Taking Hobart Seriously

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Abstract Hobart's classic 1934 paper "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It" has been widely cited (and taught in many undergraduate courses) as an example of an argument for the view that free will requires the truth of determinism. In this paper, I argue that this reading of Hobart's paper is mistaken and that we should instead read Hobart as arguing that an agent exercises her free will only if the proximate causes of the agent's action deterministically cause her action. After arguing that Hobart's view, rightly understood, escapes the problems typically raised for Hobart's compatibilism, I also argue that Hobart's view is problematic for different reasons. Nevertheless, I argue that there is a crucial insight (concerning the relation between indeterminacy and free will) to be gleaned from Hobart's paper—one that provides compatibilists with a new recipe for challenging libertarian accounts of free will.

Keywords Compatibilism; R. E. Hobart; Libertarianism; Problem of luck; Resiliency

1. Introduction

Many contemporary compatibilists believe free will to be compatible with both causal determinism and causal indeterminism.[1] Call these compatibilists "super-compatibilists," and call their view "super-compatibilism." According to super-compatibilism, agents can exercise free will in both deterministic worlds and indeterministic worlds. John Martin Fischer, a super-compatibilist, argues that this feature of his own view speaks in its favor, since it allows that our view of ourselves as free agents does not run the risk of being undermined by "the arcane ruminations—and deliverances—of the theoretical physicists and cosmologists" (2006: 5).

Taking free will to be compatible with *in*determinism, though, apparently leaves super-compatibilism vulnerable to what is arguably the greatest challenge facing libertarian accounts of free will, namely the problem of luck.[2] One way of putting the problem of luck is as follows: if an agent's action *A* at time *t* is not causally determined, then nothing about the agent prior to and up

[1] Free will (in the sense at issue in this paper) is the freedom necessary for moral responsibility.

[2] Libertarianism (in the sense at issue in this paper) is the view that the following conjunction is true: (at least some) human beings have free will, and compatibilism is false.

to *t* settles whether or not she will *A* at *t*, and so it is a matter of luck that she does *A* at *t* rather than not.[3] Since super-compatibilists take free will to be compatible with indeterminism, they apparently leave themselves exposed to the problem of luck that libertarians face.

It is sometimes suggested that one way for a compatibilist to avoid the problem of luck is to maintain that free will requires that determinism is true. This view is often attributed to R. E. Hobart, whose 1934 paper "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It" was very influential in the first half of the last century.[4] A potential problem for this view, though, is that it risks being undermined by the deliverances of the physicists and cosmologists. Were we to find out that indeterminism is true, we would thereby find out that we lacked free will. So, for super-compatibilists (like Fischer) who are motivated by the idea that our having free will should be *resilient* to the deliverances of the physicists and cosmologists, the view that free will requires determinism will not be attractive.

But, as I argue in this paper, it is a mistake to understand Hobart's compatibilism as requiring that determinism is true. (Indeed, perhaps Hobart's view has not been very influential, despite its wide citation and discussion, because of this misinterpretation.) Instead, we should read Hobart as taking one's favorite compatibilist set of (putatively) sufficient conditions on free will and adding to it the following necessary condition: an agent exercises her free will in performing

[3] This is what is sometimes called the "ensurance formulation" of the problem of luck. See, for example, Haji's (2001) formulation. For criticisms of this formulation, as well as criticisms of several other formulations of the problem of luck, see Franklin (2011a). As we will see, the problem is sometimes put in terms of *chance* rather than luck. In any case, the *locus* of the problem of luck is at the moment of non-derivatively free action, which most philosophers working on free will take to be the moment of choice (or decision).

[4] R. E. Hobart was the pseudonym of Dickinson S. Miller, who was a student and friend of William James.

a non-derivatively free action[5] only if the proximate causes of the agent's action deterministically cause her action.[6] This view, which I dub "Hobart-compatibilism," is a type of super-compatibilism (since it allows for free will in some indeterministic worlds as well as deterministic ones), but it nevertheless lacks resiliency in a way that other super-compatibilist views do not, since there are certain scientific discoveries that could, if Hobart-compatibilism were true, undermine our view of ourselves as free agents. Still, Hobart-compatibilism has advantages over the view typically attributed to Hobart. In fact, as I will argue, the considerations that are taken to motivate requiring determinism for free will are not sufficient to do so—they are only sufficient to motivate Hobart-compatibilism.

Despite its advantages in handling luck-related worries, however, Hobart-compatibilism faces serious problems. In addition to worries about resiliency to the deliverances of certain sciences (though, as I will argue, these worries do not by themselves undermine Hobart-compatibilism), it is unclear why full-fledged causal determination should be required for free will. If an agent's action is indeterministically caused but is nevertheless extremely likely to result from its proximate cause, for example, would it really follow that the action could not have been brought about by the agent's free will? In response to this challenge, I propose a different type of super-compatibilism, which I dub "neo-Hobartian compatibilism," that rejects the strong requirements of Hobart-compatibilism but nevertheless preserves Hobart's crucial insight concerning the relation between indeterminacy and free will. In the end, I argue, not only does neo-Hobartian compatibilism fare better with respect to concerns about resiliency, but it also helps to show the

[5] To say that an action is *non-derivatively* free is to say that the action's freedom does not depend entirely on some other of the agent's actions being free.

[6] I am not first to suggest the possibility of such a view—see, for example, Mele (2015)—but, though I take Hobart to have espoused this view, it has not had many proponents (if any others at all).

deep worry behind the problem of luck, namely that adding indeterminacy into the sequence leading to an agent's action does not enhance the agent's control over that action. This suggests that the problem of luck and the problem of enhanced control, which are typically taken to be independent problems for libertarianism, are best taken as a single (and deeper) problem.[7]

I begin, in section 2, by laying out some of Hobart's claims about the relation between free will and determinism. In section 3, I explicate Hobart-compatibilism, which I take to be Hobart's actual view, and contrast it with one that is typically imputed to Hobart, namely the view that determinism is required for free will (a view held by Nowell-Smith and Ayer, among others). At the end of that section, I argue that the considerations that putatively count in favor of this alternative are in fact support for Hobart-compatibilism instead. In section 4, I evaluate Hobart-compatibilism, and in section 5, I present and explicate an alternative, neo-Hobartian compatibilism. Finally, in section 6, I evaluate the new view and argue that it helps to show the real worry behind the problem of luck.

2. Hobart's Claims

Hobart begins his paper by accusing nearly all participants in the free will debate of lacking analytical imagination. (What a way to start a paper!) He argues that, rather than there being any tension between free will and determinism, it turns out that the former (free will) "strictly implies the other [determinism]" (1934: 1). Hobart goes on to add, "I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true in so far as we have free will" (1934: 2). This sentence suggests that Hobart is agnostic about both the truth of determinism and our having free will, but, in the next sentence, he rejects agnosticism about our having free will: "That we are free in willing is, broadly

[7] For discussion of the problem of enhanced control, see Clarke (1997; 2003, chapter 6), Watson (1999), and Pereboom (2001, chapter 2).

speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis" (1934: 2). Unfortunately, Hobart does not defend this claim about our having free will being a fact of experience, and he ignores the possibility that this experience is illusory; however, Hobart's (compatibilist) account of free will can be developed without relying on the claim that we actually have free will, so we can set aside problems for that claim.[8] Importantly, though, Hobart is committed to the claim that our having free will depends upon the truth of determinism.

What does Hobart mean by *determinism*, though? The minimal conception of determinism that is standard nowadays is that propositions about the intrinsic state of the world at some time together with the laws of nature jointly entail propositions about what happens at all other times.[9] This is a global thesis (about the world as a whole). This conception of determinism was popularized by van Inwagen (1983) nearly half a century after the publication of Hobart's paper, yet Hobart has a similar understanding of the thesis: "Determinism…says that the coming result is 'pre-ordained' (literally, caused) at each stage, and therefore the whole following series for to-morrow may be described as already determined" (1934: 16).[10] At any given stage of the world,

[8] The reason that we can set aside such problems is that we are only interested in what Hobart's view would look like *qua compatibilist* account, an account which may be true even if we in fact lack free will. Most compatibilists believe that their accounts are satisfied by typical human agents and thus believe that we in fact have free will, but we can (and I will here) separate compatibility questions from questions about whether we in fact have free will.

[9] For more on how to conceive of determinism, see van Inwagen (1983: 2-8).

[10] The "pre-ordination" or "necessity" associated with determinism is the necessity of certain events (including human actions) *given* a certain past state of the world and certain laws of nature (well, Hobart focuses on the past and ignores the laws, but we can set that aside). It is worth mentioning two important dissimilarities between Hobart's and van Inwagen's characterizations of determinism. Hobart refers to causation, which van Inwagen avoids by defining determinism in terms of entailment, as I articulated it above. And the entailment conception of determinism is typically taken to be bidirectional, whereas Hobart's is only unidirectional (past determines future, not *vice versa*). Despite these dissimilarities, though, the important common ground is that both aim to provide *global* theses of determinism. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to mention these differences.

facts about the world at that time (and facts about the laws of nature) entail what happens at the next stage of the series, and so on for the remainder of the series. This sounds like a global thesis, just as the currently popular conception of determinism is a global thesis.

Hobart goes on, however, to reveal that he does not have a global thesis in mind. He says, "But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it" (1934: 2). This passage is essential to understanding Hobart's project, and especially important is the shift to talk of *determination* rather than determin*ism*. In my view, the most charitable way to read Hobart is to read him as using these terms interchangeably to capture the notion of a *deterministic connection* between a cause and its effect.[11] Since there can be such deterministic connections between causes and effects in worlds that contain some indeterminacy (some causes and effects linked by causal indetermination), Hobart does not think that free will entails the global thesis of determinism, but rather that free will entails a certain kind of local determination.

This reading, if correct, challenges two typical representations of Hobart. The first is that Hobart takes free will to require determinism in the global sense.[12] Interestingly (to me, anyway), the title of Hobart's paper ("Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It") is often cited incorrectly, with "determinism" in place of "determination." This, I think, has led many to characterize Hobart as taking free will to require global determinism.[13] Despite his claims

[11] As I explain below, one complication is that Hobart equated causal determination with causation itself, thereby assuming the impossibility of indeterministic causation, but I will set this aside here.

[12] I will return to this this view, which I call "old-school compatibilism," at the end of section 3.

[13] As far as I can tell, Nowell-Smith (1948) is the first to cite Hobart's paper incorrectly. To be fair to him and to the subsequent philosophers who have made the same mistake, Hobart apparently

at some places to the effect that *determinism* "is true so far as we have free will" (1934: 2), Hobart actually seems to have thought that free will is compatible with some indeterministic scenarios, as indicated by the conjunction of his claim that we have free will—"That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience" (1934: 2)—and of his claim that he is not affirming "that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance" (1934: 2). Hobart does not think that the presence of some indeterminacy in the world would immediately rule out free will; instead, Hobart thinks that the absence of certain causally deterministic sequences would rule out free will.[14]

A second common misunderstanding of Hobart is that he is a soft-determinist. This term is (typically) taken to refer to someone who is a compatibilist and who also believes that the thesis of determinism is true. (A "hard-determinist" shares the latter belief but denies compatibilism.) Since the time that these terms were introduced, there has been a major decline in the number of scientists who believe that the thesis of determinism is true. As a result, there are now far fewer "determinists" participating in the free will debate. Still, despite the common view of his day that the thesis of determinism is true, Hobart was *not* a determinist. He says explicitly, "I am not maintaining that determinism is true" (1934: 2), which, even if Hobart only meant that he was unsure about whether there were in fact certain causally deterministic sequences, strictly implies that Hobart was no determinist.

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uses the terms interchangeably, as I have just suggested in the text, though he must not mean *global* determinism, as do most people who use the term nowadays.

[14] Given his focus on an agent's freedom in acting, I take Hobart to be interested in the sequence issuing in action, not in the sequences of events prior to, say, an agent's birth. And since the problem of luck concerns the time of action, requiring that an agent's actions be deterministically caused by is proximate cause addresses the problem directly. More on this in the next section.

So far I have avoided addressing a certain complication in understanding Hobart's claims. (This complication will not affect the rest of my project, but I address it in the interest of good Hobart-interpretation.) Hobart takes his opponent to be the indeterminist. "When I speak below of 'the indeterminist' I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination" (1934: 2). To Hobart's mind, however, for an event to be undetermined is for it to be *uncaused*. "To regard [a certain act] as caused," he says, "would be determinism" (1934: 4). So, for Hobart, free will's involving *in*determination is equivalent to free will's requiring that certain events be uncaused.[15] In other words, like many philosophers before Anscombe's inaugural lecture (1971), Hobart took causation to involve a necessary connection between cause and effect, so he did not think that indeterministic causation was a possibility.[16] This makes it difficult to say whether, had he entertained the idea of (say) an event-causal libertarianism, Hobart would have taken indeterminacy to be a problem for such a view. Nevertheless, I will follow tradition in reading Hobart as giving a proto-problem-of-luck challenge to libertarians in general, so we can set aside this complication.

3. Hobart-Compatibilism

We have seen that Hobart takes free will to require some kind of determination. A natural way to understand this requirement is to see it as the claim that free will requires that there be deterministic connections between certain psychological states of an agent and her behavior, such

[15] There are some libertarians who require that free actions be uncaused, such as Ginet (1990) and McCann (1998), but this is a minority view, even among libertarians.

[16] Anscombe argues (persuasively, to my mind) for the possibility of indeterministic causation, the possibility of which has since been taken for granted in the free will debate. It follows from this possibility that thesis of determinism should not be identified with the thesis that every event has a cause. See van Inwagen (1983: 3-5), who calls this latter thesis the "Principle of Universal Causation," for a discussion of this point.

as the formation of an intention.[17] More specifically, a compatibilist might adopt the following necessary condition for free will (adding it to one's favorite compatibilist set of putatively sufficient conditions on free will):

> *Causal Determination Requirement* (hereafter 'CDR'): an agent exercises her free will in performing a non-derivatively free action only if the proximate causes of the agent's action deterministically cause her action.[18]

Call a compatibilist whose account includes CDR a "Hobart-compatibilist," and call her view "Hobart-compatibilism."[19] The Hobart-compatibilist not only takes free will to be compatible with determinism but also takes free will to be compatible with *some types* of indeterminism (and thus, it is worth noting, Hobart-compatibilism counts as a super-compatibilist position); on this view, indeterministic worlds which contain deterministic connections between (at least some) agents' actions and the proximate causes of those agents' actions can be (and are, assuming other compatibilist conditions are satisfied) compatible with free will.

Hobart-compatibilism shares an interesting feature with libertarianism: both maintain that free will is compatible with only *some types* of indeterminism. For libertarians, not just any sort of indeterminism will suffice for free will. As Peter van Inwagen puts the point, "if determinism

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[17] It is a tricky matter to give an account of causal determination in indeterministic worlds, and I will not do so here, but its possibility is taken for granted in the literature, as the passage from van Inwagen (1983) cited below indicates.

[18] CDR requires causal determination between agents' actions and the proximate causes of those actions, but, if one preferred (perhaps because one took luck at earlier points in the sequence to threaten freedom), the causal determination required could be a longer sequence; for example, one could require that all causation that is internal to agents (or between the initiations of deliberations to the performance of actions, or…) be deterministic causation. Nothing crucial hangs on any particular formulation of CDR, though I formulate it as it is because, as I mentioned in note 3, the *locus* of the problem of luck is at the moment of choice.

[19] It should be noted that CDR is compatible with incompatibilist accounts of freedom, though Hobart himself would not have accepted such a view. See note 20 for examples of such a view.

is incompatible with free will, so is the thesis that everything except one distant particle of matter is determined" (1983: 126). Both the libertarian and the Hobart-compatibilist maintain that only certain types of indeterministic worlds allow for free will. For the libertarian, the types of indeterministic worlds that allow for free will are worlds which contain *indeterminacy* in the right places. For the Hobart-compatibilist, the types of indeterministic worlds that allow for free will are worlds which contain *causal determination* in the right places.[20]

Consider the following two indeterministic worlds. In the first, *w1*, Daphne is a normal adult agent who is deliberating about whether to get a cup of coffee or to smoke a cigarette. Prior to and during her deliberation, Daphne's psychological states are indeterministically connected. Moreover, each of the following causal chains are indeterministically connected: (A) the one connecting Daphne's deliberative process to her judgment that it would be best (in the circumstances) to smoke a cigarette, (B) the one connecting this judgment to her forming an intention to smoke, and (C) the one connecting this intention-formation to the carrying out of that intention in the lighting up of her cigarette.[21] According to Hobart-compatibilism, we do not yet

[20] One might wonder what differences there are between Hobart-compatibilism and a view sometimes called "modest libertarianism" (or "deliberative libertarianism," among other names) discussed by Dennett (1978, chapter 15), Mele (1995: 211-221; 2006: 9-14), and Clarke (2003, chapter 4). According to modest libertarianism, an agent's having free will requires that there be indeterminacy internal to the agent, but the proximate causes of free actions must deterministically cause those actions (and thus the indeterminacy that modest libertarianism requires is typically located within the agent's deliberative process, e.g., in what comes to mind during this process). While this libertarian account shares with Hobart-compatibilism something like CDR, the former *also requires* indeterminacy (of a very specific kind) in order for there to be free will; it is, after all, an incompatibilist account. Hobart-compatibilism does not require any indeterminacy whatsoever in order for there to be free will.

[21] Of course, if one objects to this way of laying out the pertinent psychological states, the example may be redescribed to fit one's own picture. And, importantly, Hobart-compatibilists are only committed (*qua* Hobart-compatibilists) to there being deterministic connections between agents' actions and the proximate causes of those actions; it is left open whether those connections are the ones mentioned in (A), (B), or (C).

have room for free will in *w1*. But now imagine another indeterministic world, *w2*, that is very much like *w1* but in which the causal chains mentioned in (A)-(C) are *deterministic* causal chains. Such a world, says the Hobart-compatibilist, would be hospitable to free will, despite there being indeterminacy at certain places (such as prior to and during agents' deliberations about what to do).

The compatibilist account just articulated (Hobart-compatibilism) might bring to mind a type of compatibilism, which I refer to as "old-school compatibilism," that has fallen out of style. According to old-school compatibilism, not only is free will compatible with causal determinism, but determinism is *required* for free will.[22] According to Peter van Inwagen, many of the proponents of the "*Mind* Argument" (which can be construed as a version of the problem of luck) were themselves old-school compatibilists:

> The *Mind* Argument proceeds by identifying indeterminism with chance and by arguing that an act that occurs by chance, if an event that occurs by chance can be called an act, cannot be under the control of its alleged agent and hence cannot have been performed freely…Proponents of the *Mind* Argument conclude, therefore, that free will is not only compatible with determinism but entails determinism. (1983: 16-17)

Proponents of the problem of luck need not be believers in free will, and so they need not conclude that free will is compatible with determinism,[23] but if the problem of luck is indeed a problem, as these proponents seek to show, then it looks like free will, if it exists, requires determinism.

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[22] See, for example, Ayer (1946) and Nowell-Smith (1948). Smart (1961) develops a similar line as the others against libertarian accounts of free will without endorsing old-school compatibilism. Hobart (1934) is typically taken to be in this camp, but I take this to be a mistake, for the reasons given in the previous section.

[23] This is later granted by van Inwagen (1983: 148).

But if what worries old-school compatibilists about indeterminism is the indeterminacy between agents' actions and the proximate causes of those actions, then it should not be *determinism* that is required for free will but rather a certain kind of *deterministic sequence*, namely, deterministic causal chains linking the proximate causes of agents' actions to their actions. As I have argued, such causal chains are possible in indeterministic worlds, so the old-school compatibilist was wrong to think that free will required (or entailed) determinism. In other words, the considerations often taken to count in favor of old-school compatibilism—that undetermined actions would be the result of luck or chance, and therefore not freely performed—really only provide support fort Hobart-compatibilism. To rule out luck or chance at the time of action, our world need not be fully deterministic—local determination of actions by their proximate causes will suffice.

4. Evaluating Hobart-Compatibilism

I have provided a non-standard (but, I think, superior) interpretation of Hobart, and I have contrasted this view with one typically imputed to Hobart. In this section, I evaluate the view that I have attributed to Hobart (i.e., Hobart-compatibilism), beginning with an advantage Hobart-compatibilism enjoys over rival (non-Hobartian) super-compatibilist views.

4.1 Luck

Recall that super-compatibilists who do not appeal to CDR are apparently subject to what is arguably the greatest challenge facing libertarian accounts of free will, namely the problem of luck.[24] As I mentioned above, one way of putting the problem of luck is as follows: if an agent's

[24] For a thorough discussion of the problem of luck, see Mele (2006). The ensurance formulation that I mentioned above is one way of putting the problem, but there is a different formulation that uses similar language, namely Pereboom's "disappearing agent objection" (2014b), that targets event-causal libertarianism in particular. See Mele (2017, chapter 8) for a reply. Other formulations of the problem of luck, such as the formulation Mele (2006) develops, use language

action *A* at time *t* is not causally determined, then nothing about the agent prior to and up to *t* settles whether or not she will *A* at *t*, and so it is a matter of luck that she does *A* at *t* rather than not. An older way of putting the problem, making use of the concept of chance, is offered by van Inwagen:

> If indeterminism is to be relevant to the question whether a given agent has free will, it must occur because the acts of that agent cannot be free unless they (or perhaps their immediate causal antecedents) are undetermined. But if an agent's acts are undetermined, then how the agent acts on a given occasion is a matter of chance. And if how an agent acts is a matter of chance, the agent can hardly be said to have free will. (2002: 168)

Since super-compatibilists take free will to be compatible with the type of indeterminism blocked by Hobart-compatibilism's CDR, they apparently leave themselves exposed to the same problem of luck faced by libertarians.

As should be clear, Hobart-compatibilism is tailored to avoid exactly this problem. On this view, no causally undetermined action can be the result of an agent's exercising her free will. For this reason, the problem of luck does not arise for Hobart-compatibilism, and this is an advantage it enjoys over rival super-compatibilist views.[25]

4.2 Resiliency

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of "present luck" and "cross-world luck." These formulations are importantly different from an older statement of the problem in terms of "chance," which is basis for the *Mind* argument as well as for van Inwagen's "rollback argument" (2000). For a super-compatibilist response to the problem of luck (which is friendly to libertarianism), see Fischer (2012, chapter 6). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to distinguish between the various formulations of the problem of luck.

[25] It might be the case, however, that Hobart-compatibilism faces a *different* problem of luck, namely, the problem of "constitutive" luck—see Nagel (1979: 28) for the introduction of this term—but, since this problem (if it is a problem) is shared by all compatibilist views, and so we need not consider it in more detail here.

But there is a problem for Hobart-compatibilism that is avoided by super-compatibilists who deny CDR. Recall that Fischer argues that because, on his view, free will is compatible with both determinism and (more kinds of) indeterminism, it does not run the risk of being undermined by "the arcane ruminations—and deliverances—of the theoretical physicists and cosmologists" (2006: 5).[26] In an important sense, on Fischer's account, our view of ourselves as beings with free will (and perhaps as morally responsible persons, if these depend on our sometimes exercising free will) is *resilient* to the deliverances of the sciences. This feature of the super-compatibilist's position is taken by Fischer not only to be an advantage it has over libertarian accounts but also an advantage over old-school compatibilism. Fischer explains:

> There is a large literature surrounding the "Luck Problem." This problem is, after all, why some compatibilists have claimed that not only is moral responsibility compatible with causal determinism, but moral responsibility *requires* causal determinism. This is not, however, the direction I would take, because it would imply that our moral responsibility would, as it were, hang on a thread—just as much as it would if moral responsibility were deemed *incompatible* with causal determinism. (2012: 98-99, footnote omitted)

It is open to a super-compatibilist like Fischer, whose view does not include CDR, to claim that Hobart-compatibilism is in the same camp as libertarianism and old-school compatibilism with respect to their implication that our freedom "hangs by a thread."

In fact, Justin Capes (2013) argues that a certain type of view (of which, it turns out, Hobart-compatibilism is an instance) will not likely be attractive to compatibilists who are motivated by what he, following Daniel Speak (2008), calls the "resiliency intuition." The

[26] This is not to say that free will is compatible with any type of scenario whatsoever—a point to which I will return below.

resiliency intuition is just the idea that our view of ourselves as having free will (or being morally responsible persons) should not hang by a thread. Capes introduces the term "hard compatibilism" to refer to the view that either, on a more demanding version, global determinism is required for free will, or, on a less demanding version, at least that "there must be a deterministic connection between pertinent psychological features of the agent and the agent's behavior" (2013: 641). Capes then goes on to say:

> Should it turn out that our actions are indeterministically caused, hard compatibilism would have the unsavory consequence that no one ever acts freely or is morally responsible. Like incompatibilism, then, hard compatibilism seems to make our status as free and responsible agents contingent upon the deliverances of our best physical theories. Compatibilists like Fischer who are motivated by the resiliency intuition are therefore likely to eschew hard compatibilism in favor of a less demanding position, according to which free action and moral responsibility are compatible with the truth of both determinism and indeterminism. (2013: 642-643)

As will become clear in what follows, I take there to be an important resiliency-relevant difference between the more demanding and less demanding variations of "hard compatibilism" (which correspond exactly to old-school and Hobart-compatibilism, respectively), and I will defend Hobart-compatibilism against Capes's criticism of "hard compatibilism."

I wish to make three points in response to the resiliency worry for Hobart-compatibilism. First, it is not the case that Hobart-compatibilism lacks resiliency to the same degree that libertarianism and old-school compatibilism do. On the latter two views, learning of the truth or falsity of determinism, respectively, would be enough to show that we lack free will. On Hobart-compatibilism, however, the situation is more complex. In order for the deliverances of the

sciences to show that we lack free will, as Hobart-compatibilists conceive of it, it would need to be shown that there are not any deterministic causal chains of the type required by CDR. But such deterministic causal chains are possible in many worlds that are nevertheless indeterministic. In fact, even if it turns out that there are indeterminacies at the micro-level, it might be that many (or even all) macro-level events that are internal to the agent (and thus would connect the proximate cause of her action to her action) are deterministically connected. According to David Hodgson, "Most scientists and philosophers…see [chaos and complexity theory] as explaining why there can be unpredictability in complex systems, even when they are strictly deterministic" (2002: 87). Hodgson also claims that even the indeterminism of quantum mechanics might be such "that in any event in systems as hot, wet, and massive as neurons of the brain, quantum mechanical indeterminacies quickly cancel out, so that for all practical purposes determinism rules in the brain" (2002: 86). The possibilities described by Hodgson are friendly to Hobart-compatibilism, since they suggest that, even if our world appears to be or in fact is indeterministic, it might nevertheless allow for deterministic causal connections between the proximate causes of agents' actions and their actions.

To put the point differently, Hobart-compatibilism is resilient to the deliverances of the physicists and cosmologists, though perhaps not to the deliverances of the neuroscientists (since, presumably, the neuroscientists could discover that there are no deterministic connections between our actions and their proximate causes).[27] Not only does this make Hobart-compatibilism more resilient than both libertarianism and old-school compatibilism, but it also suggests that Hobart-compatibilism is not very far off, with respect to resiliency, from such a rival super-compatibilism

[27] Moreover, it may very well be that the resiliency intuition about the deliverances of the physicists and cosmologists is stronger than one that concerns neuroscience and the proximate causes of our actions.

as Fischer's since (presumably) on Fischer's view, the neuroscientists could discover that the mechanisms that issue in our actions are not responsive to reasons.[28] This leads to my second point in response to the resiliency worry for Hobart-compatibilism.

Second, Hobart-compatibilists might countenance the suggestion that their view adds a further constraint to our having free will (and thus makes free will hang by a thread)—the constraint that our actions be deterministically caused by their proximate causes—since, on their view, such a constraint is required in order to avoid luck-related worries. In other words, Hobart-compatibilists might admit that it is an unhappy consequence of the need to address the problem of luck that their view leaves free will to hang by a thread, but they might hasten to add that the mere fact that the view hangs by this sort of thread does not decisively count against it. Super-compatibilists like Fischer do not think that there is something problematic about having *some* constraints on an account of free will, for they grant that there are possible worlds in which free will does not exist. After referencing van Inwagen's "fanciful but logically adequate example" of a world in which free will would be not be possible, namely, one in which "when any human being is born, the Martians implant in his brain a tiny device…which [is undetectable by the individual and] contains a 'program' for that person's entire life" (van Inwagen 1983: 109), Fischer says, "I agree that a discovery that an individual (or all of us) were manipulated in this fashion could reasonably cause us to give up our view of ourselves as free and morally responsible agents. So my claim is not that there are no possible empirical discoveries that could call our agency and moral responsibility into question" (2006: 30-31, n. 15). Since Hobart-compatibilism simply adds

[28] On Fischer's account, a mechanism's being reasons-responsive requires that it be both receptive to reasons (recognizing reasons in an appropriately patterned way) and reactive to them (acting in accordance with some sufficient reason to do otherwise is some possible world with the same laws). See Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chapter 3) for more on reasons-responsiveness.

a necessary condition for free will to an account like Fischer's, and since it does so with the aim of avoiding a problem that arises from certain types of indeterminacy, it is unclear whether there is a relevant difference between the way that Hobart-compatibilism lacks some resiliency (to certain types of indeterminacy) and the way that a non-Hobartian super-compatibilism lacks some resiliency (to certain types of manipulation).[29]

Finally, whereas super-compatibilists avoid incurring the theoretical cost of requiring certain deterministic causal chains, the Hobart-compatibilist avoids having to provide an answer to the problem of luck, and the super-compatibilist, in virtue of her super-compatibilism, is committed to having some answer.[30] Given the complexity and difficulty of the problem of luck, a compatibilist may see an advantage in giving up some resiliency in order to avoid being committed to answering this problem.

4.3 A Problem for Hobart-Compatibilism

To my mind, resiliency-related considerations do not undermine Hobart-compatibilism, yet a different worry undermines Hobart-compatibilism. Because Hobart-compatibilism is committed to CDR, the view entails that no action that is indeterministically caused can be a non-derivatively free action. This implies that even if the causal connection between and action and its proximate causes has a 99.9 percent probability associated with it (with a 0.01 percent chance that some other

[29] A related point is that super-compatibilists and Hobart-compatibilists alike want their theories to be resilient *given the appropriate constraints on their theories*. If a constraint that blocks the problem of luck is one such appropriate constraint, then it is not a strike against Hobart-compatibilism that this constraint leaves the theory less resilient.

[30] As I mentioned in note 24, Fischer (2012, chapter 6) recognizes this need and attempts to provide an answer.

effect would result from the same cause), such an action cannot be directly free. But, as I will now argue, such an implication reveals that CDR is too strong a requirement on free will.[31]

First, consider a case in which an outcome is indeterministically caused. Suppose that Sassy the assassin aims to shoot a certain target, pulls the trigger, and succeeds in killing her target. It is natural to think that Sassy can exercise control (or freedom) in bringing about her intended outcome, and this is so even if we suppose that there was a chance of her failing to succeed in hitting her target. If there is even as much as a 20 percent chance that Sassy will fail to bring about the outcome that her target is assassinated (perhaps because of the chance of strong gusts of winds), and if Sassy nevertheless succeeds in assassinating her target, we would not say that the indeterminacy of the outcome precluded Sassy's freedom in bringing it about.

Now suppose that, instead of an outcome, the item that is indeterministically caused is Sassy's decision to shoot. If Sassy deliberates about whether to shoot the innocent person (which, let us assume, Sassy knows to be morally wrong) and comes to decide to shoot, and if this decision is indeterministically caused (with a high probability, say) by Sassy's judgment about what it would be best to do, we would not think that Sassy's freedom in deciding to shoot is undermined merely in virtue of that decision's being indeterministically caused.

But notice that Hobart-compatibilism's CDR implies that, in cases of directly free actions, there can be no indeterminacy. Given our natural responses to the cases just introduced, however, this is an implausible requirement.

Compare this worry for Hobart-compatibilism with one way that Fischer (2006: 5-6) defends the resiliency intuition discussed above. Fischer thinks that we take ourselves to have the control necessary for moral responsibility and that we would not abandon this view of ourselves

[31] For a similar line of thought, see Kane (1999) and Mele (2017, chapter 8).

as having this control if we were to find out that, rather than the laws of nature having 99.9 percent probabilities associated with them, they have 100 percent probabilities (which is to say that determinism is true).[32] Why would our view of ourselves persist? One plausible reason is that we do not see a relevant difference in the level of control over an action between the following two possibilities:

1) The causal connections between events in our world (including our actions and their proximate causes) have associated with them 99.9 percent probabilities.
2) The causal connections between events in our world (including our actions and their proximate causes) have associated with them 100 percent probabilities.

If you are a compatibilist, it is hard to see what reason you could have for thinking that the difference between these two possibilities is so great that only the second allows for the right kind of control (for freedom and moral responsibility). (Incompatibilists, of course, have a principled reason for thinking that these two possibilities are very different, as exactly one of them is consistent with determinism.) If something that happened had a 99.9 percent chance of happening, it certainly was not a fluke, much less an inexplicable event. If an agent satisfied a typical compatibilist's set of putatively sufficient conditions on free will in performing an action that was 99.9 percent likely to happen, what could make it the case that this exercise of agency involved *so much less control* (than a similar one with a 100 percent chance of the action's occurrence) that she could not be counted as free in performing that action?[33] If there is this much a difference

[32] As I mentioned in note 1, I am taking free will to be the control necessary for moral responsibility. Given this, if there is no relevant difference in the level of control two agent possess (in performing a certain action), then either both possess free will (in performing that action) or neither does.

[33] Note that this is consistent with the position that additional indeterminacy always mitigates control—a position that is the structural reversal of Capes's (2013) "mitigating soft compatibilism" and that has been suggested by Cogley (2015)—such that there is a difference in levels of control

between the cases (again, assuming that we are compatibilists—some incompatibilists may see a significant difference here), we are owed an account of that difference.[34]

How does this relate to the problem for Hobart-compatibilism? Well, if we think that there is no sufficiently robust (and control-relevant) difference between the two possibilities mentioned above, then we should reject CDR. CDR requires deterministic connections (i.e., connections with 100 percent probabilities associated with them) between directly free actions and their proximate causes, but if full-fledged determination is not relevantly different (with respect to control) from causal connections with 99.9 percent probabilities associated with them, then CDR is too strong a requirement. Despite its advantage with respect to luck, and even though resiliency-related considerations do not undermine it, Hobart-compatibilism is nevertheless untenable.

5. Neo-Hobartian Compatibilism

At this point, given that Hobart's view (Hobart-compatibilism) is problematic, one might wonder whether Hobart really has any insight to offer. I think that he does. To see Hobart's crucial insight, recall the passage that I claimed to be essential to understanding Hobart's project: "But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such *absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it*" (1934: 2, emphasis added). So far I have

between the two probabilities mentioned. All that I am arguing is that the difference between 100 percent and 99.9 percent cannot be so robust that such indeterminacy precludes the control necessary for moral responsibility.

[34] Perhaps Haji's formulation of the problem of luck (which appeals to "ensurance") is a way of accounting for the difference, but why think that the difference between ensurance and very-close-to-(and-nearly-indistinguishable-from)-ensurance is relevant to control? It seems to me that while there may be a relevant difference between *non-adjacent points* on the control spectrum, such as between ensurance-level control and coin-flip-level control, there is no relevant difference between these *adjacent* points on that spectrum (between ensurance-level control and nearly-indistinguishable-from-ensurance-level control).

focused on Hobart's claim that absence of determination is sheer loss of freedom. This, I think, is too strong a claim (for the reason discussed in the previous section). But Hobart also claims that absence of determination *is no gain to freedom*, and this—when we delete the stronger requirement Hobart attaches to it—is Hobart's crucial insight.[35]

We can now construct an alternative to Hobart-compatibilism that nevertheless preserves Hobart's crucial insight concerning the relation between indeterminacy and free will. On this alternative (which is, like Hobart-compatibilism, a compatibilist account), absence of determination (i.e., indeterminacy) does not immediately undermine free will, but it does not add anything to freedom either. More specifically, a compatibilist might adopt the following "neo-Hobartian" principle:

> *Neo-Hobartian Principle* (hereafter 'NHP'): a non-derivatively free action can but need not be deterministically caused by its proximate causes (i.e., free action is compatible with determinism and with indeterminism), but an action's being undetermined is in no way a freedom-relevant gain.[36]

Call a compatibilist committed to NHP a "neo-Hobartian compatibilist," and call her view "neo-Hobartian compatibilism." The neo-Hobartian compatibilist is a type of super-compatibilist, taking free will to be compatible with determinism but also with indeterminism. Crucially, though, the

[35] This insight is the heart of the problem of enhanced control, to which we will return below, and so has not been entirely neglected in the contemporary literature—see, e.g., Watson (1987: 169) and more recent discussions in Franklin (2018, chapter 6) and Mele (2017, chapter 7)—though Hobart's statement of it and his distinctive version of the problem *has*. More on this below.

[36] NHP does not, of course, offer a complete compatibilist account of free will. As Hobart-compatibilism does with CDR, neo-Hobartian compatibilism takes one's favorite compatibilist set of sufficient conditions on free will and adds to it a certain principle about undetermined action (in this case NHP).

neo-Hobartian compatibilist denies that there is any freedom-relevant advantage to being in an indeterministic world rather than a deterministic one.[37]

6. Evaluating Neo-Hobartian Compatibilism

We have seen that Hobart's actual view, Hobart-compatibilism, is problematic because it adds a necessary condition to free will that is too strong. I have suggested that Hobart's crucial insight can nonetheless be preserved within a different compatibilist account, one which denies that indeterminacy can confer any freedom-relevant gain. I will go on to argue that this understanding of Hobart's insight reveals the real worry behind the problem of luck, namely that adding indeterminacy into the sequence leading to an agent's action does not enhance the agent's control over that action. This suggests that the problem of luck and the problem of enhanced control, which are typically taken to be independent problems for libertarianism, are best taken as a single (and deeper) problem. Before I do that, however, let us return to considerations about resiliency.

6.1 Resiliency

In section 4.2, I argued that Hobart-compatibilism is not undermined by extant worries (raised independently by Fischer and Capes) for similar views. Still, as I will now demonstrate,

[37] In his approach to the luck problem (on behalf of libertarians), Fischer (2012, chapter 6; 2014) argues that merely adding indeterminacy into the causal sequence leading to an agent's action does not *undermine* that agent's freedom. This is consistent with but not as strong a claim as NHP, since NHP says not only that indeterminacy does not preclude freedom but also that it is *no gain* to freedom. But it is worth emphasizing that Neo-Hobartian compatibilists will need to accept something like Fischer's solution to the problem of luck, since skeptics like Pereboom may admit that there's there is no difference in control between a deterministic relation and a 99% probability relation between proximate causes and action, but there may be a difference in the case of a 50% relation, or a 75% relation, since here is look less plausible that the agent "settles" what they do. See Pereboom's (2018) review of Mele (2017) for discussion. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this point.

neo-Hobartian compatibilism fares even better with respect to resiliency than does Hobart-compatibilism.

Recall that one important reason for distinguishing Hobart-compatibilism from old-school compatibilism is that the latter is less resilient to the deliverances of the sciences. If the physicists and cosmologists were to discover that indeterminism is true, old-school compatibilists would be forced to give up their view of human agents as having free will, but Hobart-compatibilists would not yet be in such a position, for it is possible for indeterminism to be true and for there also to be deterministic connections in the places that Hobart-compatibilists require for free will. Similarly, Hobart-compatibilism is more resilient than libertarianism, since discovering the truth of determinism would force only libertarians (and not Hobart-compatibilists) to give up their view of themselves as having free will. Since neo-Hobartian compatibilism does not require either determinism or indeterminism for free will, it is, like Hobart-compatibilism, more resilient than both old-school compatibilism and libertarianism.

But neo-Hobartian compatibilism is even more resilient, for if we were to discover that there were never deterministic connections between agents' actions and the proximate causes of those actions, we would not yet know, according to neo-Hobartian compatibilism, that we do not have free will. Suppose that our world is one in which all actions are indeterministically caused but have 99 percent probabilities associated with them; if so, Hobart-compatibilists would have to give up their view of themselves as having free will, but neo-Hobartian compatibilists, with their principle (NHP) that allows for free actions to be indeterministically caused, would not be forced

to give up their ordinary view of themselves. So neo-Hobartian compatibilism fares better than Hobart-compatibilism with respect to resiliency-related considerations.[38]

6.2 Luck

Despite neo-Hobartian compatibilism's advantage concerning resiliency, one might worry that the account is undermined by the very thing that motivated Hobart-compatibilism in the first place, namely the problem of luck. Again, luck (of the kind at issue in this paper) is introduced by indeterminacy, so it is typically thought to be particularly problematic for libertarian accounts of free will, since these require indeterminacy for free actions. But since most compatibilists nowadays are super-compatibilists, if indeterminacy is a threat to free will, then it is apparently a threat to their accounts of free will as well. One way for a super-compatibilist to respond is by offering a solution to the luck problem on behalf of libertarianism (as well as on behalf of her own view), and this is, in fact, how prominent super-compatibilists have responded.[39] But the neo-Hobartian brand of super-compatibilism has more to say than that indeterminacy does not undermine free will; it is also true, on this account, that adding indeterminacy into the picture does nothing to *contribute* to freedom, whether by transforming a case of non-freedom into one of freedom or by increasing the degree to which an agent is free. Given this neo-Hobartian understanding of the relation between indeterminacy and free will, I propose that we take the problem of luck to be inseparable from the problem of enhanced control. In the remainder of this paper, I will briefly sketch the project of combining these two challenges, with the hope that doing so will highlight a benefit of taking Hobart seriously.

[38] Moreover, both neo-Hobartian compatibilism and Fischer's super-compatibilism (which Is motivated by considerations of resiliency, are on a par with respect to resiliency (since, unlike Hobart-compatibilism, neither claims that indeterminacy would preclude freedom).

[39] See Fischer (2012, chapter 6; 2014) for this type of response.

In a recent paper on the problem of enhanced control, Christopher Evan Franklin asks, "How does the addition of indeterminism transform unfree and non-morally responsible agents into free and morally responsible ones? This is the problem of enhanced control—the problem of explaining how libertarianism secures more control than compatibilism" (2011b: 688).[40] If free will is incompatible with determinism, as the libertarian believes, then *compatibilist* conditions on free will are insufficient to capture the necessary control.[41] So if libertarianism does not secure any more control than compatibilism, then it does not secure enough control. Since libertarians and compatibilists differ concerning whether indeterminacy is required for free will, the libertarian needs for it to be the case that the addition of indeterminacy into the sequence leading to an agent's action secures more control for that agent over that action. But I will now argue that the problem of luck reveals that the addition of indeterminacy into the sequence leading to an agent's action *fails* to secure more control for that agent over that action.[42]

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[40] See also Franklin (2018, chapter 6). Franklin believes that the problem of enhanced control is particularly (and perhaps uniquely) problematic for *event-causal* libertarianism, a libertarian view that analyzes free actions in terms of agent-involving events (rather than, say, some basic notion of an agent-causal power). For statements of the worry that indeterminacy does not enhance control by itself but would in conjunction with agent-causation, see Clarke (2003), Griffith (2010), O'Connor (2000), and Pereboom (2001).

[41] Perhaps "source incompatibilists" would demur, since their worry about determinism is that precludes our being the appropriate *sources* of our actions and thus preclude freedom (e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014b). Now, it may be that source incompatibilists think that sourcehood is necessary *for control* (or for freedom, which many take to be synonymous with control), and I take it that Kane, a prominent source libertarian would accept this understanding of his view. If this is the right way to understand source incompatibilism, though, then what I say here will apply to the source libertarianism as well. If sourcehood is necessary for freedom but not for control, it seems that we are owed an explanation of the connection (or lack thereof) between freedom and control such that sourcehood concerns the former but not the latter.

[42] It is worth contrasting my approach with that of Cogley (2015), which attempts to show that libertarianism is not undermined by the problem of luck while at the same time conceding that indeterminacy always *mitigates* control. Cogley also claims that the degree to which an agent has control over an action depends upon the probability that that action will result from a certain set of mental states. I am not relying on this claim here (nor the claim that indeterminacy always

To see this, consider what libertarians typically take to be a paradigmatic case of free action, a case in which an agent is deliberating between two salient options and both are genuinely available to the agent (both options are possible for the agent, holding fixed the past and the laws of nature). Most famous of these cases is Robert Kane's (1996: 126) example involving a businesswoman who is on her way to an important meeting, witnesses a mugging, and must choose whether to hurry on or to stop and call for help. In cases like this, Kane thinks, agents can bring about modifications to their characters (hence Kane calls them "*self-forming* actions") by performing undetermined actions that result from competing "efforts of will." The businesswoman, for example, simultaneously wills to call for help (acting in accordance with what morality requires) and wills to hurry on to her meeting (acting in accordance with what she takes to be in her own best interest). In a case like this, it is possible for an agent to satisfy what Kane calls the "plurality conditions" for free will (2011: 385), according to which an agent has at least two genuinely available options—and so could have acted in more than one way—both of which options can be done voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally. When an agent satisfies these conditions, Kane argues, the agent possesses *plural voluntary control*. Either way that the agent acts, the agent will count as having done so freely. It would appear, then, that there is a type (or perhaps higher degree) of control that is only possible when indeterminacy is involved.[43]

A worry for this understanding of plural voluntary control, however, is that it relies on the fact that the agent in such a scenario *already has control* over each of the competing efforts of

mitigates control); rather, I am claiming only that no additional control (or higher degree of control) is secured by adding indeterminacy into the picture.

[43] I refer to Kane's libertarian account both because it is widely known and because it allows for a simple presentation of my take on the luck problem, but it should be noted that the problem generalizes to any libertarian account that requires indeterminacy at the time of non-derivatively free actions.

will.[44] Is plural voluntary control for some previous action required in order for an effort of will to be possessed with control? If so, then we get a vicious regress, and a first free action (involving plural voluntary control) will be impossible (which means that, for finite agents like us, freedom is impossible). To block the regress, Kane claims that the standards for control of the competing efforts of will are distinct from the standards for control on actions resulting from these efforts. Kane calls the former kind of control "only a *compatibilist kind of control*…akin to what [John Martin] Fischer and [Mark] Ravizza also call 'guidance control.'" (2011: 404). To get a more robust kind of control, on Kane's view, and thus to get the (libertarian) freedom required to be morally responsible for behavior, an agent must satisfy certain compatibilist conditions on free action twice over (i.e., the agent must have two genuinely available options, each of which consists in performing an action that would, on its own, satisfy a compatibilist set of sufficient conditions on free action). When an agent performs a non-derivatively free action, on Kane's view, the agent's effort of will that succeeded in bringing about the action satisfied compatibilist conditions on free action, yet there was another possible way that things might have gone.

Now, according to neo-Hobartian compatibilism, such an agent may well be acting freely in performing whichever of the two actions results from the competing efforts of will. But (and this is crucial), on this view, the fact that some other action might have resulted is no *gain* to the agent's freedom in acting as she did. And this is a very plausible thing to say. If the businesswoman hurries on to her meeting, and she does so because of some effort of will (that she controlled to a compatibilist's satisfaction), what gain could there possibly be to her freedom in hurrying on to the meeting that she might have failed (and stopped to help instead)?[45] If the businesswoman had

[44] For a statement of this worry, see Mele (2006: 53).

[45] As an anonymous reviewer points out, one might deny that this possibility of failing to hurry on to the meeting enhances the agent's control in the carrying out of the effort of will to hurry on to

been disposed differently, wanting only to stop to call for help (and not inclined to hurry on to the meeting), but were somehow blocked from doing so, then *this* could plausibly be seen as limiting her freedom. But it is unclear how the possibility of failing to succeed in an effort of will (even when this failure involves the success of some *other* effort) could be any gain to the freedom of what results from that effort, which is to say that the addition of indeterminacy into the sequence leading to the agent's action does not enhance the agent's control in performing that action.

Here is another way to press the worry. Libertarians typically require that agents possess a "dual power" that enables them to select from among various open alternatives. What the problem of luck is meant to show is that the mere addition of indeterminacy, while it may allow for a plurality of options, does not bestow any additional control or powers to agents (since, holding fixed everything about the agent, there are various ways the future might unfold, but the agent has no further power *over* which future unfolds). And this, I take it, is Hobart's crucial insight. Even if indeterminacy does not undermine freedom, indeterminacy is no gain to freedom, and the fact that it is no gain to freedom undercuts the motivation for *requiring* indeterminacy for free action. So, taking Hobart's insight seriously, the problem of luck should be seen as demotivating the libertarian's additional requirements on free action, and thus should be seen (at least by believers in free will) as indirectly motivating the sufficiency of compatibilist conditions on free action.[46]

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the meeting, and yet, one might think, this possibility may still be relevant to the agent's freedom insofar as this possibility allows for control over which choice is made out of a plurality of options. As I will go on to argue in the next paragraph, however, this plurality of options does not by itself contribute anything to the agent's control (whether construed as control in choosing as the agent does or construed as control *over* what choice is made).

[46] Of course, this is only a sketch of the project of combining the problems of luck and enhanced control, but the aim of this paper is not to complete such a project (or even to forestall objections to it) but rather to showcase the importance of a correct interpretation of Hoabrt's view. Further development of this project will require looking at responses to versions of the problem of enhanced control found in Franklin (2018, chapter 6) and Mele (2017, chapter 7), among others.

7. Conclusion

Hobart's classic 1934 paper has been widely interpreted as a case for free will's requiring determinism. I have argued that this is a misrepresentation of Hobart since Hobart's compatibilism requires not full-fledged determinism but only that there be deterministic connections between free actions and their proximate causes. Despite certain advantages this view enjoys, I have also argued that it requires too much and should, in the end, be rejected. Taking the view seriously was not in vain, however, since its failure is instructive and reveals Hobart's crucial insight, namely that indeterminacy is no gain to freedom. I have offered a principle that codifies this insight, and I have argued for the supremacy of this neo-Hobartian compatibilism. A noteworthy upshot of adopting neo-Hobartian compatibilism is that it highlights (what I take to be) the real worry behind the problem of luck, namely that adding indeterminacy into the sequence leading to an agent's action does not enhance the agent's control over that action. This suggests that the problem of luck and the problem of enhanced control, which are typically taken to be independent problems for libertarianism, are best taken as a single (and deeper) problem.

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