Contents:

1 Introduction

Simon Cushing

I want to know what love is

Love has been a topic of interest to philosophy since at least the time of Plato's *Symposium*, but, with a few notable exceptions, it was unduly neglected in the twentieth century, at least by writers in the analytic tradition that predominates in the English-speaking world. However, in the past quarter century, writing on the topic has exploded. In this volume we touch on most of the currently hot debates and also introduce some fascinating tangents. The main threads of discussion reflected in this volume are: the relationship between love and morality (is it adversarial, congenial or are they in fact co-dependent?); whether love is rational, subject to reasons for or against it, or a force that is not under our intentional control; and whether love affects the way we perceive the world or the way we value things in the world (and whether this is a good thing). More singular topics include: whether love would be affected by disputes in the literature on free will; whether we could be mistaken about being in love; whether our pets are capable of loving us back; whether a relationship of the kind shown in the movie *her* between a human and an artificial intelligence could be either loving or ethical; and whether the difference between patriotism and nationalism hinges on how each instances a different kind of love (and what that says about each of those "isms"). Along the way we will see analyses of the work of philosophical greats like Immanuel Kant as well as the work of more contemporary writers, in particular Iris Murdoch and philosophers actively engaged in the current revival, notably Harry Frankfurt, J. David Velleman and Niko Kolodny.

(If loving you is wrong) I don't want to be right

Love and morality may seem to be independent of each other, and often even at odds. Othello, having murdered his beloved Desdemona out of jealousy says that he is "one that lov'd not wisely but too well," implying that love is a force that can propel one to commit monstrous acts. For a more recent fictional example, think of Jaime Lannister pushing Bran Stark out of a window while muttering "The things I do for love." The fact that morality requires us to be impartial while love is very much partial is at the core of the apparent tension. The influential post-war British philosopher Bernard Williams is responsible for probably the most cited discussion of an illustration of the potential clash. He quotes Charles Fried's discussion of a man confronted with the choice of only being able to save one of two drowning people, one of whom is the man's own wife. Fried argues that the man can be morally justified in saving his wife over a stranger, but Williams bemoans even the need to give moral justification for his partiality.

> [T]he idea that moral principle can legitimate his preference, yielding the conclusion that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally permissible) to save one's wife…. provides the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife…. [T]he point is that somewhere (and if not in this case, where?) one reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to other persons will express themselves in the world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending against it. (Williams 1981: 18)

As we shall see, this case and Williams' phrase "one thought too many" have proved to be quite a touchstone in contemporary discussion. Williams provides the basis for arguing that love itself provides reasons that not only do motivate us independently of morality, but should do so, even in cases of apparent conflict. This is a theme we shall see revisited in several papers in this collection. However, many philosophers down the ages have argued that, to the contrary, love and morality are intertwined, that you cannot have one without the other. So we have two camps: one promoting love as a force independent of morality, and in some senses deserving to win out over it in the battle to motivate action, the other arguing that they march in sync and one should not see them as at odds. Confusingly, both camps can cite the work of Immanuel Kant, usually held

up as the greatest of the modern philosophers, and certainly among the most influential ethicists, for support for their position. On the one hand, Kant's ethics are notoriously demanding: he argues for a system of exceptionless rules, and contends that one's action only has moral worth if one acts out of duty, prompted by one's rational nature. This does not seem like a conception of morality that would have room for love as we typically conceive of it: for Kant, if one were to help a loved one simply because one loved them, this would not count as a moral act. However, two of contemporary philosophy's most influential defenders of "love as a moral emotion" are explicitly influenced by Kant. The first of these is Iris Murdoch, who was a philosopher before she became known for her novels (and for being the subject of the 2001 film *Iris*), whose work is the main subject of two essays in this collection. The other, whose work is cited in just about every essay in this volume, is J. David Velleman. He writes:

> We have made a mistake… as soon as we accept the assumption of a conflict in spirit. Love is a moral emotion precisely in the sense that its spirit is closely akin to that of morality. (Velleman 1999: 341)

Because Velleman's work has been *so* influential on the philosophy of love of the past twenty-odd years, I will take a moment to outline his view. In his initial essay, Velleman took particular issue with what he saw as an emerging orthodoxy that love was a *drive*. Much of love's bad moral reputation, he argued, could be traced to Freud, who presented love as a drive that all-too-often was based on misperception of its object. Contemporary analytic philosophers followed Freud in presenting love as a "syndrome of motives" with an *aim*, primarily desires directed towards the beloved, typically to be with, to benefit, to please, or to be well thought of by them. Instead of this, Velleman conceives love as a way of perceiving a loved one:

> A sense of wonder at the vividly perceived reality of another person is, in my view, the essence of love. (Velleman 2008: 199)

Velleman argues that love exactly parallels Kantian respect: for Kant, the ultimate directive of ethics (the Categorical Imperative) insists that we respect the personhood of others such that they must be regarded as

sources of value and never used as a means to one's own ends. Kant argues that respect for another acts as a check on one's own tendencies to want to exploit things in the world around us. Where respect is the mandated minimum attitude towards other persons, love, claims Velleman, is an optional maximum attitude, and love arrests our tendencies towards emotional self-protection, leaving us vulnerable to the objects of our love. This vulnerability can lead us to appreciate our beloved's features so that we may say that we love their crooked smile, but this does not mean that we love them *for* their crooked smile, which creates all kinds of problems for other theorists who do claim this, as we shall see, but rather we love the smile because it is "an expression or symbol or reminder" of the beloved's value as a person. Velleman also stresses that, while love is an attitude of valuing another, it is not one that *compares* them to others. To love comparatively is to put a price on what we value, such that it can be replaced by something of equal or greater value. But love does not rank beloveds any more than parents rank their children. Again drawing on Kant, Velleman argues that the kind of value that persons have is incomparable because it responds to their *dignity*, not to a price. This, he says, is the solution to the paradox that anyone equally may be loved, but the love for any one is uniquely special. Love is a moral emotion, just as respect is, because it is a response to the dignity of persons. Evidence of its moral influence is that it is the means by which moral lessons are first taught to children and how the moral sensibilities of adults can be (re) enlivened (Velleman 2008, 201). But perhaps most importantly, love is the emotion that makes us care about the good of another, makes us work to ensure their flourishing. Thus it is that we may end up desiring to help them, not because love itself *is* that desire, but because wanting to help them is a natural result of the vulnerability to them that itself comes from "really seeing" them (to use a phrase Velleman borrows from Murdoch).

Another philosopher who offers a Kantian take on a phenomenon one might have thought outside of the moral sphere is Neera Kapur Badhwar, who argues that the only way to make sense of the fact that true friendship (and love) must be constant through changes in personality and feeling is to locate that friendship not in a response to any contingent, inconstant features of one's friend or lover, but in their humanity (Badhwar 1989). Velleman's conception of love and Badhwar's of friendship are

overtly influenced by Kant, but are they pictures that Kant himself would recognize or endorse? In chapter 2, "Making Room for Love in Kantian Ethics," Ernesto Garcia explores this question.

First, Garcia points out that Kant actually discusses love in writings other than the ethical works that influence the two contemporary thinkers. Kant makes a distinction between moral and non-moral (or natural) love, which he calls love as a passion. While both dispose us to help others, they can be distinguished both by what aspects of our nature motivate them (rational or "sensible") and whether or not each can be morally required of us (the former can, because it is a moral obligation, while the latter cannot, because it is a contingent feeling, and thus not under our voluntary control). If moral love sounds strange, Kant argues that in fact it is the only way to understand the passages of the *New Testament* that command us to love our neighbors and enemies, for non-moral love cannot be commanded. Kant also makes a parallel distinction between types of friendship, except that moral friendship also incorporates moral love. Now, with this distinction in Kant, it appears that he has acknowledged that there is a legitimate form of love that is non-moral, and that perhaps his moral love is a specialized kind, a religious ideal. Has Velleman, in arguing that love of the kind that we might feel for our children and our partners is fundamentally a moral attitude, conflated the two loves?

A problem for Kantian moral love is that it must be truly universal: we are required, after all, to love even our enemies. The love that Velleman and Badhwar want to defend, however, is the actual, partial (in the sense of "not impartial," rather than "incomplete") love we feel for a select few individuals. How can Velleman and Badhwar explain this partiality on our parts? Badhwar argues that it is not the humanity that is found within every person that our friendship responds to but rather the empirical personhood of concrete historical individuals. Velleman argues that the love he is defending is *optional* (unlike the minimum required attitude of respect), and its reasons can be particular. But what it *is* is a disarming of emotional defenses in response to the incomparable and non-instrumental value of another human being. Garcia concludes that, on the one hand, the modern Kantians' accounts of love are improvements on Kant's own "moral love," because we find the notion of loving someone out of

duty counterintuitive, and the modern Kantians place the focus of love in the right place, that is, on the people who are the objects of our love and friendship. However, Garcia argues that what Kant gets right is in separating love out into kinds, at least one of which is non-moral. Tackling Velleman's account in particular, Garcia argues that it is open to a strong and a weak reading. The weak reading is trivially true (love involves making oneself emotionally vulnerable to another who is a being worthy of moral respect) but does not show that love is moral. The strong reading, on the other hand, which requires that we love someone *because* of our knowledge of them as moral agents is neither sufficient for love (it is equally true of appealing for help, mercy or friendship) nor necessary (one can love another romantically without viewing them as a moral agent). Garcia concludes by agreeing with Berit Brogaard that there is not a single kind of love and, while Velleman-style moral love might indeed be one kind of love, there are others, and others of value.

The look of love

Before Velleman, and in fact, influencing his argument for love as a moral emotion, was the British philosopher-turned-novelist, Iris Murdoch, whose work is undergoing something of a revival. Cathy Mason's chapter presents both an argument in support of her account and a critical evaluation of writers who, while inspired by Murdoch, have abandoned what Mason takes to be core parts of Murdoch's view. A primary motivation for Murdoch's writing was that the dominant behaviorist approach of mid-twentieth century philosophy ignored a vital kind of moral activity that was purely internal. Prior to any action that can be deemed of moral worth, we must, argued Murdoch, practice *attention*, a fundamentally moral attitude to the world that is a kind of love. This attitude has an epistemic aspect: only through viewing the world with love can one achieve a true understanding of reality, and it is this process of attending to the world in a loving way that is itself a moral activity. In a key example, Murdoch describes how a mother-in-law (M) with an initial dislike of her son's wife (D) manages to revise her view after "looking again". In so doing, not only does she arrive at a truer picture of reality, she herself is improved

by the process. While contemporary writers defending love as a moral attitude have been influenced by Murdoch, Mason argues that they do not do full justice to important elements of her view. For example, Velleman's view of love as an appreciation of the moral personhood of another that requires "really seeing" one's beloved departs from Murdoch's approach both because Murdoch, unlike Velleman, insists that love is morally *necessary*, and not merely optional, and because for her it is the concrete particularity of an individual that love focuses on, not the rational will that every person instantiates equally, as in Velleman's account.

Mason also considers Mark Hopwood's sympathetic exegetical work on Murdoch (Hopwood 2014, 2017) and finds that, while it acknowledges Murdoch's view of the particularity of the subject of love, and describes an epistemic role for love, that role is not the one Murdoch intended. Hopwood says love reveals normative demands on the lover, but, Mason contends, Murdoch insists that love's role is primarily to reveal facts about the person being loved. Furthermore, the facts revealed by the loving gaze are both objectively real and unable to be captured in the supposedly value-neutral language of science. Murdoch, argues Mason, views love as a character trait, as, in fact, a virtue, alongside those studied by the ancient Greeks, including courage and wisdom, and like those character features, love is a reliable sensitivity to real features of the world. When one gazes on another with love, as M did with D, the good qualities that one's beloved genuinely possesses (and not qualities that one projects on them because of one's loving gaze, as an anti-realist might contend) are revealed.

As might be unsurprising, Murdoch's view of love has appeared quixotic to some critics. Does it really map on to love as we normally understand it? Against the criticism that Murdoch's epistemic conception of love rules out the affective component that is stressed in all love songs, for example, Mason points out first, that there are respectable theories of emotion that present all emotions as having an epistemic component; second, that our common-sense conception of love includes the thesis that *true* love requires truly knowing one's beloved; and third, that love cannot be reduced to an affective state alone, because such states are necessarily

intermittent, whereas a love can last a lifetime. Against the criticism that Murdoch's view cannot account for the *selectivity* of love - a criticism leveled at Velleman's view, as we saw, and potentially worse for Murdoch, who rejects the idea that love is optional – Mason distinguishes between love and loving *attention*. Whereas the latter might be what is commanded, it is necessary but not sufficient for the variety of loves that there are, and what might make particular loves (for one's children, for a romantic partner) selective or unique might be a function of how one's relationship or the behavior of one's beloved facilitates the loving attention. Finally, there is the criticism that Murdoch's view seems to presume that everyone is a suitable subject for loving attention. But we are familiar with loves that we think are profoundly mistaken, or individuals who make unsuitable subjects for loving attention, perhaps because they are irredeemably wicked. But, first, a truly loving attention, because it is attuned to reality, would reveal an *absence* of good just as much as its presence. And second, the idea that loving attention is commanded for all is not peculiar to Murdoch: its most famous proponent is the Jesus of the Gospels.

Love me do

The philosopher Sally Haslanger, in her writing on gender, coined the term "ameliorative inquiry" for an approach to defining a concept that aims not solely at descriptive accuracy about the way people currently use it, but at producing a possibly revisionist, improved version, with the aim of making the society that employs the concept a better place. In chapter 4, "'Love' as a Practice: Looking at Real People," Lotte Spreeuwenberg suggests that we should do the same for the concept of love. As we have seen, both Velleman and Iris Murdoch have offered influential moralized accounts of love, and Spreeuwenberg's first task is to evaluate whether either suits the ameliorative inquiry she has in mind. Tackling Velleman's first: while she applauds his commitment to "really seeing" one's beloved, she, in common with many of Velleman's critics, finds unsatisfactory both his view of the subject of the loving gaze as the Kantian

self, and his solution to the selectivity of love (in contrast to the universality of the requirement of respect) in the claim that it is a contingent fact that we respond with love to certain empirical selves and not to others. The problem with this, points out Spreeuwenberg, is that it fails to account for the personal character of love, both because the bare Kantian self is impersonal, but also because it is a mystery what features of an individual may trigger us to respond to *their* Kantian self rather than another's.

Spreeuwenberg thus turns to the view of an author who attempts to fix this flaw while preserving what is valuable in a Velleman-like approach: Pilar Lopez-Cantero. She suggests that the subject of the loving gaze is not the bare Kantian self but its product, which is a *narrative*. This is indeed unique to each person, thereby better accounting for the personal character of love, with "narrative fit" between lover and beloved explaining when and why love blossoms. However, Spreeuwenberg finds the views of both Lopez-Cantero and Velleman to be too *passive*, certainly for her ameliorative inquiry, and uses the example of Dante and his "muse" Beatrice (whom he barely exchanged two words with, but fixated on) to illustrate why. While Dante certainly believes he loves Beatrice, and is caused to do so by some feature he perceives in her, he is not perceiving her as she truly is, but as some ideal that he projects on to her. Love should be, in the words of bell hooks, a *verb*, that is, active, a process, as Adrienne Rich puts it "of refining the truths [lovers] tell each other." Viewing it this way shifts the focus from the lover alone to an interactive partnership, and Iris Murdoch's writings on love provide a framework for this active approach. Murdoch's "M and D" case, described above, is an illustration of love as truly attending to the target of one's gaze to see her in her (changing) reality. Spreeuwenberg considers suggestions by psychologists like Lisa Bortolotti that projecting fantasies on to one's partner might have positive effects for the lover or the relationship, but concludes that fantasies are no part of the ameliorative project, especially if we widen its scope to the political sphere and call on love to break down barriers between oppressors and oppressed. Spreeuwenberg ends by cautioning that we should not assume that we can capture the full reality of our beloved, or even that this is the goal, agreeing with Carla Bagnoli that

understanding another has a possibly invasive aspect. But love as attending to others is the love that will make us and our society a better place, and therefore the best reconstruction of the concept for a project of making love a force for good.

Will you still love me tomorrow

It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that love is something over which we have no control: we fall in love, sometimes against our better judgment and to our own dismay. On this view, love is, in the words of the title of a paper by Nick Zangwill, "gloriously amoral and arational." (Zangwill 2013). However, I say "almost," because in chapter 5, "Love, choice, and taking responsibility," Christopher Cowley argues for an important role for choice in love, in the form of a lover *taking responsibility* for meeting the prospective needs of their beloved. Thus Cowley joins the previous authors in finding a moral core in love. Cowley takes up Susan Wolf's suggestion that there is a virtue in a willingness to take responsibility for what one has yet to do (*prospective* responsibility, rather than the more usually discussed *retroactive* kind) and locates just such a virtue in the commitments of an ongoing loving relationship between adults. Using the marriage vow as a case study, Cowley argues that it involves not just responsibility for one's spouse and the needs of the person they will become, but also responsibility for becoming the kind of person who will stay committed, both to the love and the meeting of needs. Cowley responds to challenges to this analysis of love both from existentialists, who could argue that it involves an abandonment of radical freedom and a bad faith essentialization of both parties, and also from a famous case described by Michael Stocker, where a person confined to a hospital is dismayed to find that the person he had considered a friend was motivated solely by moral duty to visit him (Stocker 1976). Cowley suggests that we can distinguish between duty and responsibility, where the problem with the former is that it is *impersonal*, while the latter comprises a *response* to the particular friend and their needs. In this respect Cowley's view resembles Harry Frankfurt's depiction of love as a configuration of the will that presents the lover with felt necessities that they experience just like

the demands of conscience. However Cowley finds Frankfurt's view too unilateral, as it focuses entirely on the experiences of the lover, allowing for such phenomena as unrequited love or even love of non-persons. Cowley contends that the love he wants to defend is necessarily instantiated in the relationship between two lovers, both of them moral agents. That love, claims Cowley, is depicted beautifully in *The Little Prince* where those who have chosen each other become unique in the whole world to each other. In some respects Cowley's view solves the problem of specificity (that we saw plagued Velleman's view, in the eyes of his critics) in a similar way to Niko Kolodny's view (Kolodny 2003), but adds to it the normative principle that love requires of us that we maintain and live up to the demands of that relationship.

Love is a battlefield

Just how seriously should we take the comparison between love and war at work in both *Ecclesiastes* and the well-known proverb? Andrew Sneddon, in chapter 6, "Not All's Fair in Love and War: Towards Just Love Theory," suggests that, just as Just War theory subverts that proverb in the case of war, we should construct a Just Love theory to provide an ethical roadmap for loving relationships. Just War theory is typically divided into three parts, *jus ad bellum*, which concerns the grounds for going to war, *jus in bello*, which lays out the restrictions on what is acceptable while war is waged, and *jus post bellum*, covering the aftermath. Sneddon focuses on analogues of the first two for the conducting of loving relationships. But before embarking on either, he first contends with the challenge faced by any attempt to lay out the ethics of war: that the very idea is naïve. Self-styled "realists" reject the notion that war is an appropriate (or even possible) subject of a code of ethics. A parallel challenge to Just Love theory takes Zangwill's stance on the amorality of love. However, even were that the case, Sneddon contends that loving *relationships*, and the actions taken in their context, are very much intentional, and thus subject to moral evaluation. Furthermore, Sneddon argues that if we assume the following things about love (he focusses strictly on the romantic

kind), that it is other-directed, tied up with other emotions, and love affects other emotions holistically, so that emotions felt as part of a loving relationship are *experienced as part* of that relationship, this reveals the need for an ethical rulebook, given how profoundly one's actions affect the other party in a loving relationship.

The love analogue of *jus ad bellum* Sneddon calls *jus ad amantes necessitudo*. Where war requires a just cause, love requires a just *target*, someone who is capable of participating in a loving relationship and capable of consenting to the costs of that relationship. The costs may depend on the goals of the relationship, which must also be just. These goals can be internal to the relationship, such as being partners, or external (in the sense that they could possibly be secured without such a relationship), like having sex, children or company. Other criteria of *jus ad amantes necessitudo* include "necessity" (that is, is a loving relationship necessary to achieving the goals, which, in the case of internal goals, it will always be), "proportionality" (is the relationship appropriate given the strength of one's sentiments and importance of the goals – interestingly Sneddon allows that if one is infatuated with a celebrity, seeking a relationship with them is not ruled out by this criterion, although very likely by others) and "chance of success" (the analogue of chance of victory in war). One tentative conclusion Sneddon draws is that it will be very difficult for external goals to justify a relationship according to these criteria (so so much for arranged marriages).

What about rules for behavior *within* loving relationships? *Jus in amantes necessitudo* govern actions motivated by love in a relationship already established, and, argues Sneddon, must be weighted against other priorities in a life well-lived. Displays of affection that bother others (one thinks of the *Seinfeld* episode ("The Soup Nazi") where Jerry and his girlfriend-of-the-episode (played by Alexandra Wentworth) refer to each other as "schmoopy") are out, and Sneddon recalls bitterly having to cover for a co-worker at a fast food job because she was trying to reconcile with her boyfriend. How useful is this sketch? Can real lovers actually follow such guidelines, or is the realist right to scoff? You be the judge, dear reader.

Is this love?

It is impossible to doubt whether or not one is in pain. But it does not seem to be impossible to doubt whether or not one is in *love*. In chapter 7, "Doubting Love," inspired by Graham Greene's novel *The End of the Affair*, Larry Herzberg analyzes the nature of love that would make this doubt possible, and what are the limits of doubt and certainty in matters of the heart. Herzberg draws inspiration from R.J. Sternberg's influential "triangular theory" of love that divides love into distinct components of emotion, passion and commitment. He argues that doubt is possible to varying degrees about each of these components. Least doubt is possible about our passionate feelings (they are most similar to feelings like pain whose presence or absence is indubitable), most doubt is possible about our emotions, and somewhere in between lies our certainty about the nature or existence of our commitments. Herzberg agrees with Christopher Cowley on the importance of commitment to love, and points out that there has to be a volitional element to love to explain both the defensiveness and guilt about the wrong answer to the question "do you love me?" as well as feelings of betrayal against a lover whose love goes away. Herzberg also argues that one may doubt one's emotions both because we may be unsure of their objects and because love can be comprised of a cluster of other emotions, each of which may be hard to distinguish from other, closely related emotions which are *not* indicative of love. However, Herzberg concludes that doubt is not an essential corollary of love and that there are many people whose circumstances and history ensure that they can be sure of their love.

Can't help falling in love

The view that love is something that happens to us irrespective of our plans and choices has fared poorly so far, despite its intuitive appeal, and in chapter 8, "Love and Free Agency," Ishtiyaque Haji aims to deliver another wounding blow against it. Haji argues that love is "fragile," in the sense that the value or even existence of love is conditional on the results

of age-old philosophical debates about free will. To put this in context, since at least the time of the ancient Greeks, arguments have been considered that purport to threaten our usual conviction that we are free agents, able to control our own destinies and, as a corollary, appropriately subject to assessments of responsibility such as praise and blame. That is, the reason why we standardly think it is legitimate to hold people accountable for their wrongdoings (or praiseworthy for their virtuous acts) is because we think those actions were *up to them*, under their control, not merely things that happened to them. However "responsibility skeptics" produce arguments to show that, really, our actions are not up to us, and our belief that they are is based on an illusion.

Extreme responsibility skeptics argue that *none* of our actions are *ever* up to us, which seems very radical to the uninitiated, but one can work gradually towards that conclusion by less-extreme steps. One such step is to argue for "responsibility historicism," which is the view that whether or not somebody is capable of the kinds of action that merit assessments of responsibility depends on factors outside of the mind and body of that individual (which is why the view is also called "externalism"). One major argument for externalism involves thought experiments depicting fiendish psychological manipulation of individuals, such as Alfred Mele's example "One Bad Day" (Mele 2019, 20-21) quoted by Haji. In this case, the saintly Sally is manipulated to have just the same evil psychological makeup as the merciless murderer Chuck, so that Sally intentionally plots and executes a hapless victim over the course of the titular day, only to have her saintly psychology re-instated by the same twisted psychological manipulators during the night that follows. Mele contends that we should all agree that Sally should not be held responsible for her murder, but Chuck should for his, even though both are the same from an internalist perspective. Thus whether or not one should be held responsible for an action depends on the history of how the psychology that produced that action was acquired (hence "historicism"). Canvassing various recent philosophical accounts of love (some of which should be very familiar to us by now) Haji contends that all of them contain necessary psychological elements that are open to the same kind of arguments for externalism as the responsibility-undergirding ones in "One Bad Day." To make the point, Haji describes "One Lovely Day" where whatever psychological

states manifest Romeo's love for Juliet are implanted in Romello for a day. During that day, asks Haji, "does Romello indeed *love* Juliet?" Haji contends that if we are moved by the externalist arguments supported by "One Bad Day" then we should conclude that Romello does not, and that love, like responsibility, depends not just on the presence of certain psychological states, but on how one acquired them. (Lest one wonder about the relevance of paranoid science-fiction cases involving devious covert mind-manipulators, once historicism is established, the next step is to argue that natural forces like genetics and environment, the kinds of things that really do shape our psychological makeups, can have similar responsibility/love undermining effects.)

However, even if one is not convinced by this to become an externalist, Haji maintains that even from an internalist/anti-historicist standpoint, "One Lovely Day" reveals three results. First, that even if Romello really does love Juliet during his manipulated day, that love is of a lesser value, is forced or ersatz. Second, that to be an instance of lovable behavior, an action or state has to issue from love. This parallels the distinction, insisted on by Kant among others, between praiseworthy virtuous action *from* duty, and non-praiseworthy, only apparently virtuous action *in accordance with* duty. That is, just as one's helping somebody is not meritorious if one does it solely for an expected reward, so one's showing affection to another is only praiseworthy *from love's standpoint*, if it is motivated by love, and not by duty or other considerations. Haji develops this thought in a section where he expands the suggested analogs between behavior that is morally responsible and that motivated by love, arguing that any view of love that posits that "emotions may be construed as constituting relationships of love and friendship" supports this parallel. Haji goes on to propose the notion of normative standards (he suggests the terms "commendability" and "censurability") from love's standpoint. The third result Haji adduces from "One Lovely Day" is that love is fragile in the sense introduced at the start, that it has "freedom or autonomy presuppositions." Finally, Haji considers an attempt by noted free will skeptic Derk Pereboom to save love from just the kind of externalist considerations that he (and Haji) use against responsibility. Pereboom is, in effect, a "love optimist," because he believes that while there may be

emotions, like remorse and guilt, that are both associated with relationships and "fragile" to externalist considerations, they may easily be substituted by *non*-fragile alternatives, like sorrow and regret. Against this attempt, Haji contends that these suggested analogs are equally fragile. If Seth harms you, suggests Haji, and then expresses sorrow, you would not accept that sorrow as genuine if you found that it was (once again) produced in him solely by psychological manipulation. Thus Haji concludes that whether or not we are free agents impacts not just whether or not we are morally responsible, but also whether or not we are capable of love, something philosophers of religion have long insisted on in offering justifications for God granting us free will, despite the fact that (they claim) it is responsible for all the evil and suffering in the world.

Love me for a reason

A theme running through the chapters we have just discussed has been the dispute over the extent to which love can be seen as a "gloriously arational" force that overtakes us and carries us along in a way that is beyond our control (and is thus something we cannot be held accountable for) or whether or not our love and what issues from it is a matter of rational appraisal. The front on which this dispute is most overtly fought in contemporary analytic philosophy is in the dispute over the relationship (or not) between love and *reasons*.

The most influential philosopher advocating a "No Reason" view of love (which, to be clear, means that no reasons can be given for *why* we love, although, as we shall see, he argues that love itself is the *ground* of reasons for a great many things) is Harry Frankfurt. His writing provided the motivation for many critics who have themselves become influential, most notably Velleman and Niko Kolodny. Such critics point out that love doesn't seem like bodily functions like sweating and digestion, things that are genuinely not the products of our decisions. And it does seem like, if asked "why do you love x?" the kind of answer expected is not simply "because certain chemicals were released in my brain" but rather one in-

volving reasons like “x is so dreamy!” or “x is my child!” or even, if one believes Velleman, “x is a Kantian moral agent.” The love one feels, in short, can be *justified*. Or so goes the Reason View of love. There are several variants, of course, but the most intuitive has it that when x loves y it is because of a feature or set of features of y. One the one hand, this seems right: x’s love of y should be explained by *something about y*. If the reason for x loving y had nothing to do with y, then y would no doubt be insulted (“I love you because of a compulsion I have to love everybody”). And, of course, we saw that a challenge faced by Velleman’s view was that he picked a feature that was too general (at least for his critics – as Kolodny put it, “personal ads do not read: “Bare Kantian person seeks same”” (Kolodny 2003, 174)), but on the other hand, if one *does* pick particular features of the beloved, then that also seems objectionable. Philosophers writing on this topic are fond of citing W.B. Yeats’ “For Ann Gregory,” wherein a girl with gorgeous “honey-colored” hair yearns that young men “May love me for myself alone/And not my yellow hair.” This is the core of the No Reason view’s attack on the Reason view, but No Reasoners have more weapons in their arsenal. In chapter 9, “Sentimental Reasons,” Edgar Phillips, citing Setiya (2014), lists four puzzles that point to apparently counterintuitive implications of a Reason view. First, *universality*: if Ennis’s love for Jack is based on good reasons, shouldn’t *every* rational agent, exposed to the same reasons, also love Jack? Second, *promiscuity*: if Catherine loves Jules for a certain reason (say, the insouciant way he smokes his *Gauloises*), then if Jim embodies the same feature, shouldn’t Catherine *also* love him? Third, *trading up*: suppose Kamariah loves Thomas for his long curly hair. If someone with an even more impressive mane shows up, this implies that she should abandon Thomas for the preferably-coiffed alternative. Finally, *inconstancy*: philosophers who discuss this problem are wont to cite Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 wherein he writes “Love is not love/Which alters when it alteration finds.” When Billy Bragg says “And then one day it happened/She cut her hair and I stopped loving her” (“Walk Away Renee (Version)”) it is not meant to reflect well on the maturity of the authorial voice, but it seems to follow from the Reason View that should you lose the features that were the basis for my love for you, then my love will cease.

Our two authors on this topic, Phillips and N.L. Engel-Hawbecker, respond to puzzles such as these by digging deeper into the nature of reasons themselves. Phillips points out that there are actually three different kinds of roles that reasons can play. Reasons can *explain* behavior by pointing to a cause, whether or not that cause was known to the actor. Reasons can also be what a person has in mind when acting intentionally ("motivating" or "personal" reasons). Finally, reasons can *justify* one's behavior. It may be, posits Phillips, that a particular Reasons View of love envisages the kind of reason in question to play one of the roles, but not the other. For example, it is perfectly good explanation of why I bought a loaf of bread that I was hungry. Raising the objection "but that doesn't explain why you bought *that* loaf of bread!" seems beside the point. However, he concludes that for many of the proponents of Reason Views, the reasons are meant to play more than one of these roles. So next he suggests that perhaps the problem is that we are mischaracterizing love by comparing it with reason-responsive dispositions like *intention* or *belief*. While it is true that a belief I have (say, that injecting bleach will cure Covid-19) requires justification, and *should* alter if the circumstances it concerns change, or new information comes to light, this does not necessarily apply to love. Perhaps, suggests Phillips, love is a sentiment, where such things, like one's character, are deep, long-lasting, developed gradually over time and not formed by choice. This is not to say, however, that Phillips is defending a pure No Reasons view: reasons are too important to interpersonal affairs to be abandoned entirely, and once again, love is not like digestion. However the *kinds* of reason one gives may not be profitably judged by the kinds of reason one should give to justify one's beliefs or intentions.

In chapter 10, "Wouldn't it be nice? Enticing reasons to love," Engel-Hawbecker takes a different tack. He frames the No Reasons View's challenge as the assertion that the following two claims cannot be held simultaneously: Requiring Reasons (reasons can require people to do what they favor), and Love's Prerogative (there is nothing that can require us to love anyone). It is because of the former that we are presented with puzzles like *promiscuity* and *trading up*: if my love for x is explained by reason r, and reason r applies also, or more so to y, then I am *required* to love y as

well or instead. And it is because of the latter that we reject this conclusion. The problem is not with Love's Prerogative: but perhaps we can reject Requiring Reasons without rejecting the idea that love is for a reason. One attempt at this approach suggests that the reasons for love are "warranting" reasons: reasons that, while they permit an option for which they provide a reason, as do normal reasons, do *not* forbid its absence. If this were the case then, for example, we avoid promiscuity because, while one is permitted to love every bearer of the feature that is the reason for love in one case, one is not *required* consistently to love each one.

However, Engel-Hawbecker finds two problems with this thesis. The first is that, lacking an argument that all reasons for love are like this, it appears *ad hoc*. But second, if it is the case that love needs reasons before it is permitted, then something must be forbidding it otherwise. But one can hope to be loved even if one admits that one lacks lovable features without this hope being perverse, implying that there is nothing that forbids love even without features that might serve as reasons for it. So if there are reasons for love that are not requiring, they are not warranting reasons, says Engel-Hawbecker. Instead, we should notice that reasons typically have two kinds of properties. When they require or forbid something (as my belief that a number is odd requires my belief that it cannot be divided into two equal integers) they are showing their *deontic* properties. But they also have *evaluative* properties, as when they make "an option attractive rather than demanded, required, or right," in the words of Jonathan Dancy (2004, 91), who first asserted the possible existence of reasons which have *only* evaluative properties, which he dubbed "enticing reasons." Engel-Hawbecker suggests that the reasons for love could be just such kinds of reasons, and if so, that means we can abandon Requiring Reasons and keep Love's Prerogative, without being forced to adopt a No Reasons view. Puzzles like *promiscuity* can be avoided: while my love for x is justified by a particular set of properties they instantiated, I am not thereby required also to love y because they also instantiate those properties. And indeed, while reasons *for* love are, on his view, enticing, Engel-Hawbecker insists that that does not mean that reasons *of* love, which may include duties to our current lover (x), can be requiring, and may pre-empt being drawn away by a similarly-featured other.

Drowning in the sea of love

In chapter 11, "Love, Motivation, and Reasons: The case of the drowning wife," Monica Roland takes up the discussion of such reasons of love, the kind of reasons that Harry Frankfurt *does* endorse. I have already had cause to mention Bernard Williams' discussion of Charles Fried's "case of the drowning wife" (and his contention that Fried gives the husband "one thought too many" in deliberating about preferring his wife over another who is also drowning), and this case is much-discussed in the contemporary literature on love. Roland uses this case as a touchstone to discuss the nature of the reasons love offers for benevolent acts towards others and their relationship with moral reasons. She argues that Frankfurt, Velleman and Kolodny each get something right about the case and something wrong. What Frankfurt gets right is that it is not the bare spousal relationship that provides reasons for partial treatment, and further that the husband does not need to reflect in the heat of the moment to be motivated to help his beloved. What Frankfurt gets wrong, on Roland's view, is that *loving* relationships can be normatively significant, and furthermore, valuation of those relationships by the lovers can (partially) constitute the love they have for each other. What Velleman gets right (and Frankfurt denies – although Roland argues that he is undermined in this denial by his insistence that love is a disinterested concern) is that love is a moral emotion, necessarily involving the moral attitude of respect, and furthermore that the reason for the husband's partiality is their relationship. But Velleman is wrong to say that the relationship plays no part in their love.

Both Frankfurt's and Velleman's account fail to provide an adequate account of love's selectivity – why one has reason to love only one's lover and not a qualitatively identical doppelganger. Kolody's solution to this problem is that one is only in a relationship with the original, not their clone: it is not the intrinsic properties of one's beloved that explain the selectivity of love but the relational ones. Roland also agrees with Kolodny's insistence that love is deemed by the lover to be rendered appropriate by the relationship (loving behavior by a stranger is inappropriate and disconcerting). But she believes that he is wrong to omit lovers' mu-

tual appreciation of both intrinsic and relational properties as partly constitutive of the relationship. Roland ends up endorsing a "dual account" of love. Velleman's moralized valuation of personhood provides one element, but is too general to suffice alone and must be complemented by a valuation of particulars, including the relational properties one's beloved bears towards oneself. This has the result that the husband has not one but two reasons to rescue his wife. But, to avoid a Williamsesque charge that this gives the husband *two* thoughts too many, Roland suggests that neither need be consciously formulated at the time of action: "awareness of the inherent value of his wife and the special relationship he has with her are built in to the very fabric of the husband's dispositions and thus implicit to his motivating thought."

The love cats

Up to this point we have only considered love as something that happens between (two) human individuals. However, many of us genuinely feel that we love our pets, while at the same time acknowledging that they lack many of the capacities that feature in several of the theories we have canvassed so far. (I have no doubt my cats do not respect me in the way Velleman means, and possibly in any way.) In chapter 12, "Can Our Beloved Pets Love Us Back?" Ryan Stringer investigates whether there is any possibility that the behavior we take as affection in the non-human animals (henceforth NHAs) in our lives could be indicative of something deserving to be called love. It turns out that there are a number of books and articles written by scientists that defend the claim that indeed, some NHAs are capable of love, and do love the humans in their lives. While Stringer professes himself keen to have this be true, particularly of the cats with whom he is in an otherwise mildly abusive (on their part) relationship, as a philosopher he feels he cannot take the scientists' purported evidence as sufficient without challenge. Against Gregory Burns's (2013) claim that dogs' empathy for us is sufficient to demonstrate their love for us, Stringer points out that one can feel empathy for someone whom one hates, and it might even help in the task of making them suffer. Against Carl Safina's claim (Dreifus 2019) that dogs' desire to be near

us for no other reason than to be near us evinces their love, Stringer points out both that stalkers can have this, and that it is in theory possible to have that desire isolated from any love for the target of that desire. Finally, Stringer assesses several different purported pieces of evidence for canine love in Clive Wynne's (2019) *Dog is Love: Why and How Your Dog Loves You*. That dogs have the capacity to form affectionate relationships with us does not suffice, because such things come in a wide spectrum, only some of which are loving relationships. That dogs exhibit hyper-social behavior fails because there are conditions that humans have, including Williams-Beuren Syndrome, which are similar but not taken as proof of love. Wynne fares better in Stringer's estimation by stressing that dogs show distress at being separated from their humans, find it rewarding to be near them, and apparently care about them to the point of trying to help them when in distress. Of these, evidence of attachment is deemed too self-interested to count, but the caring Stringer takes as the best potential grounds for an attribution of a capacity to love.

So what *does* love consist in, if not these scientists' criteria? Stringer postulates that, whatever else comprises love, it must have at least the following three essential components: a disposition to feel affection (which is more than the simple presence of affection, because love is more persistent than such a potentially fleeting and necessarily intermittent feeling), a non-instrumental concern for the welfare of one's beloved, to the extent of prioritizing the promotion of their welfare, and the assessment of one's beloved as so special as to be irreplaceable. Failure to capture all three of these key components dooms the initially promising philosophical accounts of Thomas Hurka (an attitudinal-dispositional theory) and Andrew Franklin-Hall and Agnieszka Jaworska (solely dispositional), but are potentially captured by Sam Shpall's (2018) tripartite theory of love. Shpall analyzes meaningful love as a devotion to an object that is liked, which partly consists in special concern for that object's good, which partly consists in emotional vulnerability to that good and what affects it. Stringer suggests that if the notion of devotion is expanded to include the idea that the object of one's devotion is irreplaceable, then this view captures his requirements. However, does it allow that NHAs can love the humans that love them? Stringer concludes that if we allow that something that does not quite rise to Shpall's standard of *meaningful* love is

still love, then dogs are plausible candidates for a capacity to love. He is forced to conclude, however, that cats fail to meet the standards of emotional vulnerability to our welfare and benevolent desire for our happiness. In a coda, however, he suggests that the relationship we can have with cats is still valuable and love-*like*, and this is no small thing.

Computer love

So much for animals loving us – what about things that are apparently inanimate? The 2013 Spike Jonze film *her* depicts a love story between a human and an artificially intelligent operating system. Assuming such a thing were possible, would it be desirable? Would the "love" that resulted be of any value? In chapter 13, "Romantic love between humans and AIs: a feminist ethical critique," Andrea Klonschinski and Michael Kühler argue that there are important reasons to doubt that it would. The first problem with the kind of relationship depicted in the film is that the "relationship" reinforces pernicious gender stereotypes. "Samantha" is *created* to meet every need that Theodore might have. However, lest it be said that this can be avoided by making AIs male, besides the fact that the male ones can also reinforce stereotypes (particularly if they're built into things like your GPS and thus telling you what to do), the second problem rears its head: because AIs lack autonomy, the relationship is of necessity asymmetrical. This is true no matter what philosophical model of love you favor; the authors consider models whereby love is construed as an attitude instantiated in the lover, as in Harry Frankfurt's love-as-caring model, love is construed intersubjectively, as in Angelika Krebs' model of love as interpersonal sharing, or love is construed as a *union*, where the participants form a "we-identity," as postulated by Mark Fisher, and Roberts Nozick and Solomon. In no case can the relationship between humans and AIs meet the requirement of a love between equals, and thus, if it counts as love at all, it is only a degenerate form, not worth pursuing.

Moreover, these problems cannot be solved simply by better programming: giving the AIs a personality would not solve the power imbalance. The user would still be able to adjust that personality in the "settings,"

the better to suit their preferences. And giving the AI actual moral autonomy is either impossible (depending on your metaphysics) or potentially catastrophic. As Klonschinski and Kühler wryly note, it would not be financially advantageous to make a product that could reject its user, not to mention the *Terminator/Robopocalypse/Ex Machina* apocalyptic possibilities. Finally, lest the problem of unequal relationships with AIs be dismissed as ethically trivial, given that they are not persons, Klonschinski and Kühler remind us of the deleterious effects on our relationships with *persons*, and on our moral characters, particularly if the gender imbalances produce more sexists. They cite Kant's distinction: we may not fail in our duties *to* AIs, but we may very well fail *with regard to* them. Thus Klonschinski and Kühler's piece draws a nice contrast with Stringer's: where he argues that our relationships with our pets can be enriching, our relationships with artificial non-persons are potential minefields.

Thin line between love and hate

If there is any entity for which love is professed as much as love for another human, it is one's country. However, it is a love that is not always looked on as a good thing. Erich Fromm's sentiment is not uncommon:

> Nationalism is our form of incest, is our idolatry, is our insanity. 'Patriotism' is its cult...Just as love for one individual which excludes the love for others is not love, love for one's country which is not part of one's love for humanity is not love, but idolatrous worship. (Fromm 1955: 58)

However, in chapter 13, "Patriotism and nationalism as two distinct ways of loving one's country," authors Maria Ioannou, Martijn Boot, Ryan Wittingslow and Adriana Mattos (who themselves represent four different nationalities) argue that not only can a principled distinction be made between nationalism and patriotism, but that, while they are both instances of love for one's country, they are distinct kinds of love, only the former is usually pernicious, and the latter does not necessarily prove a gateway to it. Patriotism, which they define as love for one's country along with a sense of personal identification with it and concern for its well-being, they liken to the love a child has for its parent. Nationalism, they allow, is a

more-contested term, but settle on the definition of nationalism used to refer to European nationalism from the late 19th to mid-20th centuries. The difference between the two is that, while both feature ingroup love, only nationalism features outgroup derogation, an observation that they back up citing both sociological literature and psychological experimentation. The love involved in nationalism has this feature, they argue, because it is more akin to passionate love, which carries with it both the refusal to acknowledge the flaws in the beloved (which leads to jingoistic distorted evaluation of one's own country above others) and the possibility of loss and attendant desperation. Nationalists are in love with a particular version of their country, one associated with their particular ethnic or cultural group, and one that is easily threatened, in a way that provokes the worst excesses that we see in nationalism. The authors' diverse disciplinary background makes this article stand out in how it draws on a particularly wide ranging variety of literatures, psychological and sociological, along with literature and philosophy, to make a compelling case for their distinctions. This is only fitting given how love itself is the subject of so many disciplines, so it is refreshing to see a case be made that empirical studies (like a study involving inhaling oxytocin prior to running trolley-problem cases with ingroup vs. outgroup potential victims) can elucidate our theoretical conclusions. If they are correct, their analysis helps to explain what kind of national crises are most likely to provoke nationalist violence, but also to rescue patriotism from the disrepute to which writers like Fromm have consigned it.

References

Badhwar, Neera Kapur. 1989. Friends as Ends in Themselves. In *Eros, Agape and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love*, ed. Alan Soble, 165-188. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.

Burns, Gregory. 2013. *How dogs love us: A neuroscientist and his adopted dog decode the canine brain.* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Enticing Reasons. In *Reason and Value: Themes from Joseph Raz*, (eds.) R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, 91-118. Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dreifus, Claudia. 2019. Carl Safina is certain your dog loves you. The New York Times.

Fisher, Mark. 1990. *Personal Love.* London: Duckworth.

Franklin-Hall, Andrew, and Agnieszka Jaworska. 2017. Holding on to reasons of the heart: Cognitive degeneration and the capacity to love. In *Love, reason and morality*, eds. Esther Kroeker and Katrien Schaubroeck, 20-38. New York: Routledge.

Fromm, Erich. 1955. *The Sane Society*, New York: Rinehart and Winston.

Haslanger, Sally. 2012. *Resisting reality: Social construction and social critique.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hopwood, Mark, 2014. *Love's Work: Eros and Moral Agency.* ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.

Hopwood, Mark, 2017. "The Extremely Difficult Realisation That Something Other Than Oneself is Real": Iris Murdoch on Love and Moral Agency. *European Journal of Philosophy* 26: 477-501.

Hurka, Thomas. 2017. Love and reasons: The many relationships. In *Love, reason and morality*, eds. Esther Kroeker and Katrien Schaubroeck, 163-180. New York: Routledge.

Krebs, Angelika. 2014. Between I and Thou – On the Dialogical Nature of Love. In *Love and Its Objects. What Can We Care For*? Ed. Christian Maurer, Tony Milligan, and Kamila Pacovská, 7–24. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kolodny N. 2003. Love as valuing a relationship. *Philosophical Review.* 112.2:135-189.

Mele, Alfred. 2019. *Manipulated agents: A window to moral responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nozick, Robert. 1990. Love's Bond. In *The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations*, 68–86. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rich, Adrienne. 1995. *On lies, secrets, and silence: Selected prose 1966-1978*. WW Norton & Company

Shpall, Sam. 2018. A tripartite theory of love. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 13: 91-124.

Solomon, Robert C. 1994. *About Love. Reinventing Romance for Our Times.* Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., Reprint 2006.

Stocker M. 1976. The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories. *The Journal of Philosophy.* 73.14: 453-46

Velleman, J. David. 1999. Love as a moral emotion. *Ethics* 109(2), 338-374.

Velleman, J. David. 2008. Beyond Price. *Ethics* 118, 191-212.

Williams, Bernard. 1981. Persons, Character and Morality. In *Moral Luck*, 1 – 19. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolf S. 2004. ‘The moral of moral luck’ in *Setting the Moral Compass. Essays by Woman Philosophers*, ed. C. Calhoun, 113-127. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Wynne, Clive. 2019. *Dog is love: Why and how your dog loves you.* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Zangwill, Nick. 2013. Love: Gloriously amoral and arational. *Philosophical Explorations* 16 (3): 298–314.