There is much to be learned from reading Brad Inwood’s new source book dedicated to later Stoicism. Stoic scholarship, which has tended to focus on the early and middle Stoa (if, as Inwood points out, there even is such a distinction to be made), will benefit tremendously from taking later Stoicism on its own, apart from and yet very much in conversation with earlier Stoicism.

Inwood makes a well-reasoned decision to mark the end of the Chrysippean era and the transition to later Stoicism at 155 BC with the diplomatic mission to Rome by the skeptic Carneades, the Epicurean Critolaus, and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. He argues that Carneades was the Stoics’ most important critic, and that ‘[t]he school’s need to respond to these challenges was a major catalyst for change and development’ alongside their engagement with Plato and Aristotle (4). Though we don’t know how Diogenes reacted, Antipater ‘clearly dealt with Carneades’ critique extensively, though perhaps not always effectively’ (4). Hence Inwood takes Antipater to be the turning point to later Stoicism.

This narrative is of great interest. The spectrum on which Inwood locates the views of Antipater and his students, from conservative to most adventurous, gives depth and nuance to the account of this stage of development. There are elements both of conservatism and of innovation in this period, like a brackish meeting of fresh and salt water in an estuary. For example, in Chapter 1 we find Antipater conservative about grammar, definition, and ἀπραξία, but engaged in controversy on modal logic by siding with Cleanthes over Chrysippus in denying the first premise of the Master Argument,
and even resisting the orthodox Stoic interest in formalism by championing single-premise syllogisms (even while remaining true to a coarse orthodoxy). Likewise, although Antipater marks a turning point in Stoicism, Inwood finds him conservative in physics, compared with Panaetius who denies the conflagration and destructibility of the cosmos, Boethus who denies the world is an animal, and Archedemus who takes the commanding faculty of the cosmos to be at the center of the earth.

Even in revising Cleanthes on the etymological treatment of the gods, Antipater is orthodox about the divinity of πνεῦμα and the legitimacy of divination. And with Apollodorus, he is conservative on body as malleable and continuous, offering a clarification rather than a revision of the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility, as some have understood him. Finally, in ethics, we find a ‘version of Stoicism’ that departs from Chrysippus, embracing ‘a kind of parity between basic practical desires and a natural desire for pursuing truth’ (38). But with respect to the status of preferred indifferents, Inwood defends Posidonius and Panaetius as upholding the orthodox commitment to the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, denying that external goods are necessary for the good life. Thus we find a subtle blend of continuity and innovation in this first period (if we can call it that).

In Chapter 2 Inwood offers a robust defense of Posidonius as an orthodox Stoic offering a systematic consolidation of physical doctrines, notwithstanding the breadth of vision he brings with his interests in math and science. Against Galen’s treatment of Posidonius as a renegade, we find him orthodox about the structure of philosophy but extending its scope to include grammar and geometry. And in basic cosmology, Inwood argues that Posidonius is clarifying rather than altering the infinity (or indefiniteness) of the extra-cosmic void and that he is treated, generally, as an authority on Stoic physics. Under the heading of metaphysics, Inwood argues that Posidonius again is clarifying orthodoxy when he concedes that surfaces exist both ‘in reality’ as well as being incorporeal conceptions; rather than departing from the idea that surfaces exist merely in conception, Inwood
suggests that Posidonius takes them to exist ‘in reality’ as a way of distinguishing them from mere fictions without assimilating them to body. (More on taking surfaces this way in a moment.)

With respect to the soul, Inwood finds Posidonius not only orthodox in making the soul’s substance be πνεῦμα, but even to claim Plato for his authority, arguing that the Timaeus presents ‘a more corporeal conception of soul than some Platonists thought, thus showing (as Antipater and perhaps Panaetius claimed) that Plato lends support to Stoic doctrine (no matter what Plato’s followers may have thought about the matter)’ (126) — this is an especially interesting recurring theme of the book, that the later Stoics were not just Platonizing and syncretizing their thought with the era, but often standing their ground and claiming Plato for their own, sometimes as holding ‘Stoic doctrines avant la lettre’ (4). And where Galen charges Posidonius with abandoning psychological monism, Inwood charges Galen with polemicizing. Similarly, in pursuit of an orthodox ethics, Inwood rejects the testimony of Diogenes Laertius that Posidonius takes indifferents to be goods, and that he denies virtue is sufficient for happiness. Here one wonders on what grounds the evidence of Galen and Diogenes is rejected if it is to be probative of orthodoxy.

But contrast these more dogmatic moments with the richness of Inwood’s arguments (with helpful bibliography) that Posidonius remains a cognitivist about the passions, even while suggesting that certain non-cognitive factors can induce irrational beliefs — Posidonius is not abandoning cognitivism but, rather, pressing Chrysippus to give a more nuanced account of how the soul falls prey to false views (137-139). Here the book is at its best, connecting early with late Stoa and advancing a sophisticated developmental narrative. For this sustained developmental narrative alone, Inwood’s book is essential reference for those using evidence of later Stoics as a window onto the earlier period, or assessing the extent to which we can speak meaningfully of a Stoic orthodoxy.

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Now something about the format of the book, particularly in contrast to the source books of Long & Sedley (A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Boeri & Salles (Marcelo D. Boeri & Ricardo Salles, *Los filósofos estoicos: Ontología, lógica, física y ética* (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2014)). First, it is a welcome approach to introduce each text with a brief analysis of the evidence it provides, alternating between narrative and texts. Whereas Long & Sedley and Boeri & Salles present a group of texts, grouped thematically, and then follow them with a commentary, Inwood opts to make his case in tandem with the texts. This approach is at its strongest in the sustained developmental narrative described above, unfolding a nuanced picture of the transitional period from Antipater to Seneca.

Other times, when Inwood is not making this case, the result is more encyclopedic, like a catalogue of views attributed to each thinker. Indeed, apart from the developmental narrative, Inwood does not engage in much interpretive controversy. Long & Sedley and Boeri & Salles often take a position and argue for it, painting the interpretive landscape and giving substantial bibliography for those interested in pursuing the topic at hand. Inwood is less focused on the interpretive landscape and more on presenting the texts as he takes them. Of course, one can only do so much and this is already an epic undertaking.

But this does mean that in some cases one will have to know already or seek elsewhere the scholarly debates. In other cases, there are some missed opportunities to keep the developmental narrative going. One example comes from Posidonius and his treatment of surfaces as existing both as incorporeal conceptions (as Inwood renders ‘κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιαν’) and ‘in reality’ (as he renders ‘καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν’), which I mentioned earlier. It is controversial, in the first place, to gloss incorporeals as conceptual, particularly as this description risks assimilating the incorporeals to fictions (as Inwood worries) or to impositions on the world by us (as others see it, assimilating them to λεκτὰ). Further, although Inwood does give some important bibliographical references to the literature on limits, we
do not find any engagement with Long & Sedley’s posit of a tripartite ontology, which includes bodies, incorporeals, and a third category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal to cover fictions and limits (like surface). Nor is there any mention of the nearly universal posit of a third class of entities called Not-Somethings (οὐτίνα) between Something and nothing, which is typically taken to include limits, fictions, and concepts. If one knows of these debates, Inwood’s commentary says much more than appears to the untrained eye.

Another example comes from the analysis of parts of Seneca’s *Epistle* 58. Inwood sees Seneca (in 58.26-29) as addressing basic metaphysical issues with ‘Stoic doctrine cast in somewhat Platonist terms’, embracing the feebleness of the material cosmos and its reliance on the demiurge as in the *Timaeus*. But the most salient metaphysical issue in *Epistle* 58, many would argue, is the rejection of Something as the highest ontological genus, and the report that some Stoics include centaurs and giants among what there is. Seneca’s report is intended to show that the genus Something is otiose. Since Seneca has already accounted for bodies and incorporeals (or what is ‘bodily and non-bodily’ as Inwood puts it) under the genus (or ‘principle’ as Inwood puts it) being, the only remaining job for the genus Something is to accommodate things that plainly are not real; therefore we should do away with Something as the highest genus. Inwood does give us this passage (58.11-15), with some important bibliographical references, but no mention is made of the issues concerning the status of fictions (whether as neither corporeal nor incorporeal or as Not-Somethings), or whether the genus Something was original or developed later or evolving over the later period — all of which would speak to Inwood’s developmental narrative.

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Perhaps another way to put the point is that Inwood lets the organization of the book do the talking. This brings me to the second point about the format of the book. In an effort to redress the ‘picture of later Stoicism that tends to overestimate the place of ethics and play down engagement with logic,
physics, metaphysics and epistemology’, Inwood aims for ‘an arrangement that is as close to uniform as possible’ (1). Even the selections of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus are presented under the headings of Logic, Physics, and Ethics in order to ‘extract from their differently organized works the contributions they made to these standard divisions of philosophy. This runs the risk of misrepresenting these thinkers by cutting up their works into artificial, even procrustean, categories’ (2).

This is a fruitful strategy to connect later with earlier Stoics. In fact, my main question is: why not more procrustean? Not only do the subdivisions of each part of philosophy vary across the chapters, the titles of the parts themselves vary, e.g. Logic; Logic and Dialectic; Logic, Dialectic and Method; Logic and Grammar; Logic and Method. Or, Physics, Physics (Cosmology and Theology), Physics and Theology, Physics and Cosmology. Without a full recitation of the varying subtitles, we can see that it might have been interesting to be strict about the procrustean arrangement as a way of highlighting their differences as much as their similarities. One might take that to be the point of varying the headings, to emphasize that they do differ in these ways; but then one wonders whether the traditional picture according to which it’s all ethics after Seneca has not been supported rather than undermined. Is there really more physics going on than they have been given credit for?

The procrustean approach in Chapter 3, which covers lesser-known Stoics from Posidonius to Seneca, suggests that there was in fact more logic and physics than ethics going on with Chairemon and Cornutus, while Musonius Rufus was active in all three but especially in logic and ethics. So far so good. But with Seneca, Epictetus, and the second century Stoics (Chapter 4), things are not so clear. The narrative concerning logic shows a clear trend away from logic for its own sake, toward the defensive and practical use of logic as a dialectical tool. (In fact, this trend might have found its seed in Antipater’s resistance to unnecessary formalism in Chapter 1.) The topic of metaphysics, on the other hand, all but disappears from the procrustean formula, appearing only for Cornutus and now as
a part of logic rather than physics. If this absence is meant to signal that the later late Stoics were less engaged in metaphysics, that would be interesting. But it would also suggest that the traditional picture has merit.

As to the topic of physics, here things are still less clear. The heading consistently appears, and many of the topics are correctly classed as physics, e.g. for Seneca, the active and passive principles, meteorology, earthquakes, optical phenomena, thunder and lighting, subterranean water, comets, providence and world order, and even gifts of nature owed to the gods. But, one wonders, do these count as contributions to physics, advancing the cause, or are they just an indication that the Stoics engaged with the material? And does Epistle 58, dividing being into bodies and incorporeals, really count as physics?

As for Epictetus (Chapter 5), while there is some material that is clearly a part of physics, e.g. the conflagration and συμπαθεία, it is not clear that Stoic cosmopolitanism (even though based on physics) is really a physical theory, nor is their commitment to the τέλος being to follow god a physical thesis on grounds that god is nature; likewise the topics of death and exile, acceptance of one’s lot in life, or teleology and gratitude. And in the second century too, much of what is included as physics may be better described as ethics, e.g. Hierocles on the topics of punishment and the goodness of god. Cleomedes, on the other hand, who is legitimately contributing to physics, is catalogued for his views on the void, zones of the cosmos, συμπαθεία, and the celestial bodies, but debates over the nature of extra-cosmic void that connect with the early Stoics are left to the side, neglecting the developmental narrative.

And with Marcus (Chapter 6), much of what appears under physics is not clearly physics, e.g. the relation of part (you) to whole (your destiny), cosmopolitanism, the nature of the human being, limitedness, even cosmic unity and flux as ethical lessons, not to mention providence as an account of how virtue is up to us, rationality, the god within, and the cosmopolis. It’s not that we can’t see
how these topics presuppose a certain physics, but that classing them as topics in physics is a bit of a stretch, particularly in comparison to the first later Stoics. Here a more procrustean approach would lay bare just how far the latest Stoics were really contributing to logic, physics, and metaphysics, as opposed to simply taking the views of their predecessors as background, or gesturing at it. Indeed, in the later ethics, Inwood calls out the Stoic rejection of needless physics to achieve the goal in life. So one wonders, again, whether the orthodox picture of the later Stoics is not borne out after all.

On the other hand, there is physics to be had, not just Marcus contributing but Marcus innovating or maybe even going rogue in Stoic physics. Inwood discusses for ethical purposes the causal autonomy of the mind for Marcus, and the idea that for him human beings are a body, a soul, and a mind (this latter really being the person), but he bypasses the juicy physics of this thesis. David Sedley (in the article ‘Marcus Aurelius on Physics,’ in M. van Ackeren (ed.), A Companion to Marcus Aurelius (West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 396-407, that Inwood cites) argues that Marcus is innovating by treating both the body and the soul as merely material stuff, stripping πνεῦμα of its divine status and powers, and identifying intelligence or the mind as a third, immaterial thing able to resist the flux of matter (i.e. body and soul). The implications of this view for Stoic physics are significant: first, πνεῦμα can no longer be the divine, immanent creator of the world; and second, insofar as they posit something immaterial and intelligent in addition to πνεῦμα and matter, which can resist their material flux, they are no longer corporealists. These are both arguably disqualifying commitments, so the possibility that Marcus is innovating in this way cries out for the developmental narrative with which Inwood begins. Is Stoicism evolving, or is Marcus no longer a Stoic? Or is this another reminder, as Sedley puts it, that ‘technical school orthodoxy is not of paramount importance to him’ (403)? Perhaps Marcus is simply indifferent to physics on ethical grounds, embracing n’importe quoi — atoms or gods, who cares? — because, either way, our insignificance is at the fore?

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In conclusion, one wishes for an epilogue that returns to the way in which Antipater marked a turning point for later Stoicism, how Posidonius systematically consolidated Stoic physics, a reassessment of the extent to which Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus were (or were not) all about the ethics, and, most of all, a return to the developmental narrative with which we began. This is simply to say that one always wants more of a good thing.

I would be remiss if I did not add that a review of the concordance shows how much this resource is needed. There is little overlap with Long & Sedley, only some with SVF 3, and the rest is culled from the editions of individual Stoics. Inwood has done a great service to the profession in gathering these resources in one place. And let us not forget the wealth of fresh translations. Inwood’s choices in translation are always informed and informative, reasoned and reasonable; agree or disagree with these choices, no research will be complete that does not take them into account.

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