Plumwood believes that 'liberal democracy has failed both democracy and ecology' (p. 135); writing from an ecofeminist perspective, she advocates a 'radical democracy' which rejects hierarchical dualisms such as nature/culture and public/private. Young, who defends 'monkey-wrenching'—direct action such as spiking trees due to be logged, sabotaging power lines, and burning property (his examples)—is the only author who advocates direct action outside formal democratic procedures. He defends monkey-wrenching as a form of civil disobedience, which is certainly part of the democratic tradition, but damage to property and possible risk to human life are certainly not part of the liberal version of that tradition as represented by, say, Rawls.

A common theme in the book is the tension between participatory, small-scale democratic institutions and the global nature of many environmental problems which as Mathews notes 'appear to call for centralist strategies which defy the decentralist proclivities of the green movement' (p. 7). Thompson, rejecting both authoritarian centralism and anarchy, advocates both respect for community integrity and heritage, and support for transnational organisations: 'a multi-layered, interlocking world society', a 'pluralist world society' (pp. 45, 46). Members of 'this complex system of interactions are likely to be the kind of individuals who can address both local and global problems' (p. 45). I found this essay especially constructive and helpful.

As Mathews notes, structures on their own do not guarantee desirable outcomes. In the 'eco-communities' that she advocates, people live 'in daily face-to-face interaction with the natural world, yet if they have been taught to regard non-human beings as mere objects, and means-to-ends ... they may never reach the kind of intersubjective relationship with the natural world that I have been advocating' (p. 81). In other words, environmentalism requires a commitment to certain values as well as the setting up of democratic institutions and political structures.

I have just one reservation about this otherwise excellent book: just how far can we go in reinterpreting democracy? None of the authors, I imagine, would accept the 'people's democracies' of the former USSR and its satellites and the 'guided democracies' of Singapore and Indonesia as kosher. In her article (though not in her introduction) Mathews does define democracy as 'an ideal type': 'I propose to call democracy understood as a system of governance dedicated to individual freedom and self-rule "liberal democracy" ' (p. 67). But, as I have noted, many of the authors don't subscribe to the liberal democratic model. Of course, there are different conceptions of democracy. If there is a second edition of this book, perhaps it could include a chapter in which the contributors present their consensus on the non-negotiable core of the concept of democracy.

Alastair S. Gunn *University of Waikato*

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Georges Rey. Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1997, xv + 362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper).

This is a book that should be on every philosopher's shelf. A very readable introductory textbook to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, it is well-positioned to service its intended audience of upper-level undergraduates and graduate students 'in the analytic tradition'. In addition to his intended audience, the author 'piously hopes' that his book 'will be accessible to anyone with an interest in the issues' (p. xiii). This is unlikely to be borne out, however, for the book is far too big and, in places, too technical for the general reader. (In terms of sophistication it stands about mid-way between Churchland's very short and accessible *Matter and Consciousness* and the professional readers edited by W. Lycan and D. M. Rosenthal.) However, while the author's book doesn't do the job of reaching beyond its target audience, it does much else besides.

The book is about *contemporary* philosophy of mind, yet Rey employs a broadly Cartesian *classical* framework to house his 'mentalist' approach. He takes seriously 'what many philosophers have thought to be the misconceived problems of the philosophy of mind since Descartes: e.g., what is the nature of a mental state? How could matter have mental properties? How could the properties be causal?' (p. xiii). However, Rey's position naturally shares far more with the contemporary work of J. A. Fodor than Descartes. The book defends a computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT) augmented by a computational/representational theory of qualitative states (CRTQ). The overall bias is *psycho-functionalist*: i.e., that an adequate functionalist understanding of mental phenomena will only emerge from a (future) empirical psychology along the lines of what a classical computational account provides. (CRTT and CRTQ are 'species' of this more general psycho-functionalism.) The hesitancy to endorse any of the present computational theories of mind on

offer—neither connectionism (process or vehicle types) nor holistic, homuncular or input/output functionalism—shares more with Nagel's (1986) equally cautious remarks about the poverty of present-day theories of mind than the author might care to admit. Even so, Rey is no 'new mysterian': the mind is to be explained computationally; the debate is only a matter what *kind* of functionalism is best. And, for Rey, what is required is a *classical* model in which cognition is understood as computations over representations stored in something like a language of thought. However, Rey is perhaps unique among functionalists in thinking that no current computational theory of mind on offer is quite up to doing the job.

The book has twelve chapters including a brief introduction. The introduction sets out differences between explanation, ontology, and ordinary talk, explains the overall cognitive science enterprise, and gives a useful chapter summary. Chapter 1 outlines the three main metaphysical approaches: reductionism, dualism, and eliminativism, as well as explaining some important key terms: propositional attitudes, qualitative states, intentionality/intensionality, types/tokens, and reference. It also outlines his 'ground rules' (p. 6) which a good theory of mind should follow, a characterisation which guides later discussion—'The need for fairness', 'The need for non-tendentious evidence', and the value of constitutive definitions and analysis in relation to philosophical and empirical research.

Chapter 2 concentrates on the 'temptations' of dualism and looks at a number of mental phenomena which seem to corroborate the dualists' case: the nature of rationality, privacy, free-will, the non-spatial and intentional character of thoughts, and the essentially mental and subjective character of experience. The nature of physicalist reduction, identity, and the Leibniz law arguments are clearly explained, as well as the relevance of 'explanatory gaps' to the dualists' case.

Chapter 3 develops philosophical arguments against dualism from an eliminativist perspective. Causal gap arguments and problems associated with the normativity of mental ascriptions are introduced in this connection. The usual objections against eliminativism are then presented: transcendental arguments, introspective arguments (such as those appealing to first-person sensory states), and finally arguments which appeal to 'standardised regularities' in mental aptitude tests (results from SAT and GRE tests are given as examples). The overall argument against the eliminativist is that the systematic responses humans make in such tests *require* that mental state ascriptions have some explanatory and predictive value (thus, the 'psycho' part of 'psycho-functionalism').

Chapter 4 looks at empirical issues associated with the eliminativist stance. Radical behaviourism (RB) is chosen as the main target. Against this, evidence from latent and passive learning, spontaneous alteration, and behavioural improvisation are presented from the psychological and ethological literature. (Evidence is drawn mainly from the behaviour of rats in mazes—stock examples usually raised in *support* of RB.) Most of this material is well-known; but it is refreshing to see it so well-argued and with useful diagrams. Alongside this data, evidence from transformational grammar is presented, demonstrating that language learning *assumes* innate capacities and processes which can't be admitted on the terms of the RB account.

Chapter 5 develops 'pre-functionalist' mentalist alternatives in response to the failure of eliminativist approaches. 'Pre-functionalist' views include analytical behaviourism and what the author calls 'introspectivism' and 'irreferentialism'. The former comprise views which assume that the meaning of mental terms and concepts 'is provided by the introspectible mental item to which it refers' (p. 136). Incorporated under this are the strange bedfellows of Locke and Searle; against them are the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke on internal states, explanations, and rule following. 'Irreferentialism' is presented as the view that 'mental terms don't *refer* but serve some other linguistic function' (p. 140). The views of Ryle, Smart, Quine, Harman, among others, are discussed here.

Chapter 6 develops common themes endorsed by a variety of functionalist accounts. The discussion ranges over Turing machines and binary coding (one of the clearest discussions of this around); and also Church's thesis, Ramsification, and multiple realizability (somewhat less clear). A number of other issues are raised including levels of functional explanation, prosthetic replacement of machine parts, and Quine's ontology/ideology distinction.

Chapter 7 deals with the differences among functionalist approaches. A number of such approaches are treated: folk functionalism, a priori and psycho-functionalism, input/output vs. anchored functionalism; holistic vs. homuncular functionalism, teleo-functionalism, and something Rey calls 'superficialism', which he attributes to the view of Dennett. Toward the end of this chapter Rey introduces his 'modest mentalism' which incorporates the central features of a generalised functionalism (intentional states which are prompted by and represent distal phenomena) while keeping some of the features of our mental 'folk psychology' intact.

In Chapters 8 and 9 the positive account is presented in detail. Chapter 8 attempts to meet Descartes' challenge that a material mind could not possibly possess *rationality*. Chapter 8 attempts to meet Brentano's associated claim that material minds could not *represent* the world in thought. The author's claim is that both challenges can be met by a suitably refined CRTT. The first challenge

is met by introducing the idea of syntactic computational architecture, the Fodorian notion of a language of thought, and a variety of examples of how a machine states can formally approximate induction, abduction, and deductive processing (a section on decision theory is added to show how practical reason can also be formally represented). The chapter concludes by arguing how a CRTT can explain a variety of features of rational mentality better than its current rival *radical connectionism* (RCON). These include: the structure, productivity, and systematicity of propositional attitudes; the rational and irrational relations between them; and their multiple roles and causal efficacy. Chapter 9 discusses the panoply of internalist and externalist theories of representation and two factor theories. It concludes in a similar fashion by pitting CRTT and RCON on the issue of explaining a variety of *semantic* features of content such as the stability and hyper-intensionality of propositional attitudes.

Chapter 10 covers 'Replies to Common Objections'; in particular, concerns that arise over functionalism in general and computationalism in particular. (Searle's 'Chinese Room' argument gets a convincing rebuff here.) Chapter 11 extends the proposed theory to the issue of 'qualia' and associated concerns: privacy, subjectivity, and privileged access; as well as 'reverse' qualia and 'absent' qualia. The author's position is that qualia do not exist as sui generis properties (though they *seem* to); they are, instead, to be understood as features of represented sensory states (i.e., outputs of sensory modules) *intensionally characterised*. This doesn't mean they are any less valuable to us, however. Being an obsessive realist about such contents is, according to the author, rather like 'being an obsessive realist about painting, insisting that a painting was beautiful only if it *actually did represent something real*' (p. 305). I wasn't convinced by this argument; but then again, some of us are obsessive realists about paintings too!

This book does an admirable job of presenting issues in clear and accessible terms. (See, for instance, the treatment of Fodor's obscure thesis of asymmetric dependencies by analogy to misidentified imprinting in goslings, p. 245.) There is some eccentric terminology (e.g., 'materialism' and 'physicalism' are defined in terms where even property dualists like Nagel come out sounding like 'materialists'). I thought some distinctions weren't needed at all; e.g., the difference between '*eliminativism*' and '*irreferentialism*'. Eliminativists are, after all, usually irreferentialists so the distinction is a blurry one as even Rey admits (p. 143) but on the whole clarifications made throughout the book were very useful. There's a fairly comprehensive glossary at the back of the book for readers' benefit.

A point of shameless pedantry: The author makes reference to 'eucalyptus' and 'gum tree' as an example of *necessarily co-extensive* terms, where 'one in each of the pairs necessarily satisfies the other' (p. 249). This isn't right. Contrary to popular belief—even in Australia—gum trees are a subset of the eucalypt species; the designation only properly applying to the smooth bark variety (e.g., the genus *haemastoma*) So such terms are not *necessarily* co-extensive. Then again, since most people don't make this distinction I suppose they *are* co-extensive (at least in their popular understanding). Perhaps there is something in internalist theories of meaning after all!

While it can always be said that a book 'leaves something out' (pun intended) Australasian Philosophy is far too unrepresented. D. M. Armstrong's work is mentioned only in two endnotes (and then not very thoroughly); and J. J. C. Smart rates a few sentences only in passing. (U. T. Place doesn't get a mention at all.) Frank Jackson gets more of a hearing (but then mainly in tandem with an American, Thomas Nagel). Similarly, there's no reference to M. C. Bradley or C. B. Martin, though Rey does discuss the 'inverted spectrum thought experiment' (see *AJP*, 1961 and 1963). Local connectionist theories might have also been discussed (for example, G. J. O'Brien and J. Opie: 'Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma and how to avoid it', *Philosophical Psychology*, 10 (1997): pp. 269–286; see also, *BBS*, forthcoming).

A good book: well-argued, well-positioned, clear focus. It's extremely irritating to have to flip back to details provided in chapter endnotes, however. Why publishers insist on this format escapes me. But, otherwise, an enjoyable reading experience.

W. Martin Davies *The Flinders University of South Australia*

Feminist Amnesia: In the Wake of Women's Liberation. Jean Curthoys. New York and London, Routledge, 1997, xii + 200.

What was special about the Women's Liberation movement, according to Curthoys, was that it initiated a collective attempt to realise a human ideal. So radical and uncompromising was this ideal