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**What is Peace? It's Value and Necessity**

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The following article is a reflection on the value of peace, a term often

* attributed to the absence of war or the lack of violence, conflict, suppression, or

, in short, phenomena considered opposite to peace. But, is this really how should be defined? It is a fact that peace, be it personal inner peace or peace

within a society, is constantly threatened, attacked, violated, and *destroyed* by a variation of causes: the failure to keep a promise, the breach of a contract, obtained by illegitimate means, economical ambitions, diverse

--· geo--noHttcaJ strategies, anarchy, social pressure, the lack of understanding on an


*:·--* u.'""""t::s, poverty, the failure to adapt, discrimination, migration, terrorism, arms tr:affiicki1ng, civil wars, the threat of a world war and the usage of weapons of mass destruction, etc.; factors that take away peace among men and women, societies, entire countries. But......What is peace? Why do we struggle so much to

it? Why is it so appreciated by the majority mankind? Why have humanists,

politicians, civil right organizations, and men of good will in

<·l!<enr-•r"' dealt with this topic in such an extended manner? Why has there been so much about peace? Why peace is so fragile? These are some of the

-uu · t..nno that I will try to answer in this contribution, using some of the texts of



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St. Augustine, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel as reference. The article is set up from the standpoint of critical reason and with a keen commitment towards humanity and its dignity and rights in this conflictive and plural world

**Introduction**

There has been written a lot about peace, but it requires too great a deal of effort to obtain or maintain it. Just by looking at the *mapa-mundi* one realizes right away that armed conflicts make up most of our daily news, whether transmitted by press, television, radio, or Internet. Why is mankind so eager to break peace and make war? Why the existence of this violent climate that leads to political unrest and war in different communities? Is it really not possible to live peacefully? This seems to be the case when contemplating the dark panorama of violence and lack of peace on a personal level as well as on a social level. Could it be that peace, as well as war, is part of the human condition? A terrible fate would await us if we gave in to the idea of a possible *equivalence* of these two opposites, because then we would bestow the same legitimacy upon both, something utterly wrong from whatever viewpoint. When mentioning peace and war, the latter of these opposites represents a shocking reality; the negation, the despicable aspects of society, as is shown by the factual dismay of war and the immense damage brought along with it. The notion that I am defending here, par excellence, is that in spite of the existence of war, one should always opt for peace, fight for it; despite the violence that we as human beings eventually are confronted with in our lives and personal experiences; and despite the indisputable threats against peace because of raging wars in different regions of the world that affect, in an almost apocalyptic way, not only a certain group of people, but rather entire cultures and nations.

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* 1. **The Search for Peace**

But what does peace involve? Does it involve the preparation for war, as the ancient Roman saying goes: Si *1·is pacem. para bellum?* Does this not bring forth a contradiction? At least it seems so in contrast with Gandhi's idea, that to achieve peace -more so than war- "peace is the way". The way of war violates peace, pushing it aside and substituting it for a state of restlessness; peace collapses and fear and indefiniteness return to man -to which Hobbes refers to with- man is a wolf to man *(homo lwmini lupus).* It is therefore of utmost concern to always work in favor of peace, without conditions, with hope and optimism, because humans develop best through peace.

And this can be explained from an individual and social perspective, as St.

Augustine already indicated in his famous *City of God,* in which he sustains that: "peace is a moment of rest without trouble nor disturbance of violence or fear". 1 What does he mean by that? Does he mean that those who live in peace, or desire so, lack of dedication or activeness to obtain it? Of course not: the meaning of his expression is much more profound, because it alludes to the legitimate aspiration of all men and women to live with this peacefulness of mind that is reflected in their social environment; that forn1s contented people with a genuine capacity to

smile, to realize their projects. to work with people; and people who can open up to others with solidarity.

For St. Augustine and the classical tradition that derives from him, inner peace is a *conditio sine qua non* of social peace. It is therefore, that a good,

1 St. Agustin. *La Ci"'lad de Di11s* (Trans later Jose Moran) ( J'l5R): Book XIX. Chap. X!!

Translated from Spanish \'crsion.



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righteous man with a good heart is someone that looks for harmony and gentleness in human relations and does not rest until he finds *the reign of peace* or *reason and justice,* because he is conscious of the fact that irrational actions break peace between men and women. Does this breaking of peace among people not happen exactly at the moment that one does not understand his own weaknesses, mistakes, illnesses, aggressions, and suffered injustices committed by others? Does this not happen just when the most brutal of human irrationalities takes place -like warfare, during which men kill each other for whatever reason?

Nevertheless, the quest for peace is like a crossword puzzle or a labyrinth.

It is not easy in this world to find a perfect formula for a lasting design; and that is

·why peace is so fragile. Does this imply that peace is an unachievable reality? It would be absurd to suppose that. It is one thing to perceive its fragility, but it is something else to assume it to be impossible. If it were impossible to realize, then there would not be so much effort to obtain and to establish it when one is deprived of it. This is shown by the experiences, reasons and efforts of support by international institutions like: the United Nations, the Nobel Peace Centre, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); the Human Security Centre, the World Council for Churches, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), etc.; but also by so many peace promoters -from yesteryear to our days- in the fields of politics, philosophy, religion and in the social struggles. It is in this scope that we find both famous and unknown men and women who are or could be awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, who work or have worked for peace, each in their specific way. John Paul II, for example, made efforts of titanic proportions to realize justice, world peace, and reconciliation between nations.

Among the winners of the Nobel Peace Prize are various women2 , quite

2 hnp:/lnobelprize.org/nobel prizcs/lists/women.html, retrieved October 14ht of2008.

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different from each other, such as: Mother Teresa of Calcuta (1979), Rigoberta Menchu ( 1992), Shirin Ebadi (2003), and Whangary Muta Maathai (2004); among the awarded mcn 3 , we find political and religious leaders, such as: Martin Luther King (1964), Alfonso Garcia Robles (1982), Lech Walesa (1983), Mikhail

Gorbachev ( 1990), Nelson Mandela {1993), Shimon Peres-Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin (1994), Jimmy Carter (2002), AI Gore (2007); and the extraordinary mediator for peace, the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize (2008), the ex president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, who collaborated effectively to obtain the independence of the African republic of Namibia in the 80s and

succeeded in ending the civil war in the province of Aceh in lndonesia 4 .

Their initiatives, actions or events on behalf of peace are indications of the fact that this as part of human reality is neither something alien nor contrary to our nature. However, that docs not mean that peace is necessarily an innate condition; that is why war exists. We are capable of cultivating it but also of loosing it. By cultivating peace we can acquire it as a virtue, on other words, as a habitual disposition that is forged through experience and the conscientious desire to achieve it, as Aristotle proposes in his characterization of the ethical virtues in

general. 5

And peace, practiced and sought in a consistent matter by someone, becomes virtue, a desirable quality that should be safeguarded for its specific

value. This indicates that we arc "naturally capable of cultivating it",6 and

naturally "we perfect it for ourselves by habit". 7 That is, one is not born as a

-' http://nobelprize.com'nobel nobelprize facts.html. retrieved October 14'" of 200R.

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[www.radiotrece.eom.mx/2008'1](http://www.radiotrece.eom.mx/2008%271) *0!* I Oipremio-nobel-de-la-paz-2008, retrieved October 14'" of

2008.

*5* Aristotle. II OJ a, 15-18 (In *Bihliotheca Scriptorum Craecorum ct Romanorum !1-fcxicana,* 1983

edition).

', An·stotle. I I OJ a, *25-2(>*

Aristotle. I I 03a, 27.

# flag carrier of peace, but that does not mean *a priori* that obtaining it is not possible, because that would be irrational. Inner peace, therefore, is the fruit of

virtue, the search for concordance, respect and solidarity towards the ones that

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
# surround us, whether they are close to us or not.

This is the basic condition of peace, the first for which we should fight. Without personal peace, social peace cannot be generated on whatsoever level, because nobody can give what he does not have. Though, when one does have personal peace, it is possible to create the necessary conditions and links within the pluralism and complexity of human societies to realize a proper climate for the development of individuals, respect for human rights and justice; a proper climate for peace to reign. Peace is thus not something unrealizable or utopian, nor is it a non-existing ideal that feeds the dreamers and the naive. It is a value of a universal rank of which the paradigm is forged from the reality of personal and social peace from those who consecrate their lives to fight for it and obtain it.

**2. Why War?**

# Thus...why does war exist? Why is peace broken'! These questions have occupied mankind since the dawn of her existence and still puzzle us nowadays. They are disturbing questions that have emerged in human history and cannot easily be answered. Complexity is inherent to them. Therefore it is plausible to state that the actions and initiatives favourable to peace are always valuable. However, there is always the disturbing reality of the threat of its constant obstruction in different regions of the world 8 when least expected.

8 The latest related reports given by international news agencies are rather shocking: More than 150 million people have died in the wars of the 20th century, of which 90% were civilians and 2.5 million were children; there are more that 40 armed conflicts going on at this moment and there



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Maybe this is due to the unrest generated by the themes of war and peace. This unrest has more profound roots than the mere loss of personal peace because it is socially linked to *the army of human freedom 9 and the problem of evil* manifested in a great number of ways: political, economical, and territorial,

interests that justify whatever immoral action; the ambition of international power; expansionism; humiliation of enemies, or disguised criminal actions to eliminate them; ethnic purity; fanaticism of any kind, etc. Isn't true that persons (individually or in groups) are to blame for the declarations of war, the invasions of other countries, or the usage of weapons of mass destruction, justifying their actions with unreasonable arguments like, for example, the existence of biological arms in places where only poverty and misery are found? Isn't plainly absurd to initiate a preventive war to assure peace? Is it not a very small group of persons that uses intimidation and force to show their hegemony when it comes to politics, economy and warfare? Think about the ones that have been the intellectual creators and executers of the majority of armed conflicts, genocides, world wars and crimes against humanity that threaten the dignity and human rights of persons and have brought with them the climax of destruction and death. Take, for example, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Auchwitz, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, the Balkans (Kosovo and Montenegro), Sierra Leona, ...and many more African countries that are still engaged in raging wars and social chaos caused by the interference of other nations. In Asia, we can find the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, or the Palestinian-Israel conflict, to point out some of the most striking examples.

are about 15 million refugees; terrorist attacks have claimed 175 casualties in 2003. This number increased to 2000 casualties in 2007, etc. Sources: *Annual Reports 2003-2007 011 amwments, disarmaments, and'lnternationa/ security* of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI), and *The Human Security Report 2005, War and Peace in the 21" Century•.*

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Cuellar, Hortensia. "In defense of Freedom."ln Piotr W. Juchacz and Roman Kozlowski (eds)

(2002): I 17-135.

Observing this scene, it can be stated that in all cases it is the tension, the dialectic interchange of encountered forces in the search of a solution by one of

the parties that -we might be able to sum up as- a ,cclear manifestation of the everlasting fight between good and evil, between the valuable and despicable,

between justice and injustice; between fundamental human rights and the violation of them, which -from a civil perspective- can manifest itself as a generalized barbarism as described in the style of Hobbes in his *Leviathan* with his striking expression *"Bellum omnium contra omnes* ". Before such panorama,

where is the rechtsstaat 10 to be found? And what is to become of human dignity,

law, justice and peace? Therefore the following should be questioned: Is the problem of war a political matter? Is it theological? Is it moral? What are some of the relevant initiatives to achieve peace?

It is well known that many modern and contemporary philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Habermas, Michael Walzer, Bobbio, Nozick, etc. have dealt with the problem from different analytic viewpoints. However, all of them have done this in relation to their own interests in the organization of society, the configuration and essence of the Modern State, and the establishment of political and social conditions to shelter social peace or to maintain it with the notion of an eventual loss of it through war. With that I refer to the fact that the topic or problem of war and peace, of coexistence and civility, of the rechtstaadt and states that are unjust, have been present throughout the reflections of all of the mentioned philosophers.

This is the justification on my behalf, to review, in a *very synthetic way,* the proposal of some of them, through the presentation of essential texts, such as the ones of: Thomas Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. The reason for this

10 State of Law

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
selection is three-fold, namely: first, the innovation of their approaches; secondly, their divergence; thirdly, their common interest -diachronically- in the contractual perspective and the construction of the Modern State, the problem of the division of power, democracy, the role of a leader, and the difficulties that come forth when trying to end a war and re-establish peace.

* I am aware of the fact that I am presenting the ideas of these classics of political philosophy in a rather schematic manner, but what I aspire -for now- is to expose the line of continuity between these four philosophers when it comes to the problem of war and the obtaining of peace.

**3. Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Human Condition**

I would like to stress some of the texts of this English philosopher, related to: a) the creation of the Modem State; b) the natural human condition; c) the state of war and the necessity for peace. His thinking is organic and therefore all of his ideas are related to one and other.

1. As for the creation of the modem state, Hobbes sustains that it is an artificial organism. In other words, it does not have a natural origin rather it is the product of art; but this is nothing new, because -as he argues- a human being also has this origin. A human being is created; the Creator of all things has made him. Man finds his origin in divine art ("we are made in his image and likeness"), and the State finds its origin in human art. Thus the State cannot be considered as a natural institution. Its statute is artificial. Moreover, it is metaphorically called "the artificial man". The modem state proceeds from human creativity, yet its power is not limited but massive, like depicted in *Leviathan* as the ancient animal, which is also referred to in the Bible. These ideas are



recollected from the following fragment:

Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. [...] Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a commonwealth, or state (in Latin, *CIVITAS),*-which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection

and defense it was intended. 11


This artificial organism, though, requires various elements in order to survive, which have to be taken in consideration. The first of them is *sovereignty,* its *artificial soul,* which nurtures it and gives it motion. As he puts it:

Sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the-seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the natural body; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; *salus populi* (the people's safety) its business; counselors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness [civil war, and

death]. 12

His description includes the basic elements of the State of Law: officials of the executive power; magistrates and judges; laws and equality that are "an artificial reason and will", and also proceed of man; the search for harmony and peace; the evasion of sedition, which is its illness, and the consideration of *the civil war* as being the death of the state. Contemplating the preceding ....Why is peace broken?

1. Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviath n.* (1651): Introduction.
2. Hobbes, Thomas. *Ibidem.*



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That, we can find within the condition of human nature, the way we are. What does that mean?

1. Hobbes's interpretation of the natural condition of men among each other is well known. At the beginning of chapter XIII of *Leviathan,* Hobbes states that men are equal by nature when it comes to mental and corporal faculties. *(Nature* had made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind.) Nevertheless, as they become more profound of nature, their reality is different, because they look for a way to realize their desires, even when this means that they become enemies of each other. The usage of force and power become their best weapon. As he comments:

I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. [...] From this equality of ability arise equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power. If one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for


any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation required, and is generally

allowed. 13

In this description we can observe the mutual distrust and insecurity that is generated among humans because of the lack of recognition of each other (they

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Hobbes, Thomas. *Ibidem.:* Chap. XJII.



do not value each others merits and accomplishments but through self-perception alone) and the fear caused by the power of other man. This leads to the thesis that humans do not experience any sense of pleasure when lying together. Moreover, this state is the source of all discord, of all reciprocal rejection between each other. And thus, the potential or actual state of war is common among men.

1. Hobbes finds three principle causes of this discord: competition, distrust, and glory. Each one has in common the suspicion or ambition to dominate over others, to win, to have security, or to show others that their undervaluing always leads to violence. His words are as follows:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel [...].The first men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends,

their nation, their profession, or their name. 14 .

In what form can this fact be counteracted? Hobbes's proposal is given through *Leviathan.* The State as a common power is something that demands respect and creates fear and is capable of controlling the violence of war: men, thus, are enemies among each other, and the fight of all against all is untied, and this is the nature of man. As he expresses in one of his most famous texts:

Hereby it is manifested that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such [a war as is of every man against every man]. For war consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle

14 *Ibidem.*

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is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war [...) so the nature of war consisted not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. 15

With these ideas, he opens up the field to put forth the necessity of the State, which is the only power capable of undoing wars and to establish peace among human beings. In what form? Passing -if we can put it like that- the law of nature, that is the jungle, to the legality and control imposed by the State, through a social

contract: "The mutual transferring of rights is that which men call contract", 16

with which the contractual tradition of modern philosophy, including John Lock, Rousseau and Kant, is inaugurated. Only through this contract can peace be maintained ....the yearn for peace possibly lays at the base of the construction of culture, industry, knowledge, navigations, the cultivation of land, arts, literature, freedom: in one word, *civilization.* Without the continuation of the fruits of war, which arc -among others- "the continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the

life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.". 17


For this reason, according to Hobbes, we arc legally and morally obligated to transfer our rights to the *Slate* with the objective of abandoning our natural state of war. This state does not only consist of fighting, but rather of the disposition to generate it through the inner violence of man himself and with it the obstruction of peace of humanity. Therefore -appealing to reason- the English

lj Hobbes. Thomas. *lhidem.*

16 Another related fragment is: "Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place.

there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that prop1iety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a C:ommonwcalth" *(!hidem:* Ch. XV). The Chapter XVII is also \·cry meaningful.

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philosopher suggests, in chapter fourteen of his *Leviathan,* some precepts or rules of virtue through which a human should *try* to achieve social peace:


It is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule contained the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means

we can to defend ourselves. 18

These ideas are sufficient for our objective, which is to show that Hobbes, in a radical way, perceives the condition of violence that a human being undergoes on several occasions, and that the search and fight for peace is indispensable. The fundamental claim of the English philosopher is not only political peace, but also personal, individual peace, as St. Augustine reminds us, because it is in the heart of man where -at first- the great battles are unleashed, which can lead not only to the establishment of peace, but also to aggression and war.

Having set that out, it is time to answers some of the unresolved questions: Is the problem of war political, theological, or moral? Focusing on the thoughts of the philosopher Hobbes, we can state that his answer includes a triple approach: If we are dealing with the rupture of social peace, generally the problem has emerged because of a political decision of someone (one person or a group of persons in power, or those who -for different reasons- want to destroy social peace through conflicts); this, on its tum, unties among the aggressors or the strategists an inner struggle because of the imminent invasion or declaration of war, with which the problem acquirers a clearly moral nuance: namely, his own conscience and freedom of decision making are at stake. If we search for the deepest roots of

IH Hobbes, Thomas. *Ibidem.:* Chap. XIV.



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
evil within man -not only physical evil but also political and moral evil- the answer seems to be given in the Bible, in the revealed doctrine, which the English philosopher alludes to constantly in his works. This means that the final undercurrent of violence in the world is, next to the personal choice of the agents of war, the original chaos provoked within man by the temptation of a superior power, that is, not wanting to be submitted to nobody and wanting to be like God.

# Rousseau and the Social Contract

One step further in the search for peace is the proposal of Jean Jacques Rousseau given in his *Social Contract* (1762), which was preceded by his famous *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754). It is known that in this discourse 19, he takes up the problem presented by Hobbes about the nature of man. Although he describes it in a splendid manner, it does not mean that it is absolved from the exegetic errors regarding the question of what human nature is, like when he

refers to the natural state of kindness and its posterior *diffidence* (so to say) when gradually being introduced to a social environment. But before exposing any appreciations, it might be more adequate to focus on the intent he made to give an answer to the evident inequality between men. Experience shows us that there can be found such vast differences between men and between women. Why is that? Rousseau indicates that the answer to this question can only be given when one really knows mankind; it is not possible to know what the origin is inequality is if we do not ask *who we are* as the Oracle of Delphi would prescribe and on base of which many great minds -not only Rousseau-present their answers. As the

19 Not in the Discourse on Arts and Sciences, with which he won the Academy of Dijon Award in 1755. That discourse deals with a different topic.



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philosopher of Geneva puts it:

Of all human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be that of mankind: and I will venture to., say, the single inscription on the Temple of Delphi contained a precept more difficult and more important than is to be found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written [...]. For how shall we know the source of inequality between men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind? And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances

he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition?. 20

How is it possible that changes have been introduced in their primitive condition? The answer of Rousseau is well known: the introduced changes in their primitive condition, in its original condition, are due to *society and her influence* that has altered throughout history the majestic simplicity with which the Author of the nature created mankind. Rousseau indicates:

Like the statue of Glaucus, which was so disfigured by time, seas and tempests [...], [the human soul, altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring], by the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors, by the changes happening to the constitution of the body, and by the continual jarring of the passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance, so as to be hardly recognizable. Instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it by its divine Author. [...] It is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species removes it still farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we make, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of making

*20* Rousseau, J.J. *What is the Origin C!( Inequality among Men, and is it authorized by Natural Law?* .(Translated by G. D. H. Cole). (1754): Preface.

the most important of all.21

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As can be observed, in this outline on the natural condition of the human being, Rousseau has taken a drastic exegetic turn as to the interpretation of Hobbes, who considered the state of war to be the original human condition. For Rousseau, on the other hand, the human being -in his origin- had the shape of the divine simplicity, the image of his Creator: afterwards -at the beginning of human history in ancient times and when man started to live in society- this image was modified and subsequently almost disappeared, like is narrated in the story of Glaucus, who through the course of time, the ocean, and the tempest (analogy very *ad hoc* to explain what he wanted), looked more like a beast than like a god. This is Rousseau's interpretation: while man gradually civilized, inequality between men became more extended. In the primitive state, everyone was equal. Afterwards came inequality among humans, equality both in a natural or physical way and in a political or moral manner. Let us look at the text:

I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul: and another, which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least authorized by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges, which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful or even in a position to exact obedience.22

This distinction -as it seems- puts forth the fundamental intuition that is found at the base of hi next philosophical work on: a) his so called pedagogical naturalism

21 Roussea , J.J. *Ibidem*

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'*Ibidem.:* Part I

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in which he defends the original state of kindness during infancy, free from the great vices of humanity, in *Emile* (1762); b) his doctrine of the social contract, necessary for the political and in some cases ethical orga.nization of society, which

is dealt with in *Social Contract,* ·published this same year. These two works, from my perspective, manifest the two complementary angels of the philosophical concerns 6f Rousseau. On the one hand, the natural condition of the human being, which -contrary to the proposal of Hobbes- consists of an original kindness, a state of innocence free from the great vices of mankind; a state of innocence Rousseau encounters in infancy, especially in the youngest children, because they are still separated from the aggressiveness and bad habits in the behavior of an adult. Contact with an adult and introduction to the society corrupts them, because

children are good of nature23 . And therefore the so called rousseaunian naturalism

That is described in his *Emile* or *On Education,* which has had an enormous influence on different educative fields in the Western World. On the other hand, in *Social Contract* he deals with the implication for this natural state of kindness in society.


The thesis is not free from ambiguities. For example: What is it that takes

place in the transition from a child to adolescence or adulthood that corrupts its mind? How can this transformation, that every adult has undergone, be explained? Where did this evil, which is visibly manifested through life in community and adulthood, come from? Rousseau does not resolve these matters. His interests lay in politics and therefore ethics, more so than psychology, sociology, or theology. So *Social Contract* came to be, the first page of which is engraved with these famous words:

D Cfr Cuellar, Hortensia. *El niño como persona.* (1990): 198-199.

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.24

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His contractual reflection, therefore, starts with the assumption of the existents of a *natural state* of the human kind in all time and place. This is the original condition of a man who lives without obstacles, free, because there are no links that can bind him. He is naturally free! There are no males that can prevent them from acting freely. Thus...why then a social contract? It is necessary to regulate lives in society, because (paraphrasing the statement of Rousseau) social order is

based on the sacred right that serves as foundation for all other rights,25 but it is

not of a natural order but of a conventional order,26 of which the objective is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the entire common force the person and goods of each member, and in which each, wittily uniting

.himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which *The Social Contract* provides the solution"27 And all this to regulate social life, to implement a good government, to respond to the will generally manifested through governors, to transit t!.te state of

nature to the state of sovereignty, the myth of the good savageness to the state of law and reason and finally inserted freely in a body that is not only political, but also moral and collective, which is the Modern State, the Republic. These ideas are initially handled in Book I, Ch. VI, VII, and VIII of this classic work of political philosophy.

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Rousseau, J. J. *The Social Contract or Principles qf Political* Right. (Translated by G. D. H.

ole, public domain). ( 1762): 1

, Rousseau, JJ. *Op.cit:* Book I, Chap. I.

*6*

*" /bidem.*

27

1bidem.: Book I, Chap. VI.



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So, how can natural condition and social order be combined? This has already been implied: through the convention of will and the practice of political liberty that guaranties "the total diffidence of each member with all his rights in

favour of the community". 28 Only by these means can the individual, naturally

free be bridged with the social, that -in all its facets29- is presented as a hostile climate to human growth. But is it possible to *create* such social order through the general will, law, and reason that impose order on to a social body. This is the reason behind the understanding of political power as an instituted relation on base of the gap of wills, favorable to the *res-publica,* the sovereign state. Who governs, thus, has the legitimacy, a legitimacy that comes forth of the general will of the governed people.

These ideas that emerge in the final decades of the 18th century have had a strong impact on the liberty proposals of various nations in the western world, from then to our days. And this is understandable, because in the search for a solution for the problem of original violence, of the imposed limitations of irrational despotism, of the legitimating of a political organ capable of installing social order, Rousseau formulates with precision, an inherited idea, which he exposes and develops brilliantly: the one of the social contract, of which the

objective is the conservation of its members/ 0 and general welfare. 31

And what generates war? He does not say too much about it. But considering his statement we could conclude that rather than among persons, it

1. *Ibidem.*
2. At least the social focus of Rousseau is presents in three-fold: a) a hostile climate for personal growth; b) a social body that finds its origin in legal conventionalism *(iusposirivism),* and; c)

ethical (which is therefore not a natural law). Here we can clearly see the ontological weakening of Rousseau's idea of human nature, to manifest himself as a naturalist capable of establishing contracts for all its alliances, formerly the key of the *Aufklarung.*

1. Rousseau, J.J. *Op.* Cit.:Book II, Chap. 5
2. *Ibidem.:* Book IV, Chap. I.





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originates between states, due to the ambition of one of them. Counteracting or working in benefit of peace is possible because of rights and reason. This is exactly the proposal of the philosopher of Köenisberg.

1. Kant and Perpetual Peace

It is well knows that the signing of the peace treaty of Basilea in April 1795 was the decisive motive that triggered Kant to write, in this same year, his essay *Perpetual Peace,* which is a necessary reference to -from an ideological point of view- try to establish peace between nations. The harsh experience of bloody conflicts during the French Revolution (1798) and the battles that continued until the treaty were immediate antecedents of this regulative text aiming to obtain everlasting peace. At least, that was Kant's intention. This is exposed through the pragmatic and political sense of his proposal.

I will show three articles, merely to illustrate the Kantian pretension to

install perpetual peace, preliminary to the first Section of this short, but pragmatic work, to exile violence, hatred, and war between nations. His statement is as follows:

I). A peace treaty should not be considered valid when it has been adjusted with a mental reservation of certain motives capable of provoking future wars.32 With this he tries to say that if a treaty is signed under those circumstances, that is, with some mental reservation of whatsoever kind, it is not really a treaty to install peace, but simply an interruption of hostilities or some

programmed armistice that maintains "the perverse plan" on the background, to continue war later on, if negotiations or conditions of peace are not favourable.

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Kant, I. *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein pholosophischer Enflmef* Koeningsberg, 1795. Spanish


Version: *La paz perpetua* (1990): 217.

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# 2). No independent State -small or big- could be acquired by another State through heritage, interchange, buy or donation.33 With this it is indicated that the notion of State does not refer to "occupied soil" but to a community of persons, a society of men, over whom nobody can decree or rule. This thesis is the application of the juridical field and its interpretation on man, which is a purpose on itself. Neither is it about understanding the State following Rousseau's model, wherein the signing of a contract is implied, through which persons are bound to respect the General Will of the ruler, as we have mentioned in previous paragraphs. Even less is it about the original state of war sustained by Hobbes, nor the succession or heritage of the big or small territories by alliances between families like in the case of monarchical Absolutism. Its nuance is eminently anthropological and moral.

3). The permanent armies *-miles perpetuus-* should disappear completely within time. 34 This article is the key point to the possibility of the founding of perpetual peace. Without armies

-according to Kant- there would not be any threat of war, because "the permanent armies are a never-ending threat of war for all the other States, given that they are always ready and willing to engage in combat". *35* Moreover, without armies there would not be spending on weaponry, nor would there be military costs like the maintenance and wages of soldiers. It turns out to be highly immoral, Kant warns us, "to pay people to die or to kill, which implies the usage of man as a mere machine in the hands of another, the state; -that is not coherent to one's own human rights."36



But, what should one do when confronted with the attacks and threats of war of other nations? On this point, Kant is consistent and says: "Quite different are the armies that are temporally realized by citizens on their own behalf, to defend themselves and their country against the attacks of the exterior enemy".37 These

1. Kant. I.Op. cit.: 217
2. *Ibidem.*
3. *Ibidem.:* 219.


*36 Ibidem.*

37 *Ibidem.*

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kinds of war "are unfortunately necessary because of the natural condition". 38

One has to defend himself as long as perpetual peace is not reached.

As we have said, the Kantian intention to reach this type of peace is excellent and represents one step further towards the real state of civilization and humanism, which humanity holds up as her ideal. Will we achieve this some day? I don't know. The sad truth is that we have had two world wars in the 201 century and conflicts continue at present. We realize that world peace is constantly threatened by all kinds of weapons of mass destruction that in the end can lead to total extermination. If we observe the world, in different regions, the dove of peace disappears behind huge clouds of violence and the flagrant impunity of those that declare war and invade countries, and that break or endanger the fragile balance of peace with reasons such as: "preventive wars", "ethnic cleansing", "establishing peace", or "geopolitical strategies to prevent violence from extending to other regions of the world."

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It is therefore that the Kantian project of perpetual peace with the foundation of a federation of states that watches over the international juridical order respected by all, was severely criticized by Hegel. His text *Philosophy of Law* where this idea is explored goes as follows:


There is no praetor, between states, not even a mediator or arbiter, even in a contingent way, that is, according to the particular will. The Kantian representation of perpetual peace through a federations of states that would settle disputes and fix all disagreements as a power recognized by all individual states, and thus preventing wars, presupposes that all states agree based on moral and religious motives, and always and definitely on the particular sovereign will, through which it continues to be affected

" *Ibidem.*

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by the contingency. 39



Hegelian realism is crushing. His argument is supported by the immovability of contingency, of *what is but could end to be,* simply bed use it encloses the possibility and not the effectiveness of the rational project that has no fissures because it is the concept of a universal kind preceding form the Absolute Spirit. Contingency, on the other hand, is rooted in a certain nature. Therefore it results to be purely conflictive and very variable. And thus it results to be an impossible intent to install a federation of states that -of iure-arbitrates an ongoing dispute between individual states with the objective of ending whatever act of violence or war. Another element that Hegel considered for this thesis as is given in the text, was the "particular sovereign will" of each people or nation, of any national state, embedded therefore in contingency.

And where shall we thus find the elements of rationality that could grant such legitimacy to law? For the same reason that -as can be affirmed- in his context it is not *physis* but *logos;* not *natura* but *ratio.* And from this order -the rational- it is possible to lay the foundation of law and to try to solve particular conflicts between nations, not through an international suppressing law system for all, but through the process of respect of the sovereignty an the emanated laws of this corresponding law system of each nation, embedded in justice. Therefore the necessity of the *politics of recognitions of others* formulated by Hegel in epigraph 331 of *Philosophy of Law,* in which he writes:

"The people are, as for the state, the spirit and its substantial rationality. [...] As a result of this, a state has a sovereign autonomy in relation to another state. *To be just as the other is to you,* means, *to be recognized* by others, is its first and absolute

39 Hegel, G.W.F. *Principios de Filosofia del Derecho.* (1988): 333.

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righf'. 40

The Kantian proposal for perpetual peace is, therefore, a utopia, a proposal of good will, but not possible to realize, even when the social-political focus of the 20'h century seems to be, at an international level, the foundation of the organization of the United Nations in 1945. Its inevitable counterpart. however, was the constitution of the defensive block of the west: the NATO, in 1949.

Would it be possible, at the beginning of the 21" century, to give peace

another chance?

*(The English translation of" this paper is hy Roe/ Blomsm)*

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
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