

Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will: Answers to Hunt and Stump

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Abstract: I have argued that like Harry Frankfurt, Augustine implicitly distinguishes between first-order desires and higher-order volitions; yet unlike Frankfurt, Augustine held that the liberty to form different possible volitional identifications is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) to responsibility for our volitional identifications, which in turn has leeway-libertarian conditions. However, David Hunt has interpreted Augustine's account of divine foreknowledge as implying a type of source-incompatibilism that does not require alternative possible actions or intentions. Moreover, while Eleonore Stump's account of Augustine on sanctification supports my interpretation, Augustine's position on predestination in his latest writings may be incompatible with liberty of the higher-order will. I will argue against Hunt's interpretation but admit that the leeway-libertarian has to reject the 'no autonomy' model in some of Augustine's late writings.

In a recent article,¹ I argued that Augustine implicitly distinguishes between what Harry Frankfurt calls first-order desires and higher-order volitions. But unlike Frankfurt, at least in his early writings, Augustine held that the liberty to form alternative second-order volitions is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the first-order desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for presently inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) to responsibility for past actions and for volitional "identifications" (constituted by higher-order volitions) that we could voluntarily have avoided. I have also argued that such a "tracing" defense of libertarian requirements for responsibility is resilient against traditional Frankfurt-style counterexamples (when we keep in place the features that make attribution of responsibility in such examples plausible).²

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However, my reading of Augustine faces two problems. First, David Hunt has interpreted Augustine's account of divine foreknowledge as implying that there is a significant sense in which we cannot do or decide otherwise in responsible actions, although we are not causally determined. On this reading, Augustine holds a version of source-incompatibilism that does not require the responsible agent to have full voluntary access alternative intentions. Katherine Rogers has similarly argued that Augustine was always a compatibilist.³ Second, while Eleonore Stump's original account of Augustine on sanctification supports my interpretation, it seems that Augustine's later views on predestination are incompatible with liberty of the higher-order will. Frankfurt himself raised this objection in response to an APA conference version of my initial article.

In response, against Hunt's reading, I will argue that Augustine's early account of divine foreknowledge is compatible with leeway-liberty (the power to do or decide otherwise, or voluntarily to bring about alternative intentions or actions, in exactly the same choice-conditions).⁴ I will also suggest a brief reply to Rogers. The locus of leeway that Augustine recognizes in the higher-order will according to Stump is similar to the remainder of human liberty that certain Islamic and Stoic thinkers use to reconcile foreknowledge or fate, respectively. The later Augustine tries various versions of this combination, although his final 'no autonomy' model indeed leaves no room for human aseity. I'll explain why the leeway-libertarian should be comfortable in simply rejecting this final view and retaining some type of leeway in the higher-order will.

I. Augustine on Foreknowledge:

Hunt's Argument and Two Leewayist Alternatives

As David Hunt has argued quite convincingly, in Book Three of *On Free Choice of the Will*, Augustine means to introduce a solution to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge that is quite different from the solution later offered by William Ockham.⁵ I think Hunt is right that Augustine's solution comes, not in the §3 discussion of the will being reflexively in its own power, but rather in the §4 argument that God's infallible foreknowledge that agent A will choose C is analogous to our later memory that A chose C, since neither *causes* or *explains* A's choosing C: "Just as your memory does not force the past to have happened, God's foreknowledge does not force the future to have happened."⁶ This passage leads Hunt to surmise that for Augustine, the agent has all the freedom she requires for moral responsibility if

- (i) she possesses her will as her own;
- (ii) she endorses or approves of her will (which here is the same as actually willing her volition);
- (iii) her will is in her power in the hypothetical sense that if she wills to form a volition V, then she forms V; and
- (iv) her will is not causally compelled or completely explained by external forces or other wills.⁷

If this is right, then *moral freedom* [the label I use for 'whatever freedom and control is required for moral responsibility'] is compatible with divine foreknowledge even understood as implying that our will is temporally necessary *de re*, since "what is temporally closed (because infallibly foreknown) may remain causally/explanatorily open."⁸ So "divine foreknowledge makes the future unavoidable without causing or explaining it."⁹ Temporal necessity is familiar to us as the sense in which we "cannot" change the past: past events are now inaccessible to our causal powers (whether or not they were causally necessary) because time has moved on since these events.¹⁰ On Hunt's interpretation, Augustine holds that divine foreknowledge makes our future choices "necessary" in the same sense that the past is fixed, although our choices to come are not *causally* or *nomologically* determined by the past or by God's foreknowledge of them. Call this the 'temporal necessity thesis' (TNT).

Moreover, Hunt sees this view as anticipating Frankfurt's arguments against the "principle of alternate possibilities" (PAP) in favor of the view that "conditions rendering an action unavoidable negate the agent's moral responsibility only if these same conditions also enter into the 'actual sequence' leading up to the action." Like Frankfurt's inactive counterfactual intervener, who does not causally explain the agent's decision in the actual sequence, "God's foreknowing the murder may make it unavoidable, but it does so without making any causal contribution to the murder, which would have occurred just as it did in the absence of divine foreknowledge."¹¹ Hunt compares this result with proposals by Eleonore Stump and Linda Zagzebski, according to which moral freedom requires agent-causation, and so is incompatible with psychophysical determinism, yet does not require that our decisions be avoidable or that we can (in the temporal sense) bring about alternative possible volitions. In a reply to Widerker, Hunt also suggests that simple foreknowledge or infallible eternal knowledge provides a perfect Frankfurt-style case in which the choice is *ensured* without any problematic trigger or prior sign. This works against PAP-type leeway principles if "God's prior belief metaphysically necessitates Jones's subsequent decision."¹² Call this the metaphysical necessity thesis (MNT): God's omniscience makes our future choices metaphysically necessary. This is distinct from TNT because temporal necessity does not entail metaphysical necessity.¹³

However, it is not so clear that Augustine accepts TNT, MNT or that it is *only* in the causal sense that we 'can' choose otherwise than we do. Notice that while Hunt thinks Augustine means to reconcile omniscient foreknowledge or eternal knowledge with human moral responsibility, he does not think Augustine means to reconcile such foreknowledge with leeway-libertarian freedom. For Hunt, Augustine's resolution works by abandoning the strong alternative-possibility requirement for moral freedom. But Augustine's resolution has often been read in the opposite way, as implying instead that divine foreknowledge does *not* conflict with our ability to form different intentions starting from the same global state of affairs.¹⁴ Liberty in this strong leeway sense involves a power to decide otherwise than one did at some time T without conditions up to and including T having to alter. For example, in his helpful analysis of the argument against Cicero in *City of God* Book V, chapter 9,¹⁵ Barry David emphasizes Augustine's idea that God gives all

secondary causes (including human agency) their effectiveness as forms of efficient causation, and thus God foreknows what these secondary causes are empowered to do.¹⁶ David clearly understands this as a reconciliation of divine foreknowledge and co-creation with *voluntas arbitrium*. This seems to be correct, for in the next chapter Augustine writes:

Now if, in our case, 'necessity' is to be used of what is not in our control, of what achieves its purpose whether we will or no—the 'necessity' of death, for example—then it is obvious that our wills, by the exercise of which we lead a good life or a bad, are not subject to a necessity of this kind. We do a great many things which we should not have done if we had not wished to. In the first place, our willing belongs to this class of acts. If we so wish, it exists; if we do not so wish, it does not; for we should not will, if we did not so wish. . . . The same applies when we say that it is 'necessary' that when we will, we will by free choice. That statement is undisputable; and it does not mean that we are subjecting our free will to a necessity which abolishes freedom. . . . Hence we are in no way compelled either to preserve God's prescience by abolishing our free will, or to safeguard our free will by denying (blasphemously) the divine foreknowledge.¹⁷

Of course, one might read this as requiring only conditional freedom: our volition is *our* because it flows from our decision and it would not have arisen if we had not so decided, even if we could not have brought about the antecedent of this counterfactual.¹⁸ But Augustine is not suggesting merely conditional freedom to do otherwise if one had wished to, because he does not mean these as distinct elements: the "wishing" itself is under our control and without it, no decision would arise. Moreover, given the pairs of opposite possible choices that frequently occur in Augustine's texts, it is natural to take this passage as implying that divine foreknowledge is compatible with "liberty" in the plural voluntary sense of freedom. The "necessity that destroys liberty" here may refer to causal rather than temporal necessity, but this implies that the latter is compatible with retaining leeway—liberty itself (and not just with moral responsibility, as semicompatibilists and source-libertarians hold).

My claim is not that this reconciliation works, but simply that Augustine thought it could. He had good reason for attempting this kind of a resolution because, as I have argued, Augustine held that Hunt's condition (i) of moral responsibility also requires leeway—liberty of the higher-order will, yet he also believed that exhaustively definite divine foreknowledge of all future choices is essential to Christian doctrine. Thus God foreknows or eternally knows which volitional identification we will bring about among the plurality that are remain fully open to us (at least before our character is set); alternatives to our actual future choices remain fully open to us in the relevant sense even though God knows that we will not take them.

Depending on how we understand "full openness," there are at least two ways in which Augustine could have thought that leeway-liberty is compatible with divine

foreknowledge. First, suppose Hunt is right that for Augustine, God's foreknowledge of free choice C makes C *temporally* necessary (TNT), although -C remains causally possible. Augustine may also have thought that C is contingent in another modal sense, namely that C and -C both remain *volitionally* possible for the agent up to time T₁ in the future. Here the volitional possibility of a decision C₂ for agent A stands for C₂ being naturally within reach of the normal psychological processes through which A forms intentions (which might include powers of agent-causation), given A's current beliefs, motivation, and opportunities: all the agentive conditions for C₂ are present for A at time T₁, even though he makes a different decision C₁ at T₁. Note that this power is not just a disposition to choose C₂ if things had been slightly different, but a sense in which C₂ is directly voluntarily accessible to A at T₁. Moral responsibility for C₁ could then require the agent to be *able*, in this volitional sense, voluntarily to avoid responsibility for C₁ (either through voluntarily avoiding C₁ itself, or by avoiding some earlier set of choices to which responsibility for C₁ traces) even though omniscient foreknowledge makes her responsibility for C₁ temporally necessary. Also note that on this view, actual-sequence conditions do not exhaust the freedom/control-condition of moral responsibility, which also includes the volitional ability to decide otherwise in the circumstances—even if this is a power that it is temporally impossible to exercise given TNT.¹⁹

Second, suppose instead that an option is "fully open" to an agent when it is accessible to the agent's rational powers or can be brought about by agentive processes (not merely by accident)²⁰ and it is temporally possible for the agent to exercise these powers. Then full openness of a choice-option C requires that C is both volitionally and temporally possible for the agent. On these definitions, TNT entails that no choice other than the one she makes it fully open to an agent. (Since full openness of an option also requires that it is metaphysically possible, MNT also entails that no alternatives to our actual choices are fully open to us).

But then Augustine may not have meant that foreknown choices are temporally *necessary* (let alone metaphysically necessary), as opposed to merely *certain*. One reading of his reverse-memory analogy for divine foreknowledge says that the fact that I will choose C at a future time T₁ is 'softer' than an ordinary fact about the past: before T₁, I could voluntarily bring it about that I do not choose C at T₁, whereas I lack any voluntary power to alter choices that I've made in the past (before T₀). My electing C among the options that are fully open to me explains God's foreknowing this choice rather than the reverse: thus my leeway-liberty is also the power to determine which causally possible future state of affairs God foreknows will become actual. Up until T₁,²¹ I can voluntarily bring it about that God foreknows (or eternally knows) that I do not choose C at T₁, even though I will not in fact bring this about.²² Some of the contents of God's foreknowledge are contingent on choices involving leeway, although he will always be correct whichever way free agents go.

If this is what Augustine thought, then his view tends towards a version of Molinism according to which, even before creation, it is true that I will choose C if I'm in these circumstances at T₁, yet God's "middle knowledge" of this fact does not entail 'Necessarily, John chooses C at T₁' in any sense that is incompatible with

my leeway-libertarian freedom not to choose C at T1. For example, consider this description of angels who do not fall: "They did not persevere in their good will because they received this activity [from God]; rather, they received this activity because God, who gave it to them, foresaw that they would persevere."²³ Note that such an angel "refrained from sinning by its own free will. It was not compelled not to sin; it refrained from sin voluntarily."²⁴ This suggests that God decides to create these angels because of the perfect contents of their subjunctive conditionals of freedom: they fill one of the important grades of possible being.

In sum, on the first alternative to Hunt's reading, Augustine accepts TNT but denies that it is incompatible with the leeway-liberty required for moral responsibility (a type of volitional ability that at least includes liberty of the higher-order will). On the second alternative to Hunt's reading, Augustine accepts that TNT is incompatible with leeway-liberty, but rejects TNT in favor of a weaker conception of foreknowledge that claims to be compatible with leeway-liberty. Since the second alternative may be more controversial, let me offer a bit more support for it.

Hunt himself emphasizes the point, undeniably found in *On Free Choice of the Will*, that "While foreknowledge does *precede* its objects in the temporal order, it *succeeds* them in the logical or explanatory order;" thus foreknowledge is unlike causal necessitation by the past.²⁵ But this suggests that what is foreknown *can* be changed by the power of libertarian freedom, though in fact it will not be changed (of course, no one *actually* chooses otherwise than they do choose). This makes it clear that at least in his early writings, Augustine did not accept the premise that leads to Hunt's strongest version of the dilemma between leeway-freedom and foreknowledge, namely MNT: "W is foreknown (by God) → necessarily W."²⁶

Still, as we have seen, we also get a dilemma if God's foreknowledge of W gives W the same temporal necessity that we find in 'hard' facts about the past. But in *On Free Choice of the Will*, Augustine may reject TNT as well; he may have thought that he was reconciling foreknowledge of W with our continuing liberty not to will W up to the moment that we do (or up to some point before this when our choices sufficiently foreclose future options). At least he probably thought that divine foreknowledge leaves us such liberty in the *higher-order* will: for several passages suggest that our will could not count as our own, or self-authored, unless our identification with the motives on which we acted originates in a faculty endowed with freedom to bring about alternative possible identifications.²⁷

II. Is the Early Augustine a Compatibilist? A Response to Rogers

Katherin Rogers has argued that Augustine rejects this way of making the content of divine foreknowledge dependent on human agency.²⁸ For example, in *On the Trinity*, Augustine writes that God "does not know them because they are, but they are because He knows them," apparently referring to all states of affairs.²⁹ But the points of this section are that God does not learn empirically or know contingently, and that everything depends on God's power for its *existence*. This applies to free agents and their capacities on either of my suggested interpretations: God can give

an agent the power to elect one of several options, without thereby determining which option is selected. Let us call this a *noncontrastive* power, as opposed to giving the agent only the power to choose C1 over C2. In general, God's noncontrastively empowering various types of "secondary causality" is consistent with their specific operation being less than fully determined by his enabling their continued existence and function.³⁰ This allows us to explain Augustine's idea that God causes free will as an "intermediate" good and thus enables good use of free will, enabling the bad use of the same will is an unavoidable side-effect.³¹ Yet the creature still exists because, knowing what it would choose, God actualizes it along with its leeway-liberty.

Rogers's work poses several other obstacles for my interpretation, since she argues that if libertarianism means that "morally significant choice originates solely from the conscious agent" then "Augustine was always a compatibilist, never a libertarian."³² Thus she holds that Augustine was never even a source-incompatibilist, let alone a leeway-incompatibilist: "He holds that although the causes of human choices are ultimately traceable to factors outside human control, this is compatible with agents being fully morally responsible for their choices."³³ Since this puts her reading at odds with Hunt's and Stump's as well as mine, I will only offer a brief response here.

Rogers's reading is driven by the insight that Augustine's conception of free will is influenced not just by his anti-Pelagianism,³⁴ but more fundamentally by his concern to find a sufficient explanation of choices (including immoral ones) in terms of their *motives*: "we are drawn to choose what we judge most desirable."³⁵ I agree that this is an important Platonic theme in *On Free Choice of the Will*: for example, when Evodius asks "why" one free creature sins and another does not, he is asking about the *motive* for forming a higher-order will to act on inordinate desires.³⁶ Augustine does not always keep this sufficiently distinct from the goal or *aim* of these desires; his first reply to Evodius is that "the root of all evils is greed" or inordinate desire again, but this is merely describes the content of unjust first-order desires.³⁷ He sketches a better reply at the end.³⁸

But Augustine never says that our choices are entirely determined by motives whose sources lie outside our control. On the contrary, he explicitly rejects Plato's model of motivation when he argues that "the first man could have sinned even if he had been created wise."³⁹ Augustine holds throughout this book that temporal goods are lower than our minds and thus their pull is weaker than our natural power; and if anything (including lower desires) "is weaker than you, your servitude is your own fault . . . since you could overpower this thing if you willed to do so."⁴⁰ The implication is clearly that we can so will in first sin, and thus at least initial wrongdoing is akratic because the agent has voluntary access to alternative possibilities. Sin can first arise from "spontaneous thought," as well as from "someone else's persuasion."⁴¹ We find the same elimination argument in Book I and Book III: "So if no one is forced to sin by his own nature or by anyone else's, the only remaining possibility is that we sin by our own will."⁴²

These examples will not probably persuade Rogers, since she holds that even Augustine's "hinge" metaphor can interpreted in compatibilist fashion.⁴³ All this

shows. I think, is that Augustine is not sufficiently aware of weaker hypothetical senses of "can" to make his many statements about the will being in its own power precise enough to rule out any such conditionalist reading. But these many passages certainly give us no positive evidence that he only means an agent would do otherwise *if* they had desired otherwise, or been more enlightened, etc. That reading feels forced: it is an *ad hoc* way of making his earlier view cohere better with his later anti-Pelagian writings.

Rogers thinks the best evidence that *On Free Choice of the Will* does not give a libertarian account of moral freedom is that this work fails to offer a "free will defense" of moral evil.⁴⁴ I agree that Augustine does not argue directly that it is metaphysically impossible to create wills endowed with moral freedom *and* ensure that they always voluntarily choose the right (the heart of Plantinga's reply to Mackie's challenge). Instead, he focuses on the idea of plenitude in the chain of being: every possible variety of creature and created thing must exist to actualize the full range of natural value.⁴⁵ I already noted his explanation of angels who never sin, and below them "there is a proper place even for the sinful nature that by its sins has lost happiness but has not thrown away the power to recover happiness" (presumably by turning back to God in the higher-order will). These in turn are a grade higher than the sort of creature who "perpetually wills to sin" rather than to turn back.⁴⁶ But even these reprobate wills are higher in natural value than animal "souls that cannot sin because they lack reason and free choice of the will."⁴⁷ In my view, the early Augustine *takes for granted* here that creatures endowed with moral freedom will divide into these three groups by their own uncaused choices, and could not be prevented from doing so if they are created. He focuses instead on the question of why God would actualize the free creatures who God foresees will put themselves into the lower two groups. That's because this challenge was far more salient in Augustine's time than Mackie's idea that one could endow a creature with moral freedom and yet cause it always to choose rightly. I suspect that in 395 A.D., Augustine would have found *that* idea facially paradoxical. By contrast, the argument from plenitude answers a question that obviously arises given divine foreknowledge of leeway-libertarian choices by possible creatures. Thus the fact that Augustine gave this argument from plenitude rather than a Plantinga-style free will defense is no evidence that he was not a libertarian in 395 A.D. The free will defense is implicit, and as Couenhoven argues, still present even as late as the *Spirit and the Letter* in 412 A.D.⁴⁸

However, I agree with Rogers that the Augustine eventually rejected his earlier view that election requires "humanly initiated petition for divine aid;" ultimately he could not accept the kind of "aseity" that Anselm recognizes in created agents (human and angelic).⁴⁹ This is because he assumed that creaturely alterity involving independence from God would detract from God's perfection rather than adding to it (as held by Pelagius's existentialist heirs). I differ from Rogers only in holding that Augustine tried out several other more tenable positions on providence and free will before ruling out any independent creaturely initiative.

III. Divine Predestination:

Stoics, Strump, and the Residual Leeway Model in Augustine

Even if Augustine initially held something like the restricted hierarchical libertarianism I have found in *On Free Choice of the Will*, there is ample reason to think that he later reconsidered the relation between freedom, sin, and grace. In his over-reaction to Pelagius, Augustine developed positions that do not always support the belief that contemporary human persons (living after the Fall) enjoy liberty of identification. In response to his increasing fear that Pelagius's views would inspire pride in the power of human freedom, Augustine developed a picture that is closer in spirit to Frankfurt's own later view that, far from liberty of identification, it is the volitional *necessity* of our strongest cares and the identifications they involve that decisively make us who we are. As Frankfurt maintains, an agent's "will may be no less truly his own when it is not by his own voluntary doing that he cares as he does."⁵⁰ However, a brief review of Augustine's later thoughts on freedom and volition can show that (a) he frequently returns to his earlier view that our higher-order will is retains leeway even when the first-order motives on which we act are largely bound by inescapable fallenness; and (b) it is when he abandons this residual higher-order liberty to complete providential determination that the tensions in his account grow most insuperable.

In his *Retractions*, Augustine comments that because *Free Choice of the Will* was directed against the Manichaeans and aimed to prove that God was not to blame for evil (or had sufficient reason to create free creatures who would sin), it did not focus on the grace "by which he so predestines his chosen people that he himself prepares the wills of those who are already using their free choice."⁵¹ This phrasing, like so many in Augustine's later writings, gives the impression that some *cooperation* between divine and human causality determines choices of the will. It is clear that human decision by itself is not enough:

unless the will is liberated by grace from its bondage to sin and is helped to overcome its vices, mortals cannot lead pious lives. And unless the divine grace by which the will is freed preceded the act of will, it would not be grace at all. It would be given in accordance with the will's merits, whereas grace is given freely.⁵²

But the phrasing here remains ambiguous: if the "act" of will preceded by grace is the first-order volition, then this is compatible with the picture we get in *Free Choice of the Will*, according to which the higher-order will can consent to or reject the inordinate desires to which the agent may be addicted in her actions. For example, "You are not blamed because you do not bind up your own [spiritual] wounds, but because you spurn the one who wants to heal you."⁵³ Given Augustine's background view that ought implies can, or that inability caused by forces beyond our control excuses,⁵⁴ the implication here is clearly that we have the power to accept healing (or turn our higher-order will). In later *Retractions* passages commenting on Book III, it is clearer that the bondage from which the "will is freed" by grace is the inability

to control first-order motives: "someone wants to act rightly but cannot," due to the effects of sin.⁵⁵ Then grace operates by making the higher-order will effective in controlling first-order motives, rather than by enabling morally superior volitional identification itself. The higher-order will is still left in the person's own control, and so grace is understood as restoring to a mortal person, who already enjoys liberty of identification, the additional power that Frankfurt called "freedom of the will,"⁵⁶ i.e., the ability to conform her first-order motives to her own autonomous higher-order will. For example, Augustine says that although a human soul is born into sin (and thus ignorance and difficulty), "no necessary forces it to remain there," since "it has the power to reform itself with God's help."⁵⁷

Let us call this the 'residual leeway model,' in which there is liberty of the higher-order will but sometimes no directly accessible alternatives to the first-order motives on which the agent acts. This model probably originated with the Stoics, who had to reconcile their beliefs that events followed a necessary predetermined pattern and that humans are free either to *consent* to their fate (and thus become happy) or to try fruitlessly to *reject* and fight it (thus becoming enslaved to desires they can never satisfy). Augustine's first reconciliation of grace and free will follows this Stoic distinction, leaving the higher-order will with a power all its own. He adds to the Stoic model a grace that makes this will effective again in controlling the whole of the person's psyche.

It seems that virtually the same reconciliation of providence and free will emerged out of similar theological disputes within early Islam. The Mu'tazilites—the first school of Islamic philosophers trained in Hellenistic philosophy—opposed both the Kharijites, who insisted that works of ethical heroism were the sole rest of faith, and the Murji'ites, who used the doctrine of predestination as a rationale for ethical laxity and political conformism.⁵⁸ In this struggle, the Kharijites parallel the Pelagians and the Murji'ites resemble the quietist Roman socialites against whom Pelagius's arguments were initially directed. In response, the Mu'tazilites developed an intermediate position that stressed "man's responsibility and power of choice," but still rejected the view that salvation was determined by merit alone.⁵⁹ Like the early Augustine, their missionary movement also emphasized free will in opposition to the Manichaean heresy. When the Ash'arite Islamic theologians later reacted against the Mu'tazilites's abstract Neoplatonic conception of God, the Ash'arites also tempered their more independent conception of free will:

On the problem of free-will, al-Ash'ari reconciled the predestination dogma with the requirements of justice by founding on certain Koranic texts a doctrine of 'acquisition,' whereby man 'acquires' the responsibility for his actions, although they are willed and created by God.⁶⁰

This notion of "acquisition" is similar to volitional identification in Frankfurt's sense: it occurs through a higher-order act of consent through which the agent becomes responsible for actions she was predestined to perform whether she endorsed them or not. Nevertheless, as in the early Augustine, at the higher-order level, the choice

to consent or not to the actions foreordained by God belongs at least partially to human freedom, and is not predetermined by His will, even if it is foreknown. Thus it seems that the personal authority of an action (its status as autonomous or not) is not determined by divine predestination on al-Ash'ari's account.

These historical comparisons provide some contextual support for reading Augustine as a residual leewayist. In response to the Stoics, Augustine argued in the *City of God* that divine foreknowledge does not impose any necessity that is contrary to our liberty, because what God foreknows is precisely our own independently made choice among available alternatives: "if He who foresaw what was to be in our will foresaw, not nothing, but something, it follows that there is a power in our will, even though he foresaw it."⁶¹ As I suggested in §1 above, the aim of this kind of reconciliation is apparently to preserve liberty of identification, as in the later Ash'arite model. Indeed, Augustine even repeats here his earlier argument that the choice in which we turn to higher or lower values is necessarily free: if we did not willingly want this volition, it would not exist.⁶² As Hunt has said, the heart of this doctrine of free will is the claim that while the will can be the efficient cause of actions, there is *no* efficient cause of volitions outside the will itself.⁶³ But at least for the early Augustine, being its own efficient cause also entails leeway-liberty. So the will cannot not be its own first mover unless it ultimately has the power to bring about alternative volitions, or at least voluntarily to avoid the volitions it does form. It is this leeway-power that distinguishes the will from all external influences.

In a helpful paper, Elconore Stump also reads Augustine as a residual leewayist by applying Frankfurt's hierarchical distinctions to his account of the will.⁶⁴ In interpreting the doctrine of sanctification, Stump proposes what she takes to be the Augustinian suggestion that prayer for self-control and changed habits can be understood in terms of the higher-order will: "Patricius's prayer for help expresses a second-order volition for God to alter Patricius's first-order will."⁶⁵ Similarly, in "hardening the heart," God in effect gives the evil agent his way by making his corrupt second-order volition effective in shaping his first-order motives. For example, Goebbels's diaries reveal his "first-order desire to wreak the sort of devastation Poland suffered whenever doing so serves Germany's interests," but it also shows his "second-order desire" that this first-order will not be weakened by pity.⁶⁶ Stump points out that in such a case, God could have "hardened Goebbels's heart for him" without this being against Goebbels's own will,⁶⁷ since this "keeps Goebbels's first-order desire from being discordant with his second-order desire and so helps Goebbels fulfill one of the requirements for free will"⁶⁸ (or rather, for autonomy). Thus on this reading, when God hardened Pharaoh's heart against Moses,⁶⁹ God did not violate Pharaoh's will or destroy his freedom, but on the contrary expanded his self-determination.

Note that on this account, Patricius, Pharaoh, and Goebbels enjoy liberty of the higher-order will, but they depend to some extent on divine influence to conform their first-order motives to their independently-formed volitional identifications: they get the dispositions with which they already identified. God's influence simply

helps empower their will,⁷² whichever way they go, to control their first-order motives; this *enhances* rather than violates their personal autonomy. As Stump says,

if he is not to destroy the freedom of the will, God will not be able to produce a first-order volition unless the second-order desire in the prayer for help is like the whole-hearted turning of the will experienced by Paul on the road to Damascus.⁶⁹ . . . The process of God's sanctifying a person consists in God's bringing an agent's first-order desires into line with his second-order desires in response to the agent's second-order volition that God do so. . . . [Thus] God cannot make human beings morally better [or worse] unless they will that he do so.⁷⁰

This illustrates how liberty of the higher-order will is compatible with a lack of leeway-control over one's first-order desires. As Stump notes, this analysis is not Pelagian, since it "does not entail that an agent can achieve sanctification primarily by the exertions of his own will" alone; the work is "done by God in response to the agent's recognition that he needs God's help."⁷¹ But unless this analysis (so similar to the Stoics and Ash'arites) merely displaces the problem by one level—in which case it does not really reconcile autonomy with sanctification and hardening of the heart after all—its requires that the agent's higher-order will is (a) self-expressive or authoritative without needing further endorsement at higher levels, and (b) at least partially independent of outside control, requiring the agent's undetermined consent as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition.⁷² Thus if the person is not to "become God's puppet,"⁷³ as Stump aptly puts it, then she must retain leeway in identification, or voluntary access to alternate possible states of her higher-order will.

IV. Augustine on Grace and Free Will:

The Intermediate and No-Autonomy Models

However, in later accounts of original sin, Augustine adopts other positions that either severely restrict liberty of identification, or eliminate it all together. In his *Treatise on Grace and Free Will*, Augustine seems at first to be proposing something like his early model in *Free Choice of the Will*. He argues that divine commandments and admonitions prove that a human person has liberty, and that it does not detract from his responsibility when he willingly "performs any act in accordance with God."⁷⁴ He also points out that the command not to consent to sinful desire for unworthy ends is addressed to the very person who finds himself unable to do good acts because he is "mastered" by concupiscence. Since "to consent and to refuse are functions proper to the will," even the person burdened with original sin has the liberty to identify with or to alienate his sinful first-order motives.⁷⁵ This remaining liberty of identification is compatible with the view that actually becoming continent or chaste in one's actions is impossible without grace to empower the will to rectitude in one's higher-order volitions and give it control over one's first-order motives and actions.⁷⁶ As Augustine says, grace "helps" free will,⁷⁷ but God does not determine the original direction of higher-order volition; He only enables it to succeed. Thus

in fighting "his own concupiscence," Augustine specifically affirms that a person may resolve to overcome sin and pray to resist temptation.⁷⁸ If we follow Stump and interpret this prayer, or the resolve it expresses, as the second-order volition to act only on ordinate desires (i.e., to conform one's desires to the conditions of eternal goods), then even in sin there are alternate possibilities of the higher-order that the person can actualize by her own power. Even if she chooses righteous second-order volitions, "the determination of the human will is insufficient, unless the Lord grant it victory in answer to its prayer."⁷⁹ But the prayer or resolve itself does not seem to derive from grace in these passages.

Yet in fear that Pelagians will misuse Biblical passages suggesting this kind of cooperation or reciprocity between human and divine wills, Augustine goes on to insist that even "our turning to God [is] itself God's gift."⁸⁰ This implies that for persons in sin, God's grace is at least a necessary condition even for the requisite resolutions of the higher-order will. As Henry Chadwick puts it, on this view "Perseverance is an unmerited gift of grace, just as is the initial turning of the will to God in faith and penitence."⁸¹ In that case, the agent lacks liberty of identification: she no longer has it in *her own* power to form different possible higher-order volitions. This contrasts with the view in *On Free Choice of the Will*, which affirms (a) that grace is *always* on offer to every person under original sin, and (b) that to receive grace depends on the free higher-order volition to accept it, which remains entirely within our power (and thus not caused by God): "And yet if anyone was willing to turn back to God so that he might overcome the penalty that had been imposed for turning away from God, it was right for God not to hinder him."⁸² There is no mention here of the later idea that being willing to turn back is also 'God's doing,' and such an addition would totally undermine Augustine point that God is fair since it is our own fault if we do not turn back to him. This point depends on our having it in our power to turn back, because the higher-order will can, on its own, at least *try* to reject sinful first-order desires. Although this attempt will not be sufficient by itself for the will to regain complete self-control, the additional grace it needs for that is always available.

In other writings, Augustine suggests views that are *intermediate* between the residual leeway and total predestination poles. One intermediate model, for example, holds that what I have been calling liberty of the higher-order will exists only for unfallen human persons, because once we have freely chosen to identify with inordinate desire, this sin itself robs us of the freedom to reform our higher-order volitions, or by our own power to commit ourselves to just or appropriate motives, instead: "For human beings cannot pick themselves up voluntarily—that is, by their own free choice—as they fell voluntarily."⁸³ This again suggests a tracing condition: responsibility traces to a liberty that existed prior to the fall. In Augustine's earlier accounts, the bondage of sin applied only to the first-order will, which is controlled by desires and impulses and thus remains unresponsive to our good higher-order volition (that wills to act on ordinate motives) until grace helps it overcome "the resistance of carnal habit."⁸⁴ But now, in this no-way-back account of identification, the sinful higher-order will cannot *by itself* form the opposite volition to identify

with ordinate motives. Stump may also have something like this in mind when she says that "a person's willing of God's help is itself a response to God's action in that person's life."⁸⁵ This is ambiguous, for her phrasing leaves it unclear whether God's action is *sufficient* by itself to bring about the agent's higher-order volition for God's help in reforming the agent's character, or whether an independent contribution from the agent is also necessary for this new volition₂ to come into being. For example, perhaps we are at liberty to form a weak or tentative higher-order volition to reform, although we cannot will, this decisively or wholeheartedly without grace. Augustine's description in the *Confessions* could be read this way, since he thought that God was helping him to change his highest-order will.

A similar intermediate view seems to emerge from Augustine's earlier and justly famous work, *A Treatise on the Spirit and the Letter*. In this reply to Marcellinus's question, Augustine reaffirms his proposition that it is possible for any non-divine human being to live without sin, "if he wanted not the will, and was assisted by the aim of God," even though none have actually achieved this.⁸⁶ This short formula implies a cooperation between God and human being in which initiatives from both are necessary. In the opening sections, Augustine is concerned to argue that our own will to self-reform cannot advance under its own steam alone: it is wrong to suppose "that without God's help, the mere power of the human will in itself, can either perfect righteousness, or advance steadily towards it."⁸⁷ God creates our free will and gives us the law to know our duty, but by itself the letter of the law only tempts us and confirms our sinfulness: without the infused spirit of "good desire" or ordinate love from the Holy Ghost, we cannot will to do our duty.⁸⁸ Yet this does not happen without our participation, since the change God works is *in our will* itself (understood in its ancient sense as a power not only of making decisions and forming intentions, but also of *motivating* them). It is possible for a person to live without sin, because this is one of the things God can "appoint to be done with the cooperation with Himself of His creature's will."⁸⁹

This phrasing could make it sound as though God could make us perfectly motivated simply by deciding to, which would violate libertarian freedom.⁹⁰ But this cannot be Augustine's meaning, because he admits both (a) that "God no doubt wishes all men to be saved"⁹¹ and (b) some do turn away from "God's summons" to believe in Him and to attain faith, although we can give no complete explanation of their motive.⁹² Together, (a) and (b) imply that something God does not control in the reprobate person uses its liberty to resist Him—and as Augustine sees, if this were not the case, then unbelieving sinners could excuse themselves by saying "that God has refused to give them this [free] will" to accept Him.⁹³ The answer for Augustine is that we cooperate with God's grace by *faith* in His mercy and forgiveness, and our will in itself is "such a neutral power, as can either incline towards faith, or turn towards unbelief."⁹⁴ If we take this to represent our alternatives within the higher-order will, then the question concerns who determines our volitional identifications.

It would be proud folly to think that we acquire faith simply by our own initiative: rather, Augustine repeatedly emphasizes that faith only "rises at the call

of God,"⁹⁵ and is thus impossible without a free act of divine grace. Faith responds to a revelation from outside its own power. But although God calls us to believe, both outwardly by testimony and inwardly in our hearts, the human agent has to answer: "it appertains to his own will to consent or to dissent" in relation to the call. So although we cannot have faith without God's "persuasion or summons,"

To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, "For what has thou that thou didst not receive?" but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent. And thus whatever it possesses, and whatever it receives, is from God; and yet the act of receiving and having belongs, of course, to the receiver and possessor.⁹⁶

In this crucial passage, it is clear that Augustine means both to allow *some* leeway and autonomy in our higher-order volitions, and yet to make faith (as identification with God's call) impossible without grace. So faith, "which seems to be the beginning either of salvation, or of that series leading to salvation," has as individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions both a divine and a human volition, each of which its agent could have voluntarily avoided. Thus liberty of the higher-order will remains in this intermediate cooperation model.

In such later works as the *Enchiridion*, by contrast, Augustine argues that "by evil use of his free will," man destroyed even this residual liberty of identification.⁹⁷ At first, he talks of sin as a state in which one is "not yet free to do what is right,"⁹⁸ which might suggest that we are still free to accept grace sincerely by willing, righteous motives. So it looks at first as if he might again endorse the residual leeway model, or one of his own earlier intermediate models. But now, he cannot accept the implication that divine mercy is not *sufficient by itself* for salvation (which follows if the human person must also independently will to accept God's help in controlling his first-order desires). He argues instead that

The whole work belong to God, who both makes the will of man righteous and thus prepares it for assistance, and assists it when prepared. For the man's righteousness of will precedes many of God's gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included among those which it does not precede. . . . If [grace] goes before the unwilling to make him willing, it follows the willing to make his will effectual.⁹⁹

Clearly in this passage, God's will operates at both stages: in forming the human agent's higher-order volition, and then in giving it power to control the first-order psychic. For "righteousness of will" refers to the second-order volition to act on ordinate and just intentions.¹⁰⁰ Thus God not only makes the repentant higher-order will effectual, as Stump emphasized; He also makes the higher-order will repentant in the first place. A person cannot turn his higher-order will towards righteousness without God's "preparation of the heart."¹⁰¹ Moreover, this prior grace is not just

necessary for a wholehearted turning of the higher-order will; it is by itself, without any independent human concurrence, *sufficient* for the determination of the higher-order will. Thus even the higher-order will to identify with divine assistance in controlling one's actions is completely caused by God, who produces the conversion or transformation in the agent's inner volitional character. Centuries later, Luther famously echoed this when he wrote, in response to Erasmus's question about self-reform, that "No man can! God has no time for your self-reformers, for they are hypocrites. The elect who fear God will be reformed by the Holy Spirit. The rest will perish unreformed."¹⁰²

This 'no-autonomy' position seems to be the most extreme in Augustine's later writings, for even the 'no-way-back model' implied that some independent human consent in the higher-order will is necessary, although not sufficient, for grace to take effect in turning the higher-order will. On the no-way-back account, grace and independent human choice seem to *share* the work of remaking the agent's inward volitional character. But in the *Enchiridion*, even that last vestige of human liberty is stripped away, out of an exaggerated fear that any room for independent human initiative will inspire human pride: lest we think that we are anything at all before God, we must believe that even our innermost consent itself is caused by God's action on our hearts.

If this reading is correct, then Augustine ended up with a position quite similar to Frankfurt's view that responsibility for our higher-order volitional character does not require any sort of leeway-liberty, even liberty of identification. But then, the familiar reaction to this late Augustinian position tells against both the late Augustine and Frankfurt. Catholic and Protestant thinkers, such as Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Rahner,¹⁰³ have plausibly argued that Augustine's final doctrine tries to rule out any chance of pride at too steep a price, namely by denying the freedom central to human selfhood.¹⁰⁴ His final position becomes an unwriting *reductio* of views that do not leave mortal persons with at least some liberty in the higher-order will. For if they lack liberty of identification even before the Fall, we must conclude with Augustine that human beings could not preserve the righteousness of their will without divine grace, nor fall unless that grace was withdrawn.¹⁰⁵ Then after the Fall, if the higher-order will itself is in total "bondage," this heart of our volitional nature "owes its freedom in no degree to itself but solely to the grace of God."¹⁰⁶ But this conclusion patently undermines his answer to the Manichaeans by making it impossible to see why all moral evil should not ultimately be attributed to God. For on this account, God arbitrarily allows some wills to sin and continue in sin, and prevents this in others. This upsets the delicately balanced position which Augustine's earlier writings worked out, and thus unwritingly reduces the higher-order will to a divine puppet-show.

In sum, I have defended Augustine's earlier views, according to which higher-order volitions are formed through a libertarian process open at least to a significant range of alternative possible identifications, and thus independent human consent is at least necessary for morally significant change in a person's motivational character. In doing so, I may appear to be endorsing a hierarchical version of *semi-Pelagianism*. This may well be correct, but then perhaps we must say: so much the better for

semi-Pelagianism, and for the later existentialist conception of responsibility for character that semi-Pelagianism partially anticipated.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps there were insights in Pelagius that the cloud of theological controversy has obscured—insights not only in his alleged belief in equal dignity of all persons, but also in his recognition of a capacity for human autonomy, that need to be retrieved and reconsidered by religious philosophers today.

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Notes

1. John Davenport, "Liberty of the Higher-Order Will: Frankfurt and Augustine," *Faith and Philosophy* 19.4 (October 2002): 437–461.
2. In addition to the arguments at the end of "Liberty of the Higher-Order Will," see the new version of the tracing defense in Davenport, "The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining from Deciding: A Response to McKenna and Pereboom," *Acta Analytica* 21.4 (Fall 2006): 62–88.
3. Katherin Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," *Religious Studies* 40.4 (2004): 415–435. This article came to my attention too late to include a full discussion of its many insights and issues in this essay.
4. I borrow the term "leeway-libertarian" from Derk Pereboom, since Strump, Zagzebski, Hunt, and others have used "libertarian" to include source-conditions that are incompatible with causal determinism but that do not require the power, starting from the same set of initial conditions, to do or decide otherwise. My view is that this broadening of the term generates unnecessary confusion, since people associate the word "libertarian" with the classical idea that moral freedom involves leeway or what Robert Kane has called "dual voluntary control."
5. See David Hunt, "On Augustine's Way Out," *Faith and Philosophy* 16.1 (January 1999): 3–26. Also see Hunt, "Augustine's Theological Fatalism: The Argument of *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.1–4," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 1–30, which presents a very similar analysis of Augustine's position.
6. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, trans. Thomas Williams (Hackett Publishing, 1993), Bk III, §4, p. 78.
7. Hunt, "On Augustine's Way Out," 7–8. Augustine's text is ambiguous enough that I think there must be some debate about how exactly to read the first three conditions. My formulation of them here is my own gloss on Hunt's brief explanation of them. Compare my version of (iii) to Harry Frankfurt's argument that the will is directly self-implementing or perfectly active: see Frankfurt, "Concerning the Freedom and Limits of the Will," reprinted in *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (Cambridge University Press, 1999): 71–81. In this paper, Frankfurt is trying to explain Descartes's *Fourth Meditation*, which of course is directly indebted to Augustine.
8. Hunt, "On Augustine's Way Out," 9–10.
9. *Ibid.*, 12.

10. See Linda Zagzebski's similar distinction between causal and temporal modality in "Omniscience and Time's Arrow," *Faith and Philosophy* 19.4 (October, 2002): 503–519 at 504. Although my phrasing portrays time's arrow as a "moving now," I agree with Zagzebski that the idea of temporal modality or "the modal asymmetry of past and future" (506) probably depends on a deeper asymmetry of cause and effect: "The idea that we cannot do anything about the past whereas we can in principle do something about (a portion of) the future is part of a network of ideas about time and causality" (509). But Zagzebski does not sufficiently emphasize the distinction between causal necessity relative to the laws and initial conditions of the universe and causal necessity relative to the accumulated past up to some time T.

11. Hunt, "On Augustine's Way Out," 17. However, there is a potential problem with Hunt's phrasing if there is no possible world in which I make the same choice C at time T as I do in the actual sequence, even though C is *not* foreknown (as on Hunt's own view, an omniscient and infallible God is there to foreknow my choice in every possible world). So we cannot gloss foreknowledge 'making no difference' as there being another possible world with the same actual sequence but no foreknowledge. In the Frankfurt-style cases, by contrast, we can explain the parallel counterfactual in terms of possible worlds: 'I would have done the same thing even if the intervener had been absent' means that there are possible worlds repeating the same actual sequence without the intervener. This point is similar to an objection raised by David Widerker in "Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *Faith and Philosophy* 17.2 (April 2000): 249–254.

12. Hunt, "On a Theological Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *Faith and Philosophy* 19.2 (April 2002): 245–255 at 249.

13. Hunt seems to assume that metaphysical necessity does not entail causal necessity; the invariability of our future choice is not nomological necessitation by the initial conditions and laws of nature. Yet if we take the natural approach of modeling causal possibility and temporal possibility as subsets of metaphysical possibility, then whatever is metaphysically impossible is temporally and causally impossible as well.

14. And although he does not attribute this view to Augustine, Hunt has also considered a way of saving leeway-libertarian freedom from divine omniscience in his paper, "Dispositional Omniscience," *Philosophical Studies* 80.3 (December 1995): 243–278.

15. I follow the current convention of referring to each of the 22 'notebooks' making up the *City of God* as "Books" subdivided into chapters, and omit any reference to "Parts" (since some editions divide the work in two Parts, and others—such as the Penguin edition—into five, following Augustine's instructions in his Letter to Firmus). However, yet other editions use the term "Parts" for each of the 22 units, and refer to their subdivisions as "Books" (all of which can be very confusing for the non-specialist reader).

16. Barry David, "Divine Foreknowledge in *De civitate Dei* 5.9: The Philosophical Value of Augustine's Polemic," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 75.4 (Fall 2001): 479–496. I am not necessarily agreeing with Augustine's claim as interpreted here (since I'm skeptical about the cogency of strong divine co-creation of decisions involving libertarian decision among options). But on this reading, his account is clearly intended to reconcile divine activity and knowledge with leeway-libertarian freedom.

17. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1984), Book 5.10, p. 195. For a more literal translation, see *The Essential Augustine* 184–185: "For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects of what it can effect—as for instance, the necessity of death—it is manifest that our

wills by which we live uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not—for we should not will if it were unwilling. . . . So also, when we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. . . . Therefore we are by no means compelled either, retaining the presence of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that he is present of future things."

18. And Hunt cites *City of God* 5.10 in his reply to Widerker, "On a Theological Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," 248.

19. On this reading, only actual history is temporally possible, given divine foreknowledge of all its states of affairs, but the temporal impossibility of alternative futures is compatible with a kind of psychological possibility that is still required for moral responsibility—a kind that looks like a leeway-condition. If the causal possibility of $\neg C$ is compatible with the temporal necessity of C, why should this not also be true for the volitional possibility of $\neg C$? Now if Augustine accepts MNT, then my future choice C is also metaphysically necessary, and it is harder to reconcile this with the volitional possibility of $\neg C$. However, the same is true for the causal or nomological possibility of $\neg C$ (see note 13).

20. In "The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining from Deciding," I used the terms "agent-can" and "agent-possible" to signal the difference between this complex sense of possibility and broadly logical possibility.

21. Or on an indirect libertarian/tracing version, up until *some point* before T1 when my past choices have sufficiently narrowed my future options.

22. If God is in time, and has always foreknown that I will choice C at T1 since the earliest time (T \rightarrow), then my leeway-libertarian power makes true a backtracking counterfactual about what God would have foreknown at T \rightarrow had I chosen otherwise at T1. If God is not in time, then my leeway-libertarian power makes true an eternal counterfactual about what God would always have timelessly known about T1 had I chosen otherwise at T1.

23. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Bk III, §11, 94.

24. *Ibid.* §12, p. 95. However, I grant that Augustine does not anticipate Alvin Plantinga's idea that there might be no creaturely essences whose subjunctive conditionals of freedom include no evil choices. For he goes on to argue that "even if all the angels had sinned, [God] would have created others, and stationed them at the posts that the first angels had abandoned by sinning" (§12, p. 96).

25. Hunt, "On a Theological Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," 250.

26. Hunt, "On Augustine's Way Out," 9.

27. See Daveport, "Liberty of the Higher-Order Will," 439–444.

28. Katherin Rogers, "Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God," *Faith and Philosophy* 24.1 (Jan 2007): 3–27 at 19. By email, she identified *On the Trinity* 15 as providing the best proof text for this claim, though it is not cited in this article nor within Augustine's *Compatibilism*, *q. gr. cit.*

29. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna (Catholic University of America Press, 1963); Bk 15, chap. 13, p. 485

30. Thus I am not convinced by Rogers's reading of secondary causes in the early Augustine as entirely determined by God: see Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," 418.
31. Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," 423; thus the *Retractions* 9,6 passage on the good use of free will coming from God is consistent with the noncontrastive power reading.
32. *Ibid.*, 419–420.
33. *Ibid.*, 415.
34. *Ibid.*, 416.
35. *Ibid.*, 422.
36. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Bk. III, §12, pp. 103–104.
37. *Ibid.*, 104.
38. *Ibid.*, §25, pp. 121–122. This section begins with the idea that motivation aims at an object of some kind and concludes that the object in view in first sin is oneself as different from God. But it does not argue that the choice is the result of a vector-sum of this motive vs the desire for union with God, or anything of that kind.
39. *Ibid.*, §24, p. 120.
40. *Ibid.*, §6, p. 84.
41. *Ibid.*, §10, p. 91.
42. *Ibid.*, §16, 103; and see Book I, §10, p. 17.
43. Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," 423.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Bk. III, §5, p. 79.
46. *Ibid.*, 81.
47. *Ibid.*, 82.
48. Jesse Couenhoven, "Augustine's rejection of the free-will defense: an overview of the late Augustine's theology," *Religious Studies* 43 (2007): 279–298, at 281. For my purposes, it is enough that Augustine could not reject the free will defense without first having held it and its libertarian components.
49. Rogers, "Augustine's Compatibilism," 422 and 427.
50. Frankfurt, "The importance of what we care about," reprinted in *The Importance of What We Care About*, 88. Also see Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love" and "On the necessity of ideals," reprinted in Frankfurt, *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
51. Augustine, *Retractions* ("Reconsiderations"), Book I, chap. 9, extracted in *On Free Choice of the Will*, trans. Thomas Williams, 125.
52. *Ibid.*, 127.
53. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Bk. III, §19, p. 107.
54. *Ibid.*, §1, p. 71.
55. Augustine, *Retractions* ("Reconsiderations"), 128.

56. It should be noted that this was a very confusing choice of labels. For not only is "freedom of the will" in Frankfurt's sense compatible with lacking the liberty to form alternative higher-order volitions; the compatibilist control it constitutes is *also* not necessary for responsibility for particular acts, on Frankfurt's view. He is unclear about whether it is necessary for autonomy or for responsibility for one's practical identity. But it would certainly be clearer to label it a kind of positive freedom or component of autonomy, rather than to give it a name implying that this condition is part of the freedom required for responsibility.
57. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Bk. III, §20, p. 109.
58. H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism*, Revised Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 1970), 77.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, 79.
61. Augustine, *City of God*, op. cit., Book V, chap. 10, p. 110. Similarly, God foreknows what effect on our choices his various ethical commands will have.
62. *Ibid.*, 109: "For, if we will, there is an act of willing; there is none if we do not want one." Compare this to the argument at *Free Choice of the Will*, Book III, §3, that "our will would not be a will if it were not in our power" (77). He adds that God's foreknowledge of our actions is thus precisely foreknowledge of our future exercise of our own libertarian power.
63. *Ibid.*, Book XII, chap. 6, p. 251. Thus for example, "the will itself, because it is a created will, wickedly and inordinately seeks the inferior being" rather than the higher value (252).
64. Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," in *Perspectives on Moral Responsibility*, ed. John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (Cornell University Press, 1993), 211–236, esp. 229. The first version of my "Liberty of the Higher-Order Will" paper read at the Eastern APA was written without prior familiarity with Stump's work, which makes the convergence between our interpretations of Augustine all the more convincing. I have subsequently been indebted to Professor Stump for advice on this paper and for helpful discussion of Frankfurt's hierarchical model and other questions.
65. *Ibid.*, 228.
66. *Ibid.*, 230.
67. *Ibid.*, 231.
68. See Exodus, 9:34–10:1.
69. Stump, "Sanctification," 228.
70. *Ibid.*, 229. I disagree with this analysis of sanctification and hardening of the heart only in the minor respect that the agent need not specifically will that God effect the change in his will, for the grace to be autonomously accepted; nor does it seem necessary that Pharaoh or Goebbels should have specifically called on God's help in their second-order volition for the result to be just. However, there are complex problems when it comes to responsibility for getting what we wanted when this occurs *because* we wanted it, but in ways that we did not envision or intend (problems of volitional luck as we might call them).
71. *Ibid.*
72. These two conditions can be related by saying that leeway-libertarian freedom is among the *source*-conditions of autonomy in the higher-order volitions that are made effective by grace.

73. *Ibid.*
74. Augustine, *A Treatise on Grace and Free Will*, chap. 4, *The Works of St. Augustine*, 445.
75. *Ibid.*, chap. 5, p. 446.
76. As he says, "yet it is God's gift which is indispensable for the observance of the precepts of chastity. Accordingly, it is said in the Book of Wisdom: 'When I knew that no one could be continent, except God gives it, then this became a point of wisdom to know whose gift it was'—*On Grace and Free Will*, chap. 8, 447.
77. *Ibid.*, chap. 8, p. 447.
78. It even seems that part of the value attributed to prayer in the Christian tradition comes from conceiving it, in effect, as a way of focusing on the formation of one's higher-order volitions.
79. Augustine, *A Treatise on Grace and Free Will*, chap. 9, p. 447.
80. *Ibid.*, chap. 10, p. 448.
81. Henry Chadwick, *Augustine* (Oxford University Press, 1986), 116.
82. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Book III, §20, p. 108.
83. *Retractions*, I, ix, §6, in *On Free Choice of the Will*, 129. This passage can also be read as supporting the residual leeway interpretation though.
84. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, Book III, §18, p. 106.
85. Stump, "Sanctification," 229.
86. Augustine, "Treatise on the Spirit and the Letter," chap. 1, in *The Works of Saint Augustine*, 83.
87. *Ibid.*, chap. 4, p. 84.
88. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, p. 85; and also chap. 14, p. 88.
89. *Ibid.*, chap. 7, p. 86.
90. On this point, see Alvin Plantinga's argument against Mackie's similar suggestion in his famous paper, "The Free Will Defense" (widely reprinted). Likewise, on Molinist grounds, Plantinga rejects what he calls "Leibniz's Lapse," i.e., his suggestion that God has at his disposal plenty of possible monads who always freely choose what is right: see Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford University Press, 1981), 180–184.
91. Augustine, "The Spirit and the Letter," chap. 58, p. 109.
92. *Ibid.*, chap. 60, pp. 110–11.
93. *Ibid.*, chap. 57, p. 109.
94. *Ibid.*, chap. 58, p. 109.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, chap. 60, p. 110.
97. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chap. 30, reprinted in *The Essential Augustine*, 181.
98. *Ibid.*, 182; my talks.
99. *Ibid.*, chap. 32, p. 183.
100. See Davenport, "Liberty of the Higher-Order Will," 440–442.

101. Augustine, *Enchiridion* chap. 32, p. 183; Augustine quotes this phrase from Proverbs 16:1.
102. Luther, *Bondage of the Will* (632), in Erasmus-Luther, *Discourse on Free Will*, trans. Ernst Winter (New York: Unger Publishing, 1961), 110. Compare this to the passage where Luther describes the human will as "a beast of burden" ridden either by God or Satan: "Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, no which it will seek." (635), 112. Luther clearly intends to rule out liberty of the higher-order will.
103. See Karl Rahner on the freedom to say "yes" or "no" to God: *Foundations of Christian Faith*, trans. William Dych (Crossroad Publishing, 1993), 100–101.
104. See Timothy Jackson, "Arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard*, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 235–256.
105. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chap. 105, p. 186. Thus the cooperation model applies only in Paradise.
106. *Ibid.*, chap. 106, p. 187.
107. I have defended an existentialist version of liberty of identification in my paper, "Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics," in *Kierkegaard After MacIntyre* (Open Court, 2001), 265–324.