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The emergence of toleration as a social virtue out of the melee of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is often seen as crucial to the development of modern liberalism (Rawls 1993, xxiii–xxiv; Kymlicka 1995, 155; Mendus 1989, 6–8). But how exactly toleration came to be regarded as a virtue in the West—indeed, how it became possible at all—is never examined closely. From the perspective of the twentieth century, toleration seems like the rational response to the intractable conflicts that the religious wars represent. In our most Whiggish moments, we even think that the widespread acceptance of toleration is one of the triumphs of rationality in the modern era. As a result, we react with amazed horror to sectarian conflicts in places like Beirut, Bosnia, and Belfast, and we wonder out loud why they "all can't just get along."

But before we shake our heads in disgust once again, we should pause to consider whether toleration really is rationally required in these deep conflicts. I will argue that in fact it almost never is. Indeed, before toleration will be rational in the classic cases of conflict, I will suggest, a deep change in the participants—a moral conversion—is required.

I. The Case for Distrust

We can begin most fruitfully, I think, by looking at an example from those much-cited wars of religion. Consider the view of Parisian Catholics on the eve of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 24 August 1572, in which they would slaughter thousands of their Huguenot countrymen for the simple reason that they were Protestants.[1] Two days before, Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, an important Huguenot military leader, had been wounded in an assassination attempt, and rumors were already circulating that the Huguenots would retaliate by staging a coup against the Catholic king, Charles IX. Although Charles and his mother, Catherine de Med-

ici, probably did not order the attempt on the admiral, they had good reason to believe that the incident would trigger another round in the civil wars that had raged off and on for ten years. Since the Protestants had never seemed too anxious to keep the peace in the three previous Wars of Religion,[2] Charles and his mother believed the Huguenots would not suffer this attack lightly. Rather than wait for the Huguenots' next move, they decided to take the offensive.

In that context, the early hours of 24 August presented Charles and his mother with a unique opportunity. Much of the Huguenot leadership had remained in Paris after the 18 August wedding of the Huguenot prince Henri de Navarre (who later become King Henri IV) to Charles's sister, Marguerite de Valois.[3] The temptation to decapitate the Huguenot movement in one stroke was overwhelming. So Charles and his mother ordered the king's own guard to finish off Coligny and to assassinate several dozen other Huguenot leaders in the city.[4]

That order set events spinning out of control. The very act of sending out the king's men against the Huguenot nobility ignited the passions of the overwhelmingly Catholic population of Paris. Over the previous decade, Parisians had amply demonstrated their devotion to Catholicism by acrimoniously opposing any peace treaties that had allowed Protestants to live in the city and by subjecting the Protestants that dared to remain to ever-increasing cycles of harassment and violence. Convinced that the mere presence of heretics in the city was displeasing to God—a message reinforced by Catholic priests like Simon Vigor (Diefendorf 1991, ch. 9)—the people were ready to see the killing of the Huguenot leadership as a general call to the massacre of all Protestants. The results were the thousands of deaths in the St. Bartholomew's Massacres both in Paris and in the provinces[5] and another quarter century of increasingly bitter warfare.

From the perspective of the late twentieth-century, we want to say that a more rational—not to mention a more moral—strategy would result if both sides had been willing to enter into a cooperative relationship based on principles fair to both sides.[6] But the toleration that such a relationship requires is much more complicated than this platitude suggests.[7] Toleration surely requires at least a minimal level of trust. Since toleration makes us vulnerable to others, "we" have to trust "them" not to take advantage of our willingness to cooperate. If the two sides can not trust each other at all, then they can not form even the distant relationship that mere tolerance demands.

Trust, however, is rational only if we can reasonably expect to gain something from it—or at least, if we do not have to sacrifice too much for it. In classical rational choice language, the Catholics of sixteenth-century France should have trusted the Huguenots enough to tolerate them only if the probability that the Huguenots were trustworthy multiplied by the gain they would receive if they proved to be so was greater than the probability that the Huguenots would betray them multiplied by the loss if they did.[8] The outcome of such a calculation would not have been to trust the Huguenots. In the view of the Parisian Catholics, the probability that the Huguenots would betray them was very high indeed. In fact, they thought, the Huguenots were untrustworthy *because* they were Protestants:

anyone who could give up the true church and who could defy the laws so openly was obviously suspect. As some Catholics of the time put it, "in diversity of religion, brotherly love and certainty of loyal service are never found."[9] In addition, the Catholics thought they would give up a lot if they made themselves vulnerable to the Huguenots: they were convinced that given the chance, the Protestants would not hesitate to kill them.

These worries could have been allayed if the French government had been a relatively neutral power that could enforce a settlement between the two sides. Then, they would not have needed to trust *each other*; they could have trusted the government instead. But of course, the state in France was not neutral, and the attempts by Catherine and later by Henri III to change its tenor were undermined by Catholic hardliners.[10] The government did not even have enough power to enforce discipline among its Catholic supporters, much less on others, and without the support of the Catholic hardliners, it could not perform even its most mundane functions. The state thus faced a classic empowerment problem: it had no power to enforce a peace unless the two sides ceded power to it, but neither side would do so until the government was already powerful enough to enforce its will.[11] As long as both sides could not trust each other at all, the government did not have the power to change the dynamics of the situation. Thus, trusting the government, rather than each other, was not a viable option.

Trust, then, either in each other or in the government, was not rationally required or even desirable for the parties involved. If anything, rationality required *distrust*.

Of course, the case of the Catholics and the Huguenots in sixteenth-century France is hardly unique. In any deep conflict, the parties will have more than enough reason to be suspicious of each other, and so they will see little reason to trust each other. To defend the rationality of trust, we can attack this argument in one of two ways: we can claim that the calculation involved is mistaken, a claim I will examine in section II; or we can claim that, contrary to the model of rationality implicit in these calculations, the nature of rationality itself requires trust, a claim I will examine in section III. Only in section IV will I suggest what has to occur before toleration can become a rational response to these forms of conflict.

II. The Calculation of Trust

The claim that the attitude of the Catholics was irrational because it was based on a gross miscalculation is the claim that the Catholics irrationally misjudged the reliability of the Huguenots, the harms that intolerance might create, or the gains that tolerance might bring. In a word, it is the claim that the Catholics' fears were based on false beliefs.

A. The price of trust

So, first, we might claim, the Huguenots were not as untrustworthy as the Catholics imagined. Given the opportunity to co-exist, we might argue, the Huguenots would not have harmed the Catholics. Such an argument, however, ignores the reality of the war that the two sides were fighting, and it fails to take seriously

their religious views. The Catholics and Huguenots were bitter enemies, because their views of the world did not permit religious compromise. They each thought that salvation was at stake and therefore that their most important duty was to win the war, and they each took whatever advantages they could find. Such an attitude, however, inspired a justifiable degree of wariness from their opponents. So we can not simply attribute their distrust to false beliefs about each other—even though they each went to some lengths to demonize the other.

B. The costs of intolerance

Second, we could argue that the Catholics miscalculated, because they had false beliefs about the consequences of war and therefore about the consequences of distrust.[12] If they had understood the suffering that the war might entail, we might argue, then they would have been more willing to risk toleration. Part of this claim is, of course, 20/20 hindsight; we know that the war and its consequences would stretch beyond anything they could imagine. To deem them irrational, however, we must claim that they did not realistically assess their chances of complete victory, that they did not adequately weigh the risks involved, or that they did not fully appreciate the horrors that might occur. Such a charge, of course, is almost certainly true: people usually overestimate their chances of winning a war, and almost no one involved in a violent conflict can appreciate its effects ahead of time. Of course, by this standard, virtually all wars are irrational.

Yet even if they had understood the tragic consequences of the enterprise on which they were about to engage, they were not necessarily irrational to pursue it. For some things, they might argue, we should "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe." And if we should do so "to assure the survival and success of liberty," as John Kennedy urged (Kennedy 1961, 313), then the Catholics of the sixteenth century would think that we should be even more willing to do so for the sake of eternal salvation. So, if we take their religious beliefs and values seriously and if we recognize that they believed that salvation itself was at issue, their willingness to endure war does not seem irrational at all.

Alternatively, we could argue that the Catholics miscalculated the costs of intolerance, because they had false beliefs about God's support for intolerance. Indeed, we might argue, the fact that the war lasted so long should have forced them to realize that God was not really on their side. But reading God's intentions from events in this world is notoriously difficult, so what some see as God's condemnation can equally be seen as a test of faith. Given the Catholics' view of the nature of salvation and of God's revelation—views which can not, I think, be shown to be *false*—we can not view their intransigence on this point as irrational. So, once again, if we take their religious beliefs seriously, we can not claim that the Catholics' trust calculations were based on false beliefs.

C. Beyond distrust

The third way we can criticize the Catholics' trust calculation is to argue that they did not understand what they had to gain from tolerating the Huguenots. As the

history of the past 400 years has shown, we might argue, toleration is a viable option that can be good for everyone, if only both sides can trust one another.

Unfortunately, even if they had our knowledge of what would come, the French Catholics could still reject our arguments. Trust alone was not the issue. If it were, then the Edict of Saint-Germain of 1562, which granted a limited toleration to the Huguenots even before the civil wars began, should have been enough to give both sides the assurances they needed. Instead, most Catholics reacted to it with horror; rather than prevent civil strife, it actually provoked the First War of Religion.[13] The Catholics reacted as they did, because they saw the church less as a set of doctrines to be believed than as the source for the social bond itself (Holt 1995, ch. 1). For them, salvation was not an individual achievement, but a *collective* good, which could be achieved only within a community of fellow believers. The people were "one bread, one body," joined in one communion and one community. Thus, even if the Catholics had believed that the Huguenots were not a direct threat to their *physical* well-being, these "heretics" were a threat to their *spiritual* well-being. For that reason, they thought that the Protestants were a cancer that had to be cut out for the good of the body politic (Diefendorf 1991, 28–38).

So the Catholics saw little to gain even if the Huguenots could be trusted not to kill them. In their view, a state could not exist unless the people shared a religion. And even if such a state could exist, it would be highly undesirable. So even if the Catholics had thought that toleration would stop the bloodshed, the price of that peace, they believed, was eternal damnation. Yet because the cares of this world, however horrible, were trivial compared to the cares of the next, they thought that the goods of tranquility were not worth the risk to their souls.

Thus, the Catholics' view goes beyond distrust. Nothing but the abjuration of the Huguenots would have been better than the war. Peace by itself was not enough. No matter how much the Huguenots were willing to cooperate with them, the Catholics could not see toleration as an option any more than we could see tolerating the Nazis as an option. Toleration, they thought, would desecrate the truth and damn everyone. Thus, the Catholics had nothing to gain from toleration. And of course, except for a few minor differences, the Huguenots had the same reasons not to tolerate the Catholics. In such circumstances, intolerance is a rational response.[14]

For this reason, the solution to this problem can not be found by seeing it as a Prisoners' Dilemma.[15] In truth, the situation would actually be much *improved* if it were a Prisoners' Dilemma. In a Prisoners' Dilemma, each prisoner does better by confessing than by remaining silent, no matter what the other does, but each sees the outcome in which both confess as worse than the outcome in which both remain silent. The result is, to use Derek Parfit's words, "collectively self-defeating" (Parfit 1984, 88). So if the situation between Catholics and Protestants were a Prisoners' Dilemma, the combatants would see toleration as better than fighting, if only they could trust each other enough to tolerate. The only problem, then, would be to find a way to get both sides to trust each other enough to secure an outcome they both preferred to civil war. But in fact, not only did both sides

think that intolerance was better no matter what the other side chose, but they also preferred civil war to toleration; anything less, they thought, would betray their faith. So, from the participants' points of view, civil war was not even collectively self-defeating; each thought that only total victory represented a better outcome.

At this point, we might argue that there are no established facts which *prevent* the two sides from cooperating, so we can blame them for failing to do so.[16] But such a stance is possible only if we *reject* their beliefs about what is required for salvation. To condemn those beliefs as *irrational*, however, we must show that their beliefs about salvation are false or that they were irrational to believe them. But without begging any questions against them, I see no means by which to do so. Modern Catholic and Protestant beliefs about salvation are shaped by a prior acceptance of toleration as a virtue, and so invoking them will tell us nothing about whether the Catholics and Huguenots of the sixteenth century were irrational. So, while we may disagree with the sixteenth-century interpretations of particular Biblical texts or of God's will in general, we can not condemn those views simply because we have a different understanding. So while no firmly-established facts preclude cooperation, no firmly-established facts require it either.

We might then hope that the problem of the religious wars is unique and that the problems would not be so intractable if eternal damnation were not at stake. But the stakes need not be literally infinite to create an argument for distrust. As long as more is at stake than mere physical well-being, the combatants can think warfare is needed to protect their values. So, for example, the key value could be a conception of freedom, and betraying it would be seen as a form of slavery. Or the key value could be the moral identity of a particular group, and betrayal would undermine its members' sense of themselves as moral beings. If we place a high, yet finite, value on freedom or moral integrity and if we reasonably believe that these values are threatened by others, then our unwillingness to tolerate them need not be based on any false beliefs about the world. Thus, we are not irrational to reject toleration—at least, not on the model of rationality we have been using so far.

III. Alternative Models of Rationality

The second way we can attack the argument for the rationality of distrust is to challenge the model of rationality that underlies it.

We might first argue that the model focuses too narrowly on self-interested rationality. If both sides would simply look at the broader interests, we might claim, then some accommodation could be found. The problems occur, we would claim, because each side was unwilling to risk its own safety for the greater good. But this argument fails to understand the devastating logic of the religious wars. The antagonists on both sides did not believe they were acting for their own self-interest; indeed, they believed that they were looking after the salvation of the *other* side as well as that of their co-religionists. So their calculations of the potential benefits and losses of toleration were not based on what was good for themselves alone, but on what they thought was good for everyone, friend and

enemy alike. Narrow self-interest was not the problem; if anything, aggressive other-directed interest was the problem.[17] For us, the point is perhaps seen even better in the case of freedom: often, the freedom we seek to win is not our own—as both the American Civil War and World War II demonstrate.

A potentially better argument is to claim that the model of rationality is too instrumental, since it measures the rationality of the parties only against their own beliefs and values. This argument can be successful, however, only if we can propose a model of rationality which is plausible in its own right, which does not beg the question against the Catholics and Huguenots of the sixteenth century, and which will show why trust in these cases is rational. I shall, over the next three sections, examine several models of rationality that try to meet these requirements: the first claims that certain rationally required goals preclude distrust (section A), the second that the structure of rationality itself precludes it (section B), and the third that rationality precludes every other means by which to achieve our goals (section C).

A. Rationally-required goals

The first model of rationality is that certain rationally-required goods preclude distrust. Whatever goals are proposed, however, this model will show that trust is rational only if it implies that avoiding bloodshed is more important than achieving goals like freedom or salvation. This position is, of course, precisely the view that underlies Hobbes's famous arguments for absolute government. The only way to prevent the kind of civil wars that plagued both France and Britain, Hobbes claims, is to give complete power to a sovereign who can then use that power to keep everyone in line (Hobbes 1991, first and second parts). But even if Hobbes's particular conclusions were not so distasteful, his approach is unpromising. Hobbes himself understands its limits: he realizes that salvation is such a powerful motivating force that he devotes nearly half of *Leviathan* to a bizarre argument designed to undermine the Puritan case for rebellion, and he is well aware that many people think that honor and glory were more important than peace (Hobbes 1991, third part; Herzog 1989, ch. 3). To insist that avoiding bloodshed is always the most important goal denies the importance of salvation, honor, glory, and freedom. To claim that these goals are less important than survival simply begs the question against both sides in the conflict.

Hobbes's argument, like many social contract arguments, claims that rationality requires us to adopt the goal of cooperating with anyone who is willing to cooperate with us.[18] The goal of cooperation will, then, require us to tolerate anyone who will similarly tolerate us. The most important variant of this argument can be found in the work of John Rawls. Toleration, Rawls argues, is the result of two elements. The first is the fact of reasonable disagreement: even after due consideration of the facts, reasonable people can still disagree with one another about the most fundamental questions in life. The second is the requirement of reasonability: reasonable people are willing to cooperate with each other on terms fair to all. Toleration, Rawls then claims, is the only principle to which all reasonable people would agree (Rawls 1993, 58–61).

However, Rawls himself does not think that this conclusion follows from rationality alone. The claim that this argument shows that toleration is rationally required is possible only if the requirements of "reasonability" are themselves rationally required. Rawls himself does not think they are; the reasonable, he claims, can not be derived from the rational (Rawls 1993, 51–53).[19] But, we might argue, since Rawls's conception of rationality is itself only slightly stronger than instrumental rationality (Rawls 1993, 50–51), we should broaden it to include what is reasonable, and then we can claim that this more robust model of rationality entails toleration.

Of course, such a move packs a lot of moral content into the conception of rationality.[20] As Rawls points out, "what [merely] rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such" (Rawls 1993, 51). So by making reasonability a part of rationality, this model assumes a particular moral vision. But moralizing rationality so explicitly only exposes the reasons why this view faces an objection similar to that against Hobbes's view: it makes paramount a value that the combatants of the sixteenth century would, with good reason, reject. The Catholics and Protestants of the Wars of Religion would not think that rationality or reasonability would require them to cooperate with people if the price of that cooperation was their very souls. Even modern liberals think we must simply fight some people—fascists and tyrants, for example—when they threaten our most fundamental values. To insist that religious differences between Catholics and Huguenots of the sixteenth century are unreasonable or irrational grounds on which to fight a war or on which to reject toleration once again begs the question against them.[21]

B. The structure of rationality

A second model of rationality we might propose maintains that the structure of rationality itself requires trust. We might argue, for instance, that a certain level of trust—indeed, a kind of toleration—is required before communication is possible at all. For example, Onora O'Neill argues that the universal authority of reason itself depends on a form of toleration that demands freedom of inquiry; otherwise, the conclusion of any debate will be distorted by the external authorities that restrict the debate (O'Neill 1989).[22] So toleration of other opinions is an essential part of the workings of rationality.

However, even if such an arguments works, it would only show that a very minimal level of trust and toleration—the level necessary to communicate—is required. Despite naive platitudes to the contrary, people can argue with each other, understand each other (more or less), and still shoot each other. Often, conflicts between groups are the most bitter when the two sides understand each other all too well and when the differences between them seem small.[23] So the more robust level of trust needed to secure a political settlement—the mundane, but deep, trust needed to engage in everyday living—does not emerge from this argument.

Still, the situation between groups may be improved if we can get them to try to understand each other and to engage in a reasonable discussion. But often they

do not do so precisely because they do not trust each other enough. Communication by itself is not enough for genuine trust. But even this modest achievement can be rejected in an extremely deep conflict: each side could claim that maintaining the "universal authority of reason" is less important than the substantive goals for which they are fighting. Even communication, they could claim, is subordinate to salvation or freedom. So they could claim that even the trust that is needed for communication is not actually required by rationality. My argument, however, does not rest on this more radical claim; I only need to argue that this transcendental argument does not generate the level of trust needed for true tolerance.

C. The irrationality of distrust

The third kind of argument for the claim that rationality itself requires trust is that rationality precludes any other means of pursuing our goals. The violence that distrust entails in these situations, we might say, fails to respect humanity and so it can not be used as a means to salvation, moral identity, or freedom, even if we perceive the violence as form of self-defense. Respect for humanity as such thus requires us to trust and to tolerate others.[24]

This view, however, like the modified Rawlsian view discussed above, moralizes the conception of rationality in a way that begs the question against the believers of the sixteenth century. But more importantly, it simply asks too much of them—indeed, it asks too much of anyone. To require the Catholics and Huguenots to trust each other is to require them to make an enormous leap of faith. We could argue that misplaced trust is not itself a sin and that morality sometimes requires sacrifices from us. But even if trust sometimes requires a leap of faith, it should not require a *blind* leap. Not even contemporary Christians think their faith—much less their rationality—requires them to risk salvation itself in the hope of peace. Besides, no faith requires us always to trust. After all, not all trusting relationships are good ones; they can be—and often are—abusive (Baier 1986). Thus, the view that we should always trust may require some people to allow themselves to be exploited for the sake of peace. While the risk of such futile sacrifices may be morally praiseworthy in some cases, in others it will jeopardize the welfare of the innocent and perpetuate institutions of injustice. So, for example, we may want to praise women in traditional marriages who sacrificed themselves for their husbands and their children, but they also helped to sustain an institution that would continue to require such sacrifices for women in the future (Baier 1992, 121–36). Requiring trust may, then, undercut our respect for humanity.

For these reasons, any alternative theory of rationality must recognize that trust is not always rational and give us some criteria for rational trust. But if there are *any* rational reasons to distrust others, the Catholics and the Huguenots of sixteenth-century France surely had them about each other: each thought, with some justification, that the people on the other side were butchers with little regard for human life or for the higher goals of salvation. So even if these ac-

counts did not impose a form of rationality that they would not recognize, they would not successfully show them that trust was indeed rational.

Thus, the claims of rationality do not seem to be conducive to trust. We simply can not claim that trust is rationally required.

IV. Establishing Toleration

Before the two sides in an intractable conflict can trust each other and before they can tolerate each other, something must change to alter their perception of the risks involved. Something must occur that allows them to see trust as a rational risk rather than as an act of lunacy. They must, I think, see the moral landscape in a new way. But to see the world in a new way requires a change that forces them to jettison their past views of the religious and political world. In a word, they must undergo a moral conversion.

To call this change a "conversion" is to emphasize the essential role played by non-rational and merely causal factors. As such, it is not the result of what people *do*, but of what happens *to them* (Dees 1996). If the change were the result of a purely rational process, then the original trust calculations would have required one or both sides in the conflict to alter their beliefs and values rather than fight. But a conversion will not be rationally justified within the system of beliefs and values that the parties already have—even if the new view is connected in important ways to the old.[25]

Too often, such changes occur as a by-product of battle fatigue. Henri IV's Edict of Nantes in 1598 was only able to suppress the religious conflicts that had been fanned by the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, because significant numbers of both Catholics and Protestants were desperate to end the warfare. Even then, the edict itself was only possible once Henri had converted to Catholicism in 1594, a move which both sides accepted since it allowed the Catholics to have a Catholic king and allowed the Huguenots' protector to keep his crown. Of course, the move also generated a lot of suspicion on both sides, since the hard-line Huguenots saw the conversion as a betrayal of their cause and the ultra-Catholics saw it as a hypocritical act, which only served to save Henri's crown. Yet the conversion generated enough support on both sides to make toleration possible, precisely because enough people had become so desperate (Wolfe 1996, ch. 6).

Even in Britain, one of the paradigms of the development of toleration, the new view that emerged in the seventeenth century was largely a product of battle fatigue. The Act of Toleration of 1689, limited though it was,[26] was intended to end the conflict between Puritans and Anglicans that had been waged in Parliament since the beginning of the century and which had continued even after the Civil War and Commonwealth of 1641–59. Of course, the act was also a product of a fear of Catholic absolutism that was embodied by Louis XIV of France, so it was as much a product of intolerance as tolerance.[27] Even Locke, who argued for a broad toleration that even included pagans, did not think that Catholics could be

trusted—not on religious grounds, but on the grounds that they had pledged themselves to obey a foreign potentate (Locke 1983, 43, 50–51).

In both the French and the British cases, battle fatigue changed the dynamics for trust. Many people, as concerned as they might have been with their spiritual welfare, became overwhelmed by the hardships of everyday life in a war economy and, of course, by the deaths of their loved ones—not to mention the devastation that the marching armies had caused to the land and to the civilians in their paths. They came to value the modest and earthly benefits of peace to the more distant prospects of salvation. Perhaps they came to believe that their salvation did not depend on prosecuting the war any longer or that the sins that were an inevitable part of warfare were worse than living with heresy. Perhaps they even came to believe that Christian charity required them to turn the other cheek and risk annihilation and that their salvation would be better secured in sacrifice than in battle.

In any case, the change in their attitude could not be rationally justified by their previous beliefs in any straightforward way; after all, their former selves would have seen it as a betrayal of the cause, as backsliding in the face of adversity, or as a sign of weakness in the face of earthly temptations. Even those who came to believe that their Christianity required this new trust only came to that understanding once they had deeply reinterpreted the implications of their beliefs and values. Their previous beliefs and values would not have allowed them to see the sacrifice as useful; it would have simply been a waste. But given the circumstances, the changes in the structure of their beliefs and values were understandable—perhaps, even justified.[28]

In this new structure of beliefs and values, the rationality of trust had changed, because each side judged that the costs of misplaced trust were much lower than they had previously thought and that the gains of successful trust were much higher. If the costs of continuing the war were high enough, then the prospects of betrayal were less bad by comparison and the hope for peace was all the more promising. Only incidentally did their view of their opponents' trustworthiness change. Yet that view changed as well, since they could observe the same battle fatigue in their opponents that they were experiencing themselves. In the new structure of values, then, the risk of trust became rational.

Only in the new structure of values does the situation resemble a Prisoners' Dilemma. Only now do the solutions to such dilemmas which rely on finding some means by which to ensure both sides that the other will take the cooperative option come into play.[29] At this point, an assurance mechanism—like a governmental policy—can help to end the warfare. And indeed, in both of the historical cases I have cited, toleration did not arise as a completely spontaneous response from the people. Instead, the government served as an enabling device, which helped both sides in the conflict to take the first step. Governmental action may not have been necessary, but it gave the moderates on each side some further assurance that the hawks on the other side would not prevail. However, neither the British nor the French government would have been strong enough to over-

come any significant resistance to toleration. But at this point in the conflict, both sides were willing to accept toleration as a *modus vivendi*, and they were thus willing to concede power to the government to enforce the solution. Each side had to trust each other somewhat before they could trust the government to solve their dispute. Only then could the government overcome the empowerment dilemma and impose a solution on the recalcitrant.

The government could only act in that capacity, however, if it had undergone a conversion of sorts as well: it had to become less interested in taking sides in the religious dispute than in securing its own power by ending a destructive civil war. To that end, both governments had to become willing to accept the increasing secularization of their power to ensure the survival of the nation.[30] Thus, toleration was possible only once both the participants and the government had found a new perspective in which that option was acceptable.

V. Securing Toleration

If a conversion is required before toleration can be established, something more is needed to make it stick. Even in an individual case, a conversion is rarely self-sustaining; it usually requires a community of supporters, who reinforce the new values and assist the convert in living her new life. Only then can the convert fully accept the consequences of her new perspective on the world. Without that support, she can easily slip back into her old ways. On a social level, even more is required. The conversions that make toleration possible are not enough to make toleration seem intrinsically good. As long as it is seen as a mere *modus vivendi*, toleration will not be stable. And as long as both sides think the other sees it as a mere *modus vivendi*, the trust that toleration generates will be extremely guarded. Only when toleration is seen as a value in itself is genuine stability assured. Only then will toleration survive shifts in power.

What exactly is required to secure toleration lies beyond the scope of this paper, but the account is bound to be quite complex. Even the experiences in Britain and France—two relatively-similar Western European countries—were quite different. To put it very crudely, the British succeeded and the French failed. In Britain, toleration was accepted—more or less—and it eventually expanded, until it included even Catholics in the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829 (Clark 1985, chs. 5–6; Bossey 1991; Trevor-Roper 1991). In France, however, the Edict of Nantes began to fall apart as soon as Henri IV was assassinated in 1610, until it was finally revoked by Louis XIV in 1685.[31] The problem becomes even more complicated if we think about toleration in other contexts. As Will Kymlicka points out, toleration need not take a liberal form; the Ottoman Empire granted toleration to groups rather than to individuals, with a correspondingly different dynamic (Kymlicka 1995, 152–72). Indeed, I suspect that we will not find a general account of what will support toleration in the complicated world of politics in which so much depends on circumstance.[32] In any case, the claim that individual toleration is a uniquely rational response is dubious indeed.

Unfortunately, the lessons of establishing toleration are hardly optimistic. The logic of deep conflicts is that no toleration is possible until a conversion in beliefs and values takes place among the participants. But those conversions are not themselves rationally required, and they need not be forthcoming at the moment we would hope. We certainly can not rely on the rationality of the parties to see intrinsic goodness of toleration; their view of the world will often not allow them to see toleration as anything less than a betrayal of their faith, their freedom, or their identity. And even if, after a series of changes in themselves, they can eventually accept toleration as a rational choice, we should make no presumptions that such changes will always occur or even that they will remain stable over time. We can only hope that the successful examples toleration they see in the world will inspire their efforts.

Thus, the chances for bringing about a situation in which toleration can flourish seem very remote indeed. However much we would like to believe that toleration is rationally required and morally compelling, we must recognize that the structure of human values often does not allow us trust each other enough to make it possible. Trust and toleration are always fragile achievements.[33]

Notes

1. My account here is based on Diefendorf 1991. For a general account of the period, see Holt 1995.

2. The Protestants had broken the first peace treaty in 1567 when they attempted to kidnap Charles himself, much as they had tried to seize Charles's brother, François II, at Amboise in 1560 before warfare even began. See Diefendorf 1991, ch. 6.

3. The marriage was one of the ways that Catherine de Medici had tried to build bridges between Catholics and Huguenots after the Third War of Religion ended in 1570. Unfortunately, many Catholics and Protestants wanted to burn those bridges.

4. Henri de Navarre himself was spared because he had just married the king's sister—but only after he agree to convert to Catholicism. He escaped the Court in 1576 and then resumed his role as the leader of the Huguenots.

5. For an account of how the massacre spread to the provinces, see Benedict 1978.

6. The ideal of cooperation that I have in mind is based on Rawls's notion of the "reasonable." See Rawls 1993, 48–50. For a discussion of Rawls's view of toleration, see section III-A below.

7. Toleration is not complicated, however, by the alleged paradoxes found by many writers, who claim that toleration exists in a no man's land between indifference and intolerance. (For the most recent examples, see Williams 1996, Horton 1996, and Fletcher 1996.) These paradoxes arise only if we think toleration must entail the disapproval of an activity. So these writers think that toleration would disappear in a truly pluralistic society in which everyone accepts everyone else's choices. On my view, however, if I accept a form of life that is different from my own, then I tolerate it, no matter whether I approve of that lifestyle or not. So, on my view, we do not cease to tolerate a form of life once we see it as intrinsically valuable. Only "mere tolerance" implies disapproval.

8. This model is best articulated in Coleman 1990, 91–116. Although these models are artificially exact and they tend to discount the feelings and attitudes that are involved in almost all situations of trust, they do capture its basic logic. So although I have reservations about placing too much weight on these calculations, they are a useful heuristic. For an account of the role of attitudes and feelings in trust, see Jones 1996. For a different way of looking at the limitations of these models, see Williams 1988.

Because much of trust can be captured by these calculations, Russell Hardin argues that the truly moral virtue is not to be trusting, but to be *trustworthy* (Hardin 1996). However, my account here is based on situations in which being trustworthy causes as many problems as being trusting.

9. Advice to Catherine de Medici from the conservative members of the Parlement of Paris in 1563. Quoted in Taber 1990, 695.

10. Henri III, Charles IX's younger brother, became king after Charles's death in 1574. But he was not a great friend of toleration. After Henri's younger brother died in 1584, the heir to the French crown was Henri de Navarre. To prevent the possibility of a Protestant king, the Guise family orchestrated the formation of the Catholic League and usurped much of the power of the state. But Henri III's attempt to reassert his power by assassinating two of the Guises failed. Henri thus had nowhere to turn but to Navarre and the Protestants. For his efforts, he (like Henri IV after him) was assassinated by a Catholic fanatic in 1589. See Holt 1995, 121–33.

11. This problem—and some possible solutions—are nicely discussed in Hampton 1986, 173–86.

12. This argument was put to me most forcefully by Scott Berman and by Mark Perlman.

13. The edict was promulgated by Catherine de Medici, acting as regent for Charles IX, in an attempt to ease the tensions that were already building. See Holt 1995, 46–49.

14. A similar observation is made about more localized forms of trust in Hardin 1993.

15. As Tracy Strong suggested to me.

16. The suggestion was made to me by Richmond Campbell.

17. For a more general account of the problems that taking interest in others may cause, as well as of the role the religious wars played in shaping the rhetoric of interests that supported capitalism, see Hirschman 1977.

18. The most clear version of this claim is found in Gauthier 1986. But it is also implied in Hampton's own view (Hampton 1986, esp. ch. 9) and in T.M. Scanlon's claim that rejecting toleration "involves a form of alienation from one's fellow citizens" (Scanlon 1996). Despite the important differences between these theories, each will, I think, fall prey to the same objection I present in this section against the Rawlsian view.

19. Indeed, my thesis in this paper is completely compatible with Rawls's theory. Rawls *starts* from the assumptions that toleration is one of the "provisional fixed points" of our intuitions (Rawls 1993, 8) and that "being reasonable...is part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of public reason" (Rawls 1993, 62). Neither the Catholics nor the Protestants of sixteenth-century France were "reasonable" in Rawls's sense, and both rejected the ideal of democracy that underlies Rawls's conception. The interesting question, then, is how these groups *became* "reasonable."

20. Indeed, the requirements of reasonability may be too strong even for Rawls's project. As Leif Wenar points out, requiring people to accept many elements within it may exclude members of most major religious groups in the United States (Wenar 1995). However, the version of reasonability that I use in this paper does not rely on the controversial aspects of Rawls's conception that Wenar rightly questions.

21. This argument is not affected by Susan Babbitt's interesting suggestion that rationality is "a property of paths of development, not of particular ends" (Babbitt 1996, 77). Babbitt judges the rationality of those paths "in terms of possibilities for making choices and taking actions that do, in fact, bring about conditions for the pursuit of one's real human interests—interests, say, in dignity and self-worth" (Babbitt 1996, 116). So in effect, she claims that rationality requires us to advance certain interests that the people of the sixteenth century would find incomprehensible. Thus, her claims about "objective interests" of humans beg the question against them. See Babbitt 1996, chs. 2–5.

22. A more explicitly Habermasian version of this argument can be found in Lutz-Bachmann 1992.

23. For contemporary examples of this point, see Ignatieff 1993, especially ch. 1 on the Serbs and Croats and ch. 6 on Northern Ireland.

24. A Kantian version of this view is suggested in Nicholson 1985, 158–73. For a response, see Raphael 1988. But a similar argument can also be make on the grounds of a natural law theology.

25. Babbitt nicely illustrates the power of these "transformative experiences," which can change our whole view of the world and not just the propositions we believe about the world (Babbitt 1996, ch. 2).

Babbitt, however, suggests that conversions need not be a-rational changes. Even when they can not be justified within the agent's own structure of beliefs and values, she argues, they can be rationally evaluated on the basis of whether they set the agent on a path that will help her to realize her objective interests (Babbitt 1996, ch. 2). Even if her view did not beg the question against the people of the sixteenth century, I think we should not appeal to such external sources of value to evaluate the rationality of these radical conversions. To do so separates the process of justification too far from any considerations that might actually motivate the agent to act. While I think Babbitt is right to worry about the effects that oppressive social environments have on people's perceptions of themselves and their world, her view would imply that the oppressed have been made *irrational* by their society. My view is that we understand them better if we see their actions as rational, *given* their environment. But a view like mine does not, as Babbitt suggests, imply that we should do nothing to change that environment. My view on these issues is presented in more detail in Dees 1996, especially section II.

26. The act itself granted toleration only to Trinitarian Protestants, and only members of the Church of England could hold political office. But the effects were broader than intended. In fact, the king at the time, William III, whose background was in the more tolerant Netherlands, supported a broader toleration than Parliament enacted. See Israel 1991. In any case, the Anglican Church was deprived of its monopoly, so it could not effectively ensure that everyone attended religious services at either an Anglican or an official Dissenter church, and so Radical Dissenters and even Catholics were free to worship in their own way. In addition, Dissenters had the right to vote, and by the practice of "occasional conformity"—attending Anglican services just enough to meet the requirements of the Test and Corporations Acts—they could hold office.

For an account of religious dissent in this period, see Clark 1985, ch. 5; Israel 1991; Bossey 1991; and Trevor-Roper 1991.

27. The intolerance embodied in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which overthrew the Catholic King of Great Britain, James II, and replaced him with William III and which led to the Act of Toleration, is emphasized in Le Roy Ladurie 1996, 193–94.

28. I discuss the ways these kinds of changes can be justified in a wide variety of cases in Dees 1996.

29. For the best discussion of possible solutions to Prisoners' Dilemmas, see Parfit 1984, ch. 4.

30. In France, Catherine de Medici, Henri III, and Henri IV had all been willing to accept the secularization of their power, but only Henri IV had the power to effect such a change. In Britain, William III and the Georges after him accepted that change to a large degree—but only as long as the state remained firmly Protestant. (After William, only Queen Anne tried to reassert the complete dominance of the Anglican Church.)

31. Holt argues that the toleration had begun to fall apart even before Henri IV's death (Holt 1995, 162–72). In any case, governmental actions and Huguenot nervousness led to a series of rebellions in the 1620s, in which the Huguenots lost more and more power. By the Peace of Alais in 1629, they had been forced to give up their protected cities that had been one of the key provisions in the Edict of Nantes.

Nevertheless, Protestants and Catholics lived together for the next fifty years in a tentative peace, and some genuinely tolerant feelings developed in some places, particularly where the two groups had roughly equal strength, as Gregory Hanlon has shown in Layrac, a town in southwestern France (Hanlon 1993). For a more general account of the ways in which Protestants and Catholics did and did not interact, see Labrousse 1985, ch. IV.

However, toleration was never seen as a good in itself, and so the position of French Protestants was always precarious. By 1679, Louis XIV had decided to eliminate the heresy from his kingdom

altogether, and he began a systematic campaign to cajole and coerce Protestants to abjure before he finally revoked the Edict altogether in 1685. On the persecution, see Scoville 1960, ch. II.

Ironically, the Revocation undermined the position of James II in Britain, by confirming fears that a Catholic king could not live with Protestant subjects. It thus indirectly provoked the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

32. In general, I think that the proper political views depend crucially on small details of context, so any general account is bound to be limited. I defend such a view in Dees 1994.

33. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University, to the Ethics Reading Group at Washington University, and to the meetings of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in Chicago in April 1995. On those occasions and others, it has benefited from the comments of numerous people: Joel Anderson, Louise Antony, Michael Barber, Scott Berman, James Bohman, Richmond Campbell, William Charron, Marilyn Friedman, Jennifer Kwon, Larry May, Mark Perlman (who commented on it at the APA), Connie Rosati, and Eleonore Stump. Work on this project was supported by a Professional Development Travel Grant and a Mellon Faculty Development Grant, both from Saint Louis University.

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