1. Introduction

The Stoics have often been compared to the earthborn Giants in Plato’s *Sophist*, primarily in passing but also, more recently, in greater depth and with diverging opinions about the lessons drawn by the Stoics in reaction to Plato.\(^1\) The Giants appear in the famous Battle of Gods and Giants, which traces a never-ending debate between the Friends of the Forms (Gods) and the Sons of the Earth (Giants), both of whom make fatal concessions in the fight over *being, what is, or existence* (ἐίναι, τὸ ὄν, οὐσία) — whether it is body, as the earthborn Giants hold, or rather Forms, as the other-worldly Gods hold (245 E 6–249 D 8).\(^2\)

With the Eleatic Visitor moderating the discussion, first the savage Giants who say that *being* is body and refuse all further discussion are hypothesized to be civilized and amenable to a conversation about *being*. These hypothetically civilized Giants concede that there are incorporeal things (e.g. the virtues) and therefore that *being* is not, after all, the same as body; from this point they are induced to accept the Visitor’s ‘dunamis proposal’ that *being* is the

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\(^{1}\) By ‘the Stoics’ I mean Stoics of the so-called early and middle periods, excluding the Roman era.

capacity or power (δύναις, dunami) to act or be acted upon. Then the Friends of the Forms are pressed to concede that in being known, the Forms and hence being are not changeless after all.

The comparison of the Stoics to the earthborn Giants takes its start from the well-known Stoic commitment that (all and) only bodies exist. But the Stoics do not simply equate being or existence with body; rather, they take what exists to be what is capable of causal interaction, doing and undergoing, and then show that only bodies meet this criterion. Furthermore, bodies are not all there is. The Stoics make Something (τί) their highest ontological genus, set over both bodies that exist, or have being, and incorporeals that subsist (ὑφεστάναι, huphestanai, or have ὑπόστασις, hupostasis) — these include time, place, void, and the sayables (λεκτά, lektá), roughly the meanings of our words. This much is relatively uncontroversial, but there is more to the story — both for the Stoics and for Plato.

At issue are questions about what in the Sophist the Stoics were reacting to, if they were engaged with the dialogue at all; how the Stoics are and are not like the Giants in particular; what use they make of the famous dunamis proposal that being is whatever has the capacity to act or be acted upon; and to what extent they are Platonizing with their incorporeal entities. With these four open questions in mind, I will reexamine Plato’s challenges in the Sophist, and then offer a new account of the Stoics as responding to Plato with an elegant ontology and sophisticated one-world metaphysics.

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4 I will typically say, for convenience, that ‘only’ bodies are or exist instead of saying ‘all and only’; it is the commitment to only bodies existing that is at issue for the Giants anyway, since in being too ashamed to corporealize or eliminate they admit that some incorporeals have being, and no one argues that some bodies do not have being.

5 I italicize ‘subsistence’ and its cognates as well as existence et al., in order to indicate their technical use; likewise, ahead, ‘obtaining’ (ὑπάρχειν, huparchein, or having ὑπάρξις, huparxis).
2. Open questions

Let us take stock of the rather wide variety of interpretations in light of our four open questions. First, what in the *Sophist* are the Stoics responding to? Most everyone agrees that the Stoics are engaged with the Battle of Gods and Giants, but there is some disagreement about whether they were looking to the Parmenidean discussion of *non-being* or not, and yet more disagreement about what lessons were drawn from the *Sophist*. We might think of these disagreements as a series of dichotomies. The opening question concerns whether the Stoics are engaged in ontology and metaphysics or not, with Katja Vogt arguing they are not. Then, among the others, there is a disagreement about whether the Stoics are engaged in metaphysics or in ontology, with D. T. J. Bailey on one side arguing that they are not counting their entities (engaged in ontology), but rather grounding them in terms of fundamentality and dependence (engaged in metaphysics). Finally, among those who take the Stoic project to be ontological, there is a disagreement about whether the Stoics are giving an account of *being* or not, with Ada Bronowski arguing that they are not, and

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6 For skepticism about any influence of the *Sophist* on the Stoics, see J. Sellars, ‘Stoic Ontology and Plato’s *Sophist*’ *[Stoic Ontology]*, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 54 (2010), 185–203; given the broad consensus that the Stoics were engaged with the dialogue, I take that much as given, and endeavor to show here just how much of the *Sophist* is reflected in Stoic metaphysics; note that by focusing on the *Sophist*, I do not deny that they had other influences within Plato (notably the *Timaeus*) and beyond.


8 Vogt, ‘Brutes’, argues that the Stoic response to the *Sophist* is to turn away from questions of *being* and *non-being* altogether, indeed that the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics or ontology at all. The Stoics take their motivation in the Visitor’s observation that the notion of *being* is as puzzling as the notion of *non-being*, and the idea that ‘we inevitably have to face the well-known difficulties about not-being if we frame philosophy as the study of being’ (149). As a result, the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics as a Platonian or Aristotelian science of *being* at all, i.e. as a distinct study of what is that goes beyond the particular investigations of physics, logic, and ethics to give some deeper understanding of reality.

9 Bailey, ‘Structure’, 256, sees the Stoics as manifesting the same philosophical project as Plato and Aristotle, namely a debate over how particulars and incorporeals exist, whether as fundamental or dependent; thus they are engaged in metaphysics, making bodies fundamental and incorporeals dependent, rather than in ontology.

10 Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–28, argues that for the Stoics ‘being’ is not a doctrinal or technical term at all; to say that only bodies exist is not to say that bodies have *being* as discussed in the *Sophist*, but that they exist in a loose and non-technical sense, in the manner of bodies; for further detail see my notes 13 and 50. On the other hand, see 326, where Bronowski embraces a technical sense of ‘existence’, taking Bailey, ‘Structure’, to task for his concerns about the term.
Jacques Brunschwig, Pierre Aubenque, and Michele Alessandrelli that they are.\textsuperscript{11} Thus it bears revisiting the \textit{Sophist} to determine what challenges and leads are present in Plato’s text, before making the comparison with Stoic evidence.

Second, in what respects are the Stoics like and unlike the earthborn Giants?\textsuperscript{12} Brunschwig and Vogt both align the Stoics with the original, untamed Giants,\textsuperscript{12} while Aubenque, Alessandrelli, and Bronowski all see the Stoics pursuing a middle ground or amalgam of views.\textsuperscript{13} This question is

\textsuperscript{11} Brunschwig, \textit{TGS}, argues at length that the Stoics developed their highest ontological genus, \textit{Something}, in response to the Battle of Gods and Giants. Rather than broadening \textit{being} to include incorporeals, as the civilized Giants do, the Stoics develop a second, distinct ontological criterion for being \textit{Something non-existent}; this criterion at once rejects Plato’s Forms from the ontology, and admits their own line of incorporeals, while leaving the \textit{being} of bodies untouched. Aubenque, ‘Occasion Manquée,’ urging Brunschwig to go further in his optimism about the Stoic response to Plato, contributes a close reading of the \textit{Sophist} showing that the crucial commitment of the Gods and Giants alike, which underwrites the paradox of their concessions, is Plato’s own commitment to the interenialment of \textit{something} and \textit{being} or \textit{what is}, which is what underwrites the preceding Parmenidean paradox of saying \textit{what is not}. As Aubenque shows, once \textit{something} and \textit{being} are prised apart, there is nothing paradoxical about saying that the sophist, or one who speaks falsely, says \textit{something} that is \textit{not}. Nor, likewise, is there anything paradoxical in the Stoic ontological genus \textit{Something} set over \textit{bodies} and \textit{non-being} (incorporeals). Alessandrelli, \textit{Il problema del \kappa\v{e}ττόν}, 7–17; ‘Qualcosa’, 13–5, takes the ontological criterion for \textit{existence} to be the true and proper focus of the Stoic response to the \textit{Sophist} — but in stages. According to this developmental account, Zeno (the founder of the school) found his inspiration for \textit{Something} as distinct from \textit{being} in the Parmenidean problem of \textit{non-being}, and called the incorporeals \textit{Somethings} rather than \textit{beings}. At this stage of Stoic doctrine, Something is not yet an ontological genus set over \textit{bodies} and incorporeals, which leaves the inchoate class of incorporeals open to the charge of being nothing at all. It is only after developing the number of incorporeals and reflecting on this worry about their dubious ontological status, and after being interrogated by their critics about what bodies and incorporeals have in common, that Chrysippus could introduce the ontological status of \textit{subsistence} to mark the objectivity of the incorporeals, and only then that \textit{Something} could be elevated to the status of ontological genus set over bodies and incorporeals, \textit{being} and \textit{subsistence}, as an answer to what they have in common (namely that they are objectively real). Cf. Brunschwig, \textit{TGS}, 26, 60, 95–109 who argues in opposite fashion that we can tell \textit{Something} is \textit{original} to Zeno because the extension developed later is problematic.

\textsuperscript{12} Brunschwig, \textit{TGS}, 72–3, on the grounds that they equate body with \textit{existence}, avow that soul is body, and corporealize the virtues. Vogt, ‘Brutes’, in that they refuse all discussion of \textit{being} looking instead at the earth and taking physics to give us the most basic understanding of the world, and in that they corporealize the virtues. The Stoics differ from the brutish Giants, however, in their understanding of body according to which reason is the only cause, for the cosmos and its individual agents alike; according to K. Vogt, ‘A Unified Notion of Cause’ [‘Unified’], \textit{Rhizomata}, 6 (2018), 65–86, the real key to understanding Stoic corporealism is not to be found in the \textit{Sophist}, but in Socrates’ intellectual autobiography in the \textit{Phaedo} (with connections to the \textit{Hippias Major}), where he seeks to assimilate natural causes to reason, the causation of the cosmos to rational agency.

\textsuperscript{13} Aubenque, ‘Occasion Manquée,’ argues that the Stoics are not properly assimilated to the original Giants, who remain trapped by the Platonic assumption that \textit{something} and \textit{being} are inseparable; they should be seen, rather, as forging a creative alternative that identifies and rejects this crucial piece of Platonic baggage. Alessandrelli, ‘Qualcosa’, sees the Stoics as forging a middle ground, like and unlike the original earthborn Giants insofar as they inherit and perfect their brute materialism, corporealizing the virtues, and unlike the civilized Giants, who do not restrict the \textit{dunamis} proposal to bodies. Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, 149–59, sees the Stoic ontology as an amalgam of all views in the Battle. She sees a ‘double reversal’ of their position in the Battle of Gods and Giants, first in that the Stoics extend corporeality rather than extending \textit{being}, i.e. they assimilate the incorporeals embraced by the civilized Giants to body (they corporealize the virtues); and second, in that they twist the \textit{dunamis} proposal to confirm corporeality rather than \textit{existence}. Then the Stoics embrace the Gods’ spirit of ontological breadth, which recognizes both \textit{being} and \textit{becoming}, and in this are motivated to make Something the highest genus set over \textit{being} and \textit{non-being} and while they also agree with them that the \textit{dunamis} proposal applies only things that
relatively straightforward, except for one wrinkle concerning the original, untamed Giants. While everyone agrees that the Stoics are corporealizing the virtues, there is disagreement among the two groups as to whether the Stoics are like or unlike the original Giants in doing so; Brunschwig, Vogt, and Alessandrelli take the brutish Giants to corporealize the virtues, while the others do not. Here too, then, it bears looking at the text again to get clear on Plato’s Giants, and then reassessing how the Stoics are like or unlike them.

Third, while everyone agrees that the Stoics are making use of the dunamis proposal in one way or another, its precise role is subject to debate. Here too the debate can be seen as a series of dichotomies. The opening question concerns whether the dunamis proposal is used as a measure of being or of corporeality, with Bronowski and Vogt arguing for the latter.\textsuperscript{14} Then, among those who take the dunamis proposal as a measure of being, there is a question about whether it serves as an ontological criterion or rather, as Bailey argues, a measure of fundamentality.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, among those who take the dunamis proposal as an ontological criterion for being, there is disagreement about whether the Stoics use just this one criterion to distinguish between being and non-being, so that what these entities have in common is being Something (Aubenque, Alessandrelli),\textsuperscript{16} or whether they

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\textsuperscript{14} Vogt, ‘Brutes’, argues that the dunamis proposal in Stoic hands does not tell us about being, for there is no study of being, but about corporeality and nature, bodies and causality; and in this they are like the brutish untamed Giants, refusing the dunamis proposal as an answer the question, ‘What is being?’. As described in the last note, Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, takes the Stoics to divert the dunamis proposal from being to corporeality, restricting it (in solidarity with the Gods) to becoming and not being. Also in favor of the dunamis proposal as the criterion for body, see M. Reesor, \textit{The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy} (New York, 1989), 13; D. Sedley, ‘Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics’ [‘Physics and Metaphysics’], in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds.), \textit{The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy} (Cambridge, 1999), 355–411 at 285; and Sellars, ‘Stoic Ontology’, 186; against, see Alessandrelli, \textit{Il problema del λεκτόν}, 13.

\textsuperscript{15} According to Bailey, ‘Structure’, 256, in identifying the fundamentally real (as he renders ‘εἴρησι’, ‘τὸ ὄν’, ‘οὐσία’) as the bodily, the Stoics turn the dunamis proposal against Plato to ratify their distinctly anti-Platonist materialism. However, as he sees it, the dunamis proposal is not an ontological criterion so much as a measure of fundamentality — to have being is to be fundamental. Only bodies for the Stoics are independent and fundamental, and hence only they have being.

\textsuperscript{16} Aubenque, ‘Occasion Manquée’, 377, takes the dunamis proposal to establish for the Stoics, at once, the being of bodies, the non-being of incorporeals, and what they have in common, namely being Something. Alessandrelli, \textit{Il problema del λεκτόν}, 13–4, likewise takes the dunamis proposal alone to determine the ontological status of bodies (since they pass) and incorporeals (since they fail).
recognize two distinct ontological criteria and thereby sidestep the question of what is common to
*being* and *non-being* (Brunschwig).\(^\text{17}\) Thus, again, it bears returning to the *Sophist* to assess whether the
Visitor’s *dunamis* proposal is ontological or metaphysical in spirit, and to examine the demand for a
common account of bodies and incorporeals, before turning to the role of the *dunamis* proposal for
the Stoics, including whether they sidestep the question of what bodies have in common or, rather,
take it head on.

Fourth, there is the open question concerning the extent to which the Stoics are Platonizing
with their incorporeals, which is reflected in scholars’ understanding of what it means for the
incorporeals to *subsist* (*ὑφεστάναι, huphestanai*, or have *ὑπόστασις, hupostasis*) and to *obtain* (*ὑπάρχειν, huparchein*, or have *ὑπάρξις, huparxis*). On one end of the interpretive spectrum, what it means to
*subsist* and *obtain* is not addressed, either because the Stoics are turning away from metaphysics
altogether, as Vogt holds, or because they are engaged simply in ontology and working in terms of
*existent* and *non-existent* Somethings, as Aubenque and Brunschwig hold. Alessandrelli does address
what it means to *subsist*, taking it to be a Chrysippean advance to introduce the term as a label for the
*modus essendi* of the incorporeals, which for Zeno were simply *Something non-existent*, and hence
vulnerable to the charge of being nothing at all.\(^\text{18}\) By elevating *Something* to the highest ontological
genus set over bodies that *exist* and incorporeals that, now, are said to *subsist*, Chrysippus alleviates
these Zenonian worries and responds to challenges from their critics about what bodies and
incorporeals have in common (being *Something objectively real*). So with Alessandrelli the term
‘*subsistence*’ is a sort of ontological marker, but as such it is silent on the incorporeals’ *way* of being, i.e.
on the metaphysics of the incorporeals. And the language of *obtaining* does not indicate an ontological status for Alessandrelli, but refers, rather, to what really has the status of *existing*, i.e. bodies.\(^{19}\) The Stoics are not especially engaged in metaphysics, on this view, let alone Platonizing.

Bronowski, on the other hand, takes the language of *subsistence* to be much more than a marker of reality, signaling that the incorporeals are not only mind-independent and objective, but on a metaphysical par with bodies; bodies and incorporeals are inter-dependent and co-constitutive of reality, because of their ontological status.\(^{20}\) Thus, on this view, the Stoics are very much engaged in questions of fundamentality and dependence. Now, Bronowski’s focus is on the sayables (\(\lambda\varepsilon\kappa\tau\alpha\), *lekta*) in particular, and it is here especially that we see the Platonizing dimension of this interpretation. Bronowski’s account of the sayables as states of affairs holding together the structure of reality, or perhaps being the structure of reality, treats them as abstract entities, akin to Russellian facts, but with two modes of being real.\(^{21}\) The sayables on the one hand *subsist* independently of the physical world, waiting to be actualized by the causal interactions of bodies; then, when these are actualized by the physical world, they have a different ontological status, they now (in addition) *obtain* as facts; and the same holds for time, which *subsists* in the past and future, but also *obtains* in the present. Thus, for Bronowski, the language of *subsistence* and *obtaining* signals the Stoics’ metaphysical commitment to two different modes of reality, or ways of being, both of which find the Stoics Platonizing with their incorporeals.

Bailey is also focused on *subsistence* and *obtaining* as different ways of being, and takes *obtaining* to be an actualizing relation; unlike Bronowski, however, Bailey takes this actualizing relation to establish that all the incorporeals are metaphysically dependent on or, in the language of

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\(^{19}\) Alessandrelli, ‘Qualcosa’, 21–2.


contemporary analytic metaphysics, grounded in bodies.\textsuperscript{22} The incorporeals, on Bailey’s view, \textit{subsist} as ‘offices’ or ‘roles’, e.g. the office of being \textit{the president of the United States}, or of being \textit{a statue of David}, or of being \textit{my watch}, and they depend on bodies ‘occupying’ or ‘filling’ those roles in order to \textit{obtain}.\textsuperscript{23} By grounding their incorporeals in body the Stoics both reverse the position of Plato and Aristotle, making incorporeals dependent on bodies, and defuse the paradox of saying that both in some sense are (since they won’t \textit{be} in the same way). So Bailey and Bronowski stand opposed in making the incorporeals dependent and independent, respectively.

Or do they? Bailey’s offices are immaterial objects that \textit{subsist} whether they are occupied or not, so the sense in which incorporeals are ontologically dependent on body is rather attenuated. Further, this kind of dependence does not seem to me to be engaged in the same metaphysical project as Aristotle’s realism \textit{in rebus}, which makes (incorporeal) universals ontologically dependent on (corporeal) primary substances; on the contrary, the independent \textit{subsistence} of the incorporeals is an avowedly Platonizing interpretation of the Stoics. Hence I group Bailey and Bronowski together, different as their views are, because both take the incorporeals to be independently \textit{subsisting}, both \textit{see obtaining} as a change in ontological status, and both embrace the idea of a permanent, unchanging form or structure of the world. Indeed, both see the Stoics as Platonizing in ways that have been underappreciated.\textsuperscript{24}

With these varying degrees of Platonizing about the incorporeals among those who find the Stoics responding to the \textit{Sophist}, then, it bears revisiting the text to reevaluate what sort of challenges Plato poses there before adjudicating how to understand the Stoic response. I turn now to the

\textsuperscript{22} Bailey, ‘Structure’, 255.
\textsuperscript{23} On the model of Pavel Tichý’s philosophy of intentionality, Bailey, ‘Structure’, n. 31. As Bailey sees it, only some story as logically complex as this theory of offices can address his central explananda (268–69): the Stoics’ ‘competing mania[s] for analyzing all manner of entities as corporeal and as incorporeal’ (254); and the Stoics’ three ways to be, the \textit{being} enjoyed by bodies, the \textit{subsistence} enjoyed by incorporeals, and a third way, \textit{obtaining}, enjoyed by incorporeals when they bear a special actualizing relation to bodies (261, 268).
Sophist with these four open questions in mind, to reconsider what the Stoics are likely to have taken up there.

3. The Sophist

The question of being and non-being arises in Plato’s Sophist at 237 A 2 in consideration of the sophist as one who makes copies. What even is a copy, if it is not what is and therefore nothing at all? And if something (τί) must be what is or else nothing (237 C 7–E 2), then whatever counts as what is (whether Forms or body) classifies all other candidates, real as they may seem, as nothing at all. Hence the debate is a never-ending stalemate.\(^{25}\)

As Aubenque has shown, this false dilemma only results from the Visitor’s ignoring the possibility that something could be the genus of two species: what is and what is not.\(^{26}\) The consistency with which the Visitor equates something and what is makes this alternative conspicuously absent, and hence a challenge the Stoics are likely to have taken up in making Something their highest ontological genus. In addition, this stretch of text reveals two more challenges: to make what is not a countable individual (238 A 1–C 12), and to make it utterable (φθεγκτόν), sayable (ῥητόν), and rational (i.e. not contradictory, not ἄλογον) (238 D 1–239 B 10). Christine J. Thomas labels this series of challenges ‘the tinos requirement’: (1) to say how what is not can have being, (2) how it can be one, and (3) how it can be available for thought and discourse without contradiction, in sum to say that what is not is something.\(^{27}\) Thus the Sophist right away reveals ontological concerns; in particular for counting its entities, and for saying that what is not somehow has being, which is to say (given the

\(^{25}\) I italicize ‘something’ to indicate its technical use in this portion of the Sophist, and continue to capitalize for the Stoics’ highest ontological genus (τὸ τί).

\(^{26}\) Aubenque, ‘Occasion Manquée’, 373–75.

\(^{27}\) C. J. Thomas, ‘Speaking of Something: Plato’s Sophist and Plato’s Beard’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (2008), 631–67 at 637–42, offers a careful analysis of these puzzles, and argues that Plato is less permissive with his ontology than is often assumed, in particular that he accepts the tinos requirement, i.e. the metaphysical constraint that discourse always be of some one existing countable thing (or several), and that he recognizes the problems this requirement brings for a theory of content.
conspicuous absence of this option) that what is not may yet be something — even if it is not what is. It also reveals semantic concerns, since all of this remains in pursuit of the sophist who says what is not.

However, the Visitor goes on, it is not just what is not that makes us ridiculous. The Presocratics — ‘everyone who has ever in their judgment [about what is] rushed headlong into delimiting the things that are, how many and of what sort they are’ (ὥστις πῶσοτε ἐπι κρίσιν ὣρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διαφιλοσοφαὶ πόσα τε καὶ ποιὰ ἔστιν, 242 C 4–6) — show us that being is just as confused as non-being. For example, if what is is two, e.g. hot and cold, and both are each one, then either they are not really two but rather three (including being), or they are not two but one (since both are being) (243 D 8–244 A 2). So now the Sophist reveals concerns for unity and wholeness in cosmology, i.e. how it is possible to make one out of many. This is where the Battle of Gods and Giants, ‘a certain never-ending battle’ (ἵπλετος μόχι τις, 246 C 3), is introduced, to show from a different perspective that what is and what is not are equally confused. In their first

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29 Thus being is not just as confused as non-being because being always leads back to non-being, as Vogt argues; it is confused in its own right, without reference to non-being. And while being and non-being do stand or fall together, it is not simply because non-being is the unavoidable problem case; this is confirmed at 249 E 2–3 and 250 E 1–2.

30 There is debate about the how the perspectives of the Presocratics and Giants on being differ from each other. Brown, ‘Innovation’, argues that the Presocratics are discussing how many beings there are, whereas the Giants are discussing what kind they are, or what they are like (and neither is asking, what is being). T. Clarke, ‘The Problem of Being in Plato’s Sophist’ (unpublished), argues against this interpretation of the distinction; his suggestion is that while the Presocratics of the previous discussion are trying to make precise determinations about what there is, the Gods and Giants are interested in ‘meta-ontological’ questions about the nature of being thanks to Tim for discussion and correspondence on this point. Cornford, PTK, 228–29, 242–48, suggests, following Campbell, Sophistes, 116–18, that the Gods and Giants are speaking with less exactness (in contrast to the precisifications of the Presocratics) and getting at the fundamental issue of the philosophic debate (materialism or idealism), and that the Battle is intended as a complete review of all philosophers’ views about ‘the real’, including Parmenides, other Presocratics, Plato’s followers, and maybe Plato himself. G. Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, vol. iii (London, 1888), 202, suggests that the first group are those who hold there to be a definite number of ‘Entia’ and the second are ‘those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia’ but deal instead with what kinds of things are beings. I am inclined to follow Cornford on this, and also agree with Clarke (and to an extent Grote) that the Gods and Giants are at least addressing the question of what being is, even if they are somewhat brutish in their efforts (as I think).
appearance, the earthborn Giants, representing the Presocratics,\(^{31}\) are characterized as fearsome (δεινοὺς) philosophical savages.\(^{32}\)

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\begin{align*}
\text{oί μὲν εἰς γῆν ἔξ οὐρανὸς πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσίν ἄτεχνος πέτρας καὶ δρός περιλαμβάνοντες.} & \text{ τών γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δισχευρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὁ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταῦταν δόμα καὶ οὐδέν ὄριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τίς το φήσι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἰναὶ, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἀλλὸ ἀκούειν.} (246 A 8–B 3)
\end{align*}
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Those who drag all things down to earth from the heavens and the invisible, inartfully [ἄτεχνος] grabbing stones and trees with their hands. For those who take hold of all such things avow only this to be: what has to it a certain impact [πρὸς βολὴν] and tangibility [ἐπαφήν], those who define body and being as the same, but if any of the others should say that something that is not body has being, they are completely contemptuous and unwilling to hear anything else.

The savagery of these Giants consists first in their simply asserting that being is body, and second in refusing to discuss the matter; they insist that being is body and are unwilling to hear anything else about it. Their uncivilized demeanor, in both regards, is later underscored by their description as ‘those who drag all things down into body by force’ (τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἐλκόντων

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\(^{31}\) See Brown, ‘Innovation’, and Cornford, \textit{PTK}, 218–30, for arguments that the Giants represent the Presocratics of the previous discussion. Cornford also argues that Parmenides is grouped with the Gods in the Battle and Heraclitus with the Giants (241–49); Gill, \textit{Philosophos}, 76–100, likewise argues that the Giants take the side of Heraclitus in particular, and the Gods of Parmenides.

\(^{32}\) It is in response to the quoted description given by the Visitor that Theaetetus describes the Giants as fearsome, and says he has already met with a good number of them (246 B 4–5). Taylor, \textit{Plato}, 384, takes Theaetetus’ familiarity to signal that we are dealing with ‘the crass unthinking corporealism of the “average man” rather than the doctrine of any particular “school”’; Cornford, \textit{PTK}, \textit{ad loc.}, takes the group to include philosophical materialists as well, though not any thinker in particular, so much as a tendency of thought. Campbell, \textit{Sophistes}, lxxv and 127, takes the familiarity to be expressed by Plato, as opposed to the Visitor, and to indicate that the Gods represent friendly but misguided members of the Academy. I agree with Cornford on this, particularly given that the Visitor has said at 245 D 12–E 8 that they have not gone through all the detailed accounts, and that the objective of the current discussion is to have them \textit{all} in view; this shows that the relevant group is neither ordinary people nor any particular thinker, but philosophical materialists generally.
βίς, 246 C 10–D 1, my emphasis). So, the Visitor proposes to hypothesize a better (βελτίους), gentler (ἡμερώτεροι) breed of Giants, ‘willing to answer less wildly than they actually do’ (νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νὲν ἐθέλοντας ἃν ἀποκρίνασθαι, 246 D 4–7, trns. N. White).  

It is in contrast to these hypothetically civilized Giants that a third aspect of the savagery of the original, untamed Giants is made explicit. Although the civilized Giants maintain that soul is a certain kind of body (perhaps tangible but not visible), they are too ashamed to say either that the virtues are body or that they are nothing at all. In this they are contrasted with the original Giants, who contend that ‘everything which is unable to be squeezed by the hands is absolutely nothing’ (πᾶν ὁ μὴ δυνατὸν ταῖς χερσί συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν, 247 C 5–7, my emphasis). Thus, although the option to corporealize the virtues is open to the untamed Giants, it is not the move they make; rather, they say that if the virtues are not tangible, then they are absolutely nothing.

This eliminative aspect of the original Giants’ savagery has been overlooked and can answer the second of our open questions, to what extent the Stoics are like the original, untamed Giants. Everyone agrees that the Stoics corporealize the virtues, and this is correct; but in corporealizing the virtues, it will not be correct to say that the Stoics are like the original, savage Giants (as Brunschwig, Vogt, and Alessandrelli do). Nor, of course, will they be like the civilized Giants, who are too ashamed to corporealize the virtues. In that moment, admitting that the virtues exist but are not bodies, the civilized Giants fold altogether on their commitment to body as being, since being now includes incorporeals. They are also subject to a further challenge, to say what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common, what could be true of them both at one

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34 Brunschwig, TGT, 68, takes the two options offered to the civilized Giants at 247C to characterize the original Giants, which is to miss the eliminative aspect of their savagery and to conflate what the Visitor asks with what the original Giants say.
and the same time.

εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἁσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἁμα καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφέρεις γεγονός, εἰς δὲ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα ἐναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥήτεον. (247 C 9–D 4)

For if they are willing to admit something incorporeal, even something small, among the beings, it is sufficient. For it is required of them to say this: what has come to be that is naturally united, at once, with these [sc. incorporeals] and with those inasmuch they have body, to which they look when they say that both are.

The reformed Giants may be more civilized for their willingness to enter discussion, but they are not very sophisticated, or principled in their position, and again are not sure what to say. The Visitor quickly offers the dunamis proposal that being is ‘what has any certain sort of capacity at all, that is of a nature either to do anything whatever to something else or to undergo even the smallest thing by the agency of the foulest, even if only once’ (τὸ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνην τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἑτερον ὅπουν πεφυκός εἶτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἀπαξ, 247 D 8–E 3). Notice that the dunamis proposal, by design, is a thin criterial notion designed to cover two very different kinds of being; the dunamis proposal is ex hypothesi insensitive to different ways of being. The discussion is not engaged with questions of fundamentality and dependence, or the relation between bodies and incorporeals. Indeed, the dunamis proposal could not function as it needs to, as what is common to contrary kinds, if it were meant to differentiate things in terms of fundamentality. So the dunamis proposal, ‘in situ’, is clearly an ontological criterion, rather than a metaphysical notion.

But this does not mean that the demand for the Giants to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common is an ontological demand, or that the Giants necessarily accept the dunamis proposal as an adequate response to the demand. In fact, it is explicit that the Giants accept the
dunamis proposal provisionally, only absent a better alternative that could yet arise: ‘maybe something else will occur to them and to us later’ (ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς διστερον ἡμιν τε καὶ τούτοις ἐτερον ἂν φανεῖη, 247 E 7–248 A 1). With this option conspicuously open, there is reason to think that Plato’s challenge to the civilized Giants is to go beyond a merely ontological criterion, to a metaphysical account of what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common insofar as they both are, or are something, i.e. to resist the two-worlds move. Lesley Brown describes Plato’s message to the Presocratics, in the guise of the earthborn Giants, along these lines, as a call to engage in both ontology and metaphysics:

[T]hose who pontificate about onta or ousia, enumerating basic principles, or declaring being to be confined to a certain kind of thing, owe us an account of their theorizing. They must give at least criteria for counting something in or out, or, better still, an account of what it is to be. Now it is highly likely that most of the theorists whom Plato takes to task did not in fact conceive of themselves as giving any sort of account of being. Parmenides, and Plato himself, are the two obvious exceptions to this. It is as if Plato’s message to the others is: nowadays we expect such thinkers to be more self-critical, to state and defend their criteria for being, even to say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings (posa kai poia ta onta). Metaphysics and ontology should replace cosmology.35

My suggestion is that the Stoics could have understood the Sophist this way too, seeing themselves as akin to the earthborn Giants, savage and civilized, and that they could have aimed to respond on the Giants’ behalf, breathing new life into their corporealism both by stating their

criteria for counting things in or out and by saying what it is to be before rolling out their cosmology.

Turning now to the Gods, their position ‘from some invisible æiry hold’ is that only the Forms have *being* and everything else, including whatever meets the *dunamis* proposal, belongs to the realm of *becoming*. The Gods’ response to the Visitor’s questioning is the move to two worlds, the contrary worlds of *being* and *becoming*. It is the stability of the Forms that earns them the status of *being*, in contrast to the flux of the material world, because this stability makes them fit to be the objects of knowledge (248 A 10–13). And it is this epistemological concern that the Visitor now turns on the Gods to force a parallel challenge to the one given to the Giants (248 B 2–4). While the Giants were handed a metaphysical challenge, to say what bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common such that both have *being* (or are *something*), the Gods are handed an epistemological challenge, to say what sort of cognitive association (κοινωνία) could possibly be common to perception (by the body) and reasoning (by the soul). Again the *dunamis* proposal is offered, but the Gods are resistant to admitting that the Forms might be acted upon and hence change by being known.

It is noteworthy that the Giants’ metaphysical challenge follows from their brutish commitment to one world (the corporeal world of *being*), while the Gods’ epistemological challenge follows from the high-mindedness of their move to two worlds (the incorporeal world of *being* and the corporeal world of *becoming*), which is immediately undermined by their own brutish rejection of the *dunamis* proposal as common to both. It is not often noted that the Friends of the Forms are described as ‘insisting violently that true being is certain non-bodily Forms that can be thought about’ (νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, 246 B 7–8, trns. N. White,

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Thus the Gods are just as contemptuous as the untamed Giants in their violent refusal to hear anything else about *being*, including even the *dunamis* proposal, and the sophistication of their two worlds move is rather blunted by their own savagery. In fact, the Friends of the Forms never even concede the point; it is the Visitor who ultimately takes a stand against the Gods (at 248 E 7–249 C 9), and then calls on the philosopher ‘to refuse the claim that the all is at rest, either from those saying the one [sc. Parmenides] or those saying there are many forms [sc. the Gods], and to not listen at all to those, again, moving *what is* in every way [sc. the Giants, presumably], but like a children’s wish, so long as *what is* and the all is moving and unmoving, to say “both together”’ (μὴτε τῶν ἔν ἦ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἰδὴ λεγόντων πάν ἐστικός ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε ὁ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὡσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πάν συνασμφότερα λέγειν, 249 C 10–D 4).

The idea behind the children’s wish is that when faced with a choice between exclusive alternatives, only a child would make the irrational demand for both, ignoring that it is impossible to conjoin exclusive alternatives. Cornford illustrates this point by the question ‘Which hand will you have?’ and, quoting a letter from Mary Lamb, ‘Which do you like best?’ The children’s plea is phrased in terms of motion and rest, whereas the foregoing discussion takes place in terms of bodies and incorporeals with the Giants, and in terms of *becoming* and *being* with the Gods (as well as bodies

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38 Or that they leave the discussion early on — once they reject the *dunamis* proposal and say that neither knowing nor being known is a case of either doing or undergoing (248 B 2–C 9), the Gods are no longer represented in the discussion; the ensuing conversation concerning change, life, soul, and mind that follows (248 E 7–249 C 9) is conducted in the first person, between Theaetetus and the Visitor, who reach agreement about what we will be convinced by (248 E 8), about what we will admit, say, deny, concede (249 A 2–B 3), and ultimately that we must use every argument we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, or intelligence as they do (249 C 6–8). I appreciate Michael Augustin pointing out this important detail in the text; see M. Augustin, *Self-Instantiation in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist [Self-Instantiation]*. Diss. University of California, Santa Barbara (2018), for arguments that the Battle has a tripartite structure (Giants-Gods-Visitor/Theaetetus), the third part being signaled in part by this switch to the first person. Campbell, *Sophistes, ad loc.*, does observe: ‘The Stranger’s practiced ear discerns that from their serene height they reply with scorn’. It is possible to read ‘βιαζόμενοι’ in the passive rather than middle voice, but I have not found any that do, e.g. Cornford, ‘maintaining with all their force,’ and there is no other indication that they are being compelled, whether by reason or something else; I thank Rachana Kamtekar for this suggestion.

39 Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.*
and incorporeals). 40 Of course, the Gods maintain that bodies and becoming are in motion and subject to the \textit{dunamis} proposal, while Forms are completely at rest and not subject to the \textit{dunamis} proposal, so the connection is not far to find; 41 and if the Giants are Heracliteans for whom all \textit{being} is in motion (since \textit{being} is body and there are no Forms), then the plea will apply equally to them. 42 Here ends the Battle of Gods and Giants.

Before proceeding to give a positive account of \textit{being} and \textit{non-being}, the Visitor puts forth one last challenge, personified by the Late Learners: ‘let’s give an account of how we call the very same thing, whatever it may be, by many names’ (\textit{λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὅντινα ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτα τὸ ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν, 251 A 5–6) how a thing can be both one and many, i.e. how a person can be one even ‘when we name him several things, when we apply colors to him, shapes, sizes, evils, and virtues; in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is human but also good and indefinitely many different things’ (\textit{πόλλ' ἂντα ἐπονομάζωντες, τά τε}

40 Though when the Visitor moves to the first person at 248 E 7–8, he does include motion alongside life, soul, and wisdom. I would like to remain neutral on several interpretive questions here: (1) whether for Plato the \textit{dunamis} proposal is a definition (G. E. L. Owen, ‘Plato on Not-Being’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), \textit{Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays}, vol. 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Garden City, 1971), 223–67; Gill, \textit{Philosophos}) or a mark of being (Cornford, \textit{PTK}; Brown, ‘\textit{Innovation}’); (2) whether it survives for Plato (YES: Brown, ‘\textit{Innovation}’; Brunschwig, \textit{TGS}; Gill, \textit{Philosophos}; Irani, ‘\textit{Perfect Change}’; F. Leigh, ‘Being and Power in Plato’s \textit{Sophist}’, \textit{Apeiron}, 43 (2010), 63–85; J. M. E. Moravcsik, ‘Being and Meaning in the \textit{Sophist}’, \textit{Acta Philosophica Fennica}, 14 (1962), 23–78; Owen, ‘Plato on Not-Being’; G. Vlastos, ‘An Ambiguity in the \textit{Sophist}’, \textit{Platonic Studies} 2nd edn. (Princeton, 1981), 270–322. NO: Augustin, \textit{Self-Instantiation}. MAYBE: Cornford, \textit{PTK}, 239); and (3) whether the \textit{dunamis} proposal is modified here by the children’s wish so that \textit{being} is now defined in terms of both motion and rest as part of its nature (e.g. Brunschwig, \textit{TGS}; Gill, \textit{Philosophos}; Irani, ‘\textit{Perfect Change}’; Moravcsik, ‘\textit{Being and Meaning in the \textit{Sophist}’; Owen, ‘Plato on Not-Being’), or the children’s wish is rather that \textit{being} should include in its extension both corporeal and incorporeal things (e.g. Augustin, \textit{Self-Instantiation}; Brown, ‘\textit{Innovation}’; Cornford, \textit{PTK}; D. Keyt, ‘Plato’s Paradox That the Immutable Is Unknowable’, \textit{The Philosophical Quarterly}, 19 (1969), 1–14). In other words, I do not wish to weigh in on whether Plato intends for the Forms to remain immutable or not. However, I will suggest that for the Stoics the challenge to be inclusive, so that the ontology includes both bodies and incorporeals in its extension, is distinct from the challenge of the children’s plea to make \textit{being} (namely body) such that it has both motion and rest. To this extent, then, I do lean toward Gill et al. in taking the children’s plea to be about the \textit{nature of being} rather than its extension; it is still possible that the Stoics saw it one way and Plato another, and to that extent I do remain agnostic about Plato.

41 I am skeptical that the Gods are refusing to call what is \textit{becoming} ‘body’, as Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, 151, argues.

42 The Giants are never explicitly described as committed to all things being in motion, except in the children’s wish; it is perhaps an assumption about body that all parties agree to implicitly, or perhaps there really is a move to single out Heraclitus, who has been invoked earlier in the discussion, as Gill, \textit{Philosophos}, argues (see n. 32). Another possibility is that the other materialists are also committed to their bodies being always in motion, albeit in different ways (either coming together or pulling apart through love and strife, or atoms in eternal motion, or however else the material principles change to produce the world of our experience).
χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι ἐτέροις μορίοις οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶν εἶναι φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ ἑτερα ἀπειρά, 251 Α 8–Β 3).

Although the Visitor is dismissive of the Late Learners, he makes it a point to keep their challenge in view: ‘Then let’s direct our questions now both to these people and also to the others we were talking with before. That way our account will be addressed to everyone who’s ever said anything at all about being’ (για τοίνυν πρὸς ἀπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἤ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁποῖον διαλεχθέντας, 251 C 9–D 3, trns. N. White). Thus the logical challenge of the Late Learners, to say how one thing can be called many or have many things predicated of it even while remaining one, stands as a dialectical bookend to the physical challenge of the Presocratics, to make one out of many with a completely corporeal cosmology.

I propose that we have now found eight distinct challenges that are likely to have been salient to the Stoics in the Sophist, each one represented below by a character in the text:

(i) Parmenides **Commit the patricide:** (1) Prise apart something from being, and show that what is not is still (2) a countable individual, and (3) a proper object of thought and discourse — state and defend your criteria for counting something in or out

(ii) Giants **Defend the Giants:** Say what it is to be, and deliver unity without Form in a completely corporeal cosmology — make one out of many

(iii) Gods **Reform the Giants:** Dare to say that soul and even the virtues are bodies — corporealize, do not eliminate

(iv) Children **Reconcile the Gods and Giants:** Make being capable of both rest and change — hear the children’s wish
Late Learners  *Silence the Late Learners*: Deliver predication without plurality, show how one thing can be called many (colors, shapes, sizes, evils, virtues, et al.) even while remaining one — make many out of one

Battle  *Be inclusive*: Do not ‘drag all things down from the heavens and the invisible to earth’ (εἰς γῆν ἐξ ὄμην καὶ ἀοράτου πάντα ἐλκουσί, 246 A 8–9) — recognize both bodies and incorporeals

Visitor  *Be principled about your inclusivity*: Go beyond a thin ontological criterion to a one-world metaphysics — find the common ground

Sophist  *Save the sophist*: Give a theory of meaning and be able to say something even when it does not represent the world as it is — say what is not

With respect to our open questions, we have already found that these challenges are both ontological (concerned with counting) and metaphysical (concerned with ways of being Something), but questions about *being* are not treated as questions about fundamentality; further, *being* is indeed problematic, but not because it leads to non-*being*. Secondly, we have seen that the original, untamed Giants do not corporealize the virtues, so at least insofar as the Stoics *do* corporealize, we can see already that they are not to be equated with either the savage Giants, who are eliminativists, or the civilized Giants who are too ashamed to corporealize. Hence I have put the challenges above simply in terms of ‘the Giants’, signaling that the Stoics will be descended from the original and civilized Giants, but not quite like either one. Third, we have seen that the *dunamis* proposal, designed to be insensitive to different ways of *being*, is an ontological patch for what is really a metaphysical challenge; and, fourth, that this challenge is to give a one-world metaphysics of bodies and incorporeals, including the semantic dimension of our world. Let us turn now to the Stoics with these challenges in view, and the interpretive questions that remain open.
4. Stoic ontology

The Stoic response to Plato’s first challenge, *Commit the patricide*, state and defend your criteria for counting something in or out, is to introduce not just one, but, as Brunschwig has argued, two distinct ontological criteria: one for *what is*, and one for *what is not* but is nevertheless Something. I will take each in turn. First, in giving the criterion for *what is* we find the Stoics turning the *dunamis* proposal against Plato, to admit only bodies; as Hahm puts it, they (and the Epicureans) ‘have grossly perverted its intent’. They start with the premise that *being* is the capacity to act or be acted upon, to do or undergo (Plut. *Comm. not.* 1073 D–E (= SVF ii. 525)). Then they show that only bodies meet this criterion (Aët. *Plac.* 4. 20. 2 (= SVF ii. 387); Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 15. 14. 1 (= LS 45G); Cic. *Acad.* 1. 39 (= LS 45A); Sen. *Ep.* 106. 5 Gummere; Cleom. *Cael.* 1. 1. 66–67; 1. 1. 99–100 Todd; D.L. 7. 55 (= LS 33H); S.E. M. 8. 263 (= LS 45B)). From these premises they can conclude that only bodies are (Alex. *Aphr.* In *Top.* 301. 19–25 (= LS 27B); Plot. 2. 4. 1 (= LS 44g); 4. 1. 28 (= SVF ii. 319); S.E. M. 10. 3–4 (= LS 49B)). Thus the *dunamis* proposal is not a criterion for bodies or corporeality, but rather for *being* — as originally proposed in the *Sophist*. Since the *dunamis* proposal is the major premise of the syllogism, and the commitment that only bodies can act or undergo is the minor premise, textual evidence that only bodies can act or undergo does not establish that the *dunamis* proposal in Stoic hands is criterial for body and not for *being*. On the contrary, as Long & Sedley say, ‘It is essential to see that the capacity to act or be acted upon,

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44 I cite parenthetically the chapter number and letter of passages as they appear in A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers [LS]*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987), e.g. 45G, following; when passages do not appear in LS, I cite the volume and passage number from H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta [SVF]*, 4 vols. (Tuebner, 1903–1905), as here; and when passages do not appear in LS or SVF I give no further citation, but do indicate the editor, as with the Seneca and Cleomedes passages, following.
45 Only bodies meet the criterion for *being* because, first, doing and undergoing require contact (Simpl. *In Categ.* 8. 302. 30–31 (= SVF ii. 342)), and, second, only body has the solidity and resistance required for contact (Nemes. *Nat. hom.* 78. 7–79. 2 (= LS 45C); 81. 6–10 (= LS 45D); D.L. 7. 135 (= LS 45E); Galen *Qualit. incorp.* xix. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F).
46 LS numbers with lower case letters refer to passages appearing only in volume ii. See Hahm, *Origins*, 12, for the idea that the Stoics follow the Epicureans in syllogizing this way (Lucretius 1. 444–446, Rouse, Smith).
though peculiar to bodies, is not advanced as a defining characteristic of body per se.47 Furthermore, that it is being and non-being that is at issue for the Stoics is confirmed by Plutarch, who complains that it is absurd for the Stoics to say that ‘there is something but it is what is not’ in reference to the incorporeals, or as Cherniss renders the commitment, ‘something is but is non-existent’ (εἶναι μέν τι μὴ Ὑν δ’ εἶναι, Comm. not. 1073 D–E (= SVF ii. 525)).48

Thus we can confirm that the dunamis proposal is used by the Stoics as an ontological criterion for being, and not for corporeality.49 And while the criterion is certainly causal, as Vogt emphasizes, this attention to causation is not to the exclusion of being; on the contrary, the commitment to being as the capacity for causal interaction is as much about being as it is about causation. And there is no reason to think, with Bronowski, that ‘being’ does not have doctrinal purport when the Stoics say that only bodies have being, or that something is the genus of being, etc.50

We can also see that there is no indication that what is at issue with the dunamis proposal is the fundamentality of being and non-being, or of bodies and incorporeals as Bailey has urged. It is simply a thin ontological criterion for being.

47 LS, 273; likewise, J.-B. Gourinat, ‘The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: “Corporealism” and the Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus’, in R. Salles (ed.), God and Cosmos in Stoicism (Oxford, 2009), 4–70 at 56, says that acting and being acted upon are a property rather than a definition of body (but cf. Gourinat ‘Les stoïciens et le dualisme’, Chôra, Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales, 13 (2015), 165–84 at 179, where it is offered as a definition of body and the Stoics are equated with the Sons of the Earth). Contrast with Hahm, Origins, 3, 11, who takes the dunamis proposal to be a second definition of body (alongside solid three-dimensional extension with resistance), and J. Mansfeld, ‘Zeno of Citium. Critical Observations on a Recent Study’, Mnemosyne, 31 (1978), 134–78 at 158–67, who finds the two definitions in tension. Marmodoro, ‘Stoic Gunk’, 156, 171; ‘Stoic Blends’, 2, 13, takes the dunamis proposal (‘that only the causally powerful exists’) to be the Stoics’ motivation for their ‘extreme physicalism’, i.e. corporealism, so she is in agreement that it is being rather than corporeality that is at issue (though this is not her focus); however, she goes on to assimilate Stoic causation to the colocation of blending, denying that this is a physical interaction between bodies and casting it instead as a case of ‘sharing subjects’ according to which the passive body shares in the properties and/or structure of the active body by being compresent with it, but not by being qualified by it or by interacting, and in this she stands on her own.


49 Brunschwig, TGS, 60, 72–3, 86–7, treats the dunamis proposal as a criterion for ‘corporeal existence’, taking corporeality and existence as equivalent; however it is clear he is committed to the dunamis proposal as a criterion for being, so he remains in contrast to Bronowski, Lekta, and Vogt, ‘Brutes’.

50 I am not moved by the argument in Bronowski, Lekta, 127–28, that being has no doctrinal purport generally because it is sometimes said that the incorporeals are such and such, e.g. that assertibles (ἀξιόματα) are true or false. It is a mistake to think that if some uses of ‘being’ are technical then they must all be technical; the pervasiveness of the copula, and the preponderance of non-technical uses of the verb ‘to be’ do not undermine so much as underscore the technical uses; see n. 2 for bibliography.
So much for *what is*, now on to *what is not*. Alessandrelli and Aubenque take the *dunamis* proposal to be the only ontological criterion, determining at once *what is* and *what is not*. However, failing to meet the *dunamis* proposal is not sufficient to differentiate the incorporeals from nothing at all. For this, there must be a second criterion that recognizes those things that, while *non-existent*, are nevertheless Something. So I take Brunschwig to be right about there being two ontological criteria rather than one, although I differ from him on the details of the second criterion, and in that I take this criterion to respond to Plato’s patricide in the *Sophist*. Whether the Stoics use the second criterion to abdicate the challenge to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common, as Brunschwig argues, or whether being Something objectively real is a sufficient response to this challenge, as Alessandrelli and Aubenque take it, remains to be seen.

The second criterion screens for those things that are not bodies, and thus do not *exist* or have *being*, but are nevertheless Something that *subsists* (τὸ ἐφεστός, Galen *Meth. med.* 10. 155. 1–8 (= *LS* 27G)). Recall that the patricide over *what is not* itself contained three challenges: (1) to prise apart *something* from *being*, (2) to show that *something* without *being* is nevertheless a countable individual, and (3) to show that *something* without *being* is a coherent object of thought. To the first, as Aubenque emphasizes, the path that allows *something* and *being* to come apart is conspicuously absent in the *Sophist*, and the Stoics clearly embrace this option by making Something the genus of *being*, which is said only of bodies, and of the incorporeals as *non-beings* (Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 301. 19–25 (= *LS* 27B); Sen. *Ep.* 58. 13–15 (= *LS* 27A), *S.E.* M. 10. 218 (= *LS* 27C)). And, as I will argue, in stating and defending a second criterion for counting Something in or out, the Stoics offer two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being Something, which correspond to
the second two challenges of the patricide.\textsuperscript{51} I will begin with the second condition on being Something, availability for thought. That the Stoics were thinking along these lines is attested by Sextus Empiricus.

\begin{quote}
\textit{εἰ γὰρ τὸ οὐ̅τὶ διδάσκοιτο, ἔσται ἡ διδάσκεται τί [... καὶ μὴν εἰ διδάσκεται τί, ἣτοι διὰ τῶν οὐ̅τινῶν διακαθίσμεται ἡ διὰ τῶν τινῶν. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τῶν οὐ̅τινῶν οἷς οἶον τε διακαθίσμενα ἀνυπόστατα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ταῦτα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς. (S.E. M. 1.15 … 1.17 Bury (27C+))}\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

For if what is not something [τὸ οὐ̅τὶ] were to be taught, it would be something, inasmuch as it is taught [...] And if, indeed, something is taught, either it will be taught through what are not something [τῶν οὐ̅τινῶν] or through what are something [τίνῳ]. But it is not possible for it to be taught through what are not something; for these have no subsistence for the mind [ἀνυπόστατα … τῇ διανοίᾳ], according to the Stoics.

This passage reports that being subsistent (ὑπόσταστος) for the mind or intellect, i.e. available to thought, is criterial for being Something for the Stoics.\textsuperscript{53} What has no subsistence for the mind is not Something; therefore, what is Something must be subsistent for the mind. And anything that is

\textsuperscript{51} I have argued elsewhere (V. de Harven, ‘How Nothing Can Be Something: The Stoic Theory of Void’ ['Nothing'], \textit{Ancient Philosophy}, 35 (2015), 405–29) for this second criterion, but offer here an updated version of it. I show there how the spatial incorporeals (place, room, surface, and void) are both countable and proper objects of thought; time, like void, is counted at the cosmic level so that it is the whole of time that is Something, rather than individual times.

\textsuperscript{52} See also S.E. M. 1. 29, 11. 224 Bury. Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, 127–28, takes this passage as evidence that the Stoics did not make a distinction between the being of bodies and that of incorporeals; on this view, it seems Alexander isn’t complaining about distinctions they do make between the being of bodies and incorporeals but, rather, correctly pointing out that the Stoics fail to make a clear distinction between their being. However, the testimony of Galen \textit{Meth. med.} 10. 155. 1–8 (= LS 27G), about the Stoics’ ‘linguistic quibbling’ over the distinction κατὰ γένη between the existent (τὸ ὄν) and the subsistent (τὸ ὄφεστος) shows this reading cannot be correct. Alessandrelli, ‘Qualcosa’, 6–7, 13, takes this passage to show that Something is not yet operating as a genus; this seems unlikely for such a late and generic report.

\textsuperscript{53} As Caston, ‘Something and Nothing’, also argues. Note that my inferring from this passage that the Stoics take subsistence for thought as criterial for being Something does not suppose Sextus himself is saying this or making this inference in his polemic here. All that Sextus attributes to the Stoics is that what is not Something has no subsistence for the mind, and that is all he needs to draw the conclusion that what is not Something cannot be taught; but this does not mean we cannot infer from the report that what is Something is subsistent for the mind.
not Something has no subsistence for the mind; therefore what is subsistent for the mind or available to thought is Something. Now what sort of availability for thought is this? My suggestion is that availability for thought is criterial of reality insofar as the relevant sense of availability lies with the world, not the mind; to be available for thought this way is to be an impressor (φανταστόν), something real, or among what there is. It is not because I think something, that it must be real (let alone that my thinking makes it real), but because something is real that it is available to be thought about.

This reading of the thinkability criterion is importantly different from a Meinongian interpretation like Victor Caston’s, which finds the Stoics motivated by concerns about intentionality and intentional objects in cases where the object does not exist, resulting in a highly permissive criterion that admits anything at all that is conceivable. The Stoic appeal to availability for thought, as I will argue, is not motivated by concerns about meaning and reference; it is, rather, an appeal to the objective features of the world as it really is. To say that what is not Something has no subsistence for the mind is simply to say that such (putative) things cannot excite an impression in us, just as Sextus’ third argument against what is not argues: what is taught becomes learning in us by exciting (Bury, for κινοῦν) or setting in motion (Bett) an impression (φαντασία), but what is not cannot do this and therefore is not teachable (1. 11–12). To be subsistent for the mind, then, is to be an impressor (φανταστόν), and to be an impressor is to be real — not a figment of the imagination (Aēt. Plac. 4.

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54 Thus I disagree with Bronowski, Lekta, 161–62, that this passage gives us a map of the Stoic ontology, which includes Somethings and Not-Somethings (a class of entities intermediate between Something and nothing at all). The express parity of reasoning (1. 16) with the earlier dichotomy what is and what is not (1. 10–14), where there is no reason to think what is not refers to entities intermediate between what is and nothing at all, shows this cannot be the correct interpretation of the text. R. G. Bury, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors [Against Professors] (Cambridge, Mass., 1949) even renders the argument using ‘something’ and ‘nothing’.

55 Caston, ‘Something and Nothing’, 154–56; by ‘Meinongian’, Caston means a theory that rejects the presupposition that having an attribute entails having some kind of being a Meinongian view can make attributions independent of questions of being, existence, and subsistence. L.S, 164, also cast Stoic subsistence as Meinongian, but in passing. G. Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge (Belfast, 1966), 92–6 first introduced Meinong and Russell to the conversation.

Thus, we can see that creatures of fiction and falsehoods are not the kind of thing we would expect to find as teachable or the sort of thing to seek as Something in light of this piece of evidence in Sextus. 57

Another important piece of evidence for the kind of availability for thought the Stoics have in mind is the following famously perplexing passage, from Sextus’ *Against the Logicians* (which argues against the specific discipline of logic, as books 7 and 8 of *Against the Professors*, which are a continuation of the schema introduced in book 1). It is offered in response to the challenge: how can the logician’s demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, which is composed of incorporeal sayables) be the agent of an imprint (τύπωσις) or an impression, let alone an infallible catalectic impression, given that incorporeals cannot act or be acted upon? This is an instance of the third argument, that *what is not* cannot excite an impression in us (1. 11–12) and that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind (1. 17) — but this time we get the Stoic response to this persistent challenge.

\[\text{ὡσπερ γάρ, ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὀπλομάχος ἔσθε’} \text{ ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενοι τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ῥυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ’} \text{ ὅτε δὲ ἀπωθεθὲν ἔστως καὶ πῶς κινούμενος ἐν ῥυθμῷ παρέχει ἐαυτῶν ἐκεῖνῳ πρὸς μίμησιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φανταστῶν ἔννια μὲν οἰονεὶ φαύνοντα καὶ θυγγάνοντα τοῦ ἤγεμονικοῦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν, ὅποιόν ἔστι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινός τὸ σῶμα, ἐνὶ δὲ τοιαύτῃ ἔχει φόσιν, τοῦ ἤγεμονικοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς φαντασιομένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ὁποίᾳ ἔστι τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. (S.E. M. 8. 409–10 (= LS 27E))\]

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For just as, they [the Stoics] say, the trainer or drill-sergeant sometimes imposes order and teaches him to make certain motions sometimes by taking the boy’s hands, and

57 And insofar as the Stoics are not motivated by concerns about intentionality, Bailey’s comparison of the incorporeals to Tichy’s offices is further to find as well.

58 Translation is an amalgam of choices made by LS; Bett, *Against the Logicians* ([Against Logicians]) (Cambridge, 2005); and Bury, *Against Logicians*.
other times presents himself to the boy for imitation by standing at a distance and moving in an orderly way, so too some impressors [φανταστών], as if they were touching and taking hold [θυγγάνοντα] of the commanding faculty, make their imprint in it, of the sort that white and black and body generally are, while other impressors have this sort of nature: with the commanding faculty being impressed [φαντασιουμένον] on the basis of [ἐπὶ] them and not by [ὁπό] them, of the sort that incorporeal sayables [λεκτά] are.

The Stoic response illustrated by the drill sergeant is to make a distinction between cases where the impressor and the agent of the impression are one and the same, and cases where the agent and the impressor come apart, i.e. when the impressor is an incorporeal incapable of causal interaction (8. 406); in the latter case, the soul itself is the agent of the impression, being impressed on the basis of (ἐπὶ) an incorporeal, which is grasped by the mind and not the senses. The surrounding context makes clear that what is at issue is whether the commanding faculty of soul can be the agent of its own impressions (8. 406–8), where the corporeal agent is distinct from the non-sensory impressor; and it is by ignoring this option to make impressor and agent distinct that Sextus generates his puzzles and rejects the Stoic solution.

Thus, I take the drill sergeant passage to confirm that being a non-sensory impressor (being subsistent for thought) entails being objectively real, among the furniture of the world, part of what

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59 It is hard to know how to render the preposition ‘ἐπὶ’ here to capture the contrast with ‘ὁπό’, which conveys corporeal agency. I follow Bett, Against Logicians, with ‘on the basis of’, but I would be open to ‘on the occasion of’ as well; Bury, Against Logicians, goes with ‘as a result’; LS go with ‘in relation to’.

60 Bury, Against Professors, renders the point just this way: ‘it is we who form presentations from them’; Brunschwig, TGS, 74–5, observes that it could only be the commanding faculty acting on itself. Without getting into the details of what leads up to the drill sergeant case, Sextus’ closing complaint that the Stoics have failed to deliver an incorporeal impressor (since, as he sees it, the drill sergeant makes an impression in virtue of being a body) confirms that this is the Stoic path (8. 410). By saying that it is really the drill sergeant as a body that makes the impression (presumably since the boy is seeing him and thus being impressed by (ὁπό) him like white and black and color in general), Sextus rebuffs the Stoic candidate for the job of agent (the commanding faculty), equating the corporeal agent of the impression with the impressor (the incorporeal) all over again, and ignores the incorporeal pattern of the drill sergeant’s motions as a candidate for the job of impressor.
there is, like the order of the drill sergeant’s motions, and like sayables in a demonstration.\textsuperscript{61} That sensory and non-sensory impressors are considered real and not merely intentional objects is confirmed by their explicit contrast with figments of the imagination (cited above), which are apparitions corresponding to \textit{nothing in reality}. Being a proper object of thought and discourse, then, is being a non-sensory impressor in the way that the patter of the drill sergeant’s motions is: as a feature of reality that we grasp by the mind rather than the senses.\textsuperscript{62} So the first part of the Something criterion screens for objectivity.

\begin{center}
* * *
\end{center}

However, this thinkability criterion by itself still leaves room for entities like Plato’s Forms to count as Something. Justice itself, the Friends of the Forms might yet respond, is intelligible and incorporeal and available to be thought about by anyone at all, and so counts as Something. But it is a hallmark of Stoic theory that they reject Plato’s Forms and embrace only particulars (Simpl. \textit{In. Categ.} 105. 5–16 (= LS 30E); Stob. 1. 135. 21–137. 6 (= LS 30A); Syr. \textit{In Metaph.} 104. 17–21 (= LS 30G)), so thinkability is merely a necessary condition of being Something, not sufficient by itself. In addition to whether a putative or candidate entity is available to thought, then, the Stoics also ask: is it, as Plato challenges, some \textit{one} thing that we can count, refer to, and quantify over as an individual? Can we legitimately apply unity and plurality, so that Something is always some \textit{one} thing (and a \textit{pair of somethings}, two, and \textit{somethings}, several)? This is the second of the two individually necessary and

\textsuperscript{61} Thus I disagree with Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, 181–93, that this passage reports a psychological distinction between two ways to receive a sayable. First, it does not follow from the fact that \textit{sometimes} the impressor is not the agent that it \textit{never} is. Second, the relevant similarity between the pattern of the drill sergeant’s motions and the sayables is nothing more than their both being incorporeal impressors, distinct from the corporeal agent of their impressions; they are analogous, the drill sergeant’s pattern is not itself a sayable.

\textsuperscript{62} I do not want to put the point about objectivity in terms of being mental or extra-mental, as Bronowski, \textit{Lekta}, does, because I take the Stoics to recognize some entities that are both mind-dependent (i.e. products of thought) and objective, notably the sayables, but also those things that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, like creatures of fiction and limits (but not concepts).
jointly sufficient conditions for being Something: particularity. Brunschwig has suggested that the Stoics’ famous Not Someone paradox is a test for particularity.63

\[ \text{ἄξιον δὲ ζητεῖν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπόστασιν διδόντας τοὺς εἶδέσιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰ ῥηθήσεται τάδε εἶναι.} \]

(1) καὶ γὰρ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἱδέας εἰ τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται.

(2) συμπαραπλητέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνθήσειν τῶν Στοιχείων περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν, πῶς αἱ πτώσεις καὶ αὐτοῖς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὕτων τὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται καὶ ὅπως παρὰ τὴν ἀγνοιαν τοῦ μὴ πάσαν οὕσιν τόδε τι σημαινέειν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν οὕτων σύνθεσιν γίνεται, παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, (3) οἶον ἐὰν τις ἔστιν ἐν Ἀθηναῖς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Μεγάροις. <ἀνθρωπος δὲ ἔστιν ἐν Ἀθηναῖς οὐκ ἀρα ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος ἐν Μεγάλαροις>.

(4) ὅ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ τις ἔστιν οὖ γὰρ ἔστι τις ὁ κοινὸς ὦς τινὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐλαβομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ παρὰ τούτο καὶ τὸ ὅνομα τούτῳ ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος ‘οὕτις’ κληθείς. (Simpl. In Categ. 105. 6–16 (= LS 30E))64

It is worthwhile to inquire of those who give being to forms and genera whether they will be called thises [τάδε]. (1) And in fact, Chrysippus puzzles about the form, whether it is to be called a ‘this something’ [τάδε τι]. (2) One must also take into account the Stoics’ custom concerning generically qualified things — how according to them cases (πτώσεις) get expressed [προφέρονται], in their school how universals

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63 Brunschwig, TG’s, 84–6. Note that Brunschwig takes the paradox to show that Forms are Not-Somethings, which I do not. I take the test to be for whether Forms are Something or not. It’s not that universals are Not-Somethings but that they are not Somethings; this is confirmed by Simplicius’ diagnosis in (4) and his point about how the sophism gets its name: from the failure to be Someone. Note the distinction between the hyphenated ‘Not-Something’, which signals an interpretive commitment to the class of Not-Somethings between Something and nothing, and ‘Not Something’, which does not.

[τὰ κοινά] are said to be not somethings [οὐτίνα], and how their ignorance of the fact that not every substance signifies a ‘this something’ gives rise to the not someone [οὐτίν] sophism, which relies on the form of expression. (3) Namely, ‘if someone is in Athens, he is not in Megara; <but humanity is in Athens; therefore humanity is not in Megara>’. (4) For, humanity is not someone [οὐ τις]; for the universal is not someone [οὐ ... τις]; but we took him as something in the argument, and that is why the argument has this name, being called the ‘not someone [οὐτις]’ argument.

As we have seen with the first condition on being Something, our ability to think about an entity is not constitutive, causal, or even explanatory of its being Something, but it is criterial since only what is real is available for anyone (any arbitrary individual) to think about. Likewise, passing the Not Someone, or οὐτίς (outis) test is not explanatory of an entity’s particularity, but indicative of it and hence criterial of its being some one thing. The test in question at (3) is this: If something is in Athens, then it is not in Megara — whatever makes the conditional come out true (when the antecedent is true) passes the test. Given the assumption in (2) that Forms are universals (κοινά), it is obviously false that if the Form of human is in Athens, then it is not also in Megara. That it is the particularity of an entity that is at issue in this use of the paradox is made clear by the reference in (1) and (2) to ‘thises’ (τόδε) and to the Stoics’ ignorance in treating Form as a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι), as well as by the diagnosis of the result in (4), namely that the Form of human was taken as someone, i.e. someone particular.\footnote{Brunschwig, *TGS*, 84, suggests we might reinterpret this non-Stoic terminology (i.e. τόδε τι) as a disjunction so that Chrysippus puzzles whether Forms are either this or something; I do not think it necessary to interpolate the ‘or’ since it can stand as Simplicius’ diagnosis of the Stoic mistake, put in his own terms, and thus does not require putting the phrase in Chrysippus’ mouth to begin with.}

It is clear that Socrates will pass the Something test because as a body he is a particular unable to be in two places at once. Less obvious is that Socrates’ place also passes the test in virtue
of Socrates being a particular. 66 What I mean is that the dependence of the incorporeals on their underlying bodies — the fact that they inherit their physical properties from the bodies on which they *subsist* — is explanatory of why they meet the Something criterion. 67 This dependence and inheritance can be understood on the model of the flow of traffic. The flow of traffic is not reducible to, or nothing but the corporeal cars in motion that we see (by which we are impressed), nor is it the motion of the cars; it is something distinct from, and yet clearly dependent on the motion of the cars that underlie it, which is grasped by the mind (on the basis of which we are impressed). The very existence (or in Stoic parlance, *subsistence*) of a certain flow of traffic (the rate at which the cars are moving) depends on the cars, and so do all the particular properties of that flow of traffic, e.g. being fast or slow, smooth or stop-and-go, in Athens or Megara in just that way. The flow of traffic thus inherits its properties from the underlying, or ‘host’ cars in motion, including being here or there, among the rest of its fully particular qualities. However, the flow of traffic is not the same thing as or nothing but the cars, or their motions (which are also corporeal); it is something distinct, an incorporeal, that arises from the cars in motion: the pace at which they are going.

Likewise, the incorporeals inherit their particular physical characteristics from the bodies on which they depend. For instance, time is not the same thing as the world’s change, but the rate of the world’s change or motion; and this is not to equate time with motion, but to identify a further entity that is not visible or otherwise accessible to the senses, as motion is, but rather an intelligible

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66 In this, and in the application of the test to mass terms and incorporeals, I differ from Brunschwig, *TGS*; Crivelli, ‘The Stoics on Definitions and Universals’ (see n. 64); and Alessandrelli, ‘Qualcosa’ (who denies the incorporeals are particulars).
entity accessible to the mind (on the basis of which we can be impressed). Further, the temporal extension of this world here cannot be there, as the temporal extension of that world (not that there are other worlds for the Stoics, but speaking hypothetically). In just the same way, the extra-cosmic void extending infinitely from all sides of this world cannot be there, extending infinitely from that world. Because time and void arise from these bodies, and not those, they cannot be there while also being here. So too, the three-dimensional extension that is the place of my car depends for its particular size and shape on my car; and just as my car cannot be in Megara if it is in Athens, neither can its place be in two places at once. In all these cases, the incorporeals that arise are particulars because they depend on particular bodies for their subsistence. This inheriting of particularity explains why these entities pass the Not Someone test. Because incorporeals are grounded in body, on the model of the flow of traffic, they count as Something; if they were not grounded in body this way, they would lack the particularity for which the Not Someone test screens.

Although we can explain why Stoic bodies and incorporeals meet the criteria for existence and subsistence, respectively, the ontological criteria for existence and subsistence are themselves thin, concerned only with counting entities in or out, and not with fundamentality. That something can do or undergo, meeting the dunamis proposal, is silent with respect to fundamentality, just as being a proper object of thought and discourse is. These criteria by themselves yield only a sorted ontology with entities of different kinds (those that exist and those that subsist), and not a hierarchical or grounded ontology that relates the entities to each other in terms of fundamentality and dependence (giving different ways of being real, explaining how these entities exist or subsist in relation to each other). However, this concern with counting and ontological criteria does not mean the Stoics are

not also concerned with grounding and metaphysics. Rather, the Stoics are concerned \textit{both} with counting and with grounding, but as distinct enterprises. Stoic ontology, counting their entities by the two criteria described above, is one thing. And Stoic metaphysics, grounding their incorporeals in body (on the model of the flow of traffic just sketched) and giving them a common, i.e. one-world, account, is another. More on the grounding of the incorporeals ahead, in Section 6, ‘Stoic Physicalism’.

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For now, returning to the first of our challenges from Plato’s \textit{Sophist}, \textit{Commit the patricide}, we can see that the Stoics are indeed stating and defending their criteria for counting things in or out of the ontology. First, they adopt (or, rather, coopt) the \textit{dunamis} proposal for \textit{being}, and they do so, not by savagely equating \textit{being} with body and refusing all further discussion, but by distinguishing between an ontological criterion for \textit{existence} (the \textit{dunamis} proposal) and what meets it (bodies). In addition, the Stoics introduce a second ontological criterion, this one for \textit{subsistence}, and they use it to count intelligible and incorporeal individuals that, while \textit{non-existent} and incapable of contact, are nevertheless Something. In all this the Stoics are not only responding to the Battle of Gods and Giants, but reaching further back into the \textit{Sophist} to strike their blow in the patricide of Parmenides: (1) they prise apart \textit{something} from \textit{being}, and show (2) (by the not Someone test) that \textit{what is not} can be counted, and (3) (by the thinkability criterion) that it is a proper object of thought and reference. Far from turning away from questions of \textit{being} and \textit{non-being}, then, Stoic ontology faces them head on.
5. Stoic corporealism

Now I will show how Stoic corporealism responds to Plato’s next four challenges: *Defend the Giants*, deliver unity without Form in a corporealist cosmology; *Reform the Giants*, corporealize the virtues, don’t eliminate; *Reconcile the Giants*, hear the children’s wish for both motion and rest in being; and *Silence the Late Learners*, show how one thing can be called many even while remaining one. The heart of Stoic corporealism, as one would expect, is the earthborn commitment to body as being, which is made explicit by Clement (Strom. 2. 436 (= SVF ii. 359)) and Diogenes Laertius, in the following:

(1) σῶμα δὲ ἐστι κατ’αὐτοῦς ἢ οὐσία, καὶ πεπερασμένη καθὰ φησιν Ἀντιπατρὸς ἐν β’ Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ. καὶ παθητὴ δὲ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς φησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἄτρεπτος, οὐκ ἄν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγίνετο· (2) ἔνθεν κάκεινος ὡς ἦ τε τομὴ <μή> εἰς ἄπειρον ἐστιν ἢν ἄπειρον <οὐκ> εἰς ἄπειρον> φησιν ὁ Χρυσιππος (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τι ἄπειρον, εἰς ὃ γίνεται ἢ τομή. ἄλλ' ἀκατάληκτος ἐστι) [...] (3) καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ δι’ ὅλου γίνεσθαι, καθὰ φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὦλγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, εἰτα συγκρασθήσεται. (D.L. 7. 150–51 (= LS 50B+ … 48A+))

(1) Substance [οὐσία] is, according to them, body [σῶμα], and it is limited, according to what Antipater says in the second book of *On Substance* and Apollodorus in the

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Physics. And it is also malleable [παθητί], as that same one says; for if it were immutable [ἀτρεπτος] the things that come out of it could not come about; (2) whence <that one also says> divisibility [ἡ τομή] is into infinity [εἰς ἀπειρον] (which Chrysippus says is infinite [ἀπειρον] <but not into infinity>; for there is not some infinity at which the division arrives, but it is unceasing). (3) And also that blendings [κράσεις] come about whole through whole [δι᾽ ὅλου] according to what Chrysippus says in the third book of the Physics, not by surface contact and juxtaposition.

As (1) reports, being, existence, or substance (οὐσία) is body, and the Stoics define body (σῶμα) as solid, three-dimensional extension with resistance (D.L. 7. 135 (= LS 45E); Galen Qualit. incorp. 19. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F); S.E. M. 11. 226 Bury). There are several things to note about this definition.

First is that solidity differentiates body from the spatial incorporeals, which are non-solid extension (Galen Qualit. incorp. 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E); Themist. In Phys. 104. 9–19 (= LS 48F)), and solidity makes body capable of contact, hence capable of causal interaction (Nemes. Nat. hom. 81. 6–10 (= LS 45D); S.E. M. 8. 409 (= LS 27E)). Second is that the Stoics are not hylomorphic thinkers for whom all body is a composite of matter and form or quality; solidity, resistance, shape, size, et al. are not components or parts of body (S.E. M. 11. 226 Bury; cf. Galen Qualit. incorp. 19. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F); Plot. 6. 1. 26. 17–28 (= SVF ii. 315); Plut. Comm. not. 1085 B–C Cherniss). For the Stoics, body as such (solid three-dimensional extension) is metaphysically simple — in this the Stoics defend the Giants and go beyond the thin ontological criterion for being to say what it is to be a body.

In order to hold that only bodies are in any robust or thick sense, at least some bodies must not be composed of anything further.

Third, in contrast to the Epicureans, who are atomists, the Stoics say that the cosmos is finite and that body is completely malleable (παθητί) and continuous (1), hence divisible to infinity without reaching minima (2) and subject to through and through blending (κράσεις δι᾽ ὅλου) (3). To
understand this inference we need to observe, fourth, that this Stoic conception of solid body — malleable as opposed to rigid — brings with it an account of resistance (ἀντιτύπια) as a mutual, responding blow, a repercussion, rather than the complete rebuffing or ricochet of atomism. This explains why body is not only subject to penetration, i.e. divisible or cuttable, but divisible to infinity; it is always possible to take another cut. This conception of solid body also means that body is entirely changeable, with no absolute shape, size, or density (though always being of some shape, size, and non-zero density or other); the Stoic conception does not presume body to be full, but to come in degrees of rarity and density. Therefore being malleable also licenses the innovative Stoic theory of through and through blending. According to this rather radical theory, two (or more) independent bodies mutually interpenetrate and become completely coextended — while remaining whole (intact) and independent. This colocation of bodies that are not dense but rare, and not rigid but penetrable, is the physical mechanism by which the Stoics deliver their corporealist cosmology.

Because body as such (solid three-dimensional extension) is metaphysically simple, not being composed of anything further (like matter and form), the Stoics can declare their fundamental entities, the two principles (ἀρχαί), to be distinct and independent bodies: divine active reason (λόγος) and passive matter (ὕλη) (D.L. 7. 134 (= LS 44B); Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 14. 1 (= LS 45G); Alex. Aphr. Mixt. 224. 32–225. 10 (= SVF ii. 310); Calc. In Tim. 289 Magee). And because the Stoic principles are blended with each other through and through, they are everywhere in interactive sympathy (συμπάθεια) with one another. Further, because the Stoics cast their principles in

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72 Note that while Marmodoro, ‘Stoic Gunk’, ‘Stoic Blends’ also takes colocation to be the mechanism of unity and cosmology, we offer very different accounts of that colocation; I do not think that causation is to be assimilated to blending, or endorse the idea of ‘sharing subjects’ as an alternative to interaction between agent and patient, nor do I embrace a distinction between cosmic unity, object unity, and causal unity.
explicitly causal roles — as divine rational *agent* and its slack *patient* — they can deliver unity and order in the cosmos without Form. This causal unity between two bodies is importantly different from the ontological unity of matter and form offered by hylomorphic accounts. First, when two (or more) bodies interact, they unite in bringing about a change, e.g. the activities of the knife and flesh are one in causing there to be cutting. In the cutting of the flesh the activities of the agent and patient are not just inseparable, but one and the same activity. This is not to say that the flesh and the knife become one and the same thing, of course. However, in the case of a total blend of agent and patient bodies, the result of the causal interaction is a new *entity*: the rational agent unifies and sustains the compound, tarring the ark inside and out as Philo puts it, so that a new individual is generated and sustained (Philo, *Quaest.* 2. 4 (= LS 47R)). This account of generation and unity holds for all individuals of the *scala naturae* — all plants, animals, humans, and the cosmos itself are generated out of nothing more than two fundamental bodies (Stob. 1. 129–130. 13 (= LS 47A); 1. 177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 28D)).73 This is how the Stoics meet Plato’s second challenge, *Defend the Giants*, and deliver unity and order without Form in a completely corporealist cosmology.74

    * * *

Now we turn to how the Stoics meet the third challenge, *Reform the Giants*, and dare to corporealize the virtues. Scholars are in agreement that the Stoics respond to Plato by taking the path the Giants would not and corporealizing the virtues with a schema that has come to be called the Categories; as A. A. Long puts it, the Stoics are ‘seizing the nettle’ that their predecessors would not.75 This

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73 See also LS chapter 47.
74 The fact that the cosmos is structured and unified immanently, by the divine rational agent, shows that the Stoics have no need to posit an independently subsisting, unalterable form of the cosmos awaiting bodies to get realized — whether sayables as the structural articulations of ontology (Bronowski, *Lekîta*) or the incorporeals as independently subsisting offices (Bailey, ‘Structure’); on the contrary, this kind of Platonizing is precisely what the Stoics do without.
75 A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics*, 2nd edn. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986; 1st edn. 1974), 153. The Stoics themselves do not call their schema ‘Categories’, a label that has been imposed by the sources and taken up in the scholarship. It is an open question to what extent the Stoics were aware of and responding to Aristotle, whose works were not in circulation at the time; nevertheless, I will continue to refer to this explanatory schema as the Stoic Categories for the sake of convenience.
explanatory schema makes each of us four, ‘all people, animals, trees, furniture, implements and clothes’ — substrates (ὑπόκειμενα, hupokeimenà), qualified individuals (ποιά, poia), individuals disposed (πώς ἔχοντα, pós echantó), and individuals relatively disposed (πρός τι πώς ἔχοντα, pros ti pós echantó) (Plot. 6. 1. 25. 1-3 Armstrong; Plut. Comm. not. 1083 Α–1084 Α (= LS 28A); Simpl. In Categ. 66. 32–37 (= LS 27F)). 76 The qualified individual is itself of two kinds, the commonly qualified (κοινός ποιός) and the uniquely or peculiarly qualified individual (ιδίως ποιόν) (Dex. In Categ. 23. 25–244 (= SVF ii. 374); Simpl. In Categ. 48. 11–16 (= LS 28E); In De an. 217. 36–218. 2 (= LS 28I); Syr. In Metaph. 28. 18–19 (= LS 28G)). For example, this quantity of marble is the substrate (ὑποκειμένον) of a statue (κοινός ποιόν), namely the Nike of Samothrace (ιδίως ποιόν), which has a certain patina (πώς ἔχον) and stands at the top of the stairs (πρός τι πώς ἔχον). In each case, to be F (made of marble, a statue, this statue, this color, and here) is to be a body in a certain state or arrangement.

The task of the Categories is to give a corporealist account not just of the virtues (the case on which the civilized Giants folded), but of all the identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies once built (whatever the scope of Plato’s Forms, his challenges are not just about the virtues, but about qualities generally) — what makes this thing F? And they do this by taking that given individual and analyzing it according to four different metaphysical aspects, making many out of one. 77 Each of us, every individual, is the following four bodies.

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76 I render ‘ποιά’ as ‘qualified individuals’ to capture the fact that the second category is the qualified, or a qualified thing, or something qualified (ποιόν, poion, singular), in contrast to a quality (ποιότης, pointés), in support of which see D. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’ ['Criterion'], Phronesis, 27 (1982), 255–75, and LS, 172–76. I consistently call the second Category the ποιόν, in the neuter, even though it is sometimes given as ποιός, masculine, to capture that this category covers all manner of individuals.

1) A substrate (ὑποκείμενον) that constitutes a qualified individual (ποιόν), like a lump of clay constitutes a statue, as plant matter constitutes a tree (or, as David Wiggins puts the same point, as a tree is constituted by the set of its molecules), and as a portion of divine breath (πνεῦμα, pneuma) constitutes a soul.\(^7\) The substrate is identified as substance (οὐσία) (Plut. Comm. not. 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4); Stob. 1. 178. 15–179. 17 (= LS 28D8–12)), which we have seen is body (solid three-dimensional extension); and for the substrate constitution is identity — corporeal substance (a portion of body as such) can change qualitatively in indefinitely many ways, but it cannot survive the addition or subtraction of any portion of body whatsoever (it survives no growth or diminution) (Calc. 292 (= LS 44D); 293 (= LS 44E); Plut. Comm. not. 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4); Stob. 1. 132. 27–133. 11 + 133. 18–23 (= LS 28q); 177. 21–178. 2 (= LS 28D1); 178. 7–10 (= LS 28D4)). A thing’s substrate is its corpulence.

2) A uniquely qualified individual (ἰδίως ποιόν) that persists through growth and diminution and all qualitative change except change to its uniqueness, from generation to destruction, e.g. the Victory of Samothrace, el Árbol del Tule, and Socrates; likewise, the commonly qualified individual (κοινῶς ποιόν) that persists unchanging through the life of the individual, e.g. a statue, a tree, a human — the identity conditions and kinds (i.e. genus and species) of all individual bodies are stable lifelong states of the constituent substance (Plut. Comm. not. 1083 C–D (=LS 28A4-5); Stob. 178. 12–21 (= LS 28D6-8)).

3) An individual disposed (πώς ἔχον) in various and sundry ways, which is the qualified individual (ποιόν) in a further state, arrangement, or condition, e.g. the statue having a

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7 D. Wiggins, ‘On being in the same place at the same time’, The Philosophical Review, 77 (1968), 90–5, was compared to the Stoics by Sedley, ‘Criterion’, but omitted in ‘Diachronic’. The Stoic view is also akin to the constitution view of L. R. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life (Cambridge, 2007), with the important caveat that for Baker constitution is not a mereological relation, because the lump of clay is neither a proper part nor an improper part of the statue, and tertium non datur. I am warmly indebted to Lynne Baker for conversation and correspondence about these ideas.
certain patina, the tree being gnarled with age, and Socrates being wise; these qualities are not the uniquely individuating or lifelong genus and species, but all the other qualities, which come in different degrees of stability, from momentary and fleeting (e.g. running, sticking out a fist, having impressions, being on guard) to stable and permanent (e.g. being virtuous) (Plut. *Virt. mor.* 440 E–441D (=LS 61B); Sen. *Ep.* 113.2 (= LS 29B); S.E. *PHI* 2. 81 (= LS 33P2); M. 11. 23 (= LS 60G2); Simpl. *In Categ.* 212. 12–213.1 (= LS 28N)).

4) An individual disposed standing in certain relations to other things (πρός τί πως ἔχον), e.g. the Nike of Samothrace at the top of the stairs, el Árbol de Tule inside a churchyard, and Socrates the husband of Xanthippe (Plut. *St. rep.* 1054 E–1055 A (= LS 29D); Simpl. *In Categ.* 165. 32–166. 29 (= LS 29C)).

These four Categories stand to each other in a nested, one-to-one mereological relation such that each constitutes the next as its substrate, e.g. the hand (ποιόν) underlies the fist (πῶς ἔχον), which in turn underlies the fist held high (πρός τί πως ἔχον) (Philo, *Aet. mund.* 48 (= LS 28P); Plot. 6. 1. 30. 24–28 Armstrong; Plut. *Comm. not.* 1077 C (= LS 28O1), 1083 C-D (= LS 28A4, quoted below), Stob. 177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 29D)). Thus it is bodies all the way down: all of the Categories are bodies and nothing incorporeal is ever invoked or required in the analysis of identity conditions, kinds, or qualities. The relation of clay to statue is not the relation of matter to form; and neither is the relation of hand to fist, nor of a fist to a fist raised in the air. The hand does not become a fist by receiving a quality, fistiness (to borrow Stephen Menn’s example), in addition to what is already there (nor should we expect it to); it is simply the hand arranged in a certain way, and it is plain that

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Not even with the individual relatively disposed, as Gourinat has suggested in correspondence; while there is no intrinsic change to the individual disposed at this stage, since the fourth Category captures how the individual disposed is related to other things external to it, this does not mean we should supply an incorporeal instead. The individual relatively disposed is related to other bodies (in fact, everything else there is in the corporeal world), and there is no reason to think the Stoics treat relations as incorporeals or hypostatize them in some other way.
the hand and the fist have different identity and persistence conditions. All manner of qualities are subject to this analysis, those that are unique and those that are common, those that are lifelong and those that are fleeting, those of the body like running and sitting, and those of the corporeal soul like the virtues. This, in brief, is how the Stoics meet Plato’s third challenge, Reform the Giants, corporealize, do not eliminate.

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In addition to rehabilitating the Presocratics (in the guise of the Giants), the Categories also show how the Stoics meet Plato’s fourth challenge, Reconcile the Gods and Giants, and hear the children’s wish to make being capable of both motion and rest. Here is how Plutarch describes the relevant Stoic commitment:

(1) δύο ἡμῶν ἑκατοστὰς ἐστὶν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ ἰδίως ποιός, (2) καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄει ἰρὲι καὶ φέρεται, μὴ τε αὔξομενον μήτε μειούμενον μὴθ’ ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, (3) τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὔξανεται καὶ μειούται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τάναντι θατέρῳ, (4) συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς αἰσθήσεως μηδανοῦ παρέχον ἄφασθαι. (Plut. Comm. not. 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4))

(1) Each of us is two substrates [ὑποκείμεναι], the one substance [οὐσία], the other <a uniquely qualified individual [ἰδίως ποιόν]>; (2) and the one is always in flux and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as [οῖν] it is at all, (3) while the other remains, and grows and diminishes and undergoes all the opposites of the other, (4) while being naturally united [συμπεφυκός], fitted together [συνηρμοσμένον] and commingled [συγκεχυμένον] with it, and nowhere giving sense-perception a grasp of the difference.

With respect to (1), recall that substance (οὐσία) is body, and that body as such, i.e. solid three-dimensional extension, is completely malleable; it has no shape, size, density, or determinate quality per se, yet it is always of some definite size and shape or other. Nevertheless, as (2) attests, although a thing’s corporeal substance (its substrate) is subject to this kind of qualitative flux, it maintains its identity so long as it has no body added to or taken away from it — for body as such, constitution is identity. The uniquely qualified individual, on the other hand, as (3) tells us, has the opposite identity and persistence conditions: it is subject to growth and diminution (it undergoes quantitative change), but cannot change in its uniqueness (it is qualitatively at rest). The Stoic response to the children’s plea thus delivers the seemingly impossible twice over: that being should be, at once, both in motion and at rest. A body at rest quantitatively (body as such, or the substrate) can be in motion qualitatively, and a body at rest qualitatively (the uniquely qualified individual) can be in motion quantitatively (subject to growth and diminution).

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We can also see how the Stoics meet Plato’s fifth challenge, *Silence the Late Learners*, and say how a person can remain one even while being many things, e.g. of a certain shape, size, color, moral character, and a million others. As I have emphasized, the move from one Category to the next is not a matter of adding any entity to what was there before, thereby risking plurality. When clay is arranged in the shape of a horse, no entity (i.e. a Form) has been added to it; the sculptor generates a statue by altering the shape of the clay, and this is not the acquisition of a distinct entity, e.g. the Form of statue, except on hylomorphic assumptions (Stobaeus 1. 177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 28D)). Likewise when a hand is arranged so as to make a fist, there is no need to seek some entity, fistiness, beyond the hand. Each one of us is indeed indefinitely many Fs, qualified in a million different ways, and body now includes many more entities than ever before — hence Brunschwig’s
‘inflationist somatology’ label is apt.\textsuperscript{81} But this permissiveness in no way jeopardizes the unity of the individual, and the Late Learners are silenced.

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Just as the predicational challenge of the Late Learners (to make many out of one) serves as a bookend to the physical challenge posed to the Presocratics (to make one out of many), so does the Stoics’ inflationist somatology in the Categories stand to their corporealist cosmology. These complementary explanatory enterprises together give metaphysical substance to the core commitment of Stoic corporealism, that only bodies are or have being. First insofar as the cosmology begins from two fundamental bodies (the principles), and delivers unity by the through and through blending of these agent and patient bodies (meeting the challenge to Defend the Giants); and second, insofar as nothing is left out of account, and the schema of the Categories succeeds in corporealizing not only the soul and its virtues, but qualities generally, without appeal to Forms or incorporeals or any other added ingredient (meeting the challenges to Reform the Giants, Reconcile the Gods and Giants, and Silence the Late Learners).

6. Stoic physicalism

Three challenges remain: the challenge of the Battle itself, Be inclusive, and recognize both bodies and incorporeals; the Visitor’s challenge, Be principled about your inclusivity, and be able to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common beyond a thin ontological criterion like the dunamis proposal; and, finally, the sophist’s challenge with which we began, Say what is not, and give a theory of meaning that accommodates false speaking. There is ample evidence that the Stoics recognize both bodies and incorporeals, so their response of the Battle to be inclusive is easy to find (S.E. M. 10. 218 (= LS 27D); 10. 234 Bury; Plut. Adv. Col. 1116 B-C Einarson and De Lacy) and easy to meet — in fact,

\textsuperscript{81} Brunschwig, TGS, 72.
even the hypothetically civilized Giants admit there are incorporeals. The Visitor’s challenge, to bridge the two worlds and give a principled one-world metaphysics for bodies and incorporeals is much more formidable.

Brunschwig takes it to be formidable enough that the Stoics expressly sidestep the issue by having two distinct ontological criteria, one for *existence* and one for *subsistence.* Alessandrelli takes the demand to be unavoidable given the presence of both bodies and incorporeals, which threaten to make the world ‘dangerously discontinuous from an ontological point of view’, and he is satisfied with being Something objectively real as an answer to what they have in common. But these are just two ways to avoid the Visitor’s metaphysical challenge, falling back into ontology and the two-worlds trap that the Giants (and, for the matter, the Gods) were not able to avoid. So, the challenge remains: to go beyond ontological criteria and give a one-world metaphysics of what it is for incorporeals to *subsist* in a world where only bodies *exist.* And a response to this challenge just is an answer to our last open question about the incorporeals — to the extent that the Stoics succeed in this one-world endeavor, they will not be Platonizing with their incorporeals.

We saw above in the discussion of the Something criterion that the ontological dependence of the incorporeals can be understood on the model of the flow of traffic, which inherits its properties and *subsistence* from the moving cars that underlie it, without being nothing but the cars in motion. This is a non-reductive model insofar as the flow of traffic is something distinct from the moving cars, as the pattern made by the drill sergeant is distinct from his motions. And it is a physicalist model: in both cases these entities are incorporeal, but clearly also physical and spatiotemporal because of their dependence on body (i.e. because their properties are inherited from

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82 Brunschwig, *TGS*, 60.
their ‘host’ bodies). This model applies to all the incorporeals, I suggest, giving univocity to the kind and a thick metaphysical account of their subsistence.

— Place (τόπος) is non-solid three-dimensional extension (διάστημα), which it inherits from the bodies that occupy or delimit the place (Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E); Stob. 1. 162. 8–26 (= LS 49A)); e.g. the place my car is parked depends for its extension on my car, and the place I could park my car depends for its extension on the cars around it delimiting the parking place.

— The extra-cosmic void (τό κένον), too, inherits its three-dimensional extension from body, namely the edge of the cosmos at which it begins; and because there is no other cosmos to delimit the void, it extends infinitely out in all directions (Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E), Cleom. *Cael.* 1. 1. 17 (= SVF ii. 538)).

— Time (χρόνος) is not spatial, but it is described in the same terminology as place and void, as extended, and as dependent on the motion of bodies: ‘Time is the extension of the world’s motion; and so it is infinite, just as number in its totality is said to be infinite’ (χρόνος δ’ ἐστι τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως διάστημα οὖτως δ’ ἔστιν ἀπειρός, Stob. 1. 105. 8–10 (= LS 51D, part, my emphasis)). The reason it follows from time’s being the extension of the world’s motion that it is infinite is that the world’s motion is infinite — the Stoics are committed to an everlasting recurrence of world cycles; thus it is clear from Stobaeus’ inference that time depends on the world’s motion that underlies it.

— The sayables (λεκτά), too, depend for their subsistence on underlying body: the rational impression (φαντασία λογική) (D.L. 7. 43 (= LS 31A7); 7. 49 (= LS 33D); 7. 55–56 Dorandi; 7. 63 (= LS 33F); 7. 159 Dorandi; Galen *PHP* 2. 5. 12 De Lacy; Sen. *Ep.* 117. 13 (= LS 33E); S.E. *M.* 8. 70 (= LS 33C)). The soul is itself a body, a portion of divine active breath (πνεῦμα, *pneuma*); now, when we see something or think about something
(i.e. have a rational impression), that breath is in a certain state or condition (it is an individual disposed in the language of the Categories), so it too is a body. Further, the rational impression has propositional content that it bequeaths to the sayable. When we are impressed either by (ὑπό) or on the basis of (ἐπί) something, we receive information from the impressor (the world as it is), and because the human soul is rational, endowed with language and inference, the impression has propositional content from the moment it hits the commanding faculty of soul (ἡγεμόνικον). Thus even the sayable is like the flow of traffic, in being an incorporeal impressor that depends for its (semantic) properties on underlying body (the rational impression).

My view, then, is that the language of subsistence is much more than an ontological marker signaling that the incorporeals are objectively real and not nothing. And far from sidestepping the challenge to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common, the Stoics take it head on. The language of subsistence is the language of ontological dependence, and in particular of non-reductive physicalism. First, the term ‘ὑπόστασις’ and its cognates, deriving from the verb ‘ὑφίστημι’, to place, set, or stand under, by itself suggests the dependence of one thing on something else that underlies. Against this, it is true that there is an ordinary language sense of ‘ὑπόστασις’ as actual reality or existence. However, as a piece of Stoic theory, wherein ‘existence’ is a technical term defined by the dunamis proposal, ‘subsistence’ cannot be synonymous with ‘existence’. The Stoics are


85 The fact that the phrase ‘non-reductive physicalism’ comes from the philosophy of mind should not prevent us from appreciating the salient point of comparison, which is that both theories offer a middle road between other-worldly dualism and reductive or eliminative materialism.
not speaking loosely, and Galen mocks them for their ‘linguistic quibbling’ (μικρολογίαν) between existence (τὸ ὑπάρχειν) and subsistence (τὸ ὑφεστάναι) (Galen Meth. med., 10. 155. 1–8 (= LS 27G)).

Furthermore, the incorporeals are sometimes described not just as subsisting, but as subsisting in consequence (παροφίσταται), or even being consequent (παρακολουθοῦν) on body (Simp. In Categ. 8. 361. 10 (= SVF ii. 507); S.E. M. 11–12 (= LS 33B); Stob. 1. 106. 5–23 (= LS 51B); Cleom. Cael. 1. 1. 64–5 Todd). And, as I argue elsewhere, the details of each incorporeal bear out this dependence. To subsist, then is to be Something whose properties are inherited from the underlying body (or bodies) on which it depends.

Contrast this with another dependence view introduced by Émile Bréhier and revived by Wolfhart Totschnig, which takes the incorporeals to be ‘surface effects at the limit of bodies’, a shadow’s existence, or something like the Doppler effect. They are ontologically dependent in being the effects, events, or actions of body; however, crucially, this view equates these effects, and thus the incorporeals as a whole, with sayables. Time, place, and void are all themselves sayables, epiphenomenal facts at the surface of being, or actions and events at the periphery of bodies; as such, the incorporeals have the ontological status of obtaining (ἐπήρχειν), and they are said to subsist (ὑφεστάναι) when they are being thought about or apprehended. However, first, there is no textual

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87 For the spatial incorporeals see de Harven, ‘Nothing’, for time and the sayables, as well as a more detailed and up-to-date treatment of the spatial incorporeals, see V. de Harven, Everything Is Something: The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics (unpublished).

evidence that place, void, or time are considered sayables; second, seeing the incorporeals as dependent on body does not make them effects in the technical sense required to equate them with sayables (more on effects as sayables shortly); and, third, only time and the sayables are said to obtain, whereas all the incorporeals are said to subsist, so any account that says all the incorporeals obtain is swimming upstream of the textual evidence.\textsuperscript{89} So, while I appreciate the idea of the incorporeals as dependent on body in the manner of shadows, and even as epiphenomenal results of bodies, this does not make them all sayables, or states of affairs.

My understanding of the incorporeals as dependent entities stands in further contrast to a variety of independence views, e.g. David Sedley takes them to be physical, but independent on the grounds that there cannot be bodies without presupposing place, or motion without presupposing time;\textsuperscript{90} and Marcelo Boeri takes the incorporeals to be necessary conditions for the existence of bodies, as their ‘temporal, locative and linguistic determinations’, concluding that bodies and incorporeals are therefore reciprocally dependent.\textsuperscript{91} I appreciate Boeri’s one-world insights and resistance to a Platonizing interpretation of the incorporeals based on their immanence in this world, as well as Sedley’s strongly physical reading, but the fact that where there is body there is place, and where there is motion there is time does not establish either the ontological co-dependence or independence of place or time.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{89} I disagree with Totschnig, ‘Bodies and Their Effects’, 137–38, that because some incorporeals are said to obtain, therefore subsistence cannot be their only way of being; obtaining is not a way of being at all.

\textsuperscript{90} Sedley, ‘Physics and Metaphysics’, 399–400, followed by Brunschwig, ‘Stoic Metaphysics’, 249, and A. Ju, ‘The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits’, Phronesis, 54 (2009), 371–89 at 376. But motion need not presuppose independent spatiotemporal intervals; it’s true that reducing space and time to underlying body would leave motion without objective coordinates, but that’s because it leaves motion without spatiotemporal coordinates altogether. If space and time are not reduced to, but rather ontologically dependent on bodies, however, the objective spatiotemporal coordinates are not thereby threatened; indeed, it is a live option in contemporary metaphysics to understand space and time relationally rather than substantively, without thereby threatening the objectivity of space-time.

\textsuperscript{91} Boeri, ‘Bodies and Incorporeals’, 751.

\textsuperscript{92} This amounts to a modal-existential analysis that is silent on metaphysical questions about fundamentality and ways of being, so the inference to their co-dependence in not licensed; in this spirit, Schaffer, ‘On What Grounds What’, 363–64, remarks that supervenience ‘is invoked to fake ordering structure within a flat ontology’.
I am also resistant to the independence advocated by Bronowski, that sayables are not semantic entities but rather metaphysical items: facts, states of affairs, or truths available to be said. This ‘metaphysical reading’ of the sayables, developed by Michael Frede, takes its start from passages that seem to class the effects of causes as predicates (κατηγορήματα, *katēgorēmata*), which are themselves incomplete sayables (D.L. 7. 63 (= LS 33F)). The surface effects view also makes this interpretive move, so what I say here against sayables as facts, events, or states of affairs speaks to Totschnig et al. as well. I will use the following passage from Sextus to illustrate:

εἴγε Ἡτοικοὶ μὲν πάν αἵτιον σῶμα φασι σῶματι ἀσωμάτω πινὸς αἵτιον γίνεσθαι, 

οἷον σῶμα μὲν τὸ σμιλιόν, σῶματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτων δὲ τῷ τέμνεσθαι 

κατηγορήματος καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σῶματι δὲ τῷ χυλῷ, ἀσωμάτων δὲ τῷ καίεσθαι κατηγορήματος. (S.E. M. 9. 211 (= LS 55B))

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93 Bronowski, *Lekta*, 89, 157, 166–69, 260–61, also argues that because the incorporeals are real and part of a cosmic structure (ποιήμα, *systēma*), they must be ontologically independent (or at least co-dependent) entities; however, realism about the incorporeals does not make them ontologically dependent or independent. I also resist the idea that being incorporeal just is being independent, and that being independent in the manner of incorporeal Forms is a job that the Stoic incorporeals are called on to fill.


95 See also Clem. *Strom.* 8. 9. 26. 3–4 (= LS 55C); 8. 9. 29. 1–2 Stählin and Fruchtel; 8. 9. 30.1–3 (= LS 55D); Stob. 1. 138. 14–139. 4 (= LS 55A).
The Stoics say that every cause [αἰτίον] is a body that becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal. For instance the knife, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate [κατηγόρημα] ‘being cut.’ And again, fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘being burnt’.

There are three elements to the analysis: the cause (αἰτίον, aition), which is a body, e.g. a knife; that to which it is the cause, another body, e.g. flesh; and that of which it is the cause, an incorporeal predicate (κατηγόρημα, katēgorēma), e.g. being cut. The guiding principle of the metaphysical view seems to be that as the effects of causes, predicates must have some kind of status as metaphysical entities rather than as logical or linguistic entities. After all, causation is physics and the physical world is indifferent to what we think and say, so these must be predicates in the sense that Aristotle’s attributes and Platonist immanent Forms are, not as linguistic entities but as metaphysical items. Here is how Frede puts it.

[Here we have a metaphysical notion of a lekton. We are not concerned with the meaning of expressions, or intentional objects or contents of thoughts, but with facts; whether or not anybody has thought of them or will ever think of them, whether or not they get stated is completely irrelevant. The point is the metaphysical point that there is an item like Socrates’ being wise which is not to be confused with either Socrates or wisdom, but which, though not a body, nevertheless has some ontological status, since it is the kind of item of which a cause, properly speaking, is the cause. Here the notion of a lekton seems to be the notion of a true thing to say, just as the notion of a predicate had been the notion of a something truthfully predicated of something. And one can see why the term lekton would have been appropriate. We}
do not understand the world properly unless we take into account that there are not only bodies, but also truths about bodies, which themselves are incorporeal.\(^{96}\)

But, as I will argue, the role of sayables in the causal context does not pull in the direction of facts or states of affairs, or sever the sayables from their logical and linguistic roles. First, let us observe that the sayables are not central or even especially relevant to the storied Stoic account of causation, and they make no appearance in physics or cosmology, so this gives us good reason to doubt that these few passages give us the original notion, or even a central notion of a sayable.\(^{97}\)

Further, the focus in the *Sophist* on true and false speaking gives good reason to expect the sayable to be semantic — as we have seen, the last of Plato’s challenges is to *Save the sophist*, and say *what is not*. Third, the sayables have well-attested dialectical roles as the bearers of truth value, what enters logical relations, and what we share in communication (among others, including psychological roles as the objects of assent and impulse) (S.E. M. 8. 11–12 (= LS 33B); 8. 69–70 (= LS 33C+); Stob. 2. 97. 15–98. 6 (= LS 33J2–3)). Not only that, one might think that the very name of the entity, \(\lambda\varepsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\nu\), or what is sayable, which comes from the verb ‘to speak’ (\(\lambda\varepsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu\)), tells us that these are inherently semantic entities.\(^{98}\)

More importantly, the causation passages do not support a metaphysical notion of sayables as facts or states of affairs to begin with. It would indeed be problematic to find incorporeals, which are incapable of causal interaction, in the causal chain of an avowedly corporeal system. My

\(^{96}\) Frede, ‘*Lekton’*, 115–16.

\(^{97}\) E.g. R. J. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought* (Oxford, 1998), 242, n. 7, mentions this wrinkle only in a footnote, and, even then avoids ontological commitment. And if the sayables were indeed central to physics, then it is quite strange that Diogenes’ list of specific topics of physics (D.L. 7. 132 (= LS 43B)) does not include the sayables, particularly given that causation is among the generic topics. Hence, presumably, the emendation of ‘\(\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\)’ to ‘\(\lambda\varepsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\alpha\)’ in IG; cf. Gourinat, ‘Ontology and Syntax’, for arguments that causes and effects should, despite their conspicuous absence on the list, be considered ‘one of the main “metaphysical” issues’ alongside those that are listed. Vogt, ‘Unified’, argues for a minimal, unified notion of a cause according to which a Stoic cause is that because of which (\(\delta\iota\omicron\ \overset{\circ}{\tilde{O}}\)), a rational maker different in kind from its effects.

\(^{98}\) And the passive modal sense according to which ‘\(\lambda\varepsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\nu\)’ means something that *can* be said, does not license treating the sayables as metaphysical (rather than semantic) entities with the modal status of attributes or states of affairs that get actualized by belonging to bodies and become available to be said.
suggestion is that the Stoics do not in fact put sayables in the causal chain when they cast them as what causes are of — causes are not of effects, we might say. Part of the problem is that there is no single Greek term corresponding to our ‘effect’; and while this translation makes for more natural English than ‘that of which the cause is a cause’, it also suggests an additional entity in the causal chain where there isn’t one.

Setting aside the surface grammar of ‘effects’, then, we can see that the role of the sayable in the causal context is not to be found in the causal chain. Not that there aren’t effects in the Stoic causal chain, but that the Stoic causal chain is found in the cause to relation between bodies; the effect of a knife cutting flesh is to the flesh, another body. All causal interaction is the cause to relation between bodies. The cause of relation, on the other hand, is not a part of the causal chain, or part of a metaphysical story of causation, but rather, part of an epistemological story. The relation between corporeal causes and the predicates they are of is a truthmaking relation, a correspondence between the world as it is and the things we say about it.99 It is well known that the Stoics hold a correspondence theory of truth, so this relation is readily available for us to apply to this context (D.L. 7. 65 (= LS 34E), S.E. M. 8.100 (= LS 34I)).100 For a sayable to be true is for it to correspond to the world as it is, to say things as they are; and for a body to be the cause of a sayable is for the world to make the sayable true.

We have independent evidence that the role of sayables as what causes are of is epistemological rather than physical or metaphysical, concerned with explanation rather than efficient causation. Clement tells us that being the cause of something is a matter of being conceived of or grasped a certain way, which certainly suggests an epistemological context (Clem. Strom. 8. 9.

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99 I do not mean to invoke here debates about the truthmaker relation in contemporary metaphysics.
29. 1–2 Stählin and Fruchtel). Stobaeus is more explicit: he reports that whereas the cause is the because (ὁτι, δι’ ὅτι), that of which it is the cause is the why (δι’ τι) — thus that of which a cause is a cause is the explanandum; then he adds that an explanation (αἱρετία) is the account (λόγος) of the cause (αἱρετικον), or the account of the cause insofar as it is a cause, the explanans to the explanandum (Stob. 1. 138. 23–139. 4 (= LS 55A3–4)).

So the cause of relation is not physical or metaphysical, but epistemological. For a body to be a cause of a sayable is to be what makes the sayable true, and to give an account of that cause is to explain why the sayable is true. The knife is a cause to the flesh of certain predications being true, e.g. ‘It is cut’, but presumably also indefinitely many others, e.g. ‘It hurts’, ‘It bleeds’, ‘It is fatal’, ‘It is indifferent to my happiness’.

Now, it is true that there has to be a sayable there to be made true, but it does not follow that in order to be what gets said, the sayable must be there as a fact, state of affairs, or truth waiting to be said. To meet this desideratum, it is not necessary to attribute to the Stoics an ontological layer of truths, or an unalterable form or structure of the world apart from the immanent god.

Rather, the logical order is that the sayable first subsists according to the rational impression, and it then is either true or false. If there were no humans in the world, there would be no sayables because there would be no rational impressions; but there would still be a world with order and

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1 A word about the translation ‘explanation’ for ‘αἱρετία’ and ‘account’ for λόγος. S. Bobzien, ‘Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes’, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford, 1999), 196–242 at 198–99, argues against understanding ‘αἱρετία’ as a propositional item or a kind of causal explanation, classing an αἱρετία as an incorporeal. Instead, she argues (200–3), we should understand the αἱρετία as a corporeal cause, as the divine rational agent responsible for the world order, taking Stobaeus to report that the αἱρετία is λόγος, i.e. the active principle. I am in strong agreement that an αἱρετία is not a propositional item or an incorporeal of some kind; indeed, as Bobzien emphasizes, this is not a term of art we find anywhere except this passage. By that same token, however, I am also resistant to giving ‘αἱρετία’ doctrinal import as the active cause and thus taking it to be a corporeal entity. I urge instead a deflationary reading of both ‘αἱρετία’ and λόγος in this context. I think we can render ‘αἱρετία’ as ‘explanation’, in contrast to ‘αἱρετικον’ as ‘cause’, without reifying and having to give it the status of a sayable or other incorporeal. To say that an αἱρετία is a λόγος of the cause is just to say in rather ordinary language that an explanation is an account of the cause. Thus neither of these terms is a technical term in this context, except to the extent that ‘αἱρετία’ is being used here, locally, in contrast to ‘αἱρετικον’. Given the contrast between the because and the why, which tells us that the incorporeal predicate is treated as an explanandum, followed immediately by the gloss of αἱρετία as an account of the cause, we have good grounds to say that the context is explanatory or epistemological. Thus we can render ‘αἱρετία’ as ‘explanation’ without introducing new causal entities of the sort Bobzien rightly rejects.
causation. In denying that there are metaphysical truths, facts, or states of affairs awaiting (but indifferent to) our saying them, I do not undo the objectivity or structure of the world. When I deny that Stoic truths are the counterpart to Aristotelian forms or Platonist immanent Forms, I do not thereby deny that there are truths or that the world is truly as it is. I just don’t take Stoic truths to be metaphysical entities like facts or states of affairs. Stoic truths are true sayables, semantic entities that depend for their content and subsistence on rational impressions, and they are made true when they correspond to the world as the immanent god makes it.

But being made true has no metaphysical or ontological import for the sayables; being made true is not a matter of being actualized or otherwise promoted in the ontology. This brings me to the question, what it means for a sayable to obtain.

μόνον δ’ ὑπάρχειν φησί τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχιμενὸν καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μὲν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἥσσιν ώς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθεμαι οἷς ὑπάρχει. (Stob. 1. 106. 18–23 (= LS 51B4))

[Chrysippus] says that only the present obtains [ὑπάρχειν], and that the past and future subsist [ὑφεστάναι] but in no way obtain, just as predicates [κατηγορήματα] are said to obtain only when the attributes [συμβεβηκότα] exist [ἐἰσίν], for example ‘walking’ obtains of me when I am walking, and does not obtain when I am lying down or sitting.

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102 The surface effects view takes predicates to be events or states of affairs that are brought into being by the causal interaction of bodies; hence they are described as shadow-like and exemplified by the Doppler effect. The metaphysical view takes predicates to be states of affairs that are not brought into being by the causal interaction of bodies but, rather, actualized by the world; hence the likeness to Aristotelian attributes or Platonist immanent Forms as metaphysical items. My focus here is on the metaphysical view that coming to obtain is a change in ontological status from subsisting to obtaining, but I continue to hold that coming to obtain is not to come into being either; when I say that obtaining has no ontological import at all, I mean this to cover both the surface effects view and the metaphysical view.


104 Here I accept ἐἰσίν and take it as the verb with μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, which I take to be the attributes in the world and not predicates; see LS, vol. ii, 302.
We are told here that only the present *obtains* (ὅπορχειν, huparchein) in contrast to the past and future, which merely *subsist* (ὁφεστάνω, huphestai), *just as* (in the way that) predicates (incomplete sayables) *obtain* only when the attributes or accidents (τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ta sumbebēkota) they predicate exist or are, i.e. when the world really is that way. So, when I am walking, the predicate ‘walking’ is true of me, in which case the predicate is said to *obtain* (S.E. M. 8. 85 Bury); and likewise when a portion of time is present, or happening now, it *obtains*. My proposal is that these are said to *obtain* because they correspond to the world’s attributes *as* they are occurring, and that this is not a change of ontological status. All sayables and all of time always have the ontological status of *subsisting* according to their underlying bodies (rational impressions and the world in motion, respectively). In addition to (and not instead of) that ontological status, when they correspond to the world *as* it is occurring — *in the manner* that is occurring, in the case of sayables, and *when* it is occurring, in the case of time, i.e. when sayables are true and some time is present — they *obtain*. What *obtains* is what is actually happening, but only in the innocent sense of ‘actual’ as being occurrence, ‘in action or existence at the time; present, current’; not in the metaphysically loaded sense ‘opposed to potential, possible, virtual, theoretical, ideal’.  

There is something special about the present and the true, the now and the world’s truths, that legitimately earns the title of *obtaining*. But *coming to obtain* is not a case of ontological switching, from *subsisting* to *existing*, from incorporeal to corporeal, from possible states of affairs to actual fact, or from the weaker status of a proposition, predicate, or case to the stronger status of fact, attribute, or quality. To *obtain* is simply to correspond to the world in a certain way — it is just a relation, with no implications for the ontological status of the incorporeal. So, again, in addition to

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105 The term ‘συμβεβηκότα’ is not Stoic language, and its use in this context does not suggest that the Stoics are pursuing the sayables as Aristotelian or Platonist immanent forms; it is, rather, an ordinary way for Stobaeus to report that predicates *obtain* when they correspond to the world as it is.

subsisting as an incorporeal grounded in the world’s motion as time always does, the present is said to obtain when it subsists according to the current unfolding of events, when it corresponds to things as (when) they are happening (as opposed to how they were or will be). Similarly, in the case of the sayables, the way the world is will make sayables, which subsist according to rational impressions, obtain whenever the sayables state things as (in the manner that) they are. The world makes certain sayables true, and when it does, they obtain; but sayables have the ontological status of subsistence whether they are true or false, whether they obtain or not. As A. A. Long puts it: ‘The hyparxis of a lekton indicates its truth-value, not its ontological status’; whether true or false, sayables ‘co-exist with a rational presentation, and this definition is not confined to veridical phantasai’.

Thus I am also resistant to the suggestion of Bailey that Stoic incorporeals should be thought of as offices or roles, e.g. the office of being my watch, that get actualized and obtain when they are occupied by bodies. He argues for the view first on the grounds that time obtains when it is occupied by present motions, second on the grounds that sayables are occupied by bodies when they obtain, and finally on the grounds that it is natural to extend this account of obtaining to place and void. I reply that there is no evidence that the Stoics spoke this way, in terms of either time or the sayables being occupied. In fact, the language of being occupied (and unoccupied) only occurs in the context of place and void subsisting — but these spatial entities are never said to obtain. Further, offices depending on bodies to occupy them, even if it were the Stoic view, is not a genuine case of ontological dependence, since Bailey’s incorporeals subsist without variation across all possible worlds; coming to be occupied does not bring the incorporeals into being.

Notwithstanding the difference between offices being occupied and sayables becoming facts, both Bailey and Bronowski are Platonizing the Stoics with obtaining as the actualization of

independently *subsisting* sayables cast as the unalterable form or structure of the cosmos. But this Platonizing conception of *subsistence* is neither a required interpretation of the Stoics nor a desired reading of the *Sophist*. So, I disagree that nothing less than a metaphysical story as complex as offices and their occupants can explain the presence of both bodies and incorporeals, and the distinction between *being*, *subsistence*, and *obtaining*. I hope to have offered a simpler alternative: bodies have the ontological status of *being* (two of them fundamentally, all others being composed out of these two principles), while incorporeals have the ontological status of *subsisting* (inheriting their properties and *subsistence* from underlying body). When time and sayables correspond to the world as (when and in the manner) it is occurring, they are said to *obtain*; and this is not instead of *subsisting*, but simply a correspondence to the world — *obtaining* is a relation, not an ontological status.\(^\text{109}\)

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Now we can see how Stoic physicalism meets the last three challenges of Plato’s *Sophist*. That the Stoics meet the challenge of the Battle itself, *Be inclusive*, and recognize both bodies and incorporeals, was the starting point of this section. Much more formidable was to show how the Stoics meet the Visitor’s challenge, *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and go beyond ontological criteria to say what it is for incorporeals to *subsist* in world where only bodies *exist*, i.e. bridge the two worlds. This is a metaphysical challenge to say what such different, even contrary-seeming entities, could possibly have in common. What bodies and incorporeals have in common is not just that they both meet an ontological criterion, or merely that both are objectively real, but that both are spatiotemporal

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\(^{110}\) Thus I agree with Alessandrelli, ‘Qualcosa’, 21–2, that *obtaining* is not a change in ontological status, but disagree that to *obtain* is for a body to really *exist* or really have the status of *existing*. 
inhabitants of this one physical world. The univocal dependence of the incorporeals on body makes them of this world, no longer contrary to bodies, but dependent on them for their subsistence.

And this remains true even in meeting the last challenge, Save the sophist, and give a theory of meaning that accounts for being able to say something even when it does not represent the world as it is — say what is not. To say what is not is to utter a false sayable that subsists but does not obtain. Given that sayables subsist according to the rational impression (a body), and given that sayables subsist this way whether they are true or false, the Stoics have met the challenge to say what is not by reference only to the physical world.

Far from Platonizing with their incorporeals, then, the Stoics offer us an innovative non-reductive physicalism. The Stoics are non-reductive insofar as the incorporeals are never cast as nothing but body, and clearly count as Something, and they are physicalist insofar as the incorporeals are all spatiotemporal entities dependent on body for their properties and subsistence. And this settles the fourth open question, to what extent the Stoics are Platonizing with their incorporeals.

7. Conclusion

I will close by working my way back up the rest of our open questions about how the Stoics respond to Plato’s Sophist. The third question was about the role of the dunamis proposal, both in the Sophist and for the Stoics, which we considered as a series of dichotomies. What we have found is, first, that the dunamis proposal is not a criterion of corporeality, but of being, the subject taken up by the Stoics out of the Sophist. Second, that both in the Sophist and for the Stoics, the dunamis proposal is a thin ontological criterion for being that merely counts things in or out, rather than a measure of fundamentality or independence. The dunamis proposal is, by the Visitor’s own design, insensitive to

111 Including even the sayables, which are spatiotemporal entities because they depend on rational impressions for their subsistence — meaning and language are earthborn too for the Stoics.
different ways of being and the Stoics take it over as such — but this does not mean they are not thinking about dependence and fundamentality, or ways of being Something; on the contrary, I have argued that the Stoics are very much delivering a hierarchical, ordered ontology. Third, we have found that the dunameis proposal is not the Stoics’ only ontological criterion, but one of two by which the Stoics count things in or out of the ontology.\textsuperscript{112}

The second open question concerns how the Stoics are like and unlike the earthborn Giants, in particular the original, savage Giants. We found that the original Giants in the Sophist are eliminative about the virtues, so the Stoics are already unlike the savage Giants insofar as they corporealize the virtues (by the Categories) rather than eliminate them. They are also far from savagely refusing all discussion and brutally equating being with body. On the contrary, they are crafty in coopting the dunameis proposal as a criterion for being, from which they infer that only bodies have being or are, and creative in crafting a second criterion for being Something. Thus the Stoics are not like the savage Giants; but neither are they like the civilized Giants who give up on their corporealism, nor are they a mere pastiche of these views. They are, rather, evolved Giants with a sophisticated corporealism, an innovative non-reductive physicalism, and a groundbreaking ontology that sets Something over being and non-being.

This brings us to the first and final open question, what in Plato’s Sophist are the Stoics reacting to, and how? Are the Stoics engaged in ontology, or in metaphysics, or perhaps neither? My answer is, both. With two criteria by which to count things in or out (as Something), one for being and another for subsistence, it is clear that the Stoics are engaged in ontology and that the term ‘being’ has doctrinal purport, for the Stoics just as for Plato (though not the same doctrinal purport, of course). But treating the dunameis proposal as an ontological criterion that counts things in or out, does not preclude a concern for fundamentality and dependence, i.e. grounding. In fact, the Stoics

\textsuperscript{112} Or, as Gourinat, in correspondence, would prefer to say: ‘tinology’.
are concerned with both counting and grounding, both with *which* things are Something (ontology) and the different ways of being Something (metaphysics). We have found that body can be fundamental for the Stoics, but not all bodies are fundamental — only the two principles; all other bodies, including the cosmos itself, are composed out of and hence dependent on the two fundamental bodies for their existence. One way to be a body, then, is to be fundamental, like the two principles, and another is to be a composite of those principles, and hence dependent on or grounded in them. Yet another way to be a body is to be constituted by another body as a substrate, e.g. the statue constituted by clay, or the fist by the hand; the distinctness of their persistence conditions (the clay and hand preexist and survive the statue and fist they constitute) reveals that this is also a case of ontological dependence, hence a second kind of grounding. And yet a third kind of grounding is the dependence of the incorporeals on the underlying bodies from which they inherit their spatial, temporal, or semantic properties and their subsistence. Thus we find the Stoics engaged in both ontology and metaphysics. What in the *Sophist* are these evolved Giants responding to, then? Everyone from the formidable father Parmenides to the hapless Late Learners.

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113 In the manner of Constituent Dependence in Koslicki, ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’.

114 But this does not make the substrate fundamental, since that is itself the total corpulence of the given thing, which is (proximately) a blend of matter and breath (πνεῦμα) and ultimately of the two principles. This second kind of grounding is not quite like any of Koslicki’s varieties, but might be welcome as a further kind, ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’, 211, n. 25.

115 In line with the Feature Dependence of Koslicki, ‘Varieties of Ontological Dependence’.

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