Keywords: doxastic disagreement; epistemic controversy; social epistemology; testimony; expertise; relativism

Article Summary
The epistemology of disagreement studies the epistemically relevant aspects of the interaction between parties who hold diverging opinions about a given subject matter. The central question that the epistemology of disagreement purports to answer is how the involved parties should resolve an instance of disagreement. Answers to this central question largely depend on the epistemic position of each party before disagreement occurs. Two parties are equally positioned from an epistemic standpoint—namely, they are epistemic peers—to the extent that they have roughly equal access to the evidence and comparable intellectual resources. When one party is epistemically better positioned than the other—that is, when one is an epistemic superior—it is widely agreed that this party should retain their belief while the other party—the epistemic inferior—should revise their opinion in the direction of what the epistemic superior believes.

Addressing the central question is a complex task when the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers. Three main answers can be distinguished. Conciliatory answers mandate that both parties revise—i.e. lower their confidence in—their beliefs upon the occurrence of peer disagreement.

1 I am grateful to the editor of REP’s epistemology section, Duncan Pritchard, for including this entry in the encyclopedia. I also thank Michele Palmira and Tommaso Piazza for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the entry. Work on this entry has received funding from the EU’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme for the project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action (PEriTiA) under grant agreement No. 870883.
Steadfast answers allow both parties to retain their respective beliefs, thereby committing them to demote the epistemic position of the interlocutor. The third group of answers suggests that the solution to peer disagreement depends on whether either party is highly justified in holding their belief. If either party is highly justified, then it is rational that this party retains its view. If neither party is highly justified, both should revise.

The epistemology of disagreement addresses further important questions such as: whether the occurrence of disagreement opens the doors to skepticism and/or relativism; what the consequences of epistemic disagreement on intellectual character are; what laypeople should do when experts disagree with each other; and whether disagreement among groups can be treated in the same way as disagreement among individuals.

1. Disagreement: The Central (Epistemological) Question

My partner thinks we spent our holidays in Italy last year. I disagree: last year we went to Portugal. Several scientists believe that a single dose of a vaccine against Covid-19 would guarantee that entire populations will soon achieve herd immunity. Other experts across the globe disagree: we cannot rely on the efficacy of a single dose for vaccines that envisage a recall if what we care about is maximizing a vaccine’s safety and effectiveness. Disagreement is a pervasive and intricate phenomenon that has serious implications for our practical and epistemic wellbeing, at both a personal and a societal level. The epistemology of disagreement, a recent branch of social epistemology (add ref. to relevant entry), explores the epistemically relevant aspects of the interaction between disagreeing parties: typically, parties who hold different—and often incompatible—beliefs in a given domain. At the core of the epistemology of disagreement lies a Central Question: What should we do when we find out that someone disagrees with us—that is, believes something different than us—on some matter? Is there a rational way to respond to disagreement?
2. Disagreeing Parties: Epistemic Peers and Non-Peers

As a first step in seeking to answer the Central Question, it is crucial to determine the epistemically standing or position of the disagreeing parties. For starters, one’s physical or psychological conditions can make one better placed epistemically than another to hold a true belief. Some illnesses and the effect of drugs, among other things, can impair one’s cognitive functioning. For example, my partner would surely be in a better epistemic position than I am to report where we spent our holidays last year if I had been recently suffering from episodes of memory loss.

In general, two main epistemic factors contribute to determining the epistemic position of the disagreeing parties: the amount of evidence at their disposal, and their intellectual resources (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Frances 2014; Kelly 2005; Lackey 2010). As regards the former, someone is better epistemically positioned than another when one is more familiar with the evidence and arguments relevant to the matter at issue than the other party. As regards the latter, someone is better epistemically positioned than another when one has more or better intellectual resources, where this typically encompasses freedom from bias and intellectual virtues such as intellectual honesty, thoroughness, and open-mindedness.

To the extent that either party is better epistemically positioned than the other in the relevant senses just presented, the disagreeing parties are considered to be *epistemic non-peers*. Unsurprisingly, the Central Question of the epistemology of disagreement invites a quite straightforward answer in cases of non-peer disagreement—at least, in those in which both parties acknowledge that they are epistemic non-peers. As far as one party is epistemically inferior—that is, worse positioned—than the other, it is generally rational that the former aligns with the latter’s view on the matter at issue (Elga 2007). This is what should happen if I suffer from memory loss and disagree with my partner about the location of some past event we attended together. Or when a layperson disagrees with a virologist about the safety of some vaccine. Whether the epistemically inferior party should defer entirely to the epistemically superior one—as opposed to including evidence that a better-positioned interlocutor disagrees with
them in the balance of reason—is a debated issue at the crossroads of the epistemology of
disagreement and the epistemology of expertise (Croce 2018; Lackey 2018; Zagzebski 2012).

The disagreement between *epistemic peers* requires a different diagnosis because it concerns
situations in which the Central Question cannot be addressed by appealing to a pre-existing inequality
in epistemic standings of the disagreeing parties. It is important to note from the outset that epistemic
peerhood is a largely idealized notion (Frances 2014; King 2012). It is extremely rare to find any real
case of disagreement in which the disagreeing parties are in the same physical and epistemic conditions.
More plausibly, they are reasonable in taking each other to be epistemic peers based on an
approximation of their current epistemic position regarding the matter at issue at the time in which the
disagreement occurs (Lackey 2010). Such approximation might involve different—at least to some
extent—scores in the three components of the epistemic position. One party might enjoy a slight
positional advantage over the other but lack some of the intellectual virtues the other displays in
reasoning about the issue.

Before introducing available answers to the Central Question in cases of peer disagreement,
consider a further set of cases of disagreement, one in which the disagreeing parties do not know
whether the interlocutor is their epistemic peer. This is most common in cases of disagreement with
people with whom we are not sufficiently acquainted to assess their epistemic standing, but also when
the disagreement concerns controversial issues. It seems reasonable to treat this category of
disagreement just like the disagreement between peers. For if we have no reason to consider the
interlocutor epistemically superior or inferior to us, responding to the Central Question incurs the same
obstacles that are involved in peer disagreement.

3. **Addressing the Central Question: Conciliatory Solutions**

One helpful way to account for the distinctive impact of peer disagreement is in reference to the larger
epistemological discussion about higher-order evidence and *epistemic defeaters* (add ref. to relevant
entry). Higher-order evidence is evidence about the quality of ordinary first-order evidence. The fact that
I form the belief that P—that my partner and I spent our last holidays in Portugal—based on a given body of evidence (E) constitutes higher-order evidence: that is, evidence about the quality of E—evidence that E supports P. It is often said that the epistemology of disagreement is concerned with higher-order evidence precisely because the occurrence of disagreement can constitute higher-order evidence too. In the example, my partner’s opinion that we did not spend our last holidays in Portugal can be understood as higher-order evidence that E does not support P. Whether higher-order evidence provided by peer disagreement defeats one’s evidence for a given belief depends on the view of epistemic disagreement one endorses.

Conciliatory or conformist views understand peer disagreement as higher-order defeat. The fact that an epistemic peer like my partner disagrees with me about the location of our last holiday is a higher-order defeater for my belief that we were in Portugal. Once two equally positioned parties acknowledge that they disagree, then both should do something to clear up the issue: that is, both should conciliate. This is why conciliatory views answer the Central Question by saying that peer disagreement always calls for doxastic revision from both parties.

The most prominent conciliatory view is the Equal Weight View. Its doctrine is rather simple: once you grant that the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers, each has to treat the interlocutor’s opinion as seriously as one treats one’s own—that is, by assigning equal weight to one’s own opinion and the interlocutor’s opinion. The specifics of the required revision vary with the view one endorses. For views admitting a graded conception of belief, assigning equal weight boils down to reducing confidence in one’s belief (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007). If my partner has a 0.8 belief that we spent our holidays in Italy last year (P), while I have a 0.4 belief that P, the Equal Weight View requires that we “split the difference” and meet in between: thus, we should both end up having a 0.6 belief that P. For views only admitting full attitudes such as belief or disbelief, assigning equal weight boils down to suspending judgment (Feldman 2006). If my partner believes that P while I believe that ¬P, the only reasonable way for us to resolve the disagreement while remaining faithful to the judgment that we are epistemic peers amounts to withholding our respective beliefs.
In both cases, assigning extra weight to one’s own opinion would be irrational, as it would amount to treating the other party as an epistemic inferior rather than a peer. This would in turn legitimate a “bootstrapping” procedure whereby one becomes more confident that one is better at evaluating the evidence than the other party based on the mere fact that they disagree with us (Elga 2007). To avoid this risk, the Equal Weight View commits to the so-called principle of Independence (Christensen 2009):

In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another person’s belief about P, to determine how (if at all) to modify one’s own belief about P, one should do so in a way that is independent of the reasoning behind one’s own initial belief about P.

In practice, the principle of Independence says that I cannot rely on the fact that my partner disagrees with me about the location of our last holiday to demote them as my peer. Counterexamples to the principle have been offered, e.g., in Kelly (2013) and Lord (2014).

An important objection against the Equal Weight View (and any conciliatory view, in general) is that they are self-defeating (Elga 2010; Littlejohn 2020). In short, the problem is that applying the view to itself would have self-undermining consequences. If two epistemic peers disagree about the Equal Weight View as a response to the Central Question, then this view mandates that both parties revise their beliefs. But revising one’s beliefs, for a defender of the Equal Weight View, requires one to downgrade one’s assessment of the view itself: hence the charge with self-defeat.

4. **Addressing the Central Question: Steadfast Solutions**

Steadfast or non-conformist views understand peer disagreement oppositely: that is, by conceding that if we “have done the math” correctly, we cannot be asked to revise our belief, as it is most likely that our interlocutor has formed the wrong opinion. If I have a clear memory that last year my partner and I spent our holidays in Portugal, the best explanation for why my partner has a different memory is that
their memory failed them in this particular instance. Thus, steadfast views reject the principle of Independence and appeal to the occurrence of disagreement to argue that both parties can stick to their guns. The main challenge for proponents of these solutions is to explain why getting to know that an alleged epistemic peer disagrees with us does not necessarily call for a doxastic revision on our part—or, to put it differently, why peer disagreement does not always provide both parties with a higher-order defeater.

The most prominent way to address the challenge is to maintain that there is an ineludible asymmetry between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective; or, between the evidence we acquire on our own and the evidence others share with us (Sosa 2010). Several proponents of the steadfast view justify this asymmetry by appealing to the role that self-trust plays in the formation and rational evaluation of our beliefs (Enoch 2010; Foley 2001; Zagzebski 2012). Self-trust is trust in the activity of our cognitive faculties: that is, trust that they are reliable in providing us with evidence for the beliefs we form. If it is rational to trust our conscientious judgment that the evidence supports our belief, as advocates of this view maintain, then it is also rational to stick to this judgment and disregard the opinion of a peer when we discover that they disagree with us. In short, these views legitimize an egocentric bias (Wedgwood 2007). Relevant objections to this approach are offered in Peter (2019).

Others account for the asymmetry by appealing to private evidence (van Inwagen 1996). Unlike the argument based on self-trust, which locates the asymmetry in the privilege each subject has in warranting the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, the argument based on private evidence locates the asymmetry in the evidence itself that each subject has at their disposal. Epistemic peers share most of their evidence but not all of it: for our evidence includes some special insight—e.g., some intuitions—that we cannot communicate to others but that contribute to the body of evidence supporting our beliefs.

A third way to address the challenge for proponents of steadfast approaches is offered by the Right Reasons View and comes from criticism of how the Equal Weight View handles the balance
between first-order and higher-order evidence (Kelly 2005). Suppose one holds a belief P justified by first-order evidence E. Once one is put before a disagreeing peer, one’s evidence E* for P encompasses not only (a) the fact that one believes P based on E, and (b) the fact that an epistemic peer believes \( \neg P \) based on E, but also (c) the original first-order evidence E for P. The Equal Weight View is right to judge that the two pieces of higher-order evidence, (a) and (b), cancel each other out, but it draws the wrong conclusions from this fact. Far from mandating that both parties should revise their doxastic attitudes, the balance of reasons shows that the solution to peer disagreement entirely depends on (c): that is, the original first-order evidence E, which keeps doing its warranting job for the party that was justified in believing P before disagreement occurred. Thus, pace conformists, the Right Reasons View mandates that the party who was originally justified in believing P by E—that is, the one who possessed the right reasons—should not conciliate but stick to their guns.

Note that, despite proposing a steadfast answer to the Central Question, the Right Reasons View does not appeal to an asymmetry between the first-person and the third-person perspective, but rather to an asymmetry between a party holding a justified belief and a party holding an unjustified belief. If previous steadfast approaches granted both parties the right not to conciliate before an instance of peer disagreement, on the Right Reasons View this is a privilege that only the party possessing the right reasons enjoys. Arguments against the Right Reasons View have been offered, among others, in Kelly (2010) and Matheson (2009).

5. Addressing the Central Question: Alternative Solutions

Alternative answers to the Central Question have been offered, among others (Lasonen-Aarnio 2013; Palmira 2019), by the Justificationist View and the Total Evidence View. Both can be taken to sit somewhere between conciliatory and steadfast views. The Justificationist View (Lackey 2010) mandates very different doxastic responses to peer disagreement depending on the antecedent level of justification one has in favor of the disputed belief. In particular, this view sides with the Equal Weight
View in all cases in which one lacks a high degree of antecedent justification for a belief P, while it requires a steadfast response whenever one has a high degree of antecedent justification for P.

The justificationist solution to peer disagreement is grounded in the following intuition. If in many ordinary cases—e.g., the disagreement I have with my partner about where we spent our holidays last year—the fact that the disagreeing party is one’s peer prevents one from holding firm to one’s belief, in other, more extreme, cases—e.g., disagreements about whether 3+3=6 or basic perceptual experiences like the presence of a known person at a dinner table—one has such strong reasons to think one has got things right that the only reasonable explanation for the disagreement is that the other party is mistaken.

The Justificationist View warrants a steadfast response to extreme cases of disagreement by rejecting the principle of Independence. The high level of antecedent justification one has in situations of that sort can be used to reopen the question about the epistemic standing of the disagreeing party and establish that they are not an epistemic peer on the matter at hand. Failing to do that would go against the constraints of rationality as it would not do justice to the justification one already possesses in favor of one’s belief.

The Total Evidence View is best understood as a revision of the Equal Weight View but also as a rejection of the Right Reasons View by its original proponent (Kelly 2010). The central idea of this approach is that a solution to peer disagreement requires that one weighs the total evidence one possesses, where this encompasses both the available higher-order evidence and the first-order evidence one has in favor of one’s belief. According to this approach, the Right Reasons View mischaracterizes the import of the higher-order evidence in responding to peer disagreement, while the Equal Weight View understates the relevance of the first-order evidence.

More specifically, the problem with the Right Reasons View lies with the moral it draws from the balancing of higher-order evidence—that is, (a) and (b) in the earlier formulation. It is not as though (a) and (b) “cancel out” each other; rather, the fact that they push in opposite directions reveals that higher-order evidence calls for some sort of doxastic revision on the part of both disagreeing
parties. Thus, higher-order evidence in peer disagreement always counts toward attaching a reduced weight to the original evidence each party had before the disagreement occurred, no matter who had the right reasons in the first place. Here is where the Equal Weight View gets the story wrong too: for the original first-order evidence still has to be included in the balance of reasons. Hence, splitting the difference or suspending judgment are the rational responses to peer disagreement only insofar as the higher-order evidence counterbalances the first-order evidence. If the original evidence strongly supports one’s belief, higher-order evidence provided by the occurrence of peer disagreement requires only a small revision on the part of the justified party, who is overall entitled to stick to their guns and retain their belief.

6. Skepticism, Dogmatism, and Intellectual Humility

The discussion of the pros and cons of conciliatory and steadfast views sheds light on two main risks we incur when disagreement arises: skepticism and dogmatism. Conciliatory views are most likely to face a skeptical threat: if we cannot hold on to our beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, then such disputed beliefs cannot amount to knowledge. The fact that disagreement is widespread amplifies the problem and puts at risk a substantial body of what we generally take to know (Goldberg 2009; Machuca 2013). Steadfast views, by contrast, are charged with dogmatism because they seem to grant us the right to privilege our own view over the opinion of a disagreeing party who we take to be as epistemically well positioned as we are (Pritchard 2013).

A further important issue related to how we respond to disagreement concerns the implications of these answers for intellectual character. Sticking to one’s guns in the face of disagreement, as steadfast views allow, is often seen as a sign of an absence of intellectual humility, if not as a marker of intellectual arrogance. Intellectually humble subjects would admit their limitations before a disagreeing party—especially if these virtuous subjects acknowledge the interlocutor as an epistemic peer—and be willing to revise their opinion (Christensen 2009). However, much depends on how the virtue of
intellectual humility is understood: steadfast responses to disagreement do not necessarily exclude that the disagreeing peers display intellectual humility (Pritchard 2018).

7. Further Issues in the Epistemology of Disagreement

The epistemology of disagreement extends beyond answering the Central Question. Peculiar challenges are raised by a particular kind of peer disagreement: namely, disagreement among experts (Conee 2009) and, most prominently, within science (Dellsen & Baghramian 2020). Pressing issues concern, among other topics, whether scientific disagreement should pave the way to relativism (Massimi 2019; add ref to entry on epistemic relativism) as well as how laypeople should decide whom to trust when experts disagree (Goldman 2001; Dellsen 2018). Disagreement within controversial fields such as politics, ethics, philosophy, and religion (Lackey 2018; Sosa 2010) is the locus of a rich discussion. Besides specific problems related to the occurrence of disagreement in each of these disciplines (Frances 2010; Hallsson 2019; Rowland 2017; Thune 2010), the debate focuses on disagreement about our most fundamental commitments: the so-called deep disagreement (Kappel 2012) or the seemingly rival hinge disagreement (Coliva & Palmira 2020; Ranalli 2020). Finally, the recent turn to collective epistemology has raised new questions about the nature of disagreement among groups and its relation to disagreement among individual epistemic subjects (Broncano-Berrocal & Carter 2020).

References and Further Reading


(Offers the first comprehensive investigation of disagreement among groups and its epistemic significance.)


Conee, E. (2009) ‘Peerage’, *Episteme* 6 (3): 313-323. (Argues that disagreeing experts have no undefeated balance of reasons in favor of their respective views, thereby showing that their positions lack epistemic justification.)


Dellsén, F. (2018) ‘When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1): 142-156. (Argues that expert disagreement provides laypeople with reasons to trust that the experts are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories.)


Enoch, D. (2010) ‘Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement’, *Mind* 119: 953-997. (Argues that most views on the market—particularly, conciliatory ones—wrongly conceive epistemic subjects involved in disagreement as mere devices more or less able to track the truth and offers an alternative framework.)


Frances, B. (2010) ‘The Reflective Epistemic Renegade’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81 (2): 419-463. (Argues that expert disagreement about philosophy with an interlocutor whom one recognizes as an epistemic superior is a blameworthy practice and discusses exceptions to this general verdict.)

Frances, B. (2014) *Disagreement*, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Offers an in-depth analysis of the main issues in the epistemology of disagreement as well as a detailed discussion of the available answers to the Central Question.)

Goldberg, S. (2009) ‘Reliabilism in Philosophy’, *Philosophical Studies* 124: 105-117. (Explores the implications of three independently plausible, but jointly incompatible, claims: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) my beliefs on controversial philosophical issues are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are justified.)

Goldman, A. (2001) ‘Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63 (1): 85-110. (Discusses how laypeople should respond to expert testimony, the novice/expert problem, as well as to expert disagreement, the novice/2-expert problem.)


explains that this view renders peer disagreement intractable, and offers an alternative account of expert testimony as providing advice.)

Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2013) ‘Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation’, Nous 47 (4): 767-794. (Raises problems of evidential attenuation and evidential amplification against the Equal Weight View and shows that these problems apply to other views on the market.)

Littlejohn, C. (2020) ‘Should We Be Dogmatically Conciliatory?’, Philosophical Studies 177: 1381-1398. (Discusses the problem of self-defeat to which conciliatory views are prone and shows that the problem leaves these views unscathed.)


Machuca, D. (2013, ed.) Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge. (A collected volume exploring the relationships between the epistemology of disagreement and the vast literature on skepticism and dogmatism.)


Matheson, J. (2009) ‘Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence’, Episteme 6 (3): 269-279. (Motivates a conciliatory solution to the Central Question and defends it from objections concerning higher-order evidence.)

Palmira, M. (2019) ‘How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement’, American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1): 83-96. (Motivates a solution to the Central Question that departs from both conciliatory and steadfast views and requires that disagreeing peers re-open the question of the truth of the matter at hand by hypothesizing.)


Ranalli, C. (2020) ‘Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology’, Synthese 197: 4975-5007. (Offers an in-depth comparative assessment of seemingly rival theories of deep disagreement, which understand the phenomenon respectively as a disagreement over hinge propositions and as a disagreement over fundamental epistemic principles.)


Sosa, E. (2010) ‘The Epistemology of Disagreement’, in A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 278-297. (Defends a steadfast answer to the Central Question and shows that the possibility to hold on to our cherished opinions in domains such as politics, ethics, philosophy, and religion depend on the answer to the Central Question.)

van Inwagen, P. (1996) ‘It Is Wrong, Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything, Upon Insufficient Evidence’, in J. Jordan & D. Howard-Snyder (eds.), *Faith, Freedom, and Rationality*, Lanham (MD): Rowman and Littlefield, 137-154. (Defends the view that evidence may include incommunicable insight which one can appeal to in the attempt to justify a disagreement with an interlocutor and stick to one’s guns.)
