Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists

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Forthcoming in Peter Furlong and Leigh Vicens, eds., Theological Determinism: New Perspectives, Cambridge University Press; please cite published version.

1. Two Types of Determinism

Many philosophers are compatibilists about moral responsibility and what we might call natural (or causal) determinism.¹ Natural determinism (which I will distinguish from theological determinism in a moment) “is the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future” (van Inwagen 1983: 3). The rough idea is that, for any time $t$ in a naturally deterministic world, given the way the world is at $t$, and given the laws of nature, there is only one way that the future (relative to $t$) can unfold from $t$. Compatibilists about moral responsibility and natural determinism—hereafter natural compatibilists—maintain (as the name suggests) that agents in worlds where natural determinism is true may be morally responsible for what they do, whereas natural incompatibilists deny this.

Another type of determinism, theological (or divine) determinism, says that God (rather than natural events/laws) determines everything that happens. While almost everyone agrees about how to characterize natural determinism, there is more variation in accounts of theological determinism, but the rough idea is that, for any time $t$ in a theologically deterministic world, given God’s decrees, there is only one way that the future (relative to $t$) can unfold from $t$.² Compatibilists about moral responsibility and theological determinism—hereafter theological compatibilists—maintain (as the name suggests) that agents in theologically deterministic worlds may be morally responsible for what they do, whereas theological incompatibilists deny this.

Now, it is possible to be a compatibilist about moral responsibility and one type of determinism but an incompatibilist about moral responsibility and the other type of determinism. In fact, recently several natural compatibilists have rejected theological compatibilism and maintain theological incompatibilism instead. On this combination of views, God’s setting

¹ As I use the term, to be morally responsible for something (an action, omission, or consequence) is to be morally accountable for it. Typically, though perhaps not always (if one can be morally responsible for morally neutral behavior), to be morally accountable for something is to be either blameworthy or praiseworthy for that thing, in the sense that one deserves blame or praise.

² Several authors include an explanatory component, according to which God’s decrees (or will) explain all other contingent facts/events. See, for example, Cyr and Vicens (Forthcoming), Furlong (2019: 15), and White (2016: 79). For a survey of several accounts, see Furlong (2019: 14-18). Here is a more theologically laden description from the Westminster Confession of Faith’s chapter “Of Providence”:

God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy providence, according to His infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of His own will, to the praise of the glory of His wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy. (WCF 5.1)

We could label this statement “theological determinism” (cf. Bignon 2018: 2), but this passage is insufficiently precise for my purposes here.
everything up would undermine our moral responsibility, whereas being “set up” by chance would not undermine our moral responsibility.

In this chapter, I will argue that the combination of natural compatibilism and theological incompatibilism is untenable (hence the title of the chapter). It will be helpful to begin with a discussion of why someone might be attracted to this combination of views in the first place, so in section 2 I will lay out the manipulation argument against compatibilism. As we will see, some natural compatibilists endorse “soft-line” responses to this argument—responses which imply theological incompatibilism. In section 3, I will argue that such “soft-line” approaches cannot succeed, and along the way I argue that their failure undermines Jason Turner’s recent compatibilist free will defense (in response to the problem of evil). I wrap up, in section 4, by considering some implications of my conclusion that natural compatibilists should be theological compatibilists. There I consider whether my conclusion highlights the “cost” of compatibilism, as proponents of manipulation arguments sometimes allege, and also whether anything follows with regard to God’s standing to blame determined human agents.

2. A Worry about Manipulation

The manipulation argument against compatibilism is really a family of arguments with a certain common structure. They begin with a case in which an agent is covertly manipulated into performing some action (typically a morally reprehensible one) all the while satisfying the conditions that many compatibilists take to be sufficient for the agent to be morally responsible for performing the action. With this in mind, the argument takes the following form:

1. The manipulated agent is not morally responsible for their action.
2. There is no relevant difference (i.e., with respect to moral responsibility) between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in naturally deterministic worlds.
3. Therefore, ordinary agents in naturally deterministic worlds are not morally responsible for anything they do (i.e., natural incompatibilism is true).

The first premise relies on an appeal to the audience’s intuition. The second premise is typically defended by pointing out that whatever may seem to count against the manipulated agent’s moral responsibility would apparently apply to ordinary determined agents, and whatever may be said in favor of ordinary determined agents’ being morally responsible would apparently apply to the manipulated agent as well.

So far I have been talking about manipulation arguments quite abstractly, and it is worth looking more closely at a particular version of the argument. The most widely discussed version of the manipulation argument is Derk Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” (2001: 110-117; 2014, chapter 4), which adds two intermediate cases (between a first manipulation scenario and an

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4 Thanks to Leigh Vicens for helping me to clarify the dialectic.
ordinary naturally deterministic world) and attempts to show that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between any of the cases.

The Four-Case Argument begins by presenting its audience with a case (Case 1) of the deterministic manipulation of Professor Plum by a team of neuroscientists such that it is causally determined that Plum will murder Ms. White. By way of neural intervention, the team enhances “Plum’s disposition to reason self-interestedly at the requisite time, so that they know that as a result it is causally ensured that he will decide to murder White and that he will want so to decide,” and the team does so “in a way that directly affects [Plum] at the neural level, but with the result that his mental states and actions feature the psychological regularities and counterfactual dependencies characteristic of genuine agency” (2014: 76).\(^5\) Though Plum satisfies various compatibilist accounts of the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility and free action, we are invited to judge that Plum is clearly not morally responsible for his decision to murder White and for his carrying out of the decision.

Next, the argument presents its audience with a case (Case 2) that is much like Case 1 but in which the neuroscientists program Plum at the beginning of his life to have the disposition to reason self-interestedly (rather than manipulating Plum from moment to moment, as they do in Case 1), and this causally ensures that he decides to murder White and that he carries out that decision (2014: 77). According to Pereboom, Plum is no more morally responsible for his decision (and action) in Case 2 than he is in Case 1.

In the next case (Case 3), “Plum is an ordinary human being, except that the training practices of his community causally determined the nature of his deliberative reasoning processes so that they are frequently but not exclusively rationally egoistic (the resulting nature of his deliberative reasoning processes are exactly as they are in Cases 1 and 2)” (2014: 78). As a result of the training practices, it is causally ensured, once again, that Plum will decide to murder White and will carry out that decision. Pereboom argues that the causal determination by the controlling agents “explains the absence of responsibility in Case 2, and it’s reasonable to conclude that he is not morally responsible in Case 3 on the same ground” (2014: 78).

The final case in the argument (Case 4) is an ordinary (naturally) deterministic world in which Plum’s “reasoning processes are frequently but not exclusively egoistic, and sometimes strongly so (as in Cases 1-3)” (2014: 79) and in which Plum decides to murder White and carries out that decision. Pereboom argues that, when it comes to Plum’s moral responsibility, there is no relevant difference between Cases 3 and 4, so we should conclude that ordinary (i.e., non-manipulated) agents in naturally deterministic worlds are not free and morally responsible, which is to say that natural compatibilism is false.

There are two ways for natural compatibilists to respond to this argument. First, they can accept Pereboom’s claim that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between any two of the cases but maintain that Plum is morally responsible in all four cases. This is an instance of what Michael McKenna (2008) calls the “hard-line” reply to manipulation arguments, which

\[^5\] This insistence on Plum’s genuine agency in Case 1 is a response to criticisms of the original version of Case 1, in which it was less clear that Plum satisfied basic conditions of agency, since his neural states were induced from moment to moment by the neuroscientists. For the original version of Case 1, see Pereboom (2001: 112-113).
accepts the second premise of the argument schema I introduced above but denies the first. McKenna defends this reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument and uses the opportunity to develop formulae for giving a hard-line reply to any manipulation argument. One feature worth noting is that, if we start with the ordinary case (a naturally deterministic world) and judge determined agents to be morally responsible, then it will follow from there being no relevant difference among the cases that the manipulated agent is morally responsible as well. In other words, Pereboom’s *modus ponens* is McKenna’s *modus tollens*.

Some natural compatibilists have gone so far as to say that the hard-line reply is in fact the compatibilist’s only option. McKenna says that, for any particular instance of the manipulation argument, denying the second premise “can only temporarily forestall the inevitable” (2008: 144).

Consider this passage from Gary Watson:

> For the compatibilist, the constitutive conditions of free agency do not conceptually depend on their origins. In this sense, free and responsible agency is not an historical notion. Consequently, compatibilism is committed to the conceptual possibility that free and responsible agents, and free and responsible exercises of their agency, are products of super-powerful designers. For consider any compatibilist account of the conditions of free agency, C. It is possible for C to obtain in a causally deterministic world. If that is possible, then it is possible that a super-powerful being intentionally creates a C-world, by bringing about the relevant antecedent conditions in accordance with the relevant laws. This possibility follows from the general point that the conditions of responsibility do not necessarily depend upon their causal origins. (1999: 360-361)

Just as the neuroscientists in Pereboom’s Case 2 manipulate Plum by programming him at the beginning of his life, if a super-powerful designer—perhaps a goddess—intentionally creates a naturally deterministic world that is otherwise just like Pereboom’s Case 4, we’ll have a case that looks a lot like manipulation. But notice that, if we are taking the super-powerful being in Watson’s scenario to be God, then Watson’s scenario is an instance of theological determinism, since this super-powerful being’s creating a naturally deterministic world may be understood as decreeing everything that takes place therein. Hence, if the natural compatibilist accepts that agents in Watson’s scenario can be morally responsible, then theological compatibilism follows. So natural compatibilists who take the hard-line reply are committed to theological compatibilism as well.

Other natural compatibilists aim to avoid this result, attempting to find some moral responsibility-relevant difference between manipulated agents and ordinary agents in naturally deterministic worlds. McKenna labels this the “soft-line” reply, and several versions of this reply have been proffered in recent years. Kristin Demetriou argues that Pereboom’s original (2001: 113) version of Case 1 admits of various interpretations, some of which invite soft-line replies since, in them, Plum is unable “to regulate his own behavior” (2010: 602). Robyn Repko Waller argues that the manipulators’ effective intentions to bring it about that the manipulated agent performs the action in question “marks a significant difference” between manipulated and ordinary naturally determined agents, “one that affects whether the resultant agent is morally responsible

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for his action” (2014: 213).8 Oisín Deery and Eddy Nahmias (2017) argue that, on a sophisticated account of causal sourcehood (one that utilizes recent interventionist theories of causation), ordinary naturally determined agents are the causal source of their behavior, whereas manipulated agents are not the causal source of theirs. The latter two proposals are more promising approaches insofar as they appear to generalize to any case that would count as manipulation, and hence they seem to evade McKenna’s criticism of forestalling the inevitable.

In the next section, I will argue that soft-line replies cannot succeed, but it is worth mentioning one complication that I have so far glossed over. Although Pereboom argues that there is no relevant difference between his Case 1 and Case 2, one difference that some may take to be relevant is that the former is a case of mid-life manipulation, whereas the latter is a case of original design. Alfred Mele (2019) treats these two types of manipulation cases differently—at least when the mid-life case involves a “radical reversal” of the manipulated agent’s values.9 Mele is officially agnostic about whether (natural) compatibilism is true, partly because he’s agnostic about whether designed agents like Ernie in his Zygote Argument (2006: 184-196) are morally responsible for the action in question. But Mele is not agnostic about whether an agent who is covertly manipulated (mid-life) into acting from an alien set of values is morally responsible; he denies that such an agent is morally responsible for performing the action in question. I agree that that there is an important difference between the two types of cases, though I disagree with Mele about whether “radically reversed” agents can be morally responsible.10 In any case, we can safely set aside cases of mid-life manipulation. What is important to see, for our purposes, is that so long as a natural compatibilist takes a hard-line approach to original design manipulation arguments (like the Zygote Argument, or Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument sans Case 1), that compatibilist is committed to theological compatibilism as well, for exactly the reason that Watson pointed out above.

3. Against Soft-Line Replies

An initial problem for the soft-line approach is that the intuition that manipulated agents are not morally responsible may be explained away (i.e. that the hard-line approach may be successful), which undercuts the motivation for a soft-line reply in the first place. Carolina Sartorio (2016: 167-169) has suggested that those who judge that manipulated agents are not morally responsible may be under the influence of a psychological “dilution of responsibility” effect. Consider a firing squad:

It is commonly claimed that part of the reason why firing squads exist is that an individual shooter in a firing squad is likely to feel less responsible for the victim’s death than if he (or she) had been the only shooter. But, of course, many think of this as just an appearance, since the existence of the other shooters doesn’t in fact make an individual shooter any less responsible for the assassination... (Sartorio 2016: 168)

8 Waller is responding to Mele’s Zygote Argument, but her reply applies to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument as well.

9 Demetriou (2010) and Sekatskaya (2019) are also what we might call “mixed” approaches.

10 See Cyr (2019b; 2020a) for discussion, and see Mele (2020) for a reply.
Similarly, the existence of the manipulators, and our focus on them, might explain why we are tempted to think that the manipulated agent is not morally responsible, despite the fact that the existence of these other agents is irrelevant to the manipulated agent’s moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{11}

But there is a deeper problem for the soft-line approach, which is that the presence of the manipulators does not make a difference to the control of the manipulated agent, and thus the manipulation is irrelevant to the manipulated agent’s moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{12} Consider Pereboom’s Case 4, which is a manipulation-free variant of Case 2. In this case, Plum has all of the same dispositions as in the original Case 2, but rather than receiving his dispositions from the neuroscientists, Plum has them naturally. Despite this difference, Plum’s life plays out in exactly the same way as in Pereboom’s Case 2, including the murdering of White. Now compare manipulated Plum with non-manipulated Plum and consider this: on what basis could one maintain that the latter possesses more control than the former, such that one agent’s moral responsibility for the murder is undermined while the other’s is unaffected? It may be that the effective intentions of the manipulators or the manipulators’ being the causal source of Plum’s action lead us to judge these cases differently, but, without a reason for thinking that non-manipulated Plum possesses more control than manipulated Plum, we should be wary of being misled.\textsuperscript{13}

Proponents of the soft-line approach might be tempted to say that the manipulated agent is not morally responsible because he is simply the “tool” of the manipulators. In particular, while Plum satisfies typical compatibilist conditions when performing various actions during his life, Plum has no say over what the beginning of this process looks like, which is to say that his initial preferences, values, etc.—which form what Neil Levy (2011: 88) calls an agent’s “endowment”—are totally outside of Plum’s control. Soft-liners may be right to raise this worry, which is sometimes called the problem of constitutive luck, but this worry arises independently of the presence of manipulators providing an agent’s endowment. Even if only natural determinism obtains, and even absent any manipulators, no agent like us exercises any control over their endowment, and so if constitutive luck were to undermine moral responsibility, this would undermine all forms of compatibilism.\textsuperscript{14} But, as most compatibilists are not skeptics about moral

\textsuperscript{11} As Sartorio (2016: 169, n. 34) notes, Mele (2006: 198, n. 16) discusses a variant of the case on which the Zygote Argument is based, in which the designer, Diana, is not morally responsible for anything. This variant is a sort of middle case between typical original design manipulation scenarios and scenarios that are identical but lack designers (the process begins purely by chance, not by intelligent design). Whereas Mele takes his hybrid case to evoke the same intuitions as his original case, and whereas Pereboom (2014: 79) reports having the same intuitions about both manipulation and chance versions of the case, Sartorio says that she is not so sure about this.

\textsuperscript{12} If there is a separate, epistemic condition on moral responsibility, clearly the manipulation will not undermine its satisfaction, for it is stipulated the manipulated agent satisfies conditions that typical compatibilists take to be sufficient for moral responsibility, including the possession of moral capacities, awareness of what one is doing, etc. I say “If…” because I am not sure whether this epistemic condition is really separate from the control/freedom condition. Cf. Mele (2010).

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Fischer’s (2012) suggestion that our intuitions may be tracking issues of autonomy rather than moral responsibility.

\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, since the same problem arises for libertarian views of free will and moral responsibility—views according to which freedom/responsibility is incompatible with determinism and yet we are at least sometimes free/responsible—the problem of constitutive
responsibility, they should not regard constitutive luck as undermining moral responsibility, and so they should say that it makes no difference to an agent’s control (and thus their moral responsibility) whether the agent is determined as a result of design by manipulators or by mere accident (chance).\footnote{For further discussion of this point in connection with some cases from science fiction, see Cyr (2018).}

This point can be brought out clearly by focusing on the first action for which non-manipulated Plum is morally responsible. Suppose that little Plum is tempted to snatch his little sister’s toy but, recognizing that this will upset her and aiming to please their father, decides to refrain from taking the toy. By hypothesis, Plum is not morally responsible for any earlier action that may have shaped aspects of his character or values, and yet, if we are to avoid skepticism about moral responsibility, compatibilists must acknowledge that Plum can be morally responsible for acting from a constitution (character, values, etc.) that was outside of his control.\footnote{This case of little Plum is based on the discussion of “little agents” in Mele (2006: 129ff.). For further discussion of little agents, see Cyr (2019a). In Cyr (2019b, and 2020a) I argue that reflecting on cases of this type (among others) should lead us to accept a non-historicist (i.e., structuralist, or internalist) conception of moral responsibility.} But notice that what is true of little Plum, including everything that counts in favor of taking him to be morally responsible, is also going to be true of “manipulated little Plum,” a duplicate of little Plum but who was programmed by neuroscientists as in Pereboom’s Case 2. In terms of their control in performing the first action for which they are morally responsible, there is no relevant difference between manipulated and non-manipulated little Plum. And since the two Plums will not differ with respect to their control over any subsequent actions, there is no relevant difference (i.e., no difference to their moral responsibility for their actions) between the older Plums.

Let us pause to consider two critical responses to this line of argument. First, one might claim that even though non-manipulated little Plum has not been morally responsible for anything prior to the action in question, his constitution may not be entirely outside of his control.\footnote{Thanks to Simon Kittle for raising this concern.} In my view, control over one’s constitution, if it is not sufficient for moral responsibility (taken together with any epistemic condition there may be on moral responsibility, which we can assume to be satisfied in all the cases considered in this chapter), could not be relevant to whether one is morally responsible for acting from that constitution.\footnote{For more on this point, see Cyr (2020a: n. 8).} Second, one might claim that there is a historical condition on moral responsibility that is independent of issues concerning control and that manipulated agents fail to meet this historical condition even if there is no difference in control between them and ordinary determined agents.\footnote{Thanks to Peter Furlong for raising this concern.} If two agents exercise the same degree of control in acting (and have the same awareness of what they are doing), it is hard to see on what basis one could explain a difference in their moral responsibility. Perhaps one could appeal to intuitions about cases of manipulation as supporting a control-independent historical condition on moral responsibility. Still, in my view, without a deeper explanation, and given what we learn by

luck is a problem for any view according to which we are ever morally responsible. See, for example, Hartman (2017: 56).
attending to little agents and the issue of constitutive luck (which I take to diagnose a confusion in our judgments about manipulation cases), this proposal seems unacceptably ad hoc.\(^20\)

I have been arguing against the soft-line approach and for the claim that, if determined-but-not-manipulated agents are morally responsible, then so too are agents manipulated in the ways described in the manipulation argument. It follows that divine determination would not undermine moral responsibility, since a divinely determined agent has no less control than a manipulated agent does. Thus, if naturally determined agents are morally responsible, then so too are divinely determined agents. Katherin Rogers (2012: 279-285) has argued for the contrapositive of this claim, namely that if divinely determined agents are not morally responsible, then neither are naturally determined agents. After considering a series of hypothetical universes in which God divinely determines you to commit a murder and yet God’s activity is progressively less involved (or more mediated) in each scenario, Rogers concludes:

…it is difficult to see the relevant difference between someone doing the making and something such as the causes at work in a deterministic universe. There seems to be nothing relevant to distinguish our final hypothetical universe where God arranges everything and then disappears leaving the chain of causes to unfold and the deterministic universe without God in its pre-history. If you are not responsible for the choice to murder in the former, then you are not responsible in the latter. If an agent who is divinely controlled is not morally responsible, then an agent whose choices are caused by a deterministic universe is not morally responsible. (2012: 284-285)

Now, I would respond to Rogers’s *modus ponens* with a *modus tollens*, but in accepting the conditional (if theological incompatibilism is true, then natural incompatibilism is true) we are allies.

If I am right, the soft-line approach is not viable, and one implication of this is that Jason Turner’s (2013) compatibilist free will defense against the problem of evil is not viable either. As famously developed by Alvin Plantinga (1974), the free will defense appeals to the value of free will and its incompatibility with (natural) determinism to undermine the problem of evil’s premise that a wholly good God would prevent or eliminate all evil that he could. Turner argues that this defense is available to the (natural) compatibilist as well as to the incompatibilist, provided that one accepts historical compatibilism, according to which “the property of acting freely [and being morally responsible] is, like the property of being a Rembrandt or a genuine one-dollar-bill, a *historical* property” (2013: 130). Most historical compatibilists defend historical conditions on moral responsibility that do not rule out the moral responsibility of agents in original design manipulation cases.\(^21\) However, according to Turner, historical compatibilists could accept the following independence thesis, where “S” and “T” are agents and “A” is an action:

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\(^{20}\) Although I have been critical of these suggestions, I think that they merit further consideration, and I plan to do so elsewhere. I would also like to continue to consider the possibility that there are different kinds of control at play in these cases. Thanks to Simon Kittle for this suggestion as well.

**Independence**: If S’s arranging matters in way w would result in T’s being causally determined to A, and if S knows this and arranges matters in way w in order to get T to A, then T does not freely A. (Turner 2013: 131)

If an agent’s acting freely requires independence of causal determination by other agents who intend for the agent to so act, then despite the compatibility of freedom with natural determinism, God could not design an agent to act according to his purposes while preserving the agent’s freedom. Turner concludes, therefore, that the free will defense against the problem of evil is not beyond the compatibilist’s reach.

Assuming that freely A-ing is a necessary condition on being morally responsible for A-ing, **Independence** can be read as a statement of the soft-line approach to manipulation arguments. Notice, however, that the thesis is silent on the explanation of dependent agents’ lack of freedom. This is noteworthy since, as we have seen in this section, there is no reason to think that designed (and thus dependent) agents possess less control than their accidental counterparts, and there is positive reason for thinking that these agents possess control to the same degree. If I am right about this, then compatibilists (both natural and theological) cannot accept **Independence**, which undermines Turner’s compatibilist free will defense.

4. *(Natural) Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists*

I have argued that the soft-line approach is not a viable option for compatibilists. Recall the form of the manipulation argument:

1. The manipulated agent is not morally responsible for their action.
2. There is no relevant difference (i.e., with respect to moral responsibility) between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in naturally deterministic worlds.
3. Ordinary agents in naturally deterministic worlds are not morally responsible for anything they do (i.e., natural incompatibilism is true).

As we have seen, the soft-line approach is to deny the second premise, but if this approach is not viable then compatibilists must deny the first premise instead, taking the hard-line approach and admitting that manipulated agents can be morally responsible for their actions.

Insofar as the first premise of the manipulation argument is intuitively plausible, the fact that compatibilists must take the hard-line approach may seem to raise the theoretical cost of accepting compatibilism. Patrick Todd puts the point as follows: “Is it really plausible to think that the fact that Plum got such a raw deal at the hands of the neuroscientists is simply irrelevant to Plum’s moral desert? I do not think so, but such a result appears to be the (increased) cost of compatibilism” (2011: 133). And Rogers, upon arguing that the first premise of (her version of) the manipulation argument is more intuitive than the hard-liner’s premise that determined agents can be morally responsible (which allows for the tollens response to the manipulation argument), says: “And this asymmetry entails a burden of proof on the compatibilist to strengthen the premise in the tollens argument or else show that the conclusion is not as difficult as it intuitively appears at first” (2012: 287).

But I do not think that taking the hard-line approach increases the cost of compatibilism, and for two reasons. First, as McKenna (2008: 156-158) argues, taking cue from Nomy Arpaly (2003: 127-129), cases of real-life “manipulation” are not all that uncommon:
Some simply discover that their “party animal” life styles no longer interest them, and they become workaholics. Others have no desire to devote their lives to parenting, and are flooded by love upon first seeing their newborns, an experience totally revising their life plans. Still others undergo inexplicable religious conversions. Here again, in these sorts of cases, cases that we do encounter in ordinary life, we have what look like more mundane cases of manipulation. (2008: 156)

If such mundane cases are relevantly similar to cases of manipulation, the hard-liner’s conclusion is not as difficult to accept as one might initially think. Second, as I have argued elsewhere—in Cyr (2016 and 2020b)—it is possible to construct a parallel manipulation argument that makes use of indeterministic manipulation and that targets libertarian accounts of free will and moral responsibility. Because of this, and because any strategy for blocking the parallel argument can be used, *mutatis mutandis*, to block the manipulation argument against compatibilism, it turns out that worries about manipulation (like worries about constitutive luck) are worries for any account according to which we can be morally responsible, not for compatibilism in particular.

In any case, if a (natural) compatibilist accepts the hard-line approach to manipulation arguments, they are accepting that we could be morally responsible even if God (rather than natural events/laws) determines everything that happens, which is to say that they endorse theological compatibilism too. And it is worth mentioning that, as we have seen, some compatibilists (like Watson and McKenna) are sanguine about this result.

Of course, it does not immediately follow from theological compatibilism that theological determinism is true or that, if it were, God would have the standing to blame determined agents (as many traditional theological determinists have maintained). Todd suspects that most compatibilists will want to accept the following claim: “On theological determinism, God cannot blame us for the wrong actions we perform, even if we meet all compatibilist conditions for being morally responsible with respect to performing them” (2012: 5). It may well be the case, for instance, that there are conditions on the standing to blame that God does not satisfy if God has determined us to act as we do.

That said, Todd provides compelling cases in which one agent determines another agent to perform a wrong action and *does* have the standing to blame the determined agent. Consider the following case:

Suppose Steffen is a typical Nazi commander working in a death camp. He hears rumors of an escape attempt. Thus, he orders Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the alarm, should he see any prisoners escaping. Thomas sees the prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed. Now, Thomas should have let the prisoners go; he should have had mercy and simply reported back to Steffen that there was nothing to the rumors. But he doesn’t. In this case, of course, Steffen cannot blame Thomas for sounding the alarm. Consider Jonas, however. Jonas is a Nazi commander working in a death camp. However, Jonas is secretly opposed to the Nazi regime. He thus does everything within his power to save the lives of as many prisoners as possible, consistent, of course, with maintaining his position as a committed Nazi; Jonas (correctly) reasons that he can do much more good secretly sabotaging the Nazi efforts as a trusted commander than he could by open defiance. Jonas hears rumors of an escape. In order to keep appearances, he must order someone to investigate the fence. Jonas thus orders Thomas to investigate the fence
and sound the alarm should he see anyone attempting escape. Jonas chose Thomas for this task because he thought that, of all the people he might choose, Thomas would be the most likely to have mercy and not sound the alarm should he actually find prisoners escaping, and instead report back that there was nothing to the rumors. Instead, however, Thomas discovers the escaping prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed. (2012: 10-11)

Todd rightly points out that it seems clearly permissible for Jonas to blame Thomas for sounding the alarm. This shows that the mere fact of one agent’s being involved in the determining of another agent’s performing an action is insufficient to establish the first agent’s lacking the standing to blame the second agent. Todd takes this to be good reason to think that God would have the standing to blame determined agents, if compatibilism were true, and he sees this as a reason to reject compatibilism. But compatibilists may take this opportunity to provide yet another tollens, accepting that God does have the standing to blame determined agents. My own view is that this is a viable option for compatibilists to take, but the details will need to be worked out elsewhere.

Acknowledgements

For comments on an earlier version of this chapter, thanks to Peter Furlong, Simon Kittle, and Leigh Vicens. Thanks also to Gabriel De Marco, John Fischer, Matthew Flummer, and Al Mele for helpful discussion of these issues.

References


