ESTABLISHING TOLERATION

RICHARD H. DEES
Saint Louis University

IN *POLITICAL LIBERALISM*, John Rawls sketches a path by which the liberal values of toleration and autonomy come to be embraced for their own sake.[1] The "just so" story he tells is that people first subscribe to the liberal principles of justice as a *modus vivendi* to end a deep conflict. But over time, they no longer focus on the areas of disagreement, and they cease to think about whether these principles are consistent with their comprehensive conceptions of a good life. They then find themselves with an allegiance to those principles for their own sake. At first they only accept them as the basic manner in which political decisions are structured in a "constitutional consensus," and then later they come to see the principles as good in themselves in the "overlapping consensus." By necessity, the story Rawls tells is sketchy, but its unspoken optimism belies the deep problems that such a transformation involves. While Rawls certainly does not pretend that the process will be orderly and rational or that the process, once begun, is inexorable, his account fails to confront the significant individual, social, and conceptual obstacles to the changes he envisions.

The key element in Rawls's story is the acceptance of toleration as a value.[2] Toleration is not obviously a virtue in its own right, especially in the circumstances in which we need it most. Two warring factions may be willing to suspend their conflict when the chances of victory no longer seem worth the fight, and so they may then be willing to accept toleration as a modus vivendi.[3] But as long as it is seen merely as a modus vivendi, toleration will be

vulnerable to shifts in power. Indeed, as long as each side even thinks that the other sees it as a modus vivendi, the trust that toleration generates will be extremely guarded. This instability does not automatically resolve itself in favor of greater toleration; as we shall see, toleration can easily come apart at just this point.

To think of toleration as a virtue in its own right, the two sides must regard the differences between the groups as good—or at least, they must cease to regard those differences as bad. They need not think that the values held by other groups are right or valuable; they need only think that there is no disvalue in the existence of different kinds of people within a political state.[4] To understand why toleration is a virtue—at least in a society such as ours—we must first understand how people can come to see it as a virtue, and so we must understand the contexts in which toleration can be seen as a good. The social and conceptual preconditions for toleration are as important to understanding the virtue of toleration as the dispositions and states of characters that characterize it. Once we realize what is involved in seeing toleration as a virtue, I will argue, we will realize that something like a conversion is needed to secure it. Such a change is not the product of purely rational forces; no argument can generate the changes in values that are necessary to effect them. So, I argue, we can only expect limited success in creating toleration in any given environment. As a result, I suggest, whether toleration can be justified in a way that the parties to such deep conflicts can accept will depend crucially on contextual features.

I.   THE PROBLEM OF TOLERATION

To think about the social and conceptual preconditions for accepting toleration as a virtue, let us start by looking at an historically important example: the experiment of toleration in France in the seventeenth century.[5] Henri IV's Edict of Nantes in 1598 ended the strife of the Wars of Religion between the Catholic establishment and the Calvinist reformers that had devastated France since 1560. It granted the French Protestants, the Huguenots, the freedom to worship in most places in which they were already established, and it gave them considerable autonomy within the regions in which they were dominant. Indeed, its not-so-secret articles even allowed the Huguenots to keep armed garrisons in key cities at the Crown's expense, so it effectively created a "state within a state" in the areas of southern and western France that the Calvinists controlled.

This example gives us a window on the conceptual issues involved in toleration precisely because it failed: toleration did not take hold in France as the result of the edict. Indeed, the Revocation of the Edict in 1685 by Louis XIV represents one of the greatest setbacks for toleration in the West. Examining why it failed will help us see what is needed to make toleration succeed.

The Fragility of a Modus Vivendi

In an important sense, the Edict of Nantes never really "worked."[6] In the years immediately following the edict, Huguenots continued to be suspicious of Catholics, and as a result, Catholics were not willing to see Huguenots as loyal subjects. Real trust between them never developed. Instead, both sides trusted—more or less—the government of Henri IV: the Protestants, because Henri had been their leader until his conversion in 1593, and the Catholics, because he had converted and because he had reaffirmed the supremacy of Catholicism in the kingdom. Of course, for the same reasons, both sides did not fully trust him either.[7] But both sides wanted peace, so they were willing to trust Henri's government to enforce that peace. As long as they did, Henri could guarantee that whoever broke the peace first would suffer the consequences.

However, neither side thought that a nation divided by religion could survive very long, nor did they think that such a state was desirable.[8] Many on each side thought their very salvation depended on the triumph of their religious views. Salvation, for them, depended not simply on their own personal faith but also on their participation in a community that adhered to the true faith.[9] And even those who did not fully share this view believed that a state divided by religion was fundamentally at odds with itself since the people did not share the core values that were necessary to produce a good state. Henri himself tried to convince the Protestant nobility to follow in his steps and become Catholics, and he set up many institutions for the peaceful conversion of Huguenots. Many Huguenots, on the other hand, viewed the toleration given to them as an opportunity to recover until they could convert more of the French to their cause. So neither side saw toleration as anything more than a temporary measure to keep the peace. Both sides preferred the peace of toleration to war, and they thought they would be punished for breaking the peace. But neither side saw any reason to accept toleration as a good in its own right.

Structurally, the situation can be summarized in game-theoretical terms in Table 1.

TABLE 1:   France in 1600

	Huguenots		
	TG	TMV	F
Catholics			
TG	3,3	4,1	6,9
TMV	1,4	2,2	5,8
F	9,5	8,6	7,7

NOTE: TG = accepting toleration as a good; TMV = accepting toleration as a modus vivendi; F = fight. Numbers represent ordinal rankings (1 = best, 2 = second best, etc.). In each box, the ranking for Catholics is first, followed by that of the Huguenots.

Of course, it is somewhat misleading to present these options as strategies that the participants could simply choose: to see toleration as a good in its own right is to see it as something other than a mere strategy.[10] However, people can, I think, come to see that having a certain attitude toward toleration could advance their interests as they are currently defined, so they can decide to cultivate a disposition that they do not currently possess.[11] If so, they can recognize that although they cannot simply choose to have a new attitude, they can choose to take actions that they expect will result in a new attitude and a shift in their values.[12]

However, the situation in France was not one in which the current interests of either side would have been promoted by a change in their attitude toward toleration. Yet it does have a stable and peaceful equilibrium: where both sides accept toleration as a modus vivendi (TMV, TMV). Nevertheless, Table 1 does not reveal how fragile the situation truly was. Since the situation was stable only as long as the both sides thought that the Crown would ensure that fighting would be punished, it depended not on their trust in each other but on their trust in the government and specifically on their trust in Henri. But when Henri was assassinated in 1610 by a Catholic fanatic and his very Catholic queen, Marie de Médici, became regent for Henri's son, the Protestants began to worry. And when the most important Protestant at Court, the duc de Sully, left the government, they began to believe that they could no longer trust the government to enforce the peace equitably. Their perception, then, was that Marie and her advisers would not punish Catholics who acted against them and that the government would in fact condone their persecution. In game-theoretic terms, they thought that they were in the situation depicted in Table 2.[13]

The Protestants thus thought that no matter what they did, the Catholics' interests were best served by renewing the war: fighting had become a dominant strategy for the Catholics. Their best response to that strategy, then, was

TABLE 2:   France in 1615

	Huguenots		
	TG	TMV	F
Catholics			
TG	3,4	6,2	9,7
TMV	2,3	5,1	8,6
F	1,9	4,8	7,5

NOTE: TG = accepting toleration as a good; TMV = accepting toleration as a modus vivendi; F = fight. Numbers represent ordinal rankings (1 = best, 2 = second best, etc.). In each box, the ranking for Catholics is first, followed by that of the Huguenots.

to make a preemptive strike, to begin the fight with some kind of surprise to get an upper hand in a war that they saw as inevitable. In this situation, then, renewed civil war (F, F) was inevitable. Not surprisingly, many Huguenots were quick to side with the aristocratic revolt of Henri II Bourbon, Prince de Condé, in 1614-1616, a move that only increased the suspicion of the Crown. And when the young Louis XIII marched an army into the independent principality of Béarn in 1620 to assert the rights of Catholics in a largely Protestant area, the Protestants saw it as the opening salvo in a larger campaign against them—an attitude that became a self-fulfilling prophecy.[14] They hurriedly met in a political assembly that openly defied the king's authority and launched a full-scale rebellion.

For the Huguenots, the rebellion was a disaster. It led to their complete military defeat and to the elimination of the Protestant armed garrisons in the Peace of Montpellier in 1622 and the Peace of the Grace of Alès of 1629.[15] The two peace treaties confirmed the basic tenets of the Edict of Nantes, but they effectively terminated the Huguenots' autonomy. After 1629, the Huguenots' position was always precarious, dependent on whether the government needed their support to galvanize its alliances with Protestant countries. Although some genuinely tolerant feelings developed in the seventeenth century, both sides viewed each other with suspicion. The Huguenots, of course, were in no position to cause problems, but even after the Huguenots refused to take advantage of the general turmoil of the Fronde years of 1648-1652,[16] few Catholics believed that Huguenots had given up their designs against the French government. The supplications the Huguenots offered were seen merely as attempts to prostrate themselves before the power of the Catholics—an attitude reinforced by the militant rhetoric of some Huguenots.[17] Indeed, throughout the seventeenth century, the stereotype of the Huguenot was that of a rebel, a republican, and a troublemaker—an image that was corroborated by the results of the English Civil War, which

ended in the beheading of Charles I in 1649 and the establishment of a commonwealth.[18] Thus, many Catholics continued to think that they were in a situation like that of 1615. As a result, they saw no reason to adopt toleration as a virtue since they still regarded it as a form of unilateral disarmament. Eventually, Louis XIV thought he could improve his own standing with Catholics both inside and outside France by suppressing the Huguenots altogether, so he began a systematic campaign to force their conversions in the 1670s before he outlawed Protestantism altogether in 1685.

The Conversion to Toleration

The Edict of Nantes was not, then, a success story for toleration. Even the twenty years immediately following its adoption did not produce anything like the rapprochement that Rawls's story would lead us to expect. Minimal toleration is not, then, a self-reinforcing virtue: once in place, it does not generate further support for itself. The reason is not hard to see. Although both sides preferred peace to the endless civil wars of the sixteenth century, their followers held a goal that was incompatible with a deeper toleration: they still thought they had a religious duty, as the adherents to the one true means to salvation, to achieve a hegemony over the other and gain complete control over the government. Since both sides thought that religious unity was the only means by which to achieve political unity, unilaterally surrendering the goal of hegemony was politically and—more important—religiously unacceptable. If they simply acquiesced to the continued existence of the other faith, they thought, they were abandoning others to damnation, neglecting their duty to charity, and endangering their own salvation. As long as they could see themselves as continuing the fight for religious unity, they could see themselves as advancing the cause of the true faith, and so they could accept toleration, even as a modus vivendi, only if they thought it was the best means to achieve hegemony in the long run. Politics was religious war by other means.

Thus, both sides entertained a delicate balance between the goal of hegemony and the requirements of peace. The religious identity of both sides required them to take an aggressive attitude toward those of a different faith, but their political commitments required them to avoid provoking the other side. So the acceptance of the modus vivendi implied that they should not use any means whatsoever to attain the true faith for everyone,[19] but it did not solve the underlying tensions between the Catholics and the Huguenots. As long as both sides held onto the goal of hegemony, whatever peace they achieved would be tentative and ultimately unstable.

TABLE 3:   France in 1600 Redux

	Huguenots	
	TG	TMV
Catholics		
TG	3,3	4,1
TMV	1,4	2,2

NOTE: TG = accepting toleration as a good; TMV = accepting toleration as a modus vivendi; F = fight. Numbers represent ordinal rankings (1 = best, 2 = second best, etc.). In each box, the ranking for Catholics is first, followed by that of the Huguenots.

TABLE 4:   A Prisoners' Dilemma

	Huguenots	
	TG	TMV
Catholics		
TG	2,2	4,1
TMV	1,4	3,3

NOTE: TG = accepting toleration as a good; TMV = accepting toleration as a modus vivendi; F = fight. Numbers represent ordinal rankings (1 = best, 2 = second best, etc.). In each box, the ranking for Catholics is first, followed by that of the Huguenots.

In this situation, both sides did not even think that a more stable peace based on seeing toleration as a good was better than the unstable peace that existed. The dynamics can be seen by focusing on the upper-left quadrant of Table 1, as shown in Table 3. The situation could not improve as long as it fit this pattern. As long as both sides regarded hegemony as a crucial goal, they would always regard toleration as a dubious good. But to give up hegemony as a goal would require them to give up part of a significant part of their religious identity. Within this structure of beliefs, neither side had a rationally compelling reason to give up that goal.

Importantly, the problem here is not a prisoners' dilemma. If it were, then both sides would see the stable peace in which both sides accepted toleration as a good as a better situation than the modus vivendi in which they actually lived, as shown in Table 4. So if the situation were a prisoners' dilemma, the problem would be how to guarantee that both sides will accept toleration as a good. Such a problem can be solved without any basic change in the values of the participants. Even though prisoners' dilemmas as such do not have any solutions, there are some well-known strategies for changing their dynamics.[20] Because both sides would see the possibility of a peace based on toleration as

better than the modus vivendi, we would only need to provide an institutional structure that could give each side reason to believe that more stable peace was in fact possible.

But the problem in France was deeper. No such institutional solutions would have worked because both sides preferred the modus vivendi to mutual toleration. Only a basic change in the values that underlay that preference could change the dynamics of the situation. A more permanent peace would have been possible only if the two sides could give up their belief that hegemony was required to fulfill their commitment to spread the word of Christ. In a word, only a conversion could lead to true toleration.

Such a conversion may seem rational to us because we already accept the Lockean view that lies behind it: the conviction that people should not be forced to profess any religious beliefs. But such a conclusion would have been far from obvious to the people of the seventeenth century. As Jonas Proast points out in his replies to Locke's *Letter concerning Toleration*, coercion is effective in at least making people listen to the arguments for the true religion.[21] Besides, some might think, suppressing a minority religion might help save the children of the recalcitrant even if it does not change the heretics themselves. We twentieth-century Westerners may deeply disagree with these claims, but they are not as such irrational; indeed, I do not even think they are false.[22] In any case, we cannot claim that the Catholics and Huguenots of the early seventeenth century were irrational to hold their beliefs about the efficacy of coercion. Indeed, given their beliefs about the requirements of salvation, we cannot, I think, claim that their actions are in any way irrational.[23]

To claim that a deeper toleration was rationally required, then, requires us to condemn their whole worldview, a task that cannot, I think, avoid begging crucial questions. And for reasons I have outlined elsewhere,[24] we can appeal as much as we like to a standard of absolute value or to the requirements of some substantive form of rationality, but such appeals will not change the situation until the participants themselves accept them. Arguments alone neither will nor should force them to change their view. Instead, something must happen to them that leads them to change their values. As such, what is needed is best described as a conversion.

Such a change need not be radical in my view; I will call the change a conversion as long as a crucial part of the process is purely causal—that is, as long as a crucial factor in the change is not the result of rational reflection on the contents of a person's beliefs and values but on some external mechanism.[25] So even if the new system of values that toleration makes possible is continuous with the old, it does not arise solely out of the beliefs and values that the people already possess. In this case, in fact, the conversion required is not especially radical. It only requires one or both sides to place

the value of peaceful cooperation—a value they already hold—far above the goal of religious hegemony. They can in fact still hold onto the goal of hegemony in an attenuated fashion, as long as they accept that the only acceptable means for achieving it is rational persuasion. So although the change requires them to alter a value they hold dear, it need not, I think, require them to reconceptualize everything in their world of values.[26] Nevertheless, some significant change must occur to the participants before a deeper toleration is possible. Their souls, so to speak, must see a new light.

II.   PRECONDITIONS FOR CONVERSION

By definition, a conversion cannot be planned. A plan for a conversion is merely a plan to enter into a life that the convert already accepts as better; the conversion of values has already taken place. But a conversion is also a deeply internal matter, which is extremely difficult—and, in most cases, impossible—to bring about by force, as the religious wars amply demonstrate. So to claim that deep toleration is possible only after a conversion is to claim that true toleration in any given situation is a matter of moral luck.

Against this claim, we might argue that the shift to toleration is a change that can be rationally planned. While we may not be able to change the "hearts and minds" of any given individuals, we might say, we can engage in a course of action that we can expect will result in a more tolerant society. What is right about this objection is that certain circumstances, some of which we may be able to control, make particular conversions more likely. In one sense, this point is trivial: no one in the New World could convert to Christianity before 1492 because it simply did not exist as an option. In a similar manner, modern toleration becomes more likely after the success of a large-scale experiment, such as that in the Netherlands or later in England.

But the objection is supposed to be deeper; the objection is that we can structure societies in a way that will make toleration rationally compelling. I will argue that no institutions or practices can serve that purpose. The obvious candidates, I will suggest, often facilitate conversions once a critical mass of people have already become truly tolerant, but they do little if anything to create that critical mass in the first place.

The English Experiment

The best historical case for a rational transition from the minimal toleration of a modus vivendi to a deeper form is probably that of England after the

Act of Toleration of 1689. The story of toleration in England is a much happier one than that of seventeenth-century France. In the grand scheme of things, of course, England and France were two fairly similar Western countries, both scarred by religious wars that ended in a declaration of toleration that encompassed the warring parties. Indeed, the comparison between them is fruitful precisely because we have every reason to think they would have similar experiences. Yet a toleration that ends the religious wars in England is not achieved in France until after another trauma, the French Revolution.[27]

In England, the Act of Toleration in 1689 put an end to the religious tensions between Anglicans and Puritans that had begun as early as 1625 and that had seen its climax in the English Civil War of 1642-1649, the execution of Charles I, and the Commonwealth of 1651-1660.[28] By 1660, the Puritan party had been defeated, but it still wielded great influence in the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681[29] and in the Glorious Revolution that deposed the Catholic King James II in 1688 in favor of his Protestant nephew and daughter, William III and Mary II. But the 1689 act offered only a limited form of toleration: it granted freedom of worship only to Trinitarian Protestants, and only members of the official Anglican Church could hold office. So Catholics, Unitarians, and non-Christians still lay outside the official toleration.[30] However, prosecutions of these groups were not too severe—although popular protests against Catholics and Radical Dissenters could still turn to violence.[31] William and Mary had actually supported a broader form of toleration than the one that passed parliament, and they and most of their successors were not inclined to enforce the less tolerant provisions of the law.[32] More important, the Anglican Church, deprived of its monopoly, could not effectively ensure that everyone attended religious services at either an Anglican or an official Dissenter church. So in practice, Radical Dissenters and even Catholics were free to worship in their own way. In addition, Dissenters had the right to vote, and by the practice of "occasional conformity"—attending Anglican services just enough to meet the requirements of the Test and Corporations Acts—they could even hold office.[33] More important, over the next 150 years, toleration gradually expanded until it led to the Catholic Relief Bill of 1791, the repeal of the Test and Corporations Acts in 1828, and finally to the full emancipation of Catholics in 1829.[34] Public sentiment was not always fully in sympathy with these reforms at the time they became law—indeed, it strongly opposed the Emancipation itself—but the toleration, such as it was, became stable over time.

In England, we could argue, we have an example of a rational transition to toleration because the 1689 act and the milieu of eighteenth-century England created an environment in which toleration seen as a good in its own right could flourish. In particular, we might point to three institutional factors that

were crucial to this milieu: the political representation that the minority had in proto-democratic institutions, the economic freedom they experienced in proto-capitalism, and the individual autonomy that they had to choose their form of worship. These arrangements, we could then argue, made the acceptance of toleration rationally compelling for people in England in a way that it was not for the French of the seventeenth century. In these circumstances, we would then conclude, toleration did not require people to convert but merely to reflect on the requirements of their own values in their current context.

Indeed, part of this story is correct, I believe. Once enough people accepted toleration, then the rationality of toleration for many of the remainder changed because the community in which they sought to live had changed. In addition, once many people have accepted toleration, then the conversion is easier for many others. Nevertheless, I will argue, a close comparison between the English example and the French actually shows that none of these institutions promotes toleration unless a large number of people have *already* been converted.

Autonomy and Toleration

Probably the most important difference between England and France lies in the kind of autonomy that was granted to the minority groups. Both the Edict of Nantes and the Act of Toleration gave autonomy to the minorities, but it took rather different forms. The French edict gave the Huguenots considerable power *as a group*: it granted them control of certain fortresses, legal control over significant portions of the country, and special tribunals (the *chambres de l'Edit*) to settle their disputes with Catholics. The Dissenters in England, however, were never allowed any official political role as a group, so the autonomy that the Dissenters gained was strictly individual. In an important sense, then, the Huguenots actually had more effective control over their lives. The political structure of the villages and towns in which they were a majority gave them a considerable voice in the day-to-day rules by which they lived, and the chambres de l'Edit gave them a mechanism by which they could fight discrimination when it occurred.

But, some might argue, the Huguenots' state-within-a-state actually undermined toleration in the long run. Since the Huguenots thought the key to their security lay in self-defense, they maintained political networks, even beyond those allowed by the edict. They remained isolated from Catholics for the most part, and as a result, the Catholics continued to demonize them. By having so much control of their lives, we might think, the Huguenots had no incentives to build a more robust form of community with the French who

were Catholic. This claim is supported by the fact that in places where Catholics and Protestants were roughly equal, some genuine toleration did emerge. The two sides were often able to work out some formal or semiformal power-sharing arrangement over public offices, their children often intermarried without serious consequence, and they even agreed to share sacred spaces such as cemeteries.[35] In England, Anglicans and Presbyterians were mixed throughout most of the country, and such daily interactions, we might think, secured the bond between them. So, we might conclude, a form of toleration in France that encouraged such interactions would have been more successful.

While this account is partially correct, the reality is more complex. Close interactions by themselves do not, after all, always build bonds of trust. Blacks and whites have lived together in the South for generations without creating any real trust; they managed to live in separate worlds right next to each other. And, contrary to what most Americans seem to think, getting people to talk to one another can sometimes exacerbate differences and inflame passions rather than promote understanding.[36] In fact, allowing the Huguenots to have significant control over large parts of their lives was not an unreasonable way to build trust between the two groups, and studies of recent civil wars have endorsed these kinds of arrangement.[37] Trust is greatly enhanced if the members of each group are guaranteed a sphere in which they can be sure that others will not interfere with them and in which they can, for the most part, live in their own way. Meaningful political toleration thus requires some sort of system that assures minority groups that they will not be systematically destroyed, so some form of autonomy is essential.[38] But that autonomy need not focus on individual rights. As Will Kymlicka points out, a system based on group rights—the *millets*—operated successfully in the Ottoman Empire for nearly 500 years by allowing each religion to govern its own affairs and punish its own members.[39] In France, such a solution may have seemed ideal: as long as Catholics had considerable control over their lives, the Huguenots were likely to be suspicious of them, so having political control over their affairs enabled them to feel safe among their often-hostile neighbors.

However, both the French example and the Ottoman example show that such autonomy is not enough. The millet system worked fairly peacefully only as long as the non-Muslim groups accepted their politically subordinate position within the Empire.[40] Such groups were only tolerated because they were "peoples of the book," who were not completely mistaken.[41] But when Christian and Jews questioned their subordinate position, the Qu'ran no longer supported their place in Muslim society, and what toleration they had from the Muslim majority evaporated.[42] The autonomy of Christians and Jews was, then, strictly limited. In France, the Huguenots never felt secure even when they had their separate sphere before 1629, and that sphere only

roused the resentment of the Catholics, who believed that their loyalties lay more with their fellow Protestants in other countries than with their fellow Frenchmen. So, as long as the Huguenots did not occupy a subordinate position, group autonomy only made both groups more suspicious of each other. And once they did occupy such a position, the Catholics still did not trust them enough to grant them even as much autonomy as the Christians and Jews enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire. Real toleration in France was not possible until the Huguenots had some politically effective means to protect themselves, but effective autonomy required effective political power.

Group autonomy proved too volatile in France to encourage toleration, but individual autonomy would not have given the Huguenots sufficient control to help: they feared that the external pressures that the majority could bring to bear on individuals could destroy their communities. Indeed, the Catholics were even more wary of individual freedom: they did not want to allow the Huguenots to proselytize, so they wanted to keep the "threat" contained to as little territory as possible. In effect, in France, the sides were polarized enough that giving the Huguenots enough autonomy in any form to make them feel secure automatically made the Catholics nervous. A different form of autonomy, then, would not have made much difference in France.

Democracy and Toleration

We might think that the reason autonomy was unsuccessful in promoting toleration in France was that France lacked the democratic institutions that support autonomy. So, we might argue, the most important difference in the English and French cases lies in the beginnings of democracy that were present in England but that were suppressed by the absolutist policies of the Bourbon monarchs. England in eighteenth century had reasonably strong representative structures and real political debates, a development that helped people recognize that disagreements need not lead to warfare. On the other hand, the France of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV developed the structures of absolute government that bypassed national representative bodies such as the Estates General, ignored the local bodies such as the provincial parlements, and co-opted the independent power of the aristocracy.

Democratic institutions in England gave Dissenters some means by which to ensure that their grievances would be heard and some assurance that they would be able to have some effect on the machinery of government. Such a voice can become more effective as toleration takes hold since they can expect that other citizens will begin to take their concerns seriously.[43] Thus, one of the reasons that toleration worked in England, we might think, was that

its democratic institutions stabilized the country by providing a voice for those who disagreed with the policies of the government. But such democratic institutions are also strengthened by the recognition that people can coexist even when they have profound disagreements and that even deep problems can be resolved through democratic means. Thus, toleration and democracy feed off one another in a "virtuous cycle" that promotes both.

Yet even if the Bourbon monarchs in France had embraced democracy, it would not have helped the Huguenots. The "virtuous cycle" has to be primed. As long as the French Catholics were unwilling to see their Protestant neighbors as equals, democracy would have caused more problems for the Huguenots rather than less. Given the antipathy many Catholics felt toward the Protestants, democratic institutions may have led to even more restrictions on them. The experience of English Catholics during the "Popish Plot" scares of the 1670s demonstrates that democratic pressures can lead to intolerance. Democracy guarantees an effective voice to no one but the majority.

Even if democracy is, in our view, the best way to give minorities a voice, it is not the only way. In the Ottoman Empire, each millet governed most of its own affairs, and the sultan had separate agreements with each of the religious groups that gave its "leader" some standing at the Imperial Court.[44] Grievances from each group were thus guaranteed to be heard by the government— even if the community's voice was represented by one man and one perspective. Of course, that voice was also limited since it could never challenge the authority of the Muslim majority. But in that respect, minorities in a democracy usually fare no better and often fare worse.

Democracy alone, then, is not the essential ingredient in converting people to toleration. Indeed, democracy only seems to help in an indirect manner by demonstrating the possibility of peaceful disagreement. It thus helps solidify feelings of toleration that are already in place, and it thereby facilitates the transition to full toleration. But democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for toleration.

Capitalism and Toleration

The third important difference between the French and the English experiences is the emergence of proto-capitalistic markets in England, while France was still caught in mercantilism. Capitalism, we might think, aids toleration for two reasons.[45] First, unlike mercantile policies that focus on the state and enhance state power, capitalism decentralizes economic power, and it thereby facilitates other institutions—such as those surrounding toleration— that rely on decentralized power. In effect, capitalism teaches the lesson that

anarchy need not result when the state does not directly control an enterprise of national importance; indeed, the goals may actually be furthered better if the state is not a part of it.

Second and more important, capitalism gives the members of different religious groups a motivation to interact on a basis that ignores religion altogether. As Voltaire puts it,

> Go into the London Stock Exchange—a more respectable place than many a court—and you will see the representatives from all nations gathered together for the utility of men. Here Jew, Mohammadan and Christian deal with each other as though they were all of the same faith, and only apply the word infidel to people who go bankrupt. Here the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts a promise from the Quaker.[46]

As Albert Hirschman argues in his classic work, *The Passions and the Interests*, the early defenses of capitalism were based on the claim that if people would pay more attention to their economic self-interest, they would pay less attention to religious differences. Replacing "enthusiasm" for religion with the cool calculations of interest thus promotes social peace.[47] Toleration is simply a by-product of this effort to redirect people's social energies. Toleration is accepted because a person's religious beliefs cease to be their most important characteristic.

As powerful as this argument is, it too fails to show that capitalism is the crucial ingredient for toleration. First, unless enough people already accept toleration, the workings of free markets will actually encourage intolerance. In the segregated South, a white restaurant owner who seated African Americans in his restaurant would lose his white customers. Likewise, the corporation that promoted a black, no matter how well qualified, to a prominent position could lose all of its white—and therefore most prosperous—customers. By itself, then, a free market does little to promote toleration. Once toleration is in place, market pressures will force corporations to cater to minority groups in numerous ways, so capitalism and toleration, like democracy and toleration, may reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle. But once again, the cycle has to be primed with toleration first.

Second, economic interests often exacerbate the differences between religious groups, and the economic success of minorities often increases the hostility toward them. We need only reflect on the long-standing resentment of the Jews in Europe for their ability to make money to see the problem. In fact, the Huguenots in France were resented by Catholics in much the same manner.[48] With little hope for advancement in the traditional avenues of the army and the judiciary, many Huguenots had turned to commerce, which their religion—unlike Catholicism—encouraged. But that success hardly

endeared them to their Catholic neighbors, who felt that they competed unfairly.[49] Free markets, then, fanned the flames of intolerance.

Finally, structural elements within capitalism may work against toleration. If some Marxist analyses are even remotely correct, the interests of capitalist classes are to keep the working class divided to maintain their control of the markets and of the power that emanates from them.[50] So, for example, Marx argues that the antagonism between English and Irish workers, a division flamed by their religious differences, was "kept alive and intensified . . . by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes" to prevent the workers from understanding their common interests against the capitalists.[51] Thus, the interests of the monied classes may be to promote religious intolerance to further divide the workers.

In any case, the workings of capitalism certainly do not guarantee an increase in toleration. Only if some toleration is already in place is such an argument even plausible. So once again, we have identified a factor that may aid the cause of toleration in some cases, but not one that makes the initial conversion to toleration more likely.

III.   TRUST AND CONVERSIONS

Individual autonomy, democracy, and capitalism all seem to aid the cause of toleration once toleration is established, but none seems capable of facilitating the initial conversion to toleration. Other factors were probably more important for what actually happened in England and France, factors that are not broad social or institutional trends that may have universal significance but contextual differences that were important in the particular situations of seventeenth-century France and eighteenth-century England.

Trivial Differences

First, the English had one hundred years of additional religious conflict to draw on—not the least of which was the failed experiment in France. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was very much in the minds of the English during the Glorious Revolution of 1688—though the lesson many took from it was that Catholics could not be trusted. Perhaps, more important, the successful toleration practiced in the Netherlands—with which William III was intimately acquainted—provided inspiration.[52]

Second, toleration in England had the continuing support of the powers that be. From William III on, the monarchy supported toleration for the most

part, and they usually did not pursue even the prosecutions that were allowed under the law. In France, on the other hand, Louis XIII and Louis XIV considered toleration a nuisance, and they were quick to enforce the letter of the law over its spirit and even to violate the letter whenever they were not distracted by external concerns. A young Louis XIII had vowed to "work towards the ruin of the Huguenots if given the opportunity,"[53] and an older Louis XIV became more religious and sought to unite his country under his control and under one faith.[54] They allowed missionaries to the Huguenot areas who, by reinvigorating the faith of Catholics, attempted to convert the Huguenots by isolating them as much as possible from the larger community. These tactics, although peaceful, only exacerbated—or created—religious tensions.[55] After 1681, the means of conversion became less subtle, as Louis XIV quartered dragoons in the homes of Protestants with orders to create havoc unless the inhabitants converted.[56] In France, then, the powers that be sought to undermine any toleration that might develop. Creating a context for toleration, then, requires the active and personal support of the powerful. Such support is, as the death of Henri IV showed, an accident of history. Institutional structures, then, are never enough; the leaders must have a personal stake in its success.

Third, toleration in England actually encompassed a large number of religious groups, not simply Presbyterians and Anglicans. The fervor of the early years of the Commonwealth of the 1650s had produced a host of religious sects—Congregationalists, Seekers, Ranters, Shakers, Quakers, Millenarians, and Fifth Monarchists, just to name a few.[57] England thus had in living memory the experience of a vast religious pluralism, much of which continued to exist into the eighteenth century. Such multiple divisions meant that everyone had some need of tolerance from others. As Voltaire, once again, puts the point,

> If there were one religion in England there would be danger of despotism, if there were two they would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and happiness.[58]

Because they had considerable experience interacting with people of different religious views, the English thought less was at stake in the mere existence of other sects—even if most continued to think that a strong established church was essential to the well-being of the country. Such a fact is, of course, an accident of the particular history of the English Civil Wars, but once again it helped create an environment in which toleration seemed more possible.

Fourth, although the 1689 Act of Toleration included more groups than the Edict of Nantes, it actually encompassed smaller doctrinal differences, a fact that made it easier to accept. The Dissenters were often seen as rebels, as heirs to the regicides of 1649, but they were still Protestants. In that sense, the toleration did not force the Anglican majority to accept too much at once, and it thus allowed the process of opening toleration to other groups to take place over time (even if it took 140 years).

Of course, the sense that doctrinal differences are small depends greatly on the context, and small differences—such as those between Serbs and Croats—can actually exacerbate tensions in a "narcissism of minor differences."[59] After all, Catholics and Protestants were all Christians, but that fact only made the tensions between them more pronounced. So the doctrinal differences seemed small and insignificant only in the face of a fifth factor: the presence of a common enemy in Catholicism. The threat posed by the expansionist policies of Louis XIV in France and by the Catholic supporters of James II and his descendents within England gave the various Protestant groups—even those not officially tolerated by the 1689 act—a reason to unite behind the establishment. However unpalatable the Anglicans found an alliance with the Dissenters, the Dissenters would aid the establishment in the battle against Catholicism and the absolutism of Louis XIV. Only the unity created by that enmity gave them the impetus to tolerate each other. Thus, the important doctrinal differences between the various groups did not disappear; they just ceased to be important in the face of a common threat. Ironically, then—and sadly—toleration in England has at its very core a worm of intolerance.

The Conditions for Trust

The five factors I have just discussed are all doggedly contextual: they all depend crucially on the historical accidents of the time. None of them depends on broad institutional programs for promoting toleration.[60] None affects the conceptual difficulties of toleration or does anything to resolve the doctrinal differences between them. Nevertheless, these contextual features are not merely random features of the social environment. In the circumstances of eighteenth-century England, each affects the *psychology* of conversion: they make a world of toleration seem more possible and more attractive, and so they make the conversion more likely. The key to that conversion, of course, was the feelings that began to emerge between Anglicans and Puritans.

In England, the key to this developing attitude was the sense that national unity was more important than the niceties of confessional unity. There were two elements in this new unity: English nationalism and anti-Catholicism. William III emphasized the former element. His political goal in taking control of England was to advance the common national interests of both the Netherlands and England in opposing the imperialistic designs of Louis XIV. For him, national interests, not religious interests, were the key to the European future. In this respect, he was far ahead of his English subjects, for whom anti-Catholic sentiments were more salient. In opposing the threat by Louis XIV, the English saw themselves working together in the common enterprise against Catholic absolutism to secure their salvation and their freedom. In these ways, the groups could see each other as fellow Protestants and fellow Englishmen, rather than as threats. Only then could they see each other as trustworthy.

Each of the contextual factors I have discussed contributed to the environment that made such trust possible. The experience of France showed how intolerance could wreck a country. The personal support of William and his successors lent stability to the regime of toleration. And the sheer diversity of groups helped to make the idea of interacting with those of a different faith seem less threatening. Yet their common cause against Catholicism made those many differences less important and less salient than what they shared. In the context provided by these factors, in fact, the more institutional factors discussed in the last section were able to play helpful roles. Individual autonomy helped to loosen group ties and thus left a place to create bonds between individuals based on a common national interest. Proto-democracy demonstrated the possibility of conflict resolution without warfare. And proto-capitalism showed that people of different religions could successfully interact with each other. Thus, in the context of eighteenth-century England, all of these elements promoted a trust that bridged the conceptual, psychological, and imaginative gaps that existed between a world in which true toleration holds few attractions and a world in which it is widely accepted and promoted.

As stated, we might think the lessons of the English example are rather depressing: toleration for Protestants, it seems, was built substantially on intolerance for Catholics. Sobering as this fact is, we should not, I think, become too disheartened. English hostility toward Catholicism only shows that a nation needs a common ideal that unites the parties to toleration, a common cause that makes those differences seem less important. Indeed, any group will define itself by the differences it has with other groups, particularly by differences in values or in ways of life.[61] Such differences lead to intolerance only if the two groups also believe that they cannot live in

proximity to one another. So even if the shared goal on which England's toleration was based was an anti-Catholic Protestantism, we can hope that the common ideal can be provided by a cultural heritage, a shared history, or, ultimately, by liberty and toleration themselves. We need not conclude that toleration is always based on intolerance.

In addition, even when toleration is founded on intolerance, that toleration is not forever tainted. The long-term character of the alliance between Anglicans and Presbyterians in England meant that many Anglicans, for example, grew up thinking of Presbyterians as people with whom they had shared goals. In emphasizing the important shared goals, each group can come to see the other as part of a shared enterprise, rather than as a threat. A similar pattern has occurred in the United States, even among the Americans whom we often think are less than tolerant: many who once insisted that the country was based on Protestant (more often, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) values came to see it as based on Christian values and, more recently, on Judeo-Christian values. So, even a toleration that is founded on intolerance can become more expansive over time, and the toleration that does exist itself becomes deeper with time as well.

The transition to broader and deeper forms of toleration is not, however, an automatic process. Indeed, as the many factors I have discussed amply illustrate, the practices that develop shared goals are not themselves practices of toleration. Instead, these practices focus on the shared goals, whatever they happen to be, and not on toleration as such. Nevertheless, they create the trust that is necessary for a deeper form of toleration; with luck, they may even promote genuine understanding between people. In any case, once someone can trust members of a different group, then she will no longer begrudge her toleration of them, and at minimum, she will no longer resent the diversity that others represent. That sentiment, I take it, is the minimum requirement for a more robust form of toleration in which toleration is seen as a good in its own right. Thus, contrary to our expectations, toleration does not create trust; instead, trust creates toleration. Or, more accurately, toleration begins in a tentative trust, which makes toleration easier, which in turn makes trust easier. Trust and toleration thus feed on each other in a virtuous cycle.

Ultimately, then, the problem in seventeenth-century France was less that the Edict of Nantes set up institutions that kept Catholics and Huguenots apart but that it created few that forced them to work together to create a common identity[62] or at least a set of common goals. Trust is always hard to nurture in any postwar context, and the obstacles were many, especially since neither side thought toleration was even possible. Since no broad trust developed, a deeper toleration was impossible.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

None of the factors I have discussed in this essay makes toleration rationally required. Each affects only the conceptual or the psychological possibilities for conversion. They thus make toleration into a "real option," to use Bernard Williams's phrase,[63] and perhaps an attractive one—but they do not make it rationally compelling to the people involved. Of course, once a critical mass of people does accept toleration as a virtue, the possibilities for further conversions become even greater because the existence of successful conversions proves that they are possible, because their presence can make vivid the attractions of the world of toleration, and because the cadre of tolerant can support the new converts, both in their new beliefs and in their new lives. At this point, the virtuous cycles of capitalism, democracy, and autonomy can give the process even further momentum. Then, even self-interest will support toleration.

Nevertheless, that band of converts is not guaranteed to grow, even if the social conditions are favorable. And in most cases, their very existence will provoke a reaction. Only after a long struggle is toleration likely to become widely accepted, and only after another is it likely to gain the force of law. In this respect, the proponents of toleration are no different from any other political group seeking to advance its cause. Of course, this group thinks it can offer something that no other group can: a chance for people of different views to exist together. It is a unique group only in the sense that it tries to encompass as many other groups as possible. But even among the tolerant, admission has a price. Everyone must accept at least one common value: the value of toleration itself. In such a context, conversion to toleration is not too difficult; it does not require too many changes in beliefs and values. Nevertheless, the changes it does require may be quite significant.

In addition, once toleration becomes accepted in one country, it creates a new context for the conversion to toleration in other countries. So in our world, no country is faced with problems as insurmountable as those faced by the French or the English. In our world, we can hope that the attractions of a tolerant society are evident enough that people in other societies will be drawn to it. But the evidence of Lebanon and Northern Ireland in the 1970s and Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s shows how difficult the transition can still be.

However, the acceptance of toleration is not promoted, I think, if we insist that toleration is rationally required. Such a view fails to take the beliefs of others into account, and so it fails to treat these individuals as the "self-authenticating sources of valid claims"[64]—as toleration itself requires. Preaching toleration sometimes helps, but a more effective means is to

demonstrate to them the possibilities available in such a life or to show people how it can make goals that they already have more possible.[65] Of course, adopting toleration as a virtue will itself change some of those goals, but such is the nature of all conversions.

The emergence of toleration is, then, a matter of context, not a matter of rationality. As such, questions about whether conversions to toleration should occur are less about justifications than about hopes, hopes that come from those who have already "crossed over." What made the English story a relative success and the French story a failure, then, lay in factors that were largely outside the control of any given actor. In France, I think, even the support of the king would not have made toleration a reality. The climate was yet ripe for it. The tragedy in France, while not exactly in the stars, was not a failure of rationality—in the king or anyone else. It was, mostly, bad moral luck. The contexts in which toleration can emerge and flourish are a delicate balance of factors that add up to a climate in which trust can emerge where it could not before. If so, then even the stability of toleration in our society must be carefully nourished. The achievement of toleration is, then, both fortuitous and fragile.

NOTES

1. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 158-68.

2. For the distinction here between two kinds of toleration, see John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *University of Chicago Law Review* 64 (1997): 783.

3. Getting the two sides to the point where they can accept toleration as a modus vivendi is itself a difficult task. Indeed, both sides usually have plenty of reason to distrust the other and plenty of reason to think that toleration in any form would be irrational. I discuss these issues in "Trust and the Rationality of Toleration," *Noûs* 32 (1998): 82-98.

4. Thus, we begin to see toleration as a virtue somewhere around the third of the five points on Michael Walzer's spectrum of attitudes of toleration: it is somewhere near the "principled recognition that the 'others' have rights even if they exercise those rights in unattractive ways." See Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 11 and chap. 1 in general. I do not think we have to see the issues in terms of rights, but the point is that we must think there is some positive value in living together with those who are different. We could do so because we think they have rights to moral autonomy in a Kantian, manner because we think such differences help us find the truth in a more Millian manner, or because we have yet other reasons to find their presence valuable.

5. For the general historical scenario, I rely on the following sources: Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7; Emmanuel La Roy Ladurie, *The Ancien Régime, 1610-1774*, trans. Mark Greengrass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), chaps. 1-2; A. D. Lublinskaya, *French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-29*, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and

Robin Briggs, *Early Modern France, 1560-1715* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3(i)-(ii).

6. This point is emphasized in N. M. Sutherland, "The Crown, the Huguenots, and the Edict of Nantes," in *The Huguenot Connection*, ed. R. M. Golden (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988), 28-48.

7. On Henri's conversion and various factions' perspectives on it, see Michael Wolfe, *The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

8. At best, both sides sought what Mario Turchetti calls "religious concord"—an attempt to reach a substantive agreement between the two groups about the correct religion—rather than any genuine form of toleration. See Turchetti, "Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 22 (1991): 15-25.

9. On this point on the Catholic side at least, see Barbara Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Many of these differences in values can, I think, be explained by rational choice mechanisms discussed in Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). But as Robert Goodin points out, these mechanisms do not fully explain the deep attachments people have to these values. See Goodin, "Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?," in *The Morality of Nationalism*, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88-104. Indeed, I would argue that Goodin's additions, while suggestive, do not go far enough.

10. This point was made clear to me by J. Donald Moon.

11. David Gauthier suggests such an argument in "In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality)," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 89 (1988-1989): 179-94.

12. I discuss these and other kinds of value transformations in "Moral Conversions," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56 (1996): 531-50.

13. Whether the Huguenots' assessment was accurate is hard to determine since their beliefs created distrust in the Catholics. Nevertheless, that belief was not unreasonable on its face, and the Catholics did nothing to assuage the Huguenots' fears.

14. See Christian Desplat, "Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to France," trans. Mark Greengrass, in *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the Modern State in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Mark Greengrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 68-83.

15. After 1622, only the heavily fortified port city of La Rochelle held out for the Huguenots on the hope of English intervention. But that intervention, when it eventually came, was woefully inadequate, and the fortress finally fell in 1628.

16. The Fronde was a series of rebellions against Mazarin and the young Louis XIV that at various times involved the officeholders in the parlements and the Prince de Condé. It represented the last resistance to the absolutist pretensions of the French Crown. See La Roy Ladurie, *The Ancien Régime*, chap. 3.

17. See Elisabeth Labrousse, *"Une foi, une loi, un roi?": Essai sur la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes* (Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1985), chap. 2.

18. See Elisabeth Labrousse, "Understanding the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes from the Perspective of the French Court," trans. Ruth Whelan, in *The Huguenot Connection*, 49-62.

19. One result was that both sides framed any conflict that arose as one in which the other side provoked a hostile response, and each side saw its own actions merely as a defense of rights already established by the Edict of Nantes. So, for example, Louis XIII saw his invasion of Béarn

as an act to protect the Catholic minority in the province, and the Huguenots saw it as a prelude to a more general campaign against them and the rights guaranteed to them by the edict.

20. See, for example, Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1984), 62-66.

21. See Jonas Proast, *The Argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration, Briefly Consider'd and Answer'd* (Oxford, 1690; reprint, New York: Garland, 1984).

22. I canvass these arguments more thoroughly in "The Justification of Toleration," in *Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance*, eds. Mehdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 134-56.

23. Rawls would not, I think, disagree with this conclusion. In his terms, the people of the sixteenth century were "rational," but they were not "reasonable." For Rawls, they do not count as "reasonable" because they do not accept the "burdens of judgment"—that is, they do not accept the view that rational people can have deep disagreements about facts and values. But Rawls, of course, is quite clear that his conception of the "reasonable" is a moral conception and that the "reasonable" cannot be derived from the "rational." See Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 48-58. For an account of the limits of Rawls's view of the reasonable, see Leif Wenar, "Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique," *Ethics* 106 (1995): 32-62.

24. I discuss such alternative models for a situation similar to this one in part III of "Trust and the Rationality of Toleration."

25. I discuss various forms of conversion and the extent to which they can be rationally justified in "Moral Conversions." For a similar view about the rationality of belief changes, see Anna Kussler, "Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt," in *Preferences*, eds. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 78-87.

26. This conversion is then what I have called a "conversion by evolution" or perhaps a "conversion by discovery," but not a "conversion by revelation." For my use of these terms, see "Moral Conversions."

27. One could argue that the Edict of Nantes was an important part of a success story that led to toleration for Protestants during the French Revolution. In that way, one could argue, it was part of a process that led to greater toleration than in England, where Catholics did not achieve full rights until 1829. In a sense, of course, this point is correct: in a sense, every past event shapes the future in some way. But the toleration needed to end the religious conflicts in France required the massive upheavals of the French Revolution, while a structurally similar toleration was achieved in Britain by the Act of Toleration. In Britain, that toleration, once achieved, was never revoked—though a broader form of toleration in Britain was achieved only with painful slowness.

28. For a general account of the context, see J. R. Jones, "The Revolution in Context," in *Liberty Secured? Britain before and after 1688*, ed. J. R. Jones (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 11-52 and his earlier book, *The Revolution of 1688 in England* (New York: Norton, 1972).

29. The Whigs, led by Locke's patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Lord of Shaftesbury, tried to pass a bill that would have excluded Charles II's Catholic brother, James, from the throne after Charles's death. All these efforts ultimately failed, and James became king in 1685. For an account, see J. R. Jones, *The First Whigs* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961).

30. In addition, the Act of Toleration only applied to England and Wales. In Scotland, the Revolution led to the reestablishment of the Presbyterian Church, which allowed no toleration for dissenters, even members of the previous Episcopalian establishment. See Jones, "The Revolution in Context," 43-45.

31. The most significant acts of public violence were those in 1710 in support of Henry Sacheverell, a high-church cleric who was impeached for preaching against the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and against toleration, the anti-Catholic riots in 1780 inspired by the efforts of Lord George Gordon to oppose freedom of worship for Catholics, and the riots against Radical Dissenter (and chemist) Joseph Priestley in 1791. For an account of religious dissent in the eighteenth century, see J.C.D. Clark, *English Society 1688-1832* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 5.

32. The only exception was Queen Anne, who was much attached to the Anglican hierarchy. Toward the end of her reign (1702-1714), the newly elected Tory majority closed loopholes in the laws and supported the Anglican complaints against Dissenters. But even they did not repeal the Act of Toleration.

33. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, *English Society*, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in *From Persecution to Toleration*, eds. Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.

34. These measures then precipitated the great democratic reform in English history, the Reform Bill of 1832, which itself became a religious issue when the bishops in the House of Lords opposed it in 1831. For an account of these changes, see Clark, *English Society*, chap. 6.

35. See Keith Luria, "Rituals of Conversion: Catholics and Protestants in Seventeenth-Century Poitou," in *Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800)*, eds. Barbara Diefendorf and Carla Hesse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 65-81; Gregory Hanlon, *Confession and Community in Seventeenth Century France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); and Labrousse, *"Une foi, une loi, un roi?,"* chap. 4.

36. For example, the negotiations at Camp David in 1978 between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin nearly broke down when the two principals spoke directly to each other. Only by shuttling between them could American President Jimmy Carter salvage an agreement. See Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), 327-60.

37. See, for example, Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War," *International Security* (forthcoming) and I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 20-34.

38. This issue is precisely the one debated by Charles Taylor and his critics in *Multiculturalism*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Using Québec as his model, Taylor argues that a government should go to great lengths to ensure the survival of a cultural group. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73. His critics are, however, suspicious of these claims. See especially, Michael Walzer, "Comment," 99-103, and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," 107-48.

39. See Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," *Analyse und Kritik* 14 (1992): 33-56. Indeed, as Michael Walzer points out, toleration can be achieved in many different kinds of settings. See Walzer, *On Toleration*, chap. 2. For more on the Ottoman example, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, "Introduction," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), I:1-34.

40. For a criticism of the Ottoman Empire as an example of toleration, see Moshe Halbertal, "Autonomy, Toleration, and Groups Rights: A Response to Will Kymlicka," in *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-13. See

also C. E. Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, I:37-51.

41. As "peoples of the book," most religions had some element of the truth. But as Seyyed Hossein Nasr notes, traditional Muslims cannot accept a view in which "man's rights" are placed above "God's rights." See Nasr, "The Metaphysical Roots of Tolerance and Intolerance," in *Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance*, 43-56.

42. See, for example, Samir Khalaf, "Communal Conflicts in Nineteenth-Century Lebanon," and Moshe Ma^coz, "Communal Conflicts in Ottoman Syria during the Reform Era: The Role of Political and Economic Factors," both in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, II:107-34 and II:91-105, respectively.

43. For a discussion of the importance of voice in organizations, particularly in politics, see Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

44. See Braude and Lewis, "Introduction" and Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma."

45. The importance of economic arguments was emphasized to me by William Charron.

46. Voltaire, *Letters on England*, trans. Leonard Tancock (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1980), 41.

47. Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). See also Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest," in *Passions and Constraints* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 42-68.

48. See Warren Scoville, *The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), chap. 2, especially 47-57, and Elisabeth Labrousse, *"Une foi, une loi, un roi?"* chap. 4.

49. See Scoville, *Persecution of the Huguenots*, chap. 5.

50. This point was emphasized to me by Eric Margolis.

51. Karl Marx, "Marx to Meyer and Vogt, 9 Apr. 1870," in *Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 591-92. For a discussion of the issues at stake in this letter, see Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21-22.

52. Even in the Netherlands, however, toleration was a very recent practice, and it was not well established even in 1688. Indeed, William III had to intervene personally to quash an anti-Catholic measure in Holland in 1687. See Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), chap. 27.

53. Quoted in Desplat, "Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to France," 69.

54. See Scoville, *Persecution of the Huguenots*, 30 and Labrousse, "Understanding the Revocation."

55. Luria, "Rituals of Conversion."

56. Scoville, *Persecution of the Huguenots*, chap. 2.

57. For an account of the radical religious ideas that emerged in the English Revolution, see Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1972).

58. Voltaire, *Letters on England*, 41.

59. On this phenomenon in politics, see Michael Ignatieff, "The Narcissism of Minor Differences" in *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 34-71. See also his *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).

60. This view is confirmed by Bernard Williams's conclusions about the nature of trust: "The problem of cooperation cannot be solved merely at the level of decision theory, social psychology, or the general theory of social institutions." See Williams, "Formal Structures and Social

Reality," in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 3-13; the quotation is at 13.

61. Such "norms of exclusion" have many kinds of benefits for the group, as Russell Hardin points out. See Hardin, *One for All*, chap. 4.

62. For more on issues of identity in the early modern context, see Ingrid Creppell, "Toleration and Identity in Early Modern Europe: The Contribution of Jean Bodin" (unpublished manuscript, 1999).

63. Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 160-67.

64. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 32.

65. This process is, in fact, how almost all virtues are taught. See Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 14.

Richard H. Dees is an associate professor of philosophy and a member of the core faculty in women's studies at Saint Louis University. He has published articles on contextual elements of political justification, and he is currently working on a book on the justification of toleration.