differing of preferences about the future and the ecological ramifications of whatever we choose to do or not do. As we become conscious of these different preferences and ramifying consequences, open conflict ensues. Ignorance can sustain the bliss of pacification. But once we find out what other people are actually doing and what effects it will have, disputes begin to arise and wax ugly.

The second problem with the line Boulding takes is that it offers no assurance that we will find nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts once we become conscious of them. If we are lucky, some "win/win" solution to the dispute may be found—or at least some way of arbitrating it which is acceptable to all the parties involved. But on the Galilean/instrumentalist view of knowledge and action, it would seem that the final court of appeal for nations remains war. For other groups and individuals it remains their equivalent of war.

So the view seems to commit us to a conception of human activity which understand "non-conflict" to be simply action in which conflict is merely latent and not yet an object of conscious concern. And we are committed to taking "peaceful conflict" to simply be conflict in which there is an absence of war and violence *so far*.

In either potential or actual form, conflict and violence are seen to be essential features of human activity and of rational life itself. And so it would appear that peace must be conceived the way social scientists do in fact conceive it, namely, as an absence. It would seem difficult to conceive human activity in ways which do not make conflict an essential feature of it. In this sense, we live in a culture of conflict and, for us, it remains difficult to conceive of peace in any way other than as a static absence.

But these ideas are not just theories that intellectuals adopt and which affect our concepts. They are founding principles entrenched in many of our institutions and they affect the details of our lives.

CHAPTER 8

The Practice of These Preachings: The Institutionalization of Conflict Assumptions

While most of us usually do not seem to talk about what we know and do in tidy Galilean and instrumentalist terms, there is still a strong tendency to *think* that our knowledge and action take these forms. For these seem to provide the clearest and most legitimate rhetoric for justifying our beliefs and plans.

People who resist describing their insight or activity in these terms are usually thought to be doing something peculiar—at least from a cognitive point of view—probably suspect. For example, many historians claim to have a distinctly non-Galilean, "narrative" understanding. But their insight is often dismissed as "merely anecdotal" and is widely supposed to not embody genuine (i.e., *scientific*) knowledge. To take a second example, artists often refuse to explain their work in instrumentalist terms and they deny their works have any *goal*—or at least no goal like the sort served by street signs, anatomical drawings, or advertisements. But many people (perhaps most) do not consider art a source of authentic knowledge—at least not any public knowledge which can play a legitimate role in deciding issues of public concern.

When differences of opinion give rise to problems and we need to think *about* what we believe and do, we try to think out answers in Galilean and instrumentalist terms—and we end up construing these differences in plans and opinions as conflicts. Further, when we find we need help and we turn to experts for advice, we tend to expect their knowledge to be as scientific as possible. We do not want to listen to stories and poems. We expect their proposals for action to be rational ones based on accurate, instrumentalist assessments of the costs and benefits of the alternatives available. We want *professional* advice.

There was a time, however, when people had no modern professionals to consult. There was no AMA, ABA, NEA, AFT, or Triple A for motorists. If they needed advice, people turned to elders, lords, priests, and people who could tell old stories well. That has changed, and with the change have come alterations in the fabric of our culture. These alterations have tailored the

institutions of our society to fit with assumptions that provide a conflict centered view of human activity.

It is somewhat difficult to say what things were different in the Middle Ages, but it is clear that they were different. Tradition laid claim to being the chief source of genuine knowledge. When questions arose, people appealed to venerable custom or turned to texts whose authority rested on divine or classical authorship. These were rarely cut and dried. Europe was a crazy quilt of culture, and customs governing people's acts were highly varied and often quite specific to local communities. But evaluations of people and their actions were made in terms of functions that were thought to be natural to them. Choices were based on beliefs about the customary, natural purposes of things—not on the basis of cost/benefit calculations.

There were two great shifts which changed all this. The first was led by the class of capitalists, the class Karl Marx critiqued. It was a class whose power derived from the control of the means of economic production. The second shift was led by the professionals, "the new middle class." This second class played the historical role Marx had wrongly assigned to the working class "proletariat." It was a class whose power derived from control of the means of the production of authoritative opinion.

This second class arose because of a cultural lacuna created by the displacements brought on by the activities of the capitalists. People were uprooted by capitalism, uprooted from jobs, homes, communities, consumption patterns and traditions of all sorts. The new professionals organized, sectored off domains in which they could claim expertise and gained the support of the state and public opinion for their claims to authority. They delivered the non-material goods, the beliefs and practices that fill our culture today. Both the capitalists and the new professionals employed three techniques which radically transformed our culture: abstraction, standardization and aggregation.

In the Middle Ages, workers, their labor, and its products were connected in a complex network of parochial and often intimate ties to a variety of natural, social, political and religious aspects of the community. With the coming of the industrial revolution, worker and labor and product were increasingly divorced from these ties. To the purchaser of coal or cloth in London, the details of who produced the goods and how were irrelevant. What mattered was that it be the kinds of coal or cloth they desired. The low cost of mass produced goods placed a premium on treating things in mass ways, abstracting from their origins and standardizing them. The same premium was placed on the standardization of workers and their labor.

Workers got identified by job types and labor was characterized in terms of production routines.

Such abstraction and standardization were the economic analogue of the process of generalization occurring in the sciences. Galileo ignored the origins of the objects he rolled down inclined planes and science overall sought to classify things in terms of general types. The "initial and subsequent conditions" governed by causal laws were not complete conditions; they were not describable by taking into account the sorts of features of things attended to in the Middle Ages. Coal became, for the capitalist and scientist alike, a standardized substance. Likewise, for the social scientist, capitalist, and social worker human beings became standardized entities as well—"Cockney adolescent males," "semi-skilled lorry drivers," or "head-of-household welfare clients."

In Western Europe, the chief force at work to effect these changes was the market system. But since Stalin it has become clear that markets are not essential; a command economy can serve to move a culture into the modern era. What is essential is that things be dealt in standardized types and considered in abstraction and moved in a flow of goods and services which is aggregated by some centralizing mechanism. The net result is a vast and complex social mechanism serving the desires and aversions of people who manipulate it in instrumental ways.

These economic transformations brought a variety of social problems. In response, non-economic aspects of society have been abstracted, standardized, and aggregated in analogous ways. Social welfare is administered to types of clients who qualify in specified ways and are dealt with en masse. Schools, medical facilities, penal systems, and other institutions have been developed along similar lines.

We have, in effect, developed a culture which institutionalizes the patterns of regularity and the ideals of mechanical efficacy which are projected by the Galilean view of knowledge and the instrumentalist view of action. There are other kinds of knowledge and action which enable the system to run—the "wisdom" of the Mayor Daley variety, the "art" of good teaching, and the "knack" of negotiating good business deals. But the social system in which we live is presented as a network of standard cases governed by general rules. It is pictured as a network of means and ends.

In this sense, we live in the midst of a social reality whose practices commit us to Galilean and instrumentalist ideas seem natural, inevitable and correct without question. Of course knowledge must be scientific! Of course rational actions are ones we have chosen carefully to make the best means achieve our preferred end! What else could useful knowledge or rational

action be? And this picture of the way reality works commits us to assumptions that spell out a conflict centered view of human activity.

Two other ways in which conflict views of human activity are embedded in our culture are worth note, one because it is so obvious and familiar, and the second because it is so basic and pervasive. The first is a common conception of negotiation. It is a view characterized (and critiqued) rather neatly by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their *Getting to Yes*:

Whether a negotiation concerns a contract, a family quarrel or a peace settlement among nations, people routinely engage in positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise. The classic example of this negotiating minuet is the haggling that takes place between a customer and the proprietor of a second-hand store:

Customer: How much do you want for this dish?

Shopkeeper: That is a beautiful antique, isn't it? I guess I could let it go for \$75.

Customer: Oh come on, it's dented. I'll give you \$15.

Shopkeeper: Really! I might consider a serious offer, but \$15 certainly isn't serious.

Customer: Well, I could go up to \$20, but I would never pay anything like \$75. Quote me a realistic price.

Shopkeeper: You drive a hard bargain, young lady. \$60 cash, right now.

Customer: \$25

Shopkeeper: It cost me a great deal more than that. Make me a SERIOUS offer.

Customer: \$37.50. That's the highest I will go.

Shopkeeper: Have you noticed the engraving on that dish? Next year pieces like that will be worth twice what you pay today.

And so it goes, on and on. Perhaps they will reach agreement; perhaps not.¹

This is a familiar and in many ways classic type of positional bargaining. These are two sides trying to agree on the distribution of some goods or sources of welfare (like crockery or cash). The players suppose that the distribution can be described in terms of a linear continuum measured, for

example, by quantities of money. The players also suppose that an increase in the welfare of one requires a decrease in the welfare of the other—and, in that sense, that their interests are opposed.

Metaphors from the physics of movement tend to structure the understanding of this kind of negotiation: people push, pull, resist, hold back, create friction, acquire inertia and so on. We can think of bargaining as a general type of game that can be played in many contexts and in different styles. The stakes at issue may be household goods in a divorce settlement or work hours and wages in a labor negotiation or missiles and warheads in an arms treaty. Players can adopt a hard bargaining strategy and hold out to maximize their wins in the current round of talks or they may adopt a soft bargaining strategy to maximize amicability in this and future talks and expedite the reaching of a settlement now.

This particular picture of negotiation—classic positional bargaining—is very prominent in our thought and practice. It influences the ways in which people practice law, make real estate deals, settle on wages and salaries, dicker over legislation, and barter for international treaties. It is deeply entrenched in a wide variety of institutions such as courts, corporations, and Congress. It is at work in local yard sales and arms negotiations in Vienna. It is laced through our language as well. When people want to reach an agreement with us and they make a proposal, we find them offering "to make a deal" and we listen for "their first offer" and we adopt an initial "position" and then wonder who will give in the most and who will win on this round. In countless ways we act as though life is a game whose essence is conflict—and the name of the game is "Winning."

One other conflict-related view central to our culture concerns a way of understanding the overall character of our relations with other human beings. We tend to view them in terms of the category of "the Other." The French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir introduced this phase in *The Second Sex*. Though her analysis can be generalized to a wide variety of relations between groups, her analysis there is directed toward relations between men and women. Her central thesis is that women have been traditionally defined and treated as "the Other" and, by this, she means a number of distinct things.

Perhaps the simplest and most central kernel of the notion turns on a distinction that arose in post-Kantian philosophy and out of which Sartre and other existentialists got in a good deal of mileage. It is the distinction between persons and things—or "subjects" and "objects." Persons are rational and *thinking* agents who interpret their world, synthesizing it in

judgments that define the things they encounter. Things are objects that are *thought about*.

Martin Buber articulated this distinction by speaking of the "I/Thou" relations in contrast to "I/it" relations. In one case we deal with other people with whom we converse and share a sense of joint responsibility; we take our talk and interaction to involve a reciprocity or mutuality. In contrast, in "I/it" relations we deal with things which we have defined and which we manipulate but which we can take to be neither free nor responsible nor capable of conversing with us. Typically, when a prosecutor and defense attorney discuss the case of a child or insane person with a judge, they address each other as "I" and "you" but simply talk about the child or insane person as "he" or "she" or "it." One way to put de Beauvoir's thesis is to say that woman has been defined as an object, as "the Other" which men talk *about* but do not address and share genuine conversation *with*.

But this grossly oversimplifies de Beauvoir's analysis. For she does not mean to say that women are never in any way conversed *with*, only that viewing them as object (for voyeurism or intercourse or breeding or housework or cheerleading) is a prominent motif—one which women as well as men have adapted to and learned to exploit. Further, it is a motif in complex thematic relations to other ways men view women. For instance, woman is also "the Other" in the sense that she is the outsider. Part of the contrast here is between that which is *same* and that which is *different* (or other). Men are the same as "us"; women are different, unlike, strange, mysterious, incomprehensible...

Notice that we sometimes count: "one, then the other, then the third..." Women are "Other" also in the sense that they are second—second in worth, second in importance. On de Beauvoir's analysis, women are "secondary" in the sense that they are lesser and deprived—less fully rational, strong, and courageous. They are the second by contrast (as well as privation) because they rely on feeling rather than reason, physical charms rather than physical strength and manipulative abuses of dependency rather than courageous self assertion.

There are a variety of analogues de Beauvoir explores to try to capture features of ways men have related to women, analogues which are similar and yet importantly distinct: master versus slave, capitalist versus proletarian, adult versus child, white versus black, civilized versus primitive, and Protestant versus Jew. Other analogues could be explored as well: professional versus client, priest versus layman, sports participant versus spectator, and chair versus committee member. All the analogues can, in turn, be illuminated by comparison and contrast with relations between men

and women. "The Other" names of a kind of social syndrome which occurs in various ways across a broad spectrum of social divisions we commonly construe in terms of conflict.

These various relations are not just metaphors which social researchers can use to build theories. These are metaphors employed in practice by participants in our social world. In some cases the employment of the analogue is quite explicit, in others it is perhaps more subliminal. Some men quite literally and self-consciously conceive of women as outsiders; some simply patronize them in the distinctive manner of professionals dealing with clients (though they have never given the analogue any conscious thought). These metaphors we live by can operate in a wide variety of ways.

To speak here of "the Other" is not to offer a neat and well defined concept but to employ a kind of motif which gives direction and thematic unity to these varied ways of relating to groups of humans who differ from ourselves. The dominant thread to which the theme of the Other serves to give prominence is a distinctive way of understanding difference between people—namely, by understanding them as *oppositions*.

In this regard, the notion of the Other serves as a kind of leit-motif for all of the conflict categories we have discussed in the foregoing chapters. Those categories form a complex family relating in various ways. But all understand difference as opposition. It is as though they suppose that a kind of "law of excluded middle" holds for all human difference. When there are two different choices or responses made to a situation, it is thought that one must be acceptable and the other not acceptable. There is a right one as over against... the other.

The list here does not exhaust the assumptions and practices relevant to the conflict centered views in our culture. But at this point we have seen that a strong case can be made for the following summary conclusion. We live in a culture in which predominant conceptions of reason, feeling, meaning, value, truth, and the self characterize activity in terms of conflict, and this view is buttressed by conceptions of knowledge and action which are entrenched in the dominant institutions of our society. We find it difficult to conceive of human activities in ways which do not make conflict an essential feature of it. In this sense, we live in a culture of conflict and, for us, it remains difficult to conceive of peace in any way other than as a static absence.

It would seem, then, that we face an alternative. Either these practices and assumptions are realistic and correct and peace is, in fact, nothing more than a static absence *or* the nature of peace has indeed been radically

obscured... and deep rooted assumptions and practices in our culture are flawed.

THE CONTEXT OF PEACE:
SOCIAL REALITY,
UNDERSTANDING, AND ACTION

Part III

It has not been sufficiently remarked that how we ought to answer the question of the moral and political legitimacy of the characteristically dominant institutions of modernity turns on how we decide an issue in the philosophy of the social sciences.

Alasdair MacIntyre¹

...nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things.

Hannah Arendt²

INTRODUCTION

In the course of describing the culture of conflict, some alternatives to it and some criticisms of it were sketched. An illustration was provided of the possibility of adopting maieutic rather than eristic assumptions about reason, feeling, meaning, truth, and the self. The conflict-centered view of the passions was shown to be a myth. It is false because it ignores the intentional character of emotions—the way in which they, like all of experience, are structured by interpretations we can choose to revise in rational ways.

Also, social scientists were said to have failed and failed profoundly. They have not been able to develop a value neutral, mathematical system of the laws of efficient causality. Most social scientists, with the exception of economists (and more about that later on), admit this themselves. Their

Galileo has not arrived and they have not discovered a single genuine law of social reality. For example, in reviewing the literature of peace and conflict research, Kenneth Boulding notes that studies seeking out the causes of war and peace

...have been frustratingly disappointing. For instance, Professor Rudi Rimmell's studies of the dimensionality of nations, while they have employed the most sophisticated statistical methods, have failed to come up with any clear correlates of the incidence of war and peace.³

Why is this? Social science has no spring chicken. Like the audience of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, we cannot help but wonder: What has detained Monsieur Galileo? Will he really come? Can he really exist at all? Or could it be that we are not waiting properly? Might it be that social science has been quite fundamentally misconceived and wrongly practiced?

In Beckett's play, a child brings a brief message each day, one that sustains some dim hope. One of the amazing things about children is that, apart from whatever preparation their biology provides, they are born entirely ignorant of their culture. In the course of remarkably few years they manage to learn an extraordinary amount about the social life of human beings around them. In a very important sense, their progress in understanding is much more rapid than that of contemporary social science.

Of course, the kind of understanding they achieve is of a different sort. They do not discover a set of laws which provide disinterested theoretical explanations. They acquire a set of competencies which enable them to participate in their culture in a purposive and critical way. But, then again, perhaps something somehow *like* this is the proper kind of knowledge to seek when we engage in systematic and intensive studies of social reality.

Here, in Part III, we will find that this is indeed the case. We will find that social reality has basic features that distinguish it and that it can only be understood in a non-Galilean way using a critical participatory method. It will turn out that that method requires that the researchers must engage in certain limited forms of peacemaking *as a part of their cognitive study itself*. It will also turn out that as we achieve a critical, participatory understanding of social reality we find that most rational activity is non-instrumental—is a process more like cultivating a hobby than manipulating a machine. We will find, furthermore, that the assumptions underlying the maieutic style of reasoning are, in fact, superior to those underlying the eristic style.

And as Part III progresses, we will find that we have eminently sound reasons for rejecting the dominant culture of conflict and adopting a network of assumptions that lead us to view differences between people as aspects of shared problems rather than oppositions between competitors. This network of beliefs will provide a framework, in Part IV, for developing a theory of peace. It will be a theory that views peace as an activity that employs maieutic reasoning, critical participatory understanding, and non-instrumental modes of cultivating our projects and practices.

CHAPTER 9

How Social Reality Is Intended To Be Understood

The peace that occurs in the social realm—where does it occur? What is social reality?

There is a basic difference between things studied by natural scientists and social scientists. It is a very striking difference. Physicists cannot converse with quarks. Enzymes can offer us no descriptions or explanations of their movements. When a rock flies through an embassy window, it has no idea what it is doing. In contrast, the rioter who throws it does. He has an idea of what he is doing and why.

The point applies here now. You are caught up just now in a bit of social activity: reading this book. You have some idea of what you are doing and why. In fact, you have many such "ideas." For instance, you have a notion of what the alphabet is and what a letter in it looks like. Similarly, you have notions of what sorts of things, words, complete sentences, theses, pieces of evidence, arguments, and books are. And you are experiencing these marked pages in terms of these concepts. When you see a mark here you see it *as* a letter, rather than just a squiggle of lines. And even if spaces are left out you still interpret these as marks expressing words. And the same with incomplete sentences. Just as importantly, you interpret these as specific words and sentences with specific meanings. If this cluster of paper was handed to a Cromagnon woman and man, they would see something. But they would not be able to read it, because they lack the skill—and they would not even see it *as* a book of letters, words and sentences because they would lack these concepts. (One way or perhaps beginning to get some inkling of what they would see is to consider a (y)ne uv teckst witch disengages NoRmAl C-ing and then stare at a single letter like this l until it starts to look odd.)

Similar sorts of points apply in contexts where we are reading signs on a highway, the traces on a trail, the expression on someone's face, the surface of a trout stream, the movements of a crowd, the current economic indicators or anything else we might run into on that great stream-like highway we think of as the book of life. One way the general point is often

put is to say that social activity is intentional—intentional in the same sense we earlier saw emotions are. Whenever we feel something inside or perceive something outside us we feel or perceive is *as* something; we interpret it. Similarly, whenever we act, engaging the world with our bodies, we perform the movements *as* something. By waving my hand vigorously from left to right I can do many things: signal cars to halt, gesture hello to a friend, shake off a fly, threaten a dog, or dismiss a passing bum. But I can perform this arm waving *as* one of these acts (rather than some other) only if I have some idea of what I am doing—some intended description that interprets it. Part of what makes the same pattern of physical movements be one act in one situation and another in some other setting is the interpretation of the setting and them movement which I myself adopt.

This intentional character of social activity is a fundamental and profoundly decisive feature of social reality. Social phenomena are in part composed of and constituted by descriptions and explanations people themselves have of what they are doing. The intentional understanding of what you are doing now in reading here does not come as an afterthought. It is not as though if someone asked you what you were doing you might say "Well, let me see... Here's a hypothesis! Perhaps I'm reading. Let's test it and see if I am right."

The understanding is not something external to the action which you might simply arrive at the way an outside observer would. It makes the act the particular act it is. What makes a flip of the finger an insult (rather than a stretching twitch or a joke) involves the beliefs the flipper has concerning how the flippee will interpret the gesture and the desire he has that that sort of interpretation be adopted. In a world without such interpretations, there would be no insults.

It is this intentional character that makes our activity distinctively social and human rather than merely animal. Mice would never insult one another. And, like the lilies of the field, they never spin nor toil nor perform labor of any sort. This is not because God provides for them. It is because they have no ideas and make no interpretations and so thought they "emit" a great deal of *behavior*, they do not perform any *actions* at all.

This intentionality suggests a kind of double-barreled working hypothesis concerning how we should study human activity. On one hand, because people always already have some understanding of what they are doing and why, it would seem that if we want descriptions and explanations of their activity, we can simply ask people themselves to provide them. On the other hand, because social phenomena are, at least in part, constituted by the self-understandings the agents have, it would seem that to study them

properly we *must* ask them. We must find out what their own interpretations of their activities are. So it seems that social researchers can and must acquire an understanding of people's activities by asking the people themselves to provide descriptions and explanations of what they are up to.

This double-barreled hypothesis needs qualification and elaboration. (It is not as though we should just write down whatever people tell us about themselves and then publish it as finished research!) And we need a more developed account of the "social reality is shot through with intentionality" thesis, one that explains its relevance to notions of meaning, reason, feeling, and the eristic notions discussed earlier. And we need to develop an account of what the views of social science, social reality and reasoning that thus emerge have to tell us about the nature of rational action in general. But as we do so, we will begin to formulate notions that make it possible to understand peace as a kind of activity which rests on the kind of understanding you have when you converse—a kind of understanding we will never have of quarks.

CHAPTER 10

Holism in the Parts

Social reality is intentional in the sense discussed in Chapter 6. All our actions and reactions involve some kind of self-understanding and interpretation. But much of our activity is also intentional in the narrower, instrumentalist sense of the term. Often, we not only know what we are doing, we know what we are trying to get done. We not only have some understanding of what is going on, we conceive of what we are doing in terms of some aim we are trying to accomplish, some purpose we are trying to realize.

However, we understand these instrumental intentions in terms of the background of understandings which make our activity intentional in the broad sense. We understand our employment of means to achieve ends in terms of more general beliefs about the world and more general values we hold. We also understand them in terms of more particular kinds of knowledge which we may find it difficult to express in propositions: knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understandings, and know-how.

Suppose we exercise the social researcher's advantage over the physicist (who is stuck with non-conversant quarks and we ask someone "*What* are you doing?" The person is likely to reply with a statement of an instrumental intention, something like: "I am writing an appeal to my senator to try to get her to vote against the funding of a new missile system." Or: "I am ordering my troops to spray tear gas into the mob in order to get the people to disperse from the capitol square." If we follow up with the question "*Why* are you doing this?" we may receive two different sorts of replies. One sort will explain why the means employed has been chosen over some other. This part of the explanation will include beliefs about the facts in this particular situation and beliefs about how, in general, the world works. For example:

"I am writing because my senator has not yet made up her mind and because senators are sometimes influenced by letters from constituents."

or:

"I am ordering the spraying of tear gas because the crowd did not comply with the verbal command to disperse and because this stuff is an effective means of disabling the people it hits, intimidating the ones nearby, and getting the crowd to break up."

If we ask why they have made these particular judgments of fact and why they have adopted these beliefs about what will work, we find that they relied in part on specific observations. But they also base their judgments on very general views about physical laws of nature, psychological theories of motivation, and beliefs about social institutions.

Instead of considering the choice of their means, people may take the question "Why are you doing this?" to concern the end that has been adopted. Their replies may initially take the form of an appeal to some more general end:

"I am trying to persuade my senator so the funding bill will be defeated. I am trying to get it defeated so there will be a slowdown in the arms race and more money will be available for education and social welfare activities. I am trying to achieve these things in order to promote peace and prosperity."

or:

"I am trying to disperse the crowd so order will be restored in the capitol. I am trying to restore order so the government can function smoothly. I am trying to achieve that in order to promote peace and prosperity."

Typically, the justification of specific ends in terms of increasingly more general ones comes to a terminus with an appeal to some general value which the most general end will help to realize: peace, prosperity, happiness, self-actualization, justice, law and order, spiritual fulfillment, or something of this sort.

The beliefs and values people use to explain their instrumental actions form a network. It is a network with a feature of decisive importance: the meanings involved are interdependent. Both the letter writer and the crowd disperser may speak of using "persuasion" to achieve their ends. But they clearly have different notions of persuasion in mind. To find out what these

different notions are, we learn about their more general views of human psychology *and* the specific techniques that exemplify the kind of persuasion they have in mind.

Likewise, both may speak of trying to promote "peace and prosperity." But, again, their conceptions of these may be markedly different. To understand the phrase, we must learn how they believe peace and prosperity are related to other notions and practices like distributive equality, retributive justice, laissez faire economics, civil disobedience, and electoral politics. We must also learn what they think of as good examples of peace and prosperity.

One way the thrust of this point is sometimes put is to say that meaning is holistic. Sentences are organically related, "interanimating" each other—giving meaning to others and taking meaning from other sentences and practices that form a context for their use.

The analysis so far has five very important consequences for social research. First, to understand someone's instrumental intention we must understand the network of beliefs and practices that provide a context for it.

Second, their action is not an effect of efficient causes of the kind of Galilean social scientists have tried to discover. Instead, it is *motivated* by *reasons* that people believe *justify* their choices. The distinction is important. Flying rocks and chemicals in tear gas have no goals they may fail to achieve and no beliefs which may turn out to be false. They simply move and combine as they are caused to. They have no reasons which may be in error and so they cannot make mistakes.

In contrast, rioters and police can. In fact, we all can and do make mistakes in almost every arena of social life. This is because our activities are structured in terms of beliefs and values which tell us what we are doing and distinguish better and worse ways of doing it. When we type a letter, pitch a stone, negotiate a deal, or reprimand an employee we are performing activities that are defined in terms of norms and goals that tell us what success requires—and ways in which we *ought* to pursue it.

To understand the flight of a rock, we need only know how forces efficiently cause it to fly. And it would be absurd to say: "Stop stone! You should not move like that!" But to understand persons who throw stones we need to learn the reasons that led them to think or feel they ought to fling it and the beliefs they hold that motivate their throwing it overhand rather than underhand—beliefs that may be justified or in error.

Third, we see now why the Galilean quest for value neutral descriptions of social reality cannot succeed. Social reality is structured in terms of values that define it, that make it what it is. We cannot explain what

someone is doing without referring to the norms they are trying to follow and the values they are trying to realize. A full explanation of why a chess player moves a pawn in a particular way must include an account of the rules that prescribe the ways pawns ought to be moved and the tactical goal he or she is trying to achieve.

We cannot even accurately *describe* a chess game or battle unless we define it in terms of value-laden concepts like "effective strategy," "casualties," and "winning." If we try to sanitize our language and speak only of "arm movements," "interactions of forces," "body counts," and other "incidents" we end up with a description of physical events that have no special significance. To describe social reality we must characterize it in terms of value-laden interpretations that define it.

A fourth point to note is that social reality is structured by normative institutions rather than natural laws. The difference is fundamental. Institutions can be changed, laws of nature cannot.

The laws of genetics that govern things like the inheritance of intelligence, racial characteristics, and sex differences are what they are. Whatever they are, they are here to stay. We can manipulate the effects of these laws through selective breeding, but we cannot alter the laws themselves.

In contrast, the norms and institutions that govern child rearing, race relations, and marriage are institutions that have been *instituted*. At some point in history they were set up. They may not have been set up deliberately by people with clear goals and instrumental intentions. But they did emerge in a social context in which they were defined in ways that were "intentional" in the broad sense of the term. They were defined in terms of interpretations and these interpretations can be revised.

Even a regularity as basic as the normal rhythm of sleep and wakefulness is "institutional" in this sense. Humans have a biological need for sleep. And our biology and environment have, in most cases, had this result: It makes sense to sleep at night and be awake during the day. Furthermore, parents tell their children when they *ought* to go to sleep. Schools, businesses, and churches schedule their activities around "reasonable" hours. Prior to the discovery of electricity, most of humankind found sunlit hours were the most "reasonable." But neon lights, factories that are expensive to shut down, or the opportunity to go smelt fishing at high tide during a new moon may lead us to decide that other hours are more reasonable.

These sorts of things may lead us to revise our institutions. Likewise, we may choose to revise the way we interpret differences in intelligence,

race, or sex. A feature pervading social reality for millennia may seem so regular and basic as to be virtual law of humankind. But then we may suddenly discover good reasons to revise the interpretations on which these are based—and new institutions emerge. In the United States today, the roles women have traditionally played in child care and industry are being revised in just this sort of way. As they are, a host of statistical regularities are reported by the Census Bureau are changing.

Those statistics are important and well worth studying. But with Galilean social scientists are mistaken when they suppose that these provide correlations that reflect mathematical natural laws that *explain* social reality. The figures they find only provide statistics that *describe* the numbers of people who have chosen to accept—or at least chosen not to change—the institutions in which they participate.

These first four points do not mean that physical causes play no part in social reality or that researchers should not worry about avoiding bias.

The efficient causes and effects that natural scientists provide the necessary conditions for social reality. A knowledge of how soil gets depleted can help explain why an agricultural community stagnates economically—because rich soil is necessary for certain crops. Also, many physical conditions which are not necessary can, nonetheless, contribute to motivating action. Drought is not required before farmers migrate, but it may give them a good reason for moving on. But these necessary and contributory physical conditions are never *sufficient* in and of themselves. They are not Galilean "efficient causes" that make things happen.

The key point is this: They are simply physical conditions that must be interpreted before they enter into social reality at all. The drought only motivates the farmers to move when they name it or think about it in some way—and the ways they interpret it may vary. They may view it as an accident of nature, a natural part of the rhythm of life, or a punishment being inflicted upon them by a wrathful God. As a result, they may view themselves rational opportunists who are moving to greener pastures, quasi-nomads who are following the wheel of life, or a people who must retreat for a time until they have exculpated their guilt before God. In each case, the "migration" is a different act and must be understood in the distinctive terms the movers themselves use to define it.

These terms are value-laden, but the researcher who uses them need not be "biased" in any objectionable way. This point will be considered later in more detail in a discussion of objectivity and completeness in social theory. Here, the point to note is that the researcher who uses the farmers' own value-laden terms to describe their activity is not *introducing* a bias of

his or her own or making personal value judgments. He or she is simply describing what the farmers are doing.

The first four points just considered bring us to a fifth. To understand people we must (1) learn how their own network of holistic meanings provides a context (2) that they take to give them reasons which justify their actions (3) in terms of value-laden notions (4) and normative institutions that—unlike the laws of nature—can be revised. The fifth point is that our understanding of these requires participation. To see how they understand their own activity, we cannot just peek at them for a moment. We must enter into their social world as they conceive it.

I speak here of "*entering into* a world" rather than merely of "*observing* it at length" because much the understanding that provides the context for such holistic meaning is not the sort that can be simply stated in propositions and reported by observers.

CHAPTER 11

Participation in the Whole

There are indispensable kinds of understanding that require participation. To see why, consider the following direction the questions we ask people can take. It is the direction taken when we ask not "*Why* are you doing this?" but "*How* are you doing this?"

At first the reply to the "How?" question typically takes the form of some more detailed description of the way the means employed is enacted:

"How am I writing to my senator? Well, I am taking out a sheet of paper and sketching the key points I want to make and then typing them up in a style I think will be sincere and forceful without sounding threatening."

The answer as to how the order to spray tear gas is being delivered and implemented might be provided by a recitation of a standard form for commands and a technical recipe for spraying which was memorized in training sessions—one which specifies how the device will be fired, how it is to be aimed, whom it should be aimed at and so on. We can go on to ask, further, how each step in these processes is performed. And in reply to the answers offered we can ask again: "And how, precisely, do you do *that*?" (How do you engage the senator's interest with your opening remark? How do you raise a question at the start? How do you type a question mark?)

Eventually we reach a point at which the person finds it difficult to answer. Some perceptions, expressions of feeling and actions seem so basic as to be starting points for explanations—starting points which cannot themselves be explained. How do you distinguish red things from green ones? How do you express feelings of calm with a smile? How do you raise your hand?

The ability to do these sorts of things does not require propositional knowledge of how we do them. It does not require the ability to use words to accurately state *beliefs* about how they are done. And propositional knowledge about the skill does not give someone the ability to use the skill itself.

Instead, such abilities require three different kinds of knowledge: Knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how. These three root belief in practice and make understanding require participation. They require that we take part in a community if we are to genuinely understand it. They require this regardless of whether our motives in seeking understanding are pacific, predatory, or purely cognitive.

Colors and sound qualities (like the tone of an oboe) provide the simplest examples of the first, knowledge by acquaintance. An educated person who has been blind from birth may be able to *say* as much or more about the color of blood as a sighted person can. His beliefs may well match reality more accurately. Yet there is something the sighted know which he does not. They know what blood looks like, because they have seen it.

Likewise, people may have knowledge by acquaintance of much more complex things like facial features and body types characteristic of ethnic groups. I know by acquaintance what Swedes and Italians look like. I do not—at least usually—reason out my assessment in any explicit way. I simply *see* them as Swedes and Italians.

While such knowledge requires direct experience, it requires more than mere exposure. We must learn to attend to the relevant features of things and we require general concepts to form ideas of such features. We must have some conception—even if it is only rough and pre-verbal—of ethnic types before we can learn to identify facial types. But on the other hand, knowledge by acquaintance is itself required to understand fully what general concepts like ethnic type mean.

Such knowledge by acquaintance is, then, related to more general notions in two ways: it gives meaning to them and also derives meaning from them. It fills them in and gives them specific import, and it also tacitly presupposes them. One way this is sometimes put is to say that our general ideas or theories are "context dependent" and that our perceptions are always "theory laden."

People may have different "perceptual types." They may literally see things differently in styles that are reflected in differences in the ways they draw on what they see and respond to it. Children who early on acquire different styles for perceiving flesh and clothing and gesture may come to have quite different understandings of what "woman," "man," and "sex" mean. Conversely, adults who later on acquire different beliefs may come to perceive the world differently. Because of the differences in the concepts they bring to the viewing of it, a butchered cow will be visually perceived in different ways by a biologist, a meat inspector, a painter, a Moslem or a Hindu.¹

In a similar way, our understanding of expressions of feelings turns out to have a double connection of reciprocity in relation to general ideas.

Very young children often do not know what they feel. As adult, we often have only vague awareness of our feelings. This is true of physical feelings—a child requires practice to learn to distinguish stomach aches from hunger. It is also true of the rich and varied feelings attendant upon our social activity. The subtle emotions of life often seem hard to pin down—until we read some poem or hear some piece of music which expresses the vague feelings and we have an experience of recognition. "Aha!" we may say. "That's just the way I have felt."

If we are asked "And what is that precisely?" we may find ourselves at a loss. It is not as though a melody has a message that can be stated in a proposition like: "I am experiencing meandering loneliness." The expressive understanding provided by a work like "The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock" or "The Moonlight Sonata" is something different from propositional knowledge—different in kind.

Expressive understanding is not necessarily better or worse, it is simply different. Most art (some would say *all good* art) provides such expressive understanding, and much language and gesture does as well. The delicate nuance of after-dinner diplomatic overtures and the power of gripping public rhetoric cannot be understood apart from expressive understanding of this sort. Likewise, in everyday conversations of our ordinary activities like child care, making appointments, talking about the news and playing cards, a central role is played by expressive understanding.²

Again, such non-propositional knowledge is related to more general ideas in two ways. It gives them content and it presupposes them. The samurai's bows and his world view, like the British gentleman's bows and his world view, are interdependent in their meaning. Knowledge by acquaintance and expressive understanding share this characteristic with a third kind of non-propositional knowledge—one often referred to as "know-how."

Know-how consists of skills acquired through practice, skill which can involve varying levels of complexity and expertise. Some (such as touch typing and marksmanship) involve primarily motor skills. Others (such as letter writing and crowd control) may involve a wide range of verbal and intrapersonal skills as well. Clearly people can have know-how of these sorts without having much in the way of theoretical knowledge about how it is that they manage to do them well. I can know how to ride a bike without being able to explain the bio-physics involved or the intentional (but non-

verbal) conscious efforts I make. Often people with great skill at negotiation or public speaking are quite inept at teaching their skill—or even incapable of describing it in an illuminating way.

This is not to say that general beliefs and notions are irrelevant to skill acquisition. Quite the opposite is true. For example, general conceptions of persuasion and beliefs about human psychology characterize the context and set the standards in terms of which skills at letter writing and crowd control are defined. Conversely, these general notions are given concrete meaning by the skills and practices in which they are applied. The point is simply that these general notions can—and most typically do—function *implicitly*. In learning the skill, we acquire a tacit understanding of a host of conceptions of the types of things to be dealt with and also a host of values which indicate how they ought to be dealt with—values internalized via role-modeling, testing techniques, rules of thumb, feels for "how these things should look (or smell)," precedents, metaphors, simple cases used as paradigms, coached trial and error, hints, and visionary rhetoric.

One can acquire a skill at "hard selling" cars or teaching kindergarten with the Montessori method without being very capable in offering explicit explanations of the general beliefs and values these practices presuppose. But one cannot learn such skills without some tacit understanding of the background such beliefs and values provide, and the background views cannot be understood apart from a grasp of skilled activities of these sorts.

Speaking a language like English—or a dialect or jargon specific to a local community—involves know how. This is a point of central importance for social research. No amount of purely theoretical linguistics can enable someone to become a competent speaker of a language. Language is learned in practice, not in theory. To learn to understand what people say about themselves, we must converse with them. We must practice the use of their language in the contexts in which it is actually used. This means that social researchers must begin their study by participating in the communities they wish to study.

This claim—that social researchers must participate in the communities they study—is a strong one. It is a claim which runs counter to the dominant, Galilean view of methodology adopted by practicing social scientists. On that view, social researchers can only achieve objectivity through *observation*. Direct participation leads to personal involvements, subjective reporting, and biased theorizing.

It is supposed that there is a rather strict analogy between natural and social science. First rate theoretical physicists can use the data supplied by experimental physicists but lack the know-how that enables the

experimentalists to deal with complex (and often very temperamental) laboratory devices. By analogy, it is thought that there can be first-rate social theorists who use data supplied by field workers but who lack the skills required to participate in the institutions of the communities they study.

However, they claim that competent social theorists must have a participatory understanding has two important merits: it is widely believed and it is true.

It—or a version of it—is widely believed by practicing lawyers, teachers, midwives, counselors, politicians, soldiers, business executives, and administrators. Such people are often hesitant to argue in *public* that they have a better idea of what is going on in courts or classrooms or Congress than do the social scientists who come in as objective bystanders and observe. But these people typically affirm something like this in private. Often they adopt a cagey stance and say that they have a kind of understanding which is different.

They are hesitant to argue it is better for a very good reason. Much of the knowledge they have learned at the bar or in the battlefield is tacit rather than explicit. It consists of knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how which they cannot articulate as propositional knowledge. So they are not able to *articulately argue* for the superiority of their understanding. They find it hard to say what it is that enables them to recognize a distinct mood in a jury or class or patient or employee. They find it difficult to say what the significance of a gesture or piece of rhetoric is. They are not able to explain in a neat or rigorous way how they are reasoning when they appeal to precedent or guide the discussion of a seminar group or carry out a battle strategy in the thick of the action. But they know that such understanding is something they have acquired through participation and practice, and they know that their understanding of what is going on in the trial, counseling session, or political campaign is deeply rooted in such non-propositional knowledge.

Such shared understanding is often mutually acknowledged through the sort of wink or nod which captures a moment—or the sort of quiet smile that savors a situation in silence. But in general, when lawyers or teachers wonder if someone else really understands what is going on—whether the other be a novice practitioner or a social scientist—they have a fairly clear standard with which they judge. They ask, simply: Can this person get things done and talk sense in the context of the institution of the law or the school system? Can he or she win cases or teach? Can he or she talk about the cases or classes in ways that make sense to other skilled lawyers or teachers?

This participation-based criterion of understanding is, of course, one that social scientists reject. In doing so, they have made a fundamental mistake. Why? An analogy to natural science helps to explain. Galileo advised the physicists of his day to study geometry and algebra because, as he put it, "nature speaks mathematics." The subsequent success of the Galilean tradition of physical science speaks highly for the wisdom of this belief as well as the assumption on which it is based, namely, that to accurately describe and explain a kind of thing we must "speak its language."

This point has an obvious corollary for social research. For people do not, by and large, speak mathematics. Instead, they speak "ordinary" or "natural" (rather than artificial) languages like English and Spanish. Such languages are not axiomatizable and they cannot be adequately expressed in rigorous and formal systems of abstract symbols. Their meanings can be only understood through participation in the kinds of social activities that provide the context for their use.

To put the central point more straightforwardly—dispensing with the analogy to natural science—we can say the following. The social reality that social researchers seek to describe and explain is constituted by understandings people themselves have of the activities in which they engage. These understandings are expressed in ordinary languages rife with vagaries of syntax and semantics and which are rooted in practices and contexts in which non-verbal elements play decisive roles. To accurately describe and explain such social reality, researchers must begin (though by no means rest content) with a knowledge of those activities as they are understood—and constituted—in these natural languages. So, to do competent research, they must participate in the kinds of communities they wish to study. This is true whether the community they study is a Zande tribe, a Hutterite commune, a type of business clique or a kind of diplomat.

Among many anthropologists, this point is held to be non-controversial. Their experience convinces them empirically of the necessity of field work for adequate theory and the necessity of participation for adequate field work.

Among philosophers, particularly those who have explored Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of a "form of life"—or the phenomenologists' notion of a *lebenswelt*—the claim that the competent understanding of social activity requires participatory understanding is likewise fairly non-controversial. The kind of analysis which has led to such a conclusion is difficult to summarize. It calls for extended and detailed consideration of specific concepts and specific ways in which our understandings of them are

related to practices of various sorts. As Wittgenstein emphasizes, we must "look and see." But the principal kinds of things we find when we do look and see can perhaps be summed up under two headings: the "family resemblance" structure of concepts in ordinary language and the nature of meaning as "use."

The classic analysis of family resemblance occurs in a passage in which Wittgenstein examines the concept of "game." When we look at things we call games—such as card games, ball games, board games, ring around the rosy, twenty questions, and so on—we may wonder:

What is common to them all?— Don't say: "There *must* be something common, or they would not all be called 'games'"— but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them, you will not see something common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained but much is lost.—Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the differences between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.³

We find the same kinds of when we look at the central terms we use to define and understand our culture: "corporation," "economics," "political power," "government," "sex," "family," "experiment," "science," "prayer," "the spiritual," "teacher," "school," and "culture."

(Note: Criticisms of this analysis which employ the distinction between "directly exhibited features" and "relational attributes" are mistaken—at least in almost all of the cases relevant to social theory. The key terms used to define relational attributes like "the potentiality of a game to be of absorbing non-practical interest to either participant or spectators" are, themselves, family resemblance notions. So the terms they might define, like game," are as well.⁴)

Political scientists have expended enormous energy trying to define power. Sociologists have done the same with status. The results have been frustrating insofar as they tried to develop a clear definition that can be stated axiomatically and consistently operationalized. The source of such frustration lies in the structure of these concepts. The concepts are not axiomatic in structure—their meaning cannot be stated in an axiomatic definition the way Euclid gave the meaning of "straight line." As they are employed by social agents to understand and structure their activity, these notions simply are not straight line concepts.

We can see now not only why the Galilean quest for mathematical theories of social reality has met so much failure but also *why* in one case, economics, it seems to have met with some success. In most arenas of life, the concepts that social reality are not axiomatizable and so the reality they define cannot be characterized in the neat, quantitative formula of algebra. But there is one arena in which people define reality with numbers and speak the language of mathematics, namely when they are producing and distributing quantities of goods and services. Because business people speak mathematics, economists studying them can *and must* employ mathematical language to describe and explain their activity.

Other social scientists often hold up economics as a promising example of the kind of Galilean theory they seek in their own fields. This is a fundamental mistake. Economics is "the exception that proves the rule" because the reason that the use of algebraic formulae in it is successful is precisely the same reason why the use elsewhere must fail. Researchers must employ the language of the people they study. In economic activity it is mathematical; elsewhere it is not. Based on economists' successes, sociologists studying street people should draw this moral: Their theories should employ street talk.

To sum up this chapter: Competent social research requires a participatory understanding. It requires a mastery of the language the community uses to structure its own activities. Competent understanding of that language requires participation in the activities of the community speaking it because it is only through such practice in varying contexts that we can learn to navigate our way about the networks of resemblance and contrast that constitute the meanings of terms. And participation is required for a second and even more important group of reasons as well. Crucial features of the contexts that determine proper usage for terms are non-verbal. Proper assessment of them requires knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how.

Overall, at this stage, two points should already be clear and a third should follow rather plainly. First, we cannot understand someone's account of his or her activity in piecemeal bits; the meanings of terms and claims and values are context-dependent, the meanings of sentences are *holistic*. Second, to understand the ground level elements of people's views of what they are doing and why, we must acquire non-propositional knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how) which requires *participation*. These two points can be summed up by saying that to understand the intentional structures of meaning that are constitutive of people's activity, we must enter into their world.

A third point follows from these. To make peace with others, we need to understand them and their social world by entering into it with them. Peacemaking requires participation in other people's communities. Until we begin to take part, we cannot even understand what they are doing and why, let alone learn how to reconcile their differences and ours.

To say that a participatory understanding of the language and practice of a community is *required* for competent understanding is *not* to say that such understanding is *sufficient*. A simple participatory understanding does not provide fully adequate descriptions and explanations of social activity. But it does provide the necessary starting point—the understanding which must be critiqued and revised in ways we are about to consider.

CHAPTER 12

The Understanding Required for Peace: Critical Participatory Research

One way to solve your problems at home is to leave. One way to eliminate conflict with others is to break off all relations with them. But, in most contexts, the peace we would like to make is not the kind in which we are simply left alone. It is the kind in which we attempt to arrive at an agreement—the sort of an agreement we might call "an understanding." Such "understandings" in the special sense require understanding in the more inclusive sense. So, to intelligently make peace *with* others, we need to understand them.

Further, regardless of what we want to do with others, whether it is a matter of swinging real estate deals or making war, the better we understand them, the better our chances for success. We seek such understanding day in and day out. The art of acquiring insight into others—the kind we pursue for our personal ends—is a basic coping skill in life. The background understanding we require may be rather simple or quite complex. But whether this understanding required is minimal or detailed, when we try to acquire it we start to engage in a kind of social research. In that sense, we are all social researchers.

How should we do such research? How can we best cultivate our understanding of others? A participatory understanding of them on their own terms is a start. But it does not go far enough. Their own understandings of themselves are rarely, if ever, adequate.

People's own understanding of their activity is typically flawed in five sorts of ways. It is vague, implicit, inconsistent, incomplete, and inaccurate. So, as social researchers, we must seek to remedy these flaws in order to adequately understand what people are doing and why. This is true whether our research is aimed to provide us with knowledge of peacemaking, warring, or simple knowledge for knowledge's own sake. However, something surprising and important turns out to be the case. It concerns a relationship between research and certain kinds of peacemaking.

To remedy the five sorts of flaws that infect people's participatory understanding of themselves, researchers undertake an activity which

involves them in making certain kinds of peace between themselves and the people they study. It also involves researchers in making a kind of peace among the people themselves who are studied. In social research, certain kinds of peacemaking are indispensable steps toward *understanding*. This point has nothing to do with the ethics of research—as though once we completed our research we were somehow obliged to use it to make peace. The point is that a limited but important kind of peacemaking is an intrinsic element of research itself, a part of its methodology—even if our interests are *purely* cognitive.

THE VAGUE AND THE IMPLICIT

People's self-understandings are always vague or implicit to some degree, and this feature cannot be eradicated. This is a basic feature of general beliefs and knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding and know-how. It serves, in part, to explain why participatory understanding is required. But this is not to say that such vague and tacit understanding is a *virtue*. Often self understandings are vague or implicit in ways that place unnecessary obstacles in the path of an activity.

Police officers may have knowledge by acquaintance of types of disorderly people and disruptive conduct. It may be a knowledge by acquaintance which they have learned from familiarity with paradigm cases and tips from fellow officers. But the researcher wants to understand in as explicit a way as possible, just what the significant features of these paradigms are and what the meaning of these tips and hints is. And the officers themselves may have an interest in trying to acquire more explicit understanding of this sort so they can improve the speed and accuracy of their responses to situations, justify them more readily, and teach new officers to make proper identifications for themselves.

For similar reasons, political orators, lawyers, and arms negotiators seek more definite and articulate accounts of what they are doing and why they are doing it. Because clear and explicit formulation is one of the hallmarks of understanding, researchers must seek these things as well.

In this regard, researchers and their subjects stand in a "win/win" relation to each other. The more clearly and explicitly the subjects of the research understand themselves, the easier the task of the researcher is. The clearer and more explicit the account that the researcher arrives at, the more useful it can be to the subjects themselves. There are, of course, cases in which people have an interest in deceiving themselves or others, a point to

which we will return. But apart from these cases, subjects and researchers share in a common interest in understanding. Their differences are not points of conflict between competing agents, they are problems or puzzles to be solved by joint inquiry where each benefits from a furthering of the other's interests.

The *joint* character of the inquiry bears emphasis. Each brings something distinctive to it. The subject brings the activity to be understood. The researcher brings a new or different perspective which raises questions the subject might never have asked or which suggests answers the subject might not have thought of proposing. Something rather analogous to this occurs, of course, in studies of natural phenomena. But there, the researcher "interrogates" things by manipulating them. In social research, the interrogation can occur in a literal dialogue. Moreover, it must.

In explicating someone's practices or values or beliefs, the researcher must propose what seems to be a clearer and more explicit account and then inquire of the subject: "Is this what you are saying and doing?" "Is that what you are really after?" In large part, this is because what gives the agent's activity its determinacy is the self-understanding with which he or she determines it, the intentional interpretations which make an arm movement a wave to a friend instead of a signal to another motorist. Apart from the cases of deception, if the subjects refuse to adopt the researchers proposed explication, then the researcher is simply wrong—though this is not to deny he may be on the right track. Since the researcher is trying to explicate the *subjects'* self-understanding and their activity which is structured by it, their assent to the researcher's account provides a crucial index of its accuracy.

The researcher/subject relation is just like that between a commentator and an author of a text. The commentator may criticize an author's words, suggest implicit assumptions are being made, diagnose vague passages, and propose clearer and more explicit formulations of what the author is trying to say. But—again, apart from deception—the author remains the final authority on what he was trying to do and say and what values he was trying to realize.

This means that in normal cases the researcher and the people she studies are related to each other not as a manipulator to a group of things or "objects" but as one *subject* to another *subject*, as I to thou—as participant in a dialogue. And it is a dialogue which in its own limited way provides a paradigm of peacemaking. For here human differences are conceived of not as latent conflicts between people with opposed interests but as shared problems to be resolved in mutual agreement.

INCONSISTENCY

A second flaw common to self-understanding is incoherence. People often have practices, beliefs or values which are inconsistent with one another. In this respect, they are in conflict with themselves.

A racist may have a practice of seeing blacks as animal-like and treating them as inferiors to be ordered about—and yet also have a practice of seeing doctors as imposing figures of authority and treating them as superiors to be obeyed. Then, one day, as a draftee in the army, he is placed under the care of a black doctor. He becomes anxious and unsettled. He is forced to respond to conflicting visual cues. Incompatible gestures and actions are elicited. He "cannot believe his own eyes" and does not know whether to look up with respect or look down with a sneer. He is incapable of responding automatically and without hesitation. He remains undecided when he thinks about what to do. He is undecided because he is confused, and confused because the norms governing his own perceptual categories and patterns of gesture are inconsistent in this case.

To take another example, a general formulating nuclear strategy might work with the assumptions that there is no defense against the Soviet's nuclear weapons *and* that we can win a nuclear war—and yet find, in the end, that these two beliefs are inconsistent. They cannot both be true. Or a labor leader might commit himself to bringing about import quotas that will, in the long run, raise his people's wages, increase the number of jobs in their field, and not cause inflation—and then find that these may be inconsistent goals, since they cannot all be achieved.

Inconsistencies of these sorts are a problem for the people themselves as well as the researchers studying them. The subjects have not made up their minds, they have not decided which of the two logically incompatible practices or beliefs or values are the ones they actually want to adopt. They literally do not know what they are doing. Their activity itself is unsettled and indeterminate. For the researcher, this means that the reality she is studying is itself incoherent and not determinate and consistent account of what is going on can be offered. So both the researcher and the subjects have an interest in eliminating the incoherence. They have a joint interest in making a kind of peace—the kind involved in putting an end to conflicts internal to the subjects' own activity.

There will, of course, be a variety of ways in which this can be done. The racist may reform his treatment of blacks, change his manner in dealing with doctors, or introduce a new category—the black professional—who is

to be dealt with in some third way. The general may decide to drop his belief that a nuclear war can be won or his supposition that no defense is possible. The point is simply that until *some* revision of this sort is made, the racist and the general and the union officer simply do not know what they are doing or what they believe and value.

Qua social theorist, the researcher has no interest in *which* way her subjects make up their minds. But she does have a cognitive interest in getting them to make their minds up in one way or another. Her cognitive interest is in getting them to render their activity determinate so it can then be understood in a coherent and determinate way. Metallurgists have an interest in purifying ore so that they have homogenous metals whose properties can then be known. Similarly, the social researcher has an interest in promoting the elimination of internal conflicts in the subjects she studies so that a coherent account can be developed.

This point applies to conflicts internal to communities as well as individuals. The norms by which a community regulates its activity may be incoherent. A classic case is that of the tragic Antigone in the play by Sophocles. She is obliged by kinship to bury her parents properly and yet obliged by citizenship to obey her lord Creon's order to leave their bodies outside the city walls. Because most of us are involved in multiple roles and multiple sets of institutional norms, such conflicts are a matter of daily difficulty. We find ourselves thrust into situations in which we face incompatible obligations as teacher *and* friend, or as doctor pledged to promote health at all costs *and* as a hospital employee under contract to maximize profits.

These conflicting roles place us in relations of opposition not only with ourselves but also with other members of such institutions who are obliged to monitor and enforce the performance of such duties. These are not simply personal conflicts between people who simply differ in their preferences. They are inconsistencies in the corporate norms adopted by the community itself. Antigone's problem is one which any member of the community might face if placed in her position *and one which all do face indirectly as bystanders forced to choose some way of treating her*. They must decide whether to make an exception to the norms of kinship or those of citizenship or else revise one or both in some way that will eliminate the inconsistency. Until this is done, the community has not collectively "made up its mind." It has not determined what are the proper norms for judging people in such positions and dealing with them.

The incoherencies in this first group involve conflicting ends. They derive from conflicts in the ways in which the community institutionalizes

ends such as family solidarity and civic loyalty or the promotion of health and profit. But incoherence can take a variety of other forms.

Some are only discovered once we begin to look at unexpected cases that come up. Others involve inconsistencies that seem to make virtually every case confusing. Parents lay down rules and then kids discover the rules are inconsistent. Judges are continually confronted with cases where two laws apply and each prescribes the opposite decision. The members of a community share the goal of building trust and decide to all follow a rule of "complete honesty." But then they discover that "complete honesty"—at least the kind they had in mind—causes pain, anxiety, and withdrawal.

Other inconsistencies may involve "double binds" that seem to apply to almost every case and make it confusing. A child in the back seat is told: "Shut up and enjoy the trip!" Colleges are required to integrate by using goals but not quotas and they are required to favor the admission of one group without disfavoring the admission of others or practicing "reverse discrimination." Parents may feel they must let their children grow into independent adulthood by making their own decisions *and* make sure that the right decisions about drugs, sex, and career choices are the ones the child makes. In a very similar way, the leaders of a superpower may find themselves committed to promoting the independence of countries in their sphere of influence *and* maintaining supremacy in their sphere.

There is a host of other types of inconsistency that can characterize the policies of communities or nations. Many arise because these corporate entities are pressured from within by groups with inconsistent values or goals. The Pentagon dreads getting involved in a war in Central America, the CIA sees the area as a manageable arena for exercising U.S. might, fundamentalist churches want to fight the spread of communism in El Salvador, and Catholics demand that the killing of their missionaries stop. The result is a recipe for inconsistent foreign policy in the area.

Or farmers in Kansas want to sell wheat to the Soviets, machinists in Connecticut want to build weapons for McDonald Aircraft, doctors in Massachusetts want to halt the arms race, and ethnic groups in Wisconsin want to get tough on communism. In this case, as we shall see in Chapter 18, the sources of inconsistency are especially complex and profound. But be the reason what they may, it should be clear on the face of it that policy makers in both the Soviet Union and the United States find themselves caught in a web of conflicting goals and norms. They have incentives both to deploy new weapons in order to strengthen their position and make demands on their opponents *and* to take the initiative in halting the arms race in order to cut its economic cost and the potential danger it brings.

The nuclear arms race is difficult to understand because the participants are operating under conflicting norms. In that sense, they do not themselves know what they are doing. If a Soviet backed army invaded Saudi Arabia, would the United States respond by using tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how would the Soviets respond? No one knows. This is not because the answer is a well kept secret. It is because the norms the superpowers operate under are inconsistent and their own intentions and future actions are indeterminate. This means that the social reality that arms researchers wish to understand is itself indeterminate. To know it more fully, researchers would need to get it to become more fully determinate. Out of a purely cognitive desire to know in an accurate and determinate way, researchers must attempt to formulate more consistent policies and get participants involved to adopt some such set of coherent policies.

It is important to emphasize that this interest of the researcher is a *cognitive* one, not a moral interest, and it has important limitations. As regards the researchers' cognitive interest, it does not matter *how* the inconsistencies are resolved, it only matters *that* they are resolved. If our aim is simply to understand the activities of people, a consistent racism or integrationalist view—or a consistent militarism or pacifism—will each do equally as well. Each will provide a determinacy to the beliefs and the plans and actions of the people studied. The point is simply that until some such consistency is achieved, the object of the researcher's inquiry will remain incoherent and indeterminate—and it will not be an object capable of being fully understood.

The subjects themselves share the researcher's cognitive interest in consistency. This point is important and basic, but it is easy to overlook. There is a temptation to suppose that consistency is just a preference logicians and theorists have—a bias other people may not share. And in one kind of case, something like that is true: if I demand that *your* beliefs be consistent with *mine*, then I am imposing my values on you. However, *self-consistency* is a universal value that everyone holds.

The reason is that there is always one person a human never wants to disagree with, namely, himself. This is not because people have an innate drive to obey some law of logic that tells them to only hold consistent beliefs. And it is not as though there is even some single, standard, uniform concept of consistency that everyone ought to adopt. Inconsistency is, itself, an open concept—a family resemblance notion. The central thread of the idea is, roughly, that two inconsistent statements are ones that mean two things that cannot both be true. We cannot believe both; we must make up our minds to

believe one *or* the other. But different concepts of meaning, truth, and mind will give us different concepts of precisely what inconsistency involves.

At a week-long conference in Hawaii, a western philosopher talked with an oriental one for days—with mounting frustration. "You keep contradicting yourself!" he finally shouted. "Well, in a sense, yes..." was the reply. "But you just can't do that!" There was a pause, and then a smile, and then the oriental philosopher replied: "Oh, but we have been doing this successfully for hundreds of years!" To take another example of which we have already considered in some detail, maieutic reasoners have a different, much more fluid notion of inconsistency than eristic reasoners because they suppose that meaning is holistic, truth is emergent, and mind is communal in character.

But whatever we mean by meaning, truth, and mind, there remains some basic conception of successfully believing something that provides us with a notion of self-consistency that we ourselves are committed to. Inconsistent beliefs are simply those that we cannot—given our views about the nature of belief—successfully believe together. We may thoughtlessly *think* we believe both and carelessly *say* we do but we cannot succeed. Until we choose one or the other we simply have not made up our minds and we do not yet know what we believe at all.

With regard to consistency, the researcher is, again, related to the subjects being studied in the way a commentator is related to the author of a text. If author voices inconsistent views, we cannot understand her because she does not understand herself. She has not made up her mind as to just what it is that she holds. As commentators, we can propose alternative ways of rationally reconstructing her views. But unless she adopts one, and until she does, we cannot determine what she really thinks because she does not yet *really* think anything. She is undecided. The words and deeds of social agents likewise provide a kind of text to be interpreted and understood through explication and rational reconstruction. And the activity of rationally reconstructing such inconsistent views and getting agents to adopt consistent ones constitutes a limited kind of peacemaking which is an intrinsic part of the method of proper social research.

Besides explicit clarity and consistency, two further hall marks of understanding are completeness and accuracy. The ways people understand their own activity are typically deficient in both.

INCOMPLETENESS AND INACCURACY

In trying to understand social reality we want to avoid adopting accounts that are only partial or inaccurate. We want the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Neither is easy to come by.

Partiality is pervasive. When we humans act, our understanding of what we are doing is littered with two sorts of incompleteness. On the one hand, there are physical facts and natural laws that provide the complex physical setting we must interpret and take into account. On the other hand, there are the interpretive activities of other people which we need to understand and deal with. We are continually trying to expand our understanding of both things, and continually falling short in our achievement.

So far as the physical facts and laws go, I need to have at least some minimal understanding in order to make my way about the world at all. When I act, I aim to intervene in nature, to change the course of the physical events. I adopt some view of what the physical facts are and what the physical consequences of my acts will be. But the causes of those facts extend back indefinitely, and the consequences of my acts extend into the future with a similar unknown and indefinite ramification.

This is as true of the corporate actions of a community as it is true of the individual deeds of a single person. To understand either fully, we want to push two questions as far as we can: 1. Why is this being done? And 2. What is being done? The first leads us to look for the causes of the facts taken into account by the actors. A tribe is migrating because of crop failures. Very well then, what caused the crops to fail? Climatic shifts? The activities of new parasites? But then what caused these?

The second question leads us to look for the unintended consequences of actions—the aspects of what is being done that were not "meant." What, for example, are the effects that practices of monoculture have on the soil? What consequences do these effects have for the nutrient cycles and other aspects of the physical environment? We may be able to find out what people are *attempting* to do without pursuing such questions, but we will need to pursue them at length if we want to know in full what it is they are *actually* doing.

Such questions arise—and call for explanations drawing on natural science—even when the physical environment is artificial. Whether we are in a prison, a factory, or a class room, we will find that noise, heat, and humidity affect people's moods and behaviors. Prisoners, workers, and students are not unaware of these. But when a riotous activity break out and

we subsequently try to find out why, we are led to look back at the earlier, unknown physical events that made the machinery break down or made the moisture accumulate. Similarly, if people smoke in a conference room or burn high sulphur coal in heating plants, a full understanding of what they are doing should include and account of the physical consequences of these things—consequences of which they may be unaware.

It is obvious that we will never understand all these causes and consequences, but it is just as obvious that the more we understand, the better. One of the tasks of social researchers is to seek complete understanding in just these ways—ways in which the self-understanding of the research subjects will typically be glaringly deficient.

So far as the social setting of our action goes, we are in the same boat. It is a boat balanced on the tip of an iceberg extending far beneath the water level of our understanding. We cannot make our way far in the world without at least some minimal knowledge of the intentions of others and the customs and institutions of the communities with which we deal. But a social researcher seeking to fully understand what we are doing (and why) needs to explore the iceberg of social reality. To understand the complex network of interchanges occurring when Cuban immigrants riot in Miami or strike breakers attack union members at a Kentucky coal mine, an account of one person's—or one group's—side of the story does not suffice. A critically refined holistic and participatory understanding of other people's activities is also required.

This point is basic and obvious. But in trying to take it into account, people commonly make two fundamental sorts of errors. One error appears often as the "common sense" of people who are not professional researchers. It is the mistake of supposing that every story has two sides. An informal study was made by former ambassador Harlan Cleveland while he was working at the state department. He examined all the issues that came across his desk in the course of one representative week. He found that the average issue had not 2 sides, but 5.6 of them. Perhaps failure to note how many sides a story can have is common because of a money fetish. We say "every coin has two sides," and then generalize. The saying ignores the obvious fact that if you look closely at a newly minted coin you find that it has edges all over and a wondrous multiplicity of angles. The events of our lives are no different. What we want is an understanding that is not merely *bi*-partial, but *im*-partial—an understanding that grasps each part of the story and fits it into a larger whole.

The second error is one often made by professional researchers. It consists in the mistake of supposing that impartiality is a matter offering

value free explanations in a sanitized terminology. Neutrality is sought by refusing to use the value laden terms employed by the people being studied. So researchers speak of "incidents" rather than brawls or battles and talk of "body counts" rather than dead soldiers and corpses of children.

We have already seen that such efforts at sanitizing language are a mistake. They keep social theory emotionally sterile only by avoiding bringing it into contact with the reality it ought to describe and explain. Here the point to note is that the completeness of understanding we should seek in doing social research does not require sterility in order to be "objective." It requires, instead, a synthesis of multiple partial perspectives in order to achieve the impartiality or "multi-partiality" that can give us a fuller understanding.

The synthesis of multiple perspectives leads to a kind of structural understanding of social interactions that goes well beyond a mere clumping together of partial accounts. In a sense, if economists only sought *impartiality* in their research, they might simply compile the accounts of the various workers and capitalists and consumers engaged in transactions. But if economists aim at *completeness* of understanding in a fuller sense, then they will try to determine what are the systematic social antecedents and consequences of individuals' actions.

If one seller in a market dominated by a handful of oligopolies lowers prices, what decisions does this motivate others to make? If all lower prices, how does this change the interests and decisions of investors and consumers? Much of economic theory is, in effect, a kind of systematic calculus for understanding structural patterns in the ways in which changes in the marketplace alter the motives relevant to people's decisions and lead them—if they are economically rational—to alter their decisions.

Economic "laws" differ from the laws of physics because they only characterize how agents *ought* to behave if those agents adopt a certain type of rationality. Such "laws" do not describe how people *must* act. Economic theories provide systematic predictions of social consequences that can be expected, rather than natural effects that are inevitable. Yet, because participants in the economic system are in fact usually socialized to reason and decide in economically rational ways, these "laws" provide a much more complete insight into the dynamics of the marketplace than individual economic agents can, themselves, normally offer.

In sum, researchers who undertake to develop a *critical* participatory understanding of social activity should seek completeness, then, by studying the physical causes of the natural setting in which people act as well as the physical consequences of those actions. And they should likewise seek

completeness by aiming at an impartial understanding of the social interactions as well as a structural understanding of the social antecedents and social consequences of actions.

In seeking completeness of understanding, the social researcher finds herself involved in activities of peacemaking again—in two sorts of ways earlier discussed. On the one hand, she stands in a win/win relation with the subjects insofar as they themselves seek more complete understanding so as to increase the efficacy of their actions. On the other hand, she has a (limited) cognitive interest in reconciling inconsistencies *between* partial views of different participants. If they have conflicting ways of perceiving and defining actors and deeds, and conflicting ways of responding, then the characteristics of the people and their acts remain indeterminate. To illustrate this, consider a contrast.

First take the case of a biennial negotiation between union officials and corporation officers. In such a case, the participants usually understand each other rather thoroughly—they are going through the moves of a complex game or ritual familiar to each side. People will not, of course, usually lay all their cards on the table at the start. But each side knows what sort of cards are there to be played and what the import of each move in the ritual is. In contrast, consider a case in which the people involved have fundamentally different views about what the negotiation is about. Suppose they differ as well in their perceptions of each other's motivations and actions. What one intends is not what the other observes. Perhaps the U.S. State Department is trying to negotiate with some Iranian students. Or perhaps two spouses are trying to reconcile very fundamental differences. In such cases, it is difficult for a researcher to say who is doing what because there is a lack of shared conventions which the subjects themselves can use to define their own activity.

I am having a fight with my spouse. Lots of different issues are brought up and the argument becomes agonizingly overheated. I try to be a good sport and end it all with a handshake or a hug so "the game of marriage can play on." But she understands marital disputes by analogy to the Catholic doctrines of sin and redemption—not by analogy to sports. So my gesture of a kiss or a hug cannot come out as I intended.

In looking at me she sees the gesture *as* that of a penitent kneeling before a priest. I see my own gesture as something like a competitor's handshake which is simply intended to let bygones be bygones. So she will not respond as I expect and I will be uncertain as to how to complete the act. She will be in the same boat. My gesture comes off as neither penitence nor

egalitarian reconciliation *per se*. It is a bit of both, a bit of neither, and something more as well—something yet to be defined.

In trying to understand such action, the social researcher has a cognitive interest in reconciling our views so as to make acts like this more determinate and intelligible. The point applies to differences in ways people like my wife and I view verbal insults, slaps, and intensive silence. The researcher has a cognitive interest in pursuing a limited form of peacemaking—the limited sort involved in getting us to agree on the ways in which we disagree. Only when we settle *that* difference can we know what we are doing to each other and give our actions a definiteness that makes them determinate, intelligible objects of cognition.

Here again, the subjects of the research are, *at least in normal cases*, in a win/win relation with the researcher. For they themselves seek to know what they are doing just as much as the researcher does. It may be, of course, that the most fundamental desire of each spouse is to hurt the other. But even then, they will want to eliminate conflicts in their understanding of each other's words and deeds. Each will want to understand the other as well as possible—in order to be as effective as they can in realizing their sadistic ends.

This is true, at least, in normal cases. But "*in normal cases*" is, perhaps not quite the right way to qualify the point. Clearly some sort of qualification is needed, however, because there are important sorts of cases in which researchers and subjects do *not* share a common interest in promoting the understanding of what is being done and why.

People can have an interest in deceiving others or themselves. When they do, their relation to the researcher is one of conflict. The case of those trying to deceive others is clear. The conflicts of interest between the researcher and the liar or propagandist are rather straightforward, at least at the start. (Once each begins to try to manipulate, then things can become rather complex.) The researcher wants to know what is actually going on; the deceiver does not want it—or at least all of it—to be known by others.

The relation of the *self*-deceiver to the researcher is usually more ambivalent. This is because self-deception is ambivalent in essence. Consider a working class conservative who deceives himself about his chances for upward mobility. Or take the case of a national security officer (with past and projected future ties to corporate interests) who deceives herself about her motives in promoting a new weapons system. Each is in the peculiar position of both knowing the truth and not knowing it. If both simply knew it, then they would not have *deceived* themselves. If they did

not know, then *they* would not have deceived *themselves*—for deceit presupposes knowledge of that about which we lie.

This split in awareness is usually coupled with a split in interests. The working middle class conservative may be aware at some level that he stands to gain much—in the long run—by coming to terms with the fact that his chances for upward mobility are insignificant. Yet he may also be aware at some level that the pain involved in doing this is—in the short run—great, and perhaps the effort is not worthwhile.

In a case like this, the researcher may find that her diagnosis of the self-deception meets resistance from the subject and yet that he, at some level, also acknowledges its truth. (One may find insistence in his words, but resignation in his eyes.)

On the other hand, lying to oneself may be quite beneficial in some cases. The national security officer may lose much and gain little by admitting to herself that her efforts at the Senate Hearing on nuclear weapons are motivated by interests in her own future employment opportunities rather than concerns over recent developments in Soviet armaments.

In both cases, the researcher faces a very difficult problem. To some extent, a diagnosis can be formulated in terms of observations of the subject and verified independently of the subject's assent. There are a variety of ways in which we can tell when people are kidding themselves, including characteristic types of gestures, postures, emotional responses, inconsistencies in words and deeds and discontinuities in reasoning. But it is very difficult to say exactly *how* they are kidding themselves. For their own understanding of what they are doing is tacit—you cannot purposefully and explicitly lie to yourself unless you have a genuinely split personality of the pathological sort. So the diagnosis of a self-deception involves the explication of some tacit understanding. And this, as we saw earlier, requires the assent of the subject for its full confirmation—or perhaps it would be better to say that such assent is required for its fully determinate and explicit instantiation or actualization. Tacit understandings and intentions cannot be fully known because they are not fully determinate.

This means that the researcher has a cognitive interest in eliminating self-deception. Psychotherapists cannot fully understand their patients until they have cured them. Social theorists cannot fully understand the false consciousness of a class, sex, or ethnic group until they get its members to raise their consciousness. Just as metal ore freed of random impurities is a more intelligible object of cognition, similarly people liberated from mental

illness or false consciousness are more intelligible subjects of research. They are more knowledgeable.

Deception of self or others is a species of a more general type of inadequacy in research subjects' self-understanding, namely: inaccuracy. Other sorts of inaccuracy—arising from errors or shortcomings in observation, judgment, or reasoning—are ones the subjects themselves have an interest in eliminating. With the researcher, they share an interest in learning what these inaccuracies are, how they have arisen, and how they can be prevented in the future. In that regard, this inadequacy is like the other four we have considered.

The criteria we have been discussing separately apply conjointly. The webs of interpretations people use to understand their own activities usually have all five flaws we have discussed. In part, this is because such webs are networks of holistically related interpretations in which flaws in any one part inform—or, rather, misinform—the other parts. But in many cases, a particular focus of our thought or our response to a situation is infected directly with all five flaws at once. This is perhaps most often the case with the responses we tend to classify as emotions.

Someone honks a horn or shouts at us and in anger we honk or holler back. Or one nation's ambassador performs the diplomatic equivalent of shouting and the ambassador of another answers in kind. We are vague about why we are angry and what we intend to accomplish with the shout. We are perhaps tacitly acting as though we believed that no one should ever shout like that and that shouting only escalates irrational confrontation and so, in accusation, we—inconsistently—shout back. We have only a partial understanding of why they honked or hollered and how they will interpret our response. And we inaccurately believe they did it deliberately to cause us pain or humiliation—rather than as a response to their own blind panic or as an attempt to warn us of an oncoming collision of cars or military forces.

In cases such as this, a more adequate understanding will alter our behavior significantly. And researchers who believe they have a more adequate understanding can put their theory to the test by trying to persuade people to adopt their account—and seeing if the behavior is altered.

So far, then, the upshot of our discussion in Part III has been this. To make peace with people, we need to understand them. To understand them, we need to engage in a holistic and participatory research which treats social reality as structured in purposive, value-laden, institutional and non-axiomatizable ways.

Further, our research must be a *critical* participatory one. It must seek to remedy the inadequacies of participants' own self-understandings which are

vague, tacit, inconsistent, partial and inaccurate. It must seek to do so through explications, rational reconstructions, elaborations that yield completeness, and critiques of inaccuracies that result from deception or error.

As researchers undertaking such inquiry, we find ourselves— except in cases of deception—in win/win relations with the people we are studying. Further, we have a cognitive interest in the kind of peacemaking involved in eliminating conflicts in their own practices, beliefs, and values as well as conflicts between their own understandings of social reality and those of the people with whom they interact. In the first respect, our cognitive activity is intrinsically *peaceable*. In the second, we find *peacemaking* (of a limited sort) is an intrinsic part of our cognitive enterprise. Even if our extra-cognitive interests are those of warmakers rather than peacemakers, we find that the limited forms of peacemaking specified above are an integral part of the proper method of social research itself. In cases of self-deception, we have a cognitive interest in liberating the people we study from their mental illness or false consciousness. (In cases in which they wish to deceive others, our cognitive interests place us in conflict with their practical interests.)

A key test of the adequacy of an account offered by a social researcher is the success she finds in getting subjects to assent to the account offered and adopt it in practice. An explication or reconstruction of someone's activity may be resisted by them, especially insofar as they are engaged in self-deception. But apart from this adoption, the account remains tentative at best. For the structures of the agents' actions are provided by their own self-understandings. It is the agents' intentions that constitute the social reality that the researcher seeks to describe and explain.

This last point applies to the book you are reading now. The book aims to offer a kind of holistic and participatory understanding of the practices connected with peace. If the explication, reconstruction, elaboration, and critique offered in these pages is rejected by readers such as yourself, this indicates the account is either false or has been misunderstood.

The account of social research and understanding which we have developed here differs markedly from the Galilean view which has dominated mainstream social science. Correlative to this difference in views of understanding is a difference in views of the nature of rational action. As we will see in Part IV, the distinctive, emerging views of understanding on the one hand and action on the other provide a framework for developing a conception of peace as a positively distinguished activity.

The two are closely related to one another. Mohandas K. Gandhi did extraordinary amounts of patient research in the course of his *satyagraha*

campaigns, but his inquiries were not searches for Galilean understanding of the sort aimed at by contemporary social scientists. And the research he did yielded a different approach to action—one which was distinctively non-instrumental in character.

CHAPTER 13

The Process of Action: Rational Activity as Cultivation

The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.

M. K. Gandhi

Action is born of understanding. While Galilean understanding prescribes one kind of action (the instrumental), critical social research prescribes another. Some of its peculiar features are already clear. For example, critical social research calls for certain (limited) kinds of peacemaking. It makes these a part of the research process itself. But there are even more profound differences as basic as those between an acorn and a catapult. Both can put oak in the air, but in very distinctive ways. One grows it upward, the other flings it toward the sky.

The Galilean view holds that we act rationally only when we know how we believe the world works, what we want (our ends), and how (through what means) we plan to cause our desires to be realized. Our beliefs about these things can, of course, be wrong. Rational actors can make mistakes. But we need to have clear beliefs about these things in order to be in the rational ballpark of people who are trying to rationally (instrumentally) manipulate means to achieve their ends. We surely will not receive grants from the National Science Foundation and we will probably not be viewed as rational agents if we cannot give clear answers to questions like: "What are your objectives, that is, what are you trying to accomplish? Also, what means do you plan to employ to achieve these goals?"

Many of us often have difficulty answering questions like these. In part this is because we are not perhaps as smart as we would like. But often the problem is more basic. There are many times when these sorts of questions seem inappropriate.

Suppose I am trying to write a novel or invent a new scientific theory, if someone wants a detailed account of it ahead of time—or he or she will only fund this activity if I say precisely what I am going to do—then I might as well not bother to apply for the grant. After all, if I already knew what the novel or theory was going to be I would not need a grant to spend time dreaming it up.

Consider another example. Suppose I lean over in bed and kiss my spouse goodnight and she turns and looks and asks: "Just what are you trying to accomplish?" I might very well find her question inappropriate. It is as though she has missed the whole point of the gesture. I was not trying to use the kiss as a means to accomplish some end. Instead, I was simply expressing something. Expressing what? Well, it may be rather hard to say. Perhaps it was an expression of affection for a loved one and coworker at the end of a long day—coupled with a sense of sympathy for her tired and aching body and a sense of how the stream of busy activity has reached the closure which bedtime brings. I might find it difficult to put this sort of thing into words. That's precisely why I kissed her.

The kiss provided a complex gesture that expresses what it was I had to "say." To ask me to translate is to suggest that she has missed the point. It is as though someone has just heard Beethoven's "Moonlight Sonata" and then asked: "What is he trying to say? I mean what, exactly, is he trying to accomplish?"

Peacemakers are often accused of acting in naive or even irrational ways, and plainly they often do so—like most of us much of the time. Gandhi, for example, made gestures and undertook projects that were not well thought out and proved to be counter-productive. And he frequently revised that complex practice he called *satyagraha* because it *needed* revision. But even his detractors often found themselves most admiring of those of his actions which seemed least sensible to them—the ones they would have never considered undertaking. Viewed instrumentally, his deeds seemed foolish. Yet they also seemed to have a peculiarly *admirable* foolishness—one that somehow showed up the wisdom of the more worldly instrumentalist actors around him. Paradoxically the seemingly irrational peacemaker's deeds can seem somehow to also be admirably sane or even saintly.

This apparent paradox loses its edge of oddness once we see that, in general, these "foolishly wise" actions exemplify expressive activities, projects, and practices that do not fit the instrumentalist model of rationality well.

This is *not* to say that they are irrational. In fact, if the assumptions of critical social research are right, then expressions, projects and practices are much fuller and in many ways more adequate examples of rational action than are instrumentalist actions (such as pushing down the lever on your toaster in order to brown your bread). They are distinctive because they involve emergence, internal reactions, and objective values. But this is precisely what one would expect of rational action once we admit that: (1) Intentions need to be made clearer and more explicit (by getting them to emerge). (2) Social reality is holistic in character. (3) Values are constitutive elements of the meanings that structure the social reality objectively out there.

If, in these respects, action is an organic process, then rational action will be like those activities of stewardship in which we try to facilitate organic processes like the growth of a garden or a forest—things which we speak of "cultivating." We speak, also, of "cultivating" shared insights, job opportunities, friendships, the cohesiveness of a seminar group, law practices, and language proficiencies. Notice, then, that just as instrumental manipulation provides us with one model of rational action (on the Galilean view), cultivation provides us with another (which draws on the critical social research conceptions of knowledge and social reality). What, then, are expressions and projects and practices and how, as forms of cultivation, are they related to one another?

EXPRESSION

When a creative poet or musician sits down to compose, she does not, at the outset, know what the result will be. There is no pre-envisioned poem or melody she is trying to make. Many artists, of course, have little or no interest in expressing anything and their work starts, typically, with a technical puzzle or possibility that their media offers. But the artist aiming at *expression* starts, instead, with a kind of experience not unlike the sort William James ascribed to babes, namely, "a blooming, buzzing confusion." There is a confusion of which she is aware but not fully conscious in any clear way.

In the process of attending to this flow of inchoate experience—and stabilizing and organizing it—she comes to find out what she feels and believes. A recurrent word finds its place in a phrase, a vague theme takes shape as a melody line. Images are gathered and their interrelationships are developed in an increasingly coherent pattern. A word choice reveals a tacit

judgment that is explored and linked to other thoughts. In the process, an artistic structure emerges which offers an interpretation of the confusion with which she started. It is an interpretation or "reading" of her feelings and thoughts which synthesizes them in an organic flow.

If you compare this process to a standard instrumental act like putting bread into a toaster in order to make breakfast, the non-instrumental character of such expression becomes clear. The cook has a clear and determinate conception of the end he would prefer to achieve: lightly browned whole wheat toast. The artist has, at best, only a vague sense of what the finished poem or musical composition will be—precisely because this act is a creative one, an act of expressing a confusion which she becomes fully conscious of only in the course of attending, stabilizing and organizing the confusion with which she starts. The cook has well defined types of materials (bread) and tools (a toaster) to work with, means whose natural properties he knows well. The artist is uncertain of how this or that word or phrase or dab of paint added here or there will affect the resulting piece.

This process of expression is one of self-discovery. In it, artists *find out* who they are, what they feel, how they think the world hangs together, what they want and how they are trying to get it. But they find these out *in* the process, as they engage in the activity of expression. They do not and cannot have precise understandings of these things at the start—the way the instrumentalist model of action requires. The activity of expression does not presuppose such self-understanding, *it provides it*. And such understanding is emergent and holistic, moving from vague and tacit awareness to the increasingly clear and explicit integration of elements in an organic whole. These features are shared by other forms of cultivation as well, projects and practices. A further feature common to these modes of cultivation is that they are regulated by objective values.

The sense in which the values that regulate expression are objective is rather minimal, but significant. There is, of course, a clear sense in which the values expressed in art seem so subjective as to be at a polar extreme opposite to the objective claims made by science. In physics we must confront public facts that either match our interpretations of reality or do not. In art it seems as though we are free to use interpretations to express whatever we feel like expressing. And this is true. *But we cannot choose interpretations that express what we do NOT feel like expressing*. What we cannot do in art—at least not if it is to express well—is to choose interpretations that express what we do not feel. Our feelings are unfixed, unstable, inchoate and open to alternative readings. But they are there, there to be expressed. The process of art is one of self-discovery, not self-

invention *ex nihilo*. In that sense, feelings are like the facts a scientist observes in making experiments. They are not arbitrarily invented, they are found.

These feelings we find in confusion and try to express are not publicly observable fact. Others can learn what they are only insofar as we are successful in expressing them. But if we lapse into cliché or repress associations or force transitions or compose works mechanically, others can tell. What they can tell is that we have failed to adequately express our feelings—whatever they were. We have failed to adequately attend to them, stabilize them, and organize them. In the process, we have deceived ourselves, and it shows. It is not, of course, as though there is some simple and perfectly reliable test that is foolproof. But people who are not fools can get reasonably reliable results by employing "lie detectors" of a wide variety of kinds—not just machines that measure galvanic skin response but perceptual and linguistic skills that enable us to spot the evasive glance or the pat phrase that indicates someone is avoiding coming to terms with a part of reality. The values that regulate expression are thus objective in a minimal but twofold sense: *what* is to be expressed is given or discovered and not merely invented, and *that* it has or has not been expressed is something that can be determined by others in reliable ways.

Like other forms of false consciousness or self-deception, the kind that occurs in failed expression takes place in a curious no-man's-land, at the border between vague awareness and focused attention. We are not fully conscious of the feelings we have not adequately expressed—to become fully conscious of them we would have had to express them successfully. Yet we are not wholly unaware of them—if we were, they would not have formed part of the blooming buzzing confusion *there* to be expressed. So there is a choice made when we deceive ourselves about our feelings—by choosing to gloss over their detail with cliché or obsessively focus on some at the expense of others. But the choice is not a rational deliberate one; it is a spontaneous decision to attend further or flee, to come to terms with who we are or hide ourselves from ourselves.

The spontaneous decision to lie to ourselves involves a corrupting of our consciousness. Like cold deliberate lies, these self-deceptions at the edge of our attention tend to require extra lies to be maintained. This is true not only in art works made by professionals but true as well of the countless gestures made each day in which we seek to express ourselves. We greet someone or gesture as we converse in a meeting, pacing our words to achieve apt expression of the feelings and thoughts we are trying to share. And we find that the false smile requires false handshakes and false words to

be sustained. With his gift for (perhaps overly) strong and pointed statements of insights, R.G. Collingwood pointed out the significance of this in a way that indicates its relevance to our understanding of self-deception or false consciousness in social affairs at large:

Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art. It is important to each one of us that in making them, however much he deceives others, he should not deceive himself. If he deceives himself in this matter he has sown himself a seed which, unless he roots it up again, may grow into any kind of wickedness, any kind of mental disease, any kind of stupidity and folly and insanity. Bad art, the corrupt consciousness, is the true *radix malorum*.²

Self-deception about our feelings leads to a distortion of our self-understanding and must be sustained through patterns of avoidance and suppression whose dishonesty breeds irresponsibility—and all the manifold forms of sins of thought and action that irresponsibility breeds and nourishes. If the spontaneous choice to decline the expression of feelings is not the root of *all* evil, still it is certainly the root of much. It is the ground level form of lack of integrity and fidelity to truth, the germs form of failure to understand and act upon our own values in responsible ways.

Expression of the unstable and inchoate elements of experience begins a process that can bear fruit in other kinds of activities—projects and practices—which are also non-instrumental in character. The non-instrumental features of expressions are worth reaffirming with one further example, before going on to consider these others.

Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was widely and rightly viewed as an expressive act. But the notion of expression many people had in mind was different from the one developed here. He was reported as "sending signals" and "making a bold statement," as though his trip was a series of bits of information that could have been encoded in a computer disk and mailed to the Israelis. What was the point of actually going instead of simply sending such disk or a letter? One view would be that it simply served to give force to the statement, to show he really meant it.

Alternatively, we might view his act as expressive in the sense characterized above. Viewed thus, Sadat was someone who did not know very clearly how he expected things to work, who he was, what he wanted to achieve or how he was going to accomplish it. Surely he had some notions about these things. But if we view his trip as an expressive activity, we see it

as one in which he was busy finding out answers to these *things in the process* of making the gesture. In the activity of greeting, speaking, responding, choosing appointments, composing his face and waving his pipe he was synthesizing his blooming and buzzing notions and feelings—he was engaged in a kind of self-discovery which could have failed. His diplomatic gesture could have failed not only in the sense that it could have led to no breakthroughs in the peace process. It could have failed by lapsing into cliché, mechanical gesture, and suppressed feelings—the way attempts to make works of art may fail.

Many of the activities popularly associated with peace work (especially forms of "witnessing" such as holding vigils, demonstrations and rallies) can succeed or fail in the same ways—as non-instrumental expressive processes that aim to structure and communicate self-understanding that synthesizes experience of a complex, fluid situation.

PROJECTS

Often, as we become conscious of our feelings and thoughts in expressions, we are led to try to make the larger world of fact more adequately reflect our values. So we undertake projects aimed at altering the shape of our environment. Sadat's visit to the Knesset led to the project of the Camp David peace talks. Often expressive letters to congressional representatives or expressive conversations with friends provide a self-understanding and consciousness of concerns and beliefs that lead to projects such as a petition campaign, the starting of a school, or the writing of a book.

Projects of this sort involve cultivation at another level of explicitness and clarity. We are as yet still unsure of precisely what we are doing and why, but we do have some tentative definitions and working hypotheses. What distinguishes such projects from tidy instrumental acts are the ways in which we "work with" such notions and the ways in which the projects take on a life of their own. We work with our general ideas about what we are doing and why. We also try to get such notions to further emerge in less vague and tacit ways and critique them for consistency, completeness, and accuracy. Such emergence is an organic process. As we will see, it typically involves the pursuit of multiple ends in ways that (in contrast to instrumental acts) involve internal relation between means and ends—and values that are objective in more than the minimal way characteristic of expressions.

Suppose, then, that you are beginning some project such as a petition drive or a set of negotiations and you are rather vague about just what you aim to achieve and how you intend to accomplish it. How might you go about trying to get your ideas to emerge and get your project to take shape?

Studies of group dynamics and problem solving provide one important source of insight. They have not yet yielded any mathematical laws of group dynamics which can be applied by social engineers. But these sorts of studies, along with critical reflections on consciousness raising techniques like those developed by feminists in the late 1960's, have resulted in the cultivation of clusters of skills that can often be very effective in making our values and beliefs clearer and more explicit and enable us to critique them for consistency, completeness and accuracy. Role playing, playing devil's advocate, and brainstorming are not just little gimmicks people can use; they—as well as a variety of other techniques—have been cultivated as subtle and effective arts.

Aesthetic theories provide another important resource. One way to get our values and beliefs to emerge is to critically reflect on our expressive activities—viewing them as works of art to be analyzed in order to make values and underlying beliefs more explicit. (Why did I begin the letter with those words? Why did I wear those clothes to the meeting?) The aesthetic categories used in studying novels and dramas are especially useful because a project is, of course, not reading another person's story; he is "writing" or acting out his own. But he can project a tentative script with key themes, characters, definitions of the setting and plot, and if he is pursuing the project intelligently, he will.

For example, suppose I am trying to negotiate a peace settlement between the government of El Salvador and the guerillas of the FMLN. Perhaps I have a few informal initial meetings with representative from each group and some third parties. I may find that my physical gestures and eye movements turn out, upon reflection, to suggest certain themes that also emerge in the verbal metaphors I employ. Perhaps they are themes of circular tables for negotiation, circles of overlapping communities, and reciprocal relations between religious and economic and political interests which are non-aligned rather than standing in bipolar oppositions.

Alternately, I might find myself led to focus on themes of integration and metaphors of spiral structures—perhaps seeing the key issues as turning on problems in integrating the peace process in El Salvador into the larger patterns of development in Central America and the Americas at large. I may loosely typecast myself in a role like that of Athena who, in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, brought an end to blood feuding by establishing an independent

jury who could decide the case in an impartial way. Or I may picture myself in a role like Carter in the Camp David talks, going back and forth between parties to mediate by developing a single text that both could consent to.

I may conceive of the setting of my work as being located in the larger arena of international diplomacy or I may view it as occurring in a local frontier in the no-man's-land between two warring factions. With regard to the plot structure of the project, I may, with Kissinger's shuttle trips in the Middle East in mind, project a series of episodic dialogues that will escalate in frequency and intensity until they reach a climatic resolution. Or I may project a plot more like the one that led to the denouement of the Vietnam story.

Or it may be that after projecting themes and characters and settings and plots like these, I may reflect on them in a self-critical way and come to the conclusion that the scenario I envision presupposes an authorial point of view which it is inappropriate for me to adopt. Perhaps racist assumptions or cultural chauvinism have led me to picture myself as a kind of Shakespeare writing in the lines for others when in reality my own role will have to be much more modest and peripheral—more like that of a secretary merely taking notes at a meeting, making sure the coffee pot is full, and running errands when asked.

We cannot impose narrative structures on reality in arbitrary ways. But we can project them as tentative ideas, as working scripts which we revise as we go along. Furthermore, we not only *can* project such scripts, we *do*, and we do so continually. Indeed, we have to do so. Without some general narrative that relates our immediate actions to the past and future we cannot make our own moment to moment deeds intelligible to ourselves. The question is not whether or not to act in terms of such scripts. The question is simply whether we are going to do so blindly or in a self-critical and reflective way that aims at getting our projects to emerge in clearer and more orderly patterns.

If we adopt the latter alternative, cultivating their emergence, we find that distinctive kinds of structures emerge, ones in which means and ends are internally related to one another in organic ways—in ways that traditional action theory and traditional ethics fail to illuminate. For those theories suppose that rational action is, at a minimum, *instrumentally* rational.

In Kantian or utilitarian ethics, actions must be described before they can be evaluated and the descriptions of individual rational actions are thought to characterize them in terms of circumstances in which some means adopted provides an efficient cause of the end desired. Means and ends are externally related. There is nothing in the definition of an end (such as

lightly browned toast) that tells you what means (a toaster or a fireplace?) is required to achieve it.

In contrast, when we are cultivating a business partnership or a marriage or are engaged in some other project, it is typical to find internal relations between means and ends. Often these internal relations are conceptual rather than casual in nature. For example, suppose I want to establish a relation of trust or love with a partner or spouse, or achieve a legitimate peace accord between warring parties. If so, then I must pursue these in trustworthy or loving or legitimate ways.

This is not so much a matter of empirical fact as a conceptual truth. Part of what it *means* for a relationship to be loving is that it was developed and sustained in loving ways. Part of the definition of a legitimate peace accord includes the requirement that it be arrived at in a legitimate way. The same goes for business contracts. If my partner wants me to sign a voluntary and legally binding agreement, holding a gun to my head simply will not do the job. The illegitimate coercion would make the contract invalid in a court of law—and if he wanted a voluntary agreement, then coercion could not, *by definition*, be employed to get it.

In general, means and ends are internally related in a conceptual way when the ends we seek are defined in terms of the process by which they are brought about. This is a point that Gandhi was much struck by. He thought of his brand of non-violence as a kind of "truth force" that could be a seed that would provide the means for growing a free society governed by free consent. And he saw that free consent could not—by definition—be coerced. It is this basic insight into the relations of means and ends that motivated much of his theory and practice.

Projects also involve internal relations between means and ends that are of a different sort, ones that are not conceptual. These arise because our projects typically involve the pursuit of multiple ends.

Suppose you have begun some political project like a petition campaign. Usually there will be a variety of values you are seeking to realize. Perhaps you want to educate voters, influence politicians, motivate involvement, build an organization, promote communal solidarity, and cultivate citizens' democratic political skills. As the petition campaign gets rolling, elements of the project may begin to support each other. What is a means to one end may turn out itself to be another end of intrinsic value on its own—one which is promoted by the use of other means or the achievement of other ends.

For example, to secure a petition signature you find with some individuals that it is necessary to talk at length and educate them on the

issue. In doing so, you may find that such talk serves as an important channel for recruiting active membership for the organization sponsoring the drive. To take another slant on these kinds of connections, notice that if you build an educational component into your business meetings this may make it possible for members to be more intelligently and actively involved in running the organization itself. This in turn will make it possible, perhaps, to operate in a less hierarchical manner and to arrive at decisions through a process of genuine consensus.

The adoption of consensus procedures in governance (as distinct from mere majority rule) may lead people to demand fuller understanding (and education) on an issue before they assent to a plan and it may also provide an opportunity for more diverse points of view and sources of information to enter into the decision process. The result may be not only better decisions but also greater individual commitment and organizational solidarity. Here, education, governance by consensus, and a strong sense of community may each be valued as intrinsic goods but also as means—each being a means to the other.

Of course things do not always work out so neatly. In fact, sometimes educative sessions make people realize how little consensus they share—and how unwilling they are to identify themselves with each other. But organic relationships of the sort described here are not only common, they are usually the moving force that gets a project to "take off" and take on a life of its own. Anyone trying to start a school or begin a business must seek to find and foster just these sorts of interconnections. But there are sorts of things that give projects integrity. In planning projects or envisioning them, this is the sort of thing that leads us to say that the project "makes sense" as a whole: its parts are both goods in themselves and reciprocal means as well—each being means to the other.

The emergent and organic features of projects give a distinctive kind of objectivity to the values that regulate them. The values pursued in projects can, of course, be objective in the minimal sense that values found in expressions are: they are discovered rather than merely invented and their discovery can be successful or fail in ways that disinterested observers can check. But there is a kind of objectivity involved in projects.

Suppose you are planning a petition campaign like the one just discussed. You value both education and governance by consensus. Very well, but what precisely are they? You will surely have at least some rough conception of these when you start. But it is also very likely that you will find your understanding of them developing as you work on the project. At first, perhaps your idea of education is that it is the flow of information from

the knowledgeable to the ignorant. And you may conceive of consensus as a kind of voting system that simply requires a majority vote not of 50% plus one or $\frac{2}{3}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$ but of 100%. As you work on the project, however, you may find two sorts of things happening.

On the one hand, you may find your understanding of each of these central values changing. Sometimes the change will just consist of the rejection of a former view in favor of an entirely new one. More often the change will occur as a development in which critical reflection on your actual use of the idea in practice leads you to make aspects of it more explicit—and perhaps view things formerly overlooked as the most essential features of the values. For example, you may find that the most important thing in successfully persuading potential petition signers is not giving them information but getting them to think through their own convictions for themselves through dialogue with others. In the process, you may find that your conception of the thing you valued, an "educated citizen," shifts. It may shift from the notion of a "citizen supplied with the facts" to a "citizen who has acquired the skills and concerns relevant for thinking through his or her own convictions."

Probably you would want to say you had both notions at the start and still hold to both. But a shift in emphasis has occurred. You have come to view the second, formerly tacit notion as more essential. Likewise, you might find that in working on a consensus basis you are led, increasingly, to view consensus as something other than a voting rule that requires unanimity. You arrive at the view that it is a process that requires shared understanding and agreement on the details and merits of a proposal. Again, this discovery may involve continuities in your earlier and later conceptions of the value of consensus. Shared understanding was, perhaps, a tacit part of your earlier idea and you may still think that consensus requires that no one say no to the proposal. But, that said, it may remain the case that a basic shift has occurred, a shift in what you consider to be the most essential to the value.

The other kind of thing you are likely to find is that as the means and ends you pursue become more internally related, your understanding of each begins to inform the other. You begin to think of education as a shared dialogue that cultivates understanding and moves toward consensus. Conversely, you begin to understand governance by consensus as inherently educative activity—rather than seeing it as a rule regulating a political bargaining process.

Such developments in your understanding of your values take the form of discovery. We find these things out; we do not make them up out of thin

air. In projects, this sort of discovery is typically a social rather than private process. Most of the values we seek to promote concern joint activities, and the values are features of these activities—they are not just private feelings or personal preferences. This gives values a kind of objectivity that involves an independence from our individual wills. The notions of education and consensus with which you start are ones you learned from others and they are constitutive meanings—values define the practices shared with others. To discover what is most essential about them is to discover something about these shared notions and shared practices, not just something that is true "for me" or "for you" as an individual. To discover that internal relations between practices of education and consensus develop is to discover something about the ideals that regulate the community of which you are a member. It is not just a discovery about your own "utility preference curves."

In making important decisions about work, marriage, business ventures, and community plans, people often find themselves guided by shared values that are emergent. They may speak of "having a leading," "finding a calling," acting according to their "lights," or listening to "a still, small voice." And they speak of following these as though they were engaged in a journey whose destination they do not know but which they can discover as it emerges from beyond the horizon.

If you look for discussions of these emergence-centered notions in twentieth century discussions of ethics you will look largely in vain. To a utilitarian or Kantian who adopts a Galilean notion of knowledge and an instrumentalist account of action, such notions are essentially unintelligible. They come off (at best) as vaguely superstitious notions concerned with experiences beyond the pale of rational deliberation and clear-headed overt action—as though people with leadings, voices, callings and lights lived in a pre-scientific world of dryads, naiads, and extra-sensory powers. But once we begin to think of activity in terms of cultivation that is guided by participatory understanding, these notions of emergent values seem neither superstitious nor irrational. They are central to the experience of rationally pursuing open-ended projects.

Once a project is completed, or even well underway, it is often possible to give a clear and explicit account of its rationale in reasonably near instrumental terms. In retrospect, we can develop "rational reconstructions" of what we were trying to do. But this permits us to give a rational account of the product of the activity, not its process. It tells us what we figured out in the course of pursuing our project, but not how we figured it out. To understand the process itself as a rational one—and to cultivate

such projects in a rational way—we need to employ non-instrumental categories.

To sum up for the moment, we see in the notion of a project that we have a conception of a rational human activity that involves the cultivation of: (1) emergent structures of experience, (2) means and ends which are internally related in conceptually ways and in reciprocal organic relations, and (3) values which are objective not only because they are discovered (like the feelings we express) but also because they are discovered to be constitutive features of a shared social reality regulated by values that are independent of our individual wills.

Projects of these sorts often result in the development of institutionalized activities which share the same features of emergence, holism and objective values but which introduce further distinctive characteristics as well. These provide a third type of non-instrumental activity, a third kind of cultivation.

PRACTICES

Some human activities require practice and repetition if we are to perform them well or even if we are to learn to perform them at all. This is a central feature of what is meant here by "practices." Examples would include law, medicine, chess, tragic drama, diplomacy, teaching, and scientific research. A second feature of this is that they, like projects, involve the pursuit of multiple ends which are internally related to the means to them. A third characteristic is that they have practitioners who have already achieved some notable degree of excellence. In this sense, they have a tradition, one which is typically borne by participants in institutions of a formal sort (such as the ABA, the AMA, and the local chess clubs). Such traditions usually require that someone learning the practice undergo an apprenticeship. But as apprentices become masters, they learn that the tradition not only can be passed on, it can be extended and deepened. It can be cultivated in new directions and with greater profundity.

Practices grow out of expressions and projects. In some cases, like that of the origins of Greek drama, their genesis is largely unknown. In other cases, a fairly detailed—though almost inevitably complex—history can be given.

For example, there are many things that would need to be included in a complete account of the origins of Gandhi's practice of *satyagraha*, but two key parts of the story would concern an expressive gesture he made and

a political project he undertook. The expressive act occurred when he was riding a train in South Africa and was ordered to leave the first class compartment which was reserved for whites. He refused to leave but passively let himself be thrown off the train without a fight. The particular way he made this gesture (and the particular ways in which it echoed and elaborated earlier experiences and coalesced his attitudes toward the British) made the act a kind of seed, a seed of insight and commitment. It, among other things, led him to undertake a political project—organizing the South African Indian community for a petition campaign. And in the course of pursuing this project and finding it take on a life of its own, Gandhi began to develop a number of the key doctrines and techniques that were later gathered in that subtle and complex practice referred to as *satyagraha* or "truth force."

Practices emerge out of expressions and projects and they are sustained by continued expressions and projects that make up a part of their fabric. So they share the same non-instrumental features that expressive activities and projects have. But practices also introduce other significant types of holism, emergence and objectivity in values.

One of these concerns holistic and organic (or internal) relations. In practices, there are reasonably definite kinds of episodes which are the units of repetition in which the practice is rehearsed (or *practiced* in the narrow sense) and performed. The central unit of activity in a practice is not the means employed to achieve an end but the rehearsal in which we practice for a performance.

Unlike instrumental means and ends, rehearsal and performances are internally related in a way as yet untouched upon. For often rehearsals are themselves performances, and performances are themselves, in turn, rehearsals for subsequent performances. People practice law by practicing at law, and when they are practicing at law they are—usually—practicing law. In the narrative process by which we would recount the story of someone involved in a practice there are, then, internal relations of two distinct types. Not only are there organic relations between the means and ends employed in each episode, there are also organic relations between the episodes that make up the narrative.

Two distinctive types of emergence also come to prominence with practices. One is glacial and sometimes hardly noticed. It is the kind of evolution by incremental changes that occurs in the development of traditions—but which cannot occur in projects because they are of such short duration. The other is of more importance. Typically a tradition of practice gets reflected on in relatively systematic ways. Participants begin to develop

a body of theory to explain the functions of the practice, how it could best be taught, and how it can best be cultivated. I am not referring to academic theories here, but to the critical participatory theories that practitioners themselves are led to develop.

These theories—and the debates that they elicit—do two things. First they accelerate the process of the critical cultivation of the activity by making it an explicit aim that is undertaken in a reflective way. As a result, they may lead to the more rapid emergence of less tacit and more consistent, complete, and accurate accounts of the practice. In doing this, the theorists typically are led to draw on earlier expressions, projects and episodes of performance that form the basis for their tradition. Cezanne's work is of importance to later painters not simply because it is good work but because it is exemplary in crucial ways, ways that reveal things about what the painting as a practice is about. Similarly, the actions of early Quakers provide a testimony that is a continuing source of revelation for contemporary members of their Religious Society of Friends and Gandhi's work provided exemplars for the civil disobedience of Martin Luther King.

Second, such theories usually bring to light tensions in the tradition. They highlight inconsistencies and alternative visions of the direction in which the practice should develop. They often even serve to create tensions—by being inadequate and yet attractive theories of the practice. In doing so they may generate dialogue and a creative interplay between theory and practice. Much of the history of early twentieth century painting could be narrated as a series of attempts to remedy the gap between inaccurate theory and actual practice by altering the practice. Likewise, much of the development of *satyagraha* can be understood as the attempt to wax eloquent in high sounding moralisms that laid Gandhi open to charges of hypocrisy—which he remedied by revising his practice.

The dialogue about theories which members of a tradition use to cultivate their practice is, in many ways, the paradigm of rational activity. But it is not a speculative activity; it is an eminently practical one. And yet it is not a string of instrumental acts. To elaborate the point, consider the activity of reasoning together in dialogue. If we try to think of a dialogue as a sequence of interactions in which people use words to manipulate one another in order to cause their desired ends to occur, then... well, we simply are not talking about *dialogue* any longer. For it is the very essence of dialogue that we not know what we are trying to achieve and how we intend to accomplish it. The point of dialogue is to raise questions and seek answers, not act on answers which we already know. Once we stop sharing a quest, the discussion is over and all that remains is propaganda or

advertising—both of which are, of course, clear examples of instrumental acts.

Now notice that rational dialogue is itself in many ways a definitive example of both rational activity *and* of a practice which can be cultivated. Then note that the non-instrumental features of dialogue are shared by other practices which are central to rational thought and action such as scientific research, legal practice, and business negotiation. Finally, draw this conclusion: cultivation provides a conception of rational thought and action which is superior to the Galilean and instrumentalist models.

This is not to say that the latter are bankrupt, but only to insist that they are fairly limited accounts that need to be placed in the larger perspective provided by a theory of cultivation that takes into account the intelligent but non-manipulative activities that are central to inquiry and action.

Practices, then, involve distinctive forms of emergence and internal relations. They also involve values which are objective in ways that go beyond those characteristic of expressions and projects. Architects and natural scientists can evaluate their peers' work in terms of the critical theory, guiding visions, and past exemplars of excellent achievement which provide standards for assessment that are independent of the feelings of individuals or the specific emergent values regulating a particular project in their tradition.

Objective values also come, in practices, to take the form of prescriptive rules and virtues which require participants in a tradition to undergo self-enlargement and self-transformation.

Most traditions of practice come to be defined by rules that characterize the standard episodes of their performance, rules that enable us to tell what counts as an argument in a court of law or what counts as a move in chess. These rules are prescriptive in the sense that they tell us how one ought to act if she is going to obtain legal standing as an attorney for the defense or how he can and cannot move a pawn if he is going to continue playing chess. But they are also descriptive in the sense that they characterize what the practice does, in fact, involve. These rules have a conventional character in the sense that they can be revised. But they are not arbitrary in that they are not expressions of any individual will. They are objective features of social reality that provide prescriptions that are constitutive of the practice.

Another sort of prescriptive style—with a similar sort of objectivity—enters in whenever practices are associated with institutions. And typically they are. For institutions that monitor performance, certify practitioners and

promulgate sound training are, for many complex practices like medicine and law, indispensable. Without such institutions the practices cannot flourish. Such institutions must employ rules to define membership, govern themselves, award prizes and honors, and so on. The value of having such rule, and the reasons for obeying them, are something that Kantian and rule utilitarian arguments have made commonplace. If people violate the rules that these institutions rest upon, then the institutions break down. If borrowers habitually lie to banks, then lending becomes impossible—unless some remedy to prevent such lies is found.

Communities that seek to promote a practice and secure its flourishing need to train the characters of their initiates. They need to get them to internalize the values that structure the practice and make its cooperative pursuit possible. This means that they must teach virtues. And typically, apprentices can learn to excel at the practice only by internalizing these values and acquiring these virtues. Such education of character usually requires a process of self-enlargement and self-transformation.

The game of chess is defined, in part, by certain rules that prohibit cheating. The child who cheats has, in an important sense, stopped playing chess. The same is true of natural science. The researcher who falsifies data is no longer pursuing science *per se*. In most games and practices honesty is a virtue that participants must acquire if they are to perform well and if the practice is to survive. (Games like "I doubt It" in which players are *supposed* to lie provide exceptions, of course.)

The child or scientist may be tempted to cheat in order to win candy, tenure or other sorts of external rewards. But both must acquire the strength of character that enables them to resist such temptation. They do so by growing. They internalize the values of playing fair and remaining honest because these are values that are internal to the practice and define it.

Honest assessments of performance are likewise required for the mastery of a practice. The would-be artist must learn to give and take in "crits" in an honest way. He cannot simply prefer works because they were made by friends or because he fears the counter-attacks that will be made on his own work. To be unjust or cowardly in these ways is to refuse to cultivate the kind of honest and accurate judgment that is the life blood of successful evaluation and performance. So courage and justice provide virtues that (at least usually) must be internalized by the participants in a tradition.

There are a variety of other virtues that are more specific to particular traditions. The student of law who has not internalized the values of due process or respect for evidence has, in an important sense, not really become

a lawyer. He or she has not yet fully internalized the role of lawyer which the practice defines. Kindergarten teachers must acquire the virtue of being disposed to give warm and loving support. College teachers must acquire the virtue of being respectful and challenging. Surgeons must acquire the virtue of cleanliness.

To speak of acquiring these virtues is to say something not just about the specific actions these people perform but the kind of characters they acquire—characters defined by the sorts of motives that dominate their decisions. The beginner may enter law or research for the glory or go into medicine for the money. If so, he is motivated by external rewards that could be gotten in other ways and that can, at times, be gotten by violating the rules of the practice. There are cases of scientists winning significant status with falsified data. But typically, to perform the practice well you must learn to "be at home" in the practice, "live" in it, "be" a lawyer or researcher. You must enlarge the number of things you value by internalizing the values that regulate the practice. You must transform yourself.³

However, the worth of internalizing such roles and virtues and the value of following prescriptive rules that are constitutive of practices or institutions can be called into question. This kind of question has, in fact, been the sorest sticking point in ethics since the Enlightenment: If I stand to gain by violating the rule (by cheating at chess, say, or lying in a court of law, or fudging my data in a scientific paper), then why should I care if my violation will make my act not count as a legitimate performance of the practice—or undermine the institutions that help the practice flourish? If I can enrich myself without enlarging myself, why acquire virtues? If I can go uncaught, why not get away with murder? What's in it for me?

People who would reason in this way are egoists. Because Kant and the utilitarians thought that, as a matter of natural fact, people are, by nature, egoists, they found it difficult to deal with this question. There is, however, a rather striking argument that Ralph Barton Perry, an early twentieth century American philosopher, offered to refute egoism. It may at first seem glib but turns out, upon reflection, to catch hold of some important truths—ones that reveal something important about practices.

The egoist holds that what is good is precisely what is good for his own self. Period. Perry's refutation was simple and direct: There is no self, *ergo* egoism is false.

The conclusion does not seem to flow. If I have no self, then plainly I cannot define the good as that which is good for myself—unless I simply mean to say that there is no good. But what could it mean to say that there is no self? Or, even more puzzlingly, to say that *I* lack a self? Who is this me

that is doing the lacking? Stated this way, the question makes such a refutation of egoism sound silly, or at least paradoxical. But suppose we counter with another question: Very well then, who (or what) are you? At that point the shoe on the other foot begins to pinch. Clearly the egoist needs to answer the question: What is a self?

There are two sorts of answers that can be given to this question, each of which must be taken into account. For there is, in some peculiar way, both a self that I am and an I that is this self. The one is an object of thought. It is the self that think I am—or discover I am—when I ask: *What* (or who) am I? The other is not an object of thought but the subject, the thinker who, in the first person singular, asks himself: Who am *I*?

Another way to get at this distinction is to note that I may try to find out things about my self by taking a look at my self. I may look in a mirror at my body or I may look at my speech patterns and gestures as they appear on tape or as they are reflected in responses other people make. Or I may look at actions or my habits or my personality traits or my peak experiences or my roles in various institutions. In all these cases, there is the self that I discover when I do the looking—the one that is the object of my visual gaze or my reflective self-examination. But in each case there is also the I that is doing the looking.

This subject-self, the I that views myself as an object, is difficult to define—and for a very good reason, that Martin Buber came squarely to grips with in his study of *I and Thou*. As soon as we try to define the I, we are viewing it as an object of thought—as an "it." So the very thing we wanted to describe disappears—by becoming a "thing." Buber concluded that I cannot acquire a spectator's knowledge of the "I." I can only cultivate my self-awareness of the I that I am by participating in the activity of thinking and acting with others and the larger world that encompasses me. In doing so, I inevitably lapse into thinking *about* myself and others—and viewing me and them as objects. Nonetheless, when this happens I can shift gears and reestablish an active orientation as I think and dialogue with others like you.

The notions of "I" and "you" are not, then, descriptive concepts that can be accounted for by Galilean social science. They are words that serve to acknowledge and avow a participatory understanding of the nature of dialogue and the process of cultivation. These words also provide an indispensable core of our understanding of what it is to be a person worthy of respect rather than a mere thing available for manipulation. And this notion of personhood is at the heart of much of our talk about the kinds of values many people take to be the best candidates we could offer for that

special status of genuinely trans-historical objective values. The notions of universal human rights and cross cultural moral truths are often tied to just this notion of persons as I's and you's. And yet the notion seems indefinable—*by definition...* so to speak. Is there any way in which this puzzling notion could provide the basis for discovering values (such as basic human rights) which are trans-historical and objective in the strongest sense of the term?

This is a question to which we will return later. The answer is yes, but the reasons can best be understood once we have gotten clearer about the nature of peace as an activity and, in particular, its limitations.

And this is something we are ready to do. We now have conceptions of reason, social knowledge, and action which permit us to fundamentally rethink the nature of peace—because they offer us models of rational human life which are not conflict centered.

Maieutic reasoning provides us with an account of how people can reason together without viewing their differences of opinions as oppositions. They may view them as parts of an emergent consensus in which an understanding organic relation between insights and facts is cultivated. Critical participatory reasoning provides us with an account of social knowledge that pictures researchers and the subjects they study as engaged in a cooperative inquiry (except in cases of deception)—a dialogue aiming at an understanding that often requires significant (though limited) forms of peacemaking. Cultivation provides us with a model of rational action in which people are not instrumental agents seeking to manipulate each other but participants in the activities of shared expressions, projects and practices. Natural scientists who engage in joint research projects employ—and exemplify—all three of these basic networks of categories. In choosing to reason maieutically to cultivate a tradition they themselves reflect on critically as participants, they choose to do so without appeal to guns. They resolve their differences by treating them as parts of problems to be solved rather than conflicts to be fought over.

It should also be clear that the categories of reasoning, social knowledge, and rational action developed so far are intimately connected. Each adopts common views of the nature of meaning, truth, feeling, reason, values, the self, and community. Is there an activity of peacemaking in the realm of social concerns that adopts this same network of categories and would enable us to deal with our differences in the ways in which natural scientists do rather than in the manner of propagandists, legal prosecutors, authoritarian parents, and diplomats whose ultimate appeal is not to reason but to conventional weapons and "peacekeeper" missiles?

THE PROCESS OF PEACE

Part IV

Peace is a dynamic thing; the detection, even the forestalling, of occasions for the quarrels; the checking of the process by which the non-agreements thus constantly generated harden into disagreements (not without the use of force) are softened into non-agreements; and the dialectical labor whereby occasions of non-agreement are converted into occasions of agreement

R. G. Collingwood¹

There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.

Motto of the Fellowship of Reconciliation

CHAPTER 14

The Opening Way

To argue that the nature of peace has been obscured by our dominant culture of conflict is to assume that there is something positive and distinct—"real peace"—*which is there to be obscured*. Is there?

Part III has brought us closer to an affirmative answer. It developed a network of categories that provide alternatives to the conflict-related ones discussed earlier. The relevance of those non-conflict categories should be commencing to clarify.

For example, the accounts of critical participatory understanding, maieutic reasoning, and cultivation characterize social research, reasoning, and action as having cooperative aspects essential to them as activities. In the discussion of research methods, we have even seen that some significant (though limited) forms of peacemaking are an inherent element of research as a cognitive enterprise. Might peace be a kind of cultivation that employs maieutic reasoning and critical participatory research?

Before considering this, note that regardless of how we answer that question the arguments of Part III can stand on their own. Whether or not the answer is yes and whether or not *that* makes any difference to you, you ought consider the independent merits of the models of research, reasoning and action developed here. If you find peace of no interest, or even if you view it as a positive evil, the arguments of Part III claim to show you ought to adopt those accounts anyway.

The central core of the arguments springs from three key theses about the nature of the human understanding by which social reality itself is structured, namely, that it is: (1) holistic, (2) participatory, and (3) emergent. In effect, what the earlier discussions did was draw out the consequences these claims have for our views of research, reasoning, and action. Because these latter views rest on a common core of theses, they are in strong affinity with each other. If you adopt the critical participatory account of social research, then you will be led to view rational activity as a process of cultivating expressions, projects, and practices. If you adopt the cultivation model of activity, then you will find yourself committed to views of

meaning, feeling, reason, value, truth, and the nature of the self that provide you with a maieutic (rather than eristic) view of reasoning.

These ideas are general in the sense that they are basic. But they are not abstractions that only concern intellectuals who busy themselves with a technical subject matter. They are categories that are rooted in everyday experiences we all share and disciplined practices we can all pursue. They provide the recipe for a systematic transformation of our culture. Insofar as we commit ourselves to cultivating these ideas and their consequences, we take up tasks that affect the way we raise children, create art, pursue business projects, revise our religious practices, formulate public policy, reason with our spouses, evaluate the performance of employees, and read books.

The integrity of the resulting network of categories constitutes one of its significant merits. And this serves, indirectly, to make the central theses of Parts I and II plausible. In and of itself it does not, of course, show that there is something we could call "real peace" which is there to be obscured. But it does show that there is a systematic and arguably better network of categories that can be adopted in place of the ones shown, in Part II, to commit us as well to the correlative conception of peace as a static (though perhaps "tranquil") absence of vigorous and conflict-ridden life. We now have alternative notions of social knowledge, reasoning, and action; can they supply us with an alternative (and less obscure) concept of peace?

Among the activities of cultivation people can pursue, we would have to include expressions of hatred, projects of oppression, and practices of warfare. Notice, furthermore, that there is no reason why a team of high-ranking officials could not employ maieutic reasoning to plan strategies for nuclear confrontation. And one of the better examples of critical participatory research is Clausewitz's classic, *On War*. To say that the conceptions of cultivation, maieutic reasoning, and critical participatory research commit us to views of activity intrinsically involving cooperative elements is not to say that they commit us to thoroughly peaceful views of activity. The questions still remain: With whom shall we cooperate? In what ways? For what purposes?

We may, in the end, want to conclude that peace is a positively distinguished activity, a kind of cultivation that employs maieutic styles of reasoning and critical participatory understanding. But to do so, we need to distinguish it as a species of cultivation distinct from other member of its genus. What distinguishes the campaigns of war from the campaigns of peacemaking or *satyagraha* undertaken by Gandhi? Furthermore, how do we

decide which of these species of cultivation is, in any particular historical context, the best to pursue?

In turning to consider what peace is and when it is wise, we move beyond the question Part I began with: What is *actually* meant by people when they use the word "peace"? The aim at this point is rather to ask, in a critical fashion: What *should* you and I mean by the term?

How Should We Define Peace? The Peace That Is a Way

What should we take "peace" to mean and what theory of peace should we adopt? One upshot of Part III concerns the kind of thing we are doing in formulating a theory of peace and the appropriate method for going about this project.

Notice, for example, that we should expect that in actual usage the term "peace" functions as a family resemblance notion, the way "politics," "status," "sex," and—most relevantly—"war" do. We should expect that its usage is not governed by an unchanging and axiomatic essence but is, instead, held together by overlapping threads of characteristics rooted in diverse practices.

If we were lexicographers, "word cartographers" of some sort, we would want to develop a kind of detailed map of the term's terrain—comparing and contrasting the varied actual usages of the term in phrases like "peace of mind," "world peace," "making peace with one's maker," "the peace that passeth understanding," "peaceable," "peace offering," "peace pipe," "peace at any price," "peace time," "Peace!", "at peace," "come in peace," "peace treaty," "peaceful relations," "officer of the peace," "keeping the peace," "peacemaker," and "Prince of peace." We would also want to carefully map out the diverse concrete contexts in which we use variants of the term and related words like "pacific," "pacifier," and "pacification."

But we are not professional lexicographers. We are attempting to explicate and critically reconstruct a central set of notions and practices which interest us as participants in our culture. In the end, the question is not so much "What *does* 'peace' *really* mean when people use the word?" as: "What is it that *we* are *trying* to mean when we talk of peace?" We should expect that common usage is imperfect and that our concern should be to answer for ourselves the question: "What *ought* we to mean by 'peace'?"

There is no need to be obsessive about the usages we choose to emphasize and adopt. Many disputes and confusions can be eliminated by simply distinguishing different usages of the word and marking them off in some way. Furthermore, many of the various usages may turn out to simply

involve what Aristotle would have called "derivative" or else "equivocal" senses of the word and its cognates. We can, for example, characterize "peaceful" and "peacemaker" as notions derived from "peace" in the same way we view "war-like" and "cold warrior" as terms derived from "war." Further, we may obviously mean rather different things when we use the one word, "war," equivocally to refer to things more properly distinguished by phrases like "world war," "gang warfare," "class warfare," and "the war between the sexes." Analogous phrases can be used to sort out distinct notions of peace.

But Aristotle himself supposed that for a key term like "peace" or "substance" or "the good" there was always some central and privileged sense, one *from* which the others were derived and which made relations between various usages intelligible—"substance properly so called" or "the good *per se*."

As an empirical hypothesis in lexicography the assumption that there are such primary and essential meanings is quite dubious and probably false, at least in most cases. However, if we treat it as a methodological maxim for critical social theory it does provide a useful regulative ideal. It tells us to *seek* to systematize our usage by coordinating it in terms of some one or a few central meanings that illuminate relations between different ways of talking and acting.

In the case of "war," it would seem that we ought indeed to think in terms of a central or core sense of "war property so called" or "war *per se*"—one that consists in the notion of an activity of battle in which nations engage in acts of armed conflict. If no community of people had ever sought to shed the blood of another in order to impose its will upon them, we might well altogether lack the concepts of war and all its cognates. In any case, the various things we speak of in terms of war can probably be most clearly coordinated in terms of their relations to this central notion. It is only because we can use this primary sense as a starting point that we find it helpful to see riots as episodes in a "class war" and see squabbles between couples as part of the "war between the sexes." That brings us to the puzzle we started in Chapter 1.

There, we gathered various strands of usage around a core conception of peace that turned out to seem fundamentally obscure. In sorting out the primary and central concept of peace, we arrived at a view in which there was a missing term in a pair of ratios. Our notion of a *state* of war finds a correlate in the concept of an *act* of war, but for our notion of a *state* of peace there seems to be no adequate corresponding notion of an *act* of peace. We can talk of nations warring, but we do not seem to know what it

would mean for them to be "peaceing" and we cannot even speak of this without violating the grammar of English—and many other Western languages as well. The even more striking disparity between the two "ratios" is that the "denominator" of peace, the notion of it as a static condition, is a kind of obverse set, a conceptual zero or place holder which is defined (at least typically) in terms of what it is *not*, i.e., it is not war—or is an absence of conflict, hostility or aggression.

Despite the obscurity of this concept of peace, we found that it could serve to coordinate our talk of peace and it was intimately tied to a network of assumptions and practices that are dominant in our culture. If we accept the eristic view of reasoning, the instrumental model of action, the Galilean view of science, and the modern institutions in which these are entrenched, it seems as though we *ought* to adopt the conception of peace as a static absence. But if we reject those assumptions and practices of the culture of conflict and adopt the network advocated in Part III, then what core notion of peace should we adopt?

The notion of peace we should make central and primary conceives of it as a positively distinguished activity. We should think of "peace *per se*, peace proper," as something *done*. The case in favor of this "denominator" concept is a polymorphous one. It does not rest on some single knockdown argument. Its merits rest, instead, on a network of views and overall appeal based on the strength of its explication, reconstruction, elaboration, and critique of our talk and action associated with peace—as well as those glimmerings of meaning that come upon us from time to time when we are led as parents to shout "PEACE!" or when we reflect in a moment of solitude and feel our busy lives called into question by some vague awareness or distant vision of a more meaningful and humane life. We should not suppose that the account accurately characterizes what "peace" did mean once or actually does mean now. The point is simply that the account offered below explains what you and I should agree to mean by it in the future.

We may start by recalling that negative definitions of peace provide an inadequate explication of what we are trying to mean by it because they end up being too broad. Ecocide would provide a state in which there is an absence of war, but we would not normally refer to a radioactively sterilized planet as a place of peace. We want to say, at a minimum, that peace involves an absence of war *in which there is life*—human life.

Consider next the case of two communities of living humans who are on neighboring islands in the South Seas and who interact very little apart from occasional sharing of common fishing grounds. We might say they are

"at peace" but want to distinguish two sorts of situations. In the first, their conceptions of their interests and the ways they choose to pursue them make war likely, and in the second these do not. In the one case, they are war *prone*; in the other, their relations are *peaceable*. In the second case we could further ask: Just how "able" at peace are they? If they are able to sustain frequent and intense interactions without recourse to war, then we would want to say that they are more "peaceful" in some strong sense of the term. Notice, then, that nuances in our word use suggest that we want to say that peace proper involves more than just human life absent of war, human life which merely avoids wars through isolation of communities and disinterest in others' actions. Peace in the strong sense of the term somehow involves living *in peace together with* others, not merely being "at peace" in an absence of interaction with them.

Now it is also fairly clear that we would like to mean by "peace proper" something that somehow involves some notion of agreement, though it is not clear precisely how agreement is involved or what kind of agreement is at issue. But we think of peacemakers as, among other things, people who resolve disagreements. We think of peace treaties as agreements which are reached and we think of the kinds of peace made between spouses or unions and corporations in a similar way. Feelings we associate with peace (such as harmony or tranquility) are thought of, in a derivative way, as *agreeable*. One way of characterizing what is meant by making peace with oneself is to say that it consists of coming to terms with oneself, and this is another way of saying that it involves a resolution of inner conflicts arrived at as a kind of inward agreement. So it seems natural to think of peace as a state of living with oneself or others *in agreement*. But what precisely is agreement, and are there any limitations on the kind involved in peace proper? These questions take some sorting out.

The way we tend to think about agreement usually assumes what logicians refer to as the "law of the excluded middle," the view that each belief or proposition is either true or false and cannot be both or some other, third, sort of thing. Adopting this view and the assumptions behind it, we tend to contrast belief with disbelief and agreement with disagreement. We tend to think of belief (or disbelief) as the readiness to affirm a proposition's truth (or its falsity) and tend to think of agreement as a situation in which two or more people each affirm one or more propositions. Disagreement, on this view, is the other alternative, the opposite case—consisting in one party affirming what the other denies.

This gives us a picture which is both too narrow and inaccurate. It is too narrow because it overlooks a third attitude we can adopt toward a claim,

namely, doubt. Rather than believe it or disbelieve it we may simply be uncertain as to whether it is true. Furthermore, and this is really rather important, *we may very often even be uncertain as to what the claim means*. Similarly, people may converse for a bit and yet remain uncertain as to whether *each other's* claims are true or, even more commonly, uncertain of what each other means. In such a case they neither agree nor disagree. They are in what we can call a state of "non-agreement"—just as we distinguish both the rational and the irrational from the non-rational and differentiate between the moral, the immoral, and the *amoral*.

Suppose someone says we need to start rehabilitating criminals and reforming our prisons and another replies by insisting that we need to start protecting possible victims and beefing up our penal system. So far, there is no single proposition about whose truth they disagree. They remain in apparent *non-agreement*. We might expect the first to reply in a hostile way, taking issue with the things said by the second person. But notice that the opposite scenario is equally intelligible. The first person might reply; "Well, I guess we are agreed on our goals then, and the question is, how can we achieve all these things you and I both believe need to be done." When two people are in non-agreement because they have simply affirmed things that could consistently turn out to all be true, then their continued dialogue can generate either disagreement or agreement. It is open to both.

What is very often overlooked is the fact that many times we *seem* to be in genuine disagreement when in fact we are still in a state of non-agreement. Suppose Jerry says, "We need to strengthen our penal system," and Angela says, "No, we don't—that's the last thing we need to do." It certainly looks as though they disagree. But do they necessarily? It all depends upon what each means by "strengthen our penal system." It may very well be that Angela takes it to mean we need to "make prison life harsher and make prison terms longer." But Jerry may, in fact, not be clear as to just what he means but basically have in mind a concern with increases in thefts and bad checks and desire to have the penal system work more effectively in preventing them. And if their discussion continued on in the manner of a genuine dialogue rather than a rhetorical confrontation, Angela might soon find herself saying something like: "Oh! Well, if that's all you are really saying, I can agree with *that*. I just think it's silly to spend \$10,000 a year putting low income women into brutalizing jail environments because they've cashed \$273 worth of bad checks." And Jerry might reply: "Well, I can see what you mean about that, but the idea that we ought to just hold people's hands when they can't make ends meet because they've decided to get addicted to drugs is just a bunch of unrealistic liberal nonsense." And

Angela might reply: "But that's not what I meant!" And the conversation might continue.

Notice these phrases the conversation would turn on: "I see what you mean"; "Well if that's what you meant"; "But I didn't mean *that*!" Angela and Jerry are busy discovering that their apparent disagreement was in fact a non-agreement. Each meant different things by the sentences the one affirmed and the other denied. And in many cases, neither may be very sure as to just what she or he really meant. They may be figuring that out as they talk about their views.

This is what we should expect. Unless we went considerably astray in Part III, it is wrong to think of meaning as coming in unchanging atomic propositions and to suppose that belief consists in the simple affirmation or denial of these. Meanings are emergent and holistic, and believing is an activity in which we commit ourselves to the cultivation of one direction of emergence rather than another.

The implications of this are profound. It means that agreements are—like beliefs—things cultivated. They are not neat little packets of propositions that come pre-packaged and which we simply choose to accept or reject. They must emerge in holistic ways from the indeterminate context of our ongoing activity—a context that is indeterminate because it is rife with implicit, inconsistent, and partial views of whose accuracy we ourselves are unsure. Jerry and Angela are likely to be in profound *non*-agreement because each is unsure of precisely what his or her words mean and even less sure of what the other is saying. Until they cultivate their understandings of themselves and each other they can neither disagree nor agree. They can, of course, dislike each other's words and shout angrily in reply. But until they have cultivated a common set of meanings and cultivated their own views sufficiently to be clear about what they do and do not believe, they cannot be said to have arrived at genuine disagreement or agreement.

Instrumental action does, of course, have a place in the process of arriving at agreement or disagreement. We type a letter as a *means* to achieve the end of informing others about our views. We may introduce a stipulative definition as a means for achieving the *goal* of clearly communicating our ideas to others. But in trying to convert non-agreement into agreement or disagreement, we cannot know beforehand what the agreement or disagreement we are trying to arrive at will be or just how we are going to arrive at it. If we did, the job would have already been done and further dialogue would be unnecessary. The conversion of non-agreement into agreement or disagreement involves expressions of both concerns and

general views of reality, it involves projects of clarification and reconstruction, and it involves practices of research and negotiation. Notice then that activities of cultivation are at the heart of the processes by which we convert non-agreements into something else.

At this point, it may be tempting to suggest that we have arrived at definitions of both "peace" and "peacemaking" as well. Peace, we might say, consists of living with people in agreement and peacemaking consists in the cultivation of such agreement. But, at a minimum, this would seem to be a misleading way of putting things. Also, it would fail to adequately narrow down our concept of peace.

It would be misleading because despite the fact that it emphasizes that agreements emerge in a process of cultivation, it suggests that what emerges is a static and determinate thing. It makes it sound as though peacemaking is a kind of cultivation that gets us to "Yes" (as in the title of Fisher and Ury's *Getting to Yes*) and as though peace itself is a state of "Yesness," so to speak. But if we view beliefs as commitments to a kind of process (rather than affirmations of static propositions), then we should view shared beliefs or agreements in the same way—as shared commitments to a process. And this does, in fact, match up with our experience. Agreements are not so much something we work *out* as something we work *with*. The signing of a treaty or contract (or the shaking of hands or the "sealing with a kiss") is simply one more moment in an ongoing process that will continue. We do not just negotiate a treaty. We must continue to negotiate its interpretation and application. We do not just cultivate a resolution of a marital dispute; we must continue to cultivate the living out of that resolution.

In some contexts we have highly ritualized practices for highlighting rather decisive moments in the process of cultivating agreement. Wedding rites, signing ceremonies, and even the closing of a cash register drawer serve this sort of function. And our courts would become madhouses without acts like these that serve to give human relations definition. But notice that even courts recognize the dynamic and developmental character of agreements which is a vivid fact of everyday experience. A contract is acknowledged to be an agreement in intent which may be signified in a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees.

At the level of international affairs, the official signing of a treaty provides a mechanism analogous to a wedding rite. But notice that we find ourselves led increasingly to talk not about arms treaties but about the *process* of arms limitation—concerned not so much with the SALT II treaty as with the SALT II process. In dealing with the Middle East we tend more and more to talk not of *the* peace we seek but about the peace *process* in

which we are participating—and the same goes for talk about the Contadora process in Central America.

The point to note here is that "agree" is a verb. And it is what we might call a verb of ongoing activity rather than a verb of culminating activity. In this way it is like the verbs "to live" and "to love" which refer to activities that are successful only when they yield conditions appropriate for their continued performance. And in this way "to agree" differs from "to die" or "to win" which are verbs of culminating activity because they refer to activities that are successful only when they reach a final stage that brings the activity to an end.

The moral to draw here is that we can keep a more accurate perspective on what peace involves if we do not think of it as a thing that we make or a state that we reach but conceive of it as a process we undertake. It is an activity in which we engage. It is not a position to be adopted but a movement along a vector. It is a process of *agreeing*—the cultivation of a shared commitment to common expressions, projects, and practices.

But even if we think of peace as an activity of cultivating processes of agreeing, our conception may remain too broad because agreement can take different forms. The woman attacked by an armed rapist may agree not to shout. The prospective house buyer may agree to a purchase without knowing the termite-ridden timbers have been covered over. Such agreements are faulty—and, in a sense, are not genuine agreements at all—because they lack free and informed consent. Notice that the rape victim might say in retrospect that she did not really agree to keep quiet, she just obeyed. And the house buyer might argue in court that she most emphatically *did not* agree to purchase a termite damaged house.

Genuine agreement, in the strong sense of the term, involves a sharing of intent, a joint commitment based on voluntary and undeceived understandings that constitute "*the* understanding" on which we agree. But there is commitment only when there is the responsible exercise of choice. For this reason, children and others who are not judged to be competent and responsible agents cannot enter into legally binding agreements in the same way mature and sane adults can.

Analogous points hold with regard to peace. We can "pacify" people by giving them drugs, manipulating them with propaganda, keeping them illiterate and unformed, or terrorizing them. But this involves peace only in a weak and derivative sense of the term—we would be tempted to deny that people living quietly in blind or fearful submission are living in genuine peace. In the strong sense of the term, we would want to say that *genuine*

peace involves an activity of cultivating freely and responsibly undertaken commitments.

Once we acknowledge the dynamic character of agreement, this point doubles in force. It is perhaps tempting to think that the instruments at our disposal enable us to compel others to agree. But once we see peace treaties and contracts as moments in an ongoing process, we see that we cannot simply compel assent and then live with the agreements reached. We must get people to go on agreeing in the joint expressions, projects, and practices which they undertake with us. Unless we are prepared to manipulate them every step of the way—leading them by the nose—we must cultivate a choice on their part which commits them to working *with* "the agreement." We must cultivate a choice on their part which commits them to the voluntary, continued cultivation of these things.

When people distinguish pseudo-peace from the real McCoy, they often have one of two cases in mind. In one, the parties involved may not be currently engaged in warfare, but they are busily cultivating disagreements and the means to resolve them through armed conflict. In such cases, "peace" really means "war-in-the-making"—as William James said of Europe in his own era and would have said of the cold war in ours. In a second sort of case, genuine peace may be absent because genuine agreements of a free and responsible sort are not being cultivated. Instead, one party is dominating the other rather than seeking its uncompelled assent and autonomous commitment. The relations between antebellum slave holders and blacks and, also, the interactions between the Polish government and the Polish people provide examples of this.

This second kind of case is the sort at issue when Micahel Walzer distinguishes "peace-with-rights" as the sort of thing he is interested in and when Johan Galtung talks of "positive peace" as an absence of injustice, oppression, and forms of "structural violence." What they are after is the real McCoy. But they end up giving us a compound notion of "peace plus"—peace plus rights, justice, liberation, or structural non-violence. They leave the concept of peace *itself* negative. This tends to obscure the fact that when injustice is imposed by oppressive resorts to violence and threats, then people are not genuinely agreeing with each other—and *genuine* peace (not just peace plus something else) is absent. Injustice is a symptom of the absence of genuine peace and oppression is a means of securing this absence. Peace proper, peace in the strong sense of the term, is best thought of, then, as a process in which people freely and responsibly cultivate shared commitments to common expressions, projects and practices.

This account of the core meaning of peace enables us to explicate equivocal and derivative senses of the term. Having defined peace in this way, we can characterize a *state* of peace as a situation in which this activity is occurring. Relations may be said to be *peaceful* insofar as they involve this activity or make it more likely or easier to engage in. *Peaceable* folks are ones prepared and inclined to engage in the activity. *Peacemakers* are ones who actually do so.

Some of the weaker senses of the term and its cognates can be understood as privative versions of peace proper. They may be situations in which some contributory conditions or elements of the process are present but not others. Perhaps people are "at peace" because they are afraid to fight or "at least they've started talking to each other." Or perhaps they have been "pacified" by some concession.

"Making peace with oneself" may be said to consist in cultivating personal commitments free of ambivalence—ones that no longer leave me "of two minds" or "at odds with myself." "Peace of mind" involves such cultivation and perhaps also "peaceful feelings" that consist of those kinds of harmony and tranquility associated with the successful pursuit of such activity.

At this point we have arrived at a fairly rich notion of peace—albeit one whose riches need considerably more unpacking. One reason the notion is rich is that the analysis of Part III provides us with three networks of categories that can be used to characterize in detail the type of thing peace involves. In saying that it is a process of cultivating agreements, we are saying that it employs *critical participatory research* and *maieutic reasoning* to pursue shared commitments to *expressions*, *projects* and *practices*. And because of the groundwork we laid in Part III, these key terms say a great deal.

For example, they serve to distinguish peace from things like traditional legal practice which employs eristic styles of reasoning. It also distinguishes peace from policy analysis and social engineering that adopt Galilean styles of research to pursue social knowledge. And it also distinguishes peace from simple instrumental acts (like pushing a toaster lever or shooting a duck in order to eat it) by characterizing it as a process that involves the non-instrumental features of cultivation which we examined in detail.

What further distinguishes peace from maieutic reasoning among torturers, critical participatory research undertaken by war strategists, and cultivation of modes of oppression like slavery can be summed up by characterizing what it is that is cultivated—namely, agreement. Not

agreement of any old type arrived at in any old way but genuine agreements. These have five distinct characteristics: (1) They are voluntary. (2) They address common concerns. (They are not just forms of isolation that let people "live and let live" on separate islands.) (3) They rest on a knowledgeable and mutual understanding arrived at through critical participatory research. (4) These researches have yielded agreements that all parties find they not only *do* accept but believe they *should*. (They are not just "agreements" to submissively *obey*.) (5) These agreements or "understandings" are ongoing commitments to share in the further cultivation of joint expressions, projects, and practices. (They are not static conditions in which people simply share dispositions to affirm some set of propositions or act in some predetermined way.)

To further unpack the meaning of the notion of peace we have arrived at, we need to consider some of the different forms these five characteristics can take. We should expect, after all, that key terms like "voluntary" will turn out to be family resemblance notions that mean different things in different contexts. We should expect this on principle because of the analysis of social reality offered in Part III. We should also expect it by analogy because other practices, such as scientific research, use key terms that mean significantly different things in different contexts. For example, "hypothesis" typically means something different when used by microbiologists interested in general theories than when it is used by geologists interested in explaining the origins of a specific mountain range. The concept of "experiment" at work when pharmacologists do "double blind experiments" differs in very important ways from the notion at work when astrophysicists perform "thought experiments." So we should expect that concepts central to our understanding of the methods of peace will likewise vary in significance when employed in different contexts.

This turns out to actually be the case, as we shall see in the next chapter. There, we will look at some of the traditions of peacemaking which serve to give us a richer understanding of the various forms that the activity of peace can take. This will further serve to help us appreciate both the potential and the limitations of the process and go on in a subsequent chapter to consider when it is and is not wise to pursue the activity of peace.

CHAPTER 16

Three Ways of Practicing Peace

Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and re-awakens the love that was lying dormant in him; the two again begin to live in peace; nobody takes notice of this. But if the two brothers, through the intervention of solicitors or some other reason, take up arms or go to law—which is another form of the exhibition of brute force—their doings would be immediately noticed in the press, they would be the talk of their neighbors and would probably go down in history. And what is true of families and communities is true of nations.

Thousands, indeed tens of thousands, depend for their existence on a very active working of this force. Little quarrels of millions of families in their daily lives disappear before the exercise of this force. Hundreds of nations live in peace. History does not and cannot take note of this fact. History is really a record of every interruption of the even working of the force of love or of the soul.¹

The activity of peace is not something novel and untried. The cultivation of shared commitments to expressions, projects, and practices is something people have practiced for a long time—though they have not always explicitly identified this activity as peace. Three particular traditions in which people have tried to cultivate excellence in this kind of practice may serve to illustrate the variety of forms that peace can take and suggest some of its possibilities and limitations. One is the Gandhian practice of *satyagraha*. A second is the Quaker process of consensus.

The third is the process of "principled negotiation" which is being developed at the Harvard Law School's Negotiation project and is described in Roger Fisher and William Ury's *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. Fisher and Ury's work is representative of a very broad

and diverse network of practices being developed by a variety of groups such as the Community Board Program of San Francisco, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, the Mennonite Conciliation Service, the American Arbitration Association, Atlanta's Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Nonviolent Change, the Family Center for Mediation and Counselling in Kensington in Maryland, the Counsel for the Facilitation of International Conflict Resolution in College Park, and other groups. (I have chosen Fisher and Ury's book as representative of these because it is short and accessible and because at recent conferences at which members of these groups were present it was the one book consistently referred to as an introduction to the general approach to negotiation being developed by such groups.)

These three are at least as different as astrophysics, pharmacology, and field biology. While each is a variation of the general type of peace process described in the preceding chapter, they differ in the kinds of problems they focus on, the cultural traditions they originate from, the specific ways in which they conceive the basic features of the process of cultivating agreement, and the particular techniques they attempt to perfect. Without attempting to do justice to any one of them, we can indicate what some of these differences are and then look at each in a bit more detail to see how each hangs together as a tradition of concrete practice.

The Quaker process was first evolved as a method for collective decision making within a community of people who shared many common testimonies (such as simplicity) and who shared a common religious faith—a kind of "primitive Christianity restored." In contrast, principled negotiation in the "Harvard style" has been experimented with as a method enabling us to resolve disputes with people and communities who have very different value systems and views of the world but who are willing to engage in a "back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed."²

The initial impulse motivating the development of Gandhi's techniques was a desire to devise a way to enable Indians to achieve the *swaraj* or "self-rule" of personal liberation, communal autonomy, and national sovereignty free of British oppression. It aimed to achieve this through "a method of securing rights by personal suffering" that consisted in a "truth force" of "passive resistance" which is "the reverse of resistance by arms."³

The first and foremost concern of early Quakers was to find a method of resolving disputes within a single community. The focal interest of people

involved in the Harvard Negotiation Project was to deal with differences between often very different communities of people involved in negotiations with each other. Gandhian *satyagraha* aimed, in contrast, to provide a non-violent way of settling differences when one of the parties (such as the South African Boers or the British) were ready and able to employ armed force instead of diplomacy.

Regarding cultural differences, Gandhi's roots lie, in part, in Hindu religion and British common law. The Quaker process of consensus finds its roots in the seventeenth century practice of the sect called the Seekers who met in silence to wait upon the Lord—as well as in early Christian notions of the presence of a Christ who comes to teach and lead his people. Principled negotiation was evolved in a late twentieth century Harvard milieu of humanists interested in negotiations taking place in the shadow of domestic and international law. These differences in cultural origin are reflected in a host of philosophical and practical nuances that distinguish the three.

For example, members of the Quaker Religious Society of Friends and Roger Fisher might both describe the process of cultivating agreements as "seeking consensus." But Quakers would mean by this a process of "communal discernment" in which a group meets to jointly discover the Truth that speaks to Power and is grounded on the "light of God in every one." Fisher and Ury would, in contrast, explain their understanding of "seeking consensus" by talk of a process of negotiation in which different interests are (hopefully) resolved in an efficient, amicable and wise way that satisfies the parties concerned and does justice to the community at large. In the one case, the conception of a legitimate agreement is rooted in theology; in the other, it is rooted in a secular morality. The two roots are not, of course, incompatible in practice—as Gandhi's habit of appeal to both makes clear.

Such differences in philosophical and cultural background are reflected in the language used to express notions of cultivation, maieutic reasoning, and social knowledge—as well as in the way these notions are operationalized. For instance, so far as their models of action go, though all three employ biological metaphors associated with cultivation, Quakers and *satyagrahis* have a special affinity for metaphors drawn from nature—especially the vegetable kingdom with its seeds, roots, and branches. Harvard-style negotiators tend to opt more often for the contemporary jargon associated with "exploring options," "project development," and "stages of analysis, planning, and discussion" that aim to "reach closure on an issue."

These variations in dialect reflect, among other things, differences in views about who the key actors are and what temporal horizons inform their

work. The botanical metaphors reflect a perspective in which the key agents are not so much individuals as communities—whose central aims are long term and involve the evolution of the cultural ecosystem as a whole. Specific actions are undertaken as part of a peace process that witnesses to an alternative social vision and provides a way into the future. In contrast, the central emphasis in "principled negotiation" is on resolving present differences and answering the question: "Who should do what tomorrow?" While all three traditions involve types of maieutic reasoning, they differ in the terms they use to describe it and the particular ways in which they practice it. For example, Quakers most typically "follow leadings" that come in the Silence and "gather consensus" by patiently meditating on their concerns and the remarks of others. Harvard-style negotiators engage in "group problem solving" where people talk a lot, "brainstorm," and use newsprint pads to "multiply options" and keep track of their agenda. The wall full of magic marker scented paper is as characteristic of their process as the prolonged lapse into that great blackboard of the Silence is characteristic of Friends' meetings. For Gandhi, in contrast, communal dialogue most typically took the form of public hearings sponsored by activist groups and government authorities or written correspondence in the form of personal letters and newspaper editorials and replies. (During the South African campaign, for instance, huge volumes of letters were published and publicly responded to in the *satyagrahis'* paper, *Indian Opinion*.)

Though each of the three traditions adopts a critical participatory view of social knowledge, they are not very self-conscious or explicit in their talk about research techniques used to improve their understanding of either the practice they are trying to perfect or the specific situations in which they employ it. Fisher and Ury simply note, for example: "Drawing on our respective backgrounds in international law and anthropology and an extensive collaboration over the years with practitioners, colleagues, and students, we have evolved a practical method for negotiating agreement amicably without giving in."⁴ They do, however, clearly and explicitly adopt the view that the kind of knowledge they seek is of a critical participatory character:

What we have tried to do is to organize common sense and common experience in a way that provides a usable framework for thinking and acting. The more consistent these ideas are with your knowledge and intuition the better... No one, however, can make you skillful but yourself. Reading the pamphlet on the

Royal Canadian Air Force exercises will not make you physically fit. Studying books on tennis, swimming, riding a bicycle, or riding a horse will not make you an expert. Negotiation is no different.⁵

Advocates of Galilean styled social science who have been critical of this kind of "subjective" or "cookbook" approach have not been addressed—the cooks have preferred to keep their kettles hot and ignore epistemological issues.

In many respects, Gandhi was more methodologically self-critical than the Harvard group or the Quakers. However, he did not formulate the principles of his "experiments with truth" by contrasting them to Galilean social science. Instead, he drew on—and revised—principles of inquiry found, for instance, in independent journalism, British-styled "reviews of grievances," and "prayerful self-introspection and self-analysis." Perhaps the most distinctive element he added was an insistence that the leaders of a movement must share the lives (the food, clothing and daily habits) of the people they sought to represent. In his view, wearing a *khadi* loin cloth was not just a political *symbol* of solidarity with the oppressed. It was part of a life style that provided an indispensable *understanding* of the social reality in which most Indians dwelt.

The differences noted so far should not suggest that the assumptions and practices of these three traditions are incompatible. On the contrary, there is considerable congruity and overlap. But each offers distinctive resources for people who might want to practice peace and each is worth considering as a coherent body of practice in its own right. Since the Quaker tradition is, in some respects, the most limited in its applicability (being designed first and foremost for dealing with intra-communal differences) it is perhaps the best to focus on first.

THE QUAKER PROCESS OF CONSENSUS

A number of umbrella organizations within the Religious Society of Friends (such as the "yearly meetings" of Philadelphia, New York and London) have published books of "Faith and Practice." However, the Society is run in a grass-roots fashion without any hierarchy authorized to provide a definitive, official formulation of Quaker practice. What follows is simply an attempt to offer a critical participatory account of that practice which highlights issues of special interest to us here.⁶

It is a practice of democratic decision making which does not employ voting. Instead, concerns are raised, discussed, and prayed over until consensus is reached. This is an open-ended process and, at its best, the process is open in ways that lead to "openings"—new insights and perspectives that allow a "way to open" for the community to discern a truth held in common. It is an activity born of shared commitments and concerns rooted in a coherent set of ideas about things as basic as the nature of meaning and truth and practiced in a disciplined way that involves at least five distinct stages or levels of development.

Regarding the commitments and concerns of Quakers, these are perhaps best understood in terms of historic testimonies and queries that "address" or "speak to" them as specific individuals and communities. For example, traditional Quaker concerns about peace are not laid out in a code of abstract, impersonal principles that provide orders everyone ought to obey. Instead, the tradition offers us personal witnesses of people like John Woolman—who found himself led to go and travel for a time among his Indian brothers. They offer questions that give pause and ask each person to consider with care: "Do you live in the virtue of that life and power that takes away the occasion of all wars?"

Quaker attitudes toward their concerns—and toward the process by which they come to act on them—are rooted in fundamental beliefs about truth, meaning, reason, and the self.

First, Quakers view truth as something that happens; it occurs. Truth is not a dead fact which is known; it is a living occurrence in which they participate when they "speak Truth to Power." The origins of this view lie in the conception of the Christ as a living truth which comes as a presence whenever two or more are gathered.

Second, meaning is conceived of as a communal process. It is like a dance; there are individual bodies moving, but one dance is occurring. When Quakers gather the sense of a meeting in order to reach a decision, they do not speak of counting heads and to see who means what. Instead, they would say we should ask ourselves what we, collectively, mean. We may say many different things, and yet somehow speak with one voice. (George Fox, one of the seventeenth century founders of the sect, would have said that this one is the voice of Christ who "has come to teach His people Himself.")

Third, feeling and reason are viewed as continuous with one another. In this respect, Quaker men and women provide a good example of a community in which there is relatively little sex-correlated difference in views of feeling and reason of the sort characterized in Part II's discussion of eristic and maieutic styles of reasoning.

Fourth, the self is viewed as inherently social and transitional, becoming. However, Quakers find that their experience of communal discernment presents a reality that demands that we somehow acknowledge both the communal character of the self and the radical worth of individuals—free and responsible individuals addressed and conjoined in the paradoxical reality of relations between "I" and "thou" (or "me" and "thee"). Further, it would be a mistake to think that the Quaker tradition pictures the self as merely social—as though it were a secular artifact created solely by social forces. For they suppose that at the heart of the community in which they participate is a spirit—a spirit which grows out of each of us and yet also grows into each of us. Perhaps the paradoxical character of this notion is best captured by the early Christian metaphor that views individuals as distinct members of a unified body of Christ.

The actual process of collective decision making is described in terms of five stages or levels: "quieting impulses," "addressing concerns," "gathering consensus," "finding clearness," and "bearing witness." The five can occur in worship, in meeting for business, in hassling things out with a spouse or employer, in working for a Nuclear Freeze... they can occur through all of life and it is thought that they should. We can focus on one of the five at a time, in which case they seem like stages or steps. Alternatively, we can look at any given moment of the process and be aware of the ways in which all five should always be present. In that case, they seem like levels or aspects. The first, quieting impulses might also be called "stilling lusts" or "entering the Silence" or "centering down."

My typical and everyday frame of mind is fragmented. I am caught up by desires, fears, frustrations, angers, habits, role expectations and impulses of all sorts. Marxists would describe this in terms of alienation and oppression. Freudians would speak of sublimation and repression. George Fox would say that lamina state of sin, a slave of my lusts. And these lusts are the condition of all wars. They jut up through our chests and ball our brains into fists. They are mechanistic causes of our behavior. They do not lure us from ahead; they push us from below and behind.

The first step is to quiet these—not by stifling them, but by having them let go of us and by letting go of them, distancing ourselves from them, freeing up. Sometimes the simplest thing to do is just to satisfy these urges. If your nose itches in meeting for silent worship, scratch it. Sometimes it is simplest to just go off from the things that stimulate and aggravate these impulses. When you are mad at your spouse, you might do well to simply take a walk. (Helpful spouses often recommend this!) Another alternative,

instead of going away physically, is to go away mentally. Many impulses require this.

There are many techniques for getting such inner distance. One is simply to express your feelings. A loud scream can be a good start. An articulate and poetic expression gets us even farther. Rendering lusts more fully conscious serves to domesticate them. Another more difficult but often even more effective technique is humor. Laughing at ourselves brings distance, perspective. While Friends' anecdotes and traditional "jokes" are typically so dry as to be virtually unintelligible as efforts in jocularly, their business meetings are often punctuated by comments that make great fun—at the speaker's own, self-acknowledged expense.

Transcendental meditation is another technique for "quieting impulses." Other techniques include focusing on a flower or a goldfish or a passage from the Bible or a simple prayer. It is some such technique as these that many Friends seem to use at the start of meetings for worship when they are "centering down." People who practice the knack of this report the result with a variety of terms: warmth, loss of sense of self, sense of wholeness, sweetness, and even light.

This warm engrossing sort of light is the kind on which Quakers focused during the eighteenth century period of Quietism. It has a great deal in common with the various lights experienced in a variety of mystical traditions. It can free us up in the depths of the Silence and provide a kind of raw power for creativity that makes radically new beginnings possible. It provides the experiential basis for what Lewis Benson calls "neo-Platonic" Christianity.⁷ People caught up in it in meeting for worship tend to breathe slowly and smile.

There is a second sort of light more distinctive with Friends. Experience of it seems to have originated in the seventeenth century practice of Seekers who met in silence to "wait upon the Lord." It is central to the innovative corporate worship and group mysticism so distinctive of the Quaker tradition. It is not like a warm solar wave in which we are engulfed; it is like a beacon, or a variety of beacons, that beckon us on. In meeting, people called on by this second sort of light tend to grimace, change the way their legs are crossed—and occasionally feel their pulse accelerate as they find themselves about to speak. This beckoning light provides the experiential basis for what Lewis Benson calls "prophetic" Christianity. Most Quakers would hold that ultimately this light has the same source as the first (*the* Light), but for our purposes here it is best to think of the two as quite different. For the second leads to an experience of disturbed care—one

which is not a result of impulse or lust but rather of feeling called into question in addressing a concern.

After we quiet our impulses, we are ready to address concerns. These concerns may arise from events of the day; they may be raised by the words of another at a meeting for worship; they may simply come to us as words or images that keep coming back to mind—gnawing on us or haunting us.

It may often be hard at first to distinguish genuine concerns from just plain old mechanical habits of mind or personal desires, but they do have a different quality. They lure us on. You can shake your head like a hound dog at a cross-road, shaking off the lusty smells, raise your head, catch the scent, and feel called on. Furthermore, there is the sense that in addressing these concerns we find ourselves addressed by them. It is a bit like being an early Hebrew, praying in the wilderness, raising your voice to God... and then you hear a voice, "Abraham!"—and, with some trembling perhaps, you respond: "Here I am Lord." The Quaker queries provide a repository of key concerns of this sort, the kind that continue to address people alive today and call us into question in central ways. Most Quakers report that meeting in worship with others often serves to markedly intensify the sense of being addressed by an issue and by the concerns of their community. They find themselves addressed by a powerful silence which waits upon us and listens.

Once you have caught the scent and a glimpse of the light ahead or felt a "leading," the next step is to follow it. This is the stage of "gathering consensus" or "seeking clearness." You find yourself exploring different angles on an issue; others speak to it, filling in perspectives with fact and insight. Insight and understanding get deepened and connected.

The gathering of consensus is more than a political method for reaching decisions—one that simply requires that no one says no. And it should not be thought of as a process of brokering votes until everyone is ready to vote in favor of a proposal. Rather, its aim is to explore concerns and the reality we live amidst and seek until we find a view that does justice to the complexity of reality and rightness. In the Quaker tradition, consensus is viewed as a practice of communal discernment that yields not only agreement but truth—a truth grounded in something beyond us.

Such seeking can yield an understanding of many different points of view—both theoretical and practical—which have much insight to offer. It is assumed that we should draw on them all, trying to get each to "speak to" the other. It would, in many ways, be nice if there were some decision procedure for sorting these out—something like the greatest happiness principle of the utilitarians or the categorical imperative in Kantian ethics. But Quakers act on the assumption that there is no overarching principle for

adjudicating such differences; there is no master rule to put everything in its place. The trick is just to keep alternative points of view in dialogue until a genuine consensus is reached—one that, in business meetings, for example, is usually characterized as the "sense of the meeting." Such dialogue requires us to bridge between different languages and to create new language. It is for this reason that poetic metaphor is so commonly employed in the reasoning process. The tacit assumption is that to answer to that of God in others, we must draw on the Creator in ourselves.

The fourth stage or level of the Quaker process is what might be called "finding clearness." This is the stage of resolve, the stage at which people find themselves standing in the conviction of some truth. The function of this stage is like that of the moment of choice in other sorts of decision processes, but finding clearness differs from ordinary choosing in two ways. First, it is not a matter of subjective preference, of deciding of your own will between two competing alternatives. It is more a matter of discovering objective moral truth, of finding your destiny, your calling. Second, this finding has the character of discovering you are in the grip of something. It is a bit like a state I once heard a minister avow to his enthusiastic congregation on the radio. His refrain was: "I got somethin' in me! I can't shake it loose!" Such conviction involves a sense of being compelled. But not by being pushed from behind as with impulses. Instead, it is a matter of being pulled from ahead, or being irresistibly drawn on, lured with necessity by a destiny. It is the kind of feeling many people had in hearing Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech. When clearness is reached, something is experienced as a truth known by direct revelation. It is seen. The followers of George Fox believe in continuing revelation and think that, like him, they can know such moral truths "experimentally," that is, through direct experience.

There is no strict and infallible test to determine in general when a group has reached genuine clearness, but some indicators are useful. Clearness usually involves a sense of *openness*, the sense that we are aware of a wide variety of perspectives on an issue. This openness involves, further, a sense of *wholeness*, an integrity that comes when all the different positions are given their due and respected. A third indicator is *unanimity*. (The lack of this can, of course, take different forms. Someone may actually "stand in the way" of proposal or they may merely ask to be "minuted in opposition" or even simply remain silently uncertain but uninterested.) Fourth, there is a sense of *presence*. This sense comes from the present moment having a thickness of awareness; we have much on our mind and it is all coordinated. It is as though we are actors in a play which has many

levels of meaning, levels which we are aware of all at once. Socrates' many layered awareness near the close of Plato's dialogue, *The Crito*, would provide a good example of this.

These four indicators can be reflected in, and enhanced by the postures and gestures of our bodies—in the openness of hands and facial expressions, in the wholeness and integrity of the flow of our gestures, and in the general physical alertness and vital presence of our bodies. When experience achieves these features, we sustain a kind of inclusive focus in our activity. This inclusive focus is what many Quakers have come to mean by simplicity. Clearness simplifies. Such simplicity is not a matter of a lack of complexity in what we think about. Instead, it is a unity of our thoughts and deeds, a gathering of clear focus.

Such clearness can compel activity. This brings us to the fifth stage, bearing witness. The activity people find themselves led to may be verbal. For instance, they may find their breath and pulse rates accelerate and feel called to speak in a meeting for worship. Or they may find themselves led to do things in public or private life.

Such activity is not best understood as "action" in the instrumentalist sense of the term—the adoption of some means to achieve some goal. When George Fox refused to take off his hat before a judge, he knew it was likely to accomplish two things, make the judge mad and get George jailed. But he was not trying to accomplish either. Many tax resisters have good reason to believe they are not going to prevent the government from getting their money. Petitioners for the Nuclear Freeze may believe their activity may not do much directly to halt the arms race in the immediate future. What motivates the activity of such people is not, primarily, the hope of achieving some end such as peace (though they would not, of course, *exclude* that!) but rather it is, primarily, the conviction that they must bear witness to the truth. It is not, of course, that they lack ends or fail to employ effective means; it is that they think of these in a distinctive way—as parts of a process of cultivating expressions, projects or practices.

The guiding concern of people bearing witness is to live rightly, in ways that are exemplary. Insofar as they have *an* end they aim at, it is perhaps most helpful to think of it as the aim of cultivating their souls and converting others. They are not so much trying to find a way to get to peace as bear witness to the conviction that there is no way to peace; peace is the way. And this way of peace is one of bearing witness to those truths found in clearness when impulses are quieted and leadings are followed in the gathering of consensus.

Quakers are convinced that genuine leadings all proceed from a common ground, springing from a unity which they seek and find. It is a ground that they experience as a presence—not unlike the presence Martin Buber tried to indicate (but could not define) in his discussion of "I and Thou." This ground or source is experienced as having a style. It has a style of conciliation rather than aggression, of inclusiveness rather than dominance, of organism rather than mechanism. Further it has the character of care; it is respectful. Also, Quakers find themselves addressed by it. In these ways, it differs fundamentally from an ethical principle and is much more like a person.

Friends differ in their views about the metaphysical relationships between Jesus of Nazareth and this inclusive, organic, caring, respectful presence that addresses us. (Many find it difficult, for instance, to describe this presence adequately using only male pronouns.) But the significance of these speculative philosophical differences seems largely beside the point when contrasted with the common experience of this person-like presence which George Fox found himself describing with the words: "Christ has come to teach his people himself."

The foregoing description idealizes the Quaker process and is not meant to accurately report what Quakers everywhere actually do but only give an account of what many of them believe are the norms that regulate what they *ought* to be attempting. In the three hundred years it has been worked with, the process has met with some significant success as well as some noteworthy failures. But to say this is, in a sense, simply to note that it is not a theory but an actual practice employed in this world by real live human beings.

Many of the theologically tinged notions—such as "bearing witness"—are applicable to—and have roots in—very different religious traditions. Furthermore, much of the Quaker practice can be abstracted from its theological context and employed in every walk of life in which people attempt to reach decisions. The skill of "centering down," for instance, has been found to be useful in committee meetings and confrontations of all sorts. To take another example, in the early 1950's, Morris Llewelyn Cook described how the Quaker practice of "taking the sense of a meeting" (rather than counting votes) had been found to work well in business and government contexts.⁸ This phrase and the activity it describes have both come to be employed widely—often leading to the effective suspension of Robert's Rules of Order when a committee chair or a faculty senate president acquires the competence to act less like a parliamentarian and more like the "clerk" of a Quaker meeting.

For people interested in drawing on the Quaker tradition, two further points are worth noting. First, the use of the practice tends to transform individuals and communities in ways that make them more competent and committed to further use of consensus. The process tends to breed the conditions for its own further success. Second, because many elements of the practice have organic relations with one another, people who employ part of its techniques often begin to find themselves rediscovering and adopting others.

But the process can be abused in an inexperienced community when some of its members use the rhetoric of consensus to mask Machiavellian politics. Furthermore, though it can be employed in contexts where people are radically at odds with one another (as in divorce proceedings), it functions best where all parties involved are making honest efforts to arrive at the corporate decision that contains the fullest measure of Truth—regardless of its impact on their personal welfare. But how can peace be practiced efficiently and successfully when the parties involved are *not already* that peaceable? Roger Fisher and William Ury's account of "principled negotiation" offers a set of alternatives.

PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION

Suppose that I am making good faith efforts to reach an agreement for ending a family feud, settling an insurance claim, merging two companies passing a piece of legislation, or establishing a military ceasefire but the *other* guys, well... they are more powerful and they may not want to play ball at all, and if they do they'll use dirty tricks! What do I do then?

In *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, Roger Fisher and William Ury are interested in just these sorts of cases. But they start their analysis off with a somewhat simpler sort of difficulty.

Suppose I am negotiating with someone who turns out to be a "positional bargainer" of the tough guy sort described in Chapter 8. I seem to have two rather unattractive options. I can play tough in turn. But this may very well result in costly bluffs that result in a settlement that pleases neither of us—it results in a settlement at all. Or I can play softy. But that is likely to make me lose in a big way this time and probably give me a very undesirable reputation of being a patsy.

"Principled negotiation" provides a fundamentally different alternative—one that changes the basic rules of the game. It does so by rejecting some of the underlying assumptions of positional bargaining and

employing a variety of techniques that have proved successful in reaching a wise agreement in an efficient and amicable way—an agreement that "meets the legitimate interest of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account."⁹

Positional bargaining assumes that life is a zero-sum game with a fixed pie split between winners and losers. Principled negotiation assumes that the pie can often be expanded in size by finding out what *interests* are hidden behind people's bargaining positions. Two sisters fight over who gets an orange. They finally cut it in half and one squeezes her half to make juice and the other uses the rind of her half to cook with—and both throw their remainders away. What looked like a fixed pie (or orange, in this case) was not—and in a sense, *both* were losers. I may offer you only \$50,000 for the house you are asking \$58,000 for because I have short term cash flow problems and am interested in keeping the down payment low. If you find this out and offer to help me with the financing I may be happy to pay a higher price and we both may benefit.

We tend to think of differences as sources of conflict. But notice that it is precisely because people often have different interests and resources (usually hidden behind their opening offers) that it is often possible to invent options where both stand to gain. So two prescriptions follow:

1. Focus on interests, not positions.
2. Invent options for mutual gain.

And Fisher and Ury catalogue a variety of ways of doing these two things such as: asking people what they want, exploring their preferences for alternative kinds of agreements, imaginatively stepping into their shoes and adopting their perspective, talking about your own interests, defining interests in terms of problems (that might be solved in a number of ways) and brainstorming—and here "brainstorming" does not refer to mere random groping but a technique that can be practiced as high art.¹⁰

Positional bargaining also assumes that negotiation is a test of wills to see who can hold out the longest before "moving" on their offer, and it treats emotions as playing cards or bargaining chips—where a fit of frustration betrays weakness and a tirade signifies unswerving commitment. And this leads us to invest ourselves in our positions and confuse the "who's" and the "what's," the issues concerning the people *who* are negotiating and the issues concerning *what* they are negotiating about. We have a more accurate picture of what's going on and are likely to be more successful if we follow a third rule: Separate the people from the problem.

Both need to be dealt with. But often the emotions that are part of the "people issues" at stake are simply psychological responses to bodily

distress, perceptions of a situation, or beliefs about it. Furthermore, they tend to become obstacles to clear communication and productive thinking. If I simply respond to your emotions emotionally (with an "Oh yeah? Well, it'll be a cold day in hell before I'll..."), then the obstacles multiply.

If physiological distress or a body load of steam is what is at issue, I would do better to perhaps offer you a glass of cool water or simply listen attentively while you let off steam. If perceptions are the issue, then I need to examine them in a critical and dispassionate way. For example, if you perceive my posture as arrogant and are responding in kind, it may perhaps be that I *am* acting arrogant and I ought to stop—or it may perhaps be that I just have a stiff back from a bad fall and you ought to revise your perception of me. If beliefs are at issue then they need to be evaluated in terms of relevant evidence. For example, in a divorce mediation, if you feel threatened by the possibility that your wife (who has been violent in the past) might pull a gun from her purse and shoot you, then perhaps we ought to have a look in her purse.¹¹

What I should not do is uncritically assume that your distress or arrogance is a token of the weakness or strength of your commitment to a bargaining position. Nor should I uncritically respond to that with emotional tokens of my own firmness of will.

A fourth prescriptive rule of thumb brings us to the real heart of *principled* negotiation: Insist on using *objective criteria*. Positional bargaining assumes that there are no objective truths about what would be a fair price, a reasonable solution, or a just settlement—or that even if there are, these are irrelevant. All that matters is winning as much as possible by hanging tough as long as you can. But, at least usually, there are objective standards that can be agreed on and we are much better off employing them.

For example, if you are negotiating a settlement with an insurance adjustor who is offering what you think is too little for your destroyed car, you can appeal to a variety of standards that are out there to be observed and which exist independently of your wills: blue book value, original price minus depreciation, typical prices asked at local dealers, or the going price asked in local papers for similar cars. In divorce settlements and a wide variety of other contexts, legal court precedents or government standards can be used to determine what would count as reasonable, fair, or just.

Even if no substantive standards are ready to hand, often an objectively fair *procedure* for arriving at a settlement can be devised such as taking turns, drawing lots, or letting a respected third party decide—perhaps using "last-best-offer arbitration" in which the final position of one of the two parties must be chosen and so each has a marked incentive to make a

reasonable offer. There are a variety of other procedures that can yield an objectively fair decision by using an objectively fair method:

Consider, for example, the age-old way to divide a piece of cake between two children: one cuts and the other chooses. Neither can complain about an unfair division.

This simple procedure was used in the Law of the Sea negotiations, one of the most complex negotiations ever undertaken. At one point, the issue of how to allocate mining sites in the deep seabed deadlocked the negotiation. Under the terms of the draft agreement, half the sites were to be mined by private companies, the other half by the Enterprise, a mining organization to be owned by the United Nations. Since the private mining companies from the rich nations had the technology and expertise to choose the best sites, the poorer nations feared the less knowledgeable Enterprise would receive a bad bargain.

The solution devised was to agree that a private company seeking to mine the seabed would present the Enterprise with two proposed mining sites. The Enterprise would pick one site for itself and grant the company a license to mine the other. Since the company would not know which site it would get, it would have an incentive to make both sites as promising as possible. This simple procedure thus harnessed the company's superior expertise for mutual gain.¹²

But, of course, this kind of principled settlement is difficult—and at times impossible—to reach if one party is more powerful than the other, refuses to negotiate on principles, or uses dirty tricks. What should we do then?

The nature of power is often misunderstood—especially when we think in positional bargaining terms. We tend to suppose that power is a kind of fluid or energy that comes in varying quantities and that the guys with the big bucks, the fancy offices and the pin stripe suits are the ones who have the most of it. They are the ones with the confidence (justified by the POWER behind them) who can hang tough in a test of wills with the little guys. But this assumption completely misunderstands the nature of negotiation.

When people negotiate with me, they are trying to get me to choose an alternative—the one they are offering. What determines my choice does not

have (or at least *should* not have) anything to do with their wealth, their high rank, or their office full of status symbols. For me, the question is: Is their alternative better than the others available to me? If I have a more attractive option, then I will turn them down—regardless of how much "power" they may have.

What this means is that the way to gain power or "leverage" in a negotiation is to explore and develop your options and weigh offers against your "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" or "BATNA." To talk your employer into a higher salary, develop some concrete alternative job possibilities. To talk a banana company into keeping more of its profits in your country and investing them in economic infrastructure, explore the possibilities of taxing it, dealing with another firm, selling to the Yugoslavs, or growing more coffee.

In one case, a small town negotiated a company with a factory just outside the town limits from a "goodwill" payment of \$300,000 a year to one of \$2,300,000 a year. How?

The town knew exactly what it would do if no agreement was reached: It would expand the town limits to include the factory and then tax the factory the full residential rate of some \$2,500,000 a year. The corporation had committed itself to keeping the factory; it had developed no alternative to reaching an agreement. At first glance the corporation seemed to have a great deal of power. It provided most of the jobs in the town, which was suffering economically; a factory shutdown or relocation would devastate the town. And the taxes the corporation was already paying helped provide the salaries of the very town leaders who were demanding more. Yet all of this power, because it was not converted into a good BATNA, proved of little use.¹³

A further point that examples like these demonstrate is that it is a mistake to think (as positional bargainers typically do) in terms of a "bottom line offer" below or above which we will refuse to go. A "trip wire" figure can be helpful to keep in mind ("If it looks as though we can't get at least \$900,000, then we'll have to stop and reconsider") but my "bottom" or "top" offer should not be \$900,000 or any other pre-determined figure. It should be an offer I consider comparable to my best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

But what if they ought to budge but won't? What if people stick to their positions and refuse to negotiate on principle? There are a variety of things that can be done. It may be that they simply don't know how to play this second sort of game (principled negotiation), and you simply need to explain what you are doing and why. (Fisher and Ury note that, unlike other strategies, "if the other side learns this one, it does not become more difficult to use; it becomes easier. If they read this book, all the better."¹⁴)

However, it may be that some "negotiation jujitsu" is called for. For example, if they make a vicious verbal attack, it may be best to sidestep it—ignoring it, letting the air clear, and focusing on the questions it raises concerning the facts of the case and the standards that might be used to settle it. Or it may be helpful to get a third party to come in and use the "one text procedure" in which they, as relatively disinterested bystanders, develop a proposal that they submit back and forth to each side for criticisms that can be used to revise it until it becomes attractive to both parties—or until the third party concludes that no agreement between the two can be reached which would be more attractive to them than their respective BATNAs.

There are a variety of dirty tricks the other side can pull. For example, they can present phony or unverified facts, lock themselves into a position by making public promises, lie, or use personal intimidation—sometimes followed up by the introduction of a second negotiator who is consoling and plays the "nice guy" in the "tough cop/soft cop" interrogation routine seen in a number of old movies. Most tactics of these sorts can be dealt with by exposing them for what they are and then negotiating over the legitimacy of their use:

Above all, be hard on principle. "Is there a theory behind having me sit in the low chair with my back to the open door?" Try out the principle of reciprocity on them. "I assume that you will sit in this chair tomorrow morning?" Frame the principle behind each tactic as a proposed "rule" for the game. "Shall we alternate spilling coffee on one another day by day?"¹⁵

None of this is to suggest, of course, that we should negotiate by always "sticking to our principles" if that means treating a principle like a position from which we will never budge. Rather, the point is that *everything* is negotiable, even the rules of the negotiation themselves—but the agreements should be sought by pursuing a joint inquiry that appeals to reasons rather than by digging in to positions.

Variations on the kind of principled negotiation practiced by Fisher and Ury's have been proliferating. The four basic rules discussed in *Getting to Yes* are not writ in stone and they do not supply a mechanical procedure for reaching agreements. What they *do* do is simply provide one way of organizing a general set of guidelines and making them explicit—and these are guidelines for a *practice* in the rich sense of that term developed in Part III, a practice with an evolving tradition that has already achieved some high levels of excellence and promises more in the future.

However, there are times when this way of cultivating peace does not seem to answer all our needs. In particular, there are times when we are dealing with people who are sufficiently well armed to feel that they can offer us what they like and disregard the justice of the terms they are trying to make us accept. This is precisely the kind of case that Gandhi confronted.

SATYAGRAHA

Because Gandhi was so skinny, bony, bare and bald it is difficult to think of him without having the idea come to mind of someone who fasted so frequently as to qualify in a treatment program for latent anorexics. Because he led so many newsworthy campaigns of mass civil disobedience it is natural to think of him as a kind of politically powerful Sister Suffragette or mild mannered union leader who closed down the government offices and retail stores by Oiling them—and the jails—with his followers. Because he was so eccentric and disarmingly gentle it is difficult to think of him as an ordinary person like you and me. He seems to qualify for the sainthood his popular status as *mahatma* or "great soul" conferred upon him—a status that places him outside the realm of realistic politics and that invalidates him as a role model for the rest of us mere mortals.

These three popular images of Gandhi—as faster, passive resister, and saint—obscure a great deal. Once we get behind them we find someone who managed to combine a great many paradoxical or even contradictory ideas by cultivating them as elements of a complex practice he came to refer to as *satyagraha*.

The connection between the mahatma and fasting was reinforced by one of the most probing studies ever made of him, Erik Erikson's *Gandhi's Truth*. Erikson's work goes well beyond the limitations of a psychoanalytic developmental study and does not reduce Mohandas K. Gandhi to a megalomaniacal anal retentive. But the book is structured around key developmental "Events" in Mohandas's life. And for methodological reasons

Erikson adopted a hypothesis which he revised without fully rejecting—that a crucial Event was Gandhi's fast during the Ahmedabad struggle over the working conditions in the textile mills.

Yet Gandhi himself saw fasting as an activity of relatively minor importance, really only one of the forms of the practice of *bramacharya* or self-purifying continence that itself was really only one element in the complex network of practices he was developing. The central function of a fast was to provide a time of physical and spiritual cleansing that permitted someone to reflect on his past errors and contemplate the appropriate ways in which to change himself in the future. In practice, however, such fasting was complicated by two things.

First, Gandhi, as a leader, assumed responsibility for the actions of his followers. He took their sins upon himself, and when adolescent students engaged in premarital sex or followers began to riot, he himself would often fast to cleanse himself of this guilt by association. But because the students and followers loved him dearly they would often change—and often *not* because they had seen the error of their ways but because they feared for his life. In a *de facto* way this gave the fast a coercive element—a form of discipline that (like the woman's threat to cry until she got her way) might bring obedience in much the same way an appeal to threats of corporal punishment might. Second, the others to whom Gandhi was representing his followers might act out of loving fear for his well-being (as in the Ahmedabad case) or, more often, out of fear that self-inflicted harm to Gandhi would result in riots or worse.

Though he often was unable to find a way to avoid the indirect introduction of these coercive elements, Gandhi characteristically tried to do so when fasting because the heart and soul of his method was designed to win people over in fundamentally non-coercive ways. This point is easily obscured by the second popular image of him, the image of a leader of mass acts of civil disobedience.

Civil disobedience or "passive resistance" and related activities like protest demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes have often been employed as weapons of the weak. Suffragettes chained themselves to gates when they lacked the economic and political clout to impose their demands. Union workers struck when the robber barons had more guns. The Czechs "non-cooperated" by refusing to sign or publish Soviet proclamations and by changing the street signs when the Red Army marched through Prague.

In such cases the actions are not violent but they are coercive; they employ the weapons that are available. And if sufficient quantities of others were ready at hand—including guns and bombs—they would probably be

used as well. Sol Alinsky has argued that Gandhi was a crafty fellow who used mass civil disobedience only because that was the most effective weapon available: "From a pragmatic point of view, passive resistance was not only possible, but was the most effective means that could have been selected for the end of ridding India of British control." Further, "if Gandhi had had the weapons for violent resistance and the people to use them, this means [armed resistance] would not have been so unreservedly rejected as the world would like to think."¹⁶

A similar (though less Machiavellian) perspective on Gandhi is offered by the theory Gene Sharp develops in his massive *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Sharp argues that "governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power."¹⁷ Furthermore, the bases for rulers' power "depend *intimately* upon the obedience of the subjects."¹⁸ Rulers have a basic need for the acceptance of their authority. Gunmen and torturers cannot lead the mass of a populace about from moment to moment imposing the ruler's will. Without the at least minimal acceptance of governmental authority the state simply cannot function. So far as the ruler is concerned, it follows that

...loss of authority will have serious consequences for his position and power. Just as subjects may accept a ruler's authority because they believe it is merited on grounds of morality and of the well-being of their society or country, subjects may for the same reasons at times deny the ruler's claims to authority over them...

If the subjects deny the ruler's right to rule and to command, they are withdrawing the general agreement, or group consent, which makes possible the existing government. This loss of authority sets in motion the disintegration of the ruler's power. That power is reduced to the degree that he is denied authority. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular government is threatened.¹⁹

Seen this way, non-violent action can serve two basic functions, the unarmed exercise of coercive power and the displacement of authority.

On the one hand, sit-ins and strikes can serve to directly impede the function of existing institutions and indirectly threaten their collapse in the face of a loss of functional legitimacy. The non-violent activists can coerce

with the threat: "Accede to our demands or else!" On the other hand, the establishment of a parallel economy or government may threaten—or succeed—in effectively displacing the ruling institutions of the society. They may do this, for example, with organized boycotts and other forms of non-cooperation that establish new institutions for driving people to their jobs (in private cars instead of on city buses) or settling legal disputes (through private arbitration boards instead of in the official courts).

It is a matter of historical fact that Gandhi's campaigns of non-violent action almost always had coercive side-effects (which many, and perhaps most, of his followers saw as the essential element in their efforts), and his own writings make it clear that he often pursued the goal of displacing British rule by establishing alternative institutions and a parallel government. BUT...

Gandhi's *intention* was to displace the rulers by enabling the masses to assume responsibility for themselves, liberating them by teaching them self-disciplined autonomy—not by overthrowing the current government. And his *intention* in suffering beatings and arrests was to "melt the heart" of his opponents—not to strike fear into their souls. His conceptions of self-liberation and self-suffering were at the very heart of the driving vision that motivated all his innovations, and an appreciation of them is essential to an understanding of the practice of *satyagraha* he developed.

Gandhi claimed that he got into politics for religious reasons and that the overriding passion of his life was "to see God face to face," to achieve a state of *moksha* or blessedness. His conception of this state was based on his distinctive reading of "the Indian Bible," *The Bhagavadgita*. Blessedness was to be achieved through liberation—liberation of the self from the illusory strands of causality that catch us up in this world and make us misunderstand who we are and why we suffer. We mistakenly suppose that our true selves are these personalities that hold offices and these bodies that get beaten. So long as we believe this, we remain unfree—buffeted about by the carrots and sticks that cause these personalities and bodies to behave as they do. To liberate ourselves, we must drop this delusion and act independently and autonomously—choosing without regard to the promises and threats that beset us.

The *Gita* teaches that this does *not* mean we should withdraw from the World—because in doing so we will only submit to another set of worldly impulses, fears of threats and desires for tranquil escape. Instead, we should continue to act in the world, but act with "non-attachment." Krishna, as the incarnation of the divine, counsels:

The seers say truly
that he is wise
Who acts without lust or scheming
For the fruit of the act:

His act falls from him,
Its chain is broken,
Melted in the flame of my knowledge.

Turning his face from the fruit,
He needs nothing:
The Atman is enough.
He acts, and is beyond action.

Not hoping, not lusting,
Bridling body and mind,
He calls nothing his own:
He acts, and earns no evil.

What God's Will gives
He takes, and is contented.
Pain follows pleasure.
He is not troubled:
Gain follows loss,
He is indifferent:
Of whom should he be jealous?
He acts, and is not bound by his action.

Unity with God is achieved not by withdrawal from the world but by allowing the illusory self to participate in the world of Maya—while remaining calmly non-attached by seeing things as they truly are.

Gandhi's crucial theological innovation sprang from his conviction that the most profound forms of attachment were rooted in fears of armed authorities. So long as we submit to oppressive governments we can be sure that we have not achieved the blessedness of non-attachment. It followed that he—and any who chose the path of enlightenment he discerned—could only pursue the religious aim of moksha by practicing a politics of liberation.

It further followed that this political liberation would have to take a definite form. It would not suffice to simply throw off the chains of the

oppressor by achieving a "negative freedom" *from* coercive control by other people. What would be required is the achievement of the "positive freedom" of autonomy, a self-disciplined self-rule that would liberate us from all the carrots and sticks this world presents—regardless of whether they are employed by other people or pressed upon us by inhuman events.

This autonomy would have to be achieved at every level. Individuals would have to be masters of themselves. Communities would have to be self-regulating and independent. Nations would have to achieve sovereignty. Gandhi believed that if he declined to work for these kinds of autonomy the reason would prove to be that he remained in a state of fearful attachment to his own worldly welfare.

Many of Gandhi's multifarious projects remain largely unintelligible and downright eccentric in appearance unless they are interpreted in light of this overall understanding of his goals. For example, he initiated a number of projects aimed at achieving economic decentralization and self-reliance for India such as the massive reintroduction of hand spinning and the use of native Indian products. At the time, many people viewed these as economically anachronistic programs motivated by a naive infatuation with John Ruskin and other nineteenth century romantics. (Now that the concept of "appropriate" or "intermediate technology" has made small seem more beautiful, estimates have shifted rather markedly.) But Gandhi was convinced that the modern integrated economy and the modern integrated state precluded communal autonomy and that economic decentralization was a prerequisite for liberation. It was of a piece with a network of programs he started to educate people and prepare them to organize themselves collectively at the local level.

This is not to say that he was an anarchist—at least not in the popular sense. He thought people should cooperate at a host of levels all the way from the familial to the international. But he believed they should cooperate *voluntarily* as responsible and autonomous individuals, towns, regions, and nations. He further held that such voluntary autonomy had to be *reciprocal*—and that is what led him to his very distinctive conception of the role of non-violent self-suffering in the struggle for political liberation.

If I coerce your compliance with my desires I remain attached to those very desires. It does not matter whether I manipulate you with threats of whippings and death or with threats of non-cooperation, non-violent obstruction, or civil disobedience. If I employ the latter the way labor unions do—as weapons to achieve my demands—then I have not liberated myself from the lust-ridden persona that is attached to those demands. To liberate *myself* I have to change your mind by an appeal to your own free and

deliberate will, not through coercion. Gandhi believed that such appeal might involve two elements.

The first was reasoning of a sort in many ways similar to the kind of principled negotiation that Fisher and Ury advocate. He required that *satyagrahis* begin their campaigns with a careful examination of the facts of the situation, a rigorous self-examination that aimed not only at self-purification but a clear separation of attitudes toward the oppressors as people as distinct from the oppression as a problem, a careful consideration of the real interests that motivated the positions that government figures adopted, an exhaustive attempt to explore options for agreement that would involve mutual gain, and a sustained good faith effort to find objective criteria that could be used to settle the dispute.²⁰

But what if the other side continued to refuse to negotiate on principle because their weapons were ready and their hearts were hardened—as was the case of the Boers in South Africa and the British in India? Then it might prove necessary to "melt" their hearts and restore them to their moral senses by offering them a peculiar kind of argument. It would be a "demonstration" of the moral principles at issue that "proved" their truth by "showing" their power over men's souls. It would be an argument (that did not rest on verbal testimony but was offered in a deed that witnessed to the principle by "clinging to the truth" in an act of self-suffering.

Gandhi coined the neologism *satyagraha* to refer to such actions. Though he continued to sometimes use other terms, this was the one that he believed best captured his conception because its etymology expressed his view of the relation between his theology, his theory of political liberation, and the practice of self-suffering.

The word *Satya* (Truth) is derived from *Sat*, which means "being." Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why *Sat* or Truth is perhaps the most important name of God...

Devotion to this Truth is the sole justification for our existence. All our activities should be centered in Truth.

Generally speaking, observation of the law of Truth is understood merely to mean that we must speak the truth. But we in the Ashram should understand the word *Satya* or Truth in a much wider sense. There should be Truth in thought, Truth in speech, and Truth in action. To the man who has realized this Truth in its fullness, nothing else remains to be known, because

all knowledge is necessarily included in it. What is not included in it is not Truth and so not true knowledge; and there can be no inward peace without true knowledge.

But how is one to realize this Truth, which may be likened to the philosopher's stone or the cow of plenty? By single-minded devotion (*abhyasa*) and indifference to all other interests in life (*vairagya*)—replies the *Bhagavadgita*... For the quest for Truth involves *tapas*—self-suffering, sometimes even unto death. There can be no place in it for even a trace of self-interest.²¹

Etymologically, the term "*satyagraha*" combined the notions of divine Being, the Truth whose understanding provided liberation, and the devotion to this truth with a self-suffering "firmness" (*agraha*) which "engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force."²² Gandhi often translated the term as either "truth force" or "clinging to truth":


Its root meaning is holding on to truth, hence, truth-force. I have also called it Love-force or Soul-force. In the application of Satyagraha I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on one's self.²³

Gandhi was convinced that self-suffering undertaken in the proper spirit could "vindicate" truths and persuade opponents of the rightness of moral principles in a way that would win their free and uncoerced consent: "Satyagraha is a most powerful process of conversion. It is an appeal to the heart."²⁴

This kind of persuasion is perhaps best likened to certain non-inferential arguments used in philosophy and mathematics—ones which appeal to *insight* rather than verbal reasoning. For example, if people doubt the existence of an external world and minds other than their own, I may punch them in the arm or get up and start walking off in order to "bring them to their senses." While this is not an *argument* in the standard sense of the term, it does provide a form of persuasion that appeals to their own faculty of rational choice. The experiences of pain and loneliness can make us "see"—in a way verbal premises cannot—that there is indeed a world and a

realm of other human beings beyond the confines of our own minds. Perhaps an even more appropriate analogy would be the kind of mathematical argument Plato rehearses in his *Meno*.

In that dialogue, the character of Socrates gets a slave boy to understand a theorem of geometry which says that if one square's sides are equal to the diagonal of another then it will have exactly twice the area of the other. He does this by having the boy observe a diagram composed of triangles and squares like this:



After this, he gets the boy to *see* that if the diagonal of the inner square is indeed the length of the side of the outer square, all of the triangles are equal in area. And then Socrates points out that there are exactly twice as many triangles in the outside square as there are in the inner one. At this point, the slave boy realizes that the outside square must have twice the area of the inner one. In cases like this, it would not be accurate to say that we simply focus on the premises and draw a conclusion. Instead, we attend to a part of our experience and then reach an insight. Our new knowledge does not come as a belief that is compelled by assumptions but as a realization that is grounded in a new insight.

Wittgenstein writes of Indian mathematicians said to offer demonstrations by drawing figures and then simply saying: "Look at this. Now look at this. See?" Gandhi's practice of *satyagraha* was intended to provide an Indian ethicist's demonstration of moral principles in something like the same way—in a way that appealed for voluntary and autonomous assent without in any way compelling the will with external coercive force. "Satyagraha is gentle, it never wounds. It must not be the result of anger or malice. It is never fussy, never impatient, never vociferous. It is the direct opposite of compulsion. It was conceived of as a complete substitute for violence."²⁵

Gandhi was fully and painfully aware of the enormous difficulties involved in trying to actually practice *satyagraha* in an entirely non-coercive way—especially when large numbers of people were involved. He usually found it necessary to restrict the masses to relatively less painful forms of self-suffering—such as boycotts—that could more easily be undertaken in the proper spirit. And he required his cadres of *satyagraha* leaders to commit themselves to regimens of prayer, abstinence, self-examination, and rigorous self-discipline. He also had a fairly realistic estimate of the difficulties his opponents would have in letting their hearts melt and he believed that great patience would often be required.

But despite these imperfections and problems, the historical record indicates that Gandhi's method often worked and worked in something like the way he intended. And he usually found that when it did not, a retrospective critical examination could enable him to ferret out many of the reasons why and enable him to revise his practice in light of the discoveries he made in his "experiments with Truth."

What emerged was a complex and subtle practice for cultivating voluntary and freely adopted shared commitments to expressions of respect for Indian sovereignty, projects to develop communal autonomy, and practices of governance that enabled Indians to rule themselves. It was a practice of peace that combined many of the elements characteristic of Quaker consensus and principled negotiation. But it added a theory of personal, cultural and (perhaps most importantly) social change that squarely addressed the problem of cultivating genuine agreements with armed oppressors who were initially unwilling to negotiate on any issues that seemed to threaten their self interests.

Was Gandhi's method the most effective and efficient available? To what extent can it work in other contexts? The first question can be considered at this point; the second will be dealt with in the next chapter.

The questions of effectiveness and efficiency have to be assessed in light of the ends at which we aim. If Gandhi had sought an independent India governed as a Maoist communist state he might have found a guerrilla movement would have done the job and done it rapidly. But that simply was not his aim. Given the aim he did have—personal, communal, and national liberation that achieved a self-regulating state of independent non-attachment and blessedness—a guerrilla movement would have been not merely less effective, it would have been wholly unsuccessful. In *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, he replies to a reader who argues: "Why should we not obtain our goal, which is good, by any means whatsoever,

even by using violence? Shall I think of the means when I have to deal with a thief in the house? My duty is to drive him out anyhow." Gandhi's reply is:

Your reasoning is plausible. It has deluded many. I have used similar arguments before now. But I think I know better now, and I shall endeavor to undeceive you. Let us first take the argument that we are justified in gaining our end by using brute force because the English gained theirs by using similar means. It is perfectly true that they used brute force and that it is possible for us to do likewise, but by using similar means we can get only the same thing that they got. You will admit that we do not want that.²⁶

What the English got was a colonial government whose authority rested on coercion rather than the voluntary consent of the governed. An armed rebellion could only enable a nationalist party to achieve authority as a government through reliance on military might. It would liberate India only by replacing a foreign elite by an indigenous one—without, in the process, teaching the citizens of India to liberate themselves and act autonomously as individuals and communities. It is at just this point that Gandhi makes the comment quoted in Part III in the discussion of the organic relations between elements of practices: "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same-inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree." We can no more grow a tree of genuine liberation from the seeds of war than we can plant an acorn and grow a maple.

Gandhi's claims here are not, I think, analytic truths. It seems conceivable that an army could liberate a nation and then lay down its arms and create a participatory democracy of the kind Gandhi sought. It could even be argued that something very roughly resembling this may have occurred in Costa Rica in 1948. But empirically, Gandhi's view has an enormous weight of data on its side. Evidence abounds for the negative claim that the seeds of war do not bring genuine liberation. Evidence for the positive claim, that *satyagraha* can achieve genuine liberation, is not so much scanty as impure. We probably lack any clear and unambiguous examples of the sort of government he sought. But we have a number of approximations to it and it can be plausibly argued that there is a significant correlation between the extent to which a government is genuinely liberating in Gandhi's sense and the extent to which it came to power and maintained

its authority not through mere force of arms but through types of non-violent action that approximate the kind of *satyagraha* that Gandhi cultivated.

These discussions of three different traditions of the practice of peace serve to illuminate both the variety of forms peace can take and the compatibility of methods whose cultural origins are often quite different.

Notice, for example, that while all three aim at voluntary agreements, their conceptions of voluntariness—though not incompatible—really form a family of notions rather than any single, neat, Platonic essence. For Fisher and Ury the operative notion is essentially that employed in courts of law. Mature, sane adults uncoerced by external threats of violence are responsible for their acts, and if they agree to a thing they do so voluntarily. In the Quaker tradition, genuinely free or voluntary action must spring from an inward peace that comes when we center down and distance ourselves from impulses of fear and desire. This is something like what Gandhi would speak of as non-attachment, though Quakers might, perhaps, be hesitant to use that term because it seems to suggest a *de*-tachment rather than the drawing closer to the Light that Quakers would speak of or the clinging to the Truth that Gandhi himself would insist upon. As for Gandhi, he operates with an especially rich and multi-faceted conception of voluntariness that includes both the legal and theological notions as well as a network of cultural, social, economic and political concepts of liberation as self-mastery, self-discipline, self-reliance, and self-regulation.

These differences in conceptions of voluntariness reflect—and are reflected—in variations in the three traditions' conceptions of other key aspects or levels of the process of peace. For example, all three suppose that peace-makers or negotiators need to disengage themselves from emotions that might cloud their own thought processes. But whereas Quakers speak of this in terms of "centering down into the Silence," the notion gets operationalized in principled negotiation by talk of "separating the people from the problem." Quakers aim at a frame of mind which is rightly attuned to "leadings" of "the Spirit," whereas Fisher and Ury aim at an analogous but distinct frame of mind which is sane by virtue of being rationally dispassionate rather than being "sane" by virtue of "living in that condition which takes away the occasion of all war." Gandhi's operative notion here is that of *bramacharya*, a network of techniques (such as fasting and sexual abstinence) which "purifies" or "cleanses" the self so as to prepare one to act without "attachment."

Each tradition has developed ways of viewing situations in terms of parts of a human problem to be solved rather than in terms of oppositions to be fought over. But Fisher and Ury talk of this as a process of "focusing on

interests rather than positions" whereas Quakers talk of "addressing concerns." The first phrase expresses the notion in a way that emphasizes categories we associate with discussion of "enlightened self-interest"—needs, wants, and desires that each party may happen to have. The second phrase expresses a similar idea but in a way that emphasizes the sense in which questions of righteousness and truth may come into play as genuine "concerns" in which we care for others. It also is indicative of the network of Quaker ideas about how "leadings" may "address *us*" and "call" us to action. These two idioms are compatible, of course. They simply serve to highlight different aspects of the things that may be parts of the problem being dealt with—just as Gandhi's frequent talk of making "a review of the grievances" serves to highlight the questions of justice and personal dignity that may be at issue.

At the start of this chapter, differences related to these were noted—differences in views about what it is to be committed to an agreement, what it is to share an agreement with another, and what it means to cultivate expressions, projects and practices. What we find, then, is that there is not one neat cut-and-dried thing which peace is but that there is an open-ended family of practices which can be pursued at high levels of excellence and which are open themselves—as practices—to further cultivation. But to what extent will the perfection of such practices enable us to dispense with the alternatives of physical force, armed threats, violence, and war?

CHAPTER 17

The Horizons of Peace: Violence, Faith, and Trans-Historical Objective Values

As every farmer knows, some dogs won't fetch and some seeds don't grow. Are there times when people interested in cultivating peace should conclude that it is impossible or unwise to do so? It is surely very tempting to insist the answer *must* be that there are—though, for reasons that will become clear, this is a question we may choose to *live with* rather than simply answer and set aside. But on the face of it, there are a number of practical difficulties that can arise. They include linguistic or cultural barriers to communication, profound hostilities rooted in ancient quarrels, and plain old lack of time to adequately negotiate.

Perhaps more importantly, there seem to be at least two situations in which peace cannot be cultivated at all or is not as worthy a choice as other alternatives in light of the results it is likely to yield. On the one hand, the quest for objective criteria to employ in settling disputes may seem pointless because there appear to be no such objective values—or at least none that will be mutually accepted by the parties involved. On the other hand, we may have to deal with brutal people who are so unwilling to negotiate that even the purest and most perfect form of *satyagraha* leaves their hearts untouched.

The consideration of these problems brings us back to questions earlier postponed—questions about the objectivity of values, the nature of the self as I or It, pacifism, and relations between the practice of peace and alternative coercive practices such as those cultivated by the military and police.

VALUES AND PERSONS

The relationship between the practice of peace and questions about the objectivity of values needs some careful spelling out. There are important connections between the two, but the connections are more complex than they might seem at first. This is because both peace and objectivity can take a variety of forms.

Notice first that the practice of peace need not necessarily presuppose the existence of objective values of any kind. You and I can cultivate an agreement even if the values that motivate each of us are entirely different and are pure and unadulterated personal preferences. I have an apple, you have an orange, we each would prefer the other and we agree to an exchange. We may have absolutely no desire to make each other better off and we may disagree entirely in our tastes—and this subjective difference of opinion about what is of value is precisely what makes the agreement possible.

However, suppose that you like both apples *and* oranges and propose to simply take my piece of fruit by brute force and hang on to your own. I might not think this fair. And it is precisely at this point—when questions about fairness, reasonableness, legitimacy, justice, and so on come up—that the objectivity of values becomes an issue.

Here again, it may turn out that we can cultivate an agreement that is mutually satisfactory even if we remain profoundly opposed in our views about what the relevant objective standards are—or even if we deny there are any. In dividing possessions in a divorce settlement, Michaela may believe things should go to the person who originally bought them with his or her salary money, Monte may believe that justice demands that they be split down the middle. In spite of this fundamental difference of opinion about what a fair *procedure* would be, they may be able to reach an amicable settlement if it turns out that both procedures would yield the same *substantive* result. People do not, in short, have to agree for the same reasons in order to agree.

However, in many cases, perhaps most, the prospects for reaching a substantive agreement are much better if all the parties involved are willing to commit themselves to the same kinds of reasoning. If they all believe that there are objective values or principles that provide criteria for deciding the substance of the agreement, then the process of cultivating such an agreement is made enormously easier and is much more likely to succeed. To what extent are there such objective standards that can, should, and will be accepted by people?

Much depends here on what we mean by "objective." Objectivity is an open concept employed in a variety of contexts that are related by strands of family resemblance. For example, when we speak of good art critics whose tastes have the merit of objectivity, we often mean those whose tastes are relatively *normal* rather than eccentric, and relatively cosmopolitan or *broad based* rather than parochial. In law courts, objectivity most often refers to the disinterested *impartiality* of someone's judgment. In discussions of natural science, it often refers to physical *objects* to which objectively true beliefs *correspond*.

There are two central strands, however, that run through these various uses of the term and that find their origins in the post-Cartesian period of philosophy that began in the seventeenth century. Descartes wanted to know what—if anything (or anyone)—existed outside his own subjective consciousness. His difficulties in answering this question structured the framework in which subsequent philosophers worked. His method was to try to doubt every belief he could until he arrived at a core set of beliefs which were indubitably certain and then build a system of beliefs upon that unshakable foundation.

This way of approaching things led philosophers to conceive of objectivity in terms of two criteria. Something was understood as being objective if it existed independently of my own mind. It could be *known* to be objective if a belief in it imposed itself upon my will—if I simply could not, upon due consideration, doubt its independent existence. The various uses of objectivity to characterize normal, broad based, or impartial judgments or ones that correspond to physical objects all provide variants of these two core ideas: that the objective exists independently of subjective wills or consciousnesses and that the fact of its objective existence has the power to compel belief.

Though the second aspect of objectivity presents special problems, on the first score we have already found (in Part III) that there are a variety of values which are objective—objective in the sense that they exist independently of our subjective wills. We found that feelings we try to express are discovered rather than invented and that they exist independently of our wills in that minimal sense—though they do not exist independently of our subjective minds which are having the feelings of disgust, delight and so on.

Further, we found that as projects are cultivated they begin to acquire a public and organic character. This results in the existence of values that are structures of social reality independent of our individual minds and that take on a life of their own which becomes independent of our individual wills.

Institutionalized rules for proper conduct, shared definitions of community goals and norms, and reciprocally conducive means and ends become values that social researchers can study, analyze, and critique as observable constituents of the world in which we participate. Practices, because they are cultivated from expressions and projects, incorporate those types of objective values and add others: past exemplars of high achievement in the practice, compliance with and strengthening of the institutions that are indispensable for the flourishing of the tradition, and virtues of character that normally need to be internalized if practitioners are to achieve excellence.

All of these types of values are objective in ways that can enable people to cultivate agreements by "negotiating on principle"—by appealing to criteria which are "objective" in the sense Fisher and Ury have in mind in *Getting to Yes*. But to effectively and rightly employ them in this way we need to recognize a basic limitation they all share. While they are objective in the sense that they exist independently of our subjective wills, they need not be objective in the sense that they can—or even *should*—compel assent.

The most straightforward way to appreciate this is to think about moral reasoning in terms of one of the simplest of all argument patterns, one that many logicians would argue is *the* fundamental pattern of a rational argument—the *modus ponens* form of hypothetical conditional argument. Arguments of this form tell us that we should adopt some conclusion C because *if* we believe something else, B, then C follows *and we do in fact believe B*. For example:

First premise: If the Anglo-Saxon practice of law is best, then we ought to obey its procedural rules.

Second premise: The Anglo-Saxon practice of law is best.

Conclusion: Therefore, we ought to obey its procedural rules.

All of the objective values involved in expressions, projects, and practices exist as independently discoverable things that can be introduced into arguments of this form. But, at least so far, it would seem that all of them have a conditionality that the argument pattern makes explicit. They provide values that offer imperatives telling us how we ought to act. But the imperatives are all hypothetical. *If* I feel X or am committed to project Y or adopt practice Z, then I ought to adopt the values these things entail. *But*, if I have doubts about X, Y, or Z—or reject it outright—then the conclusion no longer follows and my rational assent is no longer compelled.

And, as a matter of fact, it seems clear that there are lots of times when I *ought* to reject X, Y, and Z—when they are, for example, expressions of brutal disregard for human rights, projects of enslavement through debt peonage, or practices of genocidal warfare. Or so it seems to me. And that, of course, is the problem. How can I tell if my beliefs here are true in the relevant twofold objective way. How can I tell if the values on which I base these judgments have an existence independent of the social reality in which I have grown up. Also, how can I tell if other people both *should* and *will* (if presented with the proper argument or witnessing actions) acknowledge the legitimacy of these values—especially when their own upbringing has taught them a different set of basic values? After all, for the Aztecs, given their cultural assumptions and practices, human sacrifice was a perfectly rational and moral activity.

The values that are constituent elements of expressions, projects, and practices can be used to evaluate activities that occur in the context of their cultivation. But by what criteria are we to evaluate those expressions, projects, and practices themselves?

We can, of course, step back from them and turn to more basic or widely shared expressions, projects, and practices that provide their setting. In trying to reach a settlement on some project for busing school children out from District #8 into the suburbs we can appeal to the values that structure the larger project of integrating the community as a whole. In negotiating over the proper way to practice corporate tax law we can fall back on more general principles of contemporary jurisprudence or appeal to the traditions of constitutional precedence and Anglo-Saxon common law. And in most cases, when our differing conceptions of fair procedure do not happen to yield similar substantive conclusions and we need to seek objective criteria for cultivating an agreement, this is what we do.

But there are times when we step back and seem to fall into a void—Marxist Iraqis and Shiite Iranians, Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, blacks and whites in South Africa, and Indian communities and military juntas in Latin America may find that they simply do not seem to share any sufficiently broad base of common values on which to cultivate mutually acceptable agreements. Is this the case? Or might it be that there are objective values that transcend cultural perspectives?

If there are, the argument of Part III implies that they will be emergent values that must be cultivated rather than predetermined absolute values that can be known *a priori* in a fully determinate way. For all the meanings of our words and practices—and the social realities which they define—are permeated with an indeterminacy which makes them emergent.

Immanuel Kant thought otherwise. He thought that human reason itself had a fixed essence that implied universal principles of morality, unconditional "*categorical imperatives*" that could be known by appeal to reason alone—independently of the varying perspectives provided by cultural differences and historical change. He was wrong.

All of his candidates for "categorical imperatives" turned out to rest on concepts of human practices which were historically conditioned and emergent in ways that gave them a hypothetical character. He was right to argue that we should keep our promises to repay loans—*but only if we believe that the institution of borrowing and lending is legitimate*. A revolutionary who sees it as a corrupting element in a capitalist system may find it morally permissible—or even morally obligatory—to make false promises which will serve to undermine the evil banking system.

Furthermore, the conception of rationality on which Kant's ethics is based has proven to be a relatively limited one rooted in eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas. The concept of reasoning itself—as the arguments of Parts II and III make clear—is an open concept structured by strands of family resemblance. Even such basic principles of logic as "the law of the excluded middle" can be rejected by people who reason maieutically rather than eristically. Fundamental concepts such as consistency can admit of widely divergent interpretations by linear and dialectical reasoners. And even the practice of demonstration itself can take the radically different forms found in the detailed verbal proof of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (in which it takes pages and pages to prove that one plus one equals two) and the "Now look at this" demonstrations of the Wittgenstein's Indian mathematicians.

None of this implies that there cannot be trans-historical, objective values. It simply means that if there are they must be emergent. They will be something discovered rather than known *a priori*, and our understanding of them will need to be cultivated. Are there any good reasons for supposing that emergent trans-historical objective values exist, and, if so, what might some of them be?

If the kind of values at issue do exist, they will have to be tied to essential features of human nature. Why? Well, they might spring, *ultimately*, from a source beyond humanity such as an eternal realm of Platonic forms or a divine being. But suppose that such an extra-human source secures the independent existence of such values and determines which beliefs about them are true and *ought* to be adopted. People endeavoring to cultivate peace will only be able to make effective appeals to such values if we humans have a nature that gives us access to these truths

and enables them to compel the assent of our wills by "winning conviction," "causing conversion," "melting our hearts" or something of that sort. We do not cultivate agreements by simply *knowing* what is right but by *successfully persuading* others to accept it.

Given the profound cultural differences our species has developed, what reason is there to suppose that there is a universal essence to human nature that could provide a plausible ground for emergent trans-historical values—values that are objective in the sense that they should *and could* compel the assent of all?

The fact that we can and do distinguish between other species and our own suggests that we share common features that make us identifiably human. Two types of features in particular seem central in this process individuals of our own kind, biological ones and cultural ones.

People have bodies, bodies with common physical structures produced by common kinds of DNA. Our common biological nature and physical needs provide one promising way to ground emergent trans-historical objective values. We might offer hypothetical arguments of the following sort:

If you have a human body, then you need to eat (or drink, breathe or procreate) and must value food (or potable water, breathable air, or intercourse).

You have a human body.

Therefore, you need to eat and must value food (or potable water, breathable air, or intercourse).

Because we too have bodies, arguments of this sort can substitute a larger and more inclusive "we" for the "you" in the premises and conclusion: "Therefore, we *all* need food, water, and air." And because we share a common earth, consequences of significance follow.

In many contexts, this kind of argument may well serve to demonstrate (and compel assent to) values that seem to transcend cultural perspectives and which can be discovered and cultivated as emergent objective truths. In particular, ecological research may lead us to discover that—perhaps without realizing it—we have valued things like clean water and unpolluted air all along and that we must, because of our physical nature, continue to do so. In the long run, research on the environmental impact of nuclear weapons may well prove to be one of the most important and profound realms in which we discover cross-cultural values rooted in our biological nature.

But unlike animals, people do not just *have* bodies with biological needs, they *interpret* them. This is, in fact, one of the things that enables us to recognize others as genuine humans. The point is worth elaborating.

Suppose we discovered a community of animals in the jungle with DNA identical to ours but we found that they had no culture—no institutions, no customs, and no language. We would not consider their tribe to be a genuine human community or society, and if we found that they could not be taught a language or introduced into a culture we would be strongly tempted to view the group's members as something that differed from us in kind in a fundamental way. (Conversely, if we encountered animals, extra-terrestrials, or even machines that could converse and carry on the activities of a full-blown culture, then we would be likely to view them as humans, or at least as persons—who simply had bodies that differed from our own.) But difficulties in viewing our biological nature as the ground of objective values are presented by just these varying linguistic and cultural interpretations of our physical selves and our environment.

It is difficult for humans to interpret starvation, suffocation, and radiation sickness as types of goodness rather than forms of suffering. But it is not so difficult for them to adopt a cultural perspective that makes these kinds of suffering—and even physical extinction itself—seem worthwhile. Suppose an expectation that heaven awaits the pious convinces me that I am better dead than red or that a globally catastrophic jihad will transport my soul to a state of eternal bliss. I would be a fool to let biological concerns get in the way of my salvation.

It may be, however, that the other basic feature we all share, our ability to speak and interpret reality, could provide an alternative ground for objective values. Probably the most promising way to pursue this possibility is consider the basic character of humans as beings who dialogue with one another—as I's that address thou's. The chief difficulty in doing so however is one that was discussed near the end of Part III. This peculiar relation which sets us apart as conscious persons or "subjects" in dialogue *with* each other—as distinct from objects we may dialogue *about*—is something which is in principle undefinable. If we cannot define it then we can not speak of it in clear and plainly true premises that yield compelling conclusions.

This is not to say that we cannot speak of it all. We have been doing so for some time. And we can even offer a kind of argument that might serve to indicate how and why it provides a source of emergent trans-historical objective values. The argument rests on the assumption that this activity of "I/Thouing" is an essential and definitive function of all human beings. And, in some sense, this seems true. Those that cannot or do not address others in

dialogue simply cannot be viewed as persons rather than things. Furthermore, the notion of an I without a thou or of a speech that is unheard seems somehow incoherent—like a cause without any effect or an inside without any outside. And so it seems as though people can only exercise this essential human function by relating to others as persons.

These considerations suggest the following kind of argument:

If you intend to function as a human person, then you must relate to others as human persons.

You intend to function as a human person.

So you must relate to others as human persons.

This sort of argument is promising but problematic. It is promising because it suggests that there might be a way of demonstrating the objective value of such things as human dignity, mutual respect, and basic human rights.

But one obvious limitation on the argument is that it does not specify just who these others are that we must relate to as humans. The whites in South Africa might view each other that way and thus enable themselves to function as humans in I/thou relations with others. But they might continue to treat blacks as second class citizens or as non-citizens and non-humans entirely—as mere instruments of production. It might even be that a totalitarian dictator could, once he had learned a language and culture by participating in human relations with others, decide to start treating *all* others as objects to be manipulated, as mere means to his own ends. It is not clear that the conversations he carried on with himself alone would enable him to function *fully* as a human, but it is clear that they would permit him to, at least to some degree. He and we are each in some sense a composite I *and* thou because we can listen to ourselves when we speak.

The moral of this first point is, then, that if we want to appeal to any values associated with personhood when we are cultivating agreements with others, then we have to find ways of persuading them that we and the rest of the people they deal with are persons who should be related to as thous.

One way of doing this is to act in ways that show them we cannot be manipulated but that we can be conversed with. And this is part of what the practice of *satyagraha* aims to accomplish. If we demonstrate the courage of our convictions by acting on principle rather than responding to carrots and sticks, then we make it impossible for oppressors to manipulate us like donkeys or dogs. And the witness of our courageous self-suffering gives them the best of reasons for viewing us as conscious subjects who must be dealt with as persons, namely, the fact that our actions remain unintelligible

on any other terms. Gandhi's deeds repeatedly confronted the Boers and the British with two choices: view him as insane or negotiate with him as a man. If they did not relate to him as a person they could not make any sense of what he was doing—or predict what he would do next.

But what, precisely, is it to relate to someone as a person? If Martin Buber is right, then we can not say precisely. In fact, in a sense, we can not *say* what it is to be an I or a thou at all. We can not define this quintessential human activity; we can only know it through participation and acknowledge it through mutual responsiveness. This makes appeal to the notion of personhood difficult indeed for anyone attempting to discover and cultivate objective values.

We can, of course, say that the mutual responsiveness involved requires treatment with respect and dignity and that it precludes the violation of certain basic human rights. So rape and acts of torture that do not respect other people's personal dignity and bodily integrity are ruled out—along, perhaps, with violations of basic guarantees such as free speech and habeas corpus.

But someone might ask for the reason why. Precisely why are these ruled out? Though it is less likely in a case of rape, a torturer might choose to establish an undeniably human relation with a strong willed victim—addressing him as a thou in "these little conversations aimed at acquiring a bit of information."

The victim could, of course, reply that the torturer was simply using his polite and seemingly civilized talk as a ploy, as a means of manipulation—and that the relation between the two was a fake, a mere simulacrum of a genuine I/thou relation. However, the torturer might be able to offer an argument in reply. And this brings us to the central point. What counts as treating someone as a person is arguable—and negotiable. Our conception of it is, itself, something which needs to be cultivated.

It has, in fact, been cultivated extensively. Time and again someone has looked to her or his condition and said: "You think that's treating us like human beings? That's not treating us like human beings. You don't treat someone like a human being when you..."

The Greeks in the *Illiad* supposed that if you dealt with someone in the ways prescribed by their social roles, then that was adequate. If they were barbarian outsiders, you could enslave them. If they were slaves, you could interrogate them under torture. If they were women, you could trade them like chattel. If they were your own children, you could dispose of them at will. If they were members of your army who spoke out publicly against the plan you had ordered, you could stun them to silence by smacking the

broad edge of your sword against their heads. If they were unarmed fleeing opponents, you could spill their brains across the ground and trample them beneath your horse's hooves. In the milieu of Achilles and Hector, all these things were standard, socially approved ways in which you could deal with other people—if you yourself held the appropriate privileged status.

We might say that, in a sense, their society differed from ours in whom it counted as people. Slaves, children and women did not count. Greek princes did. But this would be misleading because the early Greeks simply did not operate with the kind of person/thing distinction we employ. Special privileges did not attach to warriors and princes because they were people but because they were warriors or princes. Insofar as the early Greeks had a concept of persons, it was one they applied to all humans, even those who spoke only the "bar bar bar" language of the barbarians.

As slaves, serfs, landless freemen, women, and other oppressed people have pursued the quest for respect, dignity and human rights, they have enriched our concepts of what personhood involves. The notion that there are universal human rights attaching to people simply because they are persons has been advanced by their efforts to convince ruling powers that "you don't treat people like human beings when you" beat them, press them into forced labor, deny them the vote, impose a state sanctioned theology, or view them as sex objects. For many people, personhood has come to imply not only political rights but economic, religious, social and cultural ones as well.

Indeed, one way of describing world history would be to narrate it as the story of a massive project of cultivation—the cultivation of emergent trans-historical objective values associated with that most basic and definitive of human functions, the activity of relating to others as subjects or persons rather than objects or things—as thous rather than its. Key themes in this story would include the notions of not only respect, dignity and rights but also consent autonomy, independence, and self-reliance—because these have come to be viewed as essential features of the activity of dialogue in which people speak for themselves with others. And it would be important to recount the episodes in which people like Gandhi came to see these features of individual people as indissolubly bound with correlative notions at the communal and national level—bound with notions of economic self-regulation, cultural independency and political sovereignty.

This is the kind of story Hegel told in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and *The History of Philosophy*. While I would not tell it in quite the way he does I believe that some such story is true and that we have, in this way, discovered a number of emergent trans-historical objective values including all the ones

mentioned above. I know that this view is debatable, and to critics my initial reply is simply this: Let's consider the arguments. I am ready to negotiate.

It is important, however, to see what form the argument will take. It will *not* proceed in the manner Kant adopted when he tried to demonstrate the validity of his various categorical imperatives; that is, it will not attempt to offer indubitable premises and show that the conclusions follow of necessity. The ultimate appeal will not be to a premise we can state but to an experience in which we participate.

I cannot state precisely what the I/thou relation is, let alone deduce what values it implies. What I can do is engage in the activity of addressing you as another subject like the one I am. And I can show you experientially how to distinguish the times when you yourself are addressing others as thous and when you are viewing them as objects.

For example, I can get you to see what it is like when a doctor examines a patient and talks *with* his interns *about* the body's symptoms and illnesses. I can have you recall what it was like as a child to hear adults talk *about* you while ignoring your presence. Or I can ask you to parade yourself before members of the opposite sex who are talking *with* each other *about* the merits and flaws of your appearance. Attention to these kinds of experiences can heighten your awareness of the distinction at issue.

Once you clearly understand the distinction experientially—as a kind of participatory knowledge that can be *acknowledged* though it cannot be defined—then I can employ the distinction in arguing about the way you treat me or others. My argument may usefully appeal to a wide variety of notions and principles you may accept—such as the concept of equality, the right to property, or the guarantee of due process. But, in the end, the heart of my argument will appeal to your experiential understanding of the basic distinction between persons and things. It will boil down to this: Pay attention to the way you are treating these people when you act this way. Can't you see that you are treating them as things rather than relating to them as persons?

Reasoning of this sort has no place for dogmatism. It is always possible that I may be mistaken. Perhaps I believe that we view people in impoverished countries as things if we are unwilling to offer them economic aid. But perhaps such aid would only express an illicit paternalism that promotes mass starvation and I am simply wrong. Furthermore, *if I do not* offer you this peculiar kind of experiential argument in a radically open-minded way, then I fail to fully address *you* as a thou to whom I ought to respond with dialogue rather than manipulative propaganda.

I am convinced that open-minded reasoning of this sort can (and often *has*) won the assent of people who find that their wills are compelled to accept the conclusion—compelled not by any external threat or promise but by the irresistible force of insight. But I will not attempt to offer historical evidence that this is true—though a good deal of insight may come through a study of stories in which *satyagraha* and other forms of witnessing to the truth have converted unbelievers. Here, I will simply ask you to consult your own experience. If you do, I believe you will find yourself convinced that there are emergent trans-historical objective values—values which can be appealed to when we seek to cultivate agreements with other people.

Before going on it is worth noting a two-sided merit of the view of cross-cultural and trans-historical objective values offered here. The view explains why so many people have been convinced there are such values *and* why attempts to prove them in philosophy journals have been so remarkably unsuccessful.

People are convinced there are such values because they are acquainted with them experientially and know that they do in fact exist.

Contemporary philosophers have been unsuccessful in persuading each other that such values exist because their profession normally reasons by appeal to premises rather than by witnessing to experiences. Furthermore, ethicists have, by and large, supposed that trans-historical objective values would have to be *a*-historical values that could be rigorously defined independently of any particular social context.

The attempt to find such *a*-historical values has proved fruitless. For example, when one philosopher puts forth a theory of universal rights, another replies by noting that the concept of a right itself is something that most societies have lacked and that cannot be defined apart from distinctive types of governance and legal practices that make the notion intelligible. (You cannot have a right to own property if your society lacks the concept of private ownership. And you cannot in any significant sense have a right to anything at all if there is no institutional mechanism for seeking redress when your right is violated.)

But if the view offered above is correct, the quest for *a*-historical values *should* prove fruitless because values—like all the meanings constitutive of social reality as a whole—are emergent. But this is not to say that they must be subjective or culturally relative. It only implies that if there are objective values they will be trans-historical and we will need to cultivate our understanding of them and our activities based on them to get them to emerge.

WHEN IS PEACE WISE?

If there are trans-historical objective values we can fall back on in trying to cultivate agreements with others, then it would seem to be always possible—in theory at least—to practice peace. No matter how fundamentally different the others' starting points are, the basis for agreement would be there. But even if you were persuaded by the discussion in the foregoing section, you ought to be ready to acknowledge that there are times when what is possible in theory may prove nigh impossible in practice—or, at the very least, unwise.

There are times when the person we are trying to address and cultivate an understanding with simply will not respond in kind. He may be an upset child who has "completely lost it," a neighbor who is overcome with racial hatred, a businessman obsessed with greed, a politician totally preoccupied with advancing her power, a soldier who has been trained in brutalizing ways and given drugs (like the goon squads employed by the Polish government), a religious fanatic in the throes of an ecstatic vision, or someone who believes that all the real people have been replaced by humanoids and she is the only person left in existence.

The successful practice of peace presupposes an emerging reciprocity in the process of negotiation. If such reciprocity continues to elude us, we may need to question whether it can be achieved at all or is worth the effort even if it can. How, in practice, can we answer that question?

It calls for a kind of practical judgment which cannot be prescribed independently of a consideration of the concrete details of each case. But we can cultivate our ability to make such judgments and we can do so in light of two basic concepts.

First, we need to be clear about what this reciprocity is that we are looking for. It is not a compliance with our wishes; it is a willingness to dialogue. We should not put forth our demands and then conclude "they aren't ready to negotiate seriously and in good faith" because they refuse to meet our terms. The sign that others are ready to negotiate in good faith is that they listen to our reasons, offer replies, and then take their own replies seriously—that is, if we show them that on their own terms they ought to think differently, then they rethink their views. If we cannot get them to rethink their own views, then we cannot negotiate with them. But if we can in any way raise doubts in their own minds, then we have the makings for genuine dialogue.

This provides us with a general principle for our practical judgments. The cultivation of peace remains possible if, and only if, we can raise questions in the others' minds. Anything that limits our ability to do this will limit our ability to pursue dialogue and cultivate agreements. So a second general principle is: Peace becomes less promising and less wise a practice insofar as our abilities to raise doubts in others' minds are limited by language barriers, physiological distress that impedes their thought (or ours), entrenched perceptions that prevent them from viewing us as partners in dialogue, physical obstacles to communication (like helmets, jail walls, fences, and sheer distance), and other things—including the possibility that their minds are "gone."

In judging whether peace is wise, a second concept we can employ is that of the BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The practice of peace becomes less wise precisely insofar as options to it become more attractive.

It is important to assess peace and the other alternatives in terms of their long-run consequences. It may be that I can get to buy the new boat I want now by trotting down to Sears with my charge card—without bothering to negotiate plans for its purchase with my wife. But the effects of making this purchase without consultation may be devastating for a relationship I value deeply and do not want to destroy. Still, even once we take long-run consequences like this into account, there turn out to be lots of cases in which it would be foolish to not exercise our BATNA instead of practicing peace.

It is important to note that in most cases our BATNA does *not* turn out to involve any appeal to force of arms. When the seller at the flea market proves to be intractable in demanding a price I deem unfair, my BATNA is never (or at least almost never) the option of beating him up and taking the article I desire. When the woman I have fallen in love with turns out to be unwilling to accept any offer of marriage, my BATNA will not be to shoot her. If a local union refuses to settle for a wage I am willing to pay, I will often find options such as relocating my plant much more attractive than bringing in a bunch of company police to terrorize the workers and break the strike with weapons.

Several things often lead to mistaken practical judgments about the actual attractiveness of BATNA that employ violence. One is our tendency to contrast peace with war and negotiation with violence. Another is our tendency to respond self-righteously with indignance. We find ourselves saying: "Oh yeah? So you won't listen to reason, huh? Well maybe you'll listen to *this*!" Our angry indignance in the face of personal affront—an

indignance which may be perfectly justified—can yield a strong impulse to act and act immediately with the first means that come to mind. When the Iranian students seized the American hostages in Teheran, many U.S. citizens responded with an impulse to nuke ‘em. "Nuke ‘em till they glow in the dark. Nuke ‘em to show ‘em we won’t take this lying down." But, of course, a consideration of how the Iranians and other nations would probably respond made it clear that this kind of BATNA was one of the least attractive available.

Another thing that makes us often misjudge the merits of violent BATNA is our unwillingness to stoically accept the things we cannot change. Regardless of how much the United States may have disapproved of the revolution occurring in Vietnam and even if that disapproval was totally merited, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement with Ho Chi Minh was clearly not the one the United States adopted. War can no more always work than peace can. We may not like this fact but we have to learn to live with it.

One further thing that leads to misjudgment in the employment of personal violence, police power, or military might is our frequent failure to actively explore and develop other concrete possibilities. Parents who get caught up in a cycle of corporal punishment that becomes outright abuse of their unruly children might actually be better off sending the kids to a boarding school or giving them up for adoption. But few explore this option seriously enough to find out precisely what it would involve. So what initially seems an unattractive option remains just that, an unexplored and initially unattractive option.

To take another example, the United States has expended enormous resources in studying effective ways to engage in counter-guerrilla warfare. But in many cases, perhaps even most, it might turn out that the best way to deal with revolutionary guerrilla movements, led, say, by Marxist Leninists, is to let them seize power and then coopt their government and get them to alter their policies—and eventually their revolutionary vision—until it matches the kind of thing the United States desires. But genuinely effective ways of doing this remain relatively unexplored. If the United States had spent as much money researching methods of cooption as it has spent on studying counter-insurgency warfare, policy-makers might find the latter option much less attractive (relative to the former) than they now do.

This last point applies to the practice of peace itself in general. The less we know of what it is, how it has been tried in the past, the variety of forms it can take, and when it can be practiced successfully, then the less attractive it will seem. Peace will prove to become our wisest alternative in

increasingly more contexts as we actively explore and develop our best alternative to non-negotiated non-agreement.

PACIFISM

It may seem odd that in a book about peace so little has been said thus far about pacifism as a philosophical commitment to refuse to use violence. In part, the explanation is that pacifism is—at least usually—conceived of as a negative doctrine. It is a commitment to *non*-violence. The central thrust of this book has aimed at conceiving of peace and related notions in terms of an activity we can perform—one which is defined positively in terms of what we do rather than negatively in terms of what we refuse to do. Thus, the most extended account of non-violence offered here so far occurred in the section on Gandhi's practice of *satyagraha*—a practice in which non-violence appears simply as an aspect of an activity of undertaking self-suffering in order to win unforced assent to moral principles. But a second explanation for the delay in discussing pacifism is that the doctrine becomes fully intelligible only once lodged in the larger context of the theory of peace developed in the foregoing chapters.

Jan Narveson and others have argued that pacifism is, in fact, morally incoherent in the following way. It supposes that the sanctity of human life prohibits us from ever harming persons *even when by harming them we could prevent them from doing much greater harm to others*.¹ If we believe that violence is an evil and that the more of it there is the greater the evil, then we should always be prepared to employ a little of this evil to avoid a lot—assuming, of course, that this little and this lot are our only two options.

The conscientious objector who refuses combat service may have a number of responses to this line of criticism, including a key one that turns on consideration of that last assumption, the assumption that we sometimes face dilemma between committing some violence and permitting others to commit even more.

One kind of response appeals to over-riding religious considerations. If I believe that my highest obligation is to obey God's will and revelation tells me that God wills I never commit acts of violence, then I have a compelling reason to be a thoroughgoing pacifist. The motive for my choice may be a fear of hell or a desire for heaven, a compelling respect for the divine, an unyielding love of God or a conviction that acts of violence simply trap me further in the realm of Maya and prevent me from realizing my true self or achieving the enlightened understanding that there is no self.

Some of these motives appeal to long-run consequences (like heaven and hell) or to short-run consequences (like the state of blessedness which can be achieved now through non-violent *ahimsa*). Others reject a "consequentialist" view of action entirely. For example, if I obey God's will out of love, I may neither understand nor care about what the actual consequences of my obedient acts will be. The results remain in the hands of the inscrutable divinity.

The adoption of a non-consequentialist ethics may also be used by secular reasoners who make no appeal to divine powers. Someone may argue, for example, that the attempt to choose our actions on the basis of their likely effects is (at least usually) misguided because we simply lack the foresight to know what those results will be. Instead of aiming at good consequences we should aim at becoming good persons—people of virtuous character. In this view, it is not wrong to lie because people will be hurt; it is wrong to lie because acts of deception violate our personal integrity and flaw our characters by making us liars—regardless of what harmless good the lie itself does. Likewise, the consequences of acts of violence must remain in doubt because our knowledge is always imperfect. The one thing of which we can be sure is that the commission of acts of violence will, by definition, make us into the kinds of people who commit acts of violence and thus make us vicious rather than virtuous—assuming that a readiness to commit acts of violence is a vice.

But this sort of response is little more than away of shifting the focus of the argument rather than responding to the original criticism of pacifism. We shift to talking about what counts as a good or virtuous character rather than a good action of desirable consequences. But we still need to show that the warrior's character is vicious in a way that the pacifist's is not. And it seems difficult to determine what makes a character trait good apart from at least some significant consideration of the consequences that result when people acquire that character—unless we are ready to appeal to over-riding religious considerations. And the result seems to be that the argument gets lengthened but does not get resolved.

The critic can go on to argue that pacifists adopt the morally incoherent view that we should acquire a character trait that makes us sometimes choose to avoid a lesser evil by permitting a greater evil.

In many cases this might turn out to be less incoherent than it at first sounds. The pacifist could point out that we usually lack the time and resources to carefully weigh the consequences of each of our acts and so we have to formulate policies—the way "rule utilitarians" do—and choose the policies that will, *on average, in the long run*, yield the best consequences.

In practice, it is likely to turn out that the habit of responding non-violently will, on average, yield the best results in most cases and so we should adopt it as a policy. There might be times when a police officer could save lives by shooting at an armed felon who is fleeing into a crowd, but usually the returning of the felon's fire will fail to stop him and result in harm to innocent bystanders. The decision to shoot or hold fire must be made quickly in situations of stress and is likely to be flawed by misjudgments. So we should adopt the policy of never firing on fleeing felons in cases like this because it will, on average, in the long run, yield the best results.

This line of argument can offer a compelling defense of non-violence in a wealth of cases—at the international as well as local levels. For example, an "Entebbe" style raid on kidnapping terrorists may sometimes work. But the logistical problems are usually so great as to raise serious doubts about the soundness of using such raids as a standard response. The use of one or two tactical nuclear weapons might be argued to sometimes prove an effective policy option. (Perhaps Eisenhower could have successfully used them, as he threatened to, when MacArthur's troops were surrounded by the Chinese and North Koreans.) But the starkly unpredictable consequences of their use—including effects on international relations as well as the environment—argue that such an option should not be adopted as a policy. A pacifist revolutionary in Latin America could argue, similarly, that though guerrilla movements sometimes liberate at a price worth the cost, they *usually* do not (especially in light of the relevant BATNAs) and revolutionaries should adopt a policy of non-violence.

But while this rule utilitarian style of argument can plausibly defend pacifism in many cases, it is not clear that it can defend it in *all*, and the critic can always argue that there are reasonably well-defined cases in which we have sufficient weapons to do the job, we know pretty well what the results of our use of violence will be, and in those types of cases the use of force will, (average, and in the long run, yield the greatest good or least evil.

A good deal of popular debate about pacifism takes the form of extended arguments over just what those cases are and if any do in fact exist. William Hawk has presented a delightful dialogue that is representative of such debates:

O.K. You're a pacifist. What would you do if someone were, say, attacking your grandmother?

Attacking my poor old grandmother?

Yeah. You're in a room with your grandmother and there's this guy about to attack her and you're standing there. What would you do?

I'd yell, "Three cheers for Grandma!" and leave the room.

No, seriously. Say he had a gun and he was about to shoot her. Would you shoot him first?

Do I have a gun?

Yes.

No. I'm a pacifist, I don't have a gun.

Well say you do.

All right. Am I a good shot?

Yes.

I'd shoot the gun out of his hand.

No, then you're not a good shot.

I'd be afraid to shoot. Might kill Grandma.

Come on. O.K., look. We'll take another example. Say you're driving a truck. You're on a narrow road with a sheer cliff on your side. There's a little girl standing in the middle of the road. You're going too fast to stop. What would you do?

I don't know. What would *you* do?

I'm asking you. You're the pacifist.

Yes, I know. All right, am I in control of the truck?

Yes.

How about if I honk my horn so she can get out of the way?

She's too young to walk. And the horn doesn't work.

I swerve around to the left of her since she's not going anywhere.

No, there's been a landslide.

Oh. Well, then. I would try to drive the truck over the cliff and save the little girl.

(Silence)

Well, say there's someone else in the truck with you. Then what?

What's my decision have to do with being a pacifist?

There's two of you in the truck and only one little girl.

Someone once said, "If you have a choice between a real evil and a hypothetical evil, always take the hypothetical one."

Huh?

I said, why are you so anxious to kill off all the pacifists?

I'm not. I just want to know what you'd do if...

If I was with a friend in a truck driving very fast on a one-lane road approaching a dangerous impasse where a ten-month old girl is

sitting in the middle of the road with a landslide on one side of her and a sheer drop-off on the other?

That's right.

I would probably slam on the brakes, thus sending my friend through the front windshield, skid into the landslide, run over the little girl, sail off the cliff and plunge to my own death. No doubt Grandma's house would be at the bottom of the ravine and the truck would crash through her roof and blow up in her living room where she was finally being attacked for the first, and last, time.²

The comic character of this dialogue springs from the incompatibility of two deeply held convictions. The critic thinks it is unquestionably clear that there are times when we face the dilemma of either harming or killing some people or else allowing even more harm or death to occur. And she believes that pragmatic realism demands in those cases that we opt for the lesser of the two evils. The pacifist is convinced that these cases always turn out to be false dilemmas; there is always some third better alternative like shooting the gun out of the assailant's hand or honking the child off the road. And he believes that morality demands we seek out this other option and exercise it.

The pacifist may admit that there will be times when we will fail to find it or will be unable to employ it successfully. But he is convinced that we must simply accept this fact in a stoic manner and he believes that we will always be better off seeking for that third alternative instead of turning to the use of violence.

Now this version of pacifism could be interpreted as resting on an empirical claim that the pacifist and his critic should simply examine concretely and in detail—looking at case after case and considering whether there seems in fact to be a better third alternative. And this kind of empirical study can be especially valuable because it serves to cultivate our ability to make wise practical judgments. However, this kind of pacifism can also be understood in another way—one that casts considerable light on its motivation and the reasons why some pacifists so strongly resist accepting any of the counter-examples offered by their critics.

The conviction that non-violent, better alternatives always exist can be interpreted as not as an empirical claim in need of proof but as a presupposition of a practice—a presupposition which can be vindicated or rendered implausible but cannot be refuted. An analogy will clarify the kind of presupposition involved.

Take the scientist who assumes that every event has a cause. This belief is not really a claim that has been demonstrated, it is a presupposition underlying the practice of scientific research. The scientist simply *assumes* that each event has a cause and then she turns to the particular events that interest her and begins looking for their explanations. If you asked her why she thought this assumption was justified, she might reply by pointing to the many successful discoveries made in the past. But if you replied with the empirical argument that there remain many events whose causes have eluded discovery—and *which might not have causes at all*—she is unlikely to take such an argument very seriously. Her response is likely to be: "Well, those are cases where we just haven't found the cause yet. But there is *always* going to be some cause out there to be discovered." If you ask her how she can be so certain of this, she is likely to appeal to some dubious kind of *a priori* philosophical argument or, more probably, reason circularly ("I know because... because I just *know*") and simply insist that this belief must be true.

The function of this presupposition is further illuminated by considering how she would respond to the following case. Suppose she gives a graduate assistant the task of discovering why a protein she is interested in will not separate properly in an electrophoresis apparatus. He works on the problem for an entire semester and then comes back with the following report: "There's absolutely no reason at all why the protein won't separate, Dr. Russell. It just doesn't. I guess we must have stumbled, unfortunately, on one of those things that simply doesn't have a cause."

Dr. Russell will not be delighted with this "discovery" and busily start writing a paper to submit to *Science*. Her reply will be something of this sort: "What do you mean it doesn't have a cause! Of course it does! Are you out of your mind? We're not playing at sorcery here, we're practicing science! Get the hell out of my office and come back when you've figured out what's wrong with that damn electrophoresis machine!"

The most revealing part of her reply is the fourth sentence: "We're not playing at sorcery here, we're practicing science." Scientists are in the business of discovering causal explanations. The assumption that every event has a cause (or that every variable is a function of some other independent variable) is a presupposition which is constitutive of the practice of science itself. Insofar as we reject this presupposition, we stop doing scientific research.

A similar cognitive function may be served by the pacifist's assumption that every situation always admits of some third option which is morally superior to an act of violence or allowing the evil it would prevent.

We can view pacifism not as a mere doctrine defined by what it prohibits but as a full-fledged practice of non-violent peacemaking. If we view it that way, it shifts our understanding of the conviction that a way will always open for the non-violent cultivation of agreements through a practice of *satyagraha*. This no longer is viewed as a dubious empirical claim. Instead, it is understood as a presupposition of the practice. To reject it is to stop being a *satyagrahi*.

There are many forms of peacemaking and pacifism. We can practice "principled negotiation" without becoming pacifists and we can be pacifists on religious grounds that permit bleakly pessimistic views of the prospects for cultivating agreements. We may even believe that ours is an age in which wars will destroy all mankind, there is nothing we can do about this, and we are not obliged to practice peacemaking—we are only obliged to worship rightly and refuse to participate in the evil ways of this world.

But whether we opt for it or not, the practice of pacifism conceived of as a practice of peacemaking remains a coherent option. Mennonites and Quakers who actively cultivate peace under the assumption that "way will open" are not morally unintelligible people who simple-mindedly refuse to be realistic and pragmatic. Or, at any rate, not all of them are. Many are simply people who have chosen to adopt a practice—and a way of life—that is defined in terms of the assumption that non-violent solutions can, at least in principle, always be found—and that it is their business to discover these and make them a reality.

We may want to refer to this presupposition as an article of faith. But it is important to see that it is an article of faith in precisely the same sense in which the fundamental presuppositions of science are. It is not something "you believe when you know it ain't so." It cannot be proven true or false any more than the scientist's basic assumptions can be, but it can be vindicated by the successful pursuit of the practice it is constitutive of—just as the scientist's assumption that *every* event has a cause is vindicated by successful research. So it is not an empirically meaningless speculation about what lies beyond our experience in space and time. It is a presupposition that serves to make a certain kind of disciplined activity intelligible. In that sense, it is a faith that serves to give meaning to our practices in this life—rather than a creed that trades meaning here and now for something promised in the hereafter.

And yet...

And yet the arguments of this chapter do lead us to the brink of some very fundamental questions about humanity, being, and the divine. The questions are difficult to deal with and at some points impossible to resolve.

But they are questions worth raising, and some of them are worth raising again and again. For there are some basic questions that we answer best when we do not answer them once and for all—or even try to "get a firm grip on them." Such questions are ones we should choose to live with day by day—allowing them to get an increasingly firm grip *on us*.

METAPHYSICS AND PEACE

From some points of view, some of this book's claims would seem strange or even downright bizarre. It is not so much the reasons appealed to or the conclusions drawn that will seem odd. It is some of the implications that those conclusions seem to suggest.

The central arguments of this book are at many points rather straightforward. They do interconnect at times in some rather multi-faceted ways. But that is to be expected because of the kind of basic claims the book deals with: that peace has been fundamentally obscured in our culture; that it has been obscured by whole networks of assumptions and practices that give us a conflict-centered view of human life; that these networks are flawed (on their own terms) and should be replaced by other views of reason, emotion, meaning, truth, value, the self, social knowledge, and rational action; that the resulting (interconnected) networks of views lead us to conceive of peace as a positively distinguished activity we can perform. There is no need to recap all the ties between these views. Just listing them all in one sentence is enough to bring immediately to mind the thickness of the argument.

The argument has this kind of "thickness" because it concerns alternative ways of life—alternative ways in which we could cultivate our own culture. This kind of argument cannot be laid out in a single, neat, linear proof like a demonstration in geometry. It has to circle around issues, spiral outward, dig back in to untangle issues, cast about for ways of reworking the threads of our culture, and... well, it has to proceed in the fashion of a kind of complex negotiation which aims to gather consensus by dealing with a broad range of very different points of view and trying to synthesize them.

But the arguments are straightforward in the sense that they do not appeal to arcane pieces of information and they come in relatively manageable clumps that can each be assessed individually—though, and this is worth emphasizing, the interconnections between individual arguments and various clumps of them do claim to have a coherence that adds significantly to their strength. For example, the reasons offered for adopting a maieutic account of reasoning, a critical participatory account of social

knowledge and a cultivation model of rational action each claim to support each other. And they support, and are in turn supported by, the analysis of personhood developed in the account of the I/thou relation. But it is conclusions like the ones concerning that relation which seem to suggest implications that are strange or even bizarre.

It is not so much the peculiarly indefinable character of the distinction between persons and things that is odd. It is the puzzles it raises about (the) nature of reality. This book argues that social reality has features that make it different from physical reality and that persons have features (which cannot be defined) that make them different from things like apples and toaster levers. But how, then, are these two realms and these two kinds of entities connected? The distinctions suggest that we have to adopt some kind of philosophical dualism that posits realms of mind and matter in something like the way Descartes did. And this yields a puzzle similar to Descartes' problem of relating the two—which he hoped to solve (but did not) by connecting them with a mysterious function of the pineal gland.

It seems certain that there is only one ultimate overall reality. Even if we find it useful to talk of "alternative realities"—rather than different perspectives on the *one* reality—these various realities will be of interest to us only if they are all related to us, and thus to one another, in some larger single scheme of things. If we are to believe in a social realm, persons, and emergent trans-historical objective values, then it seems as though we need some overall account of how these fit into the rest of reality and relate to the kind of physical reality discovered by natural science. In this way, our practical interest in peace leads us to a concern with metaphysical questions.

Such questions are worth addressing here, if only briefly, and yet they are not the sorts of questions we should expect to make much headway with—at least not the sort of headway we expect in other areas of inquiry such as botany and economics. The best single remark ever made about metaphysics was probably the first sentence of Immanuel Kant's massive analysis of the problems of metaphysics, his *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.

Kant was wrong to suppose that there is some universal essence to reason and that it divides up *a priori* into neat compartments. But his remark captures the most distinctive and disturbing feature of the kinds of questions

we group under the heading of metaphysics: we can neither answer them nor ignore them.

But how then should we deal with them? An example here will help.

Many of the classic metaphysical puzzles arise when we try to understand how the views of reality implied by one group of practices are related to the ones implied by some other. For instance, the practice of treating humans as persons and holding them responsible for the choices they make seems to presuppose that they do in fact make choices and that if they choose wrongly we can blame them because they could have spoken or acted otherwise. This is not just an abstract article of faith, it is a presupposition of the practice of law as we know it. Judges suppose that defendants may be culpable for their crimes and suppose they acted voluntarily in the sense that they could have chosen to act differently. If the defendant turns out to be insane or not yet of age or not capable of free and responsible action for some other reason, then she is treated in a fundamentally different way. And there are practices for determining whether the person in the defendant's chair should be treated as a person or as a patient, a juvenile, or some other sort of thing the lawyers will talk *about* and the judge will do something *to*.

Scientists, in contrast, suppose that every event has a cause and this means that every action can be explained. If people acted one way rather than another, then—just as there must be a reason Dr. Russell's damn electrophoresis machine won't work—there must be a reason why they acted as they did. And this reason explains why they did not—and *could not*—have acted otherwise.

Now the question is: Could the defendant have acted otherwise or not? The scientist's practice leads him to presuppose that she could not have; the judge's practice presupposes the opposite. Whose presupposition is right?

This particular question leads us pretty directly to a host of other metaphysical problems. The judge's practice leads him to suppose that sometimes people's actions can be explained by appeals to moral values—namely, when the person chooses to act rightly *because it is the right thing to do*. But the scientist's practice leads her to suppose that all actions are events in the physical world which can be explained solely by appeal to physical facts and the laws of nature. Who is right? Furthermore, who is right about the nature of persons? Are they subjects that can be addressed as *thous* or are they physical objects that must be studied and defined like all the other things around us?

We can not ignore these sorts of questions because we cannot help but adopt some kind of answer to them in practice and because the answers we adopt make important differences in the ways we live. You and I are daily in just the same situation the judge is. We have to decide whether or not to hold people responsible for what they do. We make different decisions based upon the sanity, age, and rational competence of the people with whom we deal. I may respond very differently to someone who has thrown a rock at my car window depending upon all sorts of judgments about their capacity for free and deliberate choice. Or I may adopt a view like the scientist's and hold no one responsible in the sense that would imply guilt. I may just view them as things that need to be dealt with—just as a judge persuaded that "determinism" is true might view all the criminals that come before his court as deviants in need of rehabilitation or treatment rather than as free agents who ought to be punished.

I may, of course, simply not give the matter a great deal of thought. But my actions will turn out in practice to presuppose some view or another. And whatever view I or the judge adopt will clearly make a difference—rehabilitation centers are often quite different from prisons.

But while metaphysical questions about freedom and determinism and other such presuppositions cannot be ignored, it also seems that they cannot be answered—at least not in the way we would like to have them answered, namely, once and for all.

They do not concern empirical claims like the belief that a cow has four stomachs. To find out if people have free will or an "I" or knowledge of trans-historical objective values, we cannot just "cut them open and look." These metaphysical claims are presuppositions of practices and they can be neither demonstrated nor refuted. They can be vindicated by successful pursuit of the practice. And if they fail to be vindicated in that way (as in the case of the teleological presuppositions of medieval physics), then we may at some point choose to simply set aside the practice—and with some justification. But so long as our various practices like law and natural science are productive, then we have some reason to continue to engage in them and adopt the beliefs they presuppose—even if these contradict one another.

But how can we deal with the apparent contradictions? From a theoretical point of view they are unsatisfying because they seem to make our beliefs inconsistent. From a practical point of view they are a source of difficulties because we need to decide which belief should be acted on in any given situation. The judge, for example, needs to decide whether to hold the defendant responsible as the prosecutor urges or view the defendant's acts as

involuntary consequences of early upbringing and the like—as he is urged to do by the psychiatrist who is called as a witness for the defense.

One way to handle the contradictions is to argue that they are only apparent, not real. We may adopt some version of "compatibilism" which holds that the doctrines of free will and determinism can both be true. Perhaps it will turn out that some sophisticated doctrine of metaphysical parallelism can show that the languages of the judge and the scientist are both true, though different, ways of describing the same reality. One rather subtle and elegant way of doing this is provided in Geoffrey Hellman and Frank Thompson's "Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction."³ However, such sophisticated philosophical accounts offer little useful guidance in practical contexts like the one the judge faces.

A more homespun version of "compatibilism" may be of more help, however. Perhaps an analysis of our everyday use of the concept of a free action will turn out to *not* require that responsible deeds have no cause at all. It may simply be that they are caused, as Aristotle held, by "internal" things like character traits and deliberate reasoning—rather than being caused by "external" threats or physical constraints. Vicious criminals may be caused to rape or murder by their own deviant values. Still, they are responsible for these actions because those values are *theirs* and they are acting according to their own (internally rooted) desires rather than as a result of external threats. In short, in this view, free acts are ones that people perform because they want to—regardless of whether their wants themselves were predetermined. But there are two problems with this approach.

First, it is not clear that actions which are free in this sense are ones for which we are really responsible and can be held to blame. What about the crimes of the adult thief who is motivated by a drug addiction acquired in her mother's womb? Or consider the member of Tachito Somoza's National Guard who was "recruited" at the age of fourteen and taught to repeat things like: "What are we? TIGERS! And what do tigers eat? THE BODIES OF THE PEOPLE!" Or consider the case of the blueblooded capitalist who was raised in a secluded environment of private schools and a milieu in which it was assumed without argument that social Darwinism justified grossly unfair labor practices and a system of debt peonage that condemned masses of people to brutal poverty.

Such people's actions are caused by "internal" character traits and modes of reasoning they have been taught. But it is not clear that we ought to hold them morally responsible for their immoral deeds. And if any of them are to be excused, then why not excuse all of us for all our misdeeds—for each of us might have a story to tell about how physical and social

factors in our environment made us the kinds of people who (in Aristotle's sense) "voluntarily" choose to act in immoral ways.

Second, many of the metaphysical problems related to the free will/determinism issue seem difficult to resolve with this kind of compatibilism. How do trans-historical objective values exist in relation to physical events? In particular, how do the two interact when that peculiar type of entity called a person thinks about what you and I *ought* to do in light of those values and then *does it* here in the world of space and time? Just this sort of theoretical question takes on a very practical cast when a counselor or social critic wants to understand the process by which people are persuaded they ought to change *and then* actually follow through and alter their behavior.

There is an alternative to accepting one metaphysical belief rather than another or tidying up our seemingly conflicting presuppositions by working out some systematic doctrine of compatibilism. The alternative consists in not trying to answer metaphysical questions once and for all and continuing to live with them as open questions to which we give transitional answers. I believe that this is what most of us ordinarily do and that it is the wisest course to pursue.

For example, a good judge will begin a trial with an open mind. To find out if the witness is a responsible agent who freely chose to commit her crime, he will begin by talking *with* her. Suppose he finds it impossible to practice the activity of responsible dialogue with her—and decides that the assumption of her competence is not vindicated. He may begin to talk *about* her *with* a jail guard or prison psychiatrist. But then the defense attorney may call in a sociologist who talks *with* the judge *about* these prison staff—explaining their perceptions of the prisoner and their treatment of her in terms of physical conditions at the prison or social forces determining the behavior of the staff. The prosecution might, in turn, call in a political scientist who would try to undermine the sociologist's testimony—not by arguing against her evidence but by talking *with* the judge *about* her and her profession and the political forces that cause them to present the kinds of analysis she advocates. And then...

This kind of process could continue indefinitely. Notice that the judge does not attempt to determine once and for all who is a free and responsible person and who is not. Instead, he lives with this as an open question to which he gives transitional answers.

In many cases such answers may be transitional in the sense that they are *provisional*. We are open-minded because we are not yet sure of what the truth is. But in many cases the answers are transitional in another sense.

They are not hypotheses adopted in a tentative way until we acquire further evidence; they are presuppositions we adopt for the moment because the context seems appropriate.

For example, the judge may decide that the defendant was not a free and responsible agent when she committed her crime of shoplifting. He may talk about her case with a psychologist and then decide to sentence her to a juvenile rehabilitation center. But before dismissing her from the court he may talk *with* her—addressing her in a direct and personal way with words like these: "Young lady, this time I have taken into account your home environment and the peer pressures you were subjected to. Next time I will not. I am sending you to a counseling program that will give you the opportunity to change. Make the most of it. If I see you in this court again I will hold you entirely responsible for any crimes you may have committed."

In this case, the judge is demanding that the defendant *assume* responsibility for her actions. He believes that in this situation it is appropriate to *decide* to start treating her as a responsible person whose acts are freely chosen. This kind of transition to adopting a different metaphysical presupposition is one made frequently. Parents, spouses, counselors, and social critics may point out to us what has caused our past behavior and then demand that we assume responsibility for it in the future. This kind of transition is one we can make with ourselves and it is central to the process of personal growth. I may think about myself as a human whose actions can be defined and explained and then consider how *I* will assume responsibility for *myself* in the future.

Whenever we are involved in two practices that have conflicting presuppositions we can deal with the question about which belief is right in this kind of way. We can view it as an open question which we should live with on a daily basis by giving transitional answers. Are people motivated by leadings that give them insight into emergent trans-historical objective values or governed by bodily desires and cultural conditioning? Are they persons we should address as thous or organisms we should study and manipulate? Is the awareness we have in private meditation and communal sharing a presence of the Divine or a by-product of brain chemistry and alpha waves?

There is no point in burdening this book with a lengthy philosophical examination of these issues which tries to sort them all out. As metaphysical problems to be given definitive solutions, our reason finds that they "transcend all its powers" with questions "it is not able to answer." But the questions are also ones which this study of peace makes arise and which in practical contexts we are unable to ignore. The wisest course is to simply

accept the limits of our philosophical powers and the inevitability of our philosophical problems and go on living with these issues as open questions which we must answer time and again—deciding which answer is appropriate by using a practical judgment which we can cultivate but never perfect.

EPILOGUE

CHAPTER 18

The Hands of the Future What Peace Might Disclose

Although this book has discussed a wide variety of concrete problems associated with peace it has not argued for any particular concrete solutions. It has not prescribed any institutional structures for family counseling, it has not laid out a plan for legal reform, it has not articulated a social theory for dealing with racial conflicts, it has not presented an economic program for dealing with poverty in the third world, it has not fleshed out a political theory for counteracting growths in militarism, and it has not detailed a plan for halting the nuclear arms race. Limitations of space and competence provide key reasons why systematic solutions to these concrete problems have not been advocated here. But there is another fundamental sort of reason as well, one that can best be seen by focusing for a moment on the last problem.

One reason this book has not offered any concrete proposal concerning the arms race is that it is an extremely complex process that needs calls for focused and detailed study. But another reason has to do with one of the central moving forces underlying the nuclear arms race. It is motivated, in part, by a fundamental inconsistency in the norms of international behavior which the superpowers have adopted.

The inconsistency can best be seen by attending to an equivocation in the term used to define the function of nuclear arms. They are supposed to serve to provide for "national security." But two things are meant by this: the security of the population in each country, and the security of the government by which they are ruled. Taking the security of the first as our goal, we suppose that nuclear weapons serve to protect our citizens by preventing nuclear war. The other side is deterred from attacking because we commit ourselves to retaliation. And they are not encouraged to strike first in order to "use it before you lose it" because we assure them that we ourselves will never strike first. This view leads us to adopt the following rule: "Retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack, but never strike first and reassure the other side you will not."

Fine. But suppose the enemy attacks with conventional weapons. Suppose the Soviets are marching through Tijuana or the United States is dropping napalm on Leningrad. If our side is losing a conventional war, then at some point our existence as a nation will be threatened. It is here that the second meaning of "national security" becomes operative. To preserve the existence of our sovereign government, we must be prepared, if necessary, to strike first with nuclear weapons.

It might seem as though this second view is simply an immoral doctrine adopted by power-hungry civilian leaders. But notice that they may not have much choice about adopting it. Pretend you are president and the generals from the Pentagon or Kremlin tell you that they can no longer sustain a conventional war against enemy troops that are now killing your soldiers (who are these generals' *currently* obedient subordinates) someplace three hundred miles from the capital. Suppose they request permission to use a dozen tactical nuclear weapons to cut off the enemy's supplies and cripple their attack and you refuse permission. What is likely to happen?

It is highly likely that the weapons will be employed whether you like it or not. If you refuse to give the order desired, you may be disobeyed or displaced by a coup. Knowing this, and knowing the likely consequences of going over the brink into a nuclear war that will probably escalate, it is in your interests to avoid having this situation ever arise. It would seem that the best way of doing so would be to use the threat of nuclear weapons to deter *non-nuclear* attacks. In fact, since acts of "economic warfare" like cutting off the flow of oil through the Gulf of Oman would be likely to escalate into confrontations with conventional weapons, it would seem wise to explicitly include "nuclear options" among the responses you threaten to make to such attacks. For the sake of protecting your government's national security (and preventing a coup that would precipitate nuclear confrontations), you should, then, adopt the following rule: "Whenever vital national interests are in danger, threaten to use nuclear weapons in a first strike."

These lines of argument based on the two concepts of national security are each "perfectly rational"—at least in some straightforward everyday sense of that phrase. Yet together, they yield a pair of norms which are fundamentally inconsistent with each other: (1) Never threaten to strike first. (2) Threaten to strike first when vital national interests are in danger.

Both the United States and the Soviets have advocated the popular version of "deterrence theory," mutually assured destruction or "MAD," which prescribes the first norm. Both have also adopted the theory of national security as security of sovereignty which prescribes the second norm.

The United States has adopted the second norm explicitly in its policy pronouncements concerning Western Europe and the Middle East. The Soviets have publicly affirmed a "no first use" policy. But when actions and words disagree, "listen to the actions." In practice they, like the United States, have built and deployed tactical and intermediate range weapons that are irrelevant to MAD deterrence. Furthermore, given the size of their arsenal, there is little reason to doubt they have missiles trained on U.S. silos—missiles that, again, can only be understood as first strike weapons because once the United States used *its* silos in a first strike these would no longer be of any military significance.¹

The result is a negotiator's nightmare. There are a host of competing domestic and international forces pressuring both governments. Some urge them to escalate and others demand that they de-escalate their promises to never strike first or their threats to go ahead and do so. And to make good these promises and threats, each government has to act by building or not building whatever new weapons systems can be dreamed up. All the pressure groups involved find justification for their conflicting views in one or the other of the two fundamental imperatives to which both super-powers are committed. The result is an absolute mess. How can we get out of it?

Technological breakthroughs will not provide the solution. A new defensive system cannot alter the basic strategic position of either side. Satellites with lasers that could protect the *civilian* population (rather than just guard key military installations) involve a host of fundamental technical problems and neither side is seriously attempting to develop such a system. But even if they did, there is a plethora of chemical and (especially) biological weapons being developed. Furthermore, a system for defending citizens from these is made impossible by the indefinitely various ways in which they could be delivered—including sending a letter containing a self-opening packet of plague viruses to an IRS office in Los Angeles.

Arms agreements could certainly help and are well worth trying. They probably hold out our best hope for preventing accidental nuclear war. But even if both sides reduce their arsenals by ninety percent, they will still be stuck with the ability to use whatever bombs they have and build more if they so choose—and they will still be trapped in the basic strategic doctrines that continue to encourage them to *both* de-escalate *and* re-escalate.

I believe that in the long run the only way in which we will be able to avoid the enormous dangers the arms race poses will be to forget about them. I do not mean that we should stick our heads in the sand and pretend they do not exist. Instead, what I mean is this.

We have to accept the fact that modern weapons have catapulted us into an era in which military force simply cannot any longer serve its traditional function as the final arbiter—"adjudicating" disputes by letting might determine who is right. If the super powers are going to live "in peace" with each other in the old-fashioned sense that they manage to get by without going to war, then they will have to learn to live "in peace" in the other sense discussed in this book. They will have to learn to view differences as pieces of a shared problem rather than as conflicts in a situation of opposition. We will have to find ways to deal with each other by cultivating voluntarily shared commitments to expressions, projects and practices. In short, so far as the international scene goes, there is no other way to peace except the peace that is a way.

It is a way filled with obstacles and difficulties of all sorts. It would be silly to try to outline some master plan for it here. It is a huge task that huge numbers of people need to work at.

But it also involves a couple of little tasks that you and I need to get cracking on. I have a rough idea of one or two I might try to finish in a spare hour tomorrow and I am sure that you do as well.

As we snap, crackle and pop along upon our appointed rounds, we may have occasions for despair. We may weigh the odds and be tempted to conclude that concerns for peace are pointless. In those moments, I believe it is dishonest not to weep and express our feelings to the full. But the fear, frustration, and anger express values we can name. We can name the people we love and the institutions we cherish. And we can name the things that threaten them and we can find in such expressions the makings of projects and practices that will serve to let us define ourselves more fully and secure the well-being of the people we respect and the objects we hold dear. And we can choose to take part in those projects and practices in a way that cultivates peace. We can choose to do so not out of expectation of some later reward but out of the overriding sense of the intrinsic value of practicing peace. Even if we die tomorrow, it will have been worth practicing peace during the time allotted us this day.

But as we look about us, we can also take heart for the future. It is true that our world is in the throes of great problems which are often viewed as conflicts that will breed the conditions for an indefinite number of future wars and fights. But there are fundamental trends that are altering the nature of culture not only in the United States but throughout the world. Many of these trends are proving to foster the conditions that promote the activity of peace and the transformation of our culture of conflict into a culture of peace. And there are literally millions of people who are coming to realize

the nature of many of these trends and who are acting to serve as midwives of this new culture.

In the long run, the changes of most profound significance are likely to be the ones that people in the mass media would not normally classify under the heading of news about developments in peace. The growth—and maturing—of peace movements connected with the nuclear arms freeze. Witness for Peace, and Sanctuary are, of course, very important. But even more fundamental developments of the kind Alvin Toffler discusses in *The Third Wave* dig deeper at the roots of our culture as a whole.

For example, innovations in applied biology, computer science, and other technologies are pushing world culture to increasing decentralization. This is reflected in the diversification of "mass" media and the increasingly novel and varied markets—and subcultures—they serve. Social experiments in homes, offices, and voluntary organizations are further fostering increases in diversity, novelty, and decentralization—and at seemingly exponential rates of increase. One does not need to read Fisher and Ury in order to learn about the merits of "multiplying options" in negotiation. We only need to gaze across a magazine shelf in order to see the availability of many new options for housing, food, family structure, work, medical care, worship, and education.

Even within large corporations and government bureaucracies there is a spread of "intrapreneurship" and a shift to new modes of management—ones that emphasize the skills of group problem solving and consensus rather than traditional lines of hierarchical authority and obedience. People are learning to "get to yes" by "negotiating without giving in" in a wide variety of contexts. Parent Effectiveness Training teaches them to focus on interests rather than positions when dealing with children by speaking in "I statements" rather than "you statements." Management/labor relations are being transformed by the importation of organization structures developed in Japan.

People are learning to work by consensus because they have to. The proliferation of centers of power and resources increasingly place them in the position of dealing with people they cannot compel and must deal with on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, the proven effectiveness of non-conflict styles of group problem solving makes them increasingly attractive options—even for people who may resist the philosophical assumptions that underlie them. Not long ago a Colorado based organization that offers training programs in "mediation, negotiation, and group problem solving" approached a state prison system to offer some workshops. When prison officials were asked to

consider offering courses in "negotiation," they replied: "No. That would be of no interest to us. We are a paramilitary organization that does not operate on the basis of negotiation." The trainers paused for a bit, and then quietly asked if there would be any interest in a workshop on group problem solving. The reply was enthusiastic: "Oh yes! We have lots of problems!"

There was, of course, only one significant difference between the first course the trainers proposed and the second which they actually taught. In the second, the word "negotiation" was not employed.

Many of the key agents who are midwifing the fundamental changes in our midst are people who have themselves experienced profound personal transformations. Perhaps family problems led them to try one of the new counseling techniques, or work-related stress may have led them to try bio-feedback, or vague religious impulses may have led them to experiment with meditation. In the process of dealing with these problems or interests they began to undergo a fundamental reorientation in the ways in which they experience life. What were conceived of as personal conflicts or interpersonal confrontations get reconceived. A new gestalt, a new "paradigm," emerges. Differences which appeared as conflicting oppositions are now viewed as elements of a problem to be solved.

What works in one context is then tried in others. Increasingly, these individuals begin to see the world in a new way. They let go of the conflict centered assumptions of our culture and begin to operate with new assumptions. They assume that difficulties should be dealt with not by fighting out conflicts but by transforming the terms in which the situation is understood. They assume that real growth and progress occurs when problems are faced squarely and transcended. And they find increasingly that their own success in pursuing such transformation breeds the conditions for further success.

They also find networks of other people who can aid them in the process of personal growth and social transformation which their initial experience has drawn them into. They come to join what Marilyn Ferguson has called the "Aquarian Conspiracy." It is an open conspiracy of people who are seeking to transform our culture. Their conspiracy

...is at the same time pragmatic and transcendental. It values both enlightenment and mystery...power and humility... interdependence and individuality. It is simultaneously political and apolitical. Its movers and shakers include individuals who are impeccably Establishment allied with one-time sign-carrying radicals.²

The historical roots of this conspiracy lie in traditions of mystical practice and scientific studies of consciousness and brain functions. Its progress is tied to participatory studies of self-transformation that yield personal growth and lead to social transformation. At the heart of it is a host of insights into ways of being conscious of consciousness itself and ways of letting the mind grow. And a central fruit of it is an increasing awareness of presence. It is a presence realized when we make use of our full potential to live creatively and in ways that foster growth.

It is a presence which can wed the portions of ourselves we might think to be masculine—as opposed to feminine. It is a presence which discloses undreamed-of possibilities—and thereby discloses things fundamental about the actualities in which we are rooted. It whispers secrets, hints at leadings, directs beacons to the future, and, at times, it may even drench us in sunlight. It is something each of us may come more and more to witness for ourselves—and offer witness to for others.

This presence can bring continuity to our lives. To explore its depths we must make use of the categories of ethics, religion, science and philosophy. And we must be prepared to reconceive aspects of ourselves that are as fundamental as our sex.

As we practice peace, this presence is disclosed. It is a presence that is experienced when we are most fully human. It brings an awareness of emergent trans-historical values. It is not a paternalistic God whose almighty power guarantees that this will be the best of all possible worlds. But it is a presence that offers us leadings toward the Truth and empowers us with the courage to cling to it in a loving way that grants us openings that melt our hearts. It is something that we cannot adequately name but that we can encounter and acknowledge. We can cultivate our ability to experience this presence in a host of ways. In its light, all of us are sisters and brothers of one flesh. If we seek it, we shall find it.

APPENDIX A

Building a Peace Academy

The real university, he said, has no specific location. It owns no property, pays no salaries and receives no material dues. The real university is a state of mind. It ... is nothing less than the continuing body of reason itself.¹

Plato's *Republic* stands as the first major classic of Western social philosophy. It provided a systematic critique of Greek culture's art, economy, religion, social systems, methods of governance and the central conceptions of reason, knowledge, and action which underlay them. It provided a detailed defense of a vision of a reconstructed culture, one ruled by wisdom rather than the lust for material welfare, social status, or personal power.

In the *Republic*, conflict is viewed as optional. It is seen as a view of human differences based on ignorance, intemperance, injustice, or cowardice. People who have achieved wisdom see that when people disagree it is because one or more have made a mistake. There are objective truths about how we ought to live. These truths exist independently in a realm of eternal forms, and we can come to know them by a process of open-ended discussion that Plato contrasted with the eristic reasoning of sophists and called "dialectic." To know them is to cherish them. They are objective values that compel the will of all who have freed themselves from intemperate bodily lusts, unmastered passions of anger, and cowardly fears for their apparent welfare which make them ignore the highest goods of experience—the goods achieved by the active soul.

Like most Greeks, Plato took it for granted that the active soul could flourish fully only in the shared life of a community committed to raising

virtuous citizens who cultivated wise and fair relations with each other and their neighboring societies. The *Republic* is a vision of such a community. In it, an economy based on agriculture provides the basic means of life. An educational system aimed at producing good citizens and rulers provides the people and culture which employs those means to create a society which cherishes and promotes the highest ideals Plato could envision.

While we can learn much from Plato's blueprint, many of its underlying assumptions no longer apply. We no longer live in a pre-industrial world of isolated city-states. Perhaps the most basic premise of the *Republic* which has become obsolete is, in fact, the assumption that we live in a world in which it is possible to envision one single ideal form of social life. There are many forms of communal life worth pursuing. And no single scheme for integrating them can do justice to the complexity of the world in which we live. A single model for national government can no more be adequate for our world than a single method of agriculture, a single style of worship, or a single family structure. At the level of international affairs, no simple plan for a world government will solve our problems. The problems are complex, local as well as global, and filled with continuing novelties. They require solutions that are subtle, variegated in scope, and ad hoc.

But we can build communities that cultivate expressions, projects, and practices to better our common lot. As we do so, two insights of Plato should inform our work.

First, the economic structure of a community provides the necessary conditions for its maintenance and growth, and that structure is conditioned by external facts but can—and must—be intentionally chosen and revised by any community that aims to thrive. It does no good to cook up utopian schemes if they are not based on realistic interpretations of economic resources and considerations. But these still leave us with enormous room for interpretation. Entrepreneurial activity—whether undertaken by private or public agents—will be a necessary prerequisite for any fundamental changes in our communities and our culture.

Second, the educational system of the community provides the heart of its maintenance and growth. It is what culture is all about. Education can take a host of forms, but in each it provides the way the community lives into the future. The transformation of our culture requires us to become students and teachers in every walk of life.

We can start with our families, our friendships, our workplaces, our local political units—or our churches, our professions, and our voluntary organizations. They all provide arenas in which to cultivate a new culture. In each, we can bring to bear the categories discussed in this book.

We can try to introduce maieutic styles of reasoning in the family counsels or committees we serve on at work and at clubs. We can engage in critical participatory research for any practice in which we take part. We can cultivate any of the parts of our culture that we are involved in and that make us who we are. In doing so, we can cultivate voluntary commitments to cultivate shared expressions, projects, and practices. We can undertake special projects that are explicitly concerned with "peace issues"—cultural exchange programs, neighborhood conflict resolution centers, and political lobbying on foreign policy issues. But we can be active in the transformation of our culture without becoming "activists." The one sort of activity may lead us in a natural way to undertake the other. But both are intrinsically worthwhile and we should not hesitate to simply work as we find ourselves led to do so.

There is an international peace academy. It is a university without walls. It is a school for continuing education. It charges no fees and it grants no degrees. It has no chancellors or professors. Its members consist of people like you and me who simply enroll in courses called "Introduction to Neighbors #101," "Talking Over Coffee #212," "Changing Habits #369," "Readings #411," and "Practicum #412."

Some curricula materials and department phone numbers are listed in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

Some Resources

I. READINGS

What follows is a modest list of readings that provide useful places to pursue further critical thinking about the notions used in Parts III and IV to characterize peace as an activity. Almost all of these works have very useful bibliographies.

A. Alternative Forms of Reasoning Including the Eristic, Maieutic, and Other Styles:

Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982. (Deals with sex related differences in moral reasoning.)

R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Apollo Edition, New York, 1971. (Contrasts eristic and "dialectic" in a complex but subtle analysis that philosophically minded readers will find of special help in reflecting on Part IV.)

B. Emotion and Judgment

Robert Solomon, *The Passions*, Anchor Books/Doubleday NY, NY, 1977. (Critiques the "myth of the passions" and develops a view of the relations between emotion and cognition analogous to the one developed here.)

C. Critical Participatory Research and Non-Instrumental Models of Action:

Brian Fay, *Social Theory and Political Practice*, George Alien & Unwin, London, 1975. (Clear and very helpful introduction to Galilean models of social science and instrumental models of action as well as alternatives analogous to the ones developed here.)

Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 1984. (Profound and elegant philosophical and historical analysis of the genesis and significance of contemporary views of ethics and social science. Especially helpful for anyone interested in pursuing the notion of a practice.)

Paulo Freire, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Sheed & Ward, London, 1972. (Develops a rich and distinctive account of critical participatory research in the context of the third world.)

D. The Quaker Process of Consensus:

Howard Brinton, *Friends for Three Hundred Years*, Pendle Hill Publications, Wallingford, Pennsylvania, 1965. (A standard—and excellent—introduction to the history and practice of Quakers.)

Michael Sheeran, *Beyond Majority Rule*, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, Philadelphia, 1983. (A very perceptive study of the Quaker process of consensus by a Jesuit social scientist employing a critical participatory method of research.)

E. Principled Negotiation:

Roger Fisher and William Dry, *Getting to Yes*, Penguin Books, New York, 1981. (A short and especially well written introduction with excellent examples.)

F. Gandhi's Satyagraha:

Joan Bondurant, *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1965. (Includes detailed descriptions of *satyagraha* campaigns in the context of an

extremely helpful discussion of the systematic character of Gandhi's thought and practice.)

Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance*, Schocken Books, New York, 1961. (A very useful anthology of Gandhi's writings on *satyagraha*.)

Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad, India, 1928. (A narrative of Gandhi's first "campaign" and the development of his method. Especially illuminating in showing his use of categories of cultivation—rather than instrumental concepts of action—and notions of critical participatory research—rather than Galilean science.)

G. Related Styles of Peacemaking and Social Change:

Virginia Coover, et al., *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution*, New Society Press, Philadelphia, 1977. (An extremely useful cross between a peace and justice organizer's manual and encyclopedia.)

Kathleen and James McGinnis, *Parenting for Peace and Justice*, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1981. (A readable and down to earth guide written from a religious perspective and which includes a very useful bibliography.)

Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973. (A virtual encyclopedia of techniques and case histories of non-violent direct action.)

Marilyn Ferguson, *The Aquarian Conspiracy*, J. P. Tarcher Inc., Los Angeles, 1980. (An excellent synthetic survey of a host of current developments in approaches to personal and social transformation.)

Duane Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity*, William Morrow and Company Inc., New York, 1981. (A good place to start in thinking about relations between peacemaking and life-style issues.)

II. ORGANIZATIONS

A large though not exhaustive list of local and national organizations involved in peace-related work called *A Directory of Small Groups Seeking Peace* is available from either:

Jesse Aiken
Pax Dei
Box 44
Damascus, MD 20872

or:

Andrea Coolidge
World Peacemakers
2025 Massachusetts Ave. N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Also, a number of groups that practice—and offer training programs in—styles of peacemaking and conflict resolution similar to "principled negotiation" are listed in the *Dispute Resolution Directory*. It also includes a useful bibliography. It is available through:

National Institute for Dispute Resolution
1901 Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington D. C. 20036

III. SOME PROJECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

The intent of this book has not been to defend a Galilean theory of peace which should be believed but to cultivate a critical, participatory account of a practice of peace in which we can engage. What follows is a list of projects that might be pursued with the aim of further cultivating this understanding—projects that would lead you to critically revise the ideas of this book in light of your own ongoing activity.

1. Maieutic Reasoning:

Listen carefully to several people who are talking and try to identify their reasoning style as eristic or maieutic. Attend to their postures, gestures,

emotions, word choices, metaphors, interests, and preoccupations. Think of ways to tie specific details of their conversation to a general analysis of their style of thought. Then try to alter their style indirectly by setting an example or directly by talking with them about it.

Expect novelty, try to find ways in which the categories discussed in chapter five do not fit, and develop new ones.

2. Emotion and Judgment:

Take two emotions you experience with intensity, one you cherish and one you would like to avoid. Reflect on each with care and try to say in detail what its "intentional" component is. What beliefs does it involve? How? What physiological changes are associated with it? Now reflect critically on those beliefs. How true are they and what makes them true? Next time you start feeling the emotion, keep thinking.

3. Models of Action:

a. Take something you are doing that is important to you. Try to describe it rigorously as one of a group of instrumental actions. What precisely are your goals? What are your means and why do you believe these will accomplish your ends?

Is this difficult to do? Why? What is left out or left vague?

b. Now take the same activity and try to describe it as an expression, project or practice. Use the categories discussed in Part III to try to cultivate it. (For example, try using three different working "scripts" to characterize the setting, your role, the plot, the key themes, and the author's point of view.)

4. Methods of Research:

a. Take some practice you have pursued for a while and read several articles or a book about it written by a social scientist operating with the Galilean model. What do you learn from them? How does it relate to what you already know? (One place to start would be with an activity like flirting, courting, or parenting and some articles from *Psychology Today*, or, even better, the original journal articles on which the magazine essays are based.)

b. Read a study of some practice or institution and reflect carefully on the extent to which it employs the Galilean model or the critical participatory account of social knowledge. Make notes in the margins identifying uses of key categories. Then consider how much of the argument of Part III seems correct. (One useful trio of books to start with would be the following, which all deal—in different ways—with negotiation: Jeffrey

Rubin and Bert Brown's *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*, Academic Press, NY, NY 1975; Howard Raiffa's *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982, and Roger Fisher and William Ury's *Getting to Yes*. Penguin Books, NY, 1981. The first uses a Galilean method, the third uses a critical participatory method, and the second something in between—because it employs decision theory of the sort found in economics which, as explained in chapter 12, may seem Galilean in method though it is not.)

c. Take some community you are involved in and develop a critical participatory theory of its central practice or practices. Write it up, share it, and see how it goes over.

d. Take a profession with which you are involved (either as a professional yourself or as a recipient of professional service) and consider how conflict categories are employed in it and how alternatives could be developed and used. (If you are ambitious, you might draw on some of the techniques described in Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and employ them to make a systematic study of this profession—forming discussion groups that dialogue about pictures or audio tapes that provide "codifications" of experience, searching "generative themes," and so on.)

5. *Practices of Peace:*

a. Try employing the Quaker process of consensus in the context of your own family or some other small group. Use it, for instance, in deciding on some life style issue or a career choice.

b. Try applying "principled negotiation" in bargaining for a new house, a new job, or a raise—or take some dispute in which you are not directly involved (such as a neighborhood dispute over zoning)—and enter as a third party mediator using the "single text" procedure.

c. The application of Gandhi's method calls for patient and systematic work; we cannot just "give it a whirl next Saturday." However, many of the skills involved can be practiced in everyday contexts of a wide variety of sorts. A good place to begin in thinking about this is the *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* by Virginia Coover, et al.

6. *Shortcomings of This Book:*

a. One of the things this book does not do is offer any concrete, systematic scenarios for altering institutions in the United States. To develop one, you might consider some particular arena of foreign policy such as Central America and try to think out—and implement—fundamental changes. For example, suppose that Central America was set aside as an

experimental zone in which the U.S. chose to develop a kind of "peace-industrial complex" in its foreign policy. What institutions and practices might be developed to deal with issues of national security and economic development? (For example, how might we substitute civilian-based, non-violent defense for military defense systems? How might a Contadora process of negotiation displace traditional styles of State Department diplomacy? How might private sector profit and non-profit organizations be encouraged to develop and play appropriate roles in U.S. foreign affairs in the region?)

b. Theoretically minded readers might choose to try to remedy shortcomings in this book's treatment of the role of narrative understanding in the cultivation of projects. Or they might address its failure to formulate a theory of critical participatory research which assimilates recent work by writers like Michel Foucault. Or they might consider carefully whether the proposal for dealing with metaphysical issues (by living with them as open questions to which we give transitional answers) makes sense in fact and can be applied in the cases not discussed at any length here (such as the relations between the realms of trans-historical emergent objective truth presupposed in the practice of peace and the realm of fact and natural law presupposed in physical science). Or they might consider whether this book actually succeeds—as it claims to do—in *employing* the method of critical participatory research which it *advocates*.

Notes

PREFACE

1. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1982, p. 226.

2. AGAINST TRANQUILITY AND CONCORD

1. Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1970, pp. 216-217.
2. Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1978, p. 6.
3. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1976, p. 20.
4. Kenneth Boulding, "Towards a Theory of Peace," *International Conflict and Behavioral Science*, ed. Roger Fisher, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1964, p. 73.
5. Joseph Margolis, "The Concepts of War and Peace," *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 6, No. 2, Summer 1980, p. 211.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
7. For an illuminating account of Kant's attempt to develop such a notion, see W.B. Gallie's *Philosophers of Peace and War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 8-36.
8. Wladyslaw Strozewski, "In Search of the Essence of Peace," *Dialectics and Humanism*, Autumn 1982, Volume IX, No. 4 p. 161.

3. PEACE AS ABSENCE

1. Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, 1960, p. 151, original emphasis.
2. For other examples, see Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars*, p. 51 and Joseph Margolis' "The Concepts of War and Peace," p. 224.

3. "Nothing," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Volume 5, Macmillan Inc., New York, 1967, p. 524.

4. THE PERVASIVE PRESENCE: CONFLICT

1. "A Definition of Peace Science, The Queen of the Social Sciences," *Journal of Peace Science*, Volume 4, Number I, Fall 1979, p. 4.

PART II: THE CULTURE OF CONFLICT

1. *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1939, p. 38.

2. *The Idea of Nature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, pp. 25-26.

5. THE STRIFE OF REASON IN DEFENDING CLAIMS

1. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Volume LXXVII, No. 8, August 1980, p. 455.

2. See, for instance, Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

6. THE FIRES INSIDE

1. Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions*, Anchor Books, New York, 1977.

2. *Iliad*, translated by Richard Lattimore, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, p. 215.

3. *James*, Chapter Four, Verse I, *The New Testament of the Jerusalem Bible*. Doubleday & Co., New York, 1966, p. 485.

4. *John I*, Chapter One, Verses 5-7, *ibid.*, p. 502.

5. Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward Peace and War*, Abingdon Press, New York, 1960, pp. 91-92.

6. John B. Morrall, *Political Thought in Medieval Times*, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1958, p. 19.

7. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L.A. Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford University Press, London, 1888, p. 415.

8. *Ibid.*

7. A WORLD OF FACT AND PREFERENCE

1. Perhaps the clearest and still most influential statement of this view is to be found in Carl G. Hempel's *Philosophy of Natural Science*.

2. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 26, 1985, p. 6.

3. Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1984, p. 88.

4. *Stable Peace*, pp. 9-10.

8. THE PRACTICE OF THESE PREACHINGS

1. Penguin Books, New York, 1981, pp. 3-4.

PART III: THE CONTEXT OF PEACE

1. *After Virtue*, p. 87.

2. *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, pp. 9 and 10.

3. *Stable Peace*, p. 25.

11. PARTICIPATION IN THE WHOLE

1. For a fascinating—and well-illustrated—book exploring the theory laden character of perception, see Ernst Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*.

2. An excellent account of expression is provided by R.G. Collingwood's *The Principles of Art*.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E. Anscombe, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, pp. 31-32.

4. Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the Arts," in *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. Morris Weitz, Macmillan, New York, 1970.

13. THE PROCESS OF ACTION

1. M.K. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance*, Schocken Books, New York, p. 10.
2. R.G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938, p. 285.
3. The concept of a practice developed here differs somewhat from, but is much indebted to that in Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*.

PART IV: THE PROCESS OF PEACE

1. *The New Leviathan*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1971, p. 334.

16. THREE WAYS OF PRACTICING PEACE

1. M.K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1938, pp. 78-79.
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8. Morris Llewelyn Cook, "The Quaker Way Wins New Adherents," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1951, pp. 21ff.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
10. For a very helpful discussion of creative thinking and the uses of brainstorming see William J.J. Gordon's *Synectics*.
11. *Winning Through Accommodation*, by W. Richard Evarts *et al.*, is one useful handbook for mediators which deals with these "people issue" sorts of problems and ways of handling them.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.
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14. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

16. Sol Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals*, Vintage Books, New York, 1971, pp. 42 and 38.

17. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973, p. 8.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

20. For Gandhi's systematic conception of such stages in a campaign see Joan Bondurant's *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958.

21. M.K. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha)*, Schocken Books, New York, 1951, pp. 38 and 39.

22. M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, Navajavan Publishing House, 1929, p. 102.

23. *Non-Violent Resistance*, p. 6.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

26. *Hind Swaraj*, pp. 70-71.

17. THE HORIZONS OF PEACE

1. See, for example, Jan Narveson, "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis," *Ethics*, 75, 1965, and also Sidney Hook, "The Ideology of Violence," *Encounter*, 34, April 1970.

2. William Hawk, "Ethics and Peace," pp. 1-2, presented at the 1983 National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution in Athens, Georgia.

3. *Journal of Philosophy*, 72, 1975, pp. 551-564.

18. THE HANDS OF THE FUTURE

1. For these weapons, there is a justification the Soviets could offer—one the United States has offered, the "suicide or surrender scenario." Readers familiar with it are no doubt capable of deciding for themselves whether it is a plausible view that can explain each side's chosen arsenal.

2. *The Aquarian Conspiracy*, J.P. Tarcher, Inc., Los Angeles, 1980, p. 18.