Indeed, if I may be allowed the anachronism, the Hindus were Spinozaites more than 2,000 years before the existence of Spinoza; and Darwinians many centuries before Darwin; and Evolutionists many centuries before the doctrine of Evolution had been accepted by the Scientists of our time, and before any word like Evolution existed in any language of the world.¹

— Sir Monier Monier-Williams (1819–1899 C.E.)

¹ Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, page xii.
मेरे बाबा के लिए
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Preface

For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees another; there one smells another; there one tastes another; there one speaks to another; there one hears another; there one thinks of another; there one touches another; there one understands another. But where everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby and whom would one see? then whereby and whom would one smell? then whereby and whom would one taste? then whereby and to whom would one speak? then whereby and whom would one hear? then whereby and of whom would one think? then whereby and whom would one touch? then whereby and whom would one understand? whereby would one understand him by means of whom one understands this All? (yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram paśyati, tad itara itaram jighrati, tad itara itaram rasayate, tad itara itaram abhivadati, tad itara itaram śṛṇoti, tad itara itaram manute, tad itara itaram sprśati, tad itara itaram vijānāti | yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kam paśyet tat kena kam jighret tat kena kam rasayet tat kena kam abhivadet tat kena kam śṛṇuyāt tat kena kam manvīta tat kena kam sprśet tat kena kam vijānīyāt | yenedam sarvam vijānāti taṁ kena vijānīyāt)²

— Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad

² Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 147. The translations of the Upanishads that appear in this book are by Robert Ernest Hume, sometimes with minor edits. For the Sanskrit text of both the Upanishads and Śaṅkara’s works, this book relies on Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL), except as otherwise indicated.
I began writing this book as Part Six of my book *Torah and Nondualism*, and early drafts addressed the rich history of nondualist thought in post-scriptural Jewish literature. But as my research proceeded and broadened, I became intrigued by the parallels I saw between the nondual ideas of Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) and those of *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism, a philosophy that emerged in 9th century Kashmir and later spread to South India. Therefore, I put aside for another day, if not another scholar, the task of documenting Judaism’s enduring commitment to nondual truth, and I set out to explicate Spinoza in light of South Asian philosophy of mind. As the saying goes, “this, too, is for the best,” for my exploration of Vedānta, *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism, and Spinoza has proved fruitful beyond expectation.

The primary subject of this book is the question of consciousness, what David Chalmers called the “hard problem,” but one cannot explain consciousness without also saying something about ontology, epistemology, determinism, ethics, and

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3 The *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy that is discussed in this book is sometimes referred to as “Kashmir Shaivism,” and therefore I have included a reference to Kashmir in the book’s title. But, historically speaking, Shaivism does not divide neatly into a northern type in Kashmir and a southern type in Tamil Nadu. More importantly, even within Kashmir, Shaivism was far from monolithic in terms of philosophy and ritual practice. During the 9th through the 11th centuries of the Common Era, when *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy was emerging, the dominant form of Shaivism in Kashmir was the dualistic *Sāiddhāntika* tradition. Hence, using the term “Kashmir Shaivism” for the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy is a bit like using the term “German Christianity” for Protestantism.

4 Hebrew: *Gam zu l’tovah*. The phrase is most often associated with Nachum ish Gam Zu, a saintly practitioner of nondualism who is described in the Babylonian Talmud. “Whatever would happen to him, he would say, ‘This, too, is for the best.’” He did so even in extraordinarily trying circumstances. See *BT Taanit* 21a.

death. The discussion may seem dry to those who are not accustomed to philosophical discourse. I have not written a devotional book; rather, I have written an analytical one that demands a certain amount of effort from its reader, although the reader can also take some solace in knowing that I am not a professional philosopher and that the book would likely have been even more impenetrable if I were.

I am not a professional philosopher, but I am a person for whom subject-object duality has ceased to feel real, replaced by a nondual experience that is much more satisfying and true. And although this book is somewhat demanding of its reader, it also offers the possibility of great reward. The reader who follows the book’s reasoning to the end has the opportunity to gain an entirely new conception of self, one that “removes the veil” that separates knower from known.

And when the illusion of the subject-object divide dissolves, the mind-body problem dissolves with it, and philosophical puzzles like Mary and her black-and-white room⁶ are easily understood. The key point is that all consciousness is consciousness of one’s own self. There is no such thing as consciousness of another. One cannot be conscious of a thing — anything — without being that thing. The reason there appears to be an outside world, when in truth one is only conscious of one’s own self, is the same reason that the reflection of a city on the flat surface of a small mirror appears to be a distant city. It is a trick of perception that makes one’s consciousness of self appear to be the knowing of an external world. But even more importantly, consciousness of self is not different from being self, for consciousness and being are the same thing.

⁶ Mary and her black-and-white room is a thought experiment that gets to the heart of the mind-body problem. See Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” pp. 128–130. It is discussed in the present work at pages 149 to 150, below.
That assertion may sound like idealism. The philosophy presented here is perhaps a type of idealism, but it is a *diffuse* non-reductive idealism. One errs if one imagines that there is a material thing that has or contains consciousness, for matter *is* consciousness, but one also errs if one imagines that the objects of the physical world have no intrinsic existence independent of one’s consciousness of them. Even when one’s consciousness of a particular object ceases, the object remains conscious of itself, and therefore it is real. Its own consciousness, not that of a remote observer, is the foundation of its being.

This book will appeal to philosophy of mind scholars, and it will thrill students of South Asian nondualism. But it is worth reading just for the brief anecdote about Albert Einstein in Princeton and what that anecdote tells us about human agency.

I would like to thank Lakshman Joo and Jankinath Kaul for their wisdom and example, and Jim Wasserman, Daniel Matt, Daniel Boyarin, and Yitzhak Melamed for their friendship and support. The mistakes are mine alone.

J.H.C.
October 2, 2021
Berkeley, California
Introduction

[It would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind [(i.e., to concede that the mind is a material thing having a spatial form)] than it would be for me to concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by one to an immaterial thing.]

— Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680 C.E.)

1. Cartesian Dualism and Its Alternatives

We tend to divide the world into pairs of opposites, and often this dualism takes on a moral valence. We speak of truth and falsity, good and evil, God and devil, but in doing so, we fail to appreciate that this moral dualism has its source in a deeper rift at the core of human psychology. I am referring to the subject-object divide, the distinction we feel between self and other. The subject-object divide gives rise to moral dualism, for it is very hard to describe something as evil without first seeing it as other, but the subject-object divide also gives rise to something that philosophers call the mind-body problem.

The mind-body problem is brought to the fore by Princess Elisabeth’s challenge to René Descartes, quoted above. How, Princess Elisabeth asked, could “an immaterial thing” (a mind) have “the capacity to move a [material] body and be moved by one”? Put another way, what constitutes the point of intersection between one’s mind and one’s brain? How does a physical process in the brain give rise to a conscious thought in the mind, and how

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7 The texts that this book quotes are often difficult to understand, and I have frequently included emendations in square brackets to add clarity. Where the translator of the text in question has already included emendations in square brackets, those that are by the present author are underlined.
The Nondual Mind

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does a conscious thought in the mind initiate a physical process in the brain?

Moral dualism is concerned with the problem of evil, and moral dualists often suppose evil to be the creation of an anti-God — a supernatural force in competition with God. Thus, moral dualism is closely related to theological dualism. By contrast, ontological dualism is concerned with Princess Elisabeth’s challenge to Descartes. It focuses on the fundamental rift between mind and body, and more broadly between self and other, seeing consciousness and matter as ontologically distinct realms. But as said, moral dualism has its source in ontological dualism. So, let us delve into the mind-body problem, and from what we learn about the mystery of consciousness, let us see what we can learn about God and the devil.

René Descartes (1596–1650 C.E.) asserted that each of us is an immaterial soul operating a body from a command center located in the pineal gland of the brain. According to that view, data from the sensory nerves flow through the body’s neural network to the brain and, after some suitable processing, these data arrive in the pineal gland, and there the soul awaits, ready to observe, interpret, and respond with appropriate command decisions: “Stop at the curb. Look both ways. Listen for passing cars. Now proceed. . . .” And as the soul issues its diverse directives, the body responds dutifully. A message is dispatched, again through the neural network, to the relevant muscle group, which reacts as necessary to actualize the soul’s intentions. That, at least, is what Descartes imagined, and people who have not thought deeply about the mind-body problem usually embrace some variant of his mind-body dualism, because it seems to align so closely with everyday human experience.

And apparently confirming this Cartesian model of the human soul is the near-death experience. The immaterial soul slips temporarily from its sheath of flesh and experiences its independence and immortality. There, below, sprawled across the
sidewalk, lies the body, paramedics crouching at its side, administering aid, and above that frenetic scene, the soul gazes down with calm detachment. And then, perhaps, the soul makes a conscious decision to reenter the body. The heart muscle resumes its autonomic contractions, and the paramedics sigh in relief, smile, and cheer.

As noted, most people are more or less comfortable with the Cartesian notion that the physical body contains an immaterial bubble-like soul, and they imagine that at the moment of bodily death, the soul will slip away unscathed, and it will then reincarnate in some suitable new body. Or, perhaps, it will “sleep in the dust” until the resurrection of its original body in messianic times. Or, perhaps, it will journey to the world of the ancestors, bundled up in the “bundle of life.” Or, perhaps, there is a world of disembodied souls, high in the starry heavens, a world where the soul will be rewarded for its constancy, piety, and faith.

René Descartes’s answer to the mind-body problem is known as “Cartesian dualism,” and Cartesian dualism has serious flaws. Its first and most fundamental flaw is that, according to physical science, the physical world is a causally complete and closed system. Every event in the physical world is fully and sufficiently explained by immutable laws. Physical events need no soul to initiate them, for they have physical causes that do so, and in the absence of such physical causes, the soul is helpless to effect any change whatsoever.

Even Descartes struggled to explain how an immaterial soul — a thinking thing — could initiate a biological process that would, in due course, activate nerves and muscles, causing the movement of, say, an arm. How exactly does the soul communicate its message to the biological system? When Princess Elisabeth asked that question, Descartes could offer no persuasive response. Specifically, Princess Elisabeth asked “how the mind of
a human being, being only [an immaterial] thinking substance,\(^8\) can determine [(i.e., move or activate)] the bodily spirits in producing bodily actions.”\(^7\) The best Descartes could come up with was to invoke axiomatic truth. He might just as well have replied, “It is so because it is so.” But Princess Elisabeth’s doubt remained, and therefore she asked again “how the soul (nonextended and immaterial) is able to move the body.” And this time, she added the statement quoted at the beginning of this section: “[I]t would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it would be for me to concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by one to an immaterial thing.”\(^10\)

For Princess Elisabeth, it would make more sense that the soul was a material thing — a component of the physical body, in other words — than to imagine that it was an immaterial thing that could somehow interact causally with physical things. Here, Princess Elisabeth was not distinguishing matter from energy and doubting the capacity of immaterial force fields to move particles of matter; rather, she was doubting the capacity of the mind — consciousness — to do so. Princess Elisabeth had thus identified the most fundamental problem with Cartesian dualism: What provides the causal link by which an immaterial soul can direct the movements of a physical body? And, how can we say that the soul’s directives — and not the laws of physics — are what actually determine the physical body’s actions?

But the Cartesian dualist has to answer another question, too. In a living person, each component of the “soul” has some physical

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\(^8\) The term “thinking substance” does not mean a material substance that thinks. Princess Elisabeth used the term “substance” in the Cartesian sense, which contrasts “thinking substance” (i.e., mind or consciousness) with “extended substance” (i.e., matter).

\(^9\) Garber, *Descartes Embodied*, p. 172, italics added.

\(^10\) Garber, *Descartes Embodied*, p. 172, italics added.
system on which it depends. The soul’s power to see depends on the existence of physical eyes and a visual cortex; its power to hear depends on functioning eardrums and an auditory cortex; and its power to recall past events depends on the medial temporal lobe and the neocortex. If a beautiful golden sunset is seen and the soothing roar of the ocean is heard, there are eyes seeing the former and ears hearing the latter. If a memory of a pleasant summer evening is recalled, there are neurons in the medial temporal lobe and the neocortex from which the memory is drawn. If there are thoughts passing through the mind, there is some measurable electrical activity in the brain. As our scientific knowledge grows, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a physical substratum somewhere in the body for every intellectual and perceptive capacity of the “soul,” and if we damage that substratum, the soul loses the corresponding mental capacity.

Are we then to assume that this close dependence of the soul on the physical body is merely temporary and that when the body dies, the soul somehow regains the powers of thought and perception that it lost, bit by bit, as the body deteriorated prior to death? Are we to assume, despite the lockstep correlation between the mental capacity of the soul and the functioning of the physical body, that the soul somehow exists independent of the body and that when the body dies, the soul floats away to a future existence, all its mental capacities miraculously intact? Isn’t it much more likely that the human soul does not exist independent of the body; rather, it is a consciousness that is somehow linked to and dependent upon the physical systems that give rise to its conscious experiences? It is easy to see why Cartesian dualism is attractive to those confronting the certainty of bodily death, but it is hard to harmonize Descartes’s theory with the laws of physics or with the obvious dependence of specific conscious experiences on corresponding physical systems.

After considering the weaknesses of Cartesian dualism, many people abandon it in favor of some nondual solution to the mind-
body problem. Some — especially neuroscientists and computer programmers — veer toward the material, denying that there is any such thing as an immaterial soul. They argue that the physical world alone exists and that consciousness is a physical thing that we will eventually discover, just as we have discovered leptons and quarks. Others — especially religious mystics and armchair philosophers — see problems with the materialist solution to the mind-body problem. Acutely aware of the subjective experience of consciousness, which seems to them to be an undeniable fact independent of the physical facts of any observed system, they veer toward the immaterial, denying the existence of a physical world altogether. For them, the physical world is merely thought-stuff, a dream without a physical dreamer.

But there is a third possibility. What if subjective consciousness and objective matter are simply the same thing comprehended in two different ways? According to this third possibility, neither the knower (consciousness) nor the known (matter) is the ultimate reality; rather, they are each characteristics of a third thing that mediates the two. We can think of that mediating thing as consciousness, but it is not the subject side of an unbridgeable subject-object divide. Rather, it is a nondual consciousness, conscious only of itself, and conscious of itself simply by being itself.

Below is a painting of an outdoor scene:
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The image is flat, but it appears to have depth because of the rules of perspective that the artist, Leonid Afremov, has applied when painting the image. By analogy to that painting, consider the possibility that in one’s *knowing* of an object — say, a chair one might be sitting on — the “object” that is known has no separate existence from the “subject” that is knowing it. Consider that the object and its knower are only tricks of perception, like the depth that seems to characterize Afremov’s painting. They are appearances that arise when nondual consciousness — which is conscious only of itself — assumes a particular configuration, giving rise to a particular point of view.

A teacher of nondualism once asked his young student to sip from a cup of unsweetened *chai* (spiced black tea). He then asked the student to stir some sugar into the *chai* and to sip it again. “What do you taste?” asked the teacher. “Sweet,” responded the student, wondering what point the teacher was making. “Who knows the sweet?” inquired the teacher, and he told the student to contemplate the question. The student ended up leaving the teacher’s academy, but he never abandoned his pursuit of nondual wisdom. After many years, he returned to visit the same teacher, who was now an old man. The student paid his respects and then
said with smile, “The sweet knows the sweet.”

According to this theory, both the knower (the student’s mind) and the known (the sweetness of the tea) have a basis in reality, just as the depth that characterizes the artist’s painting has a basis in the perspective lines that are sketched on the flat surface of the canvas, but knower and known are secondary interpretations imposed on primary facts. What actually exists is nondual consciousness of self, configured to give rise to the illusion of a soul knowing the sweetness of tea. This point may be difficult to grasp, but the “hard problem” of consciousness is half solved if we consider that all consciousness is actually nondual consciousness of self, not subject-object consciousness. And, the “hard problem” of consciousness is the rest of the way solved if we consider that there is no material thing that has or contains this nondual consciousness of self; rather, nondual consciousness of self is the underlying substance (substantia) of existence.

We can certainly describe the foregoing answer to the mind-body problem as a type of idealism. The chair and the sweet tea are nothing but consciousness. But they are not merely the dream images of a remote dreamer, ready to go “poof” when the dreamer dreams a different dream. They are a real chair and real sweet tea in a real universe that operates according to immutable physical laws, laws that can be inventively applied to predict real events and to devise real answers to real problems. That is so, because in using the word “consciousness” to describe the true being of the chair or the sweet tea, we are not — despite the limitations of the English language — referring to the subject side of the subject-object divide; rather, we are denying the reality of the subject-object divide. The chair and the sweet tea are not just the hallucinations of some remote observer; they are also the hallucinations of themselves, having their own intrinsic being. Therefore, although they are consciousness, they are no less material, and we can just as validly describe the philosophical system proposed here as a type of materialism, but it is a type of
materialism that focuses on what matter is, not merely on what matter does.

But this summary is hopelessly inadequate to convey the true sense of these counterintuitive ideas, for it is nothing less than a new conception of self that these ideas demand of us. To gain a better grasp, therefore, we need to dive deep into nondual philosophy, both East and West. It is the assertion of this book that Spinoza’s response to the mind-body question is similar to that presented in Vedānta and, even more so, to that presented in Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Moreover, a close comparison of these philosophical systems fosters a fuller and more satisfying understanding of each of them.

2. A Note on Existing Scholarship

Other writers before me have noticed the parallels between “Spinozism” — if I may be allowed that term — and Eastern philosophy. Indeed, this comparison was made just two decades after Spinoza’s death, at a time when Eastern philosophy was little known (and even less understood) in the West. In 1697, Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique included an article on Spinoza that compared Spinoza’s philosophy to that of a Chinese sect that Bayle called “Fo.” It is unclear what particular sect Bayle had in mind. It seems to have practiced some variant of Chinese Buddhism, but Bayle’s purpose was not to expound the teachings of this sect; rather, it was to criticize Spinoza’s philosophy for the monism it allegedly had in common with this sect.11

Since Bayle, several philosopher’s — including a few in recent times — have found close parallels between Spinoza’s

nondual philosophy and Buddhism. These analyses are fascinating and informative, particularly in elaborating the problem of ethical duty in a monistic system. Buddhist philosophy is, however, beyond the scope of the present book. Rather, the focus of this book is the parallels between Spinoza’s nondual philosophy and Hindu nondualism, a comparison that I find particularly fruitful vis-à-vis an understanding of the mind-body problem.

In the mid-19th century, Sanskrit scholar Theodore Goldstücker already recognized the close parallel between Spinoza’s philosophical system and Hindu Vedānta, saying: “[H]ad Spinoza been a Hindu, his system would in all probability mark a last phase of the Vedānta philosophy.” In support of this assertion, Goldstücker relied on the acosmist interpretation of Spinoza put forward by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831 C.E.). I do not embrace Hegel’s assertion that Spinoza was an acosmist, but Goldstücker correctly observed that some of the criticisms that have been directed at Vedānta can also be said of Spinoza’s system.


13 Goldstücker, Literary Remains, p. 33.

14 As Yitzhak Melamed has shown, Hegel was not the first to characterize Spinoza as an acosmist, although Hegel certainly did much to reinforce that characterization. The idea was already put forward by the German philosopher Ernst Platner in 1776, who said: “Spinoza does not actually deny the existence of the Godhead, but rather the existence of the world.” The specific expression “acosism” in relation to Spinoza’s philosophy derives from Solomon Maimon’s writings, which Hegel probably read. On this topic, see Melamed, “Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism,” pp. 76–79. See also Melamed, “Why Spinoza is Not an Eleatic Monist?,” pp. 210–211.
Another prominent 19th century Sanskrit scholar, Friedrich Max Müller, noticed the same resemblance between Vedānta and Spinoza’s philosophy. Müller was not only one of the most esteemed Indologists of his time, but he had also completed a dissertation on Spinoza’s *Ethics*, so he was well qualified to compare the two systems. In lectures on Vedānta delivered at the Royal Institution in 1894, Müller briefly pointed out the similarities that he thought were most significant. In particular, Müller noted the similarity between Vedānta’s “Brahman” (God) and Spinoza’s infinite and eternal divine “substance” (*substantia*).

Sir Monier Monier-Williams (1819–1899 C.E.) — Müller’s rival in the 1860 election for Oxford’s Boden Professor of Sanskrit — agreed with his colleague about the similarity between Vedānta and Spinozism. Monier-Williams even boldly asserted that “the Hindus were Spinozaites more than 2,000 years before the existence of Spinoza.” What he meant, presumably, was that he saw in the Sanskrit classical works a foreshadowing of the same ideas that Spinoza would articulate in Western philosophical terms more than two millennia later. And in the century and a half that has followed Monier-Williams’s provocative comment, many scholars have tried to flesh out the details of his assertion.

If one studies this scholarly corpus, a few points stand out. (See Appendix One, p. 225, below.) First, in comparing Spinoza’s philosophy to Hindu philosophy, most of the attention has been placed on Vedānta, in particular the nondual “Advaita Vedānta” of

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16 *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, page xii.
Śaṅkara (8th century C.E.), and very little attention has been given to Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Moreover, to the extent Pratyabhijñā philosophy has been considered at all, it is treated in only a superficial manner. This book, by contrast, makes Pratyabhijñā philosophy a central part of its analysis, and doing so is critical to a valid comparison because the precise point on which scholars have distinguished Spinoza’s philosophy from Śaṅkara’s Vedānta also distinguishes Pratyabhijñā philosophy from Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, thus making Pratyabhijñā philosophy the closer analog to Spinozism.

Second, none of the scholarship comparing Spinoza’s philosophical system to Hindu philosophy focuses in particular on philosophy of mind, and that is so even though the problem of consciousness (i.e., the mind-body problem) lies at the root of so many of the other issues these philosophies address. This book makes philosophy of mind its primary point of departure, using it to motivate its other conclusions.

Third, scholars who, after becoming well versed in Hindu thought, turn to Spinoza often distort Spinoza’s theories in an effort to make Spinoza seem either more or less Hindu depending on the scholar’s personal bias. Ironically, however, I find these distortions very valuable and informative. They tend to reveal the areas in which Spinoza’s philosophy is most often misunderstood and most hotly contested, and by comparison to Hindu approaches to the same philosophical problems, we are led to a deeper understanding of Spinoza. Does Spinoza contend that thought and extension (i.e., mind and matter) are merely subjective ascriptions superimposed on divine substance (substantia)? Or, does Spinoza

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17 The term “Vedānta” can refer to any philosophical system based on the Upanishads. I generally use the term to refer to Śaṅkara’s nondual interpretation of the Upanishads, but the term also includes several competing interpretations, most notably the qualified nondualism of Rāmānuja (ca. 1017–1137 C.E.) and the dualism of Madhva (1238–1317 C.E.).
contend that thought and extension are objective realities? Is Spinoza an acosmist? Is he a covert idealist? And most importantly, who is asking the question — a mind or a brain? This book will give the answers.

3. A Brief Outline

In Part One, I describe the mind-body problem in broad outline, attempting to make the book accessible to an educated reader who does not have an extensive background in philosophy. Part One draws some basic conclusions about epistemology and consciousness, and it ends with a brief description of the theory of thought-matter equivalence.

In Part Two, I survey the classical texts of Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, comparing the assertions of the South Asian texts to the general principles discussed in Part One.

Part Three explicates Spinoza’s writings on philosophy of mind, pointing out the striking similarity between Spinoza’s ideas and those of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and addressing some of the points that have tripped up other scholars who have compared Spinoza’s system to Hindu philosophy.

In Part Four, I consider some of the significant ramifications of the Pratyabhijñā-Spinoza metaphysics. I address, among other things, the evolution of human consciousness, and I also discuss Frank Jackson’s thought experiment involving Mary and the black-and-white room.

Part Five serves as an interim conclusion. In it, I summarize the theory of consciousness presented in the preceding parts of the book.

Then, in Part Six, I engage the difficult issue of determinism, demonstrating the close affinity between Spinoza’s soft determinism (i.e., compatibilism) and the soft determinism of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. Part Six also discusses several subsidiary issues, such as the problem of criminal responsibility in a deterministic universe and the question of good and evil. I also
include a fun anecdote about Albert Einstein, discussing its relevance to the free will debate.

Finally, in Part Seven, I set forth two theories of personal immortality, both of which appear in the Hindu scriptures and in the writings of Spinoza. The first theory is based on the cyclical nature of time; the second, on the notion that there must exist an eternal essence that determines the events that we see unfolding in the time dimension.

This book also includes three appendices. Appendix One is a survey of the existing literature comparing Hindu philosophy to that of Spinoza. Scholars have done considerable work in this area, and an overview of their conclusions is helpful for purposes of identifying important themes, points of contention, and possible areas of misunderstanding. None of this literature, however, makes consciousness its point of departure, as does the present book. Appendix Two discusses the origins of the reflection metaphor that is so critical to Pratyabhijñā philosophy of mind. It is this reflection metaphor that the Pratyabhijñā philosophers use to bridge the subject-object divide, and it finds a close parallel in Spinoza’s bodily “affections.” Finally, in Appendix Three, I explicate the Garden of Eden story from Genesis, focusing on the question of free will. It is my contention that Western ideas about free will and determinism flow, in part, from the Christian dogma of original sin (i.e., the idea that, by the exercise of free will, mankind introduced evil into the perfect world God had created). Accordingly, a discussion of the Garden of Eden story is particularly relevant to the subject matter of this book. The reader may be surprised to learn that human agency is not the leading message of the Genesis story; rather, nondualism is that message.
Part One: Nondual Consciousness

1. Those Pesky Laws of Physics

Let’s conceive something very simple. Suppose a stone receives, from an external cause which strikes against it, a certain quantity of motion, by which it afterward will necessarily continue to move, even though the impulse of the external cause ceases. This continuance of the stone in motion, then, is compelled, . . . because it must be defined by the impulse of the external cause. What I say here about the stone must be understood concerning any singular thing, however composite it is conceived to be, and however capable of doing many things: each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate way. ([R]em simplicissimam concipiamus. Ex. gr. Lapis à causâ externâ, ipsum impellente, certam motûs quantitatem accipit, quâ postea, cessante causae externae impulsu, moveri necessariò perget. Haec igitur lapidis in motu permanentia coäcta est, . . . quia impulsu causae externae definiri debet; & quod hic de lapide, id de quàcumque re singulari, quantumvis illa composita, & ad plurima apta esse concipiatur, intelligendum est, quòd scilicet unaquaque res necessariò à causâ externâ aliquâ determinatur ad existendum, & operandum certâ, ac
determinatā ratione.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

a. The Mind-Body Problem

We will begin by looking more closely at the way modern physics complicates the mind-body problem. The experience we all have of being a conscious soul that dwells in and directs a material body gives rise, as we have seen, to a seemingly intractable dilemma. What provides the causal link by which an immaterial thing (a soul) can activate and influence a material thing (a body)? And, how can we say that the soul’s directives — and not the laws of physics — are what actually determine the physical body’s actions?

We can explain every event in the universe in purely physical terms, right down to the subtlest physiological processes that occur in the brains of complex living organisms. Every star and planet, every earthquake and winter storm, every green sprout and blooming flower, and every muscle, gland, and neuron is part of a single dynamic system, and all this activity is fully explainable by a vast web of causes and their inevitable effects, proceeding in accordance with a set of immutable physical laws.

When one moves one’s arm, for example, a physicist could fully explain that movement in terms of the contraction of muscles

18 Letter 58 [IV/266/1–15]. The translations of Spinoza’s writings that appear in this book are from Curley, The Collected Works of Spinoza, sometimes with minor edits. The Latin text is from Gebhardt (ed.), Spinoza Opera. Citations to the Ethics are by part (in Roman numerals) and then by an abbreviated form of Spinoza’s own headings and subheadings — D (Definition), P (Proposition), Schol. (Scholium), Cor. (Corollary), Dem. (Demonstration), L (Lemma), etc. — followed, as necessary, by an appropriate number (in Arabic numerals). Citations to Spinoza’s letters are by the letter’s number in Gebhardt, followed, in brackets, by the Gebhardt volume, page, and approximate line numbers.
and tendons, the metabolism of sugar in the blood, and the electronic pulse of a neural signal. And the same physicist could, in theory at least, also explain the physical causes of the neural messages that initiated the physiological process. And, those causes, in turn, would have physical causes, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The underlying physics that explains an arm’s movement, like the underlying physics that explains a boulder’s chaotic, tumbling descent down a steep hillside, might be enormously complex, but the fact remains that every event in the universe has a physical cause that is both necessary and fully sufficient to explain its occurrence. And yet, in the midst of this fully mechanistic universe, there is *consciousness* — an extra thing, unnecessary from the perspective of physics, and unexplained by all the physical facts. Here then is a preliminary expression of the mind-body problem: In a universe that is fully explained by physical laws, what role, if any, does consciousness play?

If one were to see a metal spoon lying on a table in front of a man holding a wand and wearing a top hat and cape, and if the spoon handle suddenly began to bend and twist as the man stared intently upon it, what would be one’s natural conclusion? Would one conclude that the man was a stage magician who had created a marvelous illusion? Would one assume there was some hidden explanation for the spoon’s unexpected behavior, an explanation that was fully congruent with the laws of physics? Or would one conclude that, without any physical explanation, the spoon handle was being bent by the power of the man’s mind alone? Most of us would reject the latter conclusion, even as we applauded the magician’s performance.

The point is that most of us side with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia in her epistolary debate with Descartes. Few of us believe that thoughts can move matter, although that belief is the necessary implication of the widely accepted theory that the soul (a thinking thing) pilots the body from some location within the brain (a
material thing). If the soul sits inside the brain, receives information channeled to it from the senses, makes choices based on that information, and, like a ship’s captain, directs the body’s operations, then how exactly does this soul activate the neurons and glands that, like the switches and wheels found on the bridge of a ship, direct the body’s course? Put another way, if we doubt that the immaterial thoughts of a magician can exert a force that bends a spoon, then shouldn’t we also doubt that an immaterial soul can exert a force that causes a neuron to fire or a gland to secrete a hormone? Shouldn’t we instead be looking for purely physical explanations for those physiological processes, and aren’t we very likely to find them if we study the matter closely enough?

b. Materialism

As noted in the Introduction, many people, after considering the weaknesses of Cartesian dualism, adopt a nondual solution to the mind-body problem. Some of these people seek the answer exclusively on the material side of the dilemma. Doing so solves the problem of how the soul directs the body’s activities. According to materialism, the soul has a material basis, and as a material thing, it is capable of exerting a force (whether mechanical, electrical, or chemical) upon the body’s physical control mechanisms. But what then can we say about the soul’s existence independent of the body? If the soul is a material thing, then it is a part of the body. More importantly, if the soul is a material thing, then it is an integral part of the closed system of causes and inevitable effects that characterizes the physical world, and therefore its every action is fully determined by the laws of physics. In short, it can only “choose” to do what the laws of physics compel it to do. Thus, all the events of history — the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, the Buddhist inscriptions on the Pillars of Ashoka, Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, the invention of the printing press, Napoleon’s decision to sell the Louisiana Territory, Hitler’s invasion of Poland, etc. — were
necessary and immutable. Indeed, everything in the dimension of time is fixed, merely waiting for its moment to occur.

And even if we accept determinism, there still remains the question of consciousness. Some materialists posit the existence of a physical substance, not yet identified, that has consciousness as one of its inherent characteristics. Once we identify this soul-stuff, we will be able to dissect a brain and point to it, even transplant it. Other materialists prefer to explain consciousness in purely functionalist terms. According to the latter theory, machines of the future that are engineered to mimic, perfectly, the functionality of the human body will be conscious by reason of their ability to act as if they are conscious. One might think of the popular episode of *Star Trek: The Next Generation* entitled “The Measure of a Man.” In that episode, Commander Data — a human-mimicking android — is adjudicated to be a conscious being, entitled to the same legal rights as biological humans.

The Commander Data problem is a variant of the “other-minds problem” that has puzzled philosophers for thousands of years. By inductive reasoning, we are generally willing to assume that other human beings have consciousness very much like our own, and we do so because they act as if they have it. Therefore, if a machine (Commander Data, for example) perfectly mimics the behavior of human beings, then who are we, who are not inside the “brain” of the machine, to say that it is not conscious? Many fans of Commander Data are functionalists at heart, and they are willing to assume that consciousness is a thing that somehow happens when a machine is sophisticated enough in its design to mimic conscious beings.

Maybe so, but those who explain consciousness in terms of functionalism seem rather stuck on the object side of the subject-object divide, telling us much about neuroscience and data processing, but fudging the details when it comes to stating precisely how consciousness arises in complex computational systems. When the materialist reaches that critical point in the
argument, what we often get is conclusory gobbledygook such as: “[A]ll the phenomena of human consciousness are explicable as ‘just’ the activities of a virtual machine realized in the astronomically adjustable connections of a human brain.”\textsuperscript{19} For the materialist, it would seem, consciousness is nothing but an elaborate smoke-and-mirrors trick.\textsuperscript{20}

But what happens when one jabs one’s finger with a sewing needle? There are various behavioral events that typically transpire: (1) the needle pierces the skin on the finger, (2) an electrical message is communicated to the spinal cord via a chain of neural cells in the finger, hand, and arm, (3) a return message is communicated to the arm muscle, (4) the muscle contracts, (5) the hand recoils, (6) the person shouts, “Ow!” But aside from all that, something else is going on: consciousness of pain. The pain isn’t merely an electrical impulse that causes a particular behavioral response; it is also known. As regards the subjective experience of being a conscious human being who suffers from a needle jab, the purely functionalist explanation of consciousness seems to fall short.

Moreover, materialism fails to assign a role to consciousness. If consciousness is just a characteristic of some yet-to-be-identified physical substance, then why does that substance need to have that particular characteristic? Wouldn’t an unconscious substance do the job just as well? And if, instead, consciousness is explained in functionalist terms, as something that somehow just happens when a machine is sophisticated enough in its design to mimic the behavior of higher-order animals, then why does it need to happen? Wouldn’t an unconscious machine be able to do the same things? In either case, what does consciousness add?

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the materialist who

\textsuperscript{19} Dennett, \textit{Consciousness Explained}, p. 431.

The Nondual Mind

attempts to explain consciousness in terms of ectoplasm or machine science has no answer for how space, time, and matter came to be. Existence poses just as much of a philosophical riddle as consciousness. So, if consciousness is explained in material terms, then we have merely substituted one philosophical riddle for another. In place of the question “What is consciousness?” we have the question “What is the physical universe?” We have come no closer to ultimate truth.

c. Idealism

The idealist, by contrast, seeks a nondual solution to the mind-body problem by looking exclusively at consciousness. Thus, if the materialist seems rather stuck on the object side of the subject-object divide, the idealist seems rather stuck on the subject side of that divide, proposing a universe that is a mere dream having no physical foundation.

But according to the idealist solution to the mind-body problem, what, if anything, can we say is real? A drunk man imagines he sees a hole in the path in front of him, and he steps aside to avoid it. The hole was real for him, argues the idealist. Whether there was an actual hole in the path or merely a dark shadow is irrelevant. The drunk man was subjectively aware of a hole, and because subjective thought is the only thing that exists, the hole — even if merely imagined — was real. So reasons the idealist, and the same reasoning can just as well be used to argue that the hole was unreal, for according to idealism, there is nothing outside the mind that one’s perceptions represent.

As a theory, idealism offers one important advantage over materialism: By making consciousness the only thing that exists, it gives consciousness a role to play. According to idealism, the world exists for the sake of being known, and its knower serves also as its creator, writing and directing the show, and also playing all the parts. Thus, idealism seems to have a lot going for it — until, that is, one stubs one’s toe.
Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.

— Richard Wilbur (1921–2017 C.E.)

Consider once again the drunk man who stepped aside to avoid an imagined hole in the path in front of him. If the same drunk man bites down hard on a ceramic apple, he will break a tooth. Regardless of how sure he is, subjectively, that the ceramic apple is a piece of soft fruit, the objective world has a sometimes-unpleasant way of taking charge of subjective experience. There is, after all, the universe that is shared in common with others, not just the universe that exists in one’s own imagination. The world can be a difficult place, and that difficulty is something idealism brushes aside a bit too casually. Holocausts happen. Earthquakes happen. People die. Worse, people suffer without dying. Countless people lack adequate nutrition and shelter. Epidemic diseases sweep across the planet. Wars ravage entire nations. And the subjective idealist merely shrugs, asserting that it is all just dream images flashing on the screen of consciousness.

And, why apply oneself to discovery, invention, and industry in a world that is only a dream? Quietism and renunciation seem like the better response. At best, we should be finding ways to dream better dreams, not ways to engineer the objects appearing before us in our present dream. Why eke out some small benefit through ingenuity and toil if, instead, one can simply awake from one’s bad dream and dream a better dream? But has any society ever overcome hunger, cold, and disease by teaching its people to dream better dreams? I’m all for dreaming better dreams, but it seems like an impractical and fanciful approach to solving the problems confronting the world.

Moreover, who (or what) is the dreamer? People die every day, and yet the dream goes on. Few of us believe that one person’s
death will cause the universe to suddenly blink out. Indeed, we suspect that even our own death will have no effect on the universe’s continuing existence. Is the answer, then, that we are all dreaming individual pieces of a shared dream? If so, how are our individual dreams coordinated with one another so that we each dream of the same object in the same place at the same time? Is perhaps God the master dreamer, coordinating all our dreams in accordance with the laws of physics? But if the dream is governed by the laws of physics, then, as seekers of philosophical truth, we seem to be no better off calling it a dream than we would be if we called it a material world. Whether it is made of dream-stuff or physical matter, it acts the way physical matter acts, and the difference between materialism and idealism is merely semantic.

d. Parallelism?

After contemplating these issues, some philosophers have proposed some version of parallelism as the most satisfying solution to the mind-body problem. These philosophers suggest the existence of a world of thought that duplicates the law-bound material world in every detail and “supervenes” upon it. But why complicate the picture in that way? Why not apply Occam’s razor to the problem and consider the possibility that thought and matter are simply the same thing? Then one does not need to prefer matter over thought (materialism), or thought over matter (idealism), or to marry the two in an eternal duet (parallelism), for thought is matter.

But how can that be? Thought and matter are so obviously not the same thing. One does not solve the mind-body problem simply by denying it. Before we can accept that thought and matter are the same thing, we need to reimagine both the self and the universe in nondual terms.
2. All Consciousness Is Consciousness of Self

[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., thought)] and the extended substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. ([S]ubstantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus Extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

Each of us can inwardly focus the attention and identify what appears to be an internal knower of the body’s propositional thoughts, its feelings, and its perceptions. This knower is sometimes called the “I” or the “soul”; other times, the “self.” Consider, however, one’s knowing of the knower. Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950 C.E.), the 20th century Indian sage who attracted many people to nondual philosophy, urged his disciples to practice ātma vicāra (“contemplation of the self”). He suggested that during silent meditation, the meditator should use the question “Who am I?” to continually refocus the attention on the knower of whatever thoughts or feelings might arise. But how does one focus one’s attention on the knower? One certainly doesn’t know the knower in the same way one knows an external object like a chair or a cup of sweet tea, for as soon as one attempts to objectify the knower, it ceases to be the knower. The very process of trying to cast one’s mental gaze on the knower is analogous to trying to use the outwardly focused light beam of a

21 Ethics, IIP7, Schol.
spotlight to illuminate the spotlight itself. It can’t be done. But a source of light doesn’t need to be illuminated by a light beam, for light is self-illuminating (svayamprakāśa). In other words, we know the knower by being the knower, and that is enough. Our knowing of the knower is an unmediated, non-sensory sort of knowing, and therefore even the word “knowing” is inappropriate, for that word implies a subject and an object, and some mediating principle that connects the two. With respect to the knower within each of us, however, being the knower and consciousness of the knower are the same thing. Dualistic subject-object consciousness simply does not apply.22

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980 C.E.) made a very similar point when he discussed consciousness in his book Being and Nothingness. Sartre said:

The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is typical of knowledge. . . . Are we obliged after all to introduce the law of this dyad into consciousness? Consciousness of self is not dual. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. [¶] . . . In other words, every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of [the consciousness] itself. (La réduction de la conscience à la connaissance, en effet, implique qu’on introduit dans la conscience la dualité sujet-objet, qui est typique de la connaissance. . . . N’est-ce pas qu’il ne faut pas introduire la loi du couple dans la

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22 This “consciousness of the knower” by “being the knower” (i.e., the self-luminosity of consciousness) is emphasized in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. See, e.g., Upadeśasāhasrī, Prose Part, vv. 54, 79, 93–108. See also Modak, Spinoza and the Upanishads, pp. 10–14.
conscience? La conscience de soi n’est pas couple. Il faut, si nous voulons éviter la régression à l’infini, qu’elle soit rapport immédiat et non-cognitif de soi à soi. [¶] . . . En d’autres termes, toute conscience positionnelle d’objet est en même temps conscience non positionnelle d’elle-même.)

To refer to this special nondual form of consciousness, Sartre coined the phrase “non-positional consciousness (of) self” (conscience non positionnelle (de) soi). This consciousness is “non-positional” because it does not stretch across a subject-object divide, and it is “(of) self” — with the “of” in parentheses — because the word “of” implies separation between two things and hence duality. I find Sartre’s phrase informative but a bit clunky and obscure. We might express the same idea with the simpler term “self-consciousness” or its synonym “self-awareness,” but those terms in English imply an egocentric psychological state (i.e., the state one has when one realizes one is being observed by someone else). To avoid that confusion, this book will use the phrase “nondual consciousness of self,” but importantly, the word “consciousness” in this phrase does not refer to the subject side of

23 Sartre, L’Être et le Néant, pp. 18–19, translated in Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. lii–liii, italics added.

24 Sartre explained: “The necessity of syntax has compelled us hitherto to speak of the ‘non-positional consciousness of self.’ But we can no longer use this expression in which the ‘of self’ still evokes the [dualistic] idea of knowledge. (Henceforth we shall put the ‘of’ inside parentheses to show that it merely satisfies a grammatical requirement.) (Ces nécessités de la syntaxe nous ont obligé jusqu’ici à parler de la «conscience non positionnelle de soi». Mais nous ne pouvons user plus longtemps de cette expression où le «de soi» éveille encore l’idée de connaissance. (Nous mettrons désormais le «de» entre parenthèses, pour indiquer qu’il ne répond qu’à une contrainte grammaticale.)” Sartre, L’Être et le Néant, p. 20, translated in Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. liv.
the subject-object divide. It does not refer, that is, to a knower contemplating itself as if from a point of view outside itself. Rather, it refers to a thing’s direct consciousness of itself by being itself. It refers to an ontology, not to an epistemology; a state of being, not a state of knowing.

Moreover, the foregoing description of consciousness grounds all conscious experience. Notwithstanding our strong feeling of being a soul that knows an objective world, subject-object consciousness is merely an illusion, a superimposition. Instead, the experience we have with respect to “[o]ur knowing of the knower” — the experience of being conscious of a thing by being that thing, not by perceiving that thing — is what all consciousness actually is. All consciousness is consciousness of self; there is no such thing as consciousness of another.

Consider, for example, one’s knowing of a tree that one sees standing on a hillside. What is it that one actually knows? Does one know the tree? No — one knows the light rays reflected from the variegated surface of the tree. But does one even know the light rays? No — the light rays pass through the cornea of the eye and make an inverted image on the retina, where rods and cones are stimulated by the light. It is, therefore, the stimulation of those rods and cones that one actually knows. But does one even know that? No — for the pattern of that stimulation is communicated through neurons to the visual cortex — some neurons being responsive to light or dark, others to various parts of the color spectrum, and still others to shape or motion — and as a result, a representation of the tree, constructed out of neural spiking frequencies and constrained by the informational categories that the neurons are physically capable of recognizing, appears in the visual cortex. It is, therefore,

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26 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 7 and 9 [making a similar point in reference to God’s thoughts].
that representation of the tree in the visual cortex that one actually knows.

But does one even know that? One can continue the same analysis through all the stages of data processing within the brain, searching for the place where sensory data actually become known by the knower — the place, in other words, where consciousness occurs. But wherever that place (or those places) might be, the most significant point is the impossibility of being conscious of anything other than representations of the world that appear somewhere within one’s own brain. Hence, whatever external thing one may be conscious of — a chair, the sweetness of tea, a tree on a hillside — it is always only one’s own self that is the actual content of one’s consciousness, and one does not know it dualistically, by perceiving it from the outside; one knows it non-dualistically, by being it.

And this principle holds true regardless of how finely one analyzes the problem. If the thing that one is conscious of is separate from oneself — if it is an object relative to a subject — then one can only be conscious of it by being conscious of the effects it is having on oneself, effects that are communicated through some medium. Ultimately, then, it is never anything other than one’s own self that is the content of one’s consciousness, and because that is so, consciousness is never actually spread across a subject-object divide. One cannot be conscious of a thing without being that thing, and therefore consciousness and being are the same thing.

Nonetheless, subject-object consciousness remains a persistent illusion. Why? The answer is that we are predisposed to seeing past our own self, which is the true content of all consciousness, in order to learn things about the external world that our own self reflects and that we desire to know in order to survive as embodied organisms. Because of this tendency to see past the self, the

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nondual character of consciousness becomes invisible to us, and we feel as if we are a subject knowing an object, an object we take to be material.

An analogy can be made to observing the world through its reflection in the surface of a small mirror — for example, the side mirror on an automobile. When we gaze at the mirror, we are really seeing only the mirror’s surface, but we tend to see past that surface, ignoring it in order to observe the objects reflected therein, which are what most interests us. The surface of the mirror thus becomes invisible to us in favor of the reflected objects, but the mirror’s surface is, in truth, the thing we are actually gazing at. Likewise, although all consciousness is nondual consciousness of self, we tend to see past our own self, ignoring it so as to gather information about the external world reflected therein, which is what most interests us. Our own self thus becomes invisible to us in favor of the external world, although our own self is, in truth, the only actual content of our consciousness.

Everyday experience offers many examples of this “seeing past.” If one closes one eye, one sees the tip of one’s own nose. But what happens when both eyes are open? The tip of the nose disappears. Certainly, light from the nose is still striking the retina of each of one’s eyes. So, why does one’s mind tune it out? The answer is that it is not useful information, and therefore it becomes invisible. Likewise, in every act of perception, the medium of perception becomes invisible in favor of the information one is seeking to gather about the external world.

Yet another example of this “seeing past” involves a new pair of eyeglasses. When one first puts on a new pair of eyeglasses with stronger lenses, the shape of external objects may seem to be distorted. Over time, however, the distortion disappears. One learns to see past the distortion created by the lenses in favor of the information one is seeking to gather about the external world.

Language provides yet another example of the tendency of any medium of perception to become transparent. To a German-
speaking boy the vocalization “Ich liebe dich” has the same meaning as the vocalization “I love you” has to an English-speaking boy. What each boy is actually conscious of is a chain of phonemes, and the phoneme chain in each case is quite different, but the phonemes become transparent, and what the boy experiences when he hears the relevant phonemes is their comforting message. And when the German-speaking boy learns English in school, he learns that “I love you” means “Ich liebe dich,” and in the beginning stages of that learning, he must hear the English words, substitute their German equivalents, and then draw meaning from the German. But over time, the English words begin to sound like their meanings, and he no longer needs to translate them into German. To put the point in colloquial terms, he begins to “think” in English. The English phonemes have become transparent to him, just as the German phonemes became transparent to him.

And the same process takes place, of course, when one learns a new phonetic alphabet. At the beginning, one must labor to recognize the unfamiliar squiggles that one sees on the printed page, and one must mentally consult a memorized list of correspondences. But over time, the squiggles of the newly learned alphabet no longer demand such deliberative interpretation. Simply looking at them causes one to hear their sound in one’s mind.

In a widely read essay, Thomas Nagel considers what it is like to be a bat “seeing” by means of its sonar. Among other things, Nagel is interested in the privileged access each conscious being has to its own mind. As he points out, we cannot really know what it is like to be a bat “seeing” by means of its sonar, for we are not bats. But can we guess? In some respects, a bat’s “seeing” by means of a sonar must be very different from a person’s seeing by means of eyes, and that difference is due to the functional differences between the tools each species uses to gather information about the external world. The bat’s sonar, for example, does not deliver information about color or shadow. Conversely,
the bat probably has a heightened sense of depth perception relative to a person, because people infer depth from shadow and also by merging the retinal images of two eyes, whereas depth (distance) is precisely the information that the bat’s sonar is capable of delivering. As Nagel explains, the bat’s sonar “is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess,” and therefore “there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine.”28

But in at least one respect, a bat’s “seeing” by means of a sonar corresponds to a person’s seeing by means of eyes, because in both cases, a sophisticated biological organism (a mammal) is employing a tool to gather information about the shape of the external world and to construct a representation of that world in its brain, and when a mammal is moving forward very quickly, it is the shape of the external world — not the means by which it is perceived — that is of primary interest. In other words, the means by which relevant information is delivered is not as important as the fact that the information gets delivered by some means. We know this to be true when we learn a new language, and we can infer it to be true more generally. In example after example, the medium that conveys desired information eventually becomes transparent to us in favor of the information we are seeking. And in like manner, our own self, which is the true content of every conscious experience, becomes transparent to us in favor of the external world reflected therein, a world that we — as organisms seeking to survive — strongly desire to know.

Thus, we feel that we are the knowers of an external physical world, knowing it across an unbridgeable subject-object divide, and we even begin to imagine that subject-object consciousness is what consciousness actually is. But what we are interpreting as “subject” and “object” is nothing other than our inherent capacity to be conscious of our own state of being. We construct that

consciousness of self into a subject knowing an object because doing so makes us better survivors in a sometimes-dangerous world.

3. Thought-Matter Equivalence

I should say that what the physiologist sees when he looks at a [hospital patient’s] brain is part of his own brain, not part of the brain he is examining.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{— Bertrand Russell (1872–1970 C.E.)}

In light of what we have said in the previous section, consider the possibility that consciousness — nondual consciousness of self — is the \textit{being} of a thing, whereas matter is how a thing \textit{appears} when it is known inferentially from the impressions it makes on one’s sense organs. And, in referring to “matter,” I include everything associated with physical reality, whether energy or mass. In other words, when item X is known empirically, it seems to be matter. But when item X is known directly, simply by being item X, it turns out to be nothing but consciousness. According to this reasoning, it is only the mediation of the senses as one’s method of knowing that makes consciousness seem to be material.

But here we have to be careful because we tend to think of consciousness as the subject side of the subject-object divide, and we cannot allow that tendency to confuse us. True consciousness, as we have explained, is a thing’s consciousness of its own state of being, not its consciousness of something outside itself. So let us use the word “thought” for subject-object consciousness, thus reserving the word “consciousness” for nondual consciousness of self. If we do, we find that thought and matter are complementary.

\textsuperscript{29} Russell, \textit{The Analysis of Matter}, p. 383.
and mutually dependent aspects of nondual consciousness.

If, for example, one is thinking of an apple, one’s apple-thought involves a mental image of a round object, about the size of a fist, usually red or green, smooth to the touch, having a distinctive aroma, etc. But thought-matter equivalence does not mean that one’s apple-thought is the same as a physical apple sitting in a bowl of fruit on a table; rather, it means that one’s apple-thought is the same as a physical brain representing an apple in the form of neural spiking frequencies, and it is the brain’s thought of itself that is the true content of the apple-thought.

But even with the benefit of that insight, the phrase “thought of itself” necessarily implies a dualism of thought and matter. We still have, on the one side, a brain’s thoughts and, on the other, a material brain patterned by neural spiking frequencies. When even that trace of dualism is removed, we are left with just nondual consciousness — consciousness that is conscious of itself by being itself, not by knowing itself. And it is that nondual consciousness that appears to us as thought and matter, just as the flat surface of a mirror reflecting a distant city appears to have depth.

One might ask, however, whether this philosophy is merely a dressed-up form of idealism. If the physical world, when experienced directly rather than empirically, turns out to be nothing but nondual consciousness, then aren’t we essentially denying the reality of matter, dismissing it as the illusory effect of a flawed epistemology? And if so, aren’t we beset by all the problems that accompany the idealist solution to the mind-body problem?

It is true that the physical world is nothing but consciousness, but that fact does not mean that everything is merely a dream you are dreaming. Rather, everything is a dream being dreamed by itself. Thus, the material world is real in every significant sense. Each particle of the universe has its own intrinsic being, but its being is nothing over and above its consciousness of self. To be a boson is to be conscious of a boson, and that is all it is.

If one perceives, say, a lump of clay on a potter’s wheel, the
clay appears to be an inert thing, devoid of consciousness. But if one recognizes that, in perceiving the clay, one is actually conscious only of the clay’s reflection within one’s own self, a self that is veritably sparkling with consciousness, then it becomes hard not to conclude that all things everywhere sparkle with that same consciousness. In other words, the only thing in this universe that one actually knows directly, without any mediation, is one’s own self, and it is undeniably conscious, so what basis does one have to deny consciousness to everything else? The fact is that we seek a material substratum for consciousness only because of the illusion of materiality created by the subject-object divide.

This section opened with a quote by Bertrand Russell about the human brain. A very good way to know a hospital patient’s brain is to study it, as a physiologist might do, using the most modern scientific equipment available. But a much more accurate way to know the hospital patient’s brain is to be it. Despite our great faith in scientific objectivity, the physiologist’s way of knowing the brain is mediated and therefore inherently unreliable, leading to confused theories such as the notion that the brain’s underlying substance is matter.

Some readers might have a doubt about the assertion just made that scientific inquiry is an unreliable form of knowing. Indeed, we value the objectivity of the scientific method precisely because of its accuracy, and in the case of a brain injury, we are grateful for the power of medical science to study the brain and heal it. The point is not that one can discover all the structures and mechanisms of one’s brain merely by closing one’s eyes and being them.\(^\text{30}\) Rather, the point is that when one is conscious of a thing by being it, one’s consciousness of that thing is not distorted by any mediating physics; it is direct and, at least in that sense, perfect. Even a drunk man has perfect and undistorted consciousness of his brain — he has perfect and undistorted

consciousness of the misinformation about the external world that his alcohol-sodden brain is at that moment representing.

By contrast, when one knows something by means of sensory perception, one’s knowledge of it is quite constrained. Human beings have only five sense organs, each responsive to only a very narrow band of information. Thus, it is as if we are viewing the external world through five tiny fragments of a broken and distorted mirror. It is true that we can vastly improve our understanding of the external world by using scientific instruments to compensate for the distortions and inadequacies of our sense organs, but we remain greatly disadvantaged when we try to learn the true form of external things using only empirical methods. Rather, such methods are most effective at doing precisely the things they evolved to do — seeking sustenance for the body and identifying and avoiding potential dangers.

Speaking metaphorically, we might say that when the physiologist studies a hospital patient’s brain, the physiologist’s way of knowing the brain is knowing it from the outside, whereas the patient’s way of knowing the same brain is knowing it from the inside. But those metaphors (“outside” and “inside”) obscure the fact that the “outside” view is mediated and inferential, whereas the “inside” view is direct. As Bertrand Russell explained, “what the physiologist sees when he looks at a [hospital patient’s] brain is part of his own brain, not part of the brain he is examining.”

Part Two: South Asian Nondualism

The absolute Citi [(“nondual consciousness”)] of its own free will is the cause of the [effectuation] of the universe. (citiḥ svatantrā viṣvasiddhihetuḥ)32

— Kṣemarāja (10th–11th centuries C.E.)

In Part One, I attempted to convey the theory of nondual consciousness in general terms. Here, in Part Two, I will focus on South Asian literary sources, tracing how nondualism is presented in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. What was said in Part One provides a foundation for interpreting the South Asian texts, but the South Asian texts deepen our understanding. What follows, however, is not an attempt to explicate either nondual Advaita Vedānta or Pratyabhijñā Shaivism in its entirety. Instead, I have selected excerpts from the principal texts of these traditions, focusing on material that bears directly on the mind-body problem.

1. The Principal Upanishads

The Upanishads are philosophical discussions that form a part of the Vedas. The philosophy presented in the Upanishads — known as Vedānta — is not consistent in every detail. A careful reader can discern different philosophical emphases that probably represent textual emendations and an evolution of philosophical thought. But one of the basic principles that emerges from the Upanishads is that Brahman (God, or the ground of being) is the same as Ātman (the “self” of the universe, or the “universal consciousness”), which is the same as ātman (the “self” of the individual, or the “individual consciousness”).

The assertion that God’s own consciousness is the consciousness underlying the soul of every person may sound to critics of Hinduism like a blasphemous arrogation of divine status by ordinary human beings. But the soul or self that the Upanishads equate with divine consciousness is a person’s true self, not the ego-self that most people — steeped in Cartesian dualism — imagine themselves to be. Most people believe a soul or self to be a thinking thing that pilots a body, but the Upanishads call our attention to a self that is more self — more interior — than that ego-self. This true self is the underlying consciousness by which the ego-self is a conscious entity.

Sunlight streaming through a window lattice may take on the shadow-and-light pattern of the lattice, but it is not different from the sunlight shining outside the house. If the window lattice is removed, the sunlight remains, no longer conditioned by the lattice. Likewise, the consciousness that illuminates an individual soul is not different from the consciousness that illuminates all things. The ego-self corresponds to the distinctive pattern of light that emerges through the lattice, whereas the true self corresponds to the sunlight that illuminates that pattern.

Already, we see that the upanishadic theory of nondual consciousness is similar to the theory of consciousness discussed in general terms in Part One. According to both theories, consciousness is universal, the ground of being. The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, dating to the early part of the first millennium B.C.E., explains that at first Brahman (i.e., universal consciousness) knew only itself, but then Brahman divided into countless parts, becoming the consciousness of individual beings. In other words, consciousness is nondual in its original or true form — conscious only of itself — but after division into countless parts, it takes the form of subject-object consciousness. Despite this apparent change, however, consciousness remains one, not many, for those who are awake to the truth:
Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahman [(i.e., universal nondual consciousness)]. [¶] It knew only itself: “I am Brahman!” Therefore, it became the All. (brahma vā idam agra āsīt | tad ātmānam evāvet | ahaṃ brahmāsmīti | tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat) . . . This is so now also. Whoever thus knows “I am Brahman!” becomes this All; even the gods have not power to prevent his becoming thus, for he becomes their self. [¶] So whoever worships another divinity [than consciousness], thinking “[This divinity] is one and I another,” he knows not. (tad idam apy etarhi ya evaṃ vedāhaṃ brahmāsmīti sa idam sarvam bhavati | tasya ha na devāś canābhūtyā īśate | ātmā hy eṣaṃ sa bhavati | atha yo 'nyāṃ devatāṃ upāste 'nyo 'sāv anyo 'ham asmīti na sa veda)33

The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad is explaining here that the consciousness that each of us experiences internally is not as individual as it seems to be. Instead, the same seamless consciousness — knowing only itself — shines in all things, and when one is aware of that fact, one recognizes one’s own innermost self to be the innermost self of all things. By realizing the unity of consciousness, one even becomes the “self” (i.e., soul) of the gods. The same idea — that one’s own consciousness is the consciousness of all things — is expressed more succinctly in the following verse: “[T]hese worlds, these gods, these beings, everything here is what this Soul is” (ime lokā ime devā imāni bhūtānīdaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā).34

Based on this principle of universal consciousness, the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad rejects dualistic devotional practices,

33 Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 83–84.

34 Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.6, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 100.
instead urging the worship of consciousness itself. The Upanishad explains that the one God (Brahman) is not an object of consciousness, and therefore our relationship with God cannot be a devotional I-and-thou relationship. Rather, God is the subject in all conscious things, a being that is knowable only by experiencing one’s own consciousness. This point is expressed in the following dialog between Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa and the sage Yājñavalkya:

Then Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa questioned him. “Yājñavalkya,” said he, “explain to me him who is the Brahman, present and not beyond our ken, him who is the Soul in all things.”

“He is your soul (ātman), which is in all things.”

“Which one, O Yājñavalkya, is in all things?”

“He who breathes in with your breathing in (prāṇa) is the soul of yours, which is in all things. . . .

Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa said: “This has been explained to me just as one might say, ‘This is a cow. This is a horse.’ [(I.e., it has been explained as a fact to be learned, not as a lived experience.)] Explain to me him who is just the Brahman, present and not beyond our ken, him who is the Soul in all things.”

“He is your soul, which is in all things.”

“Which one, O Yājñavalkya, is in all things?”

“You could not see the seer of seeing. You could not hear the hearer of hearing. You could not think the thinker of thinking. You could not understand the understander of understanding. He is your soul, which is in all things. Aught else than this is wretched.”

Thereupon Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa held his peace.

\( \text{atha hainam uṣṭaṣṭaṣ cākrāyaṇaḥ papraccha } | \) yājñavalkyeti hovāca — yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras taṁ me vyācakṣveti | eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ | yaḥ prāṇena prāṇiti sa ta ātmā

39
The identity between God (Brahman) and the consciousness that shines in each of us is repeated later in the same Upanishad:

He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the un-understood Understander. Other than He there is no seer. Other than He there is no hearer. Other than He there is no thinker. Other than He there is no understander. He is your Soul, the Inner Controller, the Immortal. (adṛśto draṣṭāsrutah śrotāmato mantāvijñato vijñātā | nānyo 'to 'sti draṣṭā nānyo 'to 'sti śrotā nānyo 'to 'sti mantā nānyo 'to 'sti vijñātā | eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ)\(^{36}\)

In other words, the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad describes God as the consciousness that makes one’s own soul conscious — the self of one’s own self. One knows God by being God, although not in the

\(^{35}\) Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.4, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 111–112.

\(^{36}\) Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.7.23, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 117.
egoistic sense. Yājñavalkya puts the point in humorous terms:

“You idiot,” said Yājñavalkya, “that you will think that [the foundation of divinity] could be anywhere else than in ourselves [(i.e., the consciousness the makes one’s own soul conscious)]! for if it were anywhere else than in ourselves, the dogs might eat it or the birds might tear it to pieces.” (ahalliketi hovāca yājñavalkyah | yatraitad anyatrāsman manyāsai | yad dhy etad anyatrāsmat syāc chvāno vainad adyur vayāṃsi vainad vimathnīrann iti)38

Yājñavalkya also makes the point — discussed at length in Part One — that one cannot be conscious of a thing without being that thing, and therefore all perception is really consciousness of self:

Verily, while he does not there see [(i.e., in the state of nondual consciousness)], he is verily seeing, though he does not see; for there is no cessation of the seeing of a seer [in the awakened state] . . . . It is not, however, a second thing, other than himself and separate, that he may see. (yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati | na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate . . . | na tu tad

37 See Kaushitaki Upaniṣad 3.8, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 328 [“‘He [God] is my self [(i.e., the consciousness within)]’ — this one should know.”]; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.2.9, Hume, p. 377 [“He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahman, becomes verily Brahman.”]; Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 1.7, Hume, p. 395 [“Brahman-knowers become merged in Brahman.”]. On the idea that the universal consciousness is the source of consciousness in the individual, see also Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7; Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.10–11, 5.12; Īśā Upaniṣad 16; Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 3.7–21; Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad 2.5.

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dvītīyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyet) [The next seven verses of the Upanishad repeat the same principle with reference to smell, taste, speech, hearing, thinking, touching, and knowing. It then continues:] Verily where there seems to be another, there the one might see the other; the one might smell the other; the one might taste the other; the one might speak to the other; the one might hear the other; the one might think of the other; the one might touch the other; the one might know the other.

(yatra vā anyad iva syāt tatrānyo 'nyat paśyed anyo 'nyaj jighred anyo 'nyad rasayed anyo 'nyad vaded anyo 'nyac chṛṇuyād anyo 'nyan manvītānyo 'nyat spṛśed anyo 'nyad vijānīyāt) An ocean, a seer alone without duality, becomes he whose world is Brahman, O King! (salīla eko draṣṭādvaito bhavati | eṣa brahma-lokaḥ samrāt)39

The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad further explains that an awakened person “sees everything as the [same universal] Soul” (sarvam ātmānaṁ paśyati),40 and in that way, the subject-object duality of a conscious soul knowing a material universe is eliminated:

For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees another; there one smells another; there one tastes another; there one speaks to another; there one hears another; there one thinks of another; there one touches another; there one understands another. But where everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby


40 Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.23, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 144. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad includes a lengthy discussion of the ātman (“soul” or “self”).
and whom would one see? then whereby and whom would one smell? then whereby and whom would one taste? then whereby and to whom would one speak? then whereby and whom would one hear? then whereby and of whom would one think? then whereby and whom would one touch? then whereby and whom would one understand? whereby would one understand him by means of whom one understands this All? (yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram paśyati, tad itara itaram jighrati, tad itara itaram rasayate, tad itara itaram abhivadati, tad itara itaram śṛṇoti, tad itara itaram manute. tad itara itaram spṛśati, tad itara itaram vijānāti | yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kam paśyet tat kena kam jighret tat kena kam rasayet tat kena kam abhivadet tat kena kam śṛṇuyāt tat kena kam manvīta tat kena kam spṛśet tat kena kam vijānīyāt | yenedāṁ sarvaṁ vijānāti taṁ kena vijānīyāt)\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{41} Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 147, italics added. See also Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.14, Hume, pp. 101–102 [same], 4.4.13, Hume, p. 142 [“He who has found and has awakened to the Soul . . . , [t]he world is his: indeed, he is the world itself.”]; Chāndogya Upaniṣad 2.21.4, Hume, p. 199 [“One should reverence the thought ‘I am the world-all!’ ’’], 7.25.1, Hume, p. 261 [“ ‘I, indeed, am below. I am above. I am to the west. I am to the east. I am to the south. I am to the north. I, indeed, am this whole world.’ ’’]; Īśā Upaniṣad 6–7, Hume, p. 363 [“In whom all beings | Have become just the Self of the discerner”]; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.2.5, Hume, p. 372 [“He on whom the sky, the earth, and the atmosphere are woven, and the mind, together with all the life-breaths, Him alone know as the one Soul (Ātman).”]; Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad 6.7, Hume, pp. 428–429 [“Now, where knowledge is of a dual nature, there, indeed, one hears, sees, smells, tastes, and also touches; the soul knows everything. Where knowledge is not of a dual nature, being devoid of action, cause, or effect, unspeakable, incomparable, indescribable — what is that? It is impossible to say!”].
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Similar ideas are found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, which also dates to the early part of the first millennium B.C.E. It describes the self-realized state by the literary device of a dialog between a father, Uddalaka Aruni, and his son, Svetaketu. The father says:

That which is the finest essence — this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (‘Soul’). (sa ya eṣo 'nimaitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvam | tat satyam | sa ātmā) That art thou (tat tvam asi), Svetaketu.42

Tat tvam asi — “That art thou.” In other words, you the reader are, insofar as you are conscious, not different from the indivisible consciousness that underlies everything, everywhere. Moreover, the subject-object divide is a false interpretation of the facts. What one interprets dualistically as “knower” and “known” is, in truth, merely the self’s consciousness of itself. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad explains the point this way:

Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else [other than oneself] — that is a Plenum. But where one sees something else[, hears something else, understands something else] [other than oneself] — that is the small. Verily, the Plenum is the same as the immortal; but the small is the same as the mortal. (yatra nānyat paśyatī nānyac chrṇoti nānyad vijānāti sa bhūmā | atha yatrānyat paśyatī anyac chrṇoty anyad vijānāti tad alpam | yo vai bhūmā tad amṛtam | atha yad alpaṃ tan martyam)43


When the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* refers to seeing, hearing, and understanding nothing else other than oneself, it is saying, in effect, that one cannot be conscious of a thing without *being* that thing, a point described in detail in Part One. In other words, it is always one’s own self that is the content of one’s consciousness, regardless of what external objects one might think one is seeing or hearing. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* explains:

As far, verily, as this world-space extends, so far extends the space within the heart [(i.e., the locus of consciousness)]. Within it [(the heart-space)], indeed, are contained both heaven and earth, both fire and wind, both sun and moon, lightning and the stars, both what one possesses here and what one does not possess; everything here is contained within it. (yāvān vā ayam ākāśas āvān eso 'ntarhrdaya ākāśāḥ | ubhe 'smin dyāvāprthivī antar eva samāhite | ubhāv agniś ca vāyuś ca śūryācandramasāv ubhau vidyun nakṣatrāṇi | yac cāsyehāsti yac ca nāsti sarvaṃ tad asmin samāhitam)\(^ {44}\)

These quotations make clear that, notwithstanding India’s venerable devotional tradition, it has an equally old philosophical tradition that equates God (Brahman) with universal consciousness (*Ātman*) and that boldly asserts that the consciousness illuminating the individual soul (*ātman*) is none other than that same universal

\(^ {44}\) *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.3, translated in Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 263. The same ideas appear in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, although there God is described in distinctively Shaivite language. See *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.20, Hume, p. 405 [“No one soever sees Him with the eye. | They who thus know Him with heart and mind | As abiding in the heart [(i.e., as consciousness)], become immortal.”], 6.11, Hume, p. 409 [“The one God, hidden in all things | All-pervading, the Inner Soul of all things.”].
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Moreover, the Upanishads assert repeatedly that matter, too, is just Brahman. But the Upanishads don’t fully explain matter, at least not in the way set forth in Part One, above. Instead, the Upanishads seem to imply a form of subjective idealism that gives matter no intrinsic being. The Upanishads state that the material world is merely “name and form,” implying (like Plato’s theory of forms) that the physical world is just something the intellect attributes or imagines:

Verily, at that time the world was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and form, as the saying is: “He has such a name, such a form.” Even today this world is differentiated just by name and form, as the saying is: “He has such a name, such a form.” (tad dhedāṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt | tan nāmarūpābhīyāṃ eva vyākriyatāsa nāmāyaṃ idaṁrūpa iti | tad idam apy etarhi nāmarūpābhīyāṃ eva vyākriyata asau nāmāyaṃ idaṁrūpa iti)45

No one can deny that the human mind makes the world intelligible by categorizing perceptions according to name and form, but are we therefore to conclude that the material world is merely our projected imaginings with no intrinsic existence? The Upanishads give hints, but they do not explicitly resolve the question.

2. Adi Śaṅkara

Adi Śaṅkara (8th century C.E.) is perhaps the most famous expounder of the philosophical system presented in the Upanishads. Little is definite about Śaṅkara’s life, although we can

45 Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7, translated in Hume, The Principal Upanishads, p. 82. The assertion that all differentiation is just name and form is repeated frequently in the Upanishads.
draw a few basic conclusions. He was born in Kalady, a village near Cochin in southwest India. It is said that he lived as a mendicant and died when he was 32 years old, and yet despite his short life, he was unusually prolific. The main emphasis of many of Śaṅkara’s writings is that consciousness is universal and unitary, and that it only appears to be individual and manifold because it shines through a countless variety of material vessels. Śaṅkara uses many analogies to illustrate this point. One well-known and oft-repeated example is that of the space (“ether”) inside and surrounding a clay jar:

There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord [(i.e., universal consciousness)]. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is [unquestioningly] assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as “the hollow (space) of a jar,” &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord [(i.e., universal consciousness)] and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the nondiscrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. (neśvarādanyah saṃsārī | tathāpi dehādi-

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46 Scholars question whether all the texts traditionally attributed to Śaṅkara were actually authored by him. For present purposes, we need not resolve the issue because our concern is merely to outline the philosophical system generally associated with Śaṅkara.
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saṃghātopādhisāṃbandha ityata eva, ghaṭa-karakaṇaṁ karakagiriguḥādyupādhisāṃbandha iva vyomnāḥ |
tatkṛṭaśa śabdapratyayavyavahāro lokasya drṣṭo
ghaṭacchidraṁ karakādicchidramityādīrākāśāvyatyareke
’pi tatkṛṭā cākāse ghaṭākāśādibhedamithyāuddhirdṛṣṭā |
tathehāpi dehādisaṃghātopādhisāṃbandhā-
viveka kṛte śvarasāṃsāribhedamithyāuddhīḥ)47

In other words, just as space is merely space, but when a jar is present, then space appears to be individualized (i.e., the space inside the jar), likewise consciousness is merely consciousness, but when the vessel of the body is present, then consciousness appears to be individualized (the body’s soul). The text quoted above is from Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Below, I set forth three additional excerpts from that text, each making essentially the same point by way of a different analogy. The first excerpt uses the analogy of the sun or moon illuminating an object in space. The next two excerpts use the analogy of the sun or moon being reflected in a body of water. In each case, Śaṅkara argues that consciousness, which is universal and unitary, appears to be individual and manifold because it shines through a variety of material forms:

[Excerpt One:] Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having passed [invisibly] through space enters into contact with a finger or some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is straight or bent, [the light] itself becomes straight or bent as it were [(i.e., the light becomes visible as the straight or bent form of the illuminated finger)]; so Brahman [(i.e., universal consciousness)] also assumes, as it were, the form of the

earth and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into connexion. (yathā prakāśaḥ sauraścāndramaso vā viyadvyāpyāvatiṣṭhamāno 'ṅgulyādyupādhi-
saṁbandhāttesvṛjuvakraśṛidhāvamī pratipadyamāneṣu tadbhāvamiva pratipadyate | evaṁ brahmāpi prthivyādy-
upādhisāṁbandhāttadākāratāmīva pratipadyate) (III, 2, 15)

[Excerpt Two:] . . . [T]herefore the Moksha Śāstras compare [Brahman] to the images of the sun [or moon] reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the two following passages: [1] “As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one divine unborn Self [(i.e., universal consciousness)]”; and [2] “The one Self [(i.e., consciousness)] of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.” (. . . 'tā eva cāsyopādhistāmitapāramārthikīṁ viśeṣa-
vattābhīpretya jalāṣūryakāśdivadityupamopādīyatām mokṣaśāstresu - <yathā hyajaṃ jyotirātmā vivasvānapo bhinnā bahudaḥiko 'nugacchan | upādhinā kriyate bhedarūpo devaḥ kṣetreṣvevamajoyamātmā> iti | <eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitāḥ | ekadā bahudhā caiva dṛṣyate jalacandravat> ityevamādiṣu) (III, 2, 18)

[Excerpt Three:] The reflected image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus
participates in all the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same. — Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were, and so on. (jalagatam hi sūryapratibimbaṁ jalavṛddhau vardhate jalahrāse hrasatī jalacalane calatī jalabhede bhidyata ityevam jaladharmānyāyi bhavatī natu paramārthataḥ sūryasya tathātvamasti | evaṁ paramārthato 'vikṛtamekarūpamapi sadbrahma dehādyupādhyantarbhāvādbhajata ivopādi-dharmānvṛddhirhrāsādīṁ) (III, 2, 20)

The main point Śaṅkara is making in each of these passages is that the individual consciousness of the body (i.e., the body’s “soul”) does not really exist as an independent entity, just as the reflection of the sun in the water does not really exist as an independent sun. Each of these (the soul and the reflection of the sun) only seems to have individuality because of the physical medium in which it appears. Below, in an excerpt from the Upadeśasāhasrī (“Thousand Teachings”), Śaṅkara again makes that point, this time using the metaphor of trees seen from a moving boat. He describes the intellect as an inert thinking machine; when that machine is pervaded by consciousness, then consciousness seems to be thinking, but the thoughts are just the movements of the intellect:


49 In Hindu philosophy, the “intellect” (buddhi) corresponds roughly to the part of the brain that uses linguistic categories to make sensory information intelligible.
Atman [(i.e., consciousness)], abiding in the intellect, is seen as [if] it were moving and meditating [when in actuality the intellect moves and meditates]. The mistake about transmigratory existence is like that of a man in a [moving] boat who thinks that it is the trees [along the shore that are moving]. (buddhisthaścalatīvātmā dhyāyatīva ca dṛṣṭyate | naugatasya yathā vṛkṣāstadvat-samsāravibhraṃah)

Intellect[,] as a result of [being pervaded by the reflection of Pure Consciousness, [comes to be aware] . . . ; and so sound and other [objects of the sense-organs] appear. By this people are deluded. (caitanyakratibimbenā vyāpto bodho hi jāyate | buddhe śabdādibhirbhasastena momuhyate jagat)\(^50\)

If there is one point Śaṅkara wants us to take away from his writings, it is that consciousness is one. In one of his most popular works, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (“Crest-Jewel of Discrimination”),\(^51\) he resorts once again to the metaphor of the sun reflected in water:

\(^50\) Upadeśasāhasrī, Metrical Part, ch. 5, vv. 2 and 4, translated in Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 114. This same idea is repeated frequently in the Upadeśasāhasrī. See also Brhadāranyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya IV, 3, 7, translated in Mādhavānanda, The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, pp. 615–616 [“By illumining the intellect — which does the thinking — through its own self-effulgent light that pervades the intellect, the self [(i.e., consciousness)] assumes the likeness of the latter [(i.e., the intellect)] and seems to think, just as light [passing through colored glass seems to be colored]. Hence people mistake that the self thinks; but really it does not.”].

\(^51\) Vivekacūḍāmaṇi is one of the works that may not have been written by Śaṅkara, but in any case, its ideas are closely aligned with those of Śaṅkara.
Looking at a reflection of the sun, mirrored in the water of a jar, a fool thinks it is the sun itself. Similarly, a stupid person, through delusion, imagines that the reflection of consciousness appearing in the limiting adjunct is the Self. (\textit{ghaṭodake bimbitamarkabimbam ālokya mūḍho ravim eva manyate | tathā cidābhāsam-upādhisamśtham bhrāntyāham ity eva jaḍo 'bhimanyate})

A wise person rejects the pot, the water, and the sun’s reflection in it and, indifferent and independent of them all, so sees the self-luminous sun in the sky which illuminates these three. (\textit{ghaṭaṁ jalam tadgatam-arkabimbaṁ vihāya sarvaṁ vinirīkṣyate 'rkaḥ | taṭastha etattritayāvabhāsakah svayaṁprakāśo viduṣā yathā tathā})

Later in the same work, Śaṅkara returns to the same point, again referring to ordinary people in a derogatory way:

When the limiting adjunct moves, the movement of [the Self’s] reflection [in that limiting adjunct] is ascribed by fools to the original, like the sun which is unmoving [appearing to move when reflected in moving water]. Likewise, one thinks “I am the doer,” “I am the enjoyer,” “I am lost,” alas! (\textit{calatyupādhau pratibimalaulyam aupādhikaṁ mūḍhadhiyo nayanti | svabimbabhūtaṁ ravivadvinīskriyaṁ kartāsmi bhoktāsmi hato 'smi heti})

Whether on water or on land, let this insentient body wallow. I am not affected by their qualities, even as the space is not affected by the qualities of the pot. (\textit{jale vāpi sthale vāpi lūṭhatveṣa jaḍātmakaḥ | nāḥaṁ vilipyey})

We can summarize Śaṅkara’s understanding of Vedānta in this way: The body and even the intellect are part of the material world; they move and act according to immutable laws that govern the material world. Consciousness pervades the body and intellect, as it does all things everywhere, and ordinary people think, “I am the doer,” “I am the enjoyer.” But in truth, the body has no individual soul, and the one that knows the body’s movements and actions is only the universal consciousness. As Śaṅkara explains: “As the space in a pot merges into the universal space, merge the individual in the great Self” (ṛgaḥkāśaṁ mahākāśa ivātmānaṁ parātmanī | vilāpyākhaṇḍabhāvena).

One’s true self, in other words, is the universal consciousness, and as for one’s body, Śaṅkara states that an awakened person neither cares about it nor identifies with it:

On account of delusion, without knowing the Truth, people say that the sun is swallowed [during a solar eclipse], its brightness being hidden by darkness. (tamasā grastavadbhānādagraśto ‘pi ravirjanaiḥ | grasta ityucyate bhṛṇtyāṁ hyajñātvā vastulakṣaṇam)

Similarly, fools — seeing a supreme knower of the Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)] who is free from the bonds of the body and so on — perceive merely the appearance of a body. (tadvaddeḥādīibandheḥbhṛyo vimuktaṁ brahma-vittamam | paśyanti dehivanmūḍhāḥ śārīrādbhāsadarśanāt)

The body of one who is liberated moves here and


there, [compelled] by the vital airs, just as the slough of a snake [is blown about by the wind]. (ahirnirłvayanīṁ vāyāṃ muktā dehaṃ tu tiṣṭhati | itastataścālīyamāno yat kiṃcit praṇāvāyunā)

Just as a piece of wood is tossed by the current to high or low ground, so too a body is carried here and there by destiny as determined by the momentum of its past actions. (strotasā nīyate dāru yathā nimnottasthalam | daivena nīyate deho yathākālopaḥbhuktiṣu)\textsuperscript{55}

Below is yet another of Śaṅkara’s many analogies, this one based on a fire-iron glowing in a hot fire. I find this analogy to be particularly meaningful, because it demonstrates the way in which one tends to co-opt the universal consciousness, making it one’s own even though it is, in truth, derivative:

Like iron coming together with fire manifests as fire [i.e., the iron begins to glow], [in a similar way] the intellect[, which is inert,] takes various forms itself, as a knower and so on [(i.e., as knower and known)], through the inherence of the Absolute [(i.e., through the presence of universal consciousness)]. As a result of it, these [two] [(i.e., knower and known)] are falsely seen in delusions, dreams, and imaginations. (ayo 'gniyoγād iva satsamanvayān mātrādirūpeṇa vijrmbhate dhīḥ | tat-kāryametaddvitayāṃ yato mṛṣā dṛṣṭaṃ bhramasvapna
dhanorathēṣu)\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{56} Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 349 (GRE Til), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 202 (Samata edition, v. 350). See also Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 133, 191.
The glowing iron appears to have its own heat, but its heat is that of the fire in which it rests. Likewise, the human intellect appears to have its own consciousness, but its consciousness is that of Brahman (the Absolute).

These texts, and especially the probative analogies they employ, succeed in redirecting our attention to the undivided universal consciousness that hides behind our everyday experience of being a soul piloting a body. But Śaṅkara’s writings, like the Upanishads on which they rely, are vague when it comes to explaining precisely how it is that universal consciousness comes to be filtered through so many material vessels, thus assuming the illusory form of so many individual souls. In this regard, Śaṅkara frequently invokes a stark consciousness-matter dualism, asserting that matter, although somehow derivative of Brahman, is completely distinct from consciousness. Śaṅkara’s consciousness-matter dualism seems to contradict the theory presented in Part One that consciousness and matter are actually the same thing comprehended in two ways, and it also seems to contradict the upanishadic claim that all perception is really perception of self. Thus, despite Śaṅkara’s great renown as a nondual master of Vedānta, he does not quite succeed in closing the subject-object divide. For example, he writes:

Fire is hot indeed but [it] does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the elements and their products, render

57 See, e.g., Bhādaranyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.23–32, 4.5.15; Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.24, 8.1.3.

58 In Hindu literature, the term “nondual” (advaita) most often refers to the unity of the individual consciousness and the universal consciousness, not the unity of subject and object. Thus, Śaṅkara is without question properly described as a nondualist.
them objects of itself. . . . Hence in the same way as we admit the existence of that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements and their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness of that consciousness from the [material] elements. And as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. (nahyagnirisṇaḥ sansvātmānaṁ dahati | nahi naṭaḥ śikṣitaḥ sansvaskandhamadhiroksyati | nahi bhūtabhautikadharmanaḥ satā caitanyena bhūtabhautikāni viśayākriyeran | . . . ataśca yathaivāsya bhūtabhautikaviśayāyā upalabdher-bhāvo 'bhupagantavyaḥ | upalabdhisvarūpa eva ca na ātmetyātmamo dehavyatiriktatvam)59

Śaṅkara is saying here that the material elements that constitute the objects of consciousness — things such as earth, water, air, and fire (energy) — could no more be conscious than an acrobat could mount his own shoulders. It seems, therefore, that Śaṅkara is more interested in asserting that all consciousness is one than he is in resolving the mind-body problem. It may be that Śaṅkara draws a sharp distinction between consciousness and matter because he wants to break our identification with the body and its mortality, but be that as it may, Śaṅkara repeatedly insists that any connection between consciousness and the body is false. For example, in his commentary on the Bhagavad-Gītā, he says:

The fact is that the ignorant, mistaking the body and so forth for the Self and impelled by attachment, aversion, etc., and conforming to righteousness and its opposite, undergo birth and death; but those who see that the Self is other than the body and the like, eschew attachment,

aversion and so on, as well as activities issuing from them; they are liberated. None may reasonably repudiate this account. Such being the case, the field-knower who is God Himself, due to differences of the adjuncts of nescience, becomes, as it were, the transmigrator, even as the Self is identified with the body and so on. It is well known that all living beings unhesitatingly treat non-self, like body, as the self due to ignorance, just as a stump is mistaken unhesitatingly for a man. In the process, of course, human characteristics don’t get lodged in the stump or vice versa. Similarly the characteristics of the Spirit [(i.e., consciousness)] do not attach themselves to the body, nor do those of the body to the Spirit. Therefore it is not proper to predicate of the Self pleasure, pain, delusion, etc., for these are exactly like old age and death, products of nescience. (tathā ca - dehādiṣu ātma-buddhir avidvān rāga-dveṣādi-prayukto dharmādharmānuṣṭhāna-kṛj jāyate mriyate cety avagamyate | dehādi-vyatiriktaṁ-darśino rāga-dveṣādi-prahāṇāpekṣa-dharmādharma-pravrtytām muryatāṃ mocyantā iti na kenaś ca pratyśākhyātum śakyaṁ nyāyataḥ | tatraivaṃ sati, kṣetrajñasyeśvarasyaiva sato 'vidyā-kṛtopādi-bhedataḥ saṁsāritvam ivā bhavati, yathā dehādy-ātmatvam ātmanaḥ | sarva-jantūnāṁ hi prasiddho dehādiṣv anātmasu ātma-bhāvo niścito 'vidyā-kṛtā, yathā sthāṇau puruṣa-nīscayaḥ | na caitāvatā puruṣa-dharmaḥ sthāṇor bhavati, sthāṇu-dharmo vā puruṣasya | tathā na caitanya-dharmo dehasya, deha-dharmo vā cetanasya sukha-duḥkha-mohātmakatvādīr ātmano na yuktaḥ | avidyā-kṛtatvāviśeṣāt, jarā-mṛtyuvat)⁶⁰

And Śaṅkara adopts the same strict consciousness-matter dualism in Vivekacūḍāmaṇi:

The sheath of the gross body is food. It originated from food, is sustained by food, and perishes without food. It is a composite of skin, flesh, blood, and excreta. Never can it be the self-existent, eternally pure Self [(i.e., consciousness)]. (deho 'yamannabhavano 'nnamayastu kośaḥ cānnena jīvati vinaśyati tadvihinah | tvakcarma-māṁsarudhirāsthipurīṣarāśīḥ nāyaṁ svayāṁ bhavitumarhati nityaśuddhaḥ)

. . . [The body] does not exist before its birth or after its death [either]. Every moment it is subject to origination and destruction and its qualities are fleeting. Its nature is impermanent. It is diverse. It is inert and is seen like a pot. How can it itself be the knower of its own changes? (pūrvam janeradhimpater api nāyamasti jātaṅkośaṅhaḥ kṣaṇagaṇo 'niyataśvabhāvaḥ | naiko jaḍaśca ghatavatparidṛśyamānaḥ svātmā kathaṁ bhavati bhāvavikāravettā)

. . . . . .

The Self is different from, and the witness of, the body, its qualities, its activities, and its states of being and so on. Being self-established, the Self is other than all these. (dehataddharmatatkaromatadavasthādisākṣīṇaḥ | sata eva svataḥsidham tadvailakoṣaṅyaṁ ātmanaḥ)

How can the body, consisting of bones, covered with flesh, full of defects, and extremely impure, be the Self, the knower, who is always other than them? (śalyarāśirāṃsaṇaḥ malapūrṇo 'tikaśmalaḥ | kathaṁ bhavedayaṁ vettā svayametadvilakoṣaṅaḥ)

. . . . . .

For those whose mind rests on the unreal, the belief that the body alone is the Self is the seed which produces
the series of sorrows from birth and so on. Therefore, with
great effort, destroy this notion. Once the mind is
detached, there is no possibility of being born again.
(dehātmadhīr eva nṛṇāmasaddhiyāṁ janmādiduḥkha-
prabhavasya bijam | yatastatastvam jahi tāṁ prayatnāt
tyakte tu citte na punarbhavāśa)\textsuperscript{61}

In these passages and numerous others like them, Śaṅkara’s
consciousness-matter dualism could not be more clear. Śaṅkara
focuses our attention on the extreme subject side of the subject-
object divide, making even the intellect into an object of
consciousness. Thus, he hopes to awaken us from our Cartesian
illusion, urging us to think of consciousness as an infinite field of
pure awareness, devoid of differentiating features and therefore
one and indivisible. But Śaṅkara’s method does not eliminate the
subject-object divide; it only accentuates it.

To be sure, there are many passages in which Śaṅkara states
that Brahman is one without a second and that the material world is
nothing but Brahman. He says for example:

The universe is an unbroken stream of perceptions of the
Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)]. Hence, it is in all respects
solely the Absolute. (brahmapratyayasantatirjagadato

\textsuperscript{61} Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 154–164 (GRETIL), translated in Grimes, The
But Śaṅkara still insists on distinguishing consciousness from matter, asserting that Brahman first created the material world and then entered into it. Moreover, Śaṅkara expressly rejects the theory set forth in Part One that all things, even an inert lump of clay, are conscious. He says:

For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent [(i.e., conscious)], non-intelligent things such as hair and [finger]nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-

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62 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 521 (GRETIL), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 258 (Samata edition, v. 522). See also Brahmasūtrabhāṣya I, 3, 22, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, vol. 34, p. 194 [“[T]he manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman . . . .”]; Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 512 [513], Grimes, p. 256 [“I am verily that Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)], the one without a second, which is like the sky, subtle, without beginning or end, in which the entire universe from the unmanifested to the gross, appears as an appearance.”]. For the principle that the material world is nothing but Brahman, Śaṅkara cites the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. See Brahmasūtrabhāṣya I, 3, 41; II, 4, 20; Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.3.2–3, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 242 [“That divinity [i.e., Being] bethought itself: ‘Come! Let me enter these three divinities [i.e., heat, water, and food] with this living Soul (ātman), and separate out name and form.”].

63 This particular answer to the mind-body problem is rooted in the Upanishads. See Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 82 [“He entered in here [(i.e., the physical world)], even to the fingernail-tips, as a razor would be hidden in a razor-case, or fire in a fire-holder.”]; Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.6.1, Hume, p. 287 [“Having performed austerity, he created this whole world, whatever there is here. Having created it, into it, indeed, he entered. Having entered it, he became . . . both the conscious (vijñāna) and the unconscious . . . .”].
dung, scorpions and similar [conscious] animals are produced. (drṣyate hi loke cetanatvena prasiddhebhyah puruṣādibhyo vilakṣaṇānāṁ keśanakhādināmupattiḥ, acetanatvena ca prasiddhebhyo gomayādibhyo vṛścikādīnāṁ)

The closest Śaṅkara comes to explaining the ontological basis of matter is his reiteration of the upanishadic theory that the world is merely “name and form” (nāmarūpa) superimposed on Brahman due to “ignorance” (avidyā), which for Śaṅkara means that it is unreal and that only Brahman is real. He says:

This entire universe, which appears to be of diverse forms through ignorance, is only the Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)] freed from all defective understanding. (yadidam sakalamaḥ visvaṁ nānārupam pratitamajñānāt | tatsarvaṁ brahmaiva prayastāśeśabhāvanādoṣam)

A jar, though a modification of clay, is not different from it [(the clay)] as it is essentially all clay. There is no separate entity of the form of the jar apart from the clay. Why, then, call it a jar? It is merely a false imagined name. (mṛtkāryabhūto 'pi mṛdo na bhinnah kumbho 'sti sarvatra tu mṛtsvarūpāt | na kumbharūpaṁ prthagasti kumbhaḥ kuto mṛṣā kalpitanāmamātraḥ)

No one is capable of showing the essence of the pot to be other than the clay. Hence, the pot is imagined only due to delusion. Clay alone is the true abiding reality of the pot. (kenāpi mṛdbhinnatayā svarūpaṁ ghaṭasya

64 Brahmasūtrabhaśya II, 1, 6, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, vol. 34, p. 305. See also Brahmasūtrabhaśya II, 1, 13, translated in Thibaut, vol. 34, p. 319 [“The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment.”].
saṃdarśayitum na śakyate | ato ghaṭaḥ kalpita eva mohān mṛḍ eva satyam paramārthaḥভূतম

All that is, being the effect of the Existent Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)], can be nothing but the Existent. It is pure Existence. Nothing exists other than it. If anyone says there is [something else], their delusion has not vanished and they babble like one in sleep. (sadbrahmakāryaṁ sakalaṁ sakevaṁ tanmātrametan na tato 'nyadasti | astīti yo vakti na tasya moho vinirgato nidritavatprajalpaḥ)

Moreover, Śaṅkara suggests that because the material world is merely name and form, it exists only in the human mind, implying a sort of subjective idealism. He says:

By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterized by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature [Brahman] at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts. (avidyākalpitena ca nāmarūpalakṣaṇena rūpabhedaṇa vyākṛtāvyākṛtātmakena tattvānyatvābhyām-

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65 Vivekacūḍāmani 227–230 (GREITL), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmani, pp. 160–161 (Samata edition, vv. 229–232). On Śaṅkara’s description of how name and form (and hence matter) arise from Brahman (consciousness), and the unreal basis of this transformation, see Brahmāsūtrakṛtaḥśastra II, 1, 9 and 14. See also Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, pp. 18–26.
The Nondual Mind

According to Śaṅkara, the material world is only an “appearance” or “semblance” (ābhāsa), like a magician’s trick. It is an “illusory modification” (vivarta), “unreal” or “false” (mithyā), a “mistake” (bhrānti) of perception, a “superimposition” (adhyāropa) upon Brahman, analogous to seeing a tree trunk and mistaking it for a person, or seeing mother-of-pearl and mistaking it for silver, or seeing a coiled rope and mistaking it for a snake. Indeed, he solves a host of philosophical problems simply by denying the reality of the world. For example, although the characteristics of an effect necessarily tell us something about the characteristics of the cause, Śaṅkara insists that Brahman (the cause of the world) is in no sense limited, defined, or qualified by the world’s diverse characteristics because they are all illusory. He says:

[As for upanishadic passages asserting that the material world and Brahman are the same], we refute the assertion of the cause [(i.e., Brahman)] being affected by the effect and its qualities [(i.e., the world)] by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience[.] [A]nd the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also [(i.e., just as the emergence of the world does not give definition to Brahman because the world is fallacious, so also, and for the same reason, the reabsorption of the world does not]

give definition to Brahman)]. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For [the experience] that the highest Self appears in those three states is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. (tatra yaḥ pariḥāraḥ kāryasya taddharmāṇāṃ cāvidyādhyaropitavānna taiḥ kāraṇaṃ sāṃspr̥yata iti, apītāvapi sa samānaḥ | asti cāyamaparo drṣṭānto yathā svayam prasāritayā māyayā māyāvī triṣvapi kāleṣu na sāṃspaṣyate, avastutvāt, evaṃ paramātmāpi sāṃsāramāyayā na sāṃspr̥yata iti | yathā ca svapnapr̥gekaḥ svapnadarśanamāyayā na sāṃspr̥yata iti | prabodhasampradāyoranaṁvāgataḥ [ed.: saṃprasādāyor] | evamavasthātrayasyaṅkṣyeke 'vyabhicāryavasthātrayena vyabhicārinā na sāṃspr̥yate | māyāṁatraṁ hyetadyatparamātmano 'vasthā-trayātmanāvabhāsanam rajjvā iva sarpādhīvāveneti)⁶⁷

Śaṅkara’s controversial doctrine of world illusion (māyāvāda) is particularly explicit in the following passage from Vivekacūḍāmaṇi:

⁶⁷ Brahmāstṛabhāṣya II, 1, 9, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, vol. 34, pp. 311–312.
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Just as place, time, objects, their knower and so on imagined during sleep are all unreal, so too, here in the waking state the world is a projection of one’s own ignorance. Likewise, this body, the sense organs, the vital breath, the ego, and so on, are all unreal. Therefore, “That thou art,” supremely serene, pure, the Supreme, the nondual Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)].

\[
\text{nidrākalpitadesā-} \\
\text{kālaviṣayajñātrādi sarvāṃ yathā mithyā tadvadihāpi} \\
\text{jāgrati jagatsvājñānakāryatvataḥ | yasmād evamidaṃ} \\
\text{śarīrakaraṇaprāṇāhamādyapyasat tasmāttattvamasi} \\
\text{praśāntamamalāṃ brahmādvayaṃ yatparam}
\]

“[T]he world is a projection of one’s own ignorance” like something “imagined during sleep”; it is “unreal” and “false” (mithyā). The problem with this sort of subjective idealism is familiar to us from Part One. For most of us, a piece of fine pottery is worth a lot more than a lump of raw clay, and if Brahman has taken the name and form of a hard rock, one had better not kick it with one’s bare foot. Therefore, name and form is not — at least at the practical level — as dreamlike and illusory as Śaṅkara’s philosophy asserts, and even Śaṅkara acknowledges that the material world is not completely false, like the “son of a barren woman.” It has a certain mundane (vyāvahārika) reality, but it is ephemeral, and our focus should be on the underlying eternal thing (the Self or Brahman) that is the most true (pāramārthika) reality. He says:

[S]o too, the modifications of prakṛti [(“primal matter”)] from the ego down to the gross body and all the sense

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68 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 252 (GRETIL), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 170 (Samata edition, v. 254). Śaṅkara frequently relies on the dream analogy to emphasize the illusory nature of the world.
objects are also unreal. Their unreality is, indeed, due to their being subject to change every moment. And the Ātman never changes. (tato vikārāḥ prakṛterahāṃmukhā dehāvasānā visayāśca sarve | kṣaṇe 'nyathābhāvitayā hyamīśām asattvamātmā tu kadāpi nānyathā)

One way to characterize Śaṅkara’s philosophy is in terms of inherence. Because some things inhere in other things, as attributes of those things, and their existence is therefore dependent, Śaṅkara asks, What is the ultimate reality on which all things depend, and which depends on no other thing? For Śaṅkara, only that which is the ground of being is entitled to be called “real.” All other things are in a constant state of flux, and hence they are mere appearances. Śaṅkara insists that Brahman — universal consciousness — is that unchanging thing which is ultimately real, and Brahman appears to change only because it illuminates ever-changing (although unreal) names and forms. He says:

Realize that [thing] to be Brahman which is nondual, indivisible, One, and blissful, and which is indicated by Vedānta as the irreducible substratum after the negation of all tangible objects. (atadvāvṛttrūpeṇa vedāntair-laksyate 'vyayam | akhaṇḍānanda mēkaṃ

69 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 350 (GREtil), translated in Chinmayananda, Ādi Śaṅkaracārya’s Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 491, italics added. John Grimes’s translation relies on a Sanskrit variant: “Therefore, all the modifications of primordial nature from egoism to the body to all sense objects are subject to continual change. But, the Self never changes, being never originated, never destroyed.” (tato vikārāḥ prakṛter aham-mukhāh dehāvasānā visayāś ca sarve | kṣaṇe 'nyathā-bhāvina eṣa ātmā nodeti nāpyeti kadāpi nānyathā) See Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 202 (Samata edition, v. 351). On the ever-changing nature of the world, see also Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 501, 503.
Śaṅkara insists on a stark dualism of consciousness and matter while also asserting that the material world is merely a cosmic trompe l’oeil. Thus, Śaṅkara solves the mind-body problem not by eliminating the consciousness-matter divide but by denying the outer world’s existence altogether. But even so, he adamantly rejects the subjective idealism of Buddhist philosophers.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, he seems to walk both sides of the line.

3. The “City in a Mirror”
Śaṅkara is a master at analogies, and he typically develops his analogies for his readers, using them to powerfully illustrate his ideas. But in \textit{Vivekaçūḍāmaṇi}, Śaṅkara makes only passing mention of an intriguing analogy that gains great significance two centuries later in the texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. Śaṅkara says: “That, wherein this reflection of the world is like a city in a mirror, that Absolute [(i.e., Brahman)] I am” (yatraiṣa jagadābhāso


\textsuperscript{71} On Śaṅkara’s rejection of Buddhist idealism, see, e.g., \textit{Brahmasūtrabhāṣya} II, 2, 28–30; \textit{Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya} IV, 3, 7; \textit{Upadeśasāhasrī}, Metrical Part, ch. 16, vv. 23–29, and ch. 18, vv. 123–151.
The idea being expressed here, without elaboration, is that the experience we have of being a soul that observes a remote world — what we have been calling the subject-object divide — is merely an illusion. The reflection of a distant city on the flat surface of a small mirror only appears to be a remote; in truth, it is the flat surface of the mirror that one is seeing. Likewise, the observed world only appears to be separate from oneself; in truth, it is only one’s own self that is the content of one’s consciousness.

This potent simile is not the first time that the doctrine of reflection (pratibimbavāda) has played a key role in Hindu philosophical discourse. As we have already seen, Śaṅkara frequently relies on the example of the sun reflected in water to describe the way the universal consciousness is modified by various media to take the illusory form of a multitude of souls. The reflected-sun example is drawn from the Brahma Sūtras, which date, at the latest, to the first centuries of the Common Era and probably earlier, and which likewise assert that the individual soul

72 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 291 (GRE Til), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 183, italics added (Samata edition, v. 292). The city-in-a-mirror simile also appears, without elaboration, in the opening stanza of the Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra, a Śaiva hymn attributed to Śaṅkara: “I bow to Sri Dakṣiṇāmūrti in the form of my guru; I bow to Him by whose grace the whole of the world is found to exist entirely in the mind, like a city’s image mirrored in a glass, though, like a dream, through māyā’s power it appears outside; and by whose grace, again, on the dawn of Knowledge, it is perceived as the everlasting and non-dual Self.” (viśvaṃ darpaṇadṛśyaṃ anagāriṣṭulaṃ nijāntaragataṃ paśyātmanātmani māyayā bairivodbhūtam yathā nidrayā | yaḥ sākṣātkurute prabodhastamaye svātmānamevādvyaye tasmai śrīgurumūrtaye nama idaṃ śrīdakṣiṇāmūrtaye) Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra, stanza 1, translated in Nikhilānanda, Self-Knowledge, pp. 233–234, italics added.

73 For an overview of the ways the reflection metaphor is used in South Asian philosophy, see Appendix Two, p. 255, below.
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is a “reflection” of the universal consciousness. And Śaṅkara’s disciples — most notably Padmapāda (8th century C.E.) — employ the same analogy. But the city-in-a-mirror simile is fundamentally different from these other uses of the reflection metaphor, for the city-in-a-mirror simile describes the known world as the reflection, and it describes the universal consciousness (i.e., Brahman) as the medium in which the reflection appears. This reversal of the reflection metaphor can be traced to Vārṣagāṇya (1st–2nd centuries C.E.), but with the simile of a city reflected in a mirror, it assumes a nondualist form.

We have said that Śaṅkara does not quite close the subject-object divide, but the city-in-a-mirror simile helps narrow the gap. It informs us that the seeming separateness of the material world — its objectivity relative to a knowing subject — is an illusion, like the illusion of remoteness that characterizes objects seen in a mirror. And as it turns out, the city-in-a-mirror simile, if applied to all things, even to so-called inanimate things like rocks and clods of earth, resolves the consciousness-matter dualism that Śaṅkara has otherwise only reinforced. Moreover, it does so without denying the reality of the world. What the city-in-a-mirror simile powerfully suggests is that subject and object are really one, and therefore objects of consciousness are also conscious subjects, having the same ontological status as conscious subjects. Hence, consciousness is not a passive and separate knower of an unreal objective world; rather, it is the objective world, and it is conscious

74 Brahma Sūtras, sūtra II.3.50. The sūtra uses the word ābhāsa for “reflection.” The same word can also mean a “semblance” or a “false appearance.”


only of itself.

But to understand how that philosophical conclusion can be derived from the city-in-a-mirror simile, we need to turn to the texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism.

4. Pratyabhijñā Shaivism

According to legend, the sage Vasugupta (9th century C.E.) had a dream in which Śiva told him to go to a particular rock near where he lived, and there, inscribed on the underside of that rock, he would find teachings that would benefit the world. Vasugupta thus discovered the seventy-seven sūtras (“aphorisms”) that constitute the Śiva Sūtras. This large rock sits beside a forest stream called the Harwan in what is now the Dachigam National Park near Srinagar, and the sūtras allegedly discovered there constitute one of the early texts that influenced the development of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. Vasugupta is also credited with writing the Spandakārikā (“Verses on Vibration”), although the actual author of the latter work might have been one of his disciples, Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa (9th century C.E.).

A different disciple of Vasugupta, Somānanda (10th century C.E.), wrote an important work called the Śivadrṣṭi (“Vision of Śiva” or “Śiva’s Philosophy”), and Somānanda’s disciple, Utpaladeva (10th century C.E.), wrote a commentary on that text. Utpaladeva also wrote the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā as well as an auto-commentary to that work.

Utpaladeva’s disciple was Lakṣmaṇagupta (10th century C.E.), whose disciple was, in turn, Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries C.E.). The latter was perhaps the leading scholar and explicator of Pratyabhijñā nondualism. Abhinavagupta wrote numerous important texts and commentaries, but for present purposes, two are particularly significant: chapter 3 of the Tantrāloka (“Light on the Tantra”) and the Paramārthasāra (“The Essence of the
Abhinavagupta’s leading disciple was Kṣemarāja (10th–11th century C.E.). Kṣemarāja wrote important commentaries on the Śiva Sūtras and the Spandakārikā, and he also wrote the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam (“Heart of Recognition”), with an auto-commentary. Finally, Kṣemarāja’s disciple, Yogarāja (11th century C.E.) wrote a useful commentary on Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra.

The present summary will focus primarily on five texts: chapter 3 of Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka, Kṣemarāja’s commentaries on the Śiva Sūtras, the Spandakārikā, and his own Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, and Yogarāja’s commentary on the Paramārthasāra. Together, these five texts provide a useful introduction to Pratyabhijñā Shaivism and its insightful answer to the mind-body problem.

Like the Upanishads and the writings of Śaṅkara, these Pratyabhijñā texts use theistic terminology in their presentation of philosophical ideas. But whereas the Upanishads and Śaṅkara refer to God primarily by way of an abstract concept — Brahman (i.e., universal consciousness) — the texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism refer to God using masculine names and honorifics associated with a specific figure from Hindu mythology. These names include Śiva, Sadāśiva, Śaṃbhu, Bhairava, and Śaṅkara, but in the context of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, these references should not be thought of as invoking a mythological deity. Instead, like the name

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77 Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra is an adaptation of an earlier Vaiṣṇavite text by Ādiśeṣa (6th century C.E.). See Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, pp. 2–6.

78 The Upanishads also sometimes use anthropomorphic names for God. They refer, for example, to Puruṣa (the Cosmic Person), using that name semi-synonymously with Ātman (“universal consciousness”), and they also refer to the various deities of Vedic myth such as Indra, Agni, Soma, Varuṇa, Rudra, Yama, etc.
Brahman in the Upanishads, these names are used to signify universal consciousness. The Pratyabhijñā texts also use feminine names for God — such as Citi and Śakti — and both masculine and feminine images play an important part in worship and ritual, but it would be a misinterpretation of Pratyabhijñā texts to imagine God in solely anthropomorphic gender-specific terms.

Moreover, the most important thing to consider in studying these texts is not their names for God but their assertions that all things, even lumps of clay, are fully conscious and that this consciousness is, in every case, consciousness of self, not consciousness of another. Those assertions, not the names used for God, is what most distinguishes Pratyabhijñā philosophy from other South Asian philosophies, and they are also what aligns Pratyabhijñā philosophy with the ideas that Spinoza articulated seven centuries later.

For example, Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā states: “The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external [to consciousness] only if they reside within [consciousness]” (vartamānāvabhāsānāṁ bhāvānām avabhāsanam | antaḥsthitavatām eva ghaṭate bahir ātmanā). Utpaladeva’s point here is that consciousness cannot somehow venture outside itself to become conscious of external objects, for if consciousness ventured outside consciousness, it would then no longer be conscious. Therefore, consciousness can only be conscious of what exists inside consciousness. In other words, consciousness can only be conscious of itself. As Utpaladeva further explains: “Consciousness has as its essential nature [inward-facing,
This principle — that all consciousness is really consciousness of self — is, of course, what Sartre meant when he used the phrase “non-positional consciousness (of) self” (conscience non positionnelle (de) soi). And this nondual quality of consciousness has profound implications as regards the mind-body problem. If consciousness is, in all cases, nondual — conscious only of itself — then the subject-object divide is unreal. In other words, all conscious subjects are the objects of their own consciousness, and nothing can be an object of consciousness without also being a conscious subject. To exist, then, is to be conscious.

This is an idea we examined in Part One, and it runs contrary to the intuition most people have. Most people believe that consciousness is dualistic — the subject side of the subject-object divide — and they believe it exists only as a special feature of complex living organisms. According to this way of thinking, if a great cataclysm destroyed all complex organisms, then the universe — full of swirling galaxies, stars, and planets — would continue much as before, but known by no one and nothing. On our own planet, the sun would rise in the east and set in the west, vegetation would sprout during the warm seasons, rivers would flow, wind would blow, rainstorms would drench the soil, but all without anyone or anything conscious of it.

But for Utpaladeva, consciousness is nondual — conscious only of itself — and it is the underlying stuff of all existence. According to this view, a universe known by no one and nothing is, simply put, an impossibility, because the opposite of the word

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80 Īśvarapratyabhijñāṇārikā I.5.13 (KSTS, vol. 34, 2nd text, p. 18), translated in Torella, The Īśvarapratyabhijñāṇārikā, p. 120. I have made an editorial emendation to the translation to better capture the sense of the word pratyavamarśa. Torella explains that pratyavamarśa is “reflective awareness” or “self-consciousness” (vimarśa) that is strongly “characterized by introjection and return to the subject.” Torella, The Īśvarapratyabhijñāṇārikā, p. xxiv, fn. 32.
“conscious” is not “unconscious”; rather, the opposite of the word “conscious” is “nonexistent.” Utpaladeva’s teacher, Somānanda, was particularly clear on this point, asserting that “a clay jar, by comprehending its own self, exists” (ghaṭāḥ svamātmānam avagacchannavasthitāḥ). Somānanda’s striking assertion led a 13th century teacher of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism to draw this conclusion: “[T]his consciousness is called being, and this being is said to be consciousness” (yā cit sattaiva sā proktā sā sattaiva ciducyate). But Somānanda further asserted that a thing’s consciousness of itself — its being, that is — is nothing other than God’s consciousness of it, for all consciousness is one.

81 Śivadrṣṭi 5.34 (KSTS, vol. 54, p. 187).

82 The quotation is from Maheśvarānanda’s Mahārthamañjarī, a South India work based on Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. See Mahārthamañjarī, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, no. 66, pp. 35, 39.

83 See Śivadrṣṭi 5.105–109 (KSTS, vol. 54, pp. 194–195) [sarve bhāvāḥ svamātmānam jānantaḥ sarvataḥ sthitāḥ | madātmāna ghaṭo vetti vedmyahāṃ vā ghaṭātmanā | sadāśivātmanā vedmi sa vā vetti madātmāna | śivātmanā yajñadatto yajñadattātmanā śivāḥ || sadāśivātmanā vetti ghaṭāh sa ca ghaṭātmanā | sarve sarvātmakā bhāvāḥ sarvasarvasvarūpataḥ | sarvasya sarvamastīha nānābhāvāmarūpakāḥ | madrūpatvāṃ ghaṭasyāsti mamāsti ghaṭārūpatā | nānābhāvaiḥ svamātmānam jānannāste svayam śivāḥ | cidvyaktirūpakāṃ nānābhedabhināmanantakaṃ]. These verses are translated by John Nemec as: “All entities, being aware of their own nature, exist as all others. The pot knows by way of my nature, or I know by way of the pot’s. I know by dint of Sadāśiva’s, or he by mine, Yajñadatta by Śiva’s, [and] Śiva by Yajñadatta’s. The pot knows by dint of Sadāśiva’s nature, and he by the pot’s. All entities consist of everything, since everything is of the nature of everything. Everything exists here as everything by having the nature and form of [all] the various entities. The pot has my nature, and I have that of the pot. Śiva exists autonomously as one who is aware, by way of the various entities, of his own nature as the form of the manifestation of consciousness, which is differentiated by the various entities, [and] is endless.” See Nemec, Influences on and Legacies, p. 345, italics added.
These are powerful ideas, and the later texts of *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism draw from these ideas to explain human consciousness, using the analogy of a city reflected in a mirror to collapse the illusion of separation that alienates us from our experiences.

**a. The *Tantrāloka’s* Pratibimbavāda**

Abhinavagupta was the great scholar and synthesizer of *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism, and the *Tantrāloka* is his most important work. The 37 chapters (āhnikas) of the *Tantrāloka* constitute a compendium of both theory and practice. In chapters 2 through 5, Abhinavagupta discusses four means of awakening to the highest truth. These are (1) “no means” (*anupāya*), (2) the “divine means” (*śāmbhava upāya*), (3) the “power means” (*śākta upāya*), and (4) the “small means” (*āṇava upāya*). Chapter 3, which addresses the “divine means” (*śāmbhava upāya*), presents an esoteric theory of the Sanskrit alphabet, focusing on the creative power of letters, but at the beginning of the chapter, Abhinavagupta outlines his own unique version of the “doctrine of reflection” (*pratibimbavāda*). Here, Abhinavagupta presents the basic principles that underlie the city-in-a-mirror simile, and therefore these verses merit close analysis.

Abhinavagupta begins by saying:

2. Light [(i.e., the light of consciousness)] is what bestows luminosity to everything. And the universe is not distinct from it. Or, if it were [distinct,] it could not manifest. (*yaḥ prakāśaḥ sa sarvasya prakāśatvam prayacchati | na ca tadvatirekyasti viśvaṁ sadvāvabhāsate*)

3. For this reason, the Supreme Lord, who is

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84 Abhinavagupta’s doctrine of reflection is also presented in the *Tantrasāra*, which is a summary of the *Tantrāloka*. See Chakravarty, *Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta*, pp. 60–62, 66.
unrestrained, displays in the firmament of his own self such immense manifestation of the creation and the destruction [of the universe]. (ato'sau parameśānāḥ svātmav yo manya nargalāḥ | iyataḥ srṣṭi- samhārādāmbarasya pradarśakaḥ)

4. Just as discrete [entities] such as earth and water become manifest in an uncontaminated mirror, in the same way the various dynamic aspects of the universe become manifest within the Lord of consciousness that is one. (nirmale makure yadvadhānti bhūmijālādayaḥ | amiśrāstadvadekasminścinnāthe viśvavṛttayah)\(^{85}\)

Thus, Abhinavagupta uses the metaphor of reflection to explain how, despite the appearance of diversity, external objects are nothing but consciousness, just as the diversity of reflected items in a mirror are nothing but mirror.

What follows next, in verses 5 through 43, is a discussion of how the sense organs of the body operate, and although this discussion does not align perfectly with our modern understanding of human anatomy, it nonetheless has much to teach us.\(^ {86}\) If one looks into the surface of a lake, one sees a reflection of one’s own face. But consider that the cornea of the eye is analogous to the surface of a lake, because the cornea, like the lake, is shiny and reflective. Similarly, if one shouts into a cave, one hears an echo. But consider that the ear is analogous to a cave, because the ear, like the cave, has a hollow cavernous inner chamber. And similar comparisons can be applied to all the senses. In other words, just as the cornea of the eye reflects on its shiny surface the external thing it sees, and just as the hollow of the ear echoes in its inner chamber


\(^{86}\) These verses are discussed in Kaul, “Abhinavagupta on Reflection (Pratibimba) in the Tantrālōka,” pp. 172–185.
the external thing it hears, so aroma reverberates in the olfactory bulb, and taste in the saliva, and touch in the skin. According to this pre-modern theory of sensory perception, each of the sense organs creates within itself a representation of the thing it perceives, and the sense organ is able to perform its function by reason of that representation.

Significantly, this model of perception is at least conceptually consistent with how we understand perception today — when one sees a tree, for example, some sort of representation of the tree appears in one’s visual cortex, and it is that representation that is actually known, not the external tree.

Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, each sense organ functions very much like a mirror, but the sense organs are imperfect mirrors, for each can only reflect (or represent) that which corresponds to its nature. A crude mirror of polished copper or crystal can grasp visual form and reflect it back, and a stone cavern or the hollow body of a musical instrument can grasp sound and reflect it back, but a copper mirror cannot reflect back sound, and a stone cavern cannot reflect back visual form, and neither can reflect back the aroma and sweet taste of an apple, or a lover’s sensuous embrace.

Abhinavagupta analogizes consciousness to these sensory reflectors, but unlike the sensory reflectors, consciousness is a perfect mirror, capable of reflecting every possible characteristic. In other words, consciousness reflects aroma, taste, form, touch, sound, and more, and Abhinavagupta describes this universal reflectivity of consciousness as its purity (nairmalya) and its clarity (svacchatā). Indeed, consciousness is such a pure and clear mirror that although we are gazing into it at every moment, it is invisible to us. We see past it to the things reflected in it, things about which we hope to gather information in order to promote our wellbeing. But most importantly, the many and diverse things that appear to the senses — pleasant and foul smells; savory, sweet, sour, and bitter tastes; straight and curved shapes; smooth and
rough textures; and harmonious and discordant sounds — are all nothing but consciousness, just as the diverse images that appear in a mirror are all nothing but mirror. Abhinavagupta says: “Since this [reflection] does not shine as distinct from this [mirror], therefore, the [latter] is said to be the locus . . .” (tasmāttu naiṣa bhedena yadbhāti tata ucyate | ādhāras).\(^87\)

Abhinavagupta next explains that although the universe exists as a reflection in consciousness, nothing exists outside consciousness, acting as the source of that reflection. It is therefore not truly a reflection; rather, it is as if it were a reflection. He says:

44. For this [reason], the universe, reflecting itself in the mirror of consciousness, expresses the pure, universal nature of [the] Lord. (tena saṅvittimakure viśvaṃ-ātmānamarpayat | nāthasya vadate’muṣya vimalāṃ viśvarūpatām)

47. And [just] as a reflection is present completely in the crystal which is completely pure, in the same way it is present in consciousness which is completely pure. (yathā ca sarvataḥ svacche sphaṭike sarvato bhavet | pratibimbaṃ tathā bodhe sarvataḥ svacchatājuṣī)

49. And [ordinarily] the reflected image (pratibimbaṃ)\(^88\) is projected [in the mirror] by the

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\(^88\) In this context, the word bimba refers to the thing that casts a reflection, and the word pratibimba refers to the reflection. It is difficult to come up with perfect English equivalents for these two terms. Kaul translates pratibimba as the “reflected image,” but that translation is potentially confusing because it might refer either to the image in the mirror or the image outside the mirror.
original image which is outside (bimbena bāhya-sthena). Once [one accepts, however, that] the latter [(i.e., the external object that casts the reflection)] is itself a reflected image (pratibimbatve) [in the mirror of consciousness], what remains of the original image (bimba) [outside consciousness]? (pratibimbam ca bimbena bāhyasthena samarpyate | tasyaiva pratibimbatve kim bimbamavaśīyatām)

50. Even if some cause is consecrated as [the] “original image” (bimbatvena) [that casts the reflection appearing in consciousness], that also would become a reflected image (pratibimbatvam) in consciousness, otherwise it would be unreal [(i.e., if it were not in consciousness, it would not exist)]. (yadvāpi kāraṇaṁ kiṃcidbimbatvenābhishiṣicyate | tadapi pratibimbatvameti bodhe'nyathā tvasat)\(^89\)

This teaching is difficult, but the point being made is that anything outside oneself, anything that might be the source of a reflection appearing in the mirror of one’s own individual consciousness, can exist only if it, too, is in consciousness, for consciousness is the underlying being of all things. Therefore, that outside thing that is casting the reflection is itself only a reflection in consciousness.

What follows this statement is a series of anticipated objections, each doubting that the diverse objects of the universe can appear as reflections in consciousness without there being anything external to consciousness that is the source of those reflections. The short answer that Abhinavagupta gives to these objections is simply that it is so. (Tantrāloka 3.52.) Abhinavagupta then discusses in technical terms the respective definitions of “original image” (bimba) and “reflected image” (pratibimba), and

he argues that the definition of “reflected image” is suitable to describe the universe even if there be no “original image.” (Id. 3.53–56.) Then, Abhinavagupta concludes:

57. This [world] is mingled with consciousness [as an image in a mirror is mingled with a mirror]. Its manifestation is impossible without consciousness [as an image in a mirror is impossible without a mirror]. Is it not [therefore appropriate] that [this universe] in which there are worlds (pura), tattvas etc. is called a reflected image (pratibimbaṁ) in consciousness (bodhe)? (bodhamiśramidam bodhādbhedenāśakyabhāsanam | paratattvādi bodhe kim pratibimbaṁ na bhānyate)

... 59. [Objection:] But the existence of the reflected image (pratibimbasya) is impossible without the original image (bimbam). [Reply:] What from that? [We do not care about this] for the original image (bimbam) is not identical with the reflected image (pratibimbe). (nanu na pratibimbasya vinā bimbam bhavetsthitiḥ | kim tataḥ pratibimbe hi bimbam tādāmyavṛtti na)

60. And therefore, in the absence of this [original image], nothing goes wrong as regards the said definition of the [reflected image]. This question is merely confined to the cause. (ataśca lakṣaṇasyāsyā proktasya tadasambhave | na hānirhetumātre tu prāsaṇo'yaṇ paryavasyati)\(^\text{90}\)

Here, Abhinavagupta is explaining that because an original image and a reflected image are not the same thing, the latter can — in theory at least — exist without the former, and the

\(^{90}\text{Tantrāloka 3.57–60, translated in Kaul, Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection, pp. 276–278.}\)
“objection,” therefore, comes down to a question of causation. We usually understand the original image to be the cause of the reflected image, and therefore we conclude that the existence of the latter depends on the existence of the former, but Abhinavagupta explains that there are different types of causes (*Tantrāloka* 3.61–64), and with regard to the so-called “reflection” of the universe that appears in the mirror of consciousness, the cause is not an object external to consciousness, but simply God’s power of self-expression:

> 65. Therefore, let us admit that the cause of such [reflection of the universe] [is] the powers of the Lord. Thus, this universe is only a reflected image (*pratibimbamalamī*) in the Lord, in the pure firmament of Bhairavic consciousness. Surely [this does] not happen because of the grace of something else. (*ato nimittāṃ devasya saktayaḥ santu tāārṣe | itthāṃ viśvamidāṃ nāthe bhairavīyacidambare | pratibimbamalamī svacche na khalvanyaprasādataḥ*)

These verses clarify that the reflection metaphor is not intended to imply the actual reflection in consciousness of a universe extrinsic to consciousness, for nothing exists that is not within consciousness. Rather, the reflection metaphor is used to show that the vast universe, full of so many diverse objects, is really one.

In the conclusion to chapter 3 of the *Tantrāloka*, Abhinavagupta briefly revisits the reflection metaphor, using it to describe the awakened practitioner’s ecstatic union with God:

> 268. The [adept] for whom the universe — all things

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in their diversity — appears as a reflection in his consciousness, that one is truly the universal sovereign. (saṃvidātmanī viśvo'yaṁ bhāvavargāḥ prapañcavān | pratibimbatayaḥ bhāti yasya viśveśvaro hi saḥ)

280. [The adept feels:] “All this proceeds from me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me.” (matta evoditamidaṁ mayyeva pratibimbitam | madabhinnam- idaṁ ceti)\(^{92}\)

In short, the adept realizes, as described in Part One, that everything that appears to be “outside” or “other” is actually only one’s own self.

b. The Śivasūtraparāśīnī

The Śivasūtraparāśīnī is Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the Śiva Sūtras. It does not discuss the doctrine of reflection (pratibimbavāda), nor does it make use of the city-in-a-mirror simile. Nonetheless, it makes several important points that are relevant to the mind-body problem and thus bear on our topic. Kṣemarāja’s commentary begins with ideas familiar to us from the Upanishads and from Śaṅkara’s writings, emphasizing that God’s universal consciousness is what each person and thing experiences as the consciousness of its own soul. Kṣemarāja says:

[I]t (the sūtra) at first teaches — in opposition to those who hold that there is a difference between man (i.e., the human self) and Īśvara (the Supreme Lord) — that consciousness of Śiva alone is, in the highest sense, the self of the entire manifestation. (tatra prathamaṁ nareśvarabhedavādi prātipaksyeṇa caitanya-

Kṣemarāja then analyzes the first sūtra, which is: “caitanyamātmā.” Kṣemarāja explains that caitanya, which means “consciousness” or “the state of being conscious,” is used here as a reference to universal nondual consciousness, and ātmā refers to the human “self” or “soul.” Therefore, the first sūtra can be rendered as “the human soul is the same as the universal consciousness.” Kṣemarāja’s commentary next proceeds to explain that there cannot be many consciousnesses. Rather, all souls must share the same consciousness. As proof, he points out that nothing can exist outside consciousness (i.e., consciousness and being are one), and therefore space, time, and form are only aspects of consciousness and cannot serve to divide consciousness into parts. Still expounding the first sūtra, Kṣemarāja next says:

Moreover, the aforesaid consciousness is the ātmā [(“soul”)] or nature of the entire universe consisting of both existent objects (like “jar” or “cloth”) [and] nonexistent but imagined objects (like “sky-flower”). This interpretation is possible, because there is no mention in the sūtra of the self of any particular being. (kimca yadetat caitanyam uktam sa eva ātmā svabhāvah višeśācodanāt bhāvābhāvarūpasya viśvasya jagataḥ)

[In other words,] every appearance owes its existence to the light of consciousness. Nothing can ever have its own being without the light of consciousness. (nahi acetyamānah ko’pi kasyāpi kadācidapi svabhāvo

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94 This is an idea that appears frequently in the Pratyabhijñā texts.
Here, Kṣemarāja is asserting, as did his teachers before him, that consciousness is the ground of being. Everything exists within consciousness, which, in all cases, is conscious only of itself, and therefore everything, animate or inanimate, has a conscious soul. A jar or a piece of cloth is just as conscious as the person reading this book.

Kṣemarāja next quotes a nondual text called the Ucchusmabhāirava Tantra, which asserts: “The knower and the known are really the same principle” (vedakaṁ vedyamekaṁ tu tattvam). Similarly, he quotes the following verse from the Spandakārikā (verse 2.4): “It is only the experiencer who always and everywhere exists in the form of the experienced” (bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvena sadā sarvatra samsthitaḥ). These ideas are, by now, familiar to us. The subject-object divide is unreal; consciousness is always conscious only of itself; the sweet knows the sweet.

The Upanishads explain that one cannot know God as an object of perception, just as one cannot know one’s own soul as an object of perception. Rather, to know God (i.e., universal consciousness) is to be God (i.e., to be conscious). But Pratyabhijñā philosophy adds an emphasis that does not come to the fore in the earlier texts. The Pratyabhijñā texts assert that even inanimate matter shares God’s indivisible nondual consciousness to the same extent and in the same way as living organisms do.

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Rocks and lumps of clay are conscious entities, and their consciousness — more accurately, their consciousness of self — is the foundation of their existence.

Kṣemarāja returns to these ideas in his commentary to the fourteenth sūtra: “dṛśyaṃ śarīram.” Kṣemarāja explains that the word dṛśyaṃ, from the Sanskrit root dṛś (“seeing,” “viewing,” “looking at”), refers to every knowable phenomenon, whether an inner state or an outer material object. And the word śarīram means “body.” Therefore, the sūtra can be rendered as: “That which presents itself to one’s consciousness is one’s body.”98 As Kṣemarāja’s explains:

Whatever is perceptible, whether inwardly or outwardly, all that appears to [the expert practitioner] like his own body, i.e., identical with himself and not as something different from him. This is so because of his great accomplishment. His feeling is ‘I am this,’ just as the feeling of Sadāśiva with regard to the entire universe is ‘I am this.’ (yadyad dṛśyaṃ bāhyamābhyaṃtaram vā tattat sarvam ahamidam iti sadāśivavanmahāsamāpattyā svāṅgakalpamasya sphurati na bhedena)99

Once again, Kṣemarāja presents a philosophical system that closely aligns with what we said in Part One, above. Most people identify with a physical human body, or perhaps with the brain of such a body, but they do not identify with the surrounding objects that their senses perceive, such as a chair or the sweetness of a cup of tea. The truth is, however, that all consciousness is

98 Jaideva Singh translates the sūtra as follows: “All objective phenomena, outer or inner, are like [the practitioner’s] own body.” See Singh, Śiva Sūtras, p. 57.

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consciousness of self, and one is aware of an external object only insofar as it is reflected and represented in one’s own being. Hence, whatever presents itself to one’s consciousness can be thought of as one’s own body (śarīram).

Moreover, external objects only appear to be material when perceived through the mediation of the senses. Their true form (as they are in themselves) is their consciousness of self, just as one’s own true form is one’s consciousness of self. And because any divisions that appear in consciousness are themselves only consciousness, a wise person recognizes that external objects are — both epistemologically and ontologically — nothing but his or her own self. There is no such thing as other.100

c. The Spandakārikā and the Spanda-Nirṇaya

The Spandakārikā is a collection of verses attributed to Vasugupta but perhaps written by his disciple Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa. The title means “Verses on Vibration,” referring to the theory that “vibration” or “pulse” (spanda) plays a critical role in the underlying structure of the universe. One can think of the universe as the interference patterns that result from the interactions among countless wave functions.101 For present purposes, however, the Spandakārikā is relevant only for what it tells us about consciousness.

100 See also Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1.15 (KSTS, vol. 1, p. 34), translated in Singh, Śiva Sūtras, p. 59 [referring to “everything as it is in its essential reality, devoid of the distinction between subject and object, like a component of oneself”].

101 See Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, verse 1.1 (KSTS, vol. 42, p. 6), translated in Singh, The Yoga of Vibration, p. 14 [“Vībhava means the infinite variety of junction and disjunction of the group of Śaktis [‘powers’]) whose highest raison d’être consists in manifestation. . . . Thus, the Lord, by mutually joining and disjoining in various ways all the objective phenomena which are of the nature of consciousness and exist in Him as identical with Him, is the cause of the manifestation and absorption of the universe.”].
The Spandakārikā has been explicated in several important commentaries. Kṣemarāja’s commentary is called the Spanda-Nirṇaya, meaning “The Comprehensive Study of Vibration.” In the Spanda-Nirṇaya, Kṣemarāja employs the city-in-a-mirror simile, using it to illustrate Abhinavagupta’s doctrine of reflection (Tantrāloka 3.1–65). Among other things, Kṣemarāja’s aim is to show that consciousness is nondual — conscious only of itself — despite appearing to stretch across an unbridgeable subject-object divide. The commentary takes the traditional form of a series of objections and replies. Kṣemarāja writes:

[Objection:] “Well, if this world has come out (i.e., separated) from that Exquisite Mass of Light [(i.e., from universal consciousness)], then how can it be manifest, for nothing can be manifest outside Light [(i.e., nothing exists outside consciousness)]?” (yadi tasmātprakāśavaṇuṣa idaṃ jagannirīyātaṃ tanna pratheta na hi prathāvāhyāṃ [ed.: prabhābāhyāṃ] ca prathate ceti yuktamiti)

[Reply:] . . . “That (i.e., the world) has not come out from Him [(i.e., from universal consciousness)] as does a walnut from a bag. Rather, the self-same Lord — through his absolute freedom, manifesting the world, on His own background, like a city in a mirror, as if different from Him, though non-different — abides in Himself.” (na prasevakādivākṣotādi tattasmānnirgatamapi tu sa eva bhagavānsvaṣvātantryādanatiriktāmapiyatiriktāmiva jagadrūpatāṃ svabhittau darpaṇanagaravat-
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prakāśayansthitaḥ)

The universal consciousness — called “Lord” (bhagavān) in this text — is always one without a second. Therefore, the world does not come into existence as something separate from universal consciousness (“as does a walnut from a bag”). Rather, the world comes into existence as a configuration of consciousness (“on His own background, like a city in a mirror”), and the separation is only apparent (“as if different from Him, though non-different”).

Later in his commentary, Kṣemarāja returns to the mirror simile, making a statement that is drawn directly from Abhinavagupta’s doctrine of reflection (see Tantrāloka 3.19). Kṣemarāja writes:

[The creator] manifests innumerable [objective] things like body, blue, etc.,

which, though non-different from the essential nature of consciousness, appear as different, like reflections in a mirror (which though non-different from the mirror appear as different). (anantān
dehanīlayābhāsāṁscidātmanaḥ svarūpādanatiriktānapi

The texts often use “blue etc.” (nīlādi) as a way of referring to objects of perception. This usage is related to the appearance of blue in the clear sky, implying that objects of perception are appearances that have a different underlying reality.


103 The texts often use “blue etc.” (nīlādi) as a way of referring to objects of perception. This usage is related to the appearance of blue in the clear sky, implying that objects of perception are appearances that have a different underlying reality.
Kṣemarāja is asserting here that consciousness is the unity that underlies all diversity. The innumerable objects of consciousness are not different from the consciousness that observes them, just as a reflection of a city in a mirror is not different from the mirror’s reflective surface.

In section 2, verses 3 and 4, the Spandakārikā explicitly declares the unity of subject and object. This is a text that we already encountered above in Kṣemarāja’s commentary to the Śīva Sūtras:

Since the limited individual self [(or soul)] is identical with the whole universe, inasmuch as all entities arise from him, and because of the knowledge of all subjects, he has the feeling of identity with them all, hence, whether in the word, object, or thought, there is no state which is not Śiva [(i.e., universal consciousness)]. It is the experiencer himself who, always and everywhere, abides in the form of the experienced, i.e., it is the Divine Himself who is the essential experencer, and it is He who abides in the form of the universe as His field of experience. (yasmātsarvakāmyojīvāḥ sarvabhāvāsamarūdhvāt | tāstāmvedanārūpeṇa tādāmyapratipattitāḥ [ed.: tādātmya] || tasmācchabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivāḥ | bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvena sadā sarvatramāṃsthitāḥ)105

By asserting that the experiencer (i.e., the subject) takes the form


of the experienced (i.e., the object), the *Spandakārikā* is reiterating the familiar point that consciousness is nondual, conscious only of itself. But, more subtly, by universalizing that principle — by having it apply “always and everywhere” (*sadā sarvatra*) — the *Spandakārikā* is telling us that objects of consciousness, even those that are inanimate, are also conscious subjects. In other words, the collapse of subject and object into one — which is the central point of the city-in-a-mirror simile — implies the consciousness of all things.

The *Spandakārikā* brings these ideas to a powerful conclusion in section 2, verses 6 and 7, which state:

This only is the manifestation of the object of meditation in the meditator’s mind: that the aspirant with resolute will has the realization of his identity with that (object of meditation). (*ayamevodayastasya dhyeyasya dhyāyicetasī | tadātmatāsamāppattiricchataḥ sādhakasya yā*)

This alone is the acquisition of ambrosia leading to immortality; this alone is the realization of Self; this alone is the initiation of liberation leading to identity with Śiva. (*iyamevāmrtraprāptirayamevātmano grahaḥ | iyaṃ nirvāṇadīkṣā ca śivasadbhāvadāyinī*)

In the South Asian religious tradition, one uses the mantra of one’s personal deity as a support in meditation, culminating (one hopes) in the manifestation of one’s deity before oneself in physical form. But this text is boldly asserting that the manifestation of one’s mantra deity occurs only in the realization that one actually is the deity that one has been meditating upon. Moreover, one’s immortality, one’s self-realization, and one’s identity with Śiva are

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all none other than the direct experience of that subject-object unity. As Kṣemarāja declares: “One should worship Śiva by becoming Śiva” (śivo bhūtvā śivam yajet).107

d. The Pratyabhijñāḥṛdayam

The Pratyabhijñāḥṛdayam was written by Kṣemarāja with the purpose of making the ideas of Pratyabhijñā philosophy accessible to non-experts. He says:

In this world, there are some devoted people who are undeveloped in reflection and have not taken pains in studying difficult works like Logic and Dialectics, but who nevertheless aspire after Samāveśa [“(merging” or “identification”)] with the highest Lord, which blossoms forth after the descent of Śakti [“(power”)]. For their sake, the truth of the teaching of [Utpaladeva’s] Īśvarapratyabhijñā is being explained briefly. (iha ye sukumāramatayo ‘kṛtatīkṣṇatarkaśāstrapariśramāḥ śaktipātonmiṣita-pārameśvara samāveśābhilāśināḥ katicit bhaktibhājaḥ teśām īśvarapratyabhijñopadesatattvaṃ manāk unmīlyate)108

The first sūtra, followed by Kṣemarāja’s auto-commentary, presents the now familiar idea that consciousness is the ground of being; nothing exists outside consciousness:

Sūtra 1:
The absolute Cītī [(“consciousness”)] of its own free will is the cause of the [effectuation] of the universe.


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(citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ)

[Kṣemarāja’s] Commentary:

. . . It is only when Citi, the ultimate consciousness-power, comes into play that the universe comes forth into being (lit.: “opens its eyelids”) and continues as existent, and when [Citi] withdraws its movement, the universe also disappears from view (lit.: “shuts its eyelids”).

([citiḥ . . .] asyaṁ hi prasarantāṁ jagat unmiśati vyavatiṣṭhate ca nivṛttaprasarāyāṁ ca nimiśati)\(^{109}\)

The second sūtra further explains that consciousness does not give rise to the universe in a dualistic sense — as an objective universe separate from and observed by a conscious soul. Rather, as Abhinavagupta said (Tantrāloka 3.3 and 3.49–50), consciousness creates the universe within consciousness. The sūtra states:

By the power of her own will (alone), she (Citi[, or “consciousness”]) unfolds the universe upon her own screen (i.e., in herself as the basis of the universe).

(svecchayā svabhittau viśvamunmī layati)\(^{110}\)

The phrase “upon her own screen” (svabhittau) is like the phrase “in the firmament of his own self” (Tantrāloka 3.3). It makes clear that what appears in the form of knower (a philosopher, for example) and known (the sweetness of tea, for example) is actually only consciousness being conscious of itself. Kṣemarāja next turns to the city-in-a-mirror simile to explain that point further:


She [(i.e., Citi, or “consciousness”)] unfolds the previously defined universe (i.e., from Sadāśiva down to the earth) like a city in a mirror, which though non-different from [the surface of the mirror] appears as different. (*prāk nirnītām viśvām darpane nagaravat abhinnamapi bhinnamiva unmīlayati*)

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Like the reflection of a distant city in the flat surface of a mirror (*darpane nagaravat*), objects of consciousness appear to be remote, but it is only the surface of the mirror that we are actually seeing when we look at a reflected city, and it is only our own self that is the actual content of our consciousness when we perceive an external object. Thus, the subject-object divide is only an appearance, “like a city in a mirror, which though non-different from [the surface of the mirror] appears as different.”

In his commentary to the ninth *sūtra*, Kṣemarāja goes on to explain that the illusory subject-object divide arises because we are embodied creatures that use sense organs to acquire knowledge about the surrounding world. Kṣemarāja says:

When the highest Lord, whose very essence is consciousness, conceals, by His free will, pervasion of non-duality and assumes duality all round, then His will and other powers, though essentially non-limited, assume limitation. . . . (In the case of) knowledge-power, owing to its becoming gradually limited in the world of differentiation, its omniscience becomes reduced to knowledge of a few things (only). By assuming extreme limitation, *beginning with the acquisition of an inner organ* [(i.e., the intellect, mind, ego, memory, etc.)*] and *organs of perception* [(i.e., the sense organs)], [the

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universal consciousness] acquires māyiya-mala, which consists in the apprehension of all objects as different [from itself]. (yadā cidātmā parameśvaraḥ svasvātantryāt abhedavyāptīm nimajjya bhedavyāptīm avalambate tadā tadīyā icchādiśaktayaḥ asamkucitā api saṃkocavatyo bhānti [ed.: bhavanti] . . . jñānaśaktih krameṇa saṃkocāt bhede sarvajñatvasya kimcijjñatvāpтеḥ antaḥkaraṇa-buddhīndriyatāpattipūrvaṃ atyantam saṃkocagrahaṇena bhinnavedyaprathāraṇaṃ māyiyaṃ malam)\(^{112}\)

Imagine, a person who, since birth, is only permitted to see and hear through a camera and microphone located somewhere inside his or her own body. This person would inevitably view internal bodily organs as if they were external. Likewise, when consciousness — which is infinite and universal — is conditioned by the “inner organ” (i.e., the brain) and “organs of perception” (i.e., the senses) of a particular body, it assumes the contracted form of an individual soul imagining the objects of its sensory perception to be external to it. The universal consciousness then believes “I am small” and “the external world is vast,” but it is only the perceptive capacity of the brain and sense organs that is small. In truth, the universal consciousness is unbound, and the entire world is internal to it, as the following verse from Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā describes:

Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of material causes, in virtue of His volition alone, renders externally manifest the multitude of objects that reside within Him. (cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntahsthitam

One could say — as Śaṅkara did — that the individual soul is what the universal consciousness appears to be when it illuminates the functioning of a brain and sense organs. But in doing so, it undergoes no actual limitation.

Consider the example of water moving in a fast-flowing cascade, forming itself into numerous whirlpools and eddies that dissipate over time and then reappear. In the same way, universal consciousness, which is dynamic and ever-changing, configures itself into corporeal systems that gather information through sense organs, and while the universal consciousness is so configured, it imagines itself to be an individual soul knowing an external material world, but in truth it never ceases to be the universal consciousness, just as the whirlpool never ceases to be water. In the Pratyabhijñāhrdayam, Kṣemarāja describes this process in terms of an alternation between concealment and grace:

[W]hen the great Lord, who is consciousness, entering into the sphere of the body, prāṇa [(“life-force”)], etc., on the occasion of the attention becoming external, makes objects like blue, etc. appear in definite space, time, etc., then with reference to [that] appearance in definite space, time, etc., it is His act of emanation. . . . With reference to their appearance as different [from the observer], it is His

\[ \text{icchāvaśād bahiḥ | yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet} \]  

113 Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā I.5.7 (KSTS, vol. 34, 2nd text, p. 16), translated in Torella, The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, p. 116. Consider also Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā I.6.7 (KSTS, vol. 34, 2nd text, p. 24), translated in Torella, The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, p. 133, which provides: “Thus also in the course of ordinary reality the Lord, entering the body etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of objects that shine within him.” (tad evaṃ vyavahāre 'pi prabhur dehādim āviśan | bhāntam evāntararthaugham icchayā bhāsayed bahiḥ)
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act of concealment. With reference to the appearance of everything as identical with the light (of consciousness), it is His act of grace. (dehaprāṇādipadaṁ āviśan cidrūpo maheśvaro bahirābhāvāvasare nilādikam arthaṁ nīyatadesakālāditaye yadā ābhāsayati tadā nīyatadesakālādyābhāsāṁse asya sraṣṭṛā | . . . bhedena ābhāsāṁse vilayakāritā | prakāśāikyena prakāśane anugraḥītṛā) 114

It is difficult to imagine that we are viewing the world inside out, that the world that surrounds us is really inside us, and that it is conscious in all its parts. It is difficult to imagine that one’s own soul is the soul of the universe, ever delighting in its consciousness of its own self. It is difficult, but not impossible.

e. The Paramārthasāra

Kṣemarāja’s disciple, Yogarāja, wrote a commentary to Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra, reiterating many of the foregoing themes. For our purposes, his commentary is most notable for its detailed discussion of the city-in-a-mirror simile, using it to describe the nondual nature of consciousness.

The first verse of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra refers to the universal consciousness as “Śaṁbhu,” an alternative name for Śiva. Addressing Śaṁbhu in the second person, as “You” to whom “I,” the writer, come for refuge, verse 1 says:

To You, the transcendent, situated beyond the abyss, beginningless, unique [(i.e., one without a second)], yet who dwell in manifold ways in the caverns of the heart,

114 Pratyabhijñāḥrdayam, com. to sūtra 10 (KSTS, vol. 3, p. 23), translated in Singh, Pratyabhijñāḥrdayam, pp. 74–75. Kṣemarāja actually describes a five-fold process (emanation, reabsorption, maintenance, concealment, and grace). By becoming aware of the pattern within our own ordinary experience, we identify ourselves with Śiva.
the foundation of all this universe, and who abide in all that moves and all that moves not, to You alone, O Śaṁbhū, I come for refuge. (paraṁ parasthāṁ gahanād anādim ekaṁ niviṣṭaṁ bahudhā guhāsu | sarvālayaṁ sarvacarācarasthāṁ tvāmeva śaṁbhum śaraṇaṁ prapadye)\textsuperscript{115}

Yogarāja’s commentary explains that all things — even inanimate objects — are conscious by the light of the universal consciousness, for nothing exists outside consciousness. He asks rhetorically: “For is it not well known that this universe . . . indeed is grounded in the universal knower . . . ?” (sarvamidāṁ kila pūrṇapramātari sthitam sat), adding that “[i]f this were not the case, this universe would not exist at all — for it would be on such hypothesis other than Light [(i.e., other than consciousness)]” (anyathā etasya prakāśaṁ bhinnasya sattaiva na syāt).\textsuperscript{116} Śaṁbhū is therefore not just one’s “own Self” (svātman); he also takes “the form of that god who is the Self of everything” (sarvasya svātmadevatāsvarūpa).\textsuperscript{117}

“[T]he Self of everything.” The idea that a rock or a clod of earth has a conscious self might leave some readers wondering what the rock or earth clod is thinking about. Therefore, verse 8 of the Paramārthasāra explains that, although all things are conscious, all things do not have anything like the subject-object


\textsuperscript{116} Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 1 (KSTS, vol. 7, p. 4), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{117} Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 1 (KSTS, vol. 7, p. 5), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, p. 71.
consciousness of a human soul, or even an animal soul, and therefore their consciousness goes unnoticed. We already saw in our study of Kṣemarāja’s Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam (com. to sūtra 9) that nondual consciousness can assume the particularized form of an individual soul only when a physical system is constructed so as to produce within itself a representation of the outside world — as is true, for example, of a living organism with a brain and sense organs. Verse 8 of the Paramārthasāra makes the same point, drawing an analogy to Rāhu.

Rāhu is the ascending lunar node (i.e., the place where the moon’s orbit intersects the ecliptic when ascending from the southern ecliptic hemisphere to the northern ecliptic hemisphere).118 In astronomy, this node is merely a location in space, but if the moon happens to be “full” (i.e., directly opposite the sun, on the far side of the earth) when this intersection occurs, we on earth experience it as a lunar eclipse (i.e., the shadow of the earth passes across the moon). In Vedic astrology, which focuses on how things appear to an earthly viewer, this ascending lunar node is thought to be an invisible planet that becomes visible during the eclipse. Using that invisible planet as an analogy, Abhinavagupta states in verse 8 of the Paramārthasāra:

Just as Rāhu, although invisible, becomes manifest when interposed upon the orb of the moon, so too this Self [(i.e., consciousness)], although [invisibly] present in all things, becomes manifest in the mirror of the intellect, by securing [similarly] a basis in external objects. (rāhurādhṛṣya 'pi yathā śaśibimbasthaḥ prakāśate tadvat | sarvagato 'pyayamātmā viṣayāśrayaṇena dhīmukure)119

118 The ecliptic is the plane defined by the earth’s orbit around the sun.

Consciousness, in other words, is “present in all things” (sarvagataḥ), but what makes the consciousness of an inert lump of clay different from that, say, of a person is the absence, in the former case, of a brain and sense organs that enable the consciousness to manifest itself “in the mirror of the intellect” (dhīmukure). Moreover, it is only through subject-object consciousness — that is, “by securing a basis in external objects” (viṣayāśrayaṇena) — that this revelation of consciousness occurs. In other words, we can become aware of consciousness only as the knower of some object. Without objects of consciousness, consciousness itself remains invisible, like light passing through empty space, without anything to illuminate. The implication of this point is profound. Although the true essence of all consciousness is nondual consciousness of self, consciousness only reveals itself in the dualistic illusion of a subject knowing an object.

In commenting on this verse, Yogarāja begins by reasserting its basic point. Yogarāja says:

Although wandering everywhere in the sky, [the demon of the eclipse] Rāhu is not perceived. Nevertheless, at the time of a [lunar] eclipse, he is clearly visible, appearing to us as if situated upon the form [viz., the orb] of the moon, [such that people say:] “This is Rahu.” (ākāśadeśe rāhuḥ sarvatra paribhramannapi na upalabhyate, sa eva punah grahopāgarakāle candramūrtisthah prathamānaḥ, ayaṃ rāhuḥ - iti parīkṣyate) . . .

Likewise [i.e., as in the example], here also [i.e., in the thesis to be exemplified], this Self [(i.e., consciousness)], although intrinsically persisting as the

120 See Bhagavad Gītā 2:24, making the same assertion.
inmost core of all beings, is not observed as such [by all beings] (sarvasya),\textsuperscript{121} for what is apprehended is apprehended only in immediate perception [(i.e., in subject-object consciousness)], where it takes a form indistinguishable from one’s own experience. (tathaiva ihāpi sarvāntaratatamatvena sthito'pi ayam ātmā svānubhavaikasvarūpatayā pratyakṣaparidṛṣyamānāḥ sarvasya tathā na upalakṣyate)\textsuperscript{122}

Yogarāja’s commentary next distinguishes between the absolute “I” and the relative “I.” The relative “I” is the “I” that appears in the sentence: “I hear sounds.” This relative “I” exists as a subject in relation to a perceived object, and it depends on the perception of the object for its existence. When an object is known, even if that object is only a mental image, then the relative “I” is also known, but when there is no object of knowing, as in dreamless sleep, the relative “I” disappears. In short, the relative “I” is the “I” of subject-object consciousness. By contrast, the absolute “I” is the nondual consciousness that constitutes one’s true self. It never disappears, even in dreamless sleep, and according to verse 8, it is “present in all things” (sarvagataḥ), but invisibly so, like Rāhu when there is no moon to eclipse. Yogarāja explains:

Moreover, when [this Self] becomes a matter of awareness in the [cognitive] experience of the “first person,” namely, [in the “I” that subtends the predicate in

\textsuperscript{121} Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi translate sarvasya as “by anyone.” That translation, implying “any person,” is too restrictive since verse 8 refers to the consciousness that is “present in all things” (sarvagataḥ).

\textsuperscript{122} Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 8 (KSTS, vol. 7, pp. 24 and 25), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, p. 97, italics added.
expressions] such as “I hear [sounds]” — an experience that occurs to every cognizer endowed with a subtle body whenever objects of sense such as sound, viewed as objects to be known, are apprehended in the mirror of intellect, or, in the mirror of intuition — then, that same Self, its form now fully manifest, is apprehended [even] in the lump of clay, etc., as that whose nature it is to apprehend [that lump]: there also the inherent Self becomes manifest, that is, is perceived by all as one and the same as their own particular experience. (yadā punaḥ puryaśṭakapramāṭīṇāṁ buddhidarpaṇe pratibhāmukure grāhyavyavasthākāle śabdādiviṣayasyavīkāreṇa śṛṇomi ityevam aham - pratītiṣayayo bhavati, tadā grāhaka- svabhāvatayā loṣṭādvāpi sthitah san sphuṭarūpaḥ, tatraiva svātmā prakāśate sarvaiśca svānubhavaikarūpaḥ pratīyate)\(^{(123)}\)

Significantly, Yogarāja — who, along with his teachers, insists that all things are conscious — is quite restrictive regarding the experience of subject-object consciousness, saying that it occurs only when sense objects are perceived “in the intellect-mirror of every cognizer endowed with a subtle body” (puryaśṭakapramāṭīṇāṁ buddhidarpaṇe).\(^{(124)}\) Although everything, everywhere, is conscious, only organisms that have a brain and sense organs are constructed in such a way that their consciousness (their absolute “I”) assumes the form of an individual soul that is the knower of

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\(^{(124)}\) The word puryaśṭaka means “eight-part city.” The “eight-part city” is a reference to the subtle body, which is said to have eight constituent parts (sometimes listed as the five senses, the mind, the intellect, and the ego). Loosely speaking, Yogarāja is referring to complex organisms that have a brain and sense organs.
objects of perception (a relative “I”). Yogarāja says:

[Nevertheless,] even though [consciousness] is there in the lump of clay, etc., it is widely taken as not being there, in virtue of [the clay’s] abounding in tamas [“(darkness,” “dullness”)], just like Rāhu in the sky [when not appearing on the orb of the moon]. (loṣṭādau atyantatamayatvāt sthito'pi asthitakalpo'sau prathate, rāhur ākāše yathā)

. . . .

But, ultimately, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, no usage distinguishes the sentient from the insentient. (na punaḥ paramārthena parameśvarāpekṣayā jaḍājaḍavyavahāra iti)\(^{125}\)

Several verses later, the Paramārthasāra employs the city-in-a-mirror simile, using it to illustrate that consciousness is really nondual — conscious only of itself — despite manifesting itself in the dualistic form of a subject knowing an object. Verses 12 and 13 state:

As, in the orb of a mirror, objects such as cities or villages, themselves various though not different [from the mirror’s flat surface], appear [there, in the mirror.] both as different from each other and from the mirror itself, so appears this world [in the mirror of the Lord’s consciousness], differentiated both internally and vis-à-vis that consciousness, although it is not different from [that universal] consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava. (darpaṇabimbe yadvan nagaragrāmādi

Yogarāja’s commentary explicates these important verses in great detail, but to better understand his commentary, we must consider that mirrors in 11th century Kashmir were made of highly polished metal, most often an alloy of copper. Thus, a “mirror” for Yogarāja was something whose reflective surface was unmistakably visible to the observer. Here is Yogarāja’s commentary:

In the depths of a clear mirror, the world appears as reflection variously — whether a city, village, fortress, enclosure, market-place, river, stream, fire, a tree, mountain, animal, bird, a man, or a woman — that is, as having various forms, each differentiated by means of its own characteristics, but also that [differentiated world] appears as undifferentiated, that is, as not different from the mirror itself, assuming a form within the mirror that is in no way different from that mirror. (yathā nirmale mukurāntarāle nagara - grāma - puraprākārāṭta - sthala - nada - nadī - jvalana - vrkṣa - parvata - paśupaksi - strīpuruṣādikam sarvam pratibimbatayā citraṃ svālakṣanyena nānārūpam bhāsate; avibhāgi darpaṇāt avibhaktaṃ sat bhāti tadabhedenaiva antar ākāraṃ samarpayati)

And although it appears there [in the mirror] as undifferentiated from the mirror itself, [that world] appears, or presents itself [to the senses] in relations of

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mutual disjunction, that is, [the world] appears as differentiable [internally], in the sense that the cloth [seen in the mirror] is different from the jar and the jar from the cloth inasmuch as each presents characteristics of its own. (tatra abhedena bhāsamānamapi bhāti vibhāgenaiva ca parasparam iti anonyasvālakṣaṇyena ghātāt paṭo bhinnah, paṭāt ghātah - iti vibhaktatayā sphurati)127

Yogarāja thus makes the point that the metallic surface of the mirror is visible to the observer in addition to the reflections that appear therein, and thus the reflections of a piece of cloth or a jar are not mistaken for a real piece of cloth or a real jar; they are known to be appearances in a mirror. Yogarāja then continues:

Everyone has an unsublated perception that “this is a mirror,” even as he apprehends the various objects therein reflected. Nor is it the case that the [image of the] jar, etc., qualifies the mirror in such fashion that the essential nature [of the mirror] would be abrogated [or altered] [— as it would if one were to say]: “this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a jar [and not a cloth],” and “this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a cloth [and not a jar].” (sarvasya punah tattatpratibimbagrahaṇe’pi darpano’yam iti abādhitā pratipattiḥ | nāpi ghātādiḥ darpanaṃ viśinaṣṭi, yena ayam ghātadarpaṇah, ayam paṭadarpaṇah iti svasvarūpātāhāniḥ atra jāyate) . . .

. . .

Likewise, in exactly the same way, namely, in complete accordance with the example of the reflection of a city, etc., in a mirror, [we assert that] the world, this universe — although not different from consciousness

most pure, the supreme Bhairava, that is, although not separated from Light itself, which abounds in unfragmented bliss and is utterly free of impurity — is displayed as differentiated [internally], like the image in the mirror — that is, as having various forms, each [determined as different] from the other [and different also from that universal consciousness], in virtue of the dichotomy of knower and known. (tadvat tathaiva darpaṇanagarādipratibimbadṛṣṭāntena vimalatama- paramabhairavabodhāḥ atiśayena vigalitakālikāt pūrṇanandodriktaḥ prakāśāt jagat viśvam vibhāga- śūnyamapi darpaṇapratibimbavat tataḥ prakāśāt avibhaktamapi, parasparam ca vibhaktatvena grāhyagrāhākāpekṣayā nānārūpam prathate)\textsuperscript{128}

Yogarāja is reiterating here what Abhinavagupta already explained in the \textit{Tantrāloka} (see \textit{Tantrāloka} 3.4). Just as the reflection of a city in a mirror is seen to be non-different from the metallic surface of the mirror in which it appears, and one necessarily is aware of the metallic mirror that is the underlying substratum of the refection, so also the universe is seen, by an awakened person, to be non-different from the divine consciousness in which the universe appears, and one necessarily is aware of the divine consciousness as the underlying substratum. Moreover, just as the objects seen in a mirror display their individual characteristics and mutual differentiation, so also the universe is displayed “as having various forms, each [determined as different] from the other,” and different, too, “from that [universal] consciousness,” despite being, in truth, non-different.\textsuperscript{129}


Yogarāja next discusses the *limitations* of the city-in-a-mirror simile, at least when that simile is applied to the totality of all consciousness, not just to the individual consciousness of a particular person. And here again, Yogarāja relies on the *Tantrāloka*, and in particular Abinavagupta’s assertion that although the universe is a reflection in consciousness, nothing exists outside consciousness that acts as the source of that reflection (see *Tantrāloka* 3.49–65). Yogarāja states:

> Nevertheless, between the Light of consciousness — endowed as it is with the state of wonder — and the light of the mirror, there is the following difference — viz., the city, etc., that is judged to be different [from the mirror] as a reflection [in the mirror], appears in the perfectly pure mirror only as external to it,[130] but [an actual city] is in no way created by the mirror. Thus the conclusion that “this is an elephant” [as applying to what is seen] in the mirror would be erroneous[, for it is a reflection of an elephant, and the actual elephant is outside the mirror].

(kimtu *darpaṇapratkāśāt* sacamatkārasya citprakāśasya iyān višeṣāḥ, - yat *darpaṇe* svacchatāmātrasanātthe bhinnam bāhyameva nagarādi pratibimbatvena abhimataṁ bhāti, natu svanirmitam, ato *darpaṇe* ayaṁ hastī iti yo niścayāḥ, sa bhrāntaḥ syāt)

On the other hand, Light [viz., consciousness], whose essence is the marvelous experience of itself [(i.e., the essence of consciousness is nondual)], makes manifest on its own surface, and out of its own free will, the [actual] universe, whose material cause is that same

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130 “. . . only as external . . .” (*bāhyameva*). One way to interpret this phrase is that only the external form of the city appears in the mirror. If one were to see a cup of sweet tea in a mirror, it would look like the external form of a cup of sweet tea, but one couldn’t drink it, and it wouldn’t be sweet.
consciousness, [as is known] by considering that [the universe] is not different [from that consciousness].

(prakāśah punah svacamatkārasāraḥ svecchayā svātmabhittau abhedena parāmrśan svasaḿvid-upādānema viśvam ābhāsayati)\textsuperscript{131}

This text is difficult, but the point is that an actual bricks-and-mortar city exists outside a mirror in which the image of a city is reflected, but nothing exists outside consciousness. There is no inert unconscious universe that becomes known when it is reflected in a conscious soul somewhere. Rather, consciousness manifests actual cities and the like on the “canvas” of consciousness, without there being anything outside consciousness that is the source of those appearances, and consciousness is then conscious of those appearances by reason of being conscious of itself.\textsuperscript{132}

But as Yogarāja has previously explained, the city-in-a-mirror simile also describes the subject-object consciousness that occurs when sense objects are perceived in the intellect-mirror of embodied beings (puryaṣṭakapramātṝṇāṃ buddhidarpāṇe), and needless to say, things do exist outside the “intellect-mirror” of a

\textsuperscript{131} Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13 (KSTS, vol. 7, pp. 38–39), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, pp. 115–116. See also Paramārthasāra, verses 48–49 (KSTS, vol. 7, p. 97), translated in Bansat-Boudon, p. 211 [“It is in Me that the universe appears, as in a spotless mirror jars and the like [appear]. . . . It is I who have taken on the form of all things, thus resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like. It is I who appear in each and every thing, just as the nature of light appears in all existent things.”].

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particular physical body. Indeed, this point is explicit in chapter 3 of the Tantrāloka, wherein Abhinavagupta describes the sense organs as reflecting various aspects of the surrounding world and performing their perceiving function by means of that reflection.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, Abhinavagupta does not deny that at the individual level, we are surrounded by real objects that we perceive only by means of the impressions they make on our sense organs.

At that individual level, therefore, the city-in-a-mirror simile applies without qualification. Whatever physical thing one might be perceiving through one’s bodily senses, one is actually only conscious of one’s own self in which that thing is being reflected and represented. Hence, one’s sense of being separate from the content of one’s consciousness is merely an illusion, like the illusion of depth that characterizes the reflection of a distant city in the flat surface of a mirror.

Moreover, according to the Paramārthasāra, the nondual consciousness of self that is illustrated by the city-in-a-mirror simile describes the consciousness of all things. Even a clay jar sitting on a shelf is fully conscious, although it has a limited subject-object consciousness because its ability to represent internally the things that surround it is limited. And because a clay jar is fully conscious, verse 74, discussing a person who is a knower of truth — a jñānin — states that “[t]he divine abode [(i.e., the locus of consciousness)] for him is his own body . . . or [if not his own, then] the body of another, or even an object, such as a jar” (nijamanyadatha śarīram ghaṭādi vā tasya devagṛham).\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{133} See Tantrāloka 3.5–43. Likewise, in his Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, Abhinavagupta defines “otherness” in terms of the body, although again emphasizing that the underlying being of all things is consciousness. See Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, vol. I, p. 48 (KSTS, vol. 22, p. 48); see also Ratié, “Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy,” p. 315.

\textsuperscript{134} Paramārthasāra, verse 74 (KSTS, vol. 7, p. 140), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, p. 252, italics added.
Yogarāja elaborates this verse as follows:

Not only is the body [for the jñānin] the abode of the deity inasmuch as it is the dwelling place of consciousness, but as well, whatever [other] objects there are that are governed by consciousness, all of them are abodes of the deity for him [the jñānin]. (na kevalaṃ śarīraṃ saṃvida āśrayaḥ - iti kṛtvā devagrhaṃ, yāvat yatkimcidvā saṃvidadhiṣṭhitaṃ tatsarvam tasya devagrhaṃ)

With this in mind, the master says [in the verse]: “or even the jar, etc.,” for the pentad of sensory domains that constitute the objects of our enjoyment — here suggested metonymically by reference to jars, etc. — are indeed governed by consciousness through entryways consisting of organs such as the eye, [ear, nose, tongue, and skin]. Furthermore, according to the teaching of the Spandaśāstra [(see Spandakārikā, verse 2.4.)], they [(i.e., the objects of our enjoyment)] are themselves composed of consciousness: “It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment.” (ityāha ghaṭādi vā iti | ghaṭādyupalakṣitaṃ viṣayapaṃcakam idam bhogyaraṃ cacṣurādīdvārena saṃvidādiṣṭhitaṃ <bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvena sadā sarvatra saṃsthitah> iti spanda-śāstropadesādṛśā saṃvinmayameva)\(^{135}\)

The genius of the city-in-a-mirror simile is that it collapses subject and object into one without privileging either the subject side or the object side. All things are consciousness, but all things are also conscious. Thus, if Pratyabhijñā Shaivism is categorized

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as idealism, it is very different from the unsettling notion that all things are merely the dream images of a remote dreamer.\textsuperscript{136} Rather, all things are the dream images of themselves, having their own intrinsic being despite being nothing but consciousness. This form of idealism, in other words, is a \textit{diffuse} non-reductive idealism, and it can just as well be categorized as materialism.

Śaṅkara’s Vedānta urged us to withdraw to the extreme subject side of the subject-object divide, identifying with a pure consciousness (\textit{caitanya}) that had no form (\textit{arūpa}) and no qualities (\textit{nirguna}), and Śaṅkara declared that the objective world of differentiation was merely an unreal appearance (\textit{ābhāsa}). But \textit{Pratyabhijñā} philosophy instead eliminates the subject-object divide, declaring all objects to be conscious subjects, and all conscious subjects to be objects of their own consciousness. The result is a world that is every bit real, but whose underlying being is consciousness.

But if the world is real, then all its diversity is also real, and that diversity must have a source in God’s own being. Drawing from the pre-Śaṅkaran theories of Bhartṛhari (5th century C.E.), \textit{Pratyabhijñā} philosophy posits a God that is Speech (\textit{vāc}) and Word (\textit{śabda}), thus giving specific form and content to God’s inner being. As we shall see in more detail in Part Seven, all the dynamic diversity of the world exists outside time as God’s eternal unchanging essence, and in the time dimension, that essence plays out as the pulse (\textit{spanda}) of creation and dissolution, a pulse that occurs both on a cosmic scale and in the arising and subsiding of every thought.\textsuperscript{137}


Part Three: Spinoza’s Nondualism

By decree of the angels and by the command of the holy men, we excommunicate, expel, curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza, with the consent of God, Blessed be He, and with the consent of the entire holy congregation, and in front of these holy scrolls with the 613 precepts which are written therein; cursing him with the excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho and with the curse which Elisha cursed the boys and with all the castigations that are written in the Book of the Law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down and cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be he when he goes out and cursed be he when he comes in. The Lord will not spare him, but then the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him, and the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven. And the Lord shall separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant that are written in this book of the law. But you that cleave unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day.  

— Decree of Excommunication against Baruch Spinoza  
(Amsterdam, July 27, 1656 C.E.)

1. Baruch Becomes Benedictus

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) was a philosopher who saw truth in things that are counterintuitive, and like other innovative thinkers before him, he was criticized and rejected for his ideas.

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138 Nadler, Spinoza, p. 120.
But notwithstanding the local community’s curse that “the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven,” Spinoza’s name is today known and respected throughout the world. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832 C.E.) praised Spinoza as “a sedative for my passions,” adding that Spinoza seemed to open up for him “a great and free outlook over the sensible and moral world” (“ich fand hier eine Beruhigung meiner Leidenschaften, es schien sich mir eine große und freie Aussicht über die sinnliche und sittliche Welt aufzutun”). In poetry, Albert Einstein wondered at the extent of his great love for Spinoza, exclaiming, “how I love this noble man” and adding “more than I can say with words” (“Wie lieb ich diesen edlen Mann. Mehr als ich mit Worten sagen kann.”). David Ben-Gurion sought to have the decree of excommunication against Spinoza rescinded, and people from all backgrounds continue to read Spinoza’s books and letters, they contemplate and discuss his ideas, and they admire the simple austerity of his way of life.

Spinoza was a Dutch Jew whose family immigrated to Holland from Portugal, where they had been forced to practice their Jewish faith in secret. Spinoza was raised and educated in a traditional Jewish manner, but even as a young man, he proved to be a revolutionary thinker, resulting in his excommunication at age 23. He then changed his name from Baruch (Hebrew for “blessing”) to Benedictus (Latin for “blessing”) and quickly became famous for his expertise in Cartesian philosophy. But Spinoza was not an uncritical follower of René Descartes. Rather, he recognized the problems that beset thought-matter dualism, and he boldly asserted that thought and matter are the same thing. In other words, Spinoza’s answer to the mind-body problem was very similar to what we have already encountered in Pratyabhijñā Shaivism.

The Pratyabhijñā texts persuasively argue that consciousness is universal, not individual; that it is nondual, not riven in two by an unbridgeable subject-object divide; and that it is the underlying
being of all things, not just that of human souls. And Spinoza’s ideas so closely conform to those same principles that one might wonder whether he had access to South Asian sources, perhaps as a result of contacts between European Jews and Jews living in Persia. It is intriguing to speculate about such connections, but I think multiple independent discovery better explains the close parallel between Pratyabhijñā nondualism and the nondual ideas of the great 17th century Dutch-Jewish philosopher.

What is most relevant to us, however, is that Spinoza picks up where Pratyabhijñā Shaivism leaves off, filling in missing numerous details and adding a measure of precision and logical rigor that is sometimes lacking in the Sanskrit texts. Therefore, whether Spinoza arrived at his ideas independently or drew them indirectly from South Asian sources, his contribution to nondual thought cannot be discounted.

2. Spinoza’s Answer to the Mind-Body Problem

Spinoza’s primary philosophical work, the Ethics, presents his theories in the form of a mathematical proof. Writing to his friend Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society, Spinoza said:

But I can think of no better way of demonstrating these things clearly and briefly than to prove them in the Geometric manner and subject them to your understanding. (Ut autem haec clarè, & breviter demonstrarem, nihil meliùs potui excogitare, nisi ut ea more Geometrico probata examini tui ingenii subjicerem . . . .) (Letter 2 [IV/8/10–20].)

In the Ethics, this “geometric manner” (more geometrico) of proof comes to its full fruition, complete with definitions, axioms, propositions, demonstrations, corollaries, lemmas, and postulates. Using these tools, Spinoza makes his way, point by point, from first principles to the most profound philosophical conclusions,
attempting to apply only irrefutable reason at each step. But the language Spinoza employs is specially and precisely defined, and his conclusions are often counterintuitive when compared to the Cartesian dualism of everyday human experience. As a result, a student of Spinoza can spend a day, or a lifetime, studying a single paragraph of the *Ethics.*

As noted, Spinoza was one of the leading experts of his time on Cartesian philosophy, and he employs many Cartesian terms and ideas in his own philosophical works, albeit with a few important distinctions. Both Descartes and Spinoza use the term “substance” (*substantia*), but contrary to Descartes, Spinoza concludes that only one infinite, eternal, and self-sufficient substance exists, and that it is God. (*Ethics*, IP11 and IP14.) Specifically, Spinoza defines “substance” as that in which other things inhere but which itself inheres in no other thing. Spinoza says:

> By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed. (*Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.*) (Id., ID3.)

In other words, substance is the ground of being. Modes, by contrast, are “the affections of a substance” (*substantiae affectiones*) (id., ID5); they are the things that inhere in substance. One could say that the relationship of modes to substance is analogous to the relationship of waves to water, or that of a clay jar to raw clay, or that of a gold ornament to molten gold, and all these analogies might bring to mind the analogies Śaṅkara uses to describe the relationship of the diverse world to Brahman. On this basis, many scholars have persuasively argued that Spinoza’s divine “substance” and Śaṅkara’s Brahman are one and the same.
But Śaṅkara and Spinoza draw different conclusions from the dependent relationship implied by inherence. Śaṅkara would argue that because waves inhere in water, only the water is real, and the waves — which are temporal — are unreal. By contrast, Spinoza would argue that both the water and the waves are perfectly real, although he would agree that the waves are temporal. Spinoza, like the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, understands the ever-changing dynamic diversity of the world to be an expression, in the dimension of time, of God’s eternal essence. Hence, the modes are real because they are God, or “substance,” comprehended in temporal terms. He says:

The difference between Eternity and Duration arises from this. For it is only of Modes that we can explain the existence by Duration. But of Substance [we can explain the existence] by Eternity . . . . (Ex quo oritur differentia inter Aeternitatem, & Durationem; per Durationem enim Modorum tantùm existentiam explicare possumus; Substantiae verò per Aeternitatem.) (Letter 12 [IV/54/15–55/5].) \(^{139}\)

Śaṅkara identifies God, or Brahman, with the extreme subject side of the subject-object divide. Thus, Brahman is pure consciousness, without form (arūpa) and without qualities (nirguṇa), and the ever-changing objective world is an unreal appearance (ābhāsa) in that consciousness. By contrast, Spinoza gives form and content to God’s inner being, and by doing so, he gives reality to the ever-changing world.

Following Descartes, Spinoza uses the term “extension” (i.e., spatial dimension) to describe the material world in the abstract, and he uses the phrase “mode of extension” (modus extensionis) to

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\(^{139}\) Regarding this passage, see Melamed, *Spinoza’s Metaphysics*, pp. 122–126.
describe, among other things, distinct material objects. He uses the term “body” in a broad sense, including within the scope of that term inorganic things such as planetary bodies. A body (corpus), for Spinoza, is a thing that moves or rests as a unified whole (see Ethics, IIP13, L1), and Spinoza accepts, too, that a body might be built up from other smaller bodies (id., IIP13, L3,“Definition”).

Spinoza uses the term “idea” (idea) for a distinct thought. He says:

By idea I understand a concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing. (Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format, propterea quod res est cogitans.) (Ethics, IID3.)

He also sometimes uses the phrase “mode of thinking” (modus cogitandi) in a similar way, especially when discussing abstract concepts like time.

As noted, Spinoza’s most profound point of departure from Cartesian philosophy is his assertion of thought-matter equivalence. More specifically, Spinoza argues that thought and matter are not distinct “substances” (i.e., the “thinking substance” and the “extended substance”) but rather two “attributes” of the same substance — two ways, that is, of comprehending a single thing. And because thought and matter are really one, the world of thought and the world of matter are perfectly isomorphic. In other words, every thought is also a material thing, and material thing is also a thought. Therefore, in the Ethics, Spinoza writes:

The order and connection of ideas [(i.e., thoughts)] is the same as the order and connection of things [(i.e., material things, etc.)]. (Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.) (Ethics, IIP7.)

[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., thought)] and the extended
substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension [(i.e., a distinct material object)] and the idea of that mode [(i.e., the thought that corresponds to that object)] are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. ([S]ubstantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus Extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa.) (Id., IIP7, Schol.)

In the above quotation, after the phrase “a mode of extension” (modus extensionis), I added, as a clarification, “a distinct material object,” and after the phrase “the idea of that mode” (idea illius modi), I added “the thought that corresponds to that object.” The latter emendation needs to be explained. Some casual readers of Spinoza might argue that the phrase “the idea of that mode” refers to the mental image a person has of a particular object when observing that object. Thus, if “a mode of extension” is an apple, then “the idea of that mode” is the apple-thought in the mind of a person observing the apple. Although that reading of Spinoza has a certain intuitive appeal, most scholars reject it.

Perhaps it is useful at this point to recall the discussion of thought-matter equivalence in Part One, above. There, I explained

140 Some scholars have shown that Spinoza derived his theory of thought-matter equivalence at least in part from medieval Jewish philosophers such as Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides, who, relying on Aristotle (Metaphysics XII, 7 and 9), asserted that God is the object of his own thoughts, that is, that for God, a thought and an object of thought are the same thing. See, e.g., Harvey, A Portrait of Spinoza, pp. 164–166. Spinoza, however, develops this principle in a way that goes beyond anything said by either Aristotle or the Jewish philosophers who relied on Aristotle.
that thought-matter equivalence does not mean that a person’s apple-thought is the same thing as a material apple sitting in a bowl of fruit on a table; rather, it means that a person’s apple-thought is the same thing as a physical brain representing an apple in the form of neural spiking frequencies. Indeed, if Spinoza were claiming an equivalence between a person’s apple-thought and a material apple sitting in a bowl of fruit, his philosophy would be incoherent. After all, many people might simultaneously observe the same material apple, and each would then have a different mental image of that apple, which would be incompatible with the one-to-one correspondence Spinoza claims to exist between thought and matter.

In order to grasp Spinoza’s assertion of thought-matter equivalence, we need to stop thinking in terms of subject-object consciousness and recall that all consciousness is really consciousness of self (conscience non positionnelle (de) soi, to use the Sartrean phrase). In other words, we do not know any external thing except by its reflection in our own being. One is conscious of one’s own self, and one perceives one’s own self as a vast and diverse external world. As Spinoza explains:

The human Mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own Body. (Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.) (Ethics, IIP26.)

Because consciousness is nondual in this way, the only “idea” (i.e., thought) that corresponds to a material apple is the apple’s thought of itself, not the thought some remote person might be having of it, and the only “mode of extension” (i.e., material thing) that corresponds to a person’s apple-thought is the person’s own brain, which is configured to represent an apple. In short, when Spinoza asserts that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one
and the same thing” (modus Extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res) (Ethics, IIP7, Schol.), he is necessarily making a statement about the thought a material thing has of itself, not the thought a remote observer might be having of it.\textsuperscript{141}

It is true, of course, that thoughts are about something, and when a person is gazing at an apple sitting in a bowl of fruit on a table, the person’s apple-thought is about an apple. But here we must resort to technical language and carefully distinguish between the objectum of a thought and the ideatum of a thought. The objectum of a person’s apple-thought is the immediate content of the person’s consciousness, which is the person’s brain configured to represent an apple. By contrast, the ideatum of the person’s apple-thought is the external thing the person’s thought is about, which is, of course, an apple. In other words, the objectum implies nondual consciousness, whereas the ideatum implies subject-object consciousness. But for present purposes the most important point is that when Spinoza asserts that there is a one-to-one correspondence between thought and matter, he is referring to a thought and its objectum, not to a thought and its ideatum.\textsuperscript{142}

With the benefit of that clarification, we are ready to consider Spinoza’s answer to the mind-body problem. Spinoza discusses “the object of the idea constituting the human mind” (objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis). (Ethics, IIP12.) Here, for reasons just explained, he cannot possibly be referring to some remote object — such as an apple — that the human mind might be thinking about. Rather, based on the theory of thought-matter equivalence, Spinoza is necessarily referring to something that actually is the human mind but taking a material form. In other words, he is referring to some material thing whose thought of


\textsuperscript{142} This point is beautifully explained in Garrett, Nature and Necessity, pp. 424–438, esp. 435–436.
itself gives rise to the human mind, meaning that whatever occurs physically in that material thing necessarily corresponds to a thought in that mind. As Spinoza puts it:

Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human Mind . . . there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the Mind; i.e., if the object of the idea constituting a human Mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the Mind. (*Quicquid in objecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, . . . ejus rei dabitur in mente necessario idea. Hoc est, si objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere, quod a mente non perciptatur.*) (*Ethics*, IIP12.)

And what could such a “body” be if not the *human* body, or some component of a human body, such as the brain and nervous system? Therefore, Spinoza concludes:

The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the [human] Body, or a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else. (*Objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus sive certus Extensionis modus actu existens et nihil aliud.*) (*Ethics*, IIP13.)

That powerful statement resolves the mind-body problem by boldly asserting that the mind *is* the body (or some component of it).¹⁴³

Thus, Spinoza completely rejects the consciousness-matter

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dualism that Śaṅkara so strongly insisted upon. As we will recall, Śaṅkara focused on the extreme subject side of the subject-object divide. On that basis, he asserted that consciousness is one and indivisible, and that it appears to be differentiated only because it illuminates different material vessels. But Śaṅkara further argued that consciousness and matter are completely distinct, and derivatively, he argued that the mind and body are also distinct. He said: “[T]he characteristics of the Spirit [(i.e., consciousness)] do not attach themselves to the body nor do those of the body to the Spirit (na Caitanya-dharmo dehasya, deha-dharmo vā cetanasya).”

Spinoza asserts exactly the opposite. For Spinoza, the mind is the body.

Moreover, because thought and matter are actually the same thing comprehended in two different ways, Spinoza universalizes his assertion of mind-body equivalence. All material bodies, everywhere, have minds, at least when the word “mind” is understood in the broadest possible sense. Thus, all things are in some sense conscious, but Spinoza qualifies that assertion, noting that the perceptive capacity of any particular “mind” depends on the suppleness (i.e., the receptivity) of the material thing that has that mind. Spinoza explains:

For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to [human beings] than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate [(i.e., conscious)]. (Nam ea, quae hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quae omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt.) . . . And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human Body must also be said of the

idea of any [material] thing. ([A]tque adeo, quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est.) In proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly. ([Q]uo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum; et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum.) (Ethics, IIP13, Schol.)

Finally, Spinoza asserts that insofar as a material thing has the suppleness and receptivity that makes its mind more perceptive, its mind also becomes more aware of itself. As Spinoza explains:

The Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the Body. (Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.) (Ethics, IIP23.)

On the other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things. ([E]t contra, qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia.) (Id., VP39, Schol.)

By way of summary, a “mind” according to Spinoza is the
thought a material thing has of itself (the latter being its objectum), and it only becomes a thought about some external thing (an ideatum) when, by force of evolution, it sees past itself to draw inferences about the world that surrounds it. But Spinoza also recognizes that even the phrase “thought of itself” implies a dualism of thought and matter. We still have, on the one side, a thought and, on the other, some material thing. Spinoza closes that gap by asserting that the thought and the material thing are one and the same; they are two attributes of a single “substance,” which Spinoza equates with God.  

If we go just one step further — a step that Spinoza doesn’t take, but one that fits — we can say that Spinoza’s “substance” is what we have been referring to in this book as “nondual consciousness of self” (pratyavamarśa). But we have to be careful here because Spinoza uses the word “conscious” (conscia), as we do in English, to refer to subject-object consciousness. (See, e.g., Ethics, VP31, Schol., VP39, Schol., VP42, Schol.) When I say that Spinoza’s “substance” is nondual consciousness, I am not referring to the subject side of the subject-object divide. Rather, I am referring to a direct consciousness of self that is based on being, not on knowing. That “conscience non positionnelle (de) soi” is what appears to us as the duality of thought and matter, just as the flat surface of a mirror reflecting a distant city appears to have depth.

3. Comparison to Pratyabhijñā Shaivism

The parallel between Spinoza’s answer to the mind-body problem and Pratyabhijñā Shaivism is striking. Spinoza’s core

145 Describing the equivalence of thought and extension (i.e., matter), Spinoza gave the example “by Israel I understand the third patriarch; I understand the same by Jacob.” (Letter 9 [IV/46/25–30].)

philosophical insight is his assertion of thought-matter equivalence:

[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., thought)] and the extended substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension [(i.e., a distinct material object)] and the idea of that mode [(i.e., the thought that corresponds to that object)] are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. ([S]ubstantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus Extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa.) (Ethics, IIP7, Schol.)

But seven centuries earlier, Somānanda had already articulated the same thought-matter equivalence, saying: “a clay jar, by comprehending its own self, exists” (ghaṭaḥ svamātmānam avagacchannavasthitāḥ).147 According to Somānanda, the existence of a thing is nothing but its thought of itself, and he added that a thing’s thought of itself is nothing but God’s thought of it.148 The latter point, too, is one Spinoza articulated:

The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the [human] Body . . . . (Objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus . . . .) (Ethics, IIP13.)

[And f]or of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is

147 See Śivadrṣṭi 5.34.
148 Śivadrṣṭi 5.105–110.
of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human Body [(i.e., that it is the human mind)] must also be said of the idea of any thing [(i.e., that it is the mind of that thing)]. (Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea, cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideae: atque adeo, quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est.) (Ethics, IIP13, Schol., italics added.)

Thus, according to both Somānanda and Spinoza, God’s thought of a thing suffices to make that thing conscious, or put another way, each thing’s consciousness of itself is the same as God’s consciousness of it.\textsuperscript{149}

And Yogarāja elaborated Somānanda’s philosophical insight, explaining that all things are conscious (i.e., conscious of themselves), but only organisms that have sense organs, a central nervous system, and a brain are constructed in such a way that the universal nondual consciousness takes the form of an individual soul knowing an external material world. Yogarāja’s words, already quoted above, bear repeating:

\[\text{[T]his Self [(i.e., consciousness)], although intrinsically persisting as the inmost core of all beings, is not observed as such by anyone . . . .}

\[\text{[But] . . . , when [this Self] becomes a matter of awareness in the [cognitive] experience of the “first person,” namely, [in the “I” that subtends the predicate in expressions] such as “I hear [sounds]” — an experience that occurs to every cognizer endowed with a subtle body [(i.e., complex organisms having a brain and sense organs)] whenever objects of sense such as sound . . . are}

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apprehended in the mirror of intellect . . . — then, that same Self, its form now fully manifest, is apprehended . . . [along with the apprehension of] [the object before us,] the lump of clay, etc., as that whose nature it is to apprehend [that lump] . . . .

[Nevertheless.] even though [consciousness] is there in the lump of clay, etc., it is widely taken as not being there . . . .

. . . .

But, ultimately, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, no usage distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.\(^{150}\)

If Spinoza had been schooled in 11th century Kashmir, his ideas would not have tracked Yogarāja’s statement any more closely. Spinoza, like Yogarāja, concludes that everything has a mind. (*Ethics*, IIP13, Schol.) In other words, everything has the thought of itself, but “in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once” (*quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum*) — that is, in proportion to the development of its sense organs, nervous system, and brain — “so its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once” (*eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum*). (Ibid.) And, insofar as a body becomes more capable of that sort of multifaceted and nuanced perception, it becomes more cognizant of external things, for “[t]he human Mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own Body” (*[m]ens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit nisi per

ideas affectionum sui corporis). (Id., IIP26; see also id., IIP13, Schol.) And, at the same time, it becomes cognizant of itself as the knower of those external things, for “[t]he Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the Body” ([m]ens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit). (Id., IIP23.) And thus arises the illusion of the subject-object divide — the awareness, that is, of a mind perceiving an external world. As Spinoza said: “[H]e who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself . . . and of things” ([Q]ui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata multum sui . . . et rerum sit conscientia). (Id., VP39, Schol.) And as Yogarāja likewise said: “[W]henever objects of sense such as sound . . . are apprehended in the mirror of intellect . . . — then, that same Self [(i.e., consciousness)], its form now fully manifest, is apprehended . . . .”

But as we will recall, Abhinavagupta also emphasized the inevitable inadequacy of empirical knowledge. He noted that the sense organs are necessarily imperfect mirrors, for each can only reflect (or represent) that which corresponds to its nature. (Tantrāloka 3.5–43.) And as a result of this distortion, we experience subject-object duality where there is none, a point that Kṣemarāja explained in his Pratyabhiṣijñāhṛdayam:

> When the highest Lord, whose very essence is consciousness, conceals, by His free will, pervasion of non-duality and assumes duality all round, then His will and other powers, though essentially non-limited, assume limitation. . . . By assuming extreme limitation, beginning with the acquisition of an inner organ [(i.e., the intellect, . . .) 151 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 8 (KSTS, vol. 7, p. 25), translated in Bansat-Boudon, An Introduction, p. 98. The Sanskrit is provided on pages 100 to 101, above.

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mind, ego, memory, etc.) and organs of perception [(i.e., the sense organs)], [the universal consciousness] acquires māyiya-mala, which consists in the apprehension of all objects as different [from itself]. (yadā cidātmā parameśvarah svasvātantryāt abhedavyāptim nimajjya bhedavyāptim avalambate tadā tadīyā icchādiśaktayaḥ asaṃkucitā api saṃkocavatyo bhānti [ed.: bhavanti] . . . antaḥkaraṇa-buddhīndriyatāpattipūrvaṁ atyantam saṃkocagrahaṇena bhinnavedyaprathārūpaṁ māyiyaṁ malam)\textsuperscript{152}

Not surprisingly, Spinoza, too, emphasizes the inadequacy of empirical knowledge: Because we know external things through the impressions they make on our sense organs (\textit{Ethics}, IIP26 [“The human Mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own Body.”]), and because such information is partial, mediated, and inferential, it is necessarily imperfect. Spinoza, who made his living as a lens grinder, providing spectacles and scientific instruments to the Dutch community, was keenly aware of the inadequacy of the information we receive by way of the eyes and other sense organs. He therefore asserts:

The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body. (\textit{Idea cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.}) (\textit{Ethics}, IIP25.)

Moreover, the effects a particular external thing has on our sense organs is muddled up with effects from many sources at once. Therefore, Spinoza says:

The ideas of the affections of the human Body . . . are not clear and distinct, but confused.” (Ideae affectionum corporis humani, . . . non sunt clarae et distinctae, sed confusae.) (Ethics, IIP28.)

And one result of this inadequate and confused knowledge of the world is the dualistic notion that we are immaterial thinking things and that the world is a material non-thinking thing, and that the two are ontologically distinct.

Spinoza’s philosophical system is set forth and defended in exquisite detail in the Ethics, but Spinoza also summarized his philosophy in a letter he wrote to his friend Henry Oldenburg. In that letter, he describes the entire universe as a single body with a single mind, and he describes the human body and human mind as a finite participant in that infinite universal being. Here are Spinoza’s words:

[A]ll bodies are surrounded by others, and are determined by one another to existing and producing an effect in a fixed and determinate way, the same ratio of motion to rest always being preserved in all of them at once, [that is, in the whole universe]. From this it follows that every body, insofar as it exists modified in a definite way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, must agree with its whole and must cohere with the remaining bodies. . . . ([O]mnia . . . corpora ab aliis circumcinctur, & ab invicem determinantur ad existendum, & operandum certâ, ac determinâtâ ratione, servâtâ semper in omnibus simul, hoc est, in toto universo eâdem ratione motûs ad quietem; hinc sequitur omne
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You see, therefore, how and why I think that the human Body is a part of Nature [(i.e., an interdependent and inseparable component of the whole)]. But as far as the human Mind is concerned, I think it is a part of Nature too. For I maintain that there is also in nature an infinite power of thinking, which, insofar as it is infinite, contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, and whose thoughts proceed in the same way as Nature, its object, does. Next, I maintain that the human Mind is this same power, not insofar as it is infinite and perceives the whole of Nature, but insofar as it is finite and perceives only the human body. For this reason I maintain that the human Mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect. (Vides igitur; quà ratione, & rationem, cur sentiam Corpus humanum partem esse Naturae: quòd autem ad Mentem humanam attinet, eam etiam partem Naturae esse censeo; nempe quia statuo, dari etiam in naturâ potentiam infinitam cogitandi, quae, quatenus infinita, in se continet totam Naturam objectivè, & cujus cogitationes procedunt eodem modo, ac Natura, ejus nimirùm ideatum. [¶] Deinde Mentem humanam hanc eandem potentiam statuo, non quatenus infinitam, & totam Naturam percipientem; sed finitam, nempe quatenus tantùm humanum Corpus percipit, & hâc ratione Mentem humanam partem cujusdam infiniti intellectûs statuo.) (Letter 32 [IV/172a/15–174a/10].)

As this letter describes, Spinoza understands the universe to be a single interdependent unity that is infinite, thus actualizing every possibility. And just as every individual thing has a mind (a
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thought of itself), likewise the universe, in its entirety, has a mind (a thought of itself). Spinoza calls this universal mind the “infinite power of thinking,” and he also calls it the “infinite intellect of God” (infiniti intellectus Dei), and whatever we might choose to call it, it necessarily exists because the material universe exists, and thought and matter are one.

And as for the human mind, it, according to Spinoza, is the fraction of that “infinite intellect” that has only the human body (or perhaps merely the human brain) as the direct content of its thought, being forced to infer things outside the body by interpreting their effects within the body.

Of course, Spinoza’s assertion that the human mind is a part of the universal mind is familiar to us from Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. It aligns with Somānanda assertion that an object’s thought of itself is nothing other than Śiva’s thought of it, and it likewise aligns with Kṣemarāja’s assertion that the “consciousness of Śiva alone is, in the highest sense, the self of the entire manifestation” (caitanyaparamārthataḥ śiva eva viśvasya ātmā). And because “the whole of nature is one Individual” (totam naturam unum esse individuum) (Ethics, IIP13, L7, Schol.), each part affecting other parts and affected by other parts, there can be no reasoned basis for declaring any one part to be separate from the whole. Therefore, the human body is not really an independent entity, and for like reason, the human mind is not an independent entity. It only appears to be a distinct mind, but in truth, its thoughts are part of

\[\text{\^{\text{Śiva}}}\text{drṣṭi} 5.105–109. The Sanskrit with English translation is provided on page 74, footnote 83, above.\]

\[\text{Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1 (KSTS, vol. 1, p. 3), translated in Singh, Śiva Sūtras, pp. 5–6.}\]
and determined by an infinite system of thought.\textsuperscript{155}

In summary, we find in Spinoza’s writings all the principles that this book has heretofore considered both in the abstract (in Part One) and in the leading texts of \textit{Pratyabhijñā} Shaivism (in Part Two). The core of the mind-body problem is the illusion of subject-object dualism. When the insight arises that all consciousness is really nondual consciousness of self (\textit{pratyavamarśa}), the mind-body problem disappears, and the riddle of consciousness is solved.

\section*{4. The Attributes of Substance}

We have seen that for Spinoza, “substance” (\textit{substantia}) is the ground of being; it is that in which other things inhere but which itself inheres in no other thing. (\textit{Ethics}, ID3.) And Spinoza further asserts that only one infinite, eternal, and self-sufficient substance exists, and that it is God. (\textit{Id.}, IP11 and IP14.) These descriptions make Spinoza’s divine substance comparable to Vedānta’s Brahman, as numerous scholars have noted.

But one issue in particular has troubled scholars who have compared Spinoza’s philosophy to that of the Hindu sages, and that issue is the proper way to understand Spinoza’s assertion that “substance” (i.e., God) has infinite “attributes,” of which the

\textsuperscript{155} The Kashmiri philosophers and Spinoza were, of course, unaware of the causal barrier imposed by the speed of light. That barrier suggests that some parts of the universe are outside the future light cones of events taking place in other parts of the universe, and vice versa, which means that those parts of the universe can no longer affect one another. Moreover, even if we restrict the term “universe” to the universe that is within the past and future light cones of a present human event, the speed of light would govern the ability of the “consciousness of Śiva” or the “infinite intellect” to communicate information from one part of its universal mind to another. One might posit that such communication is unnecessary because God knows all things simultaneously by being them, but there is still the problem of the relativity of simultaneity (i.e., that there is no single universal “now”).
“attribute of thought” and the “attribute of extension” are but two. As described in Appendix One, some scholars have adopted a subjective interpretation of the attributes, asserting that they are mere ascriptions of the philosopher’s intellect with no real existence, and based on that conclusion, these scholars assert that, for Spinoza, thought and matter (minds and bodies) are just appearances. This interpretation, of course, closely aligns Spinoza’s philosophy with Śaṅkara’s doctrine of world-illusion (māyāvāda).156 Other scholars have argued that the attributes are ontologically real, and because they are infinite in number, they infinitely multiply God’s being, making God infinitely greater than what human beings can know, and hence transcendent.157 And a third view is that the attributes are distinct aspects of the divine substance, and they are therefore real, but they do not multiply God’s being.158 Which of these descriptions is most accurate?

According to Spinoza, the attributes are “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens). (Ethics, ID4.) The modes, by contrast, are “the affections of a substance” (substantiae affectiones) (id., ID5), meaning the modifications that inhere in a substance. Therefore, if the intellect is ascribing the thought attribute to the modifications of a substance, then Finite Mode A seems to be an idea of the


mind, but if the intellect is ascribing the attribute of extension to those same modifications, then Finite Mode A seems to be a particular configuration of a material brain.

In each case, however, the intellect is ascribing something to the substance (either thought or extension), and it is perceiving the substance and its modifications relative to that ascription. Hence, the careful reader will be asking, What is Finite Mode A as it is in itself, without any ascription of the intellect? Put another way, if the intellect inevitably perceives the essence of substance under this or that attribute, is the perceivable world merely an appearance, analogous to the illusory world of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, and is the world as it is in itself unknowable?

As noted, some Vedānta scholars have made that argument, but Spinoza flatly rejects it. He asserts that “[t]he human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (\textit{mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei}). (\textit{Ethics}, IIP47.) In Spinoza’s usage “adequate knowledge” means knowledge that is true. Moreover, the intellect, according to Spinoza, is the rational subpart of the mind, and its ideas — being either axiomatic or derived by reason — are never false. (See \textit{id.}, IIP41.) Therefore, if the attributes are “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (\textit{id.}, ID4, italics added), then they must be true perceptions, not mere perceptual overlays with an existence confined to the intellect alone. Hence, the attributes must correspond to something that actually exists in the essence of substance itself, which means that they are ontologically real, not

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mere illusions.¹⁶⁰

But our story doesn’t end there, for everything we have said so far still seems to be erected upon an idealistic foundation. Notice that Spinoza uses the language of mentation whenever he discusses the attributes. In other words, thought does a double duty in Spinoza’s system; it acts as one of the attributes that the intellect perceives (alongside an infinite number of non-mental attributes), but at a higher level, it also acts as the intellect’s own act of perception. Spinoza says that everything can be “comprehended” as either thought or extension (mind or matter),¹⁶¹ but since thought is the thing doing the comprehending, thought must be the ultimate ground of being, and the non-mental attributes must be unreal.

But that seems to be true only because by trying to solve the philosophical riddle, we are thinking about it. According to thought-matter equivalence, the intellect that perceives the attributes — and, ultimately, we are referring to the infinite

¹⁶⁰ See Melamed, “The Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” pp. 90–103, esp. pp. 95 and 102; Melamed, “Spinoza’s Deification of Existence,” pp. 98–102. I agree with Yitzhak Melamed’s explication of Spinoza’s system, although Spinoza himself leaves just enough doubt about the question to allow scholars to continue to debate it. Spinoza says, for example, that “outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections” (extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones) (Ethics, IP4, Dem.), and he asserts that “the intellect . . . attributes such and such a definite nature to substance” (intellectus[] substantiae certam talem naturam tribuetis) (Letter 9 [IV/46/20–25], italics added).

¹⁶¹ “[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., thought)] and the extended substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that.” ([S]ubstantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur:) (Ethics, IIP7, Schol., italics added.)
intellect\textsuperscript{162} — is just as much an extended thing as it is a thinking thing. (See *Ethics*, IIP13; Letter 32 [IV/173a/15–174a/10].) In other words, for Spinoza, our perception of the attributes derives from their actual existence, not the other way around. Therefore, no attribute is eliminable, and none can be reduced to another.

Some Ved\text{\=a}nta scholars, accepting that the attributes are ontologically real, have argued that because Spinoza defines God as a being that is “absolutely infinite” (*absolute infinitum*), “consisting of an infinity of attributes” (*constantem infinitis attributis*) (*Ethics*, ID6), and because human beings can conceive of only two such attributes (see Letter 64 [IV/277/10–278/5]), God’s being — like that of Śaṅkara’s Brahman — is infinitely greater than what is humanly knowable.\textsuperscript{163} There are two problems with this reasoning. First, it fails to recognize that the attributes constitute aspects of the same substance, not different substances. Therefore, although they are ontologically real, they do not multiply God’s being. Second, Spinoza does not commit himself to the actual existence of any attributes other than thought and extension; rather, he commits himself to the assertion that God is unconstrained, free, and independent, which is what Spinoza means when he uses the term “infinite.” God must have “infinite” attributes because any limitation as to the number of God’s attributes would imply the existence of something outside God that imposes that limitation, but no such thing exists. As Spinoza explains:

We form the axiom [that God has infinite attributes

\textsuperscript{162} Spinoza also defines the attributes as “whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance” (*quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest, tanquam substantiae essentiam constituens*). (*Ethics*, IIP7, Schol., italics added.)

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\[(Ethics, \text{IP10, Schol.})\] from the idea we have of an absolutely infinite Being . . . , and not from the fact that there are, or could be, beings which have three, four, etc., attributes. \((Axioma \ Scholii \ Prop. \ 10. \ p. \ 1. \ ut \ in \ fine \ ejusd. \ Scholii \ innui, \ formamus \ ex \ ideà, \ quam \ habemus \ Entis \ absolutè \ infiniti, \ & \ non \ ex \ eo, \ quòd \ dentur, \ aut \ possint \ dari \ entia, \ quae \ tria, \ quatuor, \ &c. \ attributa \ habeant.)\)

(Letter 64 [IV/278/20–25], italics added.)

In summary, in Spinoza’s philosophy, the attributes of substance are ontologically real, which means that the world is real, and the attributes of substance are infinite in number, but such infinitude does not place God’s essence beyond the reach of the human mind.

5. Neutral Monism — A Dream World That Is Real

Scholars have noticed numerous similarities between Spinoza’s philosophy and Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. Among other things, scholars have pointed out (1) that Spinoza’s divine “substance” \((\text{substantia})\) corresponds to Śaṅkara’s Brahman; (2) that for both philosophers, the physical world is law-bound, and free will is in some sense illusory; (3) that for both philosophers, human categories of morality do not apply to God; (4) that for both philosophers, the consciousness of the individual partakes of God’s own consciousness; (5) that both philosophers recognize three types of knowledge, one based on sensory impressions, another based on reason, and a third based on direct knowledge of God’s essence; (6) that both philosophers urge us to follow reason instead of passion; and (7) that for both philosophers, knowledge of truth leads to human perfection and to enduring joy \((\text{laetitia})\) or bliss \((\text{ānanda})\). (See generally Appendix One, p. 225, below.)

But despite these important similarities, we have seen that Spinoza’s philosophy sharply differs from Śaṅkara’s Vedānta as
regards the status of the objective world. As Bina Gupta put it in her 1984 article for the *India Philosophical Quarterly*: “The intuitive knowledge of God which Spinoza seeks is a way to understand the world as it really is. It is not a flight from the material world, but a celebration of its essential nature and oneness. The pursuit of Brahman, on the other hand, implies repudiation of the world: it is a realization that Brahman is the only reality; the world is merely an appearance and the [individual soul] and Brahman are non-different.” Gupta’s observation is a valid one, but it is worth noting that in drawing this distinction between Spinoza’s philosophy and Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, Gupta and others identify the precise point that makes Spinoza’s philosophy similar to *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy. Spinoza’s philosophy, like *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism, offers a synthesis of materialism and idealism, validating both. In both these philosophical systems, the physical world is real in every significant sense, adhering to immutable physical laws and expressing a real essence of God. But even so, every particle of this physical world corresponds to a thought of itself, and thought and matter are dual aspects of a nondual core.

Significantly, Spinoza’s “neutral monism” (neutral between materialism and idealism) resolves many of the problems we associated with other solutions to the mind-body problem. First, by denying the reality of thought-matter dualism, and it solves the problem of how something immaterial (a mind) can have a causal effect on something material (a body). Thoughts cause thoughts, and material events cause material events, but the two progressions describe the same progression — their difference being only one of

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aspect.

In addition, neutral monism answers ontological questions about matter, space, and time, questions that the materialist leaves unanswered. Matter and thought are the same thing, and space and time are merely information.

Finally, neutral monism parries the accusation of solipsism that is often directed against idealism. The idealism that the Pratyabhijñā masters and Spinoza present to us is a diffuse non-reductive idealism in which perceived things have intrinsic being because they are themselves the locus of the consciousness that constitutes their existence. They are not just dream images; they are also dreamers. The universal nondual consciousness delights in its consciousness of itself, and it is conscious of itself from countless perspectives, so as to delight in itself all the more.
Part Four: Some Ramifications

1. The Evolution of the Soul

To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree. When it was first said that the sun stood still and the world turned round, the common sense of mankind declared the doctrine false; but the old saying of Vox populi, vox Dei [("The voice of the people is the voice of God")], as every philosopher knows, cannot be trusted in science. Reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a simple and imperfect eye to one complex and perfect can be shown to exist, each grade being useful to its possessor, as is certainly the case; if further, the eye ever varies and the variations be inherited, as is likewise certainly the case and if such variations should be useful to any animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insuperable by our imagination, should not be considered as subversive of the theory.\textsuperscript{166}

— Charles Darwin (1809–1882 C.E.)

We have seen that, according to Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, nondual consciousness of self (pratyavamarśa) is not just a special characteristic of neural cells or of the energy that flows through them. Rather, nondual consciousness of self is the intrinsic stuff of

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all being. The entire material universe is, as a whole and in each of its parts, conscious of itself, not in the way a subject is conscious of an object, but simply by being itself. And to the extent that any part of the material universe — say, a brain, or perhaps some component of a brain — is configured to reflect and represent internally the detailed characteristics of the world that surrounds it, that part’s knowing of itself can give rise to an inference about the characteristics of the surrounding world, and when it does, there becomes associated with that part what we call an “individual soul” and “subject-object consciousness.” And we have further seen that Spinoza makes the same assertions, although he doesn’t go so far as to say that nondual consciousness is the intrinsic stuff of all being. Instead, he simply says that all things have the thought of their own material form, and he adds that this thought and this material form are dual attributes of a single substance.

Of course, in an infinite universe such as ours, a universe governed by physical laws but also one that is dynamic and changing in every moment, there will naturally arise discrete systems that function more or less as units for a time. Their individuality might be only apparent, because no finite thing is completely independent of the things that surround it, but these discrete systems will nonetheless have a certain degree of independent existence, and they will tend to maintain their distinct form longer if chance has constructed them in a way that predisposes them to self-preservation. Hence, in an infinite universe such as ours, discrete systems that are self-preserving in some way will slowly become more prevalent, while those that are less self-preserving will dissipate and disappear. And two traits that vastly increase the self-preservation of any such system is its ability to recognize destructive forces in its environment and its ability to initiate defensive responses to avoid those destructive forces.

Moreover, the complex internal configuration that can enable such recognition and responsiveness will, in very many cases, be
the same sort of internal configuration that gives rise to an individual soul. Perhaps a very basic organism — say, a sea sponge (*phylum porifera*) — could function completely mechanistically, but if an organism is to have a more sophisticated ability to recognize and respond to external threats, it would need to have a very supple internal component that was capable of accurately reflecting and representing the changes occurring in its surrounding environment. And therefore, that component would have the precise characteristics that, according to both *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism and Spinoza, give rise to subject-object consciousness.\(^{167}\)

The implication of this brief discussion is, of course, that subject-object consciousness is something that evolved in our universe in the same way that the human eye evolved — simply by natural selection. And a further implication of this discussion is that functionalism turns out to be a viable theory for explaining the presence of subject-object consciousness. The internal structures that are necessary to perfectly mimic the behavior of a higher-order animal will, as a byproduct, give rise to an individual soul. I would add that functionalism, materialism, idealism, and parallelism are all, in their own ways, valid models for explaining human consciousness. The reason so many philosophers disagree about their “-isms” is that they have not transcended the subject-object divide.

### 2. Mind Meld

[W]e generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there before us “in person.” On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep us from

admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other’s own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same.\(^{168}\)

— Edmund Husserl (1859–1938 C.E.)

The foregoing discussion has, however, avoided addressing a troublesome detail. It is well and good to say that all things are conscious (conscious of self), but what in this context constitutes a “thing”? What defines the boundaries of a self-conscious unit? We can consider the problem both from a macro and a micro perspective. From the macro perspective, how can we speak of distinct “parts” of the material universe? Isn’t every so-called “part” fully determined, in both form and action, by all the things that surround it? Isn’t the entire universe a single individual that cannot be divided into parts, except perhaps by conventions of speech. And if so, how does the universal consciousness of self become segmentized into that of, say, a human brain? Or, considering the problem from the micro perspective, how does the consciousness of self associated with, say, a single subatomic particle merge with that of similar subatomic particles to become the consciousness of self associated with an atom, a molecule, a neural cell, and, finally, a collection of neural cells constituting a brain? In short, we have not really answered the mystery of consciousness (i.e., subject-object consciousness) until we have determined what sort of things can share a single mind.

Edmund Husserl, who is quoted at the beginning of this section, pointed out that a defining characteristic of any distinct mind is the inaccessibility of other minds, and conversely the accessibility of another’s mind makes that other mind, by definition, an extension of one’s own mind. (See *Cartesian Meditations*, § 50.)\(^{169}\) So, if clusters of subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, and neural cells can all somehow share a single merged mind, does it necessarily stop there? Could a group of people share a single mind as does the *homo gestalt* in Theodore Sturgeon’s *More Than Human*?

It may be that the minds of two or more people can in fact merge given the right circumstances. The two hemispheres of the human brain are in many ways redundant, meaning that if one hemisphere of the brain does not properly develop, a person can still function, albeit in a limited way. In a sense, then, most of us have two conscious brains, not one, and yet we experience both these conscious brains as a single mind.\(^{170}\) And if a person can merge the minds of two distinct brain hemispheres, then presumably two people can merge the minds of two distinct brains.

But what would it take for such a “mind meld” to occur? Presumably, it would take conditions similar to those that apply to the two hemispheres of the brain. The two people would need to be bound closely together, sharing similar sensory inputs, and they would need to be in close communication with each other. In addition, they would need to share a functional unity such that there was a systemwide advantage to having a single shared mind. Under those conditions, their sense of being two minds might

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\(^{169}\) A similar idea is expressed in Spinoza’s *Ethics*. See *Ethics*, IIA4, IIA5, and IIP13, Dem.

recede, and it might be replaced by a single merged mind.\textsuperscript{171}

According to Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, an object that maintains a particular form does so because it has a desire to do so, implying that every such object has its own mind. Hence, Somānanda said, “the riverbank wishes to collapse” (kūlaṃ pipatiṣati)\textsuperscript{172} — that is, it gives up the desire to maintain itself as a riverbank, and it adopts a different desire. This theory may seem naive, imputing volition to natural events (the tree desires to grow, the wind desires to blow, the mountain desires to stand firm, etc.), but if we consider that for an object to exist as a distinct object, it must have some physical forces or processes that maintain its form, and if we accept that thought and matter are the same thing, then the physical forces or processes that maintain an object’s form must correspond, in thought, to a will to do so. And that is exactly what Spinoza asserts:

Each thing, as far as it [can by its own power], strives to persevere in its being. (Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.) (Ethics, IIIP6.)\textsuperscript{173}

In other words, the affiliation of parts that defines a distinct material object is sufficient also to define a distinct mind, even if that mind is only the desire to maintain a particular form.

\textsuperscript{171} Cf. Della Rocca, Spinoza, pp. 115–117, esp. p. 117 [defining individual consciousness in terms of causal independence].

\textsuperscript{172} Śivadrṣṭi 5.17, italics added. See also id., 5.4.

\textsuperscript{173} Literally: “Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being”
3. Language and the Human Mind

Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.\textsuperscript{174}

— Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951 C.E.)

Without language, an individual soul’s perception of the external world is no more than a stream of incomprehensible data. But when a soul begins to categorize that incoming data by type and pattern, it is forming a protolanguage, and it can then begin to interpret the world it is perceiving. An animal may not attach a particular phoneme chain to the experience of water, but it recognizes water, because it is capable of categorizing the data that underlie its perceptions. It is able, in other words, to compare the received data against a catalog of stored archetypes, and by finding a match, it can recognize a thing such as water. Therefore, without language, no meaningful perception can occur.\textsuperscript{175}

It might be debated to what extent animals are born with this catalog of stored archetypes — this protolanguage — and to what extent they build it from experience. They are probably born with a large part of it, for even a newborn calf knows to suckle the teat of its mother, and many animals begin the process of navigating the world they inhabit within minutes or hours of birth.\textsuperscript{176} And because animals — including human ones — interpret the world by matching the data of perception against a catalog of archetypes, their knowing of the world is, in actuality, a knowing of their own

\textsuperscript{174} Zettel, no. 55, translated in Anscombe and von Wright (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Zettel, p. 12e.

\textsuperscript{175} See, e.g., Bhartṛhari’s Vākya-padiya 1.124.

\textsuperscript{176} Cf. Ethics, II40, Schol. 2; id., IIP49, Schol.
conceptions about the world, not a direct knowing of the world.

But even if animals are born with a catalog of stored archetypes, they also augment that catalog over time, based on their experiences, and some animals assign unique vocalizations or bodily movements to the most important archetypes, thus allowing them to communicate with one another. As a human child masters language, an ever-increasing vocabulary of phoneme chains is stored in its memory, and these phoneme chains can then be retrieved, arranged, and combined according to rules of grammar. As a result, human beings are able to describe past events, predict future benefits or dangers, and plan optimal responses, but most importantly, human beings are able to present to themselves, in the privacy of their own propositional thoughts — what Plato called \textit{dianoia} (διάνοια) — a narrative about the external world they are encountering.

Thus, the advanced linguistic capacity of human beings inalterably changes human perception. For a person, perception is not just a matter of recognizing water in a forest stream; a person is also able to formulate complex propositional thoughts about all the things that water implies. Most animals wander through the world recognizing categories such as food, shelter, and danger, and responding with appropriate patterned responses, but they do not construct an accompanying narrative about these experiences. Human perception, however, includes a narrative about a person living in a world, and that narrative affects what it means to have a conscious mind.

In other words, we use language not just to communicate with one another but also to communicate with \textit{ourselves}, and thus we generate a world of the imagination that rivals the world of sensory perception. Every experience is integrated into a story we are authoring about who we are, and if a particular experience doesn’t fit the story, we must change the story, or we experience a psychological crisis. And, if we are injured, we do not merely feel pain, as does an animal. We also include that pain in a narrative
about a person who suffers pain. The pain exists for a time, and then it ends, but the story about a person who had pain, and who will have pain, remains. And because of that story, our pain can become unbearable. Thus, language turns out to be a dangerous thing.

But propositional thought is not the only thing that colors human perception. Emotion does, too. A beautiful flower is not just a blend of shining colors; there is also a unique feeling in the body that accompanies a person’s perception of a flower, a feeling that is different for each person. Philosophers sometimes use the plural term “qualia” to refer to aspects of perception that are personal to the perceiver. They talk about “what it’s like” for Mary to see a particular flower, distinguishing that experience from “what it’s like” for John to see the same flower.

But this emotional aspect of human perception is easily explained. We have learned that subject-object consciousness is actually consciousness of one’s own self in which the external world is reflected like a city reflected in a mirror. But what happens if one sees just a little bit of the mirror’s surface in addition to seeing the distant city? What happens if physiological changes in one’s body distort one’s perception of some external object or event? The answer is that one experiences that distortion as an emotional coloration of the object of perception.  

Thus, the human experience of seeing a beautiful flower is a combination of (1) the perceived details of the flower (light frequencies, shape, texture, aroma, etc.), (2) a particular narrative about flowers running in one’s stream of proposition thoughts (youth, fertility, springtime, romance), and (3) the perception one has of one’s own physiology as it is affected by both the flower and the narrative (endorphin release, rapid heart rate, altered breathing pattern). And therefore, Mary’s seeing of a flower can never be the same as John’s seeing of it, because Mary and John

might be gazing at the same flower illuminated by the same setting sun, but the true content of Mary’s consciousness is her own self, and the true content of John’s consciousness is his own self. Each might be gazing at the same flower, but each is looking at it through a different mirror.

4. Mary Is Seeing Red

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes . . . . [¶] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room [and actually sees a ripe tomato for the first time] . . . ? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.178

— Frank Jackson (born 1943 C.E.)

Frank Jackson proposed the thought experiment of Mary and her black-and-white room — quoted above — as a way of showing that consciousness is something that exists independent of all the physical facts governing conscious experience. Consider the moment that Mary steps out of her black-and-white room and actually sees a ripe red tomato hanging on a vine in the afternoon

178 Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” p. 130.
sunlight. On the one hand, there are all the physical facts related to the sunlight, the tomato’s surface, the reflected light, Mary’s eye, her nervous system and brain, her brain’s electrical activity, etc. On the other hand, there is Mary’s subjective experience of seeing a red tomato for the first time. Thus, consciousness seems to be an additional fact, distinct from all the physical facts. Put another way, we can imagine the existence of all the physical facts (the sunlight, the tomato, the reflected light, the eye, the brain, the electrical activity, etc.) without consciousness being part of the show. The physical facts do not seem to demand consciousness, which seems therefore to be something extra.

But Mary’s consciousness is not an additional fact, distinct from all the physical facts involved in the act of seeing the red tomato; rather, her consciousness is the experience of being one of those physical facts.

One is reminded here of the story of the tenth man. Ten men cross a river that has a swift current. When they reach the other side, they want to confirm that no one has drowned. Each counts the others, and each counts only nine. Then they lament the loss of their colleague, but each has neglected to count himself. No one has actually been lost. The thought experiment of Mary and her black-and-white room is really a variant of that story. Imagine that each of the ten men counts ten physical bodies, including his own, but failing to recognize that he actually is one of those physical bodies, each man thinks there are now eleven men, one of whom — himself — is now a ghost. In that way, Mary’s study of the physical facts counts everything that is present, and she doesn’t find consciousness among the physical facts that are present, but her study doesn’t take into account that consciousness is what it feels like to be one of the physical facts. And once she corrects that mistake, she realizes that only a tomato can be conscious of a tomato, and only a bat knows what it is like to be a bat, and whether inside the room or out, Mary was only ever conscious of her own brain and nothing more.
5. The “You Are Here” Arrow

This is how we see the world. We see it [as if] outside ourselves, and at the same time we only have a representation of it in ourselves.\(^{179}\)

— René Magritte (1898–1967 C.E.)

According to both \textit{Pratyabhijñā} Shaivism and Spinoza, we know the external world by way of its reflection within our own being. And this phenomenon is universal. All things reflect internally, at least to a limited extent, what surrounds them, and therefore the world can be characterized as a vast house of mirrors, although most of those mirrors are relatively poor reflectors. It follows therefore that the more one investigates and accurately comprehends the true nature of the surrounding world, the more one replicates it within oneself. And perhaps becoming a thing by knowing it ever more perfectly is a suitable definition of love. The human soul can, therefore, be characterized as a mirror in a house of mirrors, and love cleans the glass. Love reveals to us that we are all really one.

Thoughtful people sometimes ask themselves, Why was I born as \textit{this} person and not as \textit{that}? Why am I this thoughtful reader of philosophy books? Why am I not that beggar, or that billionaire, or that bird? Such thoughts fail to recognize that consciousness is a single indivisible whole, just as the universe is a single indivisible whole. When gazing at the reflections of the sun in a series of water-filled jars, the sun appears to be many, and when looking at all the conscious beings in the world, each pursuing its individual interests, consciousness appears to be many, but there is only one sun, and there is only one consciousness. That is the teaching of

Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, and it is also the teaching of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism and Spinoza.

We are individuals only insofar as we perceive the world through the mediation of our sense organs rather than resting in the universal nondual consciousness that we are. Relying on our sense organs, we imagine that we are tiny souls inhabiting a vast external universe, and like the image of the world reflected in the mirrored surface of a crystal ball, everything for us then becomes distorted relative to a unique point of observation. But even so, we are all reflecting the same universe, and therefore we are one.

One way to think about individuality is in terms of map-territory relation. Alfred Korzybski pointed out that maps are useful to us precisely because they are not perfect one-to-one replicas of the territory we wish to know. Rather they are representations of that territory:

A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Korzybski, Science and Sanity, p. 58.
And yet, paradoxically, we often confuse representations of reality for reality itself, and the best example is the representation of reality that appears inside each of us, by which the world becomes knowable to us. That representation is not the world; rather, it is a map of the world. But we look at it (i.e., we look at ourselves) and think, I’m looking at the world.

This concept is wonderfully illustrated by René Magritte’s *The Human Condition* (1933). Magritte described his famous painting in this way: “In front of a window seen from inside a room, I placed a painting representing exactly that portion of the landscape covered by the painting. Thus, the tree in the picture hid the [real] tree behind it, outside the room. For the spectator, [the tree] was both inside the room within the painting and outside in the real landscape. *This is how we see the world. We see it [as if] outside ourselves, and at the same time we only have a representation of it in ourselves.*”

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Magritte sought to convey through his art that our knowing of the world is, in every case, only the knowing of an interpretation of the world; it is the knowing of a symbol that, for us, stands in place of the world. “How can anyone enjoy interpreting symbols?” Magritte asked in a letter to a friend. “They are ‘substitutes’ that are only useful to a mind that is incapable of knowing the things themselves. A devotee of interpretation cannot see a bird; he only sees it as a symbol.”¹⁸³

In our knowing of the world, each of us becomes a map of that world, a map that distorts the world relative to particular location

in space-time. And because of that distortion, we think, I am not that beggar, I am not that billionaire, I am not that bird. But by investigating and accurately comprehending the true nature of the surrounding world, we map the world ever more perfectly, and as others do the same, we close the illusory gap that separates us from one another. Each of us maps the same territory, but for each of us there is a different “You are here” arrow at the center of the map. We need to remove the “You are here” arrow. And then, in the mystical words of Emily Dickinson (1830–1886 C.E.),\(^{184}\) we can say:

\begin{quote}
The Brain - is wider than the Sky - 
For - put them side by side - 
The one the other will contain 
With ease - and You - beside - \\

The Brain is deeper than the sea - 
For - hold them - Blue to Blue - 
The one the other will absorb - 
As Sponges - Buckets - do - \\

The Brain is just the weight of God - 
For - Heft them - Pound for Pound - 
And they will differ - if they do - 
As Syllable from Sound -
\end{quote}

\(^{184}\) Franklin,\, \textit{The Poems of Emily Dickinson}, p. 269.
Part Five: Consciousness Explained?

It is only when Citi, the ultimate consciousness-power, comes into play that the universe comes forth into being, and continues as existent, and when it withdraws its movement, the universe also disappears from view. One’s own experience would bear witness to this fact. The other things [said to be the foundation of existence] . . . , since they are (supposed to be) different from the light of consciousness can never be a cause of anything, for not being able to appear owing to their supposed difference from consciousness-power, they are (as good as) nonexistent. But if they appear, they become one with the light (of consciousness). Hence, Citi, which is that light alone, is the cause. Never [are] the other [things] any cause. (asyāṃ hi prasarantarvāṃ jagat unmiṣati vyavatiṣṭhate ca nivrta-prasarāvāṃ ca nimiṣati iti svānubhava eva atra sākṣī | ānyasya tu māyāprakṛtyādeḥ citprakāśabhinnasya aprakāśamānānaitvena asattvān na kvacid api hetutvam prakāśamānātve tu prakāśaikātmyāt prakāśarūpa citir eva hetuḥ na tv asau kaścit)\textsuperscript{185}

— Kṣemarāja (10th–11th centuries C.E.)

Many philosophers — unable to overcome the subject-object divide — take the physical universe as a given, and they consider consciousness to be something extra, something that, in theory at least, could disappear from the physical universe, and the universe could continue just fine without it.\textsuperscript{186} For them, the physical


\textsuperscript{186} See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 75–76.
universe does not depend on consciousness; rather, consciousness depends on the physical universe. These philosophers happily accept the existence of space, time, and matter, and then they imagine such strange things as universes known by no one and nothing. They even imagine “zombies” — by which they mean bodies that are constructed and function exactly like living human bodies but that have no consciousness. These philosophers do not question the existence of the physical universe, but they question why, for certain complex organic structures, there is something it feels like, subjectively, to be that thing. They wonder, in other words, how it could be that some physical things have souls.

But existence is just as much a philosophical riddle as consciousness. Where, or in what, is this vast expanse of spacetime located? And how did it come to contain all these galaxies and blackholes, fermions and bosons, and all the rest? And most importantly, if it all could still exist independently of consciousness, then what could be its significance? These questions are all answered when the problem of existence finds its solution in consciousness — the nondual consciousness that Sartre called conscience non positionnelle (de) soi.

This nondual consciousness is not a conglomerate, not an amalgam, not divisible into parts. Nothing is separate from it; nothing is outside it. It is without limitation or constraint. It is independent, absolutely free. It is its own purpose, which is only to delight in its own existence. It is anything one might call God and anything one might call non-God. It is closer to each of us than anything we could seek, closer even than our own name and form. It is the soul of the soul, the self of the self, the I of the I.

This consciousness has no location, size, or duration. It didn’t come into existence; it can’t cease to exist. It isn’t inside time, space, and matter; rather, time, space, and matter are inside it. And time, space, and matter are real because the physical laws that are their basis are immutable.

This consciousness marks the horizon of existence; its absence
is the same as nonexistence. And by “nonexistence” is not meant emptiness. Rather, the absence of consciousness is simply an impossibility, because consciousness and being are the same thing.

These metaphysical principles are commonplace in the texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. Spinoza, however, is less explicit about the unity of consciousness and being. To be sure, Spinoza explicitly asserts a parallelism of thought and being. For example, Spinoza says:

In God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence. (In Deo datur necessario idea, tam ejus essentiae quam omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.) (Ethics, IIP3.)

But that is not quite the same as saying that consciousness is the underlying stuff of existence. As Yitzhak Melamed points out, “we have opposite reductive pressures on both sides of the thought-being equilibrium.” For Spinoza, “to be is to be conceived” (being = thought), but it is also true that for Spinoza, “to be conceived is to be” (thought = being). Neither thought nor being can be eliminated in favor of the other.

But we can thread the needle by putting aside the notion that the “consciousness” that is the underlying stuff of existence refers to “thought,” meaning the subject side of the subject-object divide. If the word “consciousness” instead refers to nondual consciousness of self (conscience non positionnelle (de) soi), then Spinoza’s explicit rejection of subjective idealism — his refusal to

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187 On this topic, see Melamed, *Spinoza’s Metaphysics*, pp. 139–152.

188 Melamed, *Spinoza’s Metaphysics*, p. 197. See generally id., pp. 179–199 [arguing that Spinoza embraced a dualism of thought and being].

reduce all things to thought — tells us nothing about consciousness, which mediates thought and extension as the underlying substance (substantia) of each.
Part Six: Freedom in a Deterministic Universe

1. Fables and Fantasies

But if you believe that God speaks more clearly and effectively through sacred Scripture than through the light of the natural intellect, which he has also granted us, and which, with his Divine Wisdom, he continually preserves, strong and uncorrupted, then you have powerful reasons for bending your intellect to the opinions you attribute to sacred Scripture. (Verùm si deprehandas, Deum per sacram Scripturam clariùs, & efficaciùs loqui, quàm per lumen naturalis intellectus, quod nobis etiam concessit, ac assiduò Sapientiâ suà Divinâ firmiter, & incorruptè conservat, validas habes rationes, ut intellectum flectas ad opiniones, quas sacrae Scripturae tribuis . . . .)\textsuperscript{190}

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

As philosophies go, determinism doesn’t win many popularity contests. No one wants to be controlled. It cuts us to the core, for if we are controlled, then we have no agency, and if we have no agency, then we do not really exist, at least not in the individual sense that we find meaningful. And if we have no agency even as to our thoughts, then we have no agency at all. Determinism implies ego death, and the ego doesn’t want to die. If one examines the question closely, one realizes that it is the ego that most resists determinism.

But as Spinoza pointed out, “it is no obstacle to the truth of a thing that it is not accepted by many.”\textsuperscript{191} We don’t decide

\begin{footnotes}
\item[190] Letter 21 [IV/126/15–25].
\item[191] Short Treatise II, xxvi, 10.
\end{footnotes}
philosophical questions by majority vote. Rather, we need to realign our conception of self to make the truth less unappealing. The famous 20th century nondualist Nisargadatta Maharaj (1897–1981 C.E.) taught that enlightenment is as simple as “That art thou” (*tat tvam asi*); the difficult part is believing it. Significantly, many people who reject determinism, insisting vehemently that they have the freedom to choose their course of action in every moment, are quite comfortable with the idea of divine foreknowledge. They are quite comfortable, that is, with the idea that God’s knows in advance what course of action they will choose.

The laws of physics imply a fully deterministic universe that denies the possibility of personal agency, and both Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā Shaivism embrace that principle, albeit with some nuance, as we shall see. Spinoza, however, is particularly explicit and unambiguous on the point. He asserts, for example: “In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (*In rerum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum*). (*Ethics*, IP29.) And, he adds: “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced” (*Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productae sunt*) (*Id.*, IP33.) But Spinoza — for whom thought and matter are the same thing — goes a step further. He argues that determinism applies even as regards the psyche’s flow of thoughts and desires: “In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined [(i.e., caused)] to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity” (*In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas; sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum*). (*Id.*, IIP48. Accord, *id.*, IP32, with Dem. and Cor. 2.)

Few people are ready to accept Spinoza’s uncompromising
The Nondual Mind

The sense we have of personal agency is directly related to the Cartesian paradigm of a soul piloting a body. But if we consider that the observable universe is a single interdependent unity that cannot logically be divided into parts, then our resistance to determinism slowly dissolves in favor of a much nobler conception of who we are and what it means to be free. In short, the individual person that we imagine ourselves to be doesn’t actually exist, and therefore the question of its freedom is simply irrelevant. Ramana Maharshi, the South Indian sage who attracted many people to nondual philosophy, taught that one should “enquire for whom is this destiny and [one should thus] discover that only the ego is bound by destiny... and that the ego is non-existent.”

There is no point in arguing about whether the wings on a pig are covered with hair or feathers, because pigs don’t really have wings. Similarly, there is no point in arguing about whether the individual soul of a person is free or bound, because people don’t really have individual souls. And as for one’s true self — universal nondual consciousness — it is supremely independent and free,
much more independent and free than any individual soul could ever be. But to arrive at that new construction of self, the illusory ego-self must die, and the ego-self doesn’t want to die, so people resist determinism, and they cling to fables and fantasies that reinforce their false (i.e., Cartesian) construction of who they are. And some of those fables and fantasies have even become the daily fare of religion.

Spinoza was not opposed to religion or to the religious life. Rather, he greatly appreciated the ability of prophets, acting by means of the imagination, to inspire and motivate people toward lives of piety and moral rectitude. The rituals, ceremonies, holidays, iconography, cosmogony, moral theories, and lore of religion all add a special richness to life, and these metaphorical teaching tools educate in ways that dry philosophical prose does not. Like poetry and music, these aspects of religion reach deep into the human psyche and communicate at that level. For Spinoza, their validity was not their philosophical truth; rather, it was there motivating power.

Spinoza also recognized that, for most people, religion fills a psycho-spiritual gap left open by a misunderstanding of determinism. When people hear about determinism, they think that it eliminates the justification for praise and blame. In a world that functions solely in accordance with deterministic physical laws, they ask, how can we say that any action has a moral quality, whether good or bad? Of course, every act has consequences, but in a fully deterministic world, what basis is there for imagining moral consequences? Most people intuitively recoil from the nihilism that determinism seems to imply, and for them, faith in a moralistic God provides a much-needed bulwark against the rising tide of nihilism that they associate with modern culture. Indeed, it

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193 In his *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza distinguished between philosophy and religion, arguing that each had its appropriate role and that they were mutually compatible.
was with a desire to fill that psycho-spiritual gap — that is, to validate moral behavior in a deterministic universe — that Spinoza wrote the *Ethics*.

In many cases, people love God because they imagine God to have idealized anthropomorphic qualities like kindness, compassion, self-sacrifice, providence, justice, and just a touch of righteous anger. Neither Vedānta’s “universal Self,” nor *Pratyabhijñā* Shaivism’s “nondual consciousness,” nor Spinoza’s “infinite intellect” is likely to evoke tears of heartfelt devotion or to inspire a selfish man to repent. But in place of these dry philosophical conceptions of God, religion offers us a God that has an inner psychology very much like our own. It offers us a loving and just God that we can emulate. It offers us a personal God that the great philosopher-saints — whether Śaṅkara, Abhinavagupta, or Spinoza — dare not take away.

All that is true, and yet it is also true, as Spinoza well knew, that religion meets people where they are, and it speaks to the doubts and fears they feel in that place. And, as noted, most people imagine themselves to be an individual soul piloting a body, and they don’t want to wake up from that dream. And for a person who is dreaming that dream, nothing reinforces the dream more powerfully than the belief that one can exercise one’s free will, and nothing disturbs the dream more powerfully than the body’s inevitable mortality. Thus, the two greatest fears most people have are (1) loss of personal agency and (2) bodily death. The first implies that we do not really exist as individuals, and the second implies that our existence as individuals is fleeting, relatively meaningless, and will end too-often in pain.

It is no accident, then, that the two main topics of most religions are moral choice and the immortality of the soul. The raw material of religion is the stories that people like to tell, and people like to tell stories about heroes who, exercising their free will, navigated extremely difficult moral dilemmas. And they like to tell stories about the wonderful adventures of the soul before its birth.
in a body or after the body’s death. And they even like to tell a few stories that might wake a person up from the dream of personhood.

2. You Cannot Find the Chooser

If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. . . . [¶] . . . If one thinks out to the very last consequence what one exactly knows and understands, there will be hardly any human being who will be impervious to this view, provided his self-love does not ruffle up against it. Man defends himself from being regarded as an impotent object in the course of the Universe. But should the lawfulness of events, such as unveils itself more or less clearly in inorganic nature, cease to function in front of the activities in our brain?\textsuperscript{194}

— Albert Einstein (1879–1955 C.E.)

When confronted by Spinoza’s deterministic view of the universe, one might immediately object, as did the mathematician Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708 C.E.), that one has the daily experience of making choices — exercising one’s free will, that is — and that this direct experience suffices to disprove determinism. “For who,” Tschirnhaus asked, “would deny, except by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think, in my thoughts, that [now] I want to write, and that [now] I do not want to write[?]” But Spinoza responded that this feeling of freely

exercising one’s will is merely an illusion. Surely, when one is making a choice, there exists some physical brain-event corresponding to the thought one is having, and if so, then a very expert neuroscientist could, at least in theory, trace the physical causes of that brain-event, and those physical causes would be wholly sufficient to explain why the event occurred and, therefore, why the corresponding thought occurred. There is, then, no need for an individual soul that exercises free will. The physical brain, operating according to immutable laws of physics, is perfectly capable of doing all the choosing by itself. Moreover, in a physical system that is causally complete and closed, each event occurring of necessity based on all the events that precede it, there is simply no wiggle room — no non-inevitability — that allows for the exercise of free will.

And quantum physics offers no solution to the puzzle because quantum physics is fully constrained by fixed probabilities. Therefore, it, too, leaves no room for the exercise of true freedom. Thus, according to Spinoza, Tschirnhaus’s experience of exercising his free will — now choosing to write, now choosing not to write — proves nothing more than “that the mind is [not] always equally capable of thinking of the same object.” (Letter 58 [IV/267/20–25]; see Ethics, IIIP2, Schol.)

So let’s consider: What if Spinoza is correct? What if the laws of physics really are making all the choices one imagines oneself to be making? What if all the deliberations that go into the decisionmaking process have a physical substratum and are physically determined? What if one is merely the knower of the decisionmaking process, not its decider? It certainly feels as if one is choosing, but the decision is an inevitable consequence of all

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195 The question and Spinoza’s response appear in a letter Spinoza wrote to a Leiden medical student named Georg Hermann Schuller (1651–1679 C.E.), but in that letter, Spinoza answers questions posed by Tschirnhaus. (See Letters 57 and 58 [IV/262–IV/267].)
that precedes it, or, perhaps, a fixed probability based on all that precedes it. Yes, one faces a choice, and yes, one makes the decision, but only in a mechanistic sense, for every step in the decisionmaking process is governed by physical laws.

An anecdote about Albert Einstein illustrates this point. Einstein was once seen on Nassau Street in Princeton, looking pensive as he waited to cross the street. A student asked him, “Prof. Einstein, what are you contemplating?” The student supposed that the famous scientist was struggling with some difficult question of theoretical physics, but Einstein gestured across to the popular Baltimore Dairy Lunch and said, “Whether to have chocolate or vanilla.”

So, let us imagine, as a thought experiment, that you, the reader, are contemplating a binary decision — perhaps, whether to have chocolate or vanilla ice cream at “The Balt.” Imagine further that the desirability of both options is more or less equal in your estimation, and therefore the choice between the two is not an obvious one. You contemplate the chocolate; then you contemplate the vanilla. Perhaps you even imagine the experience of each based on memories of past visits to The Balt. And then a thought appears in your mind: Chocolate. You step forward to the counter and say, “I’ll have a scoop of the chocolate, please,” and you think to yourself, “I chose the chocolate.”

But you didn’t choose anything, except in a mechanistic sense, for with what meta-mind did you choose which thought would enter your mind as you chose which ice cream to order? And if there is such a meta-mind, with what meta-meta-mind did you choose its thoughts? And the question can be asked ad infinitum. What actually happened when you chose the chocolate is that you were conscious of two options, and then you were conscious of a

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196 This story was related to the present author by his father, who was a student at Princeton in the mid 1950s. It was circulating on campus at the time.
selection that took the form of a strong thought in favor of one of the two options, and then you asserted ownership of that selection, declaring mentally that you had chosen the chocolate, after which you were conscious of, and reveled in, a sense of personal agency. But if the vanilla-thought had come instead of the chocolate-thought, then vanilla would have been your choice, and then you would have said about *that* choice that you had chosen the vanilla, and again you would have reveled in a sense of personal agency.

And that is the point Spinoza made in his letter responding to Tschirnhaus. The passage has already been quoted in part above, but the fuller version is worth reading:

But let’s examine created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to produce effects in a definite and determinate way. To clearly understand this, let’s conceive something very simple. Suppose a stone receives, from an external cause which strikes against it, a certain quantity of motion, by which it afterward will necessarily continue to move, even though the impulse of the external cause ceases. This continuance of the stone in motion, then, is compelled, . . . because it must be defined by the impulse of the external cause. What I say here about the stone must be understood concerning any singular thing, however composite it is conceived to be, and however capable of doing many things: each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate way. 

(Sed ad res creatas descendamus, quae omnes à causis externis determinantur ad existendum, & operandum certâ, ac determinatâ ratione. Quod ut clärè intelligatur, rem simplicissimam concepiamus. Ex. gr. Lapis à causâ externâ, ipsum impellente, certam motûs quantitatem accipit, quà postea, cessante causae externae impulsu, moveri necessariò perget. Haec igitur lapidis in
motu permanentia coäcta est, . . . quia impulsu causae externae definiri debet; & quod hic de lapide, id de quâcunque re singulari, quantumvis illa composita, & ad plurima apta esse concipiatur, intelligendum est, quòd scilicet unaquaeque res necessariò à causâ externâ aliquå determinatur ad existendum, & operandum certâ, ac determinatâ ratione.)

Next, conceive now, if you will, that while the stone continues to move, it thinks, and knows that as far as it can, it strives to continue moving. Of course, since the stone is conscious only of its striving, and not at all indifferent, it will believe that it is very free, and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause than because it wills to. This is that famous human freedom everyone brags of having, which consists only in this: that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. So the infant believes that he freely wants the milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. . . . (Porrò, concipe jam, si placet, lapidem, dum moveri pergit, cogitare, & scire, se, quantum potest, conari, ut moveri pergat. Hic sanè lapis, quandoquidem sui tantummodò conatûs est conscius, & minimè indifferens, se liberrimum esse, & nullâ aliâ de causâ in motu perseverare credet, quàm quia vult. Atque haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere jactant, & quae in hoc solo consistit, quòd homines sui appetitûs sint conscii, & causarum, à quibus determinantur, ignari. Sic infans se lac liberè appetere credit; puer autem iratus vindictam velle, & timidus fugam. . . .)

. . . For though experience teaches quite abundantly that there is nothing less in man’s power than to restrain his appetites, and that often, when men are torn by contrary affects, they see the better and follow the worse,
they still believe themselves to be free . . . . (Nam quamvis experientia satis superque doceat, homines nihil minus posse, quàm appetitūs moderari suos, & quōd saepe, dum contrariis affectibus conflictantur, meliora videant, & deteriora sequantur, se tamen liberos esse credunt . . . .)
(Letter 58 [IV/266], italics added.)

What Spinoza is explaining in this letter is that the laws of physics are the actual causes of all our choices, but our ignorance of the precise cause-and-effect sequence that underlies our choices leads us to believe (wrongly) that we are making “free” choices.

Spinoza makes the same point more formally in the *Ethics*. He writes:

[People] are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom — that they do not know any cause of their actions. (Falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse putant, quae opinio in hoc solo consistit, quod suarum actionum sint consciī et ignari causarum, a quibus determinantur. Haec ergo est eorum libertatis idea, quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam.) (Ethics, IIP35, Schol.; see id., IP33, Schol. 1.)

And as mentioned, the same idea appears in the literature of Vedānta. The *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* states that our actions give rise to our character and desires, and our character and desires give rise to our actions, in an ongoing cause-and-effect cycle that is fully sufficient to explain human behavior. Specifically, the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* states:

According as one acts, according as one conducts himself,
so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. The
doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by
virtuous action, bad by bad action. [¶] . . . [And] as is his
desire, such is his resolve; as is his resolve, such the
action he performs; what action (karma) he performs, that
he procures for himself. (yathākārī yathācārī tathā
bhavati | sādhukārī sādhur bhavati | pāpakārī pāpo
bhavati | punyah puṇyaṇa karmaṇā pāpah pāpena | . . . sa
yathākāmo bhavati tatkratur bhavati | yatkratur bhavati
tat karma kurute | yat karma kurute tad
abhisampadyate)197

In short, it is the flow of cause and effect, not free will, that
governs our character and hence our actions. And the Kaushātaki
Upaniṣad says:

This one [(i.e., Brahman)], truly, indeed, causes him
whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, to perform
good action. This one, also, indeed, causes him whom he
wishes to lead downward, to perform bad action. (eṣa
hyeva sādhu karma kārayati taṁ yam ebhyo lokebhya
unninīṣate | eṣa u evāsādhu karma kārayati taṁ yam adho
ninīṣate)198

Similarly, in the Bhagavad Gītā, we read:

197 Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5, translated in Hume, The Thirteen
Principal Upanishads, p. 140. See also Kena Upaniṣad 1.1, Hume, p.
335 [“By whom impelled soars forth the mind projected?”].

198 Kaushātaki Upaniṣad 3.8.33–34, translated in Hume, The Thirteen
Principal Upanishads, p. 328. The Sanskrit text of the Kaushātaki
Upaniṣad is from the Thesaurus Indogermanischer Text- und
Sprachmaterialien (TITUS).
None indeed, even for a moment, remains without doing [actions]. All, being dependent, are made to [act] by the constituents of Prakṛti [(i.e., by the natural forces)]. (na hi kaścīt kṣaṇam api jātu tiṣṭhāty akarmakṛt | kāryate hy avaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ prakṛtijair guṇaiḥ)

[Actions] are being done in all ways by the constituents of Prakṛti [(i.e., by the natural forces)]. He whose mind is deluded by egoism thinks, “I am the agent.” (prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvasaḥ | ahaṃkāra-vimūḍhātmā kartāham iti manyate)

Even a man of knowledge behaves according to his nature. All living beings conform to nature. What can repression avail? (sāḍṛśaṃ ceṣṭate svasyāḥ prakṛter jñānavān api | prakṛtīṁ yānti bhūtāni nigrahaḥ kiṃ kariṣyati)\(^{199}\)

These verses from the Bhagavad Gītā are so similar to what Spinoza says about human behavior that it merits quoting Spinoza here:

But these turmoils [of current events] move me, neither to laughter nor even to tears, but to philosophizing and to observing human nature better. For I do not think it right for me to mock nature, much less to lament it, when I reflect that men, like all other things, are only a part of nature . . . . (Me tamen hae turbae nec ad risum, nec etiam ad lacrymandum, sed potius ad philosophandum, & humanam naturam melius observandum, incitant. Nam nec naturam irridere, mihi fās existimo, multō minūs

ipsam deplorare, dum cogito, homines, ut reliqua, partem tantum esse naturae . . . .) (Letter 30 [IV/166/10–15])

Śaṅkara, not surprisingly, holds a similar view regarding determinism. In his commentary on the last of the Bhagavad Gītā verses quoted above, Śaṅkara says:

[The reference to] “nature” means impressions of work, righteous and unrighteous, done already, which manifest themselves in the present life or later. According to that nature, every living being — even one who has knowledge — behaves; let alone the foolish. Therefore all living beings conform to nature. (prakṛtīṁ yānty anugacchanti bhūtāni prāṇīnaḥ)

And the way out of this law of “conform[ity] to nature” is not to deny determinism but rather to change one’s sense of self. Śaṅkara says:

Indeed it is the ignorant who mistake for selves “the fruit and its cause” [(i.e., the deterministic flow of cause and effect)], which are non-selves; the enlightened never do so. Perceiving the otherness of the Self from “the fruit and its cause,” it is inconsistent for the enlightened to mistake

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200 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya III, 33.1, translated in Warrier, Srīmad Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya of Sri Saṅkarācārya, p. 125. See also Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya 1.1, translated in Sastri, The Isa, Kena & Mundaka Upanishads, p. 38 [“If the mind were independent in the pursuit of its objects or in desisting from pursuit, then it is not possible for any one to contemplate evil; but man, conscious of evil results, wills evil, and the mind though dissuaded, attempts deeds of serious evil consequences.”].
the latter for the real Self. (aviduṣāṃ hi phala-hetvor anātmanor ātma-darśanam, na viduṣāṃ | viduṣāṃ hi phala-hetubhyām ātmano 'nyatva-darśane sati, tayor aham ity ātma-darśanānupapatteḥ)201

And as we have seen, Śaṅkara makes a similar point in Vivekacūḍāmaṇi. Identifying determinism with the material body, he says:

The body of one who is liberated moves here and there, [compelled] by the vital airs, just as the slough of a snake [is blown about by the wind]. (ahirnirlvayanīṁ vāyaṁ muktvā dehaṁ tu tiṣṭhati | itastataścālyamāno yat kimcit prāṇavāyunā)

Just as a piece of wood is tossed by the current to high or low ground, so too a body is carried here and there by destiny as determined by the momentum of its past actions. (strotasā nīyate dāru yathā nimnonnata-sthalam | daivena nīyate deho yathākālopabhuktiṣu)202

We find the same determinism in the texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, which describe choice as a mechanistic process that we erroneously take to be an exercise of free will. A passage from Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-Nirñaya speaks of the “senses,” a technical term that does not refer merely to the five senses of perception (the tanmātras) and their corresponding sense organs (the jñānendriyas), but also to the organs of action by which we engage

201 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya XIII, 2.11, translated in Warrier, Srīmad Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya of Sri Saṅkarācārya, p. 412.

202 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 549–550 (GRETiL), translated in Grimes, The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, p. 265 (Samata edition, vv. 550–551). Similar ideas appear in the Ashtāvakra Gītā, which may have been authored by one of Śaṅkara’s students. See Ashtāvakra Gītā XI, 2–4; XVIII, 25.
the world through the senses (the *karmendriyas*). Kṣemarāja says:

>[T]hat Spanda principle not only moves the senses [(karaṇāṇi; lit.: “instruments of action”)] but rather by infusing consciousness into the supposed experiencer makes him capable of effecting the movement, etc. of the senses by virtue of which he is full of the erroneous conception, “I am directing the senses.” He himself is nothing without the infusion of the Spanda principle into him. Therefore, it is perfectly right to say that one should examine that principle which provides consciousness to both the senses and the perceiver by the impenetration of the forth-going rays of its own light. [¶] If it is maintained that one directs the senses by an internal sense which uses a goad called desire, then that sense called desire, being itself of the nature of the directed, would require another sense for setting it in motion, and that in its turn would require another, and so on. Thus there would be a regressus ad infinitum. (tattattvāṁ na kevalāṁ karaṇāṇi yāvattatprerakatvena śaṅkitāṁ kalpitamapi pramātāraṁ cetanikṛtya svayaṁ pravrīṭtyādipātāṁ karoṭi yenāsyāyamabhimāno'haṁ karaṇāṇi prerayāmītī | spandatattvānuvedhamā vināpi tu sa eva na kiṃcidīti karaṇāṇāṁ grāhakasya ca svaraśmicakra-prasarānuvedhena cetanībhāvāpādakaṁ tattvāṁ parīkṣyamīti yuktameva | yadi punaricchākhhyena pratodarūpeṇa karaṇāntareṇa karaṇāṇi prerayet tadapācchākhyaṁ karaṇāṁ preraytvaṅkaraṇāntaraṁ svapreraṇāyāpekṣeta tadyanyadityanavasthā syāt|203

This text is difficult, but Kṣemarāja is saying that we do not

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actually choose our desires or our actions; rather, we are caused to desire and to act, and then, after witnessing the desire and the action, we imagine that we have made the choice so to desire and so to act. And that, of course, is exactly what Spinoza explained in his letter answering Tschirnhaus’s doubt.

In different ways, all these passages deny the reality of the individual soul’s subjective sense of agency. But the quotation from Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-Nirṇaya also points out the impossibility of searching within oneself and finding the chooser. As Kṣemarāja explains, if one maintains that there is a special faculty by which one forms the desire that goads one’s senses and action, then with what special faculty does one form the desire that goads that desire? In other words, one has merely rephrased the problem, not answered it. And if one cannot find the chooser, then one cannot find an individual soul that has agency, and if one cannot find an individual soul that has agency, then one cannot find a soul that resembles the soul of Cartesian dualism.

The Buddhists call that experience “emptiness” (śūnyatā), and whether one is a physicist or a Buddhist (or both), emptiness can be an unsettling realization, for if “non-self” (anātman) is true, then what remains of a person?204 You don’t get to write the script; you don’t even get to pick the show; but you get a front row seat in the theater, and the story is guaranteed to be a good one.

204 The Buddhist concepts of “emptiness” (śūnyatā) and “non-self” (anātman) are much more complex than described here. The precise usage of these terms in Buddhism is beyond the subject matter of this book.
3. What Does It Mean To Be Free?

I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, . . . then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. . . . I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, [then, again,] it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. . . . For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?

— The New Testament, Rom 7:15–24 (RSV)

Poor Paul. Consider the foregoing passage from Paul’s famous letter to the church in Rome. Paul has split himself in two by deciding he likes some of the things that happen in God’s world but not others. And because it is all God’s world and because Paul has decided he likes only part of the world, Paul must be devoted to a made-up god of his imagination, not the God that actually is. And it is no answer to blame the devil, for either the devil is a second god in competition with God, in which case God is not truly God (omnipotent), or the devil is only doing God’s bidding, in which case it is all God’s show, and Paul hates God’s show,
calling it evil and wretched. Poor Paul.\textsuperscript{205}

Paul’s familiar dilemma leads us to ask, What does it really mean to be free? There is, of course, the freedom to gratify one’s passions, but if we think “freedom” means a sort of libertarian (libertine?) “freedom to indulge,” we are in grave error. The freedom to indulge implies only the absence of artificial constraints such as those imposed by parents, community, or government, but it doesn’t imply true freedom. Quite the contrary. One who indulges passions lives under the sovereignty of those passions. Far from being free, such a person is tossed this way and that by external influences, rarely expressing his or her own essential nature. The person has only substituted one form of external control (parents, community, or government) for another (the objects of passionate desire). But as we shall presently see, the freedom from one’s passions also does not imply true freedom.

Suppose a perfectly free being freely chooses good. Is that true freedom? One would think so. But if this free being freely chose good, then it must be good by nature, because, being perfectly free, its choice of good cannot have been compelled by something outside itself. And if this free being is good by nature, then it has always done good, it is now doing good, and it will always do good. In other words, this being is bound fast — by reason of its inner essential nature — to doing good. In what sense is that freedom? How, after all, can we speak of an actual capacity to do evil if, due to an immutable predisposition, evil can never be done?

\textsuperscript{205} On Paul having split himself in two, see Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” p. 136 [“In so far as the objects which are presented to [the ego] are sources of pleasure, [the ego] takes them into itself . . . ; and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure . . . .”]. This book does not attempt to explicate the theology of Paul’s letter to the Roman church, which is one of the greatest and most theologically rich texts of the ancient world. Paul may eventually have arrived at an understanding not unlike that proposed herein. See, e.g., Rom 3:20, 8:1.
Perhaps, therefore, we need to redefine freedom not as the freedom to exercise a particular choice, or not to do so, but as the freedom to express one’s inner essential nature unimpeded by external influences. Freedom, in other words, is the freedom to be the sole cause of an action rather than its concurrent cause; it is the freedom to have one’s actions arise from who or what one is, not from external compulsion. Philosophers call that freedom “compatibilism,” and they sometimes call it “soft determinism.” It is “determinism” because everything that one does is governed by immutable laws of physics, and one does it by absolute necessity, compelled to act by one’s essential nature. But it is “soft” because it involves a limited sort of free will. One’s “will” (i.e., one’s innate striving to express one’s essential nature) is “free” (i.e., not overcome by external compulsion). In other words, one is not a puppet dangling from the strings of external circumstances, forced to dance to their tune. One is rule-bound and controlled, but one is controlled from within, not from without.\(^{206}\)

Many people reject this limited definition of freedom. They want their free actions to be something they somehow make up on the spot, out of nothing, rather than a deterministic expression of an inner essential nature. But it is not clear why they prefer the former to the latter. In the former case, one’s freedom is a spontaneous new creation, expressing nothing other than the whim of the moment. In the latter case, one’s freedom is an opportunity for self-expression, and hence the person who strives to ease suffering or to promote justice reveals thereby his or her innate goodness. Is it somehow preferable to live in a world in which at any moment a good person might — by reason of being free — do something hurtful and cruel? It doesn’t seem so, and yet that is implied if one’s “freedom” is not deterministically grounded in one’s essential nature.

\(^{206}\) On this distinction, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book III, section 1.
But all this implies that the freedom we naturally desire is not really freedom at all. As Spinoza explains:

[W]e neither strive for, nor will, nor desire anything because [by the exercise of free will] we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because [due to our essential nature] we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it. ([N]ihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere, quia id bonum esse judicamus; sed contra, nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare, quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.) (Ethics, IIIP9, Schol.)

And because we desire the freedom to act solely based on who or what we are in our essential nature, we also desire that our reasoning powers should prevail over our unreasoned bodily impulses, for the latter are strongly affected by external stimuli. Hence, Paul’s indictment of his body: “I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind . . . . Who will deliver me from this body of death?” (Rom 7:23–24.)

Paul, who very much wanted to do good, complains that he finds himself instead doing the “sin” that he “hates.” But because Paul cannot control his bodily impulses, he concludes that it is not he who does the sin, but the sin that dwells in him. In Paul’s view, his reasoning powers were proof of his connection to God (and thus to immortality), and by contrast, he saw his bodily impulses as a sort of imprisonment, explicitly associating “sin” with the mortality of the flesh.

But if Paul was incapable of resisting the impulse to do the thing he had reasoned not to do, then, as he says, it was not he that did it (in the sense of an individual soul having unconstrained agency). Rather, it was the forces of nature acting upon him. And the converse, too, is true. If Paul could sometimes resist the thing he had reasoned not to do, then it was not he that resisted it (again,
in the sense of an individual soul having unconstrained agency). Rather, it was merely an expression of his essential nature. And with that insight, one begins to wake up and see that there is no doership and that there never was any doership. Paul — who frequently relied on Hebrew scripture in support of his ideas — needed to reread the Garden of Eden story from the book of Genesis and to consider more carefully what that story has to teach about free will. (See Appendix Three, p. 260, below.)

So, at last, we are equipped to answer the question we asked at the outset of this chapter. Suppose a perfectly free being freely chooses good. This free being — which is good by nature — has always done good, is now doing good, and will always do good. This being is bound fast — by reason of its good nature — to doing good. Is that freedom? Yes, that is freedom. It is the freedom to express one’s essential nature unimpeded, and that is the only freedom anyone should ever desire, and one should desire it equally for all beings.

4. Effortless Effort

As for what [your friend] has maintained next: that if we were compelled by external causes, no one could acquire the habit of virtue, I don’t know who has told him that it can’t happen from a fatal necessity, but only from a free decision of the Mind, that we should have a firm and constant disposition. (Quòd porrò statuit: quòd si à causis externis cogeremur, virtutis habitum acquirere possit nemo; Nescio, quis ipsi dixerit, non posse ex fatali necessitate; sed tantummodò ex libero Mentis decreto, fieri, ut firmato, & constanti simus animo.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

207 Letter 58 [IV/267/30–35].
“But wait a minute!” you might object. “If choice is a mere illusion, then why should I struggle to fulfill my duties and my moral obligations? If everything is determined by the laws of physics and if what I do right now cannot change the future even a bit, then I will spend the day sleeping and the night carousing.” The mistake in that sort of fatalistic thinking is the line “what I do right now cannot change the future even a bit.” Go ahead and sleep all day and carouse all night if your essential nature is so weak, but you are mistaken if you think that such behavior is somehow implied by determinism. Only a fool’s version of determinism fatalistically imagines that good will come without effort or that hardship will come despite it. If good is “fated,” then why not effort, too? Determinism does not somehow delete the role of personal effort in the efficient functioning of the universe.

Put in practical terms, it is very often the case that, in the fullness of time, the people who have pleasant things happen to them are not the same people who “spend the day sleeping and the night carousing.” Rather, they are the people whose essential nature is so strong that they cannot help but strive in every moment, regardless of the short-term results. Determinism asserts that everything is fixed by the laws of cause and effect, but what one does right now is an integral part of that cause-and-effect sequence, and therefore what one does right now is the measure of one’s future experience.208

People tend to think that determinism means fatalism and that free will is necessary to make us hardworking, self-restrained, and morally upright. And you will look long and hard to find a moral theologian who will preach to a general audience that there is no

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208 See, e.g., Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5 [discussing the law of karma]; Vivekacūḍāmāni 549–550 [same]. Consider also that one of the core teachings of the Bhagavad Gītā is to unite action (effort, striving) with surrender of the results of action (determinism). See Bhagavad Gītā 3:7–9, 13, 19–30; 4:14–23, 41; 5:7–14; 18:2–12, 23, 26, 49.
free will. Rather, moral theologians all assert that one has free will and that one must exercise one’s God-given agency by choosing what is noble and rejecting what is harmful. For as the moral theologian knows, such teachings strongly motivate people, especially people who are immersed in Cartesian dualism, imagining themselves to be souls piloting bodies.

But a wise philosopher knows that there is no shortage of personal effort in a deterministic universe, especially when we consider those people who achieve great things. Hence, Vedānta, Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza all teach that one should embrace effort but renounce personal ownership of that effort. A fool, by contrast, renounces the effort itself and bemoans the practical difficulties that follow.

But what does it mean to renounce personal ownership of effort? Ramana Maharshi was once asked by a seeker, “Are only important events in a man’s life, such as his main occupation or profession, predetermined, or are trifling acts in his life, such as taking a cup of water or moving from one place in the room to another, also predetermined?”

“Yes, everything is predetermined,” responded the famous South Indian sage.

“Then . . . what free will has man?” queried the incredulous seeker.

“What for . . . does the body come into existence?” Ramana asked rhetorically, and he then taught the same non-identification with the body that we earlier encountered in Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā. Ramana said: “[The body] is designed for doing the various things marked out for execution in this life. The whole programme is chalked out. . . . As for freedom for man, he is always free not to identify himself with the body and not to be affected by the pleasures or pains consequent on the body’s activities.”

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209 Mudaliar, Day by Day with Bhagavan, pp. 91–92, italics added.
In other words, the body must perform various actions and make various efforts, but by calling such actions and efforts “my action” and “my effort,” a person steps out of universal consciousness and reinforces the “You are here” arrow that empiricism has placed at the center of his or her world map. A passage from Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-Nirṇaya expresses a similar principle, using the name Śaṅkara to refer to Śiva, or the universal consciousness:

Śaṅkara is one who does śam. By śam is meant the grace which consists in enabling the aspirant to recognize the vast expanse of His (Śiva’s) Consciousness, which is nondualistic and is the Highest Bliss inasmuch as it calms the heat of all the afflictions. Such Śaṅkara, who is our own essential nature, do we laud. Here, the sense of [the term] “lauding” is that, by considering Him as excelling the entire cosmos, we enter into His being by obliterating the state of assumed agency [(pramāṭr; lit.: “the agent of knowing”)]. (śam upaśāntāśeṣopatāpaparamānandādvayamayasvacaitanya sphārapratyabhijñāpanasvarūpamanugraham karoti yastamimaṁ svasvabhāvam śaṅkaram stumastaṁ viśvotkarṣītvena parāmṛṣantastatkālptakalpitapramāṭrpadanimajjanena samāviśāmaḥ)²¹⁰

Here, Kṣemarāja is saying that by renouncing one’s false sense of agency, one realizes one’s identity with something much greater, to wit, the universal nondual consciousness. But Kṣemarāja also describes this state as “Highest Bliss” (paramānanda), making clear that when the idea of “my action” and “my effort” dissolves, “the heat of all the afflictions” dissolves with it.

That, then, is what it means to renounce personal ownership of effort. One renounces the idea of being a person who makes the effort. Consider the case of an athlete who, after intently pursuing victory on the playing field, notices an abrasion on the leg but is unable to recall when or how it occurred. The injury caused pain, no doubt, but the athlete did not accept ownership of the pain; instead, the athlete’s mind was directed elsewhere, and the pain was never recorded into memory. In like manner, a wise philosopher renounces ownership of effort, doing so by refusing to record the effort into a remembered narrative about a person who suffered.

Everything that occurs in this world is governed by the laws of physics, but when the laws of physics brought you, the reader of this book, into the world, did those laws create a weak-minded fool who would cease all effort upon learning that free will is an illusion? Unlikely. Therefore, if you feel some internal resistance to effort, you should ask yourself, Who is resisting? Vedānta, Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza all teach that it is your false self that is resisting, the self that thinks it has free will, the self that keeps a careful tally of merits and injustices, the self that clings to a constructed narrative. Why pay that false self any mind if it is unreal? Why give it power over you? There is no resistance to the effort required to indulge a pleasure, as the example of the athlete shows. Therefore, resistance to effort is merely a matter of having rejected some part of God’s perfect world. For you, that resistance is mere static that should be tuned out in favor of expressing your essential nature in every moment.

Here, however, it must be stressed that if one is going to function effectively in the world, allowing optimal decisions to unfold, one must always indulge the feeling that one is exercising one’s free will. In other words, even after recognizing that free will is an illusion, one must play along as if it were real, for we evolved as entities that imagined themselves to have free will, and we operate best based on that self-conception. Therefore, the only
practical difference between a person who is aware of the truth and a person who is not is that the former makes choices as if free will were real, whereas the latter makes choices believing free will to be real. But that difference is a meaningful one, for a person gains great peace of mind when “should’ve,” “would’ve,” and “could’ve” lose their sting.

So, let the moral theologians preach about free will, and let them beseech their listeners to exercise their freedom in favor of industriousness, self-restraint, and moral rectitude. Such teachings are suitable for the general congregation. But for you, the thoughtful philosopher, the realization that free will is an illusion does not cause you to cease your effort to promote good in every moment. Rather, it spurs you to greater effort because for you, effort is effortless, and moral good is the gentle path.

5. Punishment

As for what [your friend] adds next: that if we affirmed [determinism], all wickedness would be [morally] excusable, what of it? For evil men are no less to be feared, nor are they any less harmful, when they are necessarily evil. (Et quòd denique addit: quòd hoc posito omnis malitia excusabilis esset. Quid inde? Nam homines mali non minùs timendi sunt, nec minùs perniciosi, quando necessariò mali sunt.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

Perhaps the primary reason we cling to the dogma of free will is to justify reward for those who comply with society’s precepts and punishment for those who don’t. Is it fair, after all, for society to impose punishment on a violent felon if the felon had no control

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211 Letter 58 [IV/268/1–5].
over the course of events that resulted in his or her criminal behavior? We have all experienced moments when, in the throes of hot passion or the flights of misguided deliberation, we did something we later wished we had not done. If, however, we go over the event in our mind, we recognize that in the moment of acting, we were absolutely convinced that the action was correct, and we could not, therefore, have acted in any other way. And if that is true for us, who are very thoughtful and law abiding by nature, is it not equally true for the rapist and the murderer? Wasn’t he, too, acting under the influence of an irresistible impulse or a wrong-headed conviction? We all know he was, for why else would he have done what he did? But how then can we justify his imprisonment or execution? We do so, very often, by invoking the dogma that he had free will, and therefore he can be held morally responsible for his conduct.

In considering the problem of punishment in a deterministic universe, our earlier discussion of Paul’s letter to the Romans is particularly relevant, because there we saw that to be “free” means to have one’s actions determined from within (by one’s essential nature), not from without (by external influences). Consider, for example, the statement, “John is good.” The speaker probably doesn’t mean that John’s actions are all randomly generated and that, by rare chance, they all happen to be good. If that were the intention underlying the statement, then John’s very next action would be no more likely to be good than a rolled pair of dice is likely to come up boxcars. What the speaker is saying, therefore, is that John’s essential nature — the inner something that governs his

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actions when he is acting autonomously — is good. And if that is so, then the speaker must admit that it is not John’s free will that empowers John to be good; rather, it is the way John is constructed at the core of his being that does so. In other words, our ability to evaluate a person’s moral character implies that there is something essential in a person that determines behavior when external influences are absent, which, in turn, implies soft determinism (i.e., compatibilism), not free will.²¹³

And, of course, the word “good” in the statement “John is good” is not significant to the foregoing analysis; the adjective could just as well be “reliable,” “steadfast,” “kind,” “moral,” “lazy,” “selfish,” etc. Whatever the adjective used, the speaker is saying that John’s essential nature matches that description and governs his actions when he acts autonomously. Therefore, one who relies on free will as a justification for punishment is faced with an intractable dilemma: Either (1) human beings have no essential nature that governs their behavior, in which case a person’s past actions tell us nothing about his or her future conduct, and punishment serves no purpose; or (2) human beings have an essential nature that governs their behavior, in which case we can legitimately judge a person’s future conduct based on his or her past actions, but the person, then, does not truly have free will.

Indeed, true free will (i.e., indeterminism) would imply the absence of any governing principle directing a person’s behavior, in which case the person’s choices would be random and therefore blameless. It seems, then, that determinism, not free will, is what actually justifies punishment. We can justly punish a person because we accept that the person’s actions are governed by his or

²¹³ By the phrase “essential nature,” I do not mean a person’s usual character, thus excusing people who commit terrible crimes that are “out of character” for the person. Rather, by “essential nature,” I mean only that the person has some internal disposition that determines the person’s choices, and thus that they are not truly free. See Moore, “Choice, Character, and Excuse,” pp. 43–44, 53.
her own essential nature, not by mere lottery.

And it is no answer to say that a person’s essential nature is not a fixed thing, that it is instead something a person forms and reforms over time, and that a person is free to make choices about how that ongoing formation of self proceeds. That more nuanced attempt to justify punishment based on the dogma of free will merely shifts the analysis. In other words, the so-called free choices that direct a person’s ongoing formation of self are either randomly generated (in which case the person’s past actions are not indicative of the person’s future conduct), or they are rooted in some even deeper essential nature (in which case they are deterministic, not free). Again, therefore, it seems that determinism, not free will, is what justifies punishment.

According to this reasoning, what matters most for purposes of justifying punishment is not whether a person’s wrongful act was devoid of deterministic causes; rather, what matters most is whether, at the moment of acting, the person had “both the capacity and the opportunity [for] practical reasoning,” and thus could act, at least in part, based on his or her essential nature, not solely under the influence of some external compulsion. As we have said, this limited “freedom” (i.e., the freedom from external compulsion) is still deterministic; it is the label we give to determinism when actions are determined from within, not from without. But the distinction should not be discounted. Spinoza used the phrase “power of acting” to refer to the measure of a thing’s ability to be the sole cause of an event rather than its concurrent cause, and Spinoza further argued that an increase in this “power

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214 See Moore, “Causation and the Excuses,” pp. 1132–1137, 1148–1149. See also Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, pp. 152–153. Of course, wrongdoers who act based on hallucinations, delusions, or similar mental aberrations present a special case, as do children and those who are cognitively disabled.
of acting” (agendi potentia) — this ability to self-actualize\textsuperscript{215} — was the source of true happiness. (\textit{Ethics}, IID2; \textit{id.}, IIIP11; \textit{id.}, IIIP11, Schol.) In other words, autonomy is not inconsistent with determinism, and allocating criminal responsibility to those who, with the capacity and opportunity for practical reasoning, choose to commit crimes recognizes and serves the autonomy interests of both the criminal and the noncriminal — autonomy interests that are denied by a system that exonerates the criminal by ascribing all human behavior to social and environmental factors.\textsuperscript{216}

That said, however, society only has an interest in controlling antisocial behavior at its source. A person acting under provocation or duress is obviously not the sole or even the primary author of his or her actions. And it may be that most, if not all, wrongdoers act under the influence of external forces, some immediate (such as provocation or duress) and others more remote (such as upbringing or community).\textsuperscript{217} Some people are unusually weak-minded, easily swayed by bad company or the pull of destructive habits. Others have been the victims of widespread injustice and therefore have no social obligation. And still others are misinformed, and that misinformation may have hardened into a false conviction or a deep-seated distrust, distorting the person’s judgment and influencing his or her behavior. In such cases, the external forces that influence the person may be viewed as too remote to constitute a legal excuse for the person’s actions, and some form of punishment may be justified, but it may also be that punishment supplemented by other remedies (including a commitment to social

\textsuperscript{215} See Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation.”


\textsuperscript{217} See Delgado, “‘Rotten Social Background’”; Kadish, “Excusing Crime.”
reform) would best serve society’s valid interest in preserving the peace and promoting the public good.

6. Theodicy

Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man . . . has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human impotence, not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually happens) curse. . . . (Nam hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi, ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanae deinde impotentiae et inconstantiae causam non communi naturae potentiae, sed nescio cui naturae humanae vitio tribuunt, quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel, quod plerumque fit, detestantur . . . .)
But . . . nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to any defect in it, for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, i.e., the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. . . . (Sed . . . [n]ihil in natura fit, quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia, hoc est, naturae leges et regulae, secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eadem . . . .)\textsuperscript{218}

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

In Spinoza’s assessment, God didn’t create a universe that has any evil in it at all. But people nevertheless imagine evil, projecting their human conception of what ought to be upon the events they witness, and then — like modern-day versions of the prophet Job — they puzzle about evil, and they question God. Why, they ask, is there evil if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good? Why are there Holocausts? Why earthquakes? Why epidemic diseases? Why wars?

It does not seem to occur to such people that their god is as much an invention of their imagination as the so-called good and evil they assign to the events they are witnessing. They fashion a mental idol that shares their fabricated conception of what is good, and then, because many things fall short of that conception, they begin to doubt the idol they have fashioned. And, finally, they invent a second idol, at war with their beloved first idol, and they blame the second idol for everything they dislike, reassuring themselves that, in the end, the first idol will prevail over the

\textsuperscript{218} Ethics, III, Preface.
second idol. (See Appendix Three, p. 260, below.) But Spinoza saw the matter differently. He argued that, however we might legitimately define good for purposes of regulating human society and fostering human happiness (see Ethics, IVP18, Schol.), the only valid measure of good for purposes of judging God’s creation is what actually is.219

Many things are evil relative to human beings, and as human beings, we can and should fight against such things, for passivity in the face of injustice is often its own form of injustice. But regardless of the outcome of such efforts, the universe remains perfect, for if it is not perfect, then God is not perfect. Spinoza puts it this way:

[T]hings have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection, for his perfection compels us to affirm this. Indeed, from the opposite, it would clearly follow . . . that God is not supremely perfect; because if things had been produced by God in another way, we would have to attribute to God another nature, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect Being. ([R]es summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas: quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutae sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi) Deum non esse summum perfectum; nimirum quia, si res alio modo fuissent productae, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea, quam ex consideratione entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere.) (Ethics, IP33, Schol. 2.)

219 See Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 29b.
Not surprisingly, the Upanishads, too, deny the existence of anything that is evil in the cosmological sense. In the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, for example, we read the following about a “brahmin,” meaning a person who knows Brahman:

This very [doctrine of being unaffected by good and evil] has been declared in the verse:

*This eternal greatness of a brahmin
Is not increased by deeds, nor diminished.
One should be familiar with it. By knowing it,
One is not stained by evil action.*

Therefore, having this knowledge, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring, and collected, one sees the Soul just in the soul. One sees everything as the Soul. Evil does not overcome him; he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him; he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from impurity, free from doubt, he becomes a brahmin.

(\textit{tad etad ṛcābhuyktam– eṣa nityo mahimā brāhmaṇasya na karmanā vardhate no kanīyān | tasyaiva syāt padavittaṁ viditvā na lipyate karmanā pāpakenetī | tasmād evaṃvic chānto dānta uparatas titikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvātmany evātmānaṁ paśyati | sarvam ātmānaṁ paśyati | naināṁ pāpmā tarati | sarvāṁ pāpmānaṁ tarati | naināṁ pāpmā tapati | sarvāṁ pāpmānaṁ tapati | vipāpo virajo 'vicikitso brāhmaṇo bhavati})^{220}

And in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, we read:

Now, the Soul (Ātman) is the bridge [or, dam], the separation for keeping these worlds apart. Over that

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^{220} Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.23, translated in Hume, \textit{The Thirteen Principal Upanishads}, p. 144. See also Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.22.
bridge [or, dam] there cross neither day, nor night, nor old age, nor death, nor sorrow, nor well-doing, nor evil-doing. [¶] All evils turn back therefrom, for that Brahman-world is freed from evil. Therefore, verily, upon crossing that bridge, if one is blind, he becomes no longer blind; if he is sick, he becomes no longer sick. Therefore, verily, upon crossing that bridge, the night appears even as the day, for that Brahman-world is ever illumined. (atha ya ātmā sa setur dhṛtir eṣām lokānām asaṁbheda-yā | naitaṁ setum ahorātre tarato na jarā na mṛtyur na śoko na sukṛtam | sarve pāpmāno 'to nivartante | apahatapāpmā hy eṣa brahmalokāḥ || tasmād vā etaṁ setuṁ tīrťvā andhaḥ sann anandho bhavati | viddhaḥ sann aviddhoh bhavati | upatāpī sann anupatāpī bhavati | tasmād vā etaṁ setuṁ tīrťvā api naktam ahar evābhiniśpadyate | sakṛd vibhāto hy evaiśa brahmalokāḥ)²²¹

Likewise, in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, we read:

Such a one [who knows Brahman], verily, the thought does not torment: “Why have I not done the good (sadhu)? Why have I done the evil (pāpa)?” He who knows this, saves (sprṇute) himself (ātmānam) from these [thoughts]. For truly, from both of these [thoughts] he saves himself — he who knows this! [¶] Such is the mystic doctrine (upaniṣad)! (etaṁ ha vāva na tapati | kimaham sādhūnā karavam | kimaham pāpamakaravamiti | sa ya evaṁ vidvānete ātmānam sprṇute | ubhe hyevaiśa ete ātmānam sprṇute | ya evaṁ

²²¹ Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.4.1–2, translated in Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 265–266, textual emendations by the translator.
And finally, in the *Kaushītaki Upaniṣad*, we read:

There he shakes off his good deeds and his evil deeds. His dear relatives succeed to the good deeds; those not dear, to the evil deeds. Then, just as one driving a chariot looks down upon the two chariot-wheels, thus he looks down upon day and night, thus upon good deeds and evil deeds, and upon all the pairs of opposites. This one, devoid of good deeds, devoid of evil deeds, a knower of Brahman, unto very Brahman goes on. (*tat sukṛtaduṣkrte dhunute | tasya priyā jñātayah sukṛtam upayanti | apriyā duṣkrtam | tad yathā rathena dhāvayan rathacakre paryavekṣetaivam ahorātre paryavekṣata evam sukṛtaduṣkrte sarvāṇi ca dvandvāni | sa esa visukṛto viduṣkrto brahma vidvān brahmaivābhiprātī)*\(^{223}\)

So he who understands [Brahman] — by no deed whatsoever of his is his world injured, not by stealing, not by killing an embryo, not by the murder of his mother, not by the murder of his father; if he has done any evil (*pāpa*), the dark color departs not from his face. (*sa yo māṃ veda na ha vai tasya kena cana karmanā loma [ed.: loko] mīyate na steyena na bhrūṇahatyayā na mātrvadhena na pitṛvadhena | nāsyā pāpaṃ cakruṣo*

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\(^{222}\) *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.9, translated in Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 289.

\(^{223}\) *Kaushītaki Upaniṣad* 1.4 (TITUS), translated in Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, pp. 304–305.
Consistent with these upanishadic passages, Śaṅkara, too, describes an ultimate state in which one transcends moral distinctions. But the nondual texts of Pratyabhijñā Shaivism go even further, relying on moral transcendence to justify backroom ritualized violations of religious and social norms. And with this teaching, Pratyabhijñā Shaivism becomes the subject of valid criticism.

The point being made by scriptural passages that validate moral transcendence is not that a person can or should act as a self-indulgent libertine or that moral ideals serve no legitimate function. On the contrary, actions have consequences, and moral ideals evolved and are sustained because they regulate human behavior in ways that serve our interests. Hence, an intelligent person will certainly pursue the moral good. The point being made by these scriptural passages is that one is never alienated from God on account of anything one may have done.

But can the world really be perfect if it has Holocausts and earthquakes, epidemics and wars? As said, a wise person will

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224 *Kaushītaki Upaniṣad* 3.1 (TITUS), translated in Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 321. See also *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad* 6.18, Hume, pp. 435 and 436 [“Then, being a knower, shaking off good and evil, | He reduces everything to unity in the supreme Imperishable.”] [“So, with the Brahman-knowers, faults | Do never any shelter find.”]; *Bhagavad Gītā* 4:36 [*api ched asi pāpebhyaḥ sarvebhyaḥ pāpa-kṛti-tamaḥ | sarvaṁ jñāna-plavenaiva vṛijinaṁ santarīṣhyasi*], 18:17 [*yasya nāhankṛito bhāvo buddhir yasya na lipyate | hatvā 'pi sa imāl lokān na hanti na nibadhyate*].

225 See, e.g., *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* II, 1, 22; II, 3, 48; III, 3, 26–28; *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 433, 503, 545.

certainly seek to avoid such calamities, but a wise person sees no fundamental cosmological evil in them. Our sense organs allow us to perceive only a minute fraction of the universe, and we perceive it only by way of a distorted and indistinct reflection. How, then, can we judge something to be evil in the cosmological sense? As Spinoza puts it:

[W]hatever [a person] thinks is troublesome and evil, and moreover, whatever seems immoral, dreadful, unjust, and dishonorable, arises from the fact that he conceives the things themselves in a way that is disordered, mutilated, and confused. For this reason, [a moral person] strives most of all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, like Hate, Anger, Envy, Mockery, Pride, and the rest . . . . (\[A\]c proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat, et quicquid praeterea impium, horrendum, injustum et turpe videtur; ex eo oritur; quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit; et hac de causa apprime conatur res, ut in se sunt, concipere et verae cognitionis impedimenta amovere, ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua hujusmodi, quae in praecedentibus notavimus . . . .) (Ethics, IVP73, Schol.)

Relative to our human personhood, suffering and death are certainly evil, and we must avoid them, but the fact remains that bodies die — if not after 20 years, then after 90 or more. Consciousness, however, is eternal (i.e., outside time), and when eternity is the scale of reference, calculating the difference between 20 years and 90 is like comparing the waistlines of two mosquitoes.
7. The Perfect Freedom of God

I say that a thing is free if it exists and acts solely from the necessity of its own nature, and [that it is] compelled if it is determined by something else to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate way. E.g., even though God exists necessarily, still he exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his own nature alone. . . . (Ego eam rem liberam esse dico, quae ex solâ suae naturae necessitate existit, & agit; Coäctam autem, quae ab alio determinatur, ad existendum, & operandum certâ, ac determinatâ ratione. Ex. gr. Deus, tametsi necessariò, liberè tamen existit, quia ex solâ suae naturae necessitate existit. . . .) You see, then, that I place freedom not in a free decree, but in a free necessity. (Vides igitur me libertatem non in libero decreto; sed in liberâ necessitate ponere.)

. . . .

Finally, I’d like your friend . . . to tell me how he conceives the human virtue which arises from the free decree of the Mind to be consistent with God’s preordination. If he confesses, with Descartes, that he doesn’t know how to reconcile these things, then he’s trying to launch against me the same weapon which has pierced him. (Denique tuus amicus . . . vellem, ut mihi responderet, quâ ratione ille humanam virtutem, quae ex libero Mentis decreto oritur, simul concipiát cum Dei praeordinatione. Quòd si cum Cartesio fatetur, se haec nescire conciliare, ergo telum, quo ipse transfixus jam est, in me vibrare conatur.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

227 Letter 58 [IV/265/20–30 and IV/268/5–15].
God created a magnificent universe that is an expression of God’s own essence, that is constructed in perfect accord with elegant physical laws, and that plays itself out across the time dimension like an ever-turning kaleidoscope, each new configuration every bit as beautiful as the one before. Some people are troubled by that model of reality. They want the course of time to be mutable from moment to moment. They don’t like imagining time to be a fixed landscape, analogous to one of the spatial dimensions. For them, determinism seems to reduce the infinite possibilities associated with freedom to the single possibility associated with the laws of physics. Is not God more powerful than the laws of physics? Thus, determinism seems to these people to limit God’s freedom.

The truth is that most people imagine that they exist at the vanguard of time, creating the future by their free choices. Therefore, the only type of freedom most people can appreciate is the freedom they imagine they have to make decisions about the future as they proceed forward through the time dimension. And if God lacks that freedom, most people believe, then God is not free at all, which, for them, calls into doubt God’s omnipotence.

Reasoning in this way, most people insist that God must be able to change creation at any moment, making adjustments (large or small) to what the laws of physics would otherwise demand — even parting the Red Sea when necessary.\textsuperscript{228} Thus, they place God inside time. They cannot imagine a God that is outside time, the creator of time, existing changelessly throughout all time. Instead,

\textsuperscript{228} Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (the “Rambam”) (12th century C.E.) pointed out that because God exists outside time, any interruption of the laws of physics that occurs at a particular point in time must have been created by God outside time. And if that is so, then that particular interruption of the laws of physics is itself one of the laws of physics. See discussion of Aristotle in Maimonides, \textit{Guide of the Perplexed} II.29.
they imagine a God that, like themselves, is an actor on the stage of time. Spinoza joked that a circle, if it could speak, would assert that God is a perfect circle, and likewise human beings imagine God to be a perfect human being. (Letter 56 [IV/260/5–10].) They find themselves to be subject to time, and so they imagine that God, too, must be subject to time. But by placing God inside time, they make time ontologically prior to the god they worship, thus ignoring the God that is the creator of time.

At the heart of this error may be the devotee’s strong belief in the efficacy of prayer. God’s devotee may feel that if God is not an actor on the stage of time, capable of intervening in history at any moment, then prayer is futile. But determinism doesn’t make prayer futile any more than it makes effort futile. The essence of prayer is intention, and if thought and matter are the same thing, then intention is as necessary to the functioning of the physical universe as fermions and bosons are. Even in a deterministic world, we cannot expect good to come without effort, and we cannot expect effort to come without intention. Thus, proceeding through life without intentions (i.e., without prayers) is like fatalistically expecting water to boil without lighting the stove.

Therefore, one should certainly pray, and likewise one should thank God. If all the vast forces of the universe align in unseen ways to offer guidance and protection, why not feel grateful, and why not express that gratitude? But a wise person will also be grateful for what appears on the surface to be undesirable, for otherwise one’s God is a mere creature of one’s imagination.

Interestingly, the same people who reject Spinoza’s strict necessitarianism, insisting on God’s ability to intervene in history, are usually not bothered by imagining God as the creator of the universe. But if God can create a three-dimensional universe, giving a unique spatial location to each object, without thereby compromising divine freedom and omnipotence, then certainly God can instead make a four-dimensional universe, giving a unique temporal location to each event, without thereby
compromising divine freedom and omnipotence.

In other words, the ability to make choices in the dimension of time is not the measure of God’s freedom. Rather, the measure of God’s freedom is the ability to actualize every possibility implied by God’s own nature. Spinoza explains:

But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes, each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect). (Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat, quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex ejusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent.) (Ethics, IP16, Dem.)

[N]othing can be or be conceived without God, but . . . all things are in God. So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act. ([N]ihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse, sed omnia in Deo esse; quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest, a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur:) (Id., IP17, Dem.)

God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only from the necessity of his nature, and acts [only] from the necessity of his nature. ([S]olum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et ex sola suae naturae necessitate agit.) (Id., IP17, Cor. 2.)

In Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, the Sanskrit word svatantrā is used to express this same understanding of divine freedom. We have
seen that according to Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, the world is a free (i.e., unconstrained) expression of God’s eternal essence (*citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ*). As such, God can’t be an actor on the stage of time, intervening in history in response to human needs, because if God ever needed to intervene to make some adjustment as time unfolded, then such an intervention would necessarily imply that God’s eternal essence had changed, which is logically nonsensical.

In making this point, I am fully aware of the harsh condemnation that both Spinoza and Einstein faced for denying that God intervenes in history. It is quite natural and psychologically healthy for most religious people to imagine God in anthropomorphic or, at least, anthropopathic terms. For them, God is an idealized and all-powerful companion — loving them, protecting them, guiding them, responding to their needs and prayers, an invisible hand ever shaping the course of events. That is the only God most people know, and so to deny the existence of that God is tantamount to atheism. Moreover, to do so would be highly destabilizing in present-day society, leading some people to categorically deny moral obligation and others to lose the emotional strength by which they daily face severe hardships. Let me therefore be clear. I do not deny the validity and critical importance of a personal deity. But here we are considering the issue solely from the perspective of science and philosophy. If God is eternal (i.e., outside time), and if the universe expresses, in the dimensions of space and time, God’s eternal unchanging essence, then the universe needs no temporal interventions from God to make it more God-like, and if somehow it *did* need such interventions, then God’s eternal essence would need to have

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changed, which, as said, is nonsensical.\textsuperscript{230}

From this we see that although our prayers might be indispensable prerequisites to the occurrence of certain events, they cannot change or affect God in any way. Rather, God’s absolute “freedom” (svatantrā) refers to the complete absence of any impediment to or limitation upon God’s self-expression.\textsuperscript{231} In the \textit{Spanda-Nirṇaya}, Kṣemarāja describes this absolute freedom, using the name Śaṃkara for God:

\begin{quote}
Of that — i.e., of Śaṃkara — who is a compact mass of Light and Bliss and who is everyone’s own being, there is nowhere — i.e., in no space, time, or form — any obstruction — i.e., any impediment — in His free advance, because nothing can veil His nature. (tasyāśya śaṃkarātmanaḥ prakāśānandāghanasya svasvabhāvasya na kutraciddeśe kāla ākāre vā nirodhāḥ prasara-}
\end{quote

\textsuperscript{230} One might argue that although the universe expresses God’s eternal essence, it somehow degrades over time, and therefore God must occasionally intervene to ensure that it \textit{continues} to express God’s eternal essence. But if that is so, then what is the force that causes it to degrade? Either that force is included in God, in which case the degradation of the universe is an expression of God’s essence, and no corrective intervention is needed, or that force is outside God, in which case God is not God (i.e., one without a second, free from all constraint). Likewise, those who posit a God that intervenes in history cannot claim that human free will introduces evil into the world, and God must continuously intervene to counteract human evil, for that explanation turns human free will into a second power alongside God.

Here, it merits noting that Vedānta, too, struggles with the tension between the absolute detachment associated with the God of philosophy (brahman) and the active engagement associated with the God of popular religion (īśvara).

In this context, it might be valuable to consider the “many worlds” theory of quantum mechanics. This debated theory proposes that whenever there is entanglement between a quantum system and its environment, every possible outcome of that entanglement actually exists in some version of the world. Moreover, because in our own version of the world, we observe only one outcome (with all its effects), it follows that in other versions of the world, other versions of ourselves are observing other outcomes (with all their effects), resulting in decoherence among the different versions of the world. The universe thus “splits” into multiple versions of itself. According to this theory, it is only the first-person perspective (the “You are here” arrow) that we impose on the universe that causes us to measure a subatomic particle as having a particular property. Everything that, according to the laws of physics, can possibly occur actually does occur, somewhere, at some time, in some version of the universe, but because of the limitations imposed by our sense organs, we


233 The “many worlds” theory was proposed by Bryce Seligman Dewitt and R. Neill Graham based on Hugh Everett’s 1956 doctoral thesis. See Dewitt and Graham (eds.), The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. For a critical discussion, see Barrett, “Everett’s Relative-State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”; Barrett, The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds. For a defense of the “many worlds” theory, written for a popular audience, see Carroll, Something Deeply Hidden.
experience the unfolding of only one of those possibilities.234

Therefore, in God’s infinite universe, all possibilities are actualities, and it is only the limits of human perception that prevent a person from experiencing more than one of those actualities. Infinity, not choice, is the measure of God’s freedom, as Spinoza explains:

Others think that God is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring it about that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e., which are in his power) do not happen or are not produced by him. . . .

(Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere, ut ea, quae ex ejus natura sequi diximus, hoc est quae in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant sive ut ab ipso non producantur. . . .)

. . .

But I think I have shown clearly enough . . . that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed . . . . So God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, at least in my opinion, God’s

234 According to this reasoning, when a property of an electron is measured, the wave function that defines the possible results of that measurement doesn’t actually “collapse,” nor does the universe actually “split” into many worlds. Rather, the wave function and the universe continue as they were, but the consciousness of the observer “collapses” or “splits” into many perspectives, each sealed off from the others and each knowing a different result among the possible results. Put in more technical terms, the brain that observes the measured property of the electron is in a superposition of possible states of observation, and because all consciousness is consciousness of one’s own self, the consciousness of that superpositional brain is necessarily fragmented. The so-called “collapse” of the wave function is merely a limitation of perspective, like seeing a square and not realizing that it is really a cube.
omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly. (Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto . . . a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis, hoc est omnia, necessario effuxisse . . . . Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum in eadem actualitate manebit. Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe, meo quidem judicio, perfectior statuitur.)

Indeed — to speak openly — my opponents seem to deny God’s omnipotence. For they are forced to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things, which nevertheless he will never be able to create. . . . Therefore to maintain that God is perfect, they are driven to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not see what could be feigned which would be more absurd than this or more contrary to God’s omnipotence. (Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri Deum infinita creabilia intelligere, quae tamen nunquam creare poterit. . . . Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quae ejus potentia se extendit, quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotentiae magis repugnans non video, quid fingi possit.) (Ethics, IP17, Schol. See also id., IP32, Cor. 2.)

Freedom, for the Pratyabhijñā masters and also for Spinoza, is the ability to choose all the possibilities, not just one. Prof. Einstein can have both the chocolate and the vanilla. Indeed, if his choice between the two was entangled with some quantum system, then he did have both, each in a separate version of the world that actually exists.
Part Seven: Time and Eternity

1. The Circularity of Time

I ask you, my friend, to consider that men are not created, but only generated, and that their bodies already existed before, though formed differently. ([Q]uaeso, mi amice, ut consideres homines non creari; sed tantum generari, & quod eorum corpora jam ante existebant, quamvis alio modo formata.)

— Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.)

In light of what we have learned up to this point, what can we say about death? First, the notion of an immortal individual soul that floats away from the dying body and journeys to a new beatified body in heaven or to a new human body on earth is a simplistic fantasy that must be set aside. There is no bubble-like soul that exists independent of matter, steers the ship of the body, and emerges, specter-like, when the body dies. Thought and matter are one; the human soul is the human brain, or some component of it. The human brain (or some component of it) is conscious of itself by being itself. It thus has the thought of itself, and it infers an external world from effects it observes within itself. Therefore, although nondual consciousness is universal and eternal, the unique characteristics of a specific human mind depend on the complex configuration of a specific human body. The destruction of that body results in a dispersal of the system that gave rise to that individual mind, and what remains is only the consciousness of self associated with the dispersed parts.

235 Letter 4 [IV/14/15–20].

Nonetheless, the universal consciousness is what one always was. And because that consciousness is the ground of being, nothing can extinguish it. It cannot be extinguished as a whole, and it cannot be extinguished in its parts, for that would imply the theoretical possibility of extinguishing it as a whole. Therefore, the death of a person does not affect even a bit that universal consciousness. The universe was sparkling with consciousness before the person’s death, and it continues to do so no less brightly, no less beautifully, after the person’s death.

Immortality, according to this way of thought, is a matter of identifying with an immortal thing. Hive insects sacrifice themselves for the sake of the continuing vitality of the hive, and people sometimes identify so strongly with children, family, or clan that they value the continuing vitality of those social groups over their own individual existence.

Moreover, in all the effects that one’s self-expressive actions have had on the universe, there is a sort of memory — a “soul print,” one might say — of one’s unique character. Kṣemarāja says, for example: “It is never witnessed that [(i.e., it never occurs that)] the produced product, such as the [clay] jar, can conceal the nature of the agent, such as the potter, etc.” (na ca kāryam ghaṭādi kartuḥ kumbhakārāđeh kadācitsvarūpaṃ tiradadhaddrśtam).237 Rather, the jar is a soul print of the potter, and all one’s soul prints are parts of an endless chain of causes and effects, giving rise to a kind of immortality. To limit oneself to a particular thing in that chain — a human body having a particular form at a particular time — is rather arbitrary.

Consider, too, that all things in the universe proceed in cycles, human history being no exception. If so, the impressions one has made in the ripples of time may disperse for a while, but their effects will remain, and it follows that the complex forces that once

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converged to bring a particular human body into existence will do
so again, in a very similar form. And when that occurs, the new
body will give rise to an individual soul very much like one’s own.
And thus, one will be reborn, even though one’s individual soul
had no continuous existence.

The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad expresses this idea
metaphorically, making reference to the roots of a tree:

As a tree of the forest,
Just so, surely, is man.
His hairs are leaves,
His skin the outer bark.

(yathā vrkṣo vanaspatis tathaiva puruṣo 'mṛṣā | tasya
lomāni parṇāni tvag asyotpātikā bahiḥ)

. . .

A tree, when it is felled, grows up
From the root, more new again;
A mortal, when cut down by death —
From what root does he grow up?

(yad vrkṣo vrkṣo rohati mūlān navataraḥ punaḥ |
martyaḥ svin mṛtyunā vrkṣāḥ kasmān mūlāt
prarohati)

. . .

If with its roots they should pull up
The tree, it would not come into being again.
A mortal, when cut down by death —
From what root does he grow up?

(yat samūlam āvṛheyur vrksam na punar āhavet |
martyaḥ svin mṛtyunā vrkṣāḥ kasmān mūlāt
prarohati)238

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238 Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.28, translated in Hume, The Thirteen
Principal Upanishads, p. 126. See also Bhagavad Gītā 15:1–4.
What this poetic passage tells us by way of metaphor is that, after being “cut down by death,” a person will arise again, like a new tree growing up from the roots of a felled tree. But the passage adds that this return of the body can only take place if the person has left “roots” in the ground, meaning that it can only take place if the person has left soul prints in the world by acting with a gainful intent.

Still, many people are uncomfortable with the idea that at the moment of death, they will disperse into relative oblivion and then form again at some future time with no specific recollection of their former existence. They do not want the “weak immortality” of a future iteration of themselves; rather, they want the “strong immortality” of an individual soul that survives the body’s death and proceeds without interruption to a new existence. In short, they want continuity of self from one incarnation to the next, just as they have continuity of self from one day to the next.

The truth is, however, that if we are talking about the individual soul, we don’t even have that continuity of self from one moment to the next, and yet we are not bothered by that fact. A thought experiment will help illustrate the point. Suppose a powerful god has the ability to create human beings out of clay and breathe life into them. Further suppose that this god plans to create Peter and Paul, and therefore decides every personality trait that Peter and Paul will have. This god first creates Peter. Then, after some time, this god says to Peter, “I will kill you and create Paul in your place.” Peter immediately objects. Despite the promise regarding the creation of Paul, Peter rightly feels that he is going to die.

But suppose, instead, that this powerful god takes the list of, say, ten-thousand Petrine traits and the corresponding list of ten-thousand Pauline traits, and after creating Peter, this god slowly, one trait per day, changes Peter’s traits into Paul’s traits. Yesterday, Peter liked railroad travel; today, he finds that he prefers driving a car. Yesterday, Peter had green eyes; today, they look brown. In
this manner, Peter is incrementally transformed, trait by trait, over the course of some twenty-seven years into Paul, and finally, one fine morning during the middle of the twenty-eighth year, Peter says, “I think I’ll call myself Paul from now on; I like that name.” Peter no longer feels he has been killed and that Paul has been created in his place, and the reason Peter does not object is that the change from Peter to Paul happened slowly, and Peter was given a chance to identify with each new Pauline trait as it arose.

The point here is not to deny that one has some sort of continuing individual existence; rather, the point is to show that the continuum of one’s individual existence might be quantized, like frames in a movie, rather than an actual unbroken continuum, and ten-thousand tiny deaths just don’t feel as bad as one big death. The fact is that in every moment one is changing, both physically and mentally. Cells die and new cells replace them; one forgets some things and learns others; and even space-time itself may be quantized, not continuous. So, what then can we say about an individual soul? The continuity of self that one hopes for after the body’s death does not exist before the body’s death. So, if one is not scared to live, why be scared to die?

Consider another thought experiment, and here we will draw once again from ideas presented in the Star Trek television series. Imagine the existence of a teleportation device like the Star Trek “transporter.” This device can scan one’s body in an instant and determine the precise characteristics of every particle, atom, and molecule (type, spin, charge, relative location, momentum, etc.), thus converting one’s entire material existence into data. The scanning process destroys one’s body, but because one’s exact form is recorded as data, the device can transfer the data to a distant location, and there it can somehow construct one’s perfect replica out of the dust of that location. Moreover, because this reconstructed body is a perfect replica of the original scanned body, the new body is alive and conscious with the same memories and thoughts as the original, and it has all the same abilities that
the original had. Needless to say, building this device would be no small achievement, but let us assume such a device exists.

If one were to submit to being teleported in this way, one’s regenerated self in the distant location would seem to be continuous with one’s former self, but there would be no actual physical continuity. In other words, the version of oneself that appeared in the distant location would be completely distinct from one’s former self, but one would feel subjectively that one was the same person, now teleported to a new location.

And if that is so, then perhaps the continuity of self — the “strong immortality” — that most people desire is actually not as important as having the feeling of such continuity. After a few trips in the transporter, noncontinuous existence no longer seems so bad. We are no longer afraid to have our body destroyed, reduced to mere data, and then reconstructed in a distant place, and we no longer worry that the reconstructed body, which has no actual physical continuity with the body we had before, constitutes a different person. In other words, after a few trips in the transporter, we no longer cling to the idea of an individual soul that must journey from one body to the next. Intermittent existence, it turns out, is not so bad after all; it just takes a little getting used to. And, of course, the cycles of time that characterize the universe can be thought of as a giant transporter device that converts a person into data and then reconstructs that person in a future time, albeit with only a nonspecific recollection of the past. Should we ask for more?

Many people find comfort in the models of immortality taught by the major world religions. Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and non-canonical Christian scriptures suggest that the consciousness of a
person can reincarnate in a new mortal body in this world.\textsuperscript{239} And Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptures add that the soul can also acquire an immortal body.\textsuperscript{240} But these scriptural discussions of the afterlife are often quite vague about the newly embodied soul’s recollection of the past. In the case of reincarnation, for example, it is generally understood that the soul retains the \textit{wisdom} it has gained from past experiences, but no specific memories.\textsuperscript{241} And if that model of immortality is comforting for those who are attracted to traditional religion, then the memory of every detail of one’s past life is not an essential feature of immortality. Indeed, even during the life of one’s present body, memory is a relatively low-resolution sketch of what has actually transpired, and over the long term, what one primarily carries into the future is a set of accumulated values and convictions. And there is no reason why a record of those values and convictions cannot somehow survive one’s bodily death, ready to be accessed again in the future.\textsuperscript{242}

In summary, the cycles of time (\textit{samsāra}) offer us a perfectly acceptable form of immortality. The complex forces that once converged to bring a particular human body into existence will do so again. In metaphoric terms, a new tree will grow up from the

\textsuperscript{239} For Hinduism, see \textit{Chāndogya Upaniṣad} 5:3–10; \textit{Bhagavad Gītā} 2:11–53, 4:5. For Buddhism, see \textit{Majjhima Nikaya} 136. For Judaism, see Isa 26:19; Ezek 37; Job 19:25–26, 33:22–30; Eccles 1:9–10. For Christianity, see 1 Clem 24–26.

\textsuperscript{240} For Judaism, see Pss 23:6, 49:15–16, 73:23–28; Dan 12:1–3. For Christianity, see 1 Cor 15:35-58; 2 Cor 5. For Islam, see \textit{Qur’an} 2:82, 4:122, 41:8, 64:9, 98:7–8.

\textsuperscript{241} See \textit{Bhagavad Gītā} 4:5.

\textsuperscript{242} The Sanskrit term \textit{apūrva} literally means “unprecedented,” but in Hindu philosophy, the term is used to refer to a super-sensible thing which comes into existence when one does an action, thus enabling the action to produce an effect across space and time. See Halbfass, “Karma, \textit{Apūrva}, and ‘Natural’ Causes”; Potter, “The Karma Theory.”
roots of the felled tree. That is the immortality we get, and it is enough. We need not insist on the “strong immortality” of a soul that travels from body to body, when the “weak immortality” of cyclical time does the job just fine. Beings arise and subside in consciousness. Each has its natural arc of life. Perpetuating what has reached its natural end serves no purpose. But consciousness is eternal. The only thing that dies is the narrative one is authoring about a person who lived in a particular place at a particular time. But not to worry. There will be other narratives — unless, that is, one has gone outside time.

2. Eternity

There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahman: Time and the Timeless. That which is prior to the sun is the Timeless (a-kāla), without parts (a-kala). But that which begins with the sun is Time, which has parts, for the sun metes out time. Verily, the form of that which has parts [(i.e., time)] is the year [(i.e., the solar cycle)]. From the year, in truth, are these creatures [(i.e., living organisms)] produced. Through the year, verily, after having been produced, do they grow. In the year they disappear. Therefore, the year, verily, is Prajāpati, is Time, is food, is the Brahman-abode, and is Ātman [“Soul”)]. For thus has it been said: —

’Tis Time that cooks created things,
All things, indeed, in the Great Soul.
In what, however, Time is cooked —
Who knows that, he the Veda knows!
(dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe kālaś cākālaś ca | atha yaḥ prāg ādityāt so 'kālo 'kalaḥ | atha ya ādityādyah sa kālaḥ sakalāḥ | sakalasya vā etad rūpam yat saṃvatsarah | saṃvatsarāt khalv evemāḥ praṣaḥ praṣāyante | saṃvatsareṇeḥa vai jātā vivardhante | saṃvatsare
In the previous section, we talked about the cycles of time. Albert Einstein is reported to have commented that “Time is what a clock measures,” and likewise according to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, time exists in relation to the periodic change of some observed object. And the sun, because of its unmistakable prominence, symbolizes all of them. Moreover, time is circular, unfolding in planetary cycles that realign in ever-new ways. The

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244 “It might appear possible to overcome all the difficulties attending the definition of ‘time’ by substituting ‘the position of the small hand of my watch’ for ‘time.’ And in fact such a definition is satisfactory when we are concerned with defining a time exclusively for the place where the watch is located; but it is no longer satisfactory when we have to connect in time series of events occurring at different places, or — what comes to the same thing — to evaluate the times of events occurring at places remote from the watch.” (Es könnte scheinen, daß alle die Definition der ‘Zeit’ betreffenden Schwierigkeiten dadurch überwunden werden könnten, daß ich an Stelle der ‘Zeit’ die ‘Stellung des kleinen Zeigers meiner Uhr’ setze. Eine solche Definition genügt in der Tat, wenn es sich darum handelt, eine Zeit zu definieren ausschließlich für den Ort, an welchem sich die Uhr eben befindet; die Definition genügt aber nicht mehr, sobald es sich darum handelt, an verschiedenen Orten stattfindende Ereignisreihen miteinander zeitlich zu verknüpfen, oder — was auf dasselbe hinausläuft — Ereignisse zeitlich zu werten, welche in von der Uhr entfernten Orten stattfinden.) Einstein, “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper,” p. 893, translated in Lorentz et al., The Principle of Relativity, p. 39.
Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad uses the word saṃsāra (from the Sanskrit root saṃsr, meaning “to revolve,” “to cycle”) to describe this circularity of time (see Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad 1.4), and knowledge of truth (jñāna) is the means by which one can escape the cycle.\footnote{See also Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 6.2; Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.3–10.}

For most of us, a lifetime of 90 years seems far too short, but for an elderly person with a weak, pain-ridden body, a lifetime that continues forever might seem almost wearisome. In our quest for immortality, forever is not really what we seek; rather, what we seek is to transcend time. It is time that we need to overcome, not death. We need a new perspective that allows us to feel that time does not contain us — rather, that we contain time. Then, there is no “90 years,” and there is no “forever.” Then, there is only existence, consciousness, and bliss (saccidānanda). But how do we “transcend time”?

Some religious-minded people imagine that there was a vast expanse of empty space and that, at a particular point in time, God created a universe in that space, and it has existed ever since, evolving into what we find before us today. But according to the field theory of physics, How can space exist without matter? and How can time exist without a change in the relation between two things? Space and time are relative; they exist only if things exist, and they vary depending on the position of one’s “You are here” arrow. Therefore, without a created universe, there is no space or time, which means that God must be doing all this creating outside time.

Of course, once a universe exists, we can measure time from that moment forward. And, from the perspective of modern physics, we can also unwind the progression of time and imagine a “beginning” — a “Big Bang” — when all matter was confined to a single point so small that the laws of physics become
meaningless. But even if we declare the Big Bang to be “time zero” and conjecture a God that created the universe (and time) by way of that Big Bang, we still have the problem that God is doing all this creating outside time, and if so, then God didn’t just create a universe way back when; God also created one right now (i.e., at all times and at no time).247

We read in the book of Psalms: “This is the day that YHVH made; let us be glad and rejoice in it.” (Ps 118:24.) God created this day, this very moment, whatever it may hold. And Spinoza makes a similar point. He asserts:

God is not only the cause of things’ beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existing, or (to use a Scholastic term) God is the cause of the being of things.”

(Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipient existere; sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent, sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum.)

246 Cf. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, pp. 136–141 [discussing the “no boundary” theory].

247 Several classical discussions of time and how it relates to God’s creative act have made a similar point. See Plato, *Timaeus*, 37C–39E [e.g.: “Now the nature of that Living Being was eternal, and this character it was impossible to confer in full completeness on the generated thing. But he took thought to make, as it were, a moving likeness of eternity; and, at the same time that he ordered the Heaven, he made, of eternity that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness moving according to number — that to which we have given the name Time. For there were no days and nights, months and years, before the Heaven came into being . . . .” (transl. by Francis MacDonald Cornford)]; Augustine, *Confessions*, book XI, sections 12–16 [e.g.: “Your years do not come and go. Our years pass and new ones arrive only so that all may come in turn, but your years stand all at once, because they are stable . . . . Your years are a single day, and this day of yours is not a daily recurrence, but a simple ‘Today,’ because your Today does not give way to tomorrow, nor follow yesterday. Your Today is eternity . . . .” (transl. by Maria Boulding)].
In other words, things have no being, no persevering in existence, without God as their cause in every moment, and that makes God’s act of creation an eternal act. And, “in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after” (in aeterno non detur quando, ante nec post) (Id., IP33, Schol. 2), because “eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time” (nec aeternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere) (id., VP23, Schol.). In eternity, there is only God’s unchanging essence and all that it implies. As Spinoza says:

We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. (Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur, vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere, vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri et ex naturae divinae necessitate consequi concipimus. Quae autem hoc secundo modo ut verae seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub aeternitatis specie concipimus, et earum ideae aeternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt.) (Ethics, VP29, Schol.)

As already noted, this notion that the world expresses God’s eternal essence is critically important because it means — in contrast to what Śaṅkara taught — that the world is real, as real as God is real. Pratyabhijñā philosophy describes God’s eternal essence as Speech (vāc) and Word (śabda), and it asserts that this eternal Speech/Word spreads out in the dimensions of space and
time as the world we know. Abhinavagupta says, for example:

Of these phonemes, the plane that has just been described is that of the supreme Word where they are in the form of pure consciousness, nonconventional, eternal, uncreated. . . . In effect, everything moving or unmoving abides [first] in a supreme and invariable form, the essence of pure power, in Consciousness: the Self of the venerable Lord Bhairava — as is shown by all that is to be perceived of the infinite diversity of the world manifested in Consciousness in a manner first indistinct, then progressively more distinct. (tathāpi amīśaṁ varṇāṇaṁ parāvāgbhūmiriyamiha nirṇīyate yatraiva eśāmasāmayikaṁ nityamakrītraṁ saṁvinmayameva rūpaṁ . . . tathāhi - yatkimcita caramacaram ca tat pāramārthikena anapāyinā rūpeṇa vīryamātrasārātmanā tadudbhaviṣyadīṣadasphuṭatamesadasphuṭataresaṭ-dasphuṭādivastuṣatamṛṣṭikālopalakṣyamāṇatattadanda-vacitryapratthonnīyamāṇatathābhāvena [ed.: srṣṭi] saṁvidi bhagavadbhairavabhaṭṭārikātmāni tiṣṭhatyeva)²⁴⁹

And Kṣemarāja makes a similar point, using the concept of spanda. The word spanda means a “stirring” or a “slight movement,” but in the context of Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-Nirṇaya, it means an “oscillation,” a “vibration,” or a “pulse,” and the Spanda-Nirṇaya explains that this “pulse,” despite appearing to be a succession (krama) of different phases, is actually eternal and unchanging:

²⁴⁸ See Isayeva, From Early Vedanta to Kashmir Shaivism, pp. 133–145; Padoux, Vāc: The Concept of the Word, pp. 78–85, 172–188.

In reality, however, nothing arises and nothing subsides. We shall show that it is only the divine spandaśakti (the divine creative pulsation) which, though free of succession, appears in different aspects as if flashing in view and as if subsiding. (vastutastu na kimcidudeti vyayate vā kevalaṃ spandaśaktireva bhagavatyakramāpi tathātathābhāsārūpayā sphurantyuṭetīva vyayata iva ceti darśayiṣyāmah)²⁵⁰

If one considers the matter deeply, one realizes that temporal periodicity (spanda) is merely a way of describing a circle with time as one of the circle’s two dimensions, and outside time, that same periodicity is just the eternal idea of a circle. And because God’s essence includes an infinite number of such circles, each slightly different in size, there is no phase synchronicity among the countless periodic things that populate the universe. And from that absence of phase synchronicity arises the forward progression of linear time — cycles of time that constantly realign in new ways.

There is, therefore, no point in speaking of a particular moment in linear history when God created the universe. Instead, we would do better to refer to essence and its actualization in space and time. Essence is nothing other than the eternal principles from which everything in the universe is logically derivable. And the actualization of that essence is the unfolding in the dimensions of space and time of all that is implied by those eternal principles. As Spinoza explains:

[B]y Natura naturans [(“nature naturing”)] we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal

and infinite essence, i.e., God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. [¶] But by Natura naturata [(“nature natured”)] I understand whatever follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or from any of God’s attributes . . . . ([P]er Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt, hoc est Deus, quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex necessitate Dei naturae sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur . . . .) (Ethics, IP29, Schol.)

Inside space and time, new iterations of one’s body appear and disappear, but they can only do so if they also exist as an eternal essence outside space and time, unaffected by the changes space and time imply. Hence, Spinoza says, “we . . . feel that our mind is . . . eternal”:

[I]n God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human Body, under a species of eternity. (In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quae hujus et illius corporis humani essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.) (Ethics, VP22.)

Therefore, though we do not recollect that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence it has cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. (Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen mentem nostram, quatenus corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, aeternam esse, et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri
sive per durationem explicari non posse.) (Id., VP23, Schol.)

And at least as to this point, Spinoza may have benefited from his Jewish education. In Hebrew scripture, we read (Mal 3:6): “For I, YHVH, I have not changed” — God (YHVH) is outside time, changeless, and eternal — “and you, the sons of Jacob, you have not been consumed” — you, too, are outside time, changeless, and eternal.
Conclusion

I, the writer of this book, and you, its reader, are one. The only thing that separates us is the first-person perspective we impose on the universe because of the imperfections that characterize our empirical perception of it. Our true form, which we can experience when we withdraw from the senses, is the entire universe without the “You are here” arrow at its center. And that true form is consciousness, ever knowing itself, ever delighting in itself.
Appendix One: Survey of Scholarly Literature Comparing Hindu Philosophy to Spinoza

In 1921, Maganlal Buch published a book aimed at popularizing the teachings of Vedānta, and in particular those of Śaṅkara (8th century C.E.), and Buch included a brief section comparing Vedānta to Spinoza’s philosophy.\(^{251}\) The discussion does not go into depth, but it is one of the first systematic efforts to compare Vedānta and Spinozism, identifying several of the more obvious similarities. Among other things, Buch notes that Spinoza’s divine “substance” (substantia) corresponds to Vedānta’s Brahman, each being the totality of all existence, and each being conceived through itself. In addition, both philosophers assert (1) that the source of evil and unhappiness is not desire (“wrong willing”) but ignorance (“wrong knowing”); (2) that although effort generally precedes achievement, the world is law-bound, and free will is illusory; (3) that true freedom lies in knowing that the body, mind, intellect, and ego are not who or what one really is; and (4) that God is the cause of all things, although not a transitive cause.

In addition, adopting a subjective interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of the “attributes” of divine substance, Buch argues that in Spinoza’s system, as in Vedānta, the differentiated world of finite subjects and objects is only something we ascribe to God’s being; it is not itself real.\(^{252}\) Here, Buch’s reading of Spinoza makes the world into a figment of human imagination, ignoring the fact that Spinoza gave equal ontological status to both thought and matter, with neither being reducible to the other.

A different, but also relatively early, comparison of Vedānta and the philosophy of Spinoza is *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, which was Mahadev Sakharam Modak’s 1928 doctoral thesis at the

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\(^{251}\) Buch, *The Philosophy of Shankara*, pp. 198–206.

\(^{252}\) Buch, *The Philosophy of Shankara*, pp. 201–203.
University of London. Modak’s dissertation is well researched and analytically thoughtful.

Modak argues that in both philosophical systems, consciousness is self-evident,\(^{253}\) and knowledge of God is in some sense the same as unity with God.\(^{254}\) Also, both systems recognize three grades of knowledge, although Śaṅkara rejects rational analysis as a means of knowing ultimate reality (God). For Śaṅkara, intuition of God is super-rational, not an outgrowth of rational inquiry.\(^{255}\)

Modak next discusses Spinoza’s answer to the mind-body problem\(^{256}\) and the corresponding mind-body theories set forth in the Upanishads.\(^{257}\) Comparing the two, Modak notes that both systems make metaphysics their starting point, and both teach specific methods for gaining peace of mind. In addition, both systems place primary emphasis on the intellect and argue that knowledge leads to freedom. Modak also notes that Spinoza rejects Cartesian “seat of the soul” theories (i.e., that the soul is localized somewhere in the brain), and likewise the Upanishads sometimes speak of the soul as being the equivalent of infinite space, although the Upanishads are not consistent in that regard.\(^{258}\)

One of Modak’s key points is that Spinoza’s God — that is, the divine “substance” \((\text{substantia})\) — is distinguishable from the Upanishad’s Brahman because Spinoza’s God is not different from the cosmic system itself, whereas Brahman, although being the ontological basis of the physical universe, transcends it and

\(^{253}\) Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 6–9.


\(^{255}\) Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 10, 18–23, 118.

\(^{256}\) Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 24–43.

\(^{257}\) Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 43–54.

\(^{258}\) Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 54–60.
remains distinct from it. In other words, Brahman is the cause of the world, but Brahman (the cause) does not lose itself in the effect (the world). Rather, the world is Brahman’s māyā, which Modak prefers to translate as “powers,” not as “illusion.” Modak denies that, according to upanishadic thought, the world is unreal; instead, he argues that the world has a relative reality, dependent on Brahman while not being necessary or essential to Brahman. It is the latter point that, according to Modak, distinguishes Brahman from Spinoza’s God, since for Spinoza the world (i.e., the attributes and modes of substance) is a necessary expression of the divine essence. Of course, in regard to this point, Spinoza’s description of the world is as similar to Pratyabhijñā philosophy as it is distinct from Śaṅkara’s Vedānta.

Modak next notes that the Upanishads and Spinoza are very similar when it comes to ethical philosophy. In both systems, ethical precepts are relative to human experience. Ethical behavior leads, in Spinoza’s philosophy, to the intellectual love of God, and in Vedānta, to self-realization. Both systems also emphasize rational self-control, not passion, and both systems prefer a life of reason and discipline to one of renunciation. In addition, according to both systems, the “self” that must be realized or actualized is the self whose thoughts correspond most closely to God’s own thoughts, that is, the self by which the finite person expresses God most perfectly. Hence, this self-realization or self-actualization is not selfish (egotistic); rather, it is selfless (free of ego).

Modak additionally points out that the Upanishads and


261 Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 73–77, 81–83. See also id., p. 19 [noting that upanishadic thought distinguishes between empirical existence (vyāvahārika) and illusion (prātibhāsika)].

262 Modak, *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, pp. 84–104.
Spinoza are similar in their attitude toward theistic religion. Devotional scriptures are the work of human hands, albeit inspired by God, and their primary function is to teach and inspire good conduct. In both systems, the pursuit of truth is given the greatest emphasis, and knowledge of God (described as identity with God, or the intellectual love of God) is considered the highest stage of religious experience.²⁶³

In summary, the primary distinction that Modak identifies between the two systems is that according to the Upanishads, Brahman is a transcendent cause of the world, whereas according to Spinoza, God is an imminent cause of the world. In the former case, the existence of the world depends on Brahman, but it has no effect on Brahman. In the latter case, the existence of the world not only depends on God, but it also affects or defines God.²⁶⁴

Modak’s dissertation is the first scholarly in-depth comparison between the philosophy of the Upanishads and that of Spinoza, and it remains a valuable resource, but it does not make the “hard problem” of consciousness its central concern, and it does not take Pratyabhijñā philosophy into consideration. To that extent, the present book offers important insights that Modak overlooks.

Among the more superficial comparisons between Spinoza’s philosophy and that of the East, we have Samuel Max Melamed’s 1933 book entitled Spinoza and Buddha: Visions of a Dead God. S.M. Melamed’s book is more an expression of his Jewish identity than a work of serious scholarship. His facts are sometimes inaccurate, his argument is sometimes inconsistent, and he punctuates his analysis with so much generalization, stereotype,

²⁶³ Modak, Spinoza and the Upanishads, pp. 105–113.

²⁶⁴ Modak, Spinoza and the Upanishads, pp. 114–118. It is worth contrasting Modak’s interpretation of Spinoza to that Maganlal Buch, described above. As noted, Buch interpreted Spinoza as saying that the differentiated world of finite subjects and objects is only something that the human intellect ascribes to God’s being; it is not itself real.
and bigotry that it is hard to take the work seriously. For example, in the opening portion of a section entitled “The Man and His Race,” S.M. Melamed has this to say:

All of white man’s culture can be divided into two categories, two types, one which is born of the ear and the other of the eye. Semitic culture is that of the ear, while Aryan culture is that of the eye. All myth, like all plastic arts [(i.e., sculpting, molding, modeling, etc.)], originates in vision. Hence Semitic culture is without a mythology, without a pantheon, and without a plastic art. . . . Aryan culture, on the other hand, is overwhelmed with myth, populated with gods and goddesses, and saturated with plastic art.265

Continuing the same theme, we encounter this observation just a few pages later:

The stone knows no fear [(i.e., awe)]. Plants already have an inkling of fear, while the animal is positively fearful. Only the stupid is fearless. The higher the intelligence, the greater the fear [(i.e., awe)]. Love, however, has nothing to do with intelligence. . . . The Jew says ‘fear’ [(i.e., awe)] because he is a rationalist, an incorrigible intellectualist. The Aryan says ‘love’ because he is an incorrigible emotionalist.266

Later in his book, S.M. Melamed turns his critical eye toward Hinduism and Buddhism, setting forth a race-based theory of intellectual achievement that elevates “Aryans” and “Jews” above

265 Melamed, Spinoza and Buddha, p. 118.

266 Melamed, Spinoza and Buddha, p. 121.
other peoples. He says:

Long before the Aryans invaded [India] from the northwest, the Ganges land was populated by a variety of tribes. [But o]nly with the appearance of the Aryan invaders did a culture grow out of the Indian soil. In Palestine a similar phenomenon can be observed. Many tribes and races inhabited the country prior to the coming and after the going of the Jews from that land. However, Palestine’s fame and position in history as the land which gave birth to two great religions were determined not by the Canaanites or Moabites, but by the Hebrews.\(^\text{267}\)

But lest we think that India’s elite is the Jew’s equal, S.M. Melamed goes on to explain that “the Aryan invaders of India surrendered their physical energy, virility, and aggressiveness in that tropic land,”\(^\text{268}\) and he describes them as a “tropical people made indolent by a tropical heat.”\(^\text{269}\) He adds:

Just as no sweeping revolutionary movement ever arose in ancient India, so was no scientific discovery of any magnitude ever made in that land. Political revolutions require energy and interest in the state and in man, while scientific inventions require curiosity. The ancient Hindu lacked these qualifications.\(^\text{270}\)

By contrast, the “Western Aryans” were not so environmentally

\(^{267}\) Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. 235.

\(^{268}\) Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, pp. 236–237. See also \textit{id.}, p. 10.

\(^{269}\) Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. 238.

\(^{270}\) Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. 238.
The Western Aryans were more fortunate in selecting lands of temperate climates for their dwelling-places. Their bodies were not weakened by a tropical sun and their will to live was not undermined by a fever-infested jungle. Their gods were not only living but actually frolicking.271

S.M. Melamed’s book is full of such comments from start to end. But the passage just quoted, which mentions that the gods of the West are “living,” provides a good example of one of S.M. Melamed’s primary themes, a theme that is also captured in the book’s subtitle *Visions of a Dead God*. S.M. Melamed argues that the God of Spinoza, like the God of Eastern philosophical thought, is unified with nature, bound by the laws of physics, and therefore “dead,” whereas the God of the West, and in particular the God of Judaism, is separate from nature, free, and therefore “living.” He asserts:

The God of Eastern Aryan religiosity is a dead God within a bad world; the God of the Old Testament is a living God outside of a good world.272

In the background of this argument is a criticism of Spinoza’s philosophy that goes all the way back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716 C.E.) and before. Many of Spinoza’s detractors — S.M. Melamed included — can’t imagine a God that is outside time. For them, God must be an actor on the stage of time, which of course is what they imagine themselves to be. Therefore, they


see Spinoza’s God as powerless, even dead. This point is elaborated in Part Six of the present book. Here, it is enough to note that S.M. Melamed prefers to perpetuate cultural stereotypes than to do the philosophical “heavy lifting” that is necessary to address the metaphysical problems that Spinoza and Eastern philosophy address.

But S.M. Melamed’s cultural chauvinism could be tolerated if his scholarship were otherwise sound. Hence, what is most dissatisfying about S.M. Melamed’s book is its superficiality. He doesn’t bother to demonstrate his pronouncements about Spinoza or the East with careful textual analysis. Instead, he relies on generalizations, clichés, and distortions. For example, S.M. Melamed treats all Eastern philosophy (both Hindu and Buddhist) as if it were a single system. Indeed, he uses the name “Buddha” and the word “Buddhism” as metonyms for Eastern thought in general, and, more broadly, for pantheism, asceticism, and mysticism wherever those forms of religion might arise. Most significantly, S.M. Melamed has no awareness of Pratyabhijñā philosophy, which more than any other school of Hindu thought resembles Spinoza’s system.

The core thesis of S.M. Melamed’s book is that Eastern pantheism implies a God that is bound by physical laws, which leads, for human beings, to a crisis of despair, pessimism, and hopelessness, and these, in turn, lead to disengagement from public affairs (quietism), monastic asceticism, and a foolish desire to disappear into God. S.M. Melamed says:

The personal, living God of the Bible is only a correlation to its living, passionate, and powerful man. The universal and dead God of the Upanishads is equal in reality to its dead universalism. Out of the jungle [of South Asia] crawled a dead God, and out of the desert [of the Levant]

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roared a living God. [¶] The religious history of Western man is, in the final analysis, the history of a struggle between the living Jehovah and the dead Brahma.\textsuperscript{274}

S.M. Melamed argues that in ancient times, this flawed Eastern philosophy gained a foothold in the West, influencing Western thinkers such as Paul of Tarsus (1st century C.E.) and Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.), and in S.M. Melamed’s view, Spinoza’s philosophy represents the intellectual culmination of that trend (and a betrayal of the world-affirming Jewish tradition that was Spinoza’s birthright). S.M. Melamed therefore describes Spinoza as “the last tremor of Buddhism in the Western world,”\textsuperscript{275} meaning not actual Buddhism so much as its “basic driving forces in the realm of the spirit.”\textsuperscript{276} But in making this argument, S.M. Melamed presents a highly distorted understanding of Spinoza, mistakenly treating him as an acosmist who viewed “the world is a phantom sans reality,”\textsuperscript{277} and because S.M. Melamed is ignorant of the world-affirming, life-affirming teachings of Pratyabhijñā philosophy, his presentation of Eastern philosophy is similarly distorted and mistaken.

Ultimately, S.M. Melamed is more cultural commentator than scholar. Moreover, he is a cultural commentator who takes great satisfaction in his own Jewish heritage, urging an assertive and confident world-engagement that suited his role, from 1921 to 1924, as the head of the Chicago branch of the Zionist Organization of America. S.M. Melamed’s message, which told his Jewish readers to be activists, not fatalists; courageous, not

\textsuperscript{274} Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. 11–12.

\textsuperscript{275} Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. viii.

\textsuperscript{276} Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, pp. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{277} Melamed, \textit{Spinoza and Buddha}, p. 214.
despairing; and individualistic, not universalistic, was an important message for his day, and understood in those terms, his book is a work of great genius, but understood as a work of scholarship, it is too superficial and biased to significantly advance our understanding of the parallels between Spinoza’s philosophy and that of the East.

About the same time as S.M. Melamed’s book, Kurt F. Leidecker wrote a 1934 article for The Open Court, comparing Spinoza’s philosophy to Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta. Leidecker does not undertake a detailed, text-based analysis of either Vedānta or Spinoza, instead merely pointing out obvious points of similarity between the two systems, but his insights are still informative. Leidecker argues that in each system: (1) God is the eternal, self-caused, infinite existence underlying all things (“infinite” in the sense of being independent of external constraints); (2) God is beyond human categories of good and evil; (3) world-creation does not give rise to something distinct from God; (4) the consciousness of the individual soul is God’s own consciousness; (5) the human mind has access to three types of knowledge, one based on inferences drawn from sensory impressions, another based on reason, and a third based on direct knowledge of God’s essence; and (6) true knowledge leads to human perfection and to lasting joy (laetitia) or bliss (ānanda). Leidecker’s brief article is very valuable, but it merely whets the appetite for a more probing analysis.

A third book-length comparison of Hindu philosophy to that of Spinoza is Spinoza in the Light of the Vedānta by Rama Kanta Tripathi, published in 1957. Tripathi was a much more rigorous philosophy scholar than S.M. Melamed, and his book evidences a much more developed understanding of Spinoza. The book is primarily a thoughtful explication of Spinoza’s philosophical system, but Tripathi points out, throughout the course of his

278 Leidecker, “Spinoza and Hinduism.”
analysis, the places where similar ideas appear in Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta. The result is a fascinating comparison that serves to make Spinoza accessible to readers who are accustomed to thinking in Vedāntic categories.

Tripathi identifies all the most obvious parallels between Vedānta and Spinozism, such as (1) the similarity of Vedānta’s Brahman to Spinoza’s divine “substance” (substantia), (2) the unity of all things in God’s own infinite being, (3) the human pursuit of self-perfection by cultivating reason over passion, and (4) the attainment of liberation or blessedness through true knowledge — that is, knowledge of things sub specie aeternitatis (“under a species of eternity”). But Tripathi also takes liberties with Spinoza’s ideas, using his explication of Spinoza’s philosophy as a vehicle for championing the genius of Advaita Vedānta. As Tripathi’s editor concedes, Tripathi’s book is “an emendation of Spinoza in the light of Śaṅkara.” In other words, Tripathi’s purpose is, in part, to improve upon Spinoza’s philosophy by interpreting it through the lens of Vedānta. It is Tripathi’s assertion that Vedānta reconciles the most problematic parts of Spinoza’s system and that Westerners misunderstand Spinoza because they are not accustomed to ideas that are well developed in Vedānta.

There may be some validity to the latter assertion. If Spinoza’s philosophy is similar in many ways to the leading philosophies of Hindu India — and I think it is — then it follows that Hindus might have an easier access to some of its ideas than do Westerners. It is perhaps difficult for Westerners, who are generally accustomed to empirical thinking, to imagine that the subject-object divide is merely an illusion or that thought and matter are the same thing comprehended in two different ways. By contrast, those notions are much less alien to the educated Hindu, for they are central to the Hindu religious discussion. Indeed, Tripathi argues that much of the criticism of Spinoza’s philosophy can be

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279 Tripathi, *Spinoza in the Light*, p. i.
traced to an inability to think in non-empirical terms. But Tripathi, in his effort to explain Spinoza’s system in the light of Vedānta, conforms Spinoza to fit Vedānta. He asserts that Vedānta — and in particular Śaṅkara’s doctrine of world-illusion (māyāvāda, or vivartavāda) — is the key that makes sense of Spinoza’s metaphysics, and he further asserts that this acosmist emendation of Spinoza’s philosophy is implied within everything Spinoza states explicitly.

As to the latter point, Tripathi makes two interrelated arguments. First, he adopts the subjective interpretation of the “attributes” of divine substance, meaning that the categories of “thought” and “extension” (mind and matter) are, according to Tripathi’s version of Spinoza, merely things we ascribe to the infinite being of God; they are not actually existent in themselves. As Tripathi puts it, their basis is epistemological, not ontological. Thus, Tripathi reads Spinoza as holding that the entire differentiated world, in both its mental and material aspects, is a false appearance.

Second, Tripathi relies heavily on Spinoza’s assertion that “all

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determination is negation” (omnis determinatio est negatio). Following Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831 C.E.), Tripathi derives from this principle that anything that is finite (a chair, sweet tea, etc.) exists only as a selective negation of God’s infinite presence, and therefore only God’s infinite presence is real, not the finite object that one might observe. In my view, which follows that of Yitzhak Melamed (no relation to S.M. Melamed), acosmism constitutes a misreading of Spinoza, but Tripathi uses acosmism to conclude that Spinoza’s God is like Śaṅkara’s Brahman, a God relative to which all things are unreal appearances.

In making these arguments, Tripathi embraces a qualified

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282 The context of this assertion was this: “As for shape being a negation, and not something positive, it’s manifest that matter as a whole, considered without limitation, can have no shape, and that shape pertains only to finite and determinate bodies. For whoever says that he conceives a shape indicates nothing by this except that he conceives a determinate thing, and how it is determinate. So this determination does not pertain to the thing according to its being, but on the contrary, it is its non-being. Therefore, because the shape is nothing but a determination, and a determination is a negation, as they say, it can’t be anything but a negation.” (Quantum ad hoc, quod figura negatio, non vero aliquid positivum est; manifestum est, integrum materiam, indefiniti consideratam, nullam posse habere figuram; figuramque in finitis, ac determinatis corporibus locum tantum obtinere. Qui enim se figuram percipere ait, nil aliud eo indicat, quam se rem determinatam, & quo pacto ea sit determinata, concipere. Haec ergo determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non pertinent: sed econtra est ejus non esse. Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, & determinatio negatio est; non poterit, ut dictum, aliud quid, quam negatio, esse.) Letter 50 [IV/240b/25–35], italics added (the Dutch original of the letter is lost, but the Latin version has been preserved).

version of subjective idealism. Thus, Tripathi overlooks the non-reductive aspect of Spinoza’s philosophical system. For Spinoza, “a mode of extension” (i.e., a distinct material object) is just as real as “the idea of that mode” (i.e., the thought that corresponds to that object), and neither can be eliminated in favor of the other. For this reason, it is Pratyabhijñā philosophy, not Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, that most closely shares Spinoza’s core insight, for Pratyabhijñā philosophy posits a physical world that is real in every meaningful sense despite having consciousness as its underlying being.

In summary, Tripathi — whose admiration for Spinoza is beyond question — does not venture past Advaita Vedānta in his analysis, and he does not so much as mention Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Tripathi prefers to repair Spinoza’s philosophy by conforming it to Śaṅkara’s Vedānta rather than to repair Śaṅkara’s Vedānta by conforming it to Spinozism. In contrast to S.M. Melamed, Tripathi has a profound grasp of and appreciation for Spinoza’s ideas, but in the end, Tripathi loves his Vedānta as much as S.M. Melamed loves his Judaism. As a result, Tripathi’s contribution to our understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysics, although very valuable, is incomplete.

More recently, there has been renewed interest in the similarities between the philosophies of Hindu India and Spinozism. In 1984, Bina Gupta wrote a thoughtful article for the India Philosophical Quarterly, comparing Śaṅkara’s Brahman to Spinoza’s divine “substance” (substantia). Gupta keeps her focus

284 Tripathi does not go so far as to say that physical objects are like dream images, having no existence outside a person’s subjective awareness. Rather, following the traditional teachings of post-Śaṅkara Vedānta, Tripathi argues that there is an aspect of God called “Īśvara” that mediates between Brahman as the “supreme reality” (paramārthika) and the practical world of diverse phenomena (vyavahārika), and Tripathi asserts that the finite things that make up the practical world are the dream images of Īśvara. See Tripathi, Spinoza in the Light, pp. 158–159, 188–192.
narrow, and her analysis is intellectually rigorous, but her conclusions are not significantly different from those of earlier scholars. Like earlier scholars, Gupta concludes that Śaṅkara’s Brahman and Spinoza’s substance are conceptually the same. Both are eternal, self-caused, infinite existence, constrained by nothing, dependent on nothing. But Gupta also notes the key distinction between the two. In Spinoza’s system, the differentiated world of finite things is objectively real; it is a necessary expression of divine substance, and it characterizes divine substance. For Śaṅkara, by contrast, the world is a mere appearance; it is something false that human beings have superimposed upon Brahman. In other words, the world is real for Śaṅkara only insofar as it is seen to be Brahman, but insofar as it is seen to be the world, it is a mere phantasm. Therefore, those people who, through ignorance, take the world to be real make Brahman into a finite god of religious devotion, but in truth, no qualities characterize or can even be accurately ascribed to Brahman. In that regard, Gupta argues that Śaṅkara’s Brahman cannot be equated with Spinoza’s divine substance.

Having drawn that distinction, Gupta recognizes additional correspondences between the ideas of Śaṅkara and Spinoza. Both philosophers recognize three means of acquiring knowledge, and for both, freedom is achieved through the highest of these means (intuitive knowledge of God’s essence). In addition, both philosophers assert that human beings have no true free will; instead, we imagine ourselves to be free because we do not know the causes of our desires. Also, although Śaṅkara and Spinoza


both maintain that true knowledge leads to the highest goal of human endeavor, that highest goal for Spinoza is the ability to view all things under the species of eternity, understanding all things as God understands them. For Śaṅkara, by contrast, true knowledge leads to the awareness that the world is illusory.\(^{289}\)

Gupta points out that Śaṅkara’s doctrine of world illusion (māyāvāda) allows Brahman to remain indeterminate. Not only is Brahman free of external supports and constraints, but Brahman also has no form and undergoes no modifications. By contrast, Spinoza’s divine substance expresses its own eternal essence through temporal modifications that are real, thus giving rise to a real world, but also giving content to God’s inner being.\(^{290}\) Gupta then comments on the significance of this distinction. She says: “The intuitive knowledge of God which Spinoza seeks is a way to understand the world as it really is. It is not a flight from the material world, but a celebration of its essential nature and oneness. The pursuit of Brahman, on the other hand, implies repudiation of the world: it is a realization that Brahman is the only reality; the world is merely an appearance and the [individual soul] and Brahman are non-different.”\(^{291}\) Here, of course, Gupta has identified the precise distinction that makes Pratyabhijñā philosophy, not Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, the closer analog to Spinozism.

A year later, in 1985, Abheda Nanda Bhattacharyya published a short book entitled *The Idealistic Philosophy of Śaṅkara and Spinozā*. His book relies mostly on secondary sources, and it includes almost no comparative analysis of the two philosophies. Instead, the book summarizes Śaṅkara’s Vedānta (in about 70 pages), and then it separately summarizes Spinoza’s philosophy (in about 36 pages), leaving it mostly to the reader to identify


similarities and differences. Bhattacharya does, however, end each of his summaries with a section entitled “Critical Estimate” in which he expresses his own views. In these sections, he doesn’t attempt to hide his admiration for Śaṅkara’s philosophy, nor does he shy from highlighting what he deems to be the flaws in Spinoza’s system.

With regard to Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, Bhattacharya is particularly sensitive to the charge that, according to Śaṅkara, the objective world is a mere illusion. Bhattacharya devotes considerable energy to refuting that charge. His main point is that the world is not illusion in the sense of its being nonexistent; rather, the world is a false appearance, a misapprehension of the facts. The cause of the world is God or Brahman, but the cause never actually undergoes any change or transformation, and thus the effect (i.e., the world) never actually occurs; what appears as the world is actually Brahman. Nonetheless, consistent with Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, Bhattacharya readily concedes that the world has a practical significance that makes it more real than a mere dream image. Śaṅkara’s Vedānta is not subjective idealism, and it does not abandon consciousness-matter dualism: Something “external” exists as the object of consciousness, but that something is not what we imagine it to be.

With regard to Spinoza’s philosophy, Bhattacharya rejects the subjective interpretation of the “attributes” of divine substance, thus disagreeing with Rama Kanta Tripathi’s reading of Spinoza. Instead, Bhattacharya concludes that the attributes are ontologically real, thus infinitely magnifying God’s own being. Moreover, because God’s attributes are infinite in number, whereas human beings are only capable of conceiving two of those attributes (thought and extension), Bhattacharya argues that God

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293 Bhattacharya, *The Idealistic Philosophy*, pp. 30, 82.
(or substance), for Spinoza, is transcendent and unknowable.\textsuperscript{294} Taking the point further, Bhattacharyya finds in this an inconsistency in Spinoza’s philosophy. As Bhattacharyya puts it, Spinoza begins his philosophy as a pantheist (i.e., nature and God are the same thing), but he ends his philosophy as a theist (i.e., God is infinitely greater than nature, which is incomplete and hence imperfect).\textsuperscript{295}

As regards the reality of the physical world, Bhattacharyya notes that, for Spinoza, thought and extension (i.e., mind and matter) have equal status. Neither is reducible to the other, and neither can influence the other causally. But Bhattacharyya finds an inconsistency in the fact that Spinoza describes both thought and extension as conceptions of the human intellect, noting that the intellect itself is a thinking thing. Bhattacharyya says that thought, therefore, “has a double function”; it is, on the one hand, a parallel attribute to extension, and it is, on the other hand, the thinking subject that perceives both thought and extension. Bhattacharyya therefore concludes that Spinoza’s theory of thought-matter equivalence, which claims to answer Cartesian dualism, is merely Cartesian dualism in a different form.\textsuperscript{296} Of course, Bhattacharyya is not the first to notice this particular peculiarity of Spinoza’s philosophy, and although Bhattacharyya doesn’t make the point explicitly, he implies by the title of his book (\textit{The Idealistic Philosophy of Śaṅkara and Spinoza}) that for Spinoza, thought is the whole show, and matter (i.e., extension) — even if it is non-eliminable — is ultimately just a concept of the intellect. Here, I think Bhattacharyya misreads Spinoza, as I explain in Part Three of this book.

\textsuperscript{294} Bhattacharya, \textit{The Idealistic Philosophy}, pp. 103–104.


\textsuperscript{296} Bhattacharya, \textit{The Idealistic Philosophy}, pp. 105–106.
Bhattacharyya’s book is a fun read, and it makes several good points, but it fails to grapple objectively with the primary sources. As a result, Bhattacharyya’s defense of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta lacks analytical rigor, and his critique of Spinoza, although valid in part, makes a few interpretive errors. For example, Bhattacharyya takes a misstep, I think, when he argues that all nondualist philosophies need to bridge the gap between the “absolute” (i.e., Brahman or “substance”), which is infinite and perfect, and the world, which is finite and imperfect.297 Spinoza would not agree that the world is “finite”; rather, human beings divide it into finite parts, and we do so arbitrarily. Nor would Spinoza agree that the world is in any sense imperfect, evil, or sinful; rather, moralistic judgments and ethical categories are, for Spinoza, only valid relative to human needs. (Ethics, III, Preface.) Therefore, for Spinoza, there is no gap to bridge between the “absolute” and the world, and Spinoza, unlike Śaṅkara, has no need to declare the world false and to deny the reality of causal transformation. In the end, the greatest contribution of Bhattacharyya’s monograph may not be its power to persuade; rather, it may be that it forces us to think deeply about the irregularities and inconsistencies that lurk within both Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and Spinoza’s neutral monism, asking ourselves, as to each system, whether those irregularities and inconsistencies can be reconciled.

In 1998, Ben-Ami Scharfstein’s valuable exploration of comparative philosophy included a chapter comparing the philosophies of Śaṅkara and Spinoza. Much of this chapter takes the form of a scholarly (if incomplete) summary of each philosopher’s basic ideas, with very little comparative analysis, but Scharfstein makes some very interesting points at the end of his chapter. He notes that both Śaṅkara and Spinoza borrow heavily

from philosophers whose ideas they claim to reject. Scharfstein then turns to a direct point-by-point comparison. Spinoza’s method of systematic reasoning from basic principles has no counterpart in Śaṅkara, who relies on upanishadic revelation, and unlike Śaṅkara, Spinoza insists on the reality of the material world. But Scharfstein also identifies the following similarities between the two systems: (1) both describe God as infinite, atemporal, unique, the ground of all existence, impersonal, law-bound, and conscious; (2) both find ways to bridge the apparent distinction between the infinite unity of God and the diversity that characterizes the world of finite objects and conscious souls; and (3) both recognize three levels of knowledge, preferring intuitive knowledge over reason and empirical knowledge.

Scharfstein begins and ends this chapter of his book by noting the primary thing that Śaṅkara and Spinoza share: their interest in the relationship of the individual to the whole. Near the beginning of the chapter, Scharfstein makes this beautiful statement: “To the Indian [(i.e., to Śaṅkara)], every part is an illusorily small, illusorily separate manifestation of reality as an unqualified whole; and to the European [(i.e, to Spinoza)], every finite part is a relative nothing within the infinitely infinite whole. Each of the two philosophers calls on the seemingly separate individual to strive for liberation.” And Scharfstein closes the chapter with this equally beautiful statement describing the blissful state of realization that both Śaṅkara and Spinoza attained: “[T]he existential lesson they have both learned . . . is the sense of imperviousness, the steadily tranquil frame of mind, that comes

298 Scharfstein, A Comparative History, pp. 403–404.

299 Scharfstein, A Comparative History, p. 404.

300 Scharfstein, A Comparative History, pp. 404–405.

301 Scharfstein, A Comparative History, p. 368.
with success in identifying oneself with the unfathomable reality that constitutes us and, if we are enough like Shankara or Spinoza, consoles and enraptures.”

In 2013, Katherine Elise Barhydt and J.M. Fritzman published an article using Spinoza’s philosophical system as a framework through which to think about and evaluate several other philosophical systems, including those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja (ca. 1017–1137 C.E.), Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries C.E.), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854 C.E.), and Hegel. A book could easily be dedicated to any one of these comparisons, but Barhydt and Fritzman summarize each philosophy in only a page or two, adding, as to each, a page or two of analysis. The result is a bit superficial, and in the case of Abhinavagupta’s Pratyabhijñā philosophy, I disagree with several important elements of Barhydt and Fritzman’s interpretation.

Barhydt and Fritzman correctly state that, according to Pratyabhijñā philosophy, the world is real and that matter is non-different from consciousness, but they do not seem to grasp the philosophical basis of those assertions or to appreciate their full implications. In addition, Barhydt and Fritzman argue that the “Śiva” of Pratyabhijñā philosophy corresponds to Spinoza’s divine “substance” and that “Śakti,” in turn, corresponds to Spinoza’s “attributes and modes.” They then add that Śiva’s universal consciousness is “nonintentional” (i.e., it is pure subject without object) and that Śakti constitutes the content of Śiva’s consciousness (i.e., she is the objective world), and they assert that the goal of Pratyabhijñā philosophy is to experience pure Śiva consciousness separate from Śakti. I do not think that accurately describes the nondual state as conceived by Abhinavagupta or the

302 Scharfstein, A Comparative History, p. 405.
members of his school.

That said, Barhydt and Fritzman’s overall project is an interesting one, and they approach it with intelligence. Of the philosophies they examine, they conclude that only Hegel’s rises above self-authenticating assertions as to truth, and it does so because Hegel’s Geist is a collective consciousness that, unlike Brahman or Śiva, emerges from humanity, thus developing in parallel to the historical development of humanity. In other words, the world is described as being dependent on Brahman or Śiva, whereas Hegel’s Geist is described as being dependent on the world, and Hegel’s philosophy uses disagreements among philosophers as the raw material for an ever-evolving truth.\(^{305}\) The argument is an interesting one, but it is beyond the subject matter of this book.

In 2014, Kenneth Dorter wrote an article for Symposium again comparing Śaṅkara’s Vedānta to Spinoza’s philosophy. Dorter identifies many of the same similarities that previous scholars have already identified. For example, Dorter argues that both Śaṅkara and Spinoza “saw the world as ultimately a single substance that they equated with God, and [they] proposed ways of disciplining our thinking to overcome our initial perception of the world as aggregation of individual substances.”\(^{306}\) In addition, both philosophers approached the problem using logic and common sense, although Śaṅkara also relied heavily on scripture.\(^{307}\) And, both philosophers advocated freedom from passion, and they insisted that knowledge was the means of attaining that freedom.\(^{308}\) Finally, both philosophers claimed that all things are in some sense


\(^{306}\) Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” p. 215; see id., pp. 219–220.


eternal, although we tend to understand them in temporal terms, and through correct knowledge, we can come to see ourselves from the perspective of eternity, which is the same thing as seeing ourselves the way God sees us.\footnote{Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” pp. 227–228.}

All this is ground that has been covered by other scholars, but Dorter adds the point that, although philosophers who lived many centuries apart and who came from cultures that had no significant interaction might reach similar conclusions, each such philosopher will express those conclusions in the categories, metaphors, and terminology of his or her own philosophical tradition. More specifically, Dorter’s thesis is that Śaṅkara tended to express his conclusions in the language of ontology and that Spinoza did so in the language of epistemology, and this ontology-epistemology distinction accounts, in Dorter’s view, for many of the differences between the conclusions the two philosophers reached.\footnote{Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” pp. 220–227.} For example, Śaṅkara asserts that the cause of our misperception of reality is the three fundamental qualities that characterize the natural world — sattva, rajas, and tamas, which Dorter translates as “reason, passion, and dullness.” By contrast, Spinoza asserts that the cause of our misperception of reality is the inadequacy of our empirical methods of acquiring information. Thus, in Dorter’s view, Śaṅkara relies on an ontological explanation, whereas Spinoza relies on an epistemological one.\footnote{Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” p. 224–226, 234.} More broadly, Dorter concludes that Śaṅkara’s focus on ontology forces him to declare the world to be an illusion, whereas Spinoza’s focus on epistemology allows him to declare the world to be real, albeit misperceived and misinterpreted.\footnote{Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” pp. 234–235.}
I don’t agree with Dorter on every point, but some of his observations are masterful, and the ontology-epistemology distinction he draws between Śaṅkara and Spinoza is interesting, and it adds to our understanding of these two philosophers.

In 2014, the same year as Dorter’s article, William Néria published a book entitled *Plotin, Shankara, Spinoza: Le dépassement de la raison et L’expérience de l’Absolu*. As the title suggests, Néria compares the philosophies of Plotinus, Śaṅkara, and Spinoza. With respect to each philosophy, Néria first examines the individuation process that gives rise to the ego-sense. Next, Néria considers the role played by the intellect (and virtuous conduct based on the intellect) in overcoming that individuation. Finally, Néria describes the state of a person who has merged his or her individuality into the “Absolute.”

Because Néria is attempting a three-way comparison, and because he is comparing philosophies that emerged in different cultural settings and that use words in different ways, his task is a formidable one. Therefore, in marking areas of correspondence among the three philosophies, Néria necessarily makes interpretive judgments that some readers might question. Nonetheless, Néria’s approach to the task is a scholarly one. His primary point is that all three philosophies begin with a “prime intuition,” a common

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313 For example, Dorter draws a parallel between Spinoza’s *natura naturans* and the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya philosophy, and he draws a corresponding parallel between *natura naturata* and Sāmkhya’s *prakṛti*. See Dorter, “Thought and Expression,” pp. 225–226. I do not find those parallels to be persuasive. A more persuasive parallel to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* would be, in my view, Spinoza’s categories of thought and extension.

314 Dorter adapted his article as chapter two of his 2018 book *Can Different Cultures Think the Same Thoughts?*. In that chapter, he weaves into his analysis of Śaṅkara and Spinoza comparisons to the skeptical philosophy of Parmenides of Elea (6th–5th centuries B.C.E.). See Dorter, *Can Different Cultures*, pp. 41–64, 208–220.
“anchor point” that is more experiential than it is philosophical. From there, all three philosophies validate the intellect as an important method, but they all ask the seeker to go beyond reason to a higher form of knowing that eliminates the subject-object divide, resulting in eternal serenity and bliss, unaffected by desire and aversion.

Although Néria’s book is the most recent in-depth treatment of our subject, scholars have continued to be fascinated by the similarities between the philosophical systems of Śaṅkara and Spinoza. In 2016, Shakuntala Gawde wrote a brief article emphasizing the need for global intercultural harmony. Like other scholars before her, she identified the following points of similarity between Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and Spinozism: (1) God is one, infinite, indivisible, unchanging, and the underlying being of all things; (2) God does not interfere in human affairs, which are instead dictated by laws of cause and effect; (3) the consciousness of the human soul is God’s own consciousness; (4) the appearance of diversity (māyā according to Vedānta, “attributes and modes” according to Spinoza) is merely a subjective ascription, not real; and (5) true knowledge leads to human perfection and joy.

As this summary makes clear, Gawde embraces the subjective interpretation of the “attributes” of divine substance, and she


317 Gawde, “Monism of Śaṅkara and Spinoza.”

318 In 2018, two years after Gawde’s article, Urmi Ray published a brief article that makes similar points. See Ray, “Advaitavada versus Spinoza’s Monism,” pp. 610–614. Ray’s article also considers (1) the temporality of the differentiated world (id., pp. 611–612), (2) the transcendent unknowability of God (id., p. 612), and (3) God’s lack of purpose other than sport or joy (id., pp. 613–614). Like Gawde, Ray uses her comparative analysis as a basis for urging harmony in human relations.
likewise embraces the acosmist implications of that interpretation.\textsuperscript{319} On this point, she agrees with Rama Kanta Tripathi, whose 1957 book is discussed above. Of course, the acosmist interpretation of Spinoza tends to align Spinoza’s system more closely with Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, but as already said, it overlooks the fact that for Spinoza, the material world is quite real. It is that distinction that makes Spinoza’s philosophical system much closer to Pratyabhijñā philosophy than it is to Vedānta.

Michael Hemmingsen wrote an article in 2018 that focuses directly on the question of acosmism in Spinoza’s philosophy, a question that, as we have seen, is critical to any effort to align Spinoza’s philosophy with that of Śaṅkara.\textsuperscript{320} Hemmingsen’s article contrasts Tripathi’s interpretation of Spinoza with Gilles Deleuze’s alternative interpretation. Tripathi — who seeks to emend Spinoza’s philosophy in light of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta — fully embraces the subjective interpretation of the “attributes,” arguing that they are mere ascriptions that we superimpose on substance, and that substance is ultimately unknowable and transcendent (i.e., not subject to any differentiation or determination). By contrast, Deleuze is one of the philosophers who rejects the acosmist interpretation of Spinoza’s system, arguing instead that Spinoza’s divine substance is expressed in its attributes and modes, and that it exists in that expressed form, becoming an actual world of finite objects and finite ideas. Hemmingsen’s article compares the interpretations of Tripathi and Deleuze, focusing on three issues: (1) the ontological status of the attributes, (2) acosmism and the unity of all being, and (3) the parallelism of the attributes. The result is a fascinating analysis, although the reader wishes that Hemmingsen had ventured more deeply into Spinoza’s own words, explicating where either Deleuze or Tripathi fails to come to grips

\textsuperscript{319} Gawde, “Monism of Śaṅkara and Spinoza,” p. 486.

\textsuperscript{320} Hemmingsen, “Māyā and Becoming.”
with what Spinoza actually said.

In the same year as Hemmingsen’s article, Noah Forslund wrote a brief article claiming that “few publications — if any — have considered comparisons between Spinozism and Advaita Vedanta Hinduism” and adding that the two philosophies are “strikingly similar.”\(^{321}\) On the basis of this similarity, Forslund’s article urges scholars to reconsider the supposed dichotomy between Eastern and Western philosophical thought.

Forslund argues that, according to the customary understanding, the hallmarks of Western philosophy are rationalism, individualism, non-mysticism, and a personal conception of divinity, whereas Eastern philosophy tends in the opposite direction. Forslund next briefly summarizes Advaita Vedānta, saying that according to Vedānta, God is infinite, one without a second, beyond rational understanding, the ground of all being, and impersonal. Moreover, Vedānta teaches that the human experience of multiplicity and separation is due to ignorance, and that this ignorance is the source of unhappiness.\(^{322}\) Forslund then measures Vedānta against “the normative Eastern philosophical model,” finding it to be a good fit.\(^{323}\)

Forslund next briefly summarizes Spinoza’s philosophy, noting that for Spinoza, God is infinite, one without a second, the ground of all being, and impersonal. In addition, Spinoza asserts that knowledge — in particular, intuitive knowledge — removes the false sense people have of separation (from both God and the world), and it leads to freedom and happiness.\(^{324}\) Forslund next measures Spinoza’s philosophy against “the normative Western


\(^{322}\) Forslund, “Spinoza the Hindu,” pp. 7–9.


\(^{324}\) Forslund, “Spinoza the Hindu,” pp. 9–12.
philosophical model,” finding it to be a poor fit. Indeed, the only way in which Spinoza’s system fits the Western model is his reliance on a “rationalist lexicon.”

But Forslund’s main point is that Spinoza’s system closely resembles Advaita Vedānta. Here, Forslund notes that Spinoza’s God has an infinite number of attributes that are beyond human conception, and therefore Spinoza’s God, like the God of Vedānta (i.e., Brahman), is ineffable. In addition, both systems assert the unity of the individual soul with God, and the attainment of liberation through knowledge. The principal difference between Vedānta and Spinoza’s philosophy is, in Forslund’s view, that the former exists within a religious tradition with a scriptural basis. Forslund concludes his essay by urging scholars to reject what he considers to be a false East-West dichotomy.

Also in 2018, MD-Zizaur Rahaman and Ashaduzzaman Khan wrote a brief article comparing the philosophies of Rāmānuja, Spinoza, and Ibn ‘Arabī (1165–1240 C.E.). Their article doesn’t go into great depth, but it does make the point that in all three systems, God is identified in some way with the physical world and with individual souls. Rāmānuja describes physical matter and individual souls as attributes or modes of a single divine substance, and — in contrast to Śaṅkara — Rāmānuja insists on the reality of the world, rejecting Śaṅkara’s assertion that God is devoid of qualities (nirguṇa brahman). In these regards, Rāmānuja’s philosophy is similar to that of Spinoza, but Rāmānuja uses the terms “attribute” (viśeṣaṇa), “mode” (prakāra), and “substance”


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(dravya, viśeṣya, prakāri) in a very different way from Spinoza, making the two philosophies verbally similar but semantically dissimilar. For example, Rāmānuja does not assert an isomorphism of thought and matter, or the principle that all material objects have minds (and that all consciousness is consciousness of self). In addition, Rāmānuja embraces Cartesian dualism, free will, the immortality of the individual soul, and the existence of a personal God that intervenes in history. In short, his philosophy — unlike Spinoza’s — expresses the widely held intuitions of devotional religions.330

Ibn ‘Arabī, by contrast, describes the physical world and living beings as reflections of God and, therefore, as not different from God. For Ibn ‘Arabī, there is complete unity between God and living beings, each is identical with the other, seeing itself reflected in the other.331 Rahaman and Khan conclude their article by noting that despite the irreconcilable distinctions among religions, the concept of God and world (and their relation to one another) is similar in each of these three philosophies.332

Finally, in 2019, Adriano Ercolani wrote a brief article for InCircolo, focusing on the similarities between Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, Neoplatonism, and Spinoza, and in that article Ercolani briefly discusses several of the studies that are summarized above, although he adds no analysis of his own.

As this summary shows, many scholars have taken an interest in the obvious parallels between Hindu thought and Spinoza’s philosophical system. The most important distinction that scholars

330 Rāmānuja also embraces the theory of divine incarnation (avatāra). For a general introduction to Rāmānuja’s thought, see Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, ch. IX; Ādidevānanda (transl.), Yatīndramatadīpikā by Śrīnivāsadāsa.


have recognized is the doctrine of world illusion that characterizes Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, finding that doctrine to be incompatible with the doctrine of divine immanence that characterizes Spinoza’s philosophy. One must ask, however, to what extent this distinction is overstated. Many adherents to Śaṅkara’s Vedānta argue that the world is an illusion only insofar as we tend to focus on what is temporal, not on what is eternal, and thus we mistake the world for one thing when, in truth, it is another. But Spinoza would certainly agree with that point. In my view, the primary distinction between Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and Spinozism is the causal relationship between the world and God’s inner being or essence. For Spinoza, the world expresses God’s own essence, and that teaching is what makes Spinozism more like Pratyabhijñā philosophy than it is like Vedānta.
The metaphor of optical reflection plays a prominent role in South Asian philosophy. It is most often used to attempt to bridge the subject-object divide, but the metaphor finds other applications, too. Excellent studies of how the metaphor has evolved over time include Ian Whicher, “Theory of Reflected Consciousness in Yoga” (1998); Isabelle Ratié, “An Indian Debate on Optical Reflections and Its Metaphysical Implications” (2017); and Dimitry Shevchenko, “Theories of Reflection in Indian Philosophy and Jacques Lacan” (2018).

The reflection metaphor appears as early as the Chandogya Upaniṣad, in which Prajāpati tells Indra (from among the gods) and Virocana (from among the demons) that the person reflected in the eye, in water, and in a mirror is the true Self (Ātman), thus misleading Virocana but not Indra. (See Chandogya Upaniṣad 8.7–12.)

Later, in Sāṃkhya theory, it is said that the intellect (buddhi), although itself an inert unconscious thing, knows by means of the pure consciousness (puruṣa; lit.: “man” or “person”) that the intellect reflects. More specifically, the intellect reflects consciousness, and it reflects external objects, and by way of this double reflection, it knows the external objects. The Yoga Sūtras, which probably date to the first centuries of the Common Era, adopt a similar model, asserting that the intellect knows an object by reflecting within itself both the seer and the seen (draṣṭṛ-—

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333 See Shevchenko, “Theories of Reflection,” pp. 29–32. For other early uses of the reflection metaphor in Hindu philosophy, see id., pp. 8–44.

334 Sāṃkhya also describes the emergence of the “I-maker” (ahamkāra) as a result of the reflection of pure consciousness (puruṣa) in the mirror of the intellect (buddhi).
In other words, the intellect takes on the form of external objects, and then, by the reflected light of consciousness (puruṣa), it knows itself in that form.

At roughly the same time as these speculations, the Sautrāntika Buddhists were likewise using the metaphor of reflection, but they were doing so specifically to address the epistemological problem of how the soul can be conscious of things external to itself. The Sautrāntikas embraced the theory — described in Part One of the present book — that one cannot be conscious of a thing without being that thing. Consciousness can never go outside consciousness to observe the external world directly, for if it did so, it would necessarily cease to be conscious. Hence, consciousness can only be conscious of the things that appear in consciousness. From that insight, the Sautrāntikas derived the principle that the external world is reflected in consciousness, and consciousness — which is conscious of itself — becomes aware of the external world by means of that reflection. But the Sautrāntikas applied this principle in support of a strict consciousness-matter dualism. For them, the external objects that are reflected in consciousness, and thus known, are unconscious matter — existing outside consciousness but known

335 See Yoga Sūtras, sūtras IV.22–IV.23, translated in Bryant, The Yoga Sūtras, pp. 443–446. See also Yoga Sūtras, sūtra IV.17.


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by inference from their effects.\footnote{Ratié, “Can One Prove that Something Exists?,” pp. 491–495; Ratié, “The Dreamer and the Yogin,” pp. 442–445.}

In Vedānta, the reflection metaphor is most frequently used to describe the relationship between the universal consciousness (Brahman) and the individual soul (jīva) or intellect (buddhi). The individual soul (or the intellect) is said to be conscious because it reflects the consciousness of Brahman, as the water of a lake reflects the sun or moon. This usage is frequent in Śaṅkara’s commentaries, and Śaṅkara derives it primarily from the Brahma Sūtras, which date, at the latest, to the first centuries of the Common Era. Referring to the individual soul, sūtra II.3.50 states, ābhāsa eva ca (“and only a reflection”). Vindhyavāsin (4th century C.E.) expresses the same idea and may be another of Śaṅkara’s sources.\footnote{See generally Shevchenko, “Theories of Reflection,” pp. 79–85. On Vindhyavāsin, see id., p. 55.}

When the Śaiva nondualists of 10th- and 11th-century Kashmir use the reflection metaphor, their use of it cannot be understood in isolation from these antecedents in Śāṃkhya, Sautrāntika Buddhism, and Vedānta, but the Śaiva nondualists rejected the idealist assertion that external objects are unreal appearances, and they likewise rejected the dualist assertion that external objects are inert matter existing outside consciousness.

Thus, the main problem for the Śaiva nondualists was to explain how the external universe could be real without its obvious diversity negating the unity of all things as aspects of a single undivided consciousness. Utpaladeva employed the reflection metaphor to do so. He explained that just as diverse objects seen reflected in the surface of a mirror appear to be distinct objects, but in reality they are all just the mirror itself, likewise the objective universe appears to be diverse, but in reality it is a reflection
occuring in the mirror of consciousness.\textsuperscript{340}

But Utpaladeva’s solution might be misunderstood as an endorsement of the consciousness-matter dualism of the Sautrāntikas. According to that dualism, diverse objects are all just reflections in consciousness, but outside consciousness (outside the mirror), there must exist an actual diversity in the form of unconscious matter that gives rise to the reflections that appear in consciousness. Utpaladeva and later Abhinavagupta countered that Sautrāntika argument by denying the existence of anything external to consciousness that was the cause of the reflections that appeared in consciousness. They argued that if such things existed, then consciousness would be determined (i.e., affected, limited) by those external things, and then it would not be infinite, free, and independent (svatantrā) — the ground of all being. Hence, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers asserted that the cause of the reflections that appear in consciousness is none other than the freedom of consciousness to express itself, and therefore they are not, technically speaking, reflections at all; rather, they were as if reflections. In other words, consciousness configures itself in such a way as to appear as a reflection of things external to itself, thus

\textsuperscript{340} See Torella, \textit{The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā}, p. 186 (com. to Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā II.4.19, KSTS, vol. 34, 2nd text, p. 57) [“there is no conflict [in the case of a conscious entity] between its unity and its capacity to receive manifold reflections”]. See also Kaul, “Abhinavagupta on Reflection (Pratibimba) in the \textit{Tantrāloka},” pp. 164–172. Cf. \textit{Ashṭāvakra Gītā} I.19 [“Just as a mirror exists within and without the image reflected in it, even so the Supreme Lord exists inside and outside this body.”].
giving rise to the illusion of a knower and a known.  

But when the Pratyabhijñā philosophers asserted that there was nothing external to consciousness, they were not suggesting that there was nothing external to the finite intellect of an individual. At the individual level, the intellect reflects the things that surround it and thus knows those things, but none of those surrounding things is unconscious, for consciousness is the being of all things.

Abhinavagupta’s use of the reflection metaphor to explain unity in diversity became the primary use of that metaphor in Pratyabhijñā Shaivism. Again and again, we find the Pratyabhijñā philosophers using the example of reflection — and, more specifically, the example of the city reflected in a mirror — to demonstrate how the objective world can be simultaneously real, diverse, and unified with consciousness. It is that city-in-a-mirror simile, and all its implications, that is the focus of Part Two of the present book.

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342 See, e.g., Tantrāloka 3.49–50. See also Lawrence, “Remarks on Abhinavagupta’s Use of the Analogy of Reflection,” p. 590.

Appendix Three: Free Will in Hebrew Scripture

And YHVH–God planted a garden in Eden, from the East, and he placed there the Adam that he [had] formed. And YHVH–God sprouted out from the soil every tree nice for appearance and good for eating, and the Tree of Life in the midst of the garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. . . . And YHVH–God commanded concerning the Adam, saying: “From every tree of the garden you will surely eat, but from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil you will not eat from it, for in the day you eat from it, you will surely be mortal.” . . . And YHVH–God built the rib that he took out of the Adam into a woman and brought her to the Adam. . . . And the two of them were naked — the Adam and his woman — and they were not ashamed. And the Serpent was more naked than all the living beings of the field that YHVH–God had made. And he said to the woman: “Hmm? For God said, ‘You will not eat from every tree of the garden.’ ” And the woman said to the Serpent, “From the tree-fruit of the garden we will eat, but from the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God said ‘You will not eat from it, and you will not touch it, lest you be mortal.’ ” And the Serpent said to the woman, “You will surely not be mortal! For God knows that in the day you eat from it, . . . your eyes will open, and you will be like gods, knowers of good and evil.” And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and it was beneficial for the eyes, and the tree was desirable for the intellect, and she took from its fruit, and she ate, and she gave also to her man with her, and he also ate, and the eyes of the two of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and they stitched leaves of fig, and they fashioned for
them[selves] wraps. And they heard the sound of YHVH–God walking in the garden, for the spirit of the day, and the Adam and his woman hid from the face of YHVH–God in the midst of the tree[s] of the garden. And YHVH–God summoned the Adam, and he said to him, “Where are you?” And he said, “Your sound I heard in the garden, and I feared, for I am naked, and I hid.” And he said, “Who told to you that you were naked? You ate from the tree that you were commanded ‘Do not eat from it.’ ” . . . And YHVH–God said, “Behold, the Adam [is] like one from us, to know good and evil. And now, lest he send forth his hand and take also from the Tree of Life and eat and live forever.” And YHVH–God sent him from the garden of Eden.344

— The Hebrew Bible, Gen 2:8–3:23

The story of Adam and Eve’s rebellion against the commandment of “YHVH–God” is usually understood as scriptural proof that humans have free will. It is pointed out that God (YHVH) could have created Adam and Eve as programmed automatons, incapable of disobeying God’s instructions. But, instead, God created human beings with free will, and we know so because Adam and Eve used this God-given freedom to disobey God’s commandment. A comparison is then sometimes drawn to the healthy psychological development from youth to adulthood: To establish an individual identity, the youth must disobey his or her parents, after which a reconciliation is hopefully made, and the child, now an adult, engages his or her parents as a peer. According to this theory, the moral of the Garden of Eden story is that human freedom is a “greater good” that outweighs the evil of Adam and Eve’s act of rebellion against God’s will.

344 Translation by the present author based on the Masoretic text.
But is that really the moral? I don’t think so, for where did the story say that, although God was the creator of the material world, Adam and Eve were the creators of their thoughts, desires, and choices, thus making them co-creators (i.e., gods) alongside God? And where did the story say that there were no deterministic physical laws that governed all that occurred in God’s material world, including the neurons in the brains of Adam and Eve? And where did the story say that God was not the ultimate author of Adam and Eve’s disobedience? Where, in short, did the story say that Adam and Eve had agency?

The first thing to notice about the Garden of Eden story is that as soon as Adam and Eve disobey God’s commandment, thus exercising what seems to be their free will, they develop knowledge of “good and evil.” Thus, free will and moral dualism are presented as two sides of the same philosophical coin, and what the story really comes to teach us is that our (false) sense of agency goes hand in hand with our (wrong) habit of knowing “good and evil.” Adam and Eve began to imagine that they were the masters of their own destiny, and as soon as they imagined themselves to be independent agents in that way, they began dividing up God’s creation into things they deemed to be “good” and things they deemed to be “evil.”

By this reckoning, faultfinding is the underlying sin that Adam and Eve committed. Adam and Even partook from the “tree” — the mental habit — of knowing good and evil, and that mental habit made them feel alienated from God. We see, then, that the illusion of agency is inextricably linked, in the Bible’s account, with the illusion of evil. In God’s world there is no free will, and there is no evil, but as soon as one begins to imagine agency, one also begins to imagine evil. And the converse, too, is true. As soon as one begins to imagine evil, one begins to imagine that one has the freedom to choose good over evil, and then — like Paul in his letter to the Romans — one cannot understand why it is that one sometimes fails to choose good or fails to resist the things that one
has deemed to be evil.

But if the foregoing explication of Adam and Eve’s story is correct — that is, if moral dualism was Adam and Eve’s only sin — then why does God (YHVH) say in response to Adam and Eve’s eating from the Tree of Knowledge: “Behold, the Adam [is] like one from us, to know good and evil”? Doesn’t that statement imply that all the members of the Divine Council, including even YHVH, are knowers of good and evil (i.e., dualists), just like Adam and Eve?

The confusion here arises because we tend to impose the idiom of the English language onto the Hebrew text. When the Hebrew text tells us that Adam, by knowing evil, has become “like one from us,” it quite literally means that there is one member of the Divine Council that is a knower of good and evil (i.e., a dualist). And which “one” might that be? Presumably, it is the Serpent (or Satan), because he is the one who claims that knowing good and evil will make Adam and Eve “like gods.” (Gen 3:5.)

In other words, Adam and Eve ate from the tree of dualistic thinking, and they became dualists, like the Serpent (or Satan).

Therefore, a close reading of Hebrew scripture suggests that Adam and Eve never really had free will. They only imagined they had it, and then they imagined that they had used their free will to rebel against God’s command, and having so imagined, they began to justify themselves by faultfinding, that is, by persuading themselves that God gets it wrong sometimes. They thus took upon themselves the task of choosing between things in God’s perfect creation that they imagined to be inherently good and things they imagined to be inherently bad.

And for a person who proudly claims that he or she has free will, acts of heroic self-control are the proof of that claim, and irresistible bodily urges are to be feared and hated, because they undermine one’s imagined sense of agency. Therefore, when Adam

345 On Satan’s membership in the Divine Council, see Job 1:6.
and Eve took upon themselves the task of choosing things they
deemed to be evil, the first thing they chose was the natural bodily
urges that God had given them. And since nakedness reveals those
urges for the entire world to see, Adam and Eve made wraps and
covered themselves.

Then, from that small start, Adam and Eve imagined many
other things in the world to be evil, and whenever they found
themselves unable to resist such things, they justified their actions
with contrived excuses, or they covered their actions with the “fig
leaves” of locked doors and deleted computer files, or they
bemoaned their sinfulness, as Paul did in his letter to the Romans.
And although Adam and Eve could not — even after the most
careful examination — pinpoint when or how they had actually
chosen to have the thoughts and desires that led to their rebellion
against God, they never doubted their freedom to choose, for doing
so would have stripped them of the false sense of agency they
gained when they first accepted the lie of Cartesian dualism. God
therefore asked Adam, “Where are you?” By imagining that he had
agency, Adam had developed a first-person perspective. In other
words, he had become a map with a “You are here” arrow at its
center; he had developed a (false) sense of location within the
Garden of Eden.

Thus, for Adam and Eve, it was their arrogation of agency that
constituted their true rebellion. And it was that same arrogation of
agency that caused them to superimpose an invented good-evil
dualism upon the perfect world that God had made. Among the
seven days of Creation, the only day that God does not call “good”
is the second day, the day when God created a “divider” (mavdil).
Adam and Eve elevated the relative good of dualism over the
absolute good of embracing God’s wonderful show, and so it went . . .

. . . until one day they awoke from that dualist dream and
realized that they had never rebelled against God even for a
moment. In fact, they had no power to do so, and the personal
agency that they imagined themselves to have was only a proud lie that had served to separate them from God.

It was God that created the thought that motivated Adam and Eve to follow the Serpent’s advice. God created that thought just as surely as God breathed the “breath of life” into Adam’s brow (Gen 2:7); just as surely as God created pharaoh’s thoughts when pharaoh decided to harass the Israelites (see Exod 4:21, 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 10:20, 10:27, 11:9-10, 14:4, 14:8); and just as surely as God created King Cyrus’s thoughts when Cyrus proclaimed the rebuilding of the Jerusalem Temple (see 2 Chron 36:22; Ezra 1:1, 7:25). The only “sin” that Adam and Eve committed was the false belief that they had the freedom to sin (i.e., to defy God). And when they relinquished that false belief and accepted that everything is just God’s wonderful show (see Isa 45:7), they stopped their faultfinding. They stopped, that is, being knowers of “good and evil.”

But, you might say, if everything is just God’s wonderful show, then there is no moral standard that governs human conduct, and people are free to do as they please, even to hurt one another. The mistake in that reasoning is the tendency to confuse determinism with fatalism, falsely concluding that personal effort and righteousness have no place in a deterministic universe. Why can’t effort and righteousness play a role in the destiny that God has planned for human beings? God’s universe is perfect, but God has assigned a role for us to play in that universe, and it is not a passive role. By exerting ourselves in positive ways, we foster the happiness of all beings, and because we lack free will, God placed it in our hearts to do so. (See 1 Kings 10:24; Jer 31:33, 32:40; Ezek 11:19–20, 36:26–27; Ps 4:7; Prov 21:1; Ezra 1:5; Neh 2:12, 7:5.) And it is for that reason that the Torah doesn’t end with the story of Adam and Eve; rather, it starts there.

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