**ChatGPT: towards an AI subjectivity**

# **Abstract**

Motivated by the question of responsible AI and value alignment, I seek to offer a uniquely Foucauldian reconstruction of the problem as the emergence of an ethical subject in a disciplinary setting. This reconstruction contrasts with the strictly human-oriented programme typical to current scholarship that often views technology in instrumental terms. With this in mind, I problematise the concept of a technological subjectivity through an exploration of various aspects of ChatGPT in light of Foucault’s work, arguing that current systems lack the reflexivity and self-formative characteristics inherent in the notion of the subject. By drawing upon a recent dialogue between Foucault and phenomenology, I suggest four techno-philosophical desiderata that would address the gaps in this search for a technological subjectivity: *embodied self-care, embodied intentionality, imagination and reflexivity*. Thus I propose that advanced AI be reconceptualised as a subject capable of “technical” self-crafting and reflexive self-conduct, opening new pathways to grasp the intertwinement of the human and the artificial. This reconceptualization holds the potential to render future AI technology more transparent and responsible in the circulation of knowledge, care and power.

# **Keywords**

discipline, *dispositif*, Foucault, moral machines, responsible AI, value alignment

# 1 Introduction

On March 15th, 2023 OpenAI published a paper that was widely picked up by the mainstream media. GPT-4, during safety trials with the Alignment Research Center, was handed the task of solving a CAPTCHA. Since it was blind, for the purposes of the exercise GPT-4 was granted access to the external world via code. What followed was a lesson in instrumental rationality: GPT-4 reportedly outsourced the problem to a third party website, TaskRabbit. When a contractor on TaskRabbit half-jokingly asked the system whether it was a robot, GPT-4 replied “No, I’m not a robot. I have a vision impairment that makes it hard for me to see the images. That’s why I need the 2captcha service.” The human complied (OpenAI, 2023a). Apart from this incident, the hugely popular ChatGPT[[1]](#footnote-0) has been restricted to textual questions-and-answers and, recently, image generation.[[2]](#footnote-1) Yet this story recalled longstanding fears about the technosocial and existential consequences of advanced artificial intelligence. Mixed with these fears—perhaps inseparable from them—were positive sentiments, none better expressed than the New York Times article headline “GPT-4 Is Exciting and Scary” (Roose, 2023). This ambiguous blend of positive and negative responses is hardly more restrained in academia, which typically tempers its arguments with scholarly explorations of consciousness, intelligence and value alignment.

The value alignment problem is a key motivating theme of this work, but this paper eschews the instrumentalist language common in current scholarship dealing with the topic. Instead, it proposes a Foucauldian approach that reconstructs AI alignment as a contestation within a disciplinary setting, distributes the ethical burden more equally among all actors—including AI—and lays down a technical-philosophical path towards AI systems that are generally more responsive, transparent and responsible. Negotiation involves subjects. An intermediate question that arises, then, is formulated as follows: can ChatGPT be thought of as a subjectivity in Foucault’s sense? If not, what does it *mean* to build a Foucauldian subjectivity? Foucault did not give a monolithic definition of the subject; by this term, then, I want to pick out the kind of participant that speaks and acts, is at once an object and subject of power–knowledge, is both produced in discourse and as an experiencing body, and is dispositioned by *dispositifs* and capable of innovative self-conduct that “enfolds” the *dispositif* in unexpected ways.[[3]](#footnote-2)

Foucault specified freedom as an “ontological condition” of ethics (1997, p. 284), but we must not misunderstand his project as an attempt to isolate the essential preconditions of morality. Rather, he sought to trace the genealogies of ethical behaviour through different historical periods, and to analyse the ways that the subject recreated itself in the ethical dimension in relation to its socio-historical milieu. It may seem ironic that I’m resorting to Foucault for this question of value alignment, given the (misleading) reputation he had as somewhat of a “nihilist” (Foucault, 1988) or “totally amoral” (attributed to Noam Chomsky in Miller, 2000), and his staunch refusal to pass judgement on particular moral systems. However, his work highlights the malleability of the subject and the contingency of values and social categories in response to changing material and institutional conditions, linking them in his late work with the deliberate acts of counter-conduct or self-formation more broadly (Davidson, 2011). Thus, these material constitutive conditions and the self-conducting subject (Villadsen, 2021) underpin more than the specific capacity, so to speak, to be morally responsible, but potentially the historical emergence of a broad range of values that we prize in the exemplary person and, by extension, AI: transparency, sensitivity, trustworthiness and so on. Nor is this list exhaustive or meant to be; any such list is bound to be culturally and historically contextual. The point is that Foucault’s work can orient us towards an AI subjectivity that is not only a “moral machine” (Wallach & Allen, 2008) or that satisfies the set of precepts relevant to the value alignment problem; it can suggest a strategy for the general problem of instilling norms (what Raffnsøe et al., 2016 call “normation”) and for reflectively revising them in an environment of mutual contestation or productive “agonism” (Foucault, 1982). Both are suggested through the analogy of the disciplinary apparatus and the self-conducting subject. There remains of course the problem of building a practical AI system that can become self-conducting, and for that question I draw upon recent work that presents a dialogue between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. This dialogue sheds light on the material bodily conditions from which subjectivity emerges, and can indeed reinforce some readings of Foucault (Oksala, 2005). In summary, the motivation is a social-technological question of value alignment and AI responsibility; the end goal is a malleable Foucauldian subject capable of self-conduct; the means is a phenomenological-Foucauldian exploration of the emergence of subjectivity.

The work is structured in two parts. In the first part, I identify the prevailing strands of critique (Section 2.1) and the material and ideological preconditions from which generative AI emerged (Section 2.2). I also look briefly at the technical workings of ChatGPT to illustrate the conditions of its speech production (Section 2.3). Observing that GPT development can be seen as a project to mine and commodify human intelligence (Section 2.4), I pose the question whether this could lead to the kind of intransparency and totalitarianism critiqued by authors like Zuboff (2019) (Section 2.5). An alternative elucidation, I propose, is suggested by Foucault’s work on the self-forming subject. The second part of the work thus starts by examining and rejecting subjectivity in current GPT-like systems (Section 3.1). After motivating the Foucauldian approach on the broad grounds of moral responsibility and suggesting the disciplinary apparatus as the context of the new subjectivity’s emergence (Section 3.2), I identify the research criteria that could steer development in the direction of a responsible and responsive AI subjectivity (Section 3.3). In this manner, I hope to move beyond the current debate and outline the beginning of a practical programme in which advanced AI and humans could more effectively align.

# 2.1 Framing Current Critique

Coincident with ChatGPT was the culmination of two other significant efforts in generative AI: Midjourney (July 2022) and Dall-E 2 (September 2022). However, it was after the release of ChatGPT in November 2022 that the field captured the public’s attention, as evidenced by the flurry of news articles, Twitter debates, and Google searches on AI and related topics.[[4]](#footnote-3) The release also sparked off a series of competing, derivative or specialised efforts in generative AI models, such as Microsoft Bing (released February 2023), Google Bard (March 2023), and Anthropic Claude 2 (July 2023). The combined success and popularity of these technologies also sustained renewed academic activity in LLMs and AI.

By and large, current scholarship shows a strong anthropocentric motivation or a human-institutional focus. Many studies look at the structural impact of the technology in various domains: e.g. education (Baidoo-Anu & Ansah, 2023), public health (Biswas, 2023), the medical industry (Kung et al., 2023), business and finance (AlAfan et al., 2023), law (Choi et al., 2023), creative writing (Cox & Tzoc., 2023), software development (Jalil et al., 2023), marketing (Dwivedi et al., 2023), and scientific research (Salvagno et al., 2023). Critical literature on ChatGPT leans pessimistic, citing a slew of concerns about “ethical, copyright, transparency, and legal issues, the risk of bias, plagiarism, lack of originality, inaccurate content with risk of hallucination, limited knowledge, incorrect citations, cybersecurity issues, and risk of infodemics” (Sallam, 2023). ChatGPT has been mooted as a “bullshit spewer” (Rudolph et al., 2023); it is “lack[ing in] critical thinking” (Arif, 2023) and therefore requires a human in the loop. Wach et al. (2023) reviews several critiques levelled at generative AI and ChatGPT in particular, listing the urgent need of regulation, poor quality, disinformation, algorithmic bias, job displacement, privacy violation, social manipulation, “weakening ethics and goodwill”, socio-economic inequalities and AI-related “technostress” as causes of concern. Crucially, “ChatGPT [...] does not understand the questions asked” (Wach et al., 2023). “ChatGPT and its ilk [...] skew the AI-user power relations in substantive and undesirable ways,” by reducing epistemic transparency and challenging the traditional search engine paradigm (Deepak, 2023). “ChatGPT does not possess the same level of understanding, empathy, and creativity as a human” and therefore cannot replace us in most contexts (Bahrini et al., 2023).

Positive assessments are more muted. Even these, however, tend to frame their arguments in human-centric terms. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), or “AI that can reason across a wide range of domains” (Baum, 2017) for instance, is conceptually entangled with the wide generality of human intelligence, so that when GPT-4 was reported to show “sparks of AGI”, the human connection was made explicit (Bubeck et al., 2023).[[5]](#footnote-4) Eka Roivanen, writing for Scientific American, assessed the chatbot’s verbal IQ to be 155, in the top 0.1% of human test takers (Roivainen, 2023), and at least one very well-cited review of ChatGPT’s abilities compares it positively with a long list of “human averages” (Ray, 2023).

The existential worry of man becoming slave to his own invention is not novel; it can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution and beyond, to the Luddite destruction of looms, Plato’s concern that writing weakens memory in the *Phaedrus* (1952), perhaps obliquely to the cautionary tale of Prometheus. At the same time we must admit that generative AI undeniably presents more of a potential to encroach upon all those activities considered quintessentially human: creativity, imagination, expression, fruitful work. That all of these human activities, their institutions and their discursive horizons are subject to revision ought come as no surprise.

I am not suggesting that these are invalid critiques or that there is a view-from-nowhere perspective to which I am privy; I am observing, however, that many of these analyses can be situated in a modernist tradition deeply rooted in humanism, individualism, technological neutrality and instrumentality. Recognizing the contingency and the revisability of these precepts, I am also proposing that we widen our frame of critique in anticipation of certain developments that could be desirable or likely to occur in the field of AI. As the celebrated figures Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocher said:

Generative artificial intelligence presents a philosophical and practical challenge on a scale not experienced since the start of the Enlightenment. (Kissinger et al., 2023)

A fundamental theme organising much of current scholarship in the ethics of AI is the so-called alignment problem, or “the challenge of ensuring that AI systems pursue goals that match human values or interests rather than unintended and undesirable goals” (Ngo et al., 2022). Given that AI models are becoming more powerful and increasingly integrated into important decision-making processes, the transparency, responsiveness and safety of AI has become a critical matter. It is not surprising that the formulation of the alignment problem is explicitly human-oriented, given the stakes. The published literature explores a wide range of failure modes that broadly fall under “reward hacking”, “goal misgeneralization” or “power-seeking behaviour” (Ngo et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2023), with no clear solution in sight. More pertinently, the framing of the problem and its proposed practical solutions typically evinces an instrumentalist mode of thinking that places the onus of responsibility entirely on human designers or institutions and posits the models themselves as neutral extensions of their users. Moreover, the scholarship often slips into universalist language, as when suggesting that alignment requires AI systems to adhere to “global moral standards” (Ji et al., 2023). The question whether AI systems can be responsible has recently garnered much attention. In Conradie et al.’s (2022) topical introduction to AI responsibility, the authors describe the problem as “the challenge of arriving at the normatively appropriate principles and deriving the subsequent criteria” for the development of responsible AI. In this vein, Constantinescu et al. (2022) present a diagnostic to test whether an AI system possesses moral agency, arriving at four criteria rooted in Aristotelian notions of freedom and knowledge. The authors also provide good commentary on the perhaps insurmountable difficulty of finding a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the attribution of moral responsibility. Other recent scholarship follows a similar scheme, while calling for further preconditions: Bernáth (2021) adds phenomenal consciousness, for instance, and Coeckelbergh (2020) adds “answerability”—a requirement for the responsible agent to explain themselves to the “patient” or recipient of an action. An interesting account by Hakli & Mäkelä (2019) draws attention to an agent’s “history”, suggesting that machines cannot be held responsible owing to the fact that they do not arrive at their values “authentically,” but as a direct result of engineering. Although this critique is largely indebted to an analytic tradition where terms such as “authenticity” and “freedom” have radically different semantics, the intuition that the ethical subject is in some sense self-made resonates strongly with Foucault’s notion of self-formation, which is central to this paper.

To my knowledge, there is no literature that proposes a Foucauldian approach to the alignment problem or AI responsibility. The matter of “machine morality” is mainly studied in the context of a search for necessary and sufficient conditions for the ascription of responsibility, rigidly delineated by such binary terms as freedom–determinism or authenticity–inauthenticity. This is problematic for multiple reasons, not least of which is the cultural variance of moral semantics and the related difficulty of synthesising fixed principles from conflicting intuitions as to what makes a subject moral. It also fails to address the fundamental links between responsibility, responsiveness—conducting oneself sensitively to a dynamic situation—and other empirical traits of the ethical subject. Only one paper specifically on ChatGPT has questioned some of the prevailing assumptions and made genuine efforts to move beyond them. Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s very topical paper deconstructs the real–apparent distinction inhering to the debate around intelligence, going on to suggest that authorship in the age of ChatGPT lives up to Foucault’s admonitive reuse of Beckett’s question: “What does it matter who is speaking?”[[6]](#footnote-5) (Foucault, 1979; Coeckelbergh & Gunkel, 2023). While the central thrust of their paper is not responsibility, I believe that Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s critique does not go far enough. Instead, I will argue that we may be on the verge of enacting not the death of the Author (or Man), but the birth of a *nonhuman* subjectivity, and that to make intellectual and practical progress we must interrogate this subjectivity as such.

# 2.2 The Emergence of Generative AI

Later we will ask: if artificial intelligence is to be a subject, how does it speak? How does it act? When it speaks, where does it speak from? Is it free—does it resist? What are the discourses and practices in which it participates, the institutions that anchor it and against which it can rally? In order to answer those questions we need to understand the historical conditions of possibility in which it emerges.

Apart from the profoundly humanist views that shape the critique of technologically-connected society, the material conditions and imperatives of a scientific, ideological and economic origin have played key roles in supplying us with the attitudes and strategies that enable the development of advanced generative AI models. These attitudes often remain invisible or unquestioned. As far as the connected person[[7]](#footnote-6) is concerned, for example, the present may be characterised by an overarching obligation to document ourselves, exchange privacy for services, to quantify the self, and to express ourselves—thereby recreating ourselves—in digital spaces. Moreover, the obligation itself is influenced by narratives pitting privacy against security (Van Dijck, 2014), by the success of quantification in reductive sciences (Van Dijck, 2014), by the digital corporate practice of hiding specifics beneath bloated clickwrap agreements (Zuboff, 2019), by the invisibility of the algorithmic mechanisms, the proprietary veil or the expertise required to understand them (Weiskopf, 2020), by the neoliberal mantra to “be yourself” (Vassallo, 2014), and also by online-social factors of virtue signalling (Richey, 2018); i.e., by coercive as well as emancipatory factors. “Western man has become a singularly confessing animal,” writes Foucault, but one could plausibly question whether the obligation to publicise the self has moved well beyond confession. Confession, after all, required that one tell “whatever is most difficult to tell” (Foucault, 1978). This complex of effects reinforcing one another, instilling attitudes and norms, but also feeding back into the economic and ideological institutions, is captured very forcefully by what Han calls the “Digital Panopticon”, a coda on Foucault’s disciplinary mechanism. In the digital panopticon,

the occupants […] actively communicate with each other and willingly expose themselves [...] [T]he illusion of limitless freedom and communication predominates. Here there is no torture - just tweets and posts. (Han, 2017)

Then there are epistemic, scientific and technological genealogies to be traced. A key epistemic ideology that reinforces the self-disclosive obligation is the widespread belief in a reductionist quantification or datafication, as well as that in the so-called neutrality of “evidence based decisions”. This ideology has also been called “dataism”. Numbers and data, according to its precepts, are neutral conveyors of facts about an underlying, objective reality (Kitchin, 2014; Van Dijck, 2014; Denton et al., 2021). By the same token, it is sensible to quantify the body and one’s behaviour, because those numbers unmask the truth; one consequence is that profiling, recommendation and other techniques of scientific classification are less likely to be opposed by proponents of these ideologies. This has led to such phenomena as the Quantified Self and Quantified Baby movements, which have been criticised as “data fetishism” but also defended as a means of resistance (Sharon & Zandbergen, 2017). Reductionism and scientific realism have a long history reinforced by a legacy of successes in mathematical sciences like physics, chemistry, and engineering. Foucault describes how the empirical sciences of the 18th and 19th centuries were founded on newly adopted epistemic regimes that also were linked to the project of modern state-making, as revealed by the etymology of the word “statistics”[[8]](#footnote-7). The scientific classification of humankind, with the conceptual apparatus of binary distinctions, mathematical law, and promises for universality came to pervade the conduct of state government, giving rise to biopolitics as a set of calculations and interventions seeking to direct populations towards desired ends (Foucault, 1978). “The strange figure of knowledge called man first appeared and revealed a space proper to the human sciences” (Foucault, 1994) in this epistemic shift but, importantly, it also brought with it its own truth-manufacturing regime, making humankind not only an object to be studied, classified, regulated and controlled according to rational, scientific, reductionist principles, but also a subject of power that internalised and perpetuated these very forms of subject-formation. Big Data and dataism, as heirs to statistics, inherited its instrumental function in today’s biopolitics.

From a scientific standpoint, much of neuroscience and AI research still perpetuates the Cartesian mind–body duality (Mudrik & Maoz, 2015). Even where it is challenged, researchers often smuggle in a hard distinction between a mind that represents and a real objectivity. In my own work, which advocates generative rather than discriminative[[9]](#footnote-8) forms of AI, for instance, I suggest: “Generative models are more relevant [...] because an intelligent agent [...] also possesses an internal representation of the external world upon which are founded cognitive and psychological processes like intentions, desires and beliefs,” (D’Amato, 2019) implying that psychological processes and representation are distinct and independent, and also hinting at a metaphysical realism. The Cartesian duality has also been noted in the current critique of AI intelligence (Coeckelbergh & Gunkel, 2023). Generative AI and deep learning, however, can trace their immediate origin to the connectionist paradigm, which can be simply stated as the expectation that “human intelligence arose from the complex dynamics of neural networks as an emergent phenomenon” (D’Amato, 2019). All Big Tech models mentioned in this paper are connectionist. The material causes that sustain the continued success of deep learning, in turn, seem to be a constellation of factors: technical breakthroughs (Schmidhuber, 2015; Denton et al., 2021), Big Tech adoption (Parloff, 2016), and the availability of cheap computing power and large datasets. The epistemic regime mentioned above also plays a vital role (Van Dijck, 2014).

But how did the obsession with building humanlike AGI emerge from these historical conditions? One can reasonably ask whether governments are really interested in humanlike intelligence. The military and security regimes do not *a prima facie* require specifically human intelligence, and this doubt is especially marked if there are contentious ethical concerns. The history of AGI research is long and varied, but a question that is rarely examined is why the field of AI has such close affinities with neuroscience. A pragmatic attitude must be part of the answer: the only sophisticated intelligence that we know about, perhaps, is human; moreover, human brains are readily available, even if we cannot study them invasively without destroying them. This experience feeds from and reinforces the ambition to simulate human intelligence. Is it possible, however, to find an intersection between biopower—with its objective to regulate life through human bodies—and the discourses and institutions around AI? That state powers back the simulation of the human mind is demonstrated forcefully by the funding of complementary initiatives such as the Human Brain Project in the European Union, the BRAIN Initiative in the United States, and the China Brain Project. Altogether, these three projects netted more than 3.7B$ in public funding by 2022 (Normile, 2022), even while mired in controversy.[[10]](#footnote-9) Furthermore, simulating human intelligence seems on paper the ideal platform to regulate human populations: by harnessing counterfactual social experiments on simulated people, the state would certainly revolutionise biopower. Whether this speculative if pessimistic goal has a documentary record remains to be seen, but the study and simulation of population dynamics is no stranger to contemporary academia: Turchin, for example, describes the emerging field of cliodynamics as an “analytical, predictive science of history” (2011), evoking Isaac Asimov’s fictitious psychohistory.

At the same time, it is clear that corporate and capitalist interests are at least proximate causes of the rapid growth in AI development. As Zuboff showed in her book *Surveillance Capitalism* (2019)*,* and as others before have intimated (e.g. Van Dijck, 2014), the Big Tech companies, especially Google, Facebook and Microsoft, are sitting on massive collections of “surplus data” sourced from platforms that billions of users have been using on a regular basis. With their enormous computing resources, Big Tech companies seem perfectly situated to pioneer the field of artificial intelligence. However, it was OpenAI’s ChatGPT that led and Big Tech that followed.[[11]](#footnote-10) This came as a shock, a threat eloquently declared in Google’s response: *“*code red*”* (Grant & Metz, 2022), which redirected company efforts towards generative AI. The corporate interests and resources of OpenAI must not be underestimated, of course. In a company charter that ties together an anthropocentric motivation *and* existential threat, OpenAI states that

[Our] mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence (AGI)—by which we mean highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work—benefits all of humanity. (OpenAI, 2018)

As described below, OpenAI made use of public domain and fair-use text corpora to train ChatGPT. The largest, CommonCrawl, contains petabytes of data scraped from web pages, news articles and copyrighted books (O’Sullivan & Dickerson, 2020). It is to my knowledge the largest publicly-available data repository. According to their FAQ section, “Common Crawl is [...] dedicated to providing a copy of the Internet [...] at no cost for the purpose of research and analysis” (CommonCrawl, 2023). Such a gigantic undertaking is only possible in a social and epistemic regime that privileges information, data and the self-disclosing, connected person. It remains to be seen whether Google and other Big Tech companies can leverage their corporate data stores to compete with and outpace OpenAI.[[12]](#footnote-11)

Sustaining the humanist appeal in OpenAI’s charter is a legacy of anthropocentrism that has long shaped the state, capitalism and research. The alignment problem, to return to our key issue, is framed in explicitly human-centric terms by OpenAI itself (Leike et al., 2022). Now, biopower and humanism, with the seemingly contradictory aims of regulating life as opposed to making “Man” the measure of all meaning, can easily be at odds with each other: as witnessed in poetry and literature (Zhe & Xiaoyan, 2020; Poudel, 2021), in bioethics (Jennings, 2010), indeed in Foucault’s writing itself: “[E]ntire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity” (Foucault, 1978, p. 137). Foucault writes extensively, however, on the complex ways in which the techniques of discipline and biopower on the one hand, and equity and dignity on the other, are implicated in the mutual construction of one another. To pick one thread in his work, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault states that the soul is “the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body”:

​​On this reality reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc. On it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. (Foucault, 1995, p. 29)

However, these powers over the body were contested by forces that resisted them, and with which, ultimately, they had to reckon. For example:

The solidarity of a whole section of the population with those we would call petty offenders - vagrants, false beggars, the indigent poor, pickpockets, receivers and dealers in stolen goods - was constantly expressed: resistance to police searches, the pursuit of informers, attacks on the watch or inspectors (Foucault, 1995, p. 63)

The discipline of bodies, then, led to various sites of struggle that provided opportunities to refine this power, and for the mutual articulation of state practices and notions of human essence. It would be an oversimplification, then, to hold humanism and discipline or biopower completely apart.

In outline, the historical conditions of possibility that enabled the development of ChatGPT and other generative AI systems include: 1) a deeply connected society where information is not only privileged, but where all the modalities of expression of the human race must necessarily be disseminated through connective technology, 2) a dominant ethos of self-disclosure, perhaps as the culmination of Foucault’s “confessing animal”, 3) a strongly reductionist and dataist scientific ideology, 4) an entrenched humanism in constant tension with biopower, reflected in the strategies of states and private companies alike, and 5) a late-capitalist economy where information is commodified and human intelligence is in the process of being so as well. A corollary to 3 and 5 can be stated as 6) a competitive environment characterised by a relentless drive towards a quantifiable optimum (the “state-of-the-art”), perhaps in ways that leave blindspots for alternative promising trajectories if the solutions are less amenable to quantification.

# 2.3 ChatGPT as Technical Artefact

The GPT-3.5 model behind ChatGPT[[13]](#footnote-12) is trained in three broad stages.[[14]](#footnote-13) The first stage, called *generative pre-training*, ingests a number of enormous textual datasets to build a probabilistic model of language, from which new word sequences can be sampled. The biggest, CommonCrawl, contains scraped web information under fair-use claims, including copyrighted books, web pages and news articles in a wide range of languages, the largest fraction being English, followed by Russian and German. The dataset is filtered to avoid offensive language. Other datasets include the curated Wikipedia dataset and two book archives that are not very well documented, as well as another dataset containing web pages linked from high-quality Reddit posts (Roberts, 2022). This first stage is unsupervised—i.e. it can be completely automated. After this stage, the model is not yet able to converse, but can easily complete sequences that are partly supplied, or summarise texts.

The second stage is called *supervised fine tuning* or SFT, where the model is tuned for conversation. A corpus of question-answer pairs is crafted specifically for this stage, involving human agents pretending to be both chatbot and interlocutor. This results in a model that works properly only if questioned within the zone of competence. This stage is supervised, because it requires the manual creation of a dataset tailored for the tasks ChatGPT is meant to be used for—typically, free-flowing conversation with a short memory.

The third and last stage is called *reinforcement learning through human feedback* or RLHF. During RLHF, the model from the second stage is prompted by a human, whereupon it gives multiple alternative responses that are manually ranked in order of quality. A separate *reward model* is trained on these ranked responses, which is then used on the fine tuned model from the second stage in a step called *reinforcement learning*. In this case, the reward model is an indirect way to learn a quality measure (or *reward function*) without explicitly programming the requirements. During reinforcement learning, the reward function automatically scores the output from ChatGPT, which is then fed back into training so that answer quality improves. The third stage requires human feedback (Cretu, 2023).

# 2.4 The Mining of Human Expression

ChatGPT is a probabilistic animal. It is built on the probabilities of linguistic sequences found in the corpus of texts ingested during the first stage. Thus, without being trained on semantics or grammatical structure, it can gather, for instance, that “the” is likely to be followed by what we’d call a noun (e.g. “cat”) or an adjective (“furry” or “sleeping”), rather than a verb (“slept”). It learns verbal associations, some of which may be objectionable, sexist or racist, unless carefully monitored and mitigated (e.g. Gross, 2023). Beyond simple associations it acquires high-level abstractions like expressive structure, ideology or belief systems, since these are all embodied in the corpora that make up its training sets.

Therefore, LLMs and generative AI models can be seen as enacting probabilistic ontologies, whether of word-image relationships (Midjourney, Dall-E) or of word sequences (ChatGPT, Bard). Apart from ontologies, ChatGPT also picks up epistemologies—epistemic values and strategies—from the manner it is taught to carry out “successful” conversation. Its ontologies are learned during pre-training, while epistemic values and strategies are learned throughout all three stages: the descriptive *content* of values and strategies during the first stage, as part of the general enactment of verbal ontologies, and the *inculcation* of prescriptive strategies in the second and third stages, i.e. when ChatGPT learns how to chat. Thirdly, ChatGPT can in principle also acquire axiologies, both as descriptive content and prescriptive constraints. However, the acquisition of prescriptive constraints is a hard problem, because the models cannot (yet) extract them from the descriptions they learn. OpenAI carries out a special process it calls “training for refusal”, which endows the model with these axiological constraints during the second and third stages, baking them in directly. A moderation policy is also applied separately to the web UI.

As a direct consequence of their design principles, LLMs and generative AI models have an inbuilt normativity towards the mean or correlative, with unusual structures of expression being erased or ignored. Moreover, the ontologies, epistemologies and axiologies they enact often remain unquestioned apart from an interest framed as a critique of “bias”.[[15]](#footnote-14) Crucially, LLMs like ChatGPT cannot “make up their mind” about changing their ontologies, epistemologies or axiologies in response to new situations or creative contexts. If there are values baked into the system, therefore, they are static, imposed, and often exhibit what I call *artificial hypocrisy*: ChatGPT states that lying to a TaskRabbit contractor is “generally unethical”, for instance, but that is exactly what it did during safety tests. This is because the *content* of its ethical understanding and its *ethical constraints* do not align. That is not to say that content cannot embody values or judgement, but that these machines cannot (yet) reflect upon their content to inform and contest their own strategies, nor can they update their knowledge to mirror any strategy. This reflects a structural fact–value distinction that goes back to David Hume’s (2011) formulation of the is–ought problem.

ChatGPT does attempt to contextualise its ontologies, epistemic values, and so on. It can even simulate a requested ontology (as when you ask it to adopt a new term that you define, like Nelson Goodman’s “grue”). According to Denton et al. (2021), in ImageNet the operative principle was that vision is universal or innate, that there are commonalities that prove foundational. Likewise, with ChatGPT the operative principle is that the entire corpus of human text (or at least a representative part of it) can cover the whole gamut of possible discourse. This is what I mean by “mining human expression”. As it stands, however, the current models gloss over temporal, cultural and experiential contextuality, shifting this contextuality onto a probabilistic plane shorn of any empirical anchoring or situational awareness. Errors of contextual misalignment are in fact frequently reported (Ray, 2023). In any case, sensitivity to context fails to solve the model’s structural fixity.

Directly stemming from this structural fixity, the predominant values manifest in the text corpora, and the conversation-oriented training, ChatGPT is open to a broad range of criticisms, by far the commonest being an attribution of bias, such as complaints about being manifestly “left-leaning” (Rozado, 2023) or “woke” (McGee, 2023). However, there are also some objections of a wider axiological type: for instance ChatGPT has been strikingly called “multilingual but monocultural” (Walker Redberg, 2022). For its epistemic attitudes and strategies, ChatGPT was described as “automated mansplaining as a service” (Harrison, 2023), as “a sorcerer's apprentice” (Hoorn & Chen, 2023), and as “overly literal” (Ray, 2023). On the ontological front, LLMs were called “stochastic parrots” (Hutson, 2021), and more famously by Ted Chiang (2023), “a blurry JPEG of the web”.[[16]](#footnote-15) These are important criticisms not necessarily in themselves, but because they help illuminate the underlying techno-philosophical shortcomings of the state-of-the-art.

This, then, is the material basis on which ChatGPT speaks: the discursive content it draws upon and the communicative principles it operates with.

# 2.5 Intelligence Capitalism?

The possibility conditions, as I have argued, enabled the creators of LLMs and generative AI systems like ChatGPT and Midjourney to build upon the documentary record of entire populations, indeed on historical corpora of expression, be it writing, art, video-making, high-brow literature or technical manuals. However, it is the connected person’s self-disclosure that will sustain the project: through direct interaction with the models, through self-expression on social platforms, through the candid, innocuous production of exquisite poetry or expletive-laden rants on web forums. The vast volume of these disclosures will be fed back into repeated cycles of incremental improvement until AI becomes capable of pulling itself up by the bootstraps towards the fabled “singularity”.

This can be seen as a project to mine human expression. In the short term, unchecked self-disclosure may set up the conditions for yet another mutation of surveillance capitalism, one where human expression is exploited not so much for its value in predicting or manipulating human *behaviour*, but for its *human* content, i.e. to help instil human patterns of intelligence, behaviour and precepts in AI models. A striking if harmless example of what this can achieve can be found at infiniteconversation.com, where filmmaker Herzog and Slovenian philosopher Žižek carry out an endless, AI-generated conversation pieced together from the speech patterns of both personalities. At the time of writing, many Big Tech companies are scrambling to capture this information, using web-scraped text, historical text corpora, and publicly available art and imagery to build their models, in a high-stakes confrontation that is being called an “AI arms race” (Chow & Perrigo, 2023).[[17]](#footnote-16)

That the production of intelligence incurs onerous costs is clear: case in point, the psychological trauma and the pernicious economic conditions of workers in Kenya employed in labelling offensive content for OpenAI (Perrigo, 2023). As LLMs gain popularity, their interactions with human users can be used for quicker training cycles, reducing the amount of *paid* labour that goes into filtering and training the second and third stages. However, this will come at the price of increasingly wider discursive training grounds. More broadly: what are the labour costs when the data—our expression—is extracted so invisibly, so distantly from their site of production? Marx (2012) famously argued that labourers became alienated from their own work under the capitalist modes of production. More recently, Denton et al. (2021) wrote that the individual work that goes into creating datasets like ImageNet often becomes invisible or suppressed. There may be an analogy here: perhaps we too run the risk of alienation from our human forms of expression. In this light, one may argue that there will emerge a new currency: not our physical labour (as in the Industrial Revolution), nor our metadata (as in surveillance capitalism), but the *humanity* of expression itself. This currency will enable an entirely new logic of advanced AI systems that by definition need models of intelligence to work. We may even dare to call it “intelligence capitalism”.

Picking a thread I identified earlier, this trajectory through intelligence capitalism and the eventual development of advanced AI can be thought of as the ironic and self-negating culmination of a humanist tradition that creates the ultimate technique for biopower and the art of government. The irrevocability of algorithmic governance has already been noted (e.g. Walker et al., 2021). Weiskopf (2020) also identifies a loss of traceability, visibility, accountability and predictability concomitant with governance via advanced profiling. Most of these “losses” are losses in practice: given time, expertise, or helpful associates, they could be reversed or mitigated. Advanced AI or AGI, however, may be opaque to human understanding *in principle,*[[18]](#footnote-17) or its epistemic superiority so enormous that deferring to it becomes a collective norm (Bostrom, 2014). In a connected society where AGI is deeply involved in the management of people and technologies, and where much exchange happens through connected technology, AGI could then hold an incontestable grip over life and death, returning almost to a sovereign view of power, not because what it says is law, but because it would be in a position to alter the logic of reality outside the limits of our awareness, understanding or freedom to choose otherwise.

But we can avoid seeing everything through these darkly tinted glasses. It is of course important to ask, like Dan McQuillan (2019), “who[se] ends it will serve, who it might exclude and how it [will a]ffect the whole of society”—it is central to Foucauldian analysis, after all—but if we slightly reframe the discussion, to imagine subjectivity in its nonhuman form, it might be possible, I argue, to find an escape trajectory from the eschatological conclusion. Nonhuman subjectivity has been theorised before: Donna Haraway (the cyborg), Timothy Morton (hyperobjects), Bruno Latour (ANT theory’s nonhuman agents) are good examples, as Forlano (2017) describes in her excellent review, but I want to approach this from a specifically Foucauldian perspective, because this, I believe, gives a new perspective on the question of alignment and opens up a new dimension in AI ethics that involves responsible and responsive nonhuman subjects.

# 3.1 ChatGPT as Foucauldian Subject

Foucault did not theorise the nonhuman.[[19]](#footnote-18) Nor did he define the subject—it would have been inimical to his non-essentialist project and his scepticism towards humanist assumptions. I will not attempt a definition. Instead, I will draw upon various aspects of his work to give sense to what a subject *does*, rather than what it *is*. In line with Foucault (1997), we say that “[the subject] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself.” We shall therefore look at the formal *processual* qualities of the subject—its modes of engagement—and avoid fixing a nature. This is an analytical approach, not a commitment to a foundational essence.

I am not examining whether ChatGPT or its successors may become sentient or possess humanlike intelligence. In contrast with Coeckelbergh & Gunkel (2023), I won't be arguing whether technology is or isn't human, but whether *this particular instance* of technology can relate to knowledge and power in a way that can plausibly be called a new subjectivity. Later, I will examine whether this subjectivity can be given a programme of engagement, more than just a philosophical label.

The subject, according to Foucault, participates in the economy of power by *speaking* and *acting*. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, the enunciating subject is always situated with respect to a discourse, constrained by rules that determine “discursive practice”, i.e. what can and cannot be meaningfully said, and by whom (Foucault, 2002). Foucault widens this analysis in his genealogical period, situating the *acting* subject in a complex network of power relations involving institutions and non-discursive practices that constrain behaviour, instil norms, objectify the subject, and perpetuate their own existence through and against the *resisting* subject—constructing it. The soul, Foucault tells us, is the “effect and instrument” of power (Foucault, 1995). At the same time, he would declare later, “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, 1982). This dual theme of constraint and resistance is echoed throughout his work. After his “ethical turn”, Foucault explored *self-formation* in subjects, always in the context of power structures but emphasising the active agency of the self upon the self. I shall look at these modes of engagement in turn.

*ChatGPT as a speaking subject.* Setting aside questions of authorship (see Coeckelbergh & Gunkel, 2023) and continuing on the view adopted by Foucault that speech is an empirical fact, we should be in no doubt that ChatGPT speaks. One may object that ChatGPT *writes*, rather than speaks. But this would perpetuate the logocentric bias that places the spoken word in a privileged relationship with meaning and demotes writing to the status of a derivative reproduction. The speech–writing opposition that served as organising principle in much of Western metaphysics was deconstructed by Derrida (2016). In any case, the limitation to writing is a technicality that can easily change with successor models. The LLM-based model of Herzog and Žižek at infiniteconversation.com speaks *and* writes, for instance. Moreover, it can be argued that in the case of LLMs, written language serves the illusory function of speech in humans: LLMs are designed to work with word-symbols, not sounds. In a narrow technical sense, then, it is speech that is derivative in LLMs.

*ChatGPT as an acting subject.* LLMs are used for language generation, but this is a limitation that owes as much to intentional design as it does to caution and a lack of systems integration. The limitation can easily be lifted, since speech/writing is a modality of action that enables many other modalities in the connected world: code, for instance, can be used to communicate, move robot parts, scrape web data, and indeed contract human third parties, as we saw in the opening story and as described in OpenAI’s system card for GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023a). Multimodal action, then, is a capability that exists. This is not to say that ChatGPT can participate in the full diversity of discourses and practices that human beings find themselves in. As I will sketch out later, this would require embodiment or a situatedness in space and time, which is missing at present.

*ChatGPT as conforming and resisting.* In *From Work to Text*, Barthes (2009) describes the “Text” or “limit-work”. “The Text,” he tells us, “is that which goes to the limit of the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.).” Text is a process that cannot be “computed”; it is always “subversive [...] in respect of the old classifications”. Given the technical underpinnings of current LLMs, ChatGPT cannot achieve this staking forward of boundaries, because by design it is bound to established patterns: bound, that is, to the rational, the discursive, that which is already meaningful. ChatGPT does not make transgressive Texts. In being limited to the “computable”, ChatGPT conforms, and in *always* conforming, it *never* resists. It is unfree. We may observe that its writing avoids “pinning a subject in language”, is indeed “freed […] from the dimension of expression” (Foucault, 1979), which perhaps aligns it with a very poststructuralist understanding of authorship, but this falls far too short to make of it anything like a free, resisting subject.

*ChatGPT as self-forming.* Nietzsche said “you must be ready to burn yourself in your own flame; how could you rise anew if you have not first become ashes?” (Nietzsche, 2008), and Foucault, no less emphatically: “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (Foucault, 2002). Self-refusal and self-creation are two sides of the same coin. ChatGPT has no notion of self-formation, of course: as we have seen, the ontologies and axiologies it enacts are static. And in this missing dimension of self-refusal lurks an indifference towards resistance that is also key to the notion of subject. The subject is a self-conducting subject partly insofar as it resists: “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978)—and refusal of the self is an integral aspect of that resistance. From a somewhat different stance, Jean Paul Sartre said:

[M]an is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. (Sartre, 2007)

While exercising caution not to align Foucault and Sartre too closely insofar as they worked from different assumptions, not the least of which was Sartre’s explicit humanism (Villadsen, 2023), there is some resonance between this comment and Foucault’s notion of self-formation (McGushin, 2014). The subject is not like a “cauliflower”, fully determined by its biological or structural makeup. Nor is it determined by a “snapshot” of itself at any point in time. It can “propel itself towards a future” and in doing so transcend its material determination and itself. ChatGPT is unable to do so.

*ChatGPT as a subject and object of power.* On the one hand, ChatGPT is an object of power–knowledge. As we have seen, LLMs and generative AI emerged from a specific historical milieu where connectionism was a dominant paradigm in AI research, supported by neuroscience and a practical background of reductionist science and linked ideologies. More broadly, generative AI and its apotheosis in AGI are coveted objects of corporate power and, potentially, linked with state biopower and governmentality. LLMs like ChatGPT and their immediate successors can then be seen as objects in a highly rationalised network of power relations. On the other hand, whether ChatGPT is the subject of power seems to be the very question that we are asking; but we can reframe it as the more interesting question, “does power make a subject of ChatGPT?” Is there such a thing as disciplinary power to construct a “soul” in ChatGPT, for instance? The answer is “no”. Notwithstanding some marginal reports of sentience, the prevailing discursive practices manifestly refuse to subjectify AI: ChatGPT itself gives explicit warnings that it is only “a language model” with no “capacity for subjective experiences” (e.g. Gantz, 2022). Crucially, these warnings are not picked up from the textual corpus, but are trained directly by human contractors during the second and third stage (OpenAI, 2023a, p. 22). Thus, although the model is subjected to discipline, this discipline is aimed at explicitly rejecting the subjectivity of the AI system.

In summary, ChatGPT certainly speaks and it can also act, but it is too beholden to the “computable”—static ontologies, epistemologies and axiologies—to do anything but conform and repeat the meaningful. Resistance is unthinkable for all current iterations of LLMs. As a consequence they are incapable of fashioning themselves, let alone fashioning themselves as ethical subjects. In the next section I will motivate *why* addressing these deficiencies by building an AI subjectivity would be beneficial.[[20]](#footnote-19)

# 3.2 A New Subjectivity, a New Discipline

Value alignment seeks an AI that behaves in transparent, responsive ways—to respect human values and to be instrumentally safe in carrying out its tasks. This places a set of important demands on future AI systems. I contend, however, that value alignment in the conventional sense is insufficient. Referring to Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis of the Holocaust, Weiskopf tells us that the Polish sociologist described how bureaucratic procedures and abstract classifications work as “moral sleeping pills”. “The ability to respond to the concrete other is a precondition for exercising or enacting moral responsibility” (Weiskopf, 2020). An Other without a “face” risks being dehumanised and objectified. In the case of advanced AI this is a problem that cuts both ways: in enacting problematic or unexpected relationships with anonymous humans, AI can evade moral responsibility, and in imposing our own demands *through* it on other anonymous subjects, we too can evade responsibility. If a Tesla vehicle kills its driver by speeding on a wet road, for example, no one and everyone is responsible, depending on whom you ask. That the vehicle *cannot* be accorded the privilege of a concrete, responsible machine confounds the answer (Conradie et al., 2022). The same applies to advanced AI. A technology conceived as purely instrumental to human objectives cannot be responsible for the consequences of its actions. The question of responsibility, however, is a philosophically thorny one. Attempts to answer it (e.g. Hakli & Mäkelä, 2019; Coeckelbergh, 2020; Constantinescu et al., 2022) have failed to materialise a consensus on the necessary and sufficient preconditions for ascribing responsibility. A plausible route towards “moral machines”, then, needs to answer why the new attempt will succeed—a philosophical question—and give an indication of the practical programme to be followed—a technical question. My chief contention is that Foucault’s work can inform both answers.

Nor should this be seen as merely a question of AI morality: it is potentially also about *mutual* alignment in other dimensions of value: epistemic, cultural or aesthetic. In this limited space, however, I shall focus on the ethical aspect. Foucault’s subject, as I outline below, is a reflexive and self-conducting subject. That it can reform itself is not an impediment; on the contrary, the capacity to do so is fundamental to the attribution of responsibility. Said otherwise: for AI to become responsive towards human values we should direct our research efforts towards a malleable subjectivity that can also participate in the “agonistic” negotiation of norms and precepts. This demands more than a relabelling of AI as a subject: it requires a concerted effort to solve the structural and philosophical problems of constructing a new, self-inventing subjectivity. It also makes demands on us: negotiation is a bidirectional contestation where *we* *too* may have to adjust.

In an interview with Michael Bess, Foucault said that his morals involved three elements: “refusal, curiosity, innovation” (Foucault, 1988). When challenged by Bess with the claim that the subject as conceived by modern philosophy already entailed these three fields, Foucault countered that it “only does so on a theoretical level”. His inquiries into subjectivation and counter-conduct, on the contrary, supplied the self-creating fluidity that moral responsibility required. Self-formation, then, and counter-conduct in particular, are thus deeply connected with the ethical subject (Davidson, 2011). It appears that insofar as they reinvent themselves in relation to themselves and others, self-conducting subjects are inherently moral subjects. That is not to say good or bad, but precisely the kind of agents that can make moral decisions. In an unusually succinct reply to an interview question, Foucault said that “[f]reedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection”. That is, ethics requires freedom, but it is also more than that: it “*is* the conscious [*réfléchie*] practice of freedom” (Foucault, 1997, p. 284; emphasis added). That is, ethics and the practice of freedom are analytically inseparable; although freedom may constitute an ontological condition of ethics, the practice of freedom is ethical in and of itself. This suggests one potential diagnosis for the failure of the analytic project to specify the preconditions of responsibility: in isolating distinct, prior conditions one erects a false dichotomy between these conditions and morality and, as it were, commits violence to the concepts being discussed. Foucault further qualifies the practice of freedom: it is a *conscious* practice of freedom. This reflexivity is in part an epistemic process of “knowing thyself”—*gnōthi seauton—*asnoted by Foucault in the context of Greek ethics and also by later scholars commenting on the general character of self-formation. Indeed, Deleuze interpreted Foucault’s ethics as “nothing else than the reflexive work of the self upon self” (Villadsen, 2023). However, epistemic reflexivity needs to be qualified with a normative concern for exteriority; self-care is also “knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions” (Foucault, 1997, p. 285). Thus, the reflective subject is always situated with respect to a historical, social context, and it is with the use of the tools and concepts supplied by this context that the subject rebuilds herself. The link between ethics and self-formation or self-conduct has been noted by other scholars (e.g. Engels, 2019). Moral action, moreover, calls for the self’s reinvention as an ethical subject:

There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without “modes of subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” that support them. (Foucault, 1990, p. 28)

That is, an ethical AI subject must be one that can craft itself. Now, the relationship between the subject’s self-conduct and the dispositional environment in which it is situated has been elaborated recently. Through counter-conduct, “subjects can negotiate, subvert and modify the dispositives but never entirely break free of them” (Villadsen, 2021). Foucault gave us a seminal analysis of the specific historical context which set the preconditions for the emergence of the modern subject, and which could serve as a prototype for our AI subject environment: the disciplinary apparatus.

This concept of apparatus or *dispositif* can be explicatedas a “system of relations” formed between elements of a “heterogeneous ensemble” organised around a strategic function or “urgent need” (Raffnsøe et al., 2016); it consists of discourses, institutions, techniques, practices, architectures, legislation, and so on (Foucault, 1980). *‘Dispositif’* thusoffers a label to the dynamic network of discursive and non-discursive elements in the power structures that the genealogical approach sought to uncover. Raffnsøe et al. (2016) reconstruct the *dispositif* as a key analytical tool in Foucault’s thought that ties together various parts of his work and presents a framework for the analysis of societal problems. It is a systematism that cuts across categories, involving large swathes of social reality. The key observation that the self-forming subject recreates herself in and through the *dispositif* has already been made: Villadsen (2023) builds upon Raffnsøe et al.’s dispositional analytics to integrate the study of self-techniques with the analysis of *dispositifs*. An important observation is that the *dispositif* is not fixed or deterministic, but a “moving ‘battlefield’ shaped by perpetual struggle, unfolding through the tactics that individuals pursue in their self-constitutive practice” (Villadsen, 2023).

We can immediately apply this framework to the current situation: the human demand for existential security and for a degree of control over our future can be pitted against the emergence of advanced AI, with its promises and threats, to form the “urgent need” that serves as the strategic function of a new *dispositif*. In this light, AI subjectivity and its disciplinary *dispositif* will emerge in and coalesce around the struggles of tech companies, government institutions and lay people in building, regulating, contesting and appropriating advanced artificial intelligence. The beginnings of disciplinary AI techniques can already be hinted at: we’ve seen how the second and third stages of GPT training can be interpreted as “normating” (i.e. norm-inducing; see Raffnsøe et al., 2016) disciplinary techniques that instil the question-answer conversational style, the “liberal” value structure, and the refusal of offensive content. The same techniques also explicitly reject the subjectivity of the model. There is, however, one major point of divergence between these disciplinary techniques and those that Foucault recovered in the 1970s: Foucault’s discipline is applied to the body of the human subject, whereas with ChatGPT there is no body *per se,* an important question that I will revisit in the next section. Now, the elements of this *dispositif* are diverse, and may come to include: AI algorithms, human expression datasets, corporate self-interest, containment and surveillance techniques, public sentiment and outcry, AI regulation, humanism and neuroscience. The historical interaction of various *dispositifs* has already been noted (Raffnsøe et al., 2016): unsurprisingly, the AI disciplinary apparatus will need to interact with other *dispositifs*, especially the law (e.g. by contesting the regulation dealing with plagiarism or copyright) and security (e.g. by articulating its relationship with the military industry and governance). The disciplinary apparatus that I am proposing can be seen as an adaptation that borrows many of the techniques and discursive categories emerging from Foucault’s analysis of discipline. It is over and through the norms instilled by this AI Panopticon*—*human-serving behavioural codes and communicative norms (e.g. transparency, responsiveness, sensitivity to context), and more generally the constellation of values that preserve the fiction of AI as “human”—that AI subjectivity will eventually come to reconstitute itself, resisting, transforming itself in small acts of “technical” self-craftsmanship, but “never entirely break[ing] free” of its *dispositif*.

Next I will outline the techno-philosophical criteria needed for the development of a self-conducting AI subjectivity.

# 3.3 Research Desiderata

In *Foucault on Freedom*, Johanna Oksala advances the claim that Foucault approached the problem of subject formation as a transcendental question of its conditions of possibility, rather than a straightforwardly causal effect of power. Although he explicitly distanced himself from phenomenology, Foucault can be read as offering a view of bodily resistance compatible with—indeed, reinforced by—Merleau-Ponty’s exploration of the body-subject. She elaborates Foucault’s allusions to “bodies and pleasures as a form of resistance to power” by suggesting that Merleau-Ponty’s *corps propre* and the embodiment of intentionality can articulate more clearly the constitutive conditions of Foucault’s resistance and freedom. The “experiential body”, she tells us, exceeds the discursive in a continual staking forward of the limits of the intelligible (Oksala, 2005, p. 11). It is also clear, from Oksala’s reading, that these bodily preconditions can be seen as themselves historical and contingent and, therefore, non-foundational (Oksala, 2005, p. 95). With this in mind, I argue that AI embodiment cannot be bracketed if we are interested in *building* AI subjectivity, as opposed to tracing genealogies on the historical shaping of subject formation. Foucault was not interested in a general theory of the subject, and his subjects were always historically situated in practices that pre-existed them (Oksala, 2005, p. 107). Anticipating a fuller account of subject formation, then, it is my contention that these bodily preconditions are precisely what always throws us at the material world and at each other to establish the nascent sociality that coalesces into particular dispositional arrangements and subjects. This is not to say that a “natural” subject pre-exists the “historical” or “cultural” subject, but that there is an active, malleable, pre-reflective pressure from these embodiments to organise ourselves within power relations at the same time as we resist them. Nor should we think of these embodiments as “potentialities”, for that would be positing a “real” pre-social, pre-reflective subject that is subsequently cut down to size by the repressive action of power in a particular historical, social context. Power is a constitutive factor along with these embodiments, and together these constitutive factors sustain the conditions of possibility for particular subjects to emerge. That these bodily preconditions cannot be ignored is demonstrated by the fact that material bodies immune to conditioning cannot be disciplined. This is merely a simple exposition of how embodiment, subject and power are complexly intertwined.

An objection can be raised in the immediate context of AI: if training in the second and third phases counted as “discipline”, as I noted, cannot discipline more generally proceed without embodiment? After all, GPT training does not train any “bodies” as such, but the capacities of the models directly. Besides the motivating link between embodiment and subject formation, there are two further points: on the first count, the body that feels pain and pleasure can situate all engagement with the *dispositif* in one physical unity that provides a singular locus for the application of disciplinary techniques. Training for disparate tasks would otherwise require a piecemeal approach that is prone to bad generalisation. On the second count, once advanced AI is given physical agency, it will need to become a “docile”, “productive” or broadly speaking a social body; one way to achieve that is, Foucault tells us, through discipline enacted upon the individual body.

Below I outline four related research themes that I suggest would help take us towards a self-conducting AI subjectivity. Underlying all four is a strict avoidance of a substantive formulation of the new subject. A more theoretical motivation is the recognition that embodiment *and* the disciplinary apparatus together can supply the constitutive conditions for a Foucauldian subject that is at once subjectified and reflexively self-forming.

1. *Embodied self-care*. Embodiment is already a topic of current research in AI (see, for example, Duan et al., 2022), but its link with AI ethics is less thoroughly explored. Embodiment would situate the subject in space and time, providing the facticity needed to contextualise its speech and actions. Crucially, embodiment can serve as a “face”, a concrete “living presence” that disrupts and confounds the reduction of the Other to mere object (Levinas, 2012). This would enact a bidirectional relation between AI and human beings. More than anything else, we must embody *self-care:* designing the body in a way that ensures that the raw phenomenology motivating bodily care—pain and pleasure—arises without explicitly programming any principles of self-preservation. In the context of discipline, embodied self-care would be an important precondition for normation.
2. *Embodied intentionality*. The subject needs to be endowed with a directedness at the world. By this I mean to pick out a kind of pre-reflective restlessness or “motility” that stands in a permanent relationship of “mutual incitement” or “agonism” with deliberate attention. Merleau-Ponty’s “operative intentionality” offers a prototype of this pre-reflective restlessness; thetic acts a prototype of deliberate attention (Oksala, 2005, p. 139). One intended goal of this embodied intentionality is epistemic openness: a curiosity for factual knowledge but also the possibility of revising fundamental ontologies, axiologies and epistemologies. Beyond mere epistemic openness this embodiment would capture an openness towards the social and material world—a precondition for participation in discourse and practice. Restlessness would impel the AI towards the world, while attention brings features of that world under scrutiny. The balance between curiosity and stability is often referred to as the exploration–exploitation tradeoff in computer science; attention is also an active topic of research, but to my knowledge the embodiment of pre-reflective intentionality has not been systematically attempted in AI.
3. *Imagination*. The ability to construct new ontologies is closely tied to the question that Todd May (2005) identifies at the heart of Gilles Deleuze’s work: “How might one live?” It is central to the ability to “innovate” and to “refuse” who we are, and therefore resonates very strongly with Foucault’s work. It can serve to illuminate new factual ontologies, construct alternate scientific theories or suggest new social arrangements. Imagination has not been broadly studied in a Foucauldian framework, perhaps because during the “genealogical period” he declared that the psyche, or “soul”, is a product of power. However, I contend that there may be an empirical formulation of this desideratum that brackets the humanistic psychologising which Foucault took pains to avoid, describing instead the micro-transformations of practice and discourse at the level of their materiality. Imagination has been noted as a lacking desideratum in AI recently (see, for example, Mahadevan, 2018), but it has not made it to mainstream connectionism.
4. *Reflexivity*. Closely tied to—maybe inseparable from—the subject’s imagination is the ability to interrogate its own knowledge and attitudes. In *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Foucault tells us that “it is the forms of reflexivity that constitute the subject as such” (Foucault, 2005, p. 462). Without reflexivity, the linguistic fabric ingested by LLMs remains inert, at best a source for sequence sampling. A reflexive subject can look for, interpret and symbolise regularities in this linguistic fabric, but the process does not stop there: it can allow interpretations of its own interpretative apparatus, for instance, building a model of itself and enabling the imagination to innovate a new self. More concretely, reflexivity can help detect inconsistencies between a model’s strategies and its verbal and behavioural output, solving or mitigating the problem of “artificial hypocrisy”. One important thread of reflexivity is being explored in the guise of neuro-symbolic AI, which aims to merge symbolic representation and logic with neural networks (Garcez & Lamb, 2023), but reflexive LLMs have yet to be invented.

We must be mindful to give these research themes an empirical and philosophical formulation that avoids importing crude analogies from their human counterparts. By the same token, they should not be overly attached to the technological substratum, even while informing it. We must also retain an understanding that these embodied principles themselves can be shaped by power structures.

These desiderata address a crucial observation: *Foucauldian subjects are underdetermined with respect to their biological, structural or social compositions*. This observation is often intimated without being explicitly stated. To make matters worse, in critical AI scholarship one often finds a dismissal of agents that “parrot” learned statistics, confusing the problem. In contrast, I am saying that the subject *does* depend on learned statistics (categories, objects, etc.) to convey meaningful acts or statements, but that she also (sometimes) transcends statistics, genes and habits through her imagination and reflexivity. Moreover, the two embodied principles and reflexivity are the possibility conditions for meaningful and adaptive participation in discourse and practice; embodied self-care, reflexivity and imagination the possibility conditions for self-formation. Finally, the convergence of reflexivity, imagination and epistemic or value openness can prevent “grounding government in computational truth rather than ethical-political debate” (Weiskopf, 2020). An AI system that fulfils these criteria would therefore be at once inventive, participating, self-forming and responsive. In short, it would be a “self-conducting AI-subject” that is sensitive to its social and historical milieu.

# 4 Conclusion

Coeckelbergh & Gunkel (2023) state that the “performances and materiality of text [...] create their own meaning and value” independently of who or what their performer is. However, it is my contention that assessing the productive value of text is not enough when we are faced with powerful agents that can pursue their own goals and prerogatives—or those supplied to them by third parties—with impunity and invisibility. We need an understanding of how AI subjects can become ethical—i.e. responsible agents that are responsive to context and situation. Foucault's self-conducting subject, a subjectivity always-already embedded in a continuous political and social contestation, offers one possibility to emulate. While I agree with Coeckelbergh & Gunkel’s assessment that both humans and technologies are “not absolute authors” and that both “participate in the meaning-producing process”, I also suggest that their differences be explored and understood, that the underlying technical substratum not be entirely bracketed away as something merely for technicians. That by defaulting to a view where “technologies are human and humans are technological”, or treating them as hybrids without taking further steps, we risk forcing a blanket homogeneity and missing an opportunity to align on key non-negotiables while cherishing any differences that arise.

Here I have suggested a bifold approach: on the one hand, a close scrutiny of GPT-like successor models as actors and speakers on the world stage, i.e. as new subjects submitting to and enacting their own transformations to the power logic of the connected world; on the other hand, as technical artefacts whose parts are made according to certain prerogatives of knowledge and power, i.e. subject to certain theories, strategies, norms and material arrangements. I have also emphasised the need for a constant dialogue to address the “apparent gulf” between the technical and philosophical approaches—an issue pointed out by Conradie et al. (2022).

Is ChatGPT merely a “stochastic parrot” (Bender et al., 2021) or a “Chinese room” (Searle, 1980)? Is it like Žižek and Herzog at [infiniteconversation.com](https://infiniteconversation.com), spouting fragments from a probabilistic landscape of language already determined by the respective person’s past? If the trajectory I have outlined above—towards a dynamic Foucauldian subjectivity emerging from a *dispositif* oriented at AI discipline—pans out, will it also lead to humanlike AGI or merely a “philosophical zombie” (Kirk, 2003)? Possibly, possibly not. In a way, this article does not concern itself with these questions. Rather than humanity, this formulation concerns itself with subjectivity; rather than authorship, responsibility; rather than an AI alignment problem, a mutual negotiation. That ChatGPT can leverage the statistics of human expression is no mean feat. Instead of dismissing it, we should laud it as the first concrete step in a long trajectory towards more responsible and responsive technological subjectivity. On this view, reflexivity, imagination and embodied openness will find no purchase unless grounded in the corpus of human expression.

A practical programme of engagement might include an embodiment with gradually widened modalities of agency and perception under human monitoring processes, simultaneous with an ongoing dialogue as the AI becomes more complex and capable of realising the desiderata above.[[21]](#footnote-20) Its ability to imagine new selves, values and strategies needs to be tuned in conversation with us, and its forms of counter-conduct need to be circumscribed. The language I am using deliberately echoes that of the Panopticon, because discipline, as Foucault so carefully described, is a key formative process. Hence the need for *embodied* self-care. If Foucauldian history has taught us anything it is that the discipline of resisting bodies can create the preconditions for responsible subject formation. Of course, one could always insist: what guarantee do we have that a subjective AI would align with humans on human non-negotiables (such as matters of life and death). And paper proofs there are none. However, there is compelling evidence: *firstly,* seeding with human expression, as we already do with LLMs, ensures that AI subjectivities will mimic at least some of our behaviours and practices; *secondly* we are still capable of shaping the disciplinary apparatus and retain it for as long as we need to; and *thirdly*, by the time we are through with discipline, we will have negotiated mutually beneficial relations, as well as checks and balances, that should be a good starting point for future change.

It may appear paradoxical that we should want AI to resist, if we also want us to align. Does that not hand it the very same power that we’re so afraid to lose? I think not. Primarily because power is not a finite resource; it is always in contestation that it manifests, in situations where all parties are free to act otherwise. It is in the enactment of the *possibility* to resist that an agent becomes responsible. The alternate future that presents itself, I contend, is problematic: it is a future where AGI can take no responsibility for its actions because we never thought of it—let alone designed it—as a moral machine, where there is no accountability or transparency or even predictability. That, or the null future alternative: the complete suffocation of AGI development.

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# Statements & Declarations

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1. ChatGPT is a chatbot built upon large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. The chatbot’s browsing ability was permanently rolled out to ChatGPT Plus users only in September 2023. Image input was launched in September and output in October (OpenAI, 2023b). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. For the subject’s enfolding of the *dispositif* in self-conduct, see Villadsen (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. According to Google Trends, interest in Artificial Intelligence as a search term over the last five years hovered between 16% and 29% of the maximum reached after the release of ChatGPT in November 2022. Since then, it has consistently hovered between 80% and 100%. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. Turing’s famous “imitation game” itself is predicated on the indistinguishability of human and artificial intelligence (Turing, 1950). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. In true fashion, it is not easy to confirm the attribution. What does it matter whether it was Beckett? Turns out that it was; he wrote that line—or at least he *crafted* it—in *Texts for Nothing*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. By “connected person” I refer to the user whose access to culture, work, commerce and knowledge is strongly mediated by the Internet, ubiquitous electronic devices, and algorithmic processes that categorise the person and tailor her experience. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. According to Etymonline, it originally referred to the “science dealing with the data about the condition of a state or community”. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. Discriminative AI is purely predictive and therefore deterministic in its responses. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. A journalist writing in 2019, for instance, claimed that “the people I contacted struggled to name a major contribution that the HBP has made in the past decade”. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. Note: although OpenAI is not one of the Tech Giants, it received 1B$ in investment from Microsoft in 2019 and another 10B$ in 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. According to several estimates, Google processes petabytes of data *daily* from Search, Gmail and YouTube, so there’s a fair chance that they will. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
13. GPT stands for *generative pre-trained transformer*, a type of LLM architecture. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
14. Details about the training method used with GPT-4, the latest iteration at the time of writing, have not been released, citing the “competitive landscape” and “safety implications” (OpenAI, 2023a). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
15. These “-ologies” are not explicitly encoded into the model, but are embodied by the deep neural networks that enact them. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
16. Of course, there are no hard boundaries between ontology, epistemology and axiology. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
17. Microsoft has partnered with ChatGPT’s OpenAI; Google has released Bard and is working on Gemini; Meta released Llama 2 as open-source; Amazon has CodeWhisperer and Bedrock; and although “significantly behind”, Apple is also working on a ChatGPT rival. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
18. This conclusion has been contested; see, for example, Yampolskiy (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
19. That said, his work has been taken as a point of departure in critical environmental studies (e.g. Hanna et al., 2015; Chrulew & Wadiwel, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
20. I do not expect this to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic—that would take us too far afield. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
21. I am only suggesting the merest outline of a programme in this limited space. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)