

The Intentional Structure of Consciousness¹

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1. The intentional and the qualitative

Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one's leg feels to be in the leg, not 'in the mind'. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is 'all in the mind' from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is 'physical' while the first is not. And we also occasionally distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the 'physical pain' one feels in one's body. So what can be meant by saying that pain is a mental state?

Of course, it only takes a little reflection shows that this naive view is mistaken. Pain is a state of consciousness, or an event in consciousness, and whether or not all states of mind are conscious, it is indisputable that only minds, or states of mind, are conscious.² But does the naive view tell us anything about the concept of pain, or the concept of mind? I think it does. In this paper, I shall give reasons for thinking that consciousness is a form of intentionality, the mind's 'direction upon its objects'. I shall claim that the consciousness involved in bodily sensations like pain is constituted by the mind's direction upon the part or region of the body where the sensation feels to be. Given this, it is less surprising that the naive view of pain says what it does: the apparent 'physicality' of pain is a consequence of confusing the object of the intentional state—the part of the body in which the pain is felt—with the state of being in pain.

¹This paper has been presented in various forms in a number of places: at the Oxford Philosophical Society, the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, the 1998 conference on consciousness at Santa Barbara City College, the 1999 meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy in Melbourne, and at the Universities of Bristol, Lund, Otago, Sheffield and Uppsala. The paper was completed with the help of a grant from the AHRB Research Leave Scheme. For helpful comments and discussion, I thank David Chalmers, Katalin Farkas, Chris Hill, Paul Horwich, Brian Loar, Mike Martin, Adam Morton, Lucy O'Brien, Kim Sterelny, Helen Steward, Michael Tye, and Jerry Valberg. I dedicate this paper to the memory of my friend Greg McCulloch (1951-2001).

²Putting to one side the sort of panpsychism discussed by Thomas Nagel ('Panpsychism' in his *Mortal Questions* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) and aired as a possibility by David Chalmers, in *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996).

The naive view therefore provides a kind of indirect evidence for what I call *intentionalism*: the view that all mental states are intentional.³

Intentionalism is a controversial doctrine, and conscious bodily sensations are often thought to be obvious counter-examples to the view.⁴ It is often said that such sensations are ‘qualitative’ in nature, and qualitative mental states are not intentional. This is the doctrine I call *non-intentionalism* about sensations. Thus David Rosenthal:

There are two broad categories of mental property. Mental states such as thoughts and desires, often called propositional attitudes, have content that can be described by ‘that’ clauses. For example, one can have a thought, or desire, that it will rain. These states are said to have intentional properties, or intentionality. Sensations, such as pains and sense impressions, lack intentional content, and have instead qualitative properties of various sorts.⁵

Here intentional properties are described as those with a propositional content and qualitative properties are those properties which are characteristic of sensations. Propositional content is what ascribed in a ‘that’-clause, and is normally assessable as true or false. Now no-one should deny that some states of mind have propositional content, and others do not. But the question is whether this distinction is what is being rejected by intentionalists. This depends on whether Rosenthal is right to equate a phenomenon’s *being intentional* with its *having propositional content*. If he is right, then intentionalism should be understood as the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes: since all intentional states are propositional attitudes and all mental states are intentional. Intentionalism of this form is alluded to in the last sentence of this quotation from Alvin Goldman:

Philosophers commonly divide mental states into two sorts: those that have and those that lack propositional content. The former are *propositional attitudes*, and the latter *sensations, qualia* or the like. Propositional attitudes are recognised by the sentences used to ascribe them, the telltale sign being an embedded ‘that’-clause... In addition to propositional attitudes, the class of mental states includes sensations like pains, itchy

³I take the term ‘intentionalism’ from Gregory McCulloch, ‘The very idea of the phenomenological’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 93 (1993) 39-57.

⁴The other cases of mental states which are thought to be obvious counter-examples to intentionalism are certain kinds of emotions and moods. I discuss these briefly in ‘Intentionality as the mark of the mental’ in *Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind* ed. A. O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) §3. For a different kind of view, see also Michael Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995) chapter 4.

⁵David Rosenthal, ‘Identity theories’ in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell 1994) p.349.

feelings, and perceptual experiences, all of which are said to have qualitative character. However, some theorists hold that even these mental states have propositional content; and a few theorists try to explain away qualitative character in terms of propositional content.⁶

The views Goldman mentions at the end of this quotation are initially implausible. The first credits sensations like 'itchy feelings' with propositional content; but what is the propositional content supposed to be? When we say things of the form 'X hopes that p', 'X desires that p' and so on, we know what sort of thing it makes sense to put in the place of 'p' — but what are we supposed to put in the place of 'p' in 'X itchy-feels that p', or 'X feels itchily that p'? The second view Goldman mentions 'explains away' the qualitative character of sensations — presumably by showing that such character is illusory. But the qualitative character of sensations is normally introduced in terms of *how the sensation feels*; and what merit can there be in a conception of sensation which says that how a sensation feels is an illusion, something to be explained away? If intentionalism were saying this sort of thing, then it would be of little interest.

My view is that what is at fault here is not intentionalism as such, but the initial distinction between two kinds of mental state. We can immediately see that something is wrong when Goldman classifies perceptual experiences as among the states with qualitative character. The reason for doing this is presumably because there is (as Nagel put it) *something it is like* to see, hear, smell or touch something, just as there is something it is like to have a sensation.⁷ But it has long been recognised that perceptual experiences also have propositional content: one sees that the bus is coming, smells that someone is cooking goulash, or hears that the glass broke. So it seems like perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes which also have qualitative character.

One could respond that all this means is that the distinction between qualitative states and propositional attitudes is not exclusive: some qualitative states can have propositional content. But what exactly is it for a state to be qualitative? What independent grip do we have of the idea of the qualitative, other than in terms of the contrast with propositional content? We can

⁶Alvin I. Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1986) p.14.

⁷'What is it like to be a bat?' in Nagel, *Mortal Questions*

say that perceptions and sensations feel a certain way, to be sure; but it does not take much reflection to realise that the way a perception ‘feels’ is different from the way a bodily sensation feels; we can talk about how it feels to see red, so long as we do not think of this in terms of a certain ‘feel’ of redness (say) around one’s eyes.⁸ So whatever qualitative features are, we should not think of them as being the same in perception as in sensation. The most we can say at this stage is that qualitative states of mind are conscious states of mind, and consciousness comes in many forms. But if we say this, then it seems that not just perception, but many other propositional attitudes can have qualitative features, since many propositional attitudes can be conscious. I can consciously realise that now is the time to book the table for the restaurant: there is something it is like for this to suddenly come into my mind. So if the qualitative is just the conscious, then there are many propositional attitudes that are qualitative. And the fact that some propositional attitudes are not conscious just means that we have to distinguish between conscious mental states and non-conscious ones.

In effect, there are two options. The first is that a state of mind is ‘qualitative’ when it has qualities which are like those of sensation. In this sense, perceptions are not qualitative states. So the category of the qualitative is a sub-category of the conscious. One might be happy with this way of talking, so long as one had a satisfactory way of describing *non-qualitative* conscious states. The second option is to say that a state of mind is qualitative when it is conscious. In this case, perceptions are qualitative, but then so are many other propositional attitudes. One might be happy with this latter way of using the term ‘qualitative’, but then the distinction being made is essentially that between the conscious and the non-conscious.

It is therefore misleading (at best) to say that the fundamental distinction between states of mind is between qualitative states and propositional attitudes. For depending on how one understands ‘qualitative’, either qualitative states form a sub-category of conscious states, or ‘qualitative’ just means the same as *conscious*. Either way, the more fundamental distinction seems to be the distinction between the conscious and the non-conscious. And if this is the fundamental distinction between states of mind, then intentionalism does not seem to be such an

⁸It is of course important to distinguish between the sense in which a perception ‘feels’ like something and the sense in which a bodily sensation ‘feels’ like something. But it would be a mere terminological stipulation to insist on these grounds that perceptions do not ‘feel’ like anything: here I disagree with McCulloch, ‘The very idea of the phenomenological’.

obviously absurd view: for an intentionalist is then saying that all mental states are intentional, and that some are conscious and some are not. Intentionalism is then not denying consciousness (i.e. the ‘qualitative’ in the broad sense) or explaining it away; it simply accepts consciousness as a fact, just as non-intentionalism does.

However, there remains a question about what intentionalism should say about the ‘qualitative’ in the narrower sense (i.e. sensations). For as noted above, it does not seem right, on the face of it, to say that itches and pains are propositional attitudes in anything like the way beliefs are. So how can there be an intentionalist account of sensation? I want to address this problem by first breaking the connection between intentional states and propositional attitudes and proposing a somewhat different understanding of intentionality (§2). I will then go on to argue that bodily sensations should be thought of as intentional states on this understanding (§3). However, the fact that bodily sensations are intentional states does not rule out their having (narrowly) qualitative properties (qualia) in *addition* to their intentional character. One could hold that all mental states are intentional, but that some have non-intentional qualia. This is the view I call ‘weak intentionalism’. I discuss this view in §4, and reject it. Weak intentionalism is contrasted with strong intentionalism, which says that all mental states have only intentional mental properties.⁹ Two types of strong intentionalism are distinguished in §5, and I argue for the type which I call the ‘perceptual theory’. But before doing anything else, I need to say something about the idea of intentionality.

2. The idea of intentionality

I understand intentionality in a traditional way, as the mind’s direction or directedness upon its objects. When a state of mind is about something—say, as a belief that *my doctor smokes* is about my doctor—I shall say that the state of mind has an object. (Of course, intentionalism is the view that all mental states have objects; but one should not build this into the definition of intentionality.) An intentional state is a state which has, in J.J. Valberg’s phrase, ‘a need for an

⁹ The distinction I am drawing between strong and weak intentionalism is somewhat different from that drawn, using the same terms, by Brian McLaughlin (this volume). But the distinctions are nonetheless related: McLaughlin’s strong intentionalism is a variety of strong intentionalism in my sense (i.e. they are representationalists in the sense of §5 below), and his weak intentionalism is a variety of weak intentionalism in my sense (i.e. they are those weak intentionalists who believe that all phenomenal properties supervene on intentional properties).

object'.¹⁰ One cannot adequately understand what the state is without knowing what its object or objects are.¹¹ The objects of intentional states are sometimes called 'intentional objects', and I will follow this usage. But I do not mean by this that the predicate 'x is an intentional object' is true of a special class of objects having a certain nature. There is no such special class of objects; no-one could write a treatise on intentional objects as one might write a treatise on abstract objects, mental objects or physical objects. For there is nothing interesting or substantial which all intentional objects have in common. Intentional objects are just whatever one's intentional states are directed on. My thought about my doctor is directed on my doctor, on smoking, and on the fact that he smokes: intentional objects can be ordinary objects, properties, events or states of affairs (so 'object' here does not mean *particular*). One state of mind might also have many intentional objects. And, notoriously, some intentional objects do not exist.

This last fact is one of the most puzzling and much-discussed features of intentionality. But there is not space to say much about it here.¹² All I mean by the phrase *intentional object* is that at which one's mind is directed. If a state of mind has an object, if it is *directed on* an object, then it is intentional. This means that there is an answer to the question, 'on what is your mind directed?'. (The question is more natural in specific cases: 'what are you thinking about?', 'what are you afraid of?', 'what do you want?'.) Sometimes the answer to this question is a word or phrase which picks out nothing: 'Pegasus', 'phlogiston', 'the fountain of youth' all have no reference, but are answers to the question (e.g.) 'what are you thinking about?'. By 'directedness', then, I mean that feature of states of mind in virtue of which they have intentional objects. And by 'some intentional objects do not exist' I mean that some answers to the question, 'on what is your state of mind directed?' have no referents, they refer to nothing.

¹⁰J.J. Valberg, *The Puzzle of Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992) p.151, n.10. See G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature' in *Analytical Philosophy: 2nd Series*, ed. R.J. Butler (Oxford: Blackwell 1965); and Tim Crane, 'Intentionality' in E. Craig (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge 1998).

¹¹For instance: 'all consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something' Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (London: Methuen, 1958; first published 1943) p. xxvii. Compare John Searle: 'It is characteristic of Intentional states, as I use the notion, that there is a distinction between the state and what the state is directed at or about or of.' *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) p. 2.

¹²I discuss it at greater length in *Elements of Mind* (Oxford University Press 2001) chapter 1.

Directedness is the first essential feature of intentional states. The second is what I call (following Searle) *aspectual shape*.¹³ This is the idea that when something is presented to a subject (in thought, perception, desire and so on) it is always presented under a certain aspect, or in a certain way. There is no such thing as simply thinking about an object, as opposed to thinking about it (say) as *a present from one's mother*, or as *one's most precious possession*. This is what Searle means by 'aspectual shape'. The term is useful, because it is not yet tied to a particular theory or account of intentionality and related phenomena, as some terms are (e.g. Frege's *Sinn* or *sense*). Aspectual shape, like directedness, is something which any theory needs to explain, not a theoretical posit.

An intentional state, then, has an intentional object—this is directedness—and the object is presented under certain aspects and not under others—this is aspectual shape. (I say 'object' for convenience, but bear in mind that an intentional state can have more than one intentional object.) When we say what the object of an intentional state is, we have to pick a certain way of saying it, and the way of talking about the intentional object gives or expresses the *intentional content* of the intentional state. The content of two states can differ even when their objects do not: you and I can be thinking about the same person, but you think of him as Cicero and I think of him as Tully. Our thoughts have the same objects but different contents. In general, we can say that a state's having an intentional content is a matter of its having an intentional object with a certain aspectual shape.

Non-existent intentional objects mean that we cannot rest with this neat formulation, since we need to understand how something non-existent can be present in a state of mind. We can ignore the refinements needed for the purposes of this paper. But one thing is plain: non-existent intentional objects are not a special kind of object, any more than existent intentional objects are. And since (at least according to the orthodox view, which I accept) there are no non-existent objects, it follows that not every intentional state is a *relation* to an intentional object: for relations must relate what exists. However, this is consistent with saying that all intentional states are relations to intentional contents. For whether or not every state has an existing intentional object, every intentional state must have an intentional content: one cannot think

¹³John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1992) p.155.

without thinking something, perceive without perceiving something, and want without wanting something. The ‘something’ here is *what is wanted, what is thought, what is perceived*: this is the intentional content. The content is what one puts into words, if one has the words into which to put it.¹⁴ And therefore the content of a state is part of what individuates that state: that is, what distinguishes it from all other states. The other thing which distinguishes an intentional state is whether it is a belief, or a desire, or hope or whatever. Again following Searle, I call this aspect of the state—the relation which relates the subject to the content—the ‘intentional mode’.¹⁵

Every intentional state, then, consists of an intentional content related to the subject by an intentional mode. The structure of intentionality is therefore relational, and may be displayed as follows:

Subject—Intentional mode—Intentional content

This is relational because there are two dimensions of variation in any intentional state of a subject: one may be presented with the same content under various modes (as, for instance, when one can believe or hopes the same proposition) and one can be presented with different contents under the same mode (two perceptual states can have different contents, but under the same mode). To fix any intentional state of a given subject requires that two things therefore be fixed: mode and content.

Much of this fairly abstract description of intentionality should be uncontroversial.¹⁶ But notice that introducing intentionality in this way does not require any particular account of what the modes in question are, and it does not require any particular conception of content (except that it accommodate the phenomenon of aspectual shape). One could, for example, accept the general picture yet hold that the only intentional modes are the propositional attitudes as normally conceived (e.g. belief and desire). Or one could accept a wider class of intentional modes. Similarly, one could accept the general picture yet hold that the only content is

¹⁴I borrow this way of putting things from an unpublished paper by J.J. Valberg.

¹⁵Searle, *Intentionality*, chapter 1. I follow Searle in the terminology, but not in some other things: for instance, he denies that intentional states are relations to their contents.

¹⁶For an example of someone who accepts these points, see Tye, *Ten Puzzles of Consciousness* pp.94-96.

propositional content, content that can be said to be true or false. Or one could accept a wider conception of content, and say that some content is propositional and some is not.

But nothing in the very idea of intentionality compels us to choose one way or the other. Other considerations are needed to settle these issues. So, in particular, nothing in the idea of intentionality as outlined above compels us to say that content must be propositional. In fact, I believe that not all content is propositional. A state of mind has propositional content when we can say that the content of the state is true or false. But many intentional states have, on the face of it, non-truth-evaluable contents. The emotions of love and hate, for example, are directed at particular objects; fear and pity are often the same; desire is often naturally construed as having a non-propositional content; and then there is the general phenomenon of *thinking about an object*, which is not always explicable in propositional terms. Some of these examples are controversial, but I will not enter the controversy in this paper. All I need for the time being is to open up the possibility of non-propositional content, since once this possibility is opened up, then the equation (found in the quotations from Rosenthal and Goldman above) between intentional states and propositional attitudes is not compulsory. And once this is accepted, then the fact that sensations are not obviously propositional attitudes is not a refutation of intentionalism.

So much for intentionality; but what are non-intentional states supposed to be? Well, if the above definition of intentionality is accepted, then a supposedly non-intentional state or property is one which is mental, (probably) conscious, but has no intentional structure: it is not directed on anything, it has no intentional object, no aspectual shape, and no distinction can be made between anything like *mode* and anything like *content*. The term 'qualia' has been used for such properties, and I will follow this usage. It is also possible to use the term 'qualia' for the 'qualitative' in the broad sense (= the conscious) mentioned in §1; but to avoid confusion I will here use the term for qualitative properties in the narrow sense. I will use the term 'phenomenal' for qualitative in the broader sense (after all, the English *phenomenon* derives from the Greek for *appearance*¹⁷). So the phenomenal character of experience is its conscious character, and an account of the phenomenal character of experience is an account of what it is

¹⁷And as McCulloch aptly points out in 'The very idea of the phenomenological', one English dictionary definition of the term 'phenomenon' is 'the object of a person's perception; what the senses or mind notice'.

like to have that experience. In this terminology, then, it is not tautological to say that one can give an account of phenomenal character in terms of qualia. And it is not contradictory to say that one can give an account of phenomenal character in terms of intentionality.¹⁸ These are both substantial theses.

Qualia are either mental states or properties of mental states. For example, one could call the mental state of having a toothache a *quale*, or one could call the particular naggingness of the toothache the *quale*. Intentionalism must reject qualia in the first sense—obviously, since intentionalism is the view that all mental states are intentional. But it need not reject qualia in the second sense. A version of intentionalism—*weak intentionalism*—maintains that all mental states have some intentionality, but that some of these states have qualia-properties. The experience of a toothache, for instance, has intentionality (it is tooth-directed) but on top of this it may have specific qualia which account for its particular feeling. A stronger form of intentionalism says that no mental state has any non-intentional mental properties. In §4, I shall argue for strong intentionalism, and against weak intentionalism. But first I must put non-intentionalism to one side.

3. Intentionalism and non-intentionalism about sensation

The quotation from Rosenthal in §1 expresses a straightforward non-intentionalist view: there are two kinds of mental states, propositional attitudes and qualia. As noted in §1, the view ought to classify sense perception as a kind of hybrid, having both propositional content and qualia. And we also saw that this view should not equate the qualitative with the conscious, since there are conscious mental states (e.g. conscious thoughts, conscious episodes of thinking) which have no qualia in the sense just defined (§2). The consciousness involved in these non-qualitative states must be explained in some other way—for instance, in terms of the states' being the objects of higher-order states (this is the 'Higher-Order Thought' or HOT theory of conscious thought).¹⁹

¹⁸It should be obvious that I am talking throughout about what Ned Block calls 'phenomenal consciousness': see Ned Block, 'On a confusion about a function of consciousness' *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 18 (1995), 227-247; reprinted in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997).

¹⁹For HOT theories of consciousness, see David Rosenthal, 'Two concepts of consciousness' *Philosophical Studies* 49 (1986) 329-359; D.H. Mellor, 'Conscious belief' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 78 (1977-

So on this non-intentionalist view, there are conscious propositional attitudes which have qualia (e.g. perceptions) and there are conscious propositional attitudes which have no qualia (e.g. conscious thoughts). If this is granted, then it has been granted that there can be states of mind which are purely intentional, which lack qualia, and yet are conscious states. There can be no objection in principle, then, to the idea of explaining consciousness (in the case of certain mental states) using only the resources of intentionality. And this, of course, is what strong intentionalism will end up saying about all conscious states—but we have not got there yet.

The existence of conscious states which are intentional does not trouble non-intentionalism, of course; the view would only be refuted if there were no qualia. So to refute non-intentionalism, an intentionalist must examine the supposed cases of qualia, and show either that they do not exist or that they have been mistakenly classified as non-intentional. Here the chief examples, as we saw in §1, are bodily sensations. How should an intentionalist argue that bodily sensations are intentional?

There are a number of ways to proceed here, some of which will be discussed below. (For instance, Michael Tye has argued that pains actually represent damage to the body.²⁰) But it seems to me that the strongest case for the intentionality of bodily sensation comes from a correct understanding of their felt location. It is essential to bodily sensation, as we normally experience it, that it feels to have a location in the body.²¹ The phenomenological facts are as follows. Pains and other sensations feel to be located in parts of the body. To attend to a sensation is to attend to the (apparent) part or region of the body where the sensation feels to be. The location of a bodily sensation need not be felt to be precise; and it can involve the whole body. A feeling of nausea can overwhelm the middle of one's whole body, and a feeling of physical exhaustion can pervade one's whole body. The point is not that a sensation must be

78) 87-101; Peter Carruthers, 'Brute experience' *Journal of Philosophy* 86 (1988) 435-451. Sometimes HOT theories are put forward as theories of all conscious states, not just conscious thoughts. This has the consequence that a sensation is not conscious unless it is the object of a higher-order thought. Also, sometimes consciousness is explained in terms of the *availability* to higher-order thought, in other cases it is explained in terms of an actual episode or act of thinking. I find all these views implausible, but I do not have space to discuss them here.

²⁰Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* chapter 4. Tye's view is discussed in §5 below.

²¹I mean to describe normal experience; of course there are many interesting borderline cases (e.g. referred pain; and so-called 'deep pain', apparently unlocatable by the subject) and many pathological cases which are hard to describe adequately. The extent to which we find these cases unintelligible tracks the extent to which they depart from the normal case of localisable sensation; it is clear that non-intentionalism should not defend itself by appealing to cases such as these.

felt to occupy a non-vague relatively circumscribed location, but that it is felt to be somewhere within one's body. The necessity of this would explain why we find it so hard to make sense of the idea of a sensation of one's own which has a location (say) ten inches outside one's left shoulder. Phantom limbs are not such cases: what subjects feel in a phantom limb pain is not that they have a pain at some distance from the point at which the limb was severed; rather, they feel that their body extends further than it actually does.²²

That bodily sensation has an apparent location may be uncontroversial; that its location is *felt* may be less so. The non-intentionalist view mentioned above might say that the 'felt' location really involves two things: a sensation (a quale) and a belief that the sensation is located in a certain part of the body. On this view, the location of a sensation is not part of the feeling of a sensation; rather it is a result of a *belief* about where the sensation is.

But this view cannot be right. Belief is a state of mind which is revisable on the basis of other beliefs and evidence. When rational subjects come to have a reason which tells decisively against a belief, then they revise the belief. So if the apparent location of a sensation is explained by a belief about its location, one would expect the belief to be revised when a subject comes to have a reason to think that the sensation does not have that location. But this is not so. Someone who becomes convinced by the physicalist arguments for identifying sensations with brain states will come to believe that sensations are really located in the brain. But having this belief does not change the apparent location of the sensation in the body. Moreover, this person is not irrational—i.e. does not have a contradictory belief—when they claim that a sensation is in the brain but it seems to be in the leg. Feeling a sensation to be located at a certain place is not the same as believing that one has a sensation located at that place.

If we accept that a sensation feels to be located at a certain point, then I claim we should accept that sensation-states have intentionality. But why? John Searle has claimed that we should not let our ways of talking mislead us here:

The 'of' of 'conscious of' is not always the 'of' of intentionality. If I am conscious of a knock on the door, my conscious state is intentional, because it makes reference to

²²I am deeply indebted here to M.G.F. Martin, 'Bodily awareness: a sense of ownership' in *The Body and the Self* eds. J. Bermúdez, N. Eilan and A. Marcel (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995). See also D.M. Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (London: Routledge 1962).

something beyond itself, the knock on the door. If I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself.²³

But 'X is conscious of a pain' can mean at least three things. First, if being conscious of a pain means that one is aware of being in a pain-state, then it is a higher-order awareness of another mental state, and is as intentional as any other higher-order mental state (its content may be: *I am in pain*). Second, if being conscious of a pain is being aware of a pain-object, then the analogy with a knock on the door holds: the state can be as intentional as being conscious of a knock at the door. For the fact that the pain-object (if there is such a thing) is not itself intentional is no more relevant to the intentionality of the awareness of the pain-object than the non-intentional nature of the knock is relevant to the intentionality of the consciousness of the knock. And finally, being conscious of a pain may simply mean *being in pain*, which is in its nature a conscious state. But the intentionality of this is precisely what is at issue. So how can the question be settled?²⁴

In §2 I outlined the two essential features of intentionality: directedness and aspectual shape. These features generate what I call the relational structure of intentionality: intentional states involve presentations of intentional objects with aspectual shape. The presentation of an object with an aspectual shape is what I call an intentional content. Subjects are related to intentional contents (e.g. propositions) by intentional modes (e.g. belief). The nature of an intentional states is given by giving the intentional mode and the content.

What are the intentional object, the mode and the content in the case of bodily sensation? Take the example of a pain in one's ankle. The first thing to note is that this is a form of awareness; and it is not a 'mere' awareness, or 'bare awareness'. It is an awareness *of* one's ankle. It is for this reason that I say, *pace* Searle, that the ankle is the object of the state. Being in this state of pain is a matter of the ankle being presented to one in a certain way. In general, the intentional object of a state S is what is given in an answer to the question, 'what is

²³Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* p.84.

²⁴Curiously, in a footnote to the above discussion, Searle qualifies his denial of the intentionality of pains: 'The sense of body location does have intentionality, because it refers to a portion of the body. This aspect of pains is intentional, because it has conditions of satisfaction. In the case of a phantom limb, for example, one can be mistaken, and the possibility of a mistake is at least a good clue that the phenomenon is intentional.' *The Rediscovery of the Mind* p.251, note 1.

your mind directed on when in S?'. For example, the correct answer to the question, 'what is your belief about?', gives the intentional object of your belief. Now pains are not naturally said to be 'about' things; instead one asks 'what hurts?' or 'where does it hurt?' and the answer gives the intentional object of a pain: my leg, my arm, etc. That there is a relational structure here is shown by the fact that there is a distinction between the subject of the experience and the object or region which hurts; that there is an intentional object is shown by the fact that the subject's mind is directed on that object. And as with other intentional objects, there are cases where the intentional object of a sensation does not exist; for example, in phantom limb cases.

The intentional object of the pain—the ankle—is presented to the mind in a certain way. One's ankle is a part of one's foot, it is made up of bones and muscle, but it may not be presented as such in the state of pain. One may have a pain in one's liver, but not have any idea that the liver is where the pain is—one could have a pain which one can only identify as being 'over here' without even knowing that one has a liver. Thus bodily sensations exhibit aspectual shape: their objects are presented in certain ways, to the exclusion of other ways. And the content of a sensation-state is a matter of its object being presented in a certain way. This content need not be propositional.

A full account of this phenomenon needs to probe more deeply into the relationship between the experience of one's body in sensation, in kinaesthesia and proprioception, and the awareness of one's body as a unique and unified object of one's bodily awareness. The account would also need to link bodily awareness with one's sense of one's body in agency. I do not give such an account in this paper; but I note here the need for further investigation.

This is all I shall say for the time being about the directedness and aspectual shape of bodily sensations. What about the concept of an intentional mode—how does this apply to sensations? This is a question on which different intentionalist theories differ, so we must leave it until we come to discuss these theories in §5. Here I take myself to have argued for three things: first, that even non-intentionalists must accept the coherence of purely intentional conscious states; second, that all bodily sensations involve a felt bodily location; and third, that this can be understood as a form of intentionality, as that idea was introduced in §2.

4. Weak intentionalism

Suppose these points are accepted. And suppose, for the sake of argument, that intentionalist accounts of other mental phenomena, such as moods and so-called ‘undirected’ emotions, are accepted. (I shall not discuss these phenomena in this paper.) Then even if one accepted all this, one could still accept that certain mental states have qualia, in addition to their intentional properties. This is the view I call weak intentionalism.

Weak intentionalism says that all mental states are intentional, but that some have non-intentional conscious properties: qualia. The weak intentionalist holds that qualia are higher-order properties of states of mind. And since states are normally understood as instances of properties, qualia are properties of properties. Another way to express weak intentionalism in this sense²⁵ is to say that the intentional nature of certain conscious states does not exhaust their conscious or phenomenal character: two experiences could share their intentional nature and differ in their phenomenal character. Yet another way to express the view is as follows: not every phenomenal or conscious difference in states of mind is an intentional (or a representational) difference. One could be a weak intentionalist about all mental states, or one could apply the view only to particular kinds of mental states: one could say, for instance, that all perceptual experiences have intentional content, and that they also have qualia, but this is not true of beliefs.²⁶

Weak intentionalism about perceptual experience is a popular view; it has been defended by Loar, Peacocke and Shoemaker among others.²⁷ The view is normally defended by describing ways in which the phenomenal character of an experience can change even if the representational content does not (e.g. the inverted spectrum) or cases where the phenomenal character remains the same across changes in representational content (e.g. Block’s ‘inverted earth’). I do not find these arguments convincing in the case of visual experience; my sympathies are with those who defend a strong intentionalist conception of visual experience.²⁸

²⁵ Though not in McLaughlin’s sense: see footnote 9 above.

²⁶ For a useful taxonomy of varieties of intentionalism, see Alex Byrne, ‘Intentionalism defended’ *Philosophical Review* forthcoming.

²⁷ See Brian Loar, ‘Transparent experience’ (this volume); Christopher Peacocke, *Sense and Content* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983) chapter 1; Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Qualities and qualia: what’s in the mind?’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50 (1990) 109-31.

²⁸ The phenomenon of the ‘transparency’ of experience – that in visual experience one ‘sees through’ to the object itself – has often been thought to support strong intentionalism. See Gilbert Harman, ‘The intrinsic

Here my concern is with bodily sensation, since I am taking bodily sensations as one of the main sources of resistance to an intentionalist theory of mind, regardless of what happens to theories of perception. But I will talk for convenience about ‘weak intentionalism’ as if it were a view about all mental states. (Conceivably someone could agree with me about sensation but nonetheless hold that some mental states are ‘pure’ qualia; such a person should understand my term ‘weak intentionalism’ as meaning ‘weak intentionalism about sensation’.)

Since there are not many existing weak intentionalist accounts of sensation, I shall describe a weak intentionalist view of sensation drawing on the weak intentionalist views of perceptual experience just mentioned. On this view, having a pain is an intentional state, for the reasons given in §3: it is an awareness of something happening in a part or region of your body. That part or region is the intentional object of the state. But this is not the whole story about the consciousness involved in pain. For there are also qualia which are characteristic of the feeling of pain. Thus, the conscious nature of the sensation-experience is determined by two things: the part of the body the experience presents as its object, and the qualia. We can illustrate this by considering two pains, one in the right ankle and one in the left, which feel to be in different places and yet in some sense feel the same. The sense in which they feel the same is given by the qualia which the pain-states share. The sense in which they feel different is given by their intentional objects. (I assume here that the location of the sensation is part of how the sensation-state feels, for the reasons given in §3.) The view therefore locates the consciousness involved in bodily sensations in two places: in the relation to the body part, and in the intrinsic non-intentional qualia.

What are these non-intentional qualia properties of? The natural answer is that they are apparent properties of the part of the body which hurts. But if we are to maintain the parallel with the weak intentionalist theory of perception, this cannot be the right answer. In the case of perception, colour-qualia are supposed to be properties of states of mind, not properties of the coloured objects (physical objects do not have qualia, on the normal understanding of qualia).

quality of experience’ in *Philosophical Perspectives* 4, ed. J. Tomberlin (Northridge, Ca.: Ridgeview 1990); Michael Tye, ‘Visual qualia and visual content’ in *The Contents of Experience* ed. Tim Crane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992). Loar (this volume) argues for the unusual position that the existence of qualia is compatible with the facts about transparency. For an illuminating general discussion of transparency, see M.G.F. Martin, ‘The transparency of experience’, *Mind and Language* forthcoming.

So pain-qualia, construed on the same model, are also properties of mental states: the naggingness of a toothache is a property of the toothache, while the toothache itself is a (partly intentional) state of a conscious subject. A non-intentionalist, by contrast, holds that certain conscious mental states (call them 'pure qualia') have no intentionality at all. So if it is to distinguish itself from non-intentionalism, weak intentionalism must deny that there can be pure qualia: qualia cannot be instantiated *except* as properties of properties: i.e. intentional state types. If qualia were properties of body parts, then they would not be properties of properties. But they must be properties *of properties*, because otherwise there could be instantiations of pure qualia.

I will assume then that according to weak intentionalism, the qualia involved in pain are properties of the intentional state of being in pain, just as putative colour qualia are properties of the perceptual experiences of seeing objects. And I will assume that these properties are instantiated only when the intentional state is instantiated. (If one thought that 'zombies' in David Chalmers's sense were impossible, then one might add 'when and..' to the 'only when'.) But is this thesis plausible?

The difficulty with the theory is phenomenological: it derives from the unclarity of what it is to be 'aware of an intrinsic property of a state of mind'. Certainly being aware of a pain in my ankle is not like being aware of a knock at the door. The pain in my ankle seems to be a part of me, and it seems to be the *ankle* which is hurting me. It is not as if I am aware of the location of my ankle, and (in addition to this) I feel that *my being so aware* has a quale. To make sense of this, we have to make sense of the possibility of separating out, in thought, the quale from the intentional awareness. But this requires we can make real sense of pure qualia; and this is denied by the theory. The intentionality and the phenomenal character of the pain just do not seem to be separable in this way.

The essence of my objection is this: in a state of pain (in the ankle, say) there do not seem to be two things going on—the intentional awareness of the ankle, and the awareness of the pain-quale. Rather, the awareness of the ankle seems to be *ipso facto* awareness of its hurting. The hurting seems to be in the ankle. How the ankle feels seems to be a property of the

ankle. It does not seem to be an intrinsic property of the intentional awareness of the ankle.²⁹ In this respect, the objection parallels the transparency objection to visual qualia: colours seem to be properties of objects, not intrinsic properties of experiences.

Of course, the idea that colour-qualia and pain-qualia are properties of states of mind can arise from a metaphysical resistance to the idea that things like surfaces of inanimate objects can have certain sorts of properties.³⁰ The inverted spectrum shows (allegedly) that the qualitative nature of colours is in the mind; and the qualia of pain can hardly be in a physical body. But the theory is nonetheless supposed to save the appearances, the phenomena: for what is the point of a theory of consciousness which puts the phenomena in the wrong place? I propose that we put this theory to one side and see if the other intentionalist alternatives are preferable. Do strong intentionalist theories do any better?

5. Strong intentionalist theories of sensation: representationalism

These theories say that the conscious character of a sensation consists purely in that state's intentional features. There are three ways this can be understood. It can be understood as locating the conscious character of a mental state in features of the *intentional content* of the state; differences in conscious character must be differences in content. Second, the theory could locate the conscious character of a mental state in features of the *intentional mode*—the subject's relation to that content. And third, differences in content can consist in some combination of differences in content and differences in mode. This threefold distinction is just a result of the fact (outlined in §2) that intentional states can differ in their modes, their contents or both.

Tye has recently advanced a theory of the first sort; this is his *representationalism*.³¹ Tye claims that pain (for example) is a representation of damage to the body, or disturbance in the body. The conscious state is a representation of a certain state of affairs, and the consciousness consists in the fact that this state of affairs is represented. The theory's treatment

²⁹This is a point well made by Tye, 'A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal nature' in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, p.333.

³⁰For an hypothesis about how qualia came to be thought of as properties of states of mind, see my 'The origins of qualia' in *History of the Mind-Body Problem* eds. Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (London: Routledge 2000) §§4-5.

³¹Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* chapters 3-7.

of pain, however, is not very convincing. It seems clear that there are many varieties of pain, not all of which the suffering subject would be aware of as representing *damage* to the body. Tye responds to this objection that the subject need not possess the concept of *damage to the body* in order to be in pain: the representational content of pain is nonconceptual content. This may be so; but it seems to me that appealing to nonconceptual content puts the explanation of how pain feels beyond the facts which are open to mere phenomenological reflection; it builds in a complexity to the content of pain which, although it may be part of the content of unconscious representations in the subject's brain, is not part of what is *given* to the subject in cases of pain. This brings to the surface a problem with Tye's use of the notion of nonconceptual content, which I shall now explain.

The notion of nonconceptual content has been used in (at least) two ways. One way it has been used is to describe the phenomenologically available content of a person's conscious experience: for example, one might be aware of many different colours within one's present visual experience, without having concepts for all these determinate shades of colour. Some describe this as a case where the colours are represented by the nonconceptual content of the experience (or better: they are represented in a non-conceptual state of mind).³² The other use of the idea of nonconceptual content is in connection with the content of informational states of the brain—say, states of the visual system. Here the idea is that a psychologist might attribute a representation to a state of the brain which has a complex, articulated content, without there being any requirement that the subject whose brain it is can have thoughts with this content. The first notion of nonconceptual content is phenomenological, the second belongs to 'sub-personal' theories of mental processing.³³

As noted above, Tye considers the objection that someone who feels a pain need not be aware that there is damage occurring in their body, since 'such a proposal is too complicated to fit the phenomenology of pain experiences'. He responds that 'to feel a pain, one need not have

³²See Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982) p.229. For the distinction between non-conceptual content and non-conceptual states, see Tim Crane 'Non-conceptual content' in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ed. E.J. Craig (London: Routledge 1998).

³³For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Martin Davies, 'Externalism and experience' in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, pp.309-311.

the resources to conceptualise what the pain represents'.³⁴ The content of pain is nonconceptual. Which notion of nonconceptual content is Tye using? This presents a dilemma. If he is using the sub-personal notion of nonconceptual content, then the problem is that there is no requirement that any sub-personal states need enter the subject's awareness at all. So the feature Tye appealed to in order to explain the consciousness of pain (representational content) is now being articulated in terms which deny the need for awareness at all. Tye has explained consciousness in terms of the idea of nonconceptual representational content, an idea which (it is agreed on all sides) has no essential connection to consciousness.³⁵ Tye's opponent can accept that there is nonconceptual sub-personal representation of damage to the body, while still consistently holding that there are qualia which are responsible for the conscious phenomenal character of the state.

On the other hand, if Tye is appealing to the phenomenological notion of nonconceptual content, then he does need to say that the features represented enter into the subject's awareness. In the case of visual experience, the colours manifest themselves to the subject's awareness; one can be aware of things for which one has no concepts. So the subject must, contrary to what Tye says, be aware of tissue damage. Certainly, I am not saying that the subject has to think that there is tissue damage; this needs the concept of tissue damage. But the subject must be aware of it, on Tye's view, in the nonconceptual way. The original objection was not that one *could* not be aware of such things in a nonconceptual way, but that the characterisation of the content seemed too complex to characterise the experience of pain.

My diagnosis of the difficulty here is that Tye is appealing to the sub-personal conception of nonconceptual content when responding to the objection that the subject need not be aware of damage, but appealing to the phenomenological conception when using the notion of nonconceptual content to explain consciousness. The latter conception is what he needs. But then he needs to say more about why we should regard the subjects as being (nonconceptually) aware of damage to their bodies. I think that the trouble is that Tye has no resources except

³⁴Tye, 'A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character' in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, p.333.

³⁵Here I am indebted to discussions with Fiona McPherson.

those of the idea of representation. To see how we might make progress if we used more resources, we should consider the other strong intentionalist alternative.

6. Strong intentionalist theories of bodily sensation: the perceptual theory

Tye's theory locates differences in the phenomenal or conscious character of a sensation in the representational content of the state alone; hence the complexity of the content. The alternative strong intentionalist view says that the phenomenal character of a state is fixed not just by the content, but by the content and the intentional mode. This is the third view I mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, and it is the view I want to defend. (The second view, that the phenomenal character of the state of mind is fixed purely by the mode, has little to be said for it: obviously, any plausible intentionalist view must allow that the intentional object and content contribute to phenomenal character.)

I call this theory the 'perceptual theory', since it treats bodily sensation as a form of perception, the perception of things going on in one's body. (The view derives from D.M. Armstrong.³⁶) Consider first a strong intentionalist theory of perception, and what it would say about the phenomenal character of (say) visual experience. The phenomenal character of a visual experience of an aeroplane flying overhead is given by giving its content—the aeroplane, its shape and size and so on—and by giving the experience's intentional mode: seeing. The phenomenal difference between seeing an aeroplane overhead and hearing one is partly a matter of the content—*what* is experienced—but also a matter of the mode of apprehending this content, the intentional mode in Searle's sense. Certain properties of objects (e.g. colours) can only be apprehended in certain modes, so do not figure in the content of certain modes (you cannot smell colours). But others are not mode-specific: thus, for example, the difference between seeing shapes and feeling them is partly a matter of the intentional mode in question. According to a strong intentionalist theory of perception, the phenomenal character of a perception is fixed by two things: mode and content.

I say the same thing about bodily sensations. The consciousness involved in bodily sensations is a result of two things: the intentional content of the sensation, and the intentional

³⁶See D.M. Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations*; and *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge 1968).

mode. Consider a pain in one's ankle. I said that the ankle is the intentional object of the pain-state. Like the intentional objects of many outer perceptions (e.g. aeroplanes) the ankle need not itself be a conscious entity. In perception and in sensation, consciousness need not reside in the intentional objects of awareness in order for the state of awareness to be conscious. Fred

Dretske puts this point well:

Just as a visual experience of a tree is an awareness of a nonconscious object (the tree) pain is an awareness of a nonconscious bodily condition (an injured, strained or diseased part)... pains, tickles and itches stand to physical states of the body (they are experiences of these physical states) the way olfactory, visual and auditory experiences stand to physical states of the environment. In all cases, the experiences are conscious, yes, but not because we are conscious of them, but because they make us conscious of the relevant states of our bodies.³⁷

However, we are interested not just in objects of awareness, but in these objects as they are *apprehended under various aspects*—that is, in intentional content. The intentional content of a pain might be something like this: *my ankle hurts*. (This makes the content propositional for simplicity; but remember that I am not committed to all content being propositional.) But we have not fully specified the phenomenal character of this state until we have said in which intentional mode it is presented. Compare: we have not fully specified the phenomenal character of a perception of an aeroplane overhead until we have said whether the aeroplane is seen or heard.

What is the nature of the mode, in the case of pain? At the very least, it must be that the ankle is *felt*: the content is the content of a feeling, one must feel that one's ankle hurts. Pressing the analogy with perception, we can say that pain is a kind of feeling, just as seeing is a kind of perceiving. There are of course many other kinds of bodily feeling: each of these ways in which one can feel one's body are the intentional modes which have parts of the body as their intentional objects.³⁸ We can capture the spirit of this view by saying that there is a way in which English misleads when we say that Vladimir has a pain in his ankle, as if the pain were a kind of object he had in his ankle. Rather we might say that Vladimir *pains* his ankle, where

³⁷ Fred Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press 1995) pp.102-103.

³⁸It might be objected, as it was to me by Jerry Levinson, that this proliferates modes unnecessarily. However, the same kind of objection could be raised against a theory which explained differences in consciousness in terms of differences in qualia: there would be very many distinct qualia properties postulated. It is not clear why this should be a problem for either view.

paining is a relation between the ankle and Vladimir. (This is not suggested as a piece of semantic analysis, but rather as an attempt to make the view vivid. But it is worth pointing out that not all languages talk of pains as if they were objects.)

This presents pain, and other bodily sensations, as a kind of relation between oneself and one's body. Given the problems with treating intentionality as a relation to intentional objects, this cannot be quite right; but we will return to this problem shortly. For there is a more immediate problem with the suggestion: how can it accommodate the fact, which we raised as a problem for weak intentionalism, that pain seems to be *in* the part of the body, that it seems to be a property of the body? When we attend to our pains, as I said in §3, we attend to the part of the body in which we feel the pain. This is analogous to part of what is meant by the 'transparency' of visual experience: if we want to attend to our visual experiences, what we normally do is to inspect the objects of experience. (In a slogan: introspection is inspection.) The fact that there is this analogy is good for my perceptual theory; but the fact that attending to the pain is attending to the part which hurts does not seem to be so good. For haven't I said that pain is a way of being aware of one's ankle, and therefore something more like a relation and not a property?

In fact, there is not a problem here, and the transparency analogy does hold up. The way to understand the transparency of sensation is to understand the special nature of the concepts which we apply when we talk and think about our pains. The content of a pain in one's ankle might naturally be put into words as 'my ankle hurts'. On the face of it, this sentence seems to be saying that there is a property of hurting which my ankle has. But on reflection, it is clear that the concept of *hurting* is covertly relational. Something cannot hurt unless it hurts someone; in fact, a part of one's own body cannot hurt unless it hurts *oneself*. We can make no real sense of the idea that a part of one's own body might hurt, without its hurting oneself. Hurting is therefore not just a matter of a part of one's body having an intrinsic property, but rather a matter of that body part and its properties apparently affecting oneself. So one is attributing to one's ankle when one says that it hurts is something which has what I called in §2 a relational structure: the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended *as* one's ankle) and the mode is the hurting. This relies on

the idea that the part of one's body which hurts is *doing something* to oneself, that there is something about the body part which is responsible for one's feeling in this way. Peacocke has plausibly claimed that such a claim is part of the concept of pain:

To have the concept of pain is to have the concept of a state which allows its possessor to discriminate those (nonpsychological) properties whose possession by a part of his body makes that part hurt him.³⁹

This expresses two of the important phenomenological claims about pain for which I have been trying to argue in this section so far: first, that hurting is a matter of a part of the body hurting the subject. This is why I call it an intentional mode. Second, pain presents body parts in a way that the subject can (normally) discriminate them: normal sensations allow the subject to locate the pain, however roughly.

This is close to, but importantly different from, Tye's view that pain represents damage to a part of the body. It differs in two ways, one specific to the claims about pain, the other more general and theoretical. I claimed that damage need not enter into the content of the pain-experience; all that need enter into the content is the part of the body (with a certain aspectual shape) which is hurting. The perceptual theory can agree with Tye that damage to one's body can be represented by a pain experience in the sense that (e.g.) the stimulation of the retina is represented by a visual experience. But this is nonconceptual representation in the 'subpersonal' sense, and this is not our subject here. These disagreements with Tye relate to his specific claims about pain. The more general theoretical difference is that for Tye, differences in conscious states are wholly explained in terms of the representational content of the state. In the case of bodily sensation, the intentional mode is the same in different states: it is *representing*. A pain represents damage, a tickle represents a mild disturbance, orgasm is a 'sensory representation of certain physical changes in the genital region' —and so on.⁴⁰ The perceptual view, by contrast, does not locate the conscious differences solely in differences in

³⁹Christopher Peacocke, 'Consciousness and other minds' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 48 (1984) p.115. I am indebted in this paragraph to Peacocke's discussion of the concepts of pain and hurting, though I do not mean to imply that Peacocke holds a perceptual theory of sensation in my sense of the term.

⁴⁰ For these views, see Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* pp.113, 117, 118.

what is represented, but also in the different modes in which one is related to what is represented.

The experience of pain is 'transparent' because to pay attention to a pain is to pay attention to the place which hurts. But one cannot pay attention to the place which hurts without paying attention to the hurting, and the hurting, I have claimed, is the way the body part or location is (so to speak) forcing itself upon oneself. Therefore, in being aware that one's ankle hurts, one is aware that it is hurting you. This is why I say that according to the perceptual theory, the phenomenal character of the pain is given by two things: the content of the experience and the intentional mode.

What is novel about this view is that it locates the phenomenal character of the state partly in the intentional mode. It might be objected that I am simply assuming the phenomenal, stipulating it into existence by my assumption that some intentional modes are conscious and some are not. This objection is confused. Of course I am assuming that some mental states have phenomenal character and some do not. But so do those who talk in terms of qualia. Rather than assuming that certain intentional states are by their nature conscious, they assume that there are certain non-intentional properties which are by their nature conscious. If I assume consciousness, so do my opponents. But we have no alternative, since there are no prospects for anything like a *definition* of consciousness in other terms. (Whether this worries you depends on your attitude to physicalism; some remarks on this in §7.)

Finally, I need to return to the question of how, on this view, one can have a pain in one's ankle even if one does not have an ankle. The account of the relational structure of intentionality described in §2 makes intentionality a relation, not to an actually existing object, but to an intentional content. A part of the point of the idea of content is to express or capture the aspect under which the object of the intentional state is presented; the other part is to distinguish different states in the same mode. And these can be distinguished even when the intentional object does not exist. This is why we cannot say in general that intentional states are relations to intentional objects. As noted in §3, phantom limbs show that someone can feel a pain in a part of their body even when this part does not exist. So an intentionalist cannot say that pain is a relation to a body part. Rather, pain is a relation to an intentional content, where the

intentional content is the way things seem to the subject. It seems to the subject that they have a limb, and this is compatible with them knowing that the limb does not exist.

It could be said that pain is always a relation to the intentional object, but the intentional object is the cause of the pain in the body or brain. But this would break the connection between the idea of an intentional object and the phenomenology, the idea of how things seem to the subject. What the perceptual theory is trying to capture is how things seem. The cause of the sensation in the body may be another matter.

So it can be true, then, that someone can feel a pain in their foot even when they have no foot. And this is compatible with its being appropriate to tell someone 'it's not your foot that hurts, there's no such thing; it's an effect of the amputation'. Compare: it could be true that someone thinks that fate is against them, and this is compatible with its being appropriate to tell them 'it's not fate, there's no such thing; it's just bad luck'. The cases are, in the relevant respects, parallel.

7. Conclusion

I have argued for the perceptual theory of the kind of consciousness involved in sensation in a somewhat indirect way. My general aim, as I said in §1, is to dispute the simple division of states of mind into intentional states and qualitative states: this is the essence of the division assumed by non-intentionalism. The best case for this division is often claimed to be the case of bodily sensation. But, I argued, bodily sensations do exhibit the marks of intentionality, specifically in the felt location of sensation. The question then is whether such states of mind also have non-intentional properties (qualia). Weak intentionalism says they do. I claimed that this view is unstable, tending to collapse back into non-intentionalism. If we want to maintain an intentionalist position, then we should adopt strong intentionalism. Having set the rival view (representationalism) to one side, we end up with the perceptual theory. It turns out that, from a phenomenological point of view, this theory is not as strange as it might first seem.

At the beginning of this paper I asked whether there is anything we can learn from the (admittedly false) naive view that pain is not a mental state. If an intentional theory of bodily sensation is correct, then we can see why it is so natural to think of pain as a physical state:

since it is essential to pain that it feels to be in one's body. But nonetheless, it is a mental state, because it involves the characteristic mark of the mental: the intentional directedness of the mind upon an object. As Armstrong puts it:

This account of the location of pain enables us to resolve a troublesome dilemma. Consider the following two statements: 'The pain is in my hand' and 'The pain is in my mind'. Ordinary usage makes us want to assent to the first, while a moment's philosophical reflection makes us want to assent to the second. Yet they seem to be in conflict with each other. But once we see that the location of the pain in the hand is an intentional location ... it is clear that the two statements are perfectly compatible.⁴¹

This seems to me exactly right, apart from the suggestion that an 'intentional location' is a kind of location, or way of being located. An intentional location is, in this case, simply the felt location of sensation. It is this essential feature of bodily sensation which nourishes an intentional conception of sensation, and therefore the intentionalist conception of the mind.

The perceptual theory of bodily sensation is supposed to be a phenomenological theory, a systematic account or a general description of what it is like to have a certain kind of experience. As such, it does not solve some of the problems which some accounts of consciousness address. The theory is silent on the explanatory gap, it leave the knowledge argument where it is, and it says nothing about how there can be a physicalist reduction of consciousness. But these are not the only questions about consciousness. There is also another traditional philosophical project: that of 'understanding how different types or aspects of consciousness feature in the fundamental notions of mentality, agency and personhood' — as Tyler Burge puts it. Burge continues: 'such understanding will be deepened when it is liberated from ideological and programmatic preoccupations with materialism and functionalism that have dominated the revival of philosophical interest in consciousness.'⁴² The view defended in this paper is put forward as part of an attempt at such an understanding.

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⁴¹ *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* p.316.

⁴² Tyler Burge, 'Two kinds of consciousness' in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, p.433.