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Author(s): Grace A. de Laguna
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CULTURE AND RATIONALITY

By GRACE A. DE LAGUNA

IT HAS always been recognized that a close relationship exists between man's rationality and his manner of life as a social being. Plato sought to find in the organization of the state the structure of the human soul "writ large." In later times, from Hegel to Cassirer, it has been urged that the nature of reason can best be understood in the objective forms in which it manifests itself: in the institutions of human society, in art, religion, language, and in all forms of symbolic expression. And on the other hand it has been urged with equal force that the human individual can develop his native capacity for rationality, and become an actual man, only as a member of a community and within a cultural medium. His personality as a human individual, it is further urged, is molded in its distinctive shape by the culture to which he has been subjected since birth.

A culture is to some extent an integrated whole. Yet neither the institutions which may be said to represent its structure, nor the activities which represent its functioning have an existence apart from, or independent of, the individual human beings and their particular acts. As the human being can develop and realize himself as a person only through his participation in a culture, so, conversely, a culture—itself an ideal reality (i.e. of potentialities in process of actualization) is actualized only in and through the acts of concrete individuals who are persons. In playing a social role, the individual is at once realizing himself as a person and activating the functioning of the culture.

CULTURE AS PROTOTYPE OF RATIONALITY

Whether human society and culture are to be regarded as an objective expression of the nature of the individual, or whether the individual is rather to be conceived as the outcome or resultant of the mode of communal life, the intimacy of the relationship which exists between culture and the mind of the human individual is undeniable. We may well, then, undertake an examination of the form of man's activity as a social being in the hope of finding there the analogue or prototype of the form of his ideal activity as a conceptual thinker. Nor is such an enterprise to be condemned as a piece of abstract intellectualism based on an uncritical acceptance of man as primarily a *rational* being. It is often contended today on the basis of psychological evidence that reason plays a very small part in human life. What motivates the actions of the individual and determines his basic beliefs are his vital needs, his instinctual drives and unconscious desires. It is these same psychological forces, it is urged, that shape, or are expressed by, the cultural patterns of his social life. Man is not a "rational," but only a "rationalizing," animal. Now such a view rests, we would urge in reply, upon the outgrown intellectualism which takes "reason" to be something intrinsically separable from, or opposed to, "feeling" of any sort, and which could only exist and function in splendid isolation from the motivation of human desires. But human reason is no such independent faculty. Man's fundamental rationality is not properly to be limited to the capacity for drawing logically valid conclusions from formulated premises—although he undoubtedly has such capacity. We may grant that he is often unreasonable in his conduct and in his beliefs, that he will rarely consent to "follow the argument whithersoever it leads," that the wish is frequently father to the thought—in short, that there is no such thing as "reason" which can control impulse or act in independence of human need and feeling. Man's rationality is not a higher faculty added to, or imposed upon, his animal nature; on the contrary, it pervades his whole being and manifests itself in all that he does as well as in what he believes and thinks. Men may rationalize more often than they think objectively, but it is only because they are fundamentally rational beings that they are capable of rationalizing—or feel the need of it. Man is rational in all his acts and attitudes, however unreasonable these may be; he is rational also in his feelings and aspirations, in his unconscious desires and motivations as well as in his conscious purposes, and his rationality shows itself in the very symbolism of his dreams. Men could not act and feel as they do if they could not form concepts and make judgments, but neither could they make use of concepts and engage in the ideal activity of thinking if they had not developed their innate capacity for the "idealized" modes of behavior and feeling characteristic of human beings.

It is through his membership in a social community and in his participation in the cultural tradition—his "enculturation"—that the human being develops his congenital rationality and becomes a man. As every animal carries on the vital activities that constitute its life through intercourse with the natural environment to which it progressively adapts itself, so the child learns to live a human life through intercourse with the idealized environment of culture. Unlike the lower animal he is born into a world not only containing man-made artifacts, but one in which nature itself is conventionally patterned in classes and kinds. The objects he meets are not merely inviting or repellent; he must learn to distinguish them not merely as specifically dangerous or useful, but also as belonging to the class of permitted or prohibited, of "mine" or "yours," "ours" or "theirs," to be enjoyed or used in proper ways and on appropriate occasions. He could not, of course, adapt himself to this conventionally patterned world of culture or learn to live in it without the aid of ideas in which to understand it. But his basic learning must be in terms of doing. The process through which the child comes to form ideas with which to think is the same process through which he acquires the generalized habits, the idealized modes of acting and feeling which constitute his enculturation.

CULTURE AS AN "IDEALIZATION" OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Culture is at once the manifestation and the matrix of rationality. All culture is "ideal," not in the sense that it exists as ideas in men's minds, but because it consists in a set of reciprocal dynamic potentialities in men and things, which are in process of actualization through human action. Not all of any culture is actualized at any time. Back of the customs actually followed, and the standards openly accepted and applied, is a reserve of unexploited cultural resources, potential opportunities and implicit ideas and ideals, awaiting recognition and use. It is through his cultural interaction with other persons and with culturally determined things that the child himself undergoes a process of "idealization" and becomes a social and rational person. Let us consider this in more concrete detail.

From birth the child is surrounded with a world of conventionalized objects. He is handled and fed, clothed and cared for in culturally approved ways. No matter to what kind of a group he may belong, he learns to eat standardized food of traditional kinds, procured and prepared in standardized ways. If he is brought up in one culture, he acquires a taste and a physiological tolerance for foods that an individual of another culture might well find disgusting, or even unassimilable. Nor is this a matter of mere habituation such as occurs in domesticated animals, although sheer habit plays its part. It is often the idea of what a dish is or how it is prepared that whets the appetite or disgusts or even nauseates. Something similar holds of that other basic animal need, sex. Sexual desire is often presented in fiction and drama as an overmastering passion, a force of nature against which the barriers of religious sanction and legal penalities are largely ineffective. Yet as a matter of fact all the human manifestations of sex are as much subject to cultural determination as is the need and appetite for food. The truth is, of course, that in a vigorous and healthy culture there exists a large measure of conformity to standards of sexual relationship. And when cases of nonconformity are frequent, the lapses that actually occur themselves tend to fall into a pattern condoned by custom. The important point is not, however, the conformity to cultural standards in matters of sex, but rather the fact that man's whole sexual life and its psychological repercussions are conditioned and transformed in the process of his enculturation. It is normal for human beings to be sexually attracted by ideal traits and social status as well as by physical appearance. The hero of the day, the film star, and the notorious gangster or adventuress, all find the conquest of hearts made easier—or more difficult—by their reputation or prestige. Even the attractiveness of bodily form and coloring is to an indefinite extent affected by the traditional standards of the culture of the group or period.

The influence of social standards upon such basic animal needs as food and sex is a measure of the fundamental transformation of human life which the development of conceptual thought carries with it, and which are at once its condition and the resultant of its exercise. Even the changes which man has wrought in his physical environment parallel the transformation which has simultaneously been wrought in himself. Man "makes himself" in "making" the world in which he lives. The type of building he builds, the tools and machines he constructs, the plants he cultivates and the animals he hunts or domesticates, as well as the language he speaks and the rites and ceremonies he celebrates, all correspond to culturally determined ways of acting to be learned by each child, and which constitute patterns of behavior in conformity to which his own activities are molded and through which his own needs and impulses must find satisfaction and release. The ends he seeks are his ends, but he can adopt them as his own only if he also discriminates them as having a place in the cultural nexus. He seeks material ends, not primarily or simply as objects of his own desire, but as economic "goods" having an economic value. And he may amass wealth not merely for the sake of security against want, but for the power and prestige its possession may bring. However concrete and material may be the objects for which men co-operate and compete, they are objects of *value* and not of mere desire, and as such have a status within the realm of the universal and ideal.

CULTURE AS AN "IDEALIZATION" OF HUMAN BEINGS: STATUS AND ROLE

But that is only one side of the picture. The conceptual patterning of the environment is correlative to the conceptualization of the social beings who live and act in and on it. The classes and kinds, the properties and relations, which men discriminate in nature and institute in their productions, have an analogue in the groupings and divisions of men in society. The "natural" relationships of human beings to one another, of descent and consanguinity, are transformed or replaced by conventionalized lines of "kinship." Heredity is institutionalized as "inheritance" of family solidarity, of property and privilege, of customary rights and obligations. Every child is born with a cultural inheritance of more or less clearly defined and fixed social status, and every child acquires other and additional kinds of status in culturally permissible ways. The pattern of the interrelationships of individuals, of course, varies widely from culture to culture, but this does not affect the fundamental fact that the social status of the individual is always complex, and that his position in the social order is determined by the intersection of a plurality of classifications. Age and sex, family and marriage, residence and occupation, voluntary association and individual achievement, all determine with varying degrees of importance the complex status of the individual in most, if not all, cultures.

Each social status carries with it a corresponding cultural role. The individual plays a succession of roles as he passes from childhood through maturity to old age; and at each stage he must combine the playing of many roles. Even as a member of a family he is at once a son and a father, a husband and a brother, a cousin and an uncle. As a participant in the economic life of society he also alternates and combines a number of roles; he is, or may be, a consumer and producer, a buyer and a seller, and investor and a wage earner, a competitor and a member of a firm. So also he may be a member of diverse groups, political, religious, professional and social. A large part of the daily routine of his life and of his larger enterprises, and even the occupations of his leisure, are made up of activities he performs not merely in culturally determined ways, but as a culturally determined kind of performer, a "part" player. He never acts, or enjoys, simply or completely as his mere individual self. He may play his roles more or less consciously or unwittingly; some he has learned mainly through habituation and imitation, others by deliberate effort and through understanding "the rules of the game." But to whatever degree some may become a second nature to him, the playing of each involves taking an attitude, and a shift and redirection of attention, perhaps a change of mood and temper. Each social role carries with it its own distinctive goals and opportunities, as well as its own restrictions and regulations. As the child on becoming a schoolboy, or the schoolboy on graduating and getting a job, finds new opportunities and ends within reach, so the adult with each shift of role directs himself to fresh objectives and faces the specific problems of his changed situation.

In addition to the various forms of status and their correlative roles commonly recognized by anthropologists (permanent, temporary, assigned, achieved, official, unofficial, clearly defined by law or more informally prescribed) we need to recognize what may be termed "situational status," and which, though accidentally assumed by the individual, is nonetheless as characteristic of his culture as are the status and roles determined by the patterns of social organization. Examples of such situational status in our own culture would be that of house guest, participant in a telephone conversation, passer-by at the time of a traffic accident, or bystander on the occasion of a dispute between strangers. It may indeed be said that an individual almost always finds himself in some more or less recognizable situation within which he has some more or less determinate position and some more or less appropriate way of behaving. Even when he is alone in the privacy of his bedroom his attitudes and acts are appropriate to the occasion and characteristic of the culture. On the other hand, when he finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar situation, he is at a loss "how to meet it." To say that he is in an "anomalous position" is to say that he lacks situational status and is accordingly disoriented.

It is through his participation in the culturally determined life of his group that the individual prepares himself to act as a thinker. For the dynamic structure of thought is foreshadowed in the structure of the cultural activities and life of man. The kinds and classes, the groupings and relations by which the cultural world is patterned, and which he must learn to discriminate in his attitudes and modes of behavior, constitute the group plan, the preliminary draft, of the conceptual order in terms of which he begins to think. The distinctions he learns to make in his behavior, and to express in language, furnish the material with which conceptual thought has to work and the instrument through which it can function. In learning to play a cultural role he is preparing himself to think abstractly. Thought depends on experience, not only because the thinker must find in experience the objects of thought, but because he must learn through active and direct *experiencing* to carry on the ideal activity that thinking is. The child gets this experience in learning cultural *ways* of acting and feeling, for these in being standardized are at once "idealized" and concrete. Playing a social role is the prototype of thought in that it involves the idealizing of behavior. But it is also the prototype in that its structure is the analogue of the *perspective* structure of thought.

ROLE PLAYING AS "IDEALIZED" ACTIVITY

Let us consider first the idealization involved in playing a social role. Playing such a role differs fundamentally from playing a dramatic role on the stage. The actor's role is that of impersonation; he is playing the part of a concrete individual, a real person. This is true even though the part be that of a hero or a villian, or even that of an abstract vice or virtue as in an old morality play. The Hamlet or the Othello of Shakespeare is indeed in a sense merely a "character," and thus a sort of universal. What the actor attempts is to give concrete reality to such a universal, to vivify or create a living creature out of an image. The man who plays a social role must achieve just the opposite. He does not impersonate another individual, but plays in his own person. The man who enters a profession or joins a trade union, or becomes a public official, or becomes a husband, is not taking on a new and different individual personality. He is, or may be, in some sense enlarging himself as he finds scope in his new role for hitherto unused and undeveloped capacities and powers. Yet each role—although roles differ greatly in this respect—calls for only a part of the full man, and brings into play only a selection of his powers and personality. It is a trite observation that a corrupt and disloyal official may be a devoted husband and loyal friend. A man exhibits different facets of his character and his personality in his different roles as he exercises different powers. His concrete individuality is not exhausted in the playing of any social role; he still has untapped reservoirs of native endowment, potentialities for other roles than those he is called on to play at any time or occasion, or that belong to the repertory of his actual life. He may "put himself" more into one role than another, and accept one as dominant over others by "identifying himself" with it. It is also true that if he is restricted to the playing of a limited role or set of roles, he may suffer a permanent stultification as an individual, or he may be driven to abnormality of personality through a conflict of roles. On the other hand, he may use one role to enrich or deepen his playing of another. There is, then, no real paradox in saying that it is only a real concrete individual, a man and not a robot, who can play any social role, and yet that the playing of any role involves a division of the concrete individual. "Division" is however not the right term; a man does not suffer a divided personality in playing a social role. Rather he undergoes and performs upon himself an operation of abstraction. He takes and feels himself to be something general—the child *becomes* a schoolboy to himself, or the maiden a blushing bride. The individual is thus "idealized" as a self-conscious *person.*

PERSPECTIVITY AND ORIENTATION

Social action is the prototype of thought not only in that it thus involves the idealization of human beings and of the world in which they live, but in that it exhibits the same basic type of structure—perspectivity. Each status assumed by the individual constitutes a standpoint from which he acts in playing his social role. Each such standpoint provides a wider or narrower perspective of the cultural nexus, in which the objects and persons on and through which he acts exhibit distinctive aspects. He is able to act in this perspective only so far as he is himself *oriented* with reference to its culturally determined goals and opportunities. Thus a man is able to play the role of father, for example, only so far as he has the proper feelings and attitudes not only toward the child as his son, but also appreciates and accepts the opportunities and responsibilities entailed by his paternal status. Thus oriented as a father, he treats his son in terms of the boy's relation to other persons and things, as well as in his direct relation to himself; and he treats other persons and things with reference to their bearing on the boy as his son. The playing of any role involves a similar perspectivization of the field of action, and the adequacy with which it is played will depend upon the degree of orientation achieved by the actor.

If human beings, like insects, were biologically fitted for only one special function in the organized group life, there would be no need for and no possibility of orientation. Human intelligence is bound up with man's lack of such innate social specialization; it conditions and depends upon his natural capacity for performing a variety of possible social functions. Moreover the playing of any role involves the performance of a succession of specific acts within specific and varied situations. The individual must orient himself to each situation in turn within one role and also be able to shift from one role to another. It is this continued change of social standpoint, this ability to move from one "ideal" position in the cultural continuum to another that necessitates and makes possible his social orientation. The worker bee doubtless has feelings peculiar to his kind, but he cannot have an "idea" of his position in the swarm, or "feel" his social status, As the perceptual orientation of the moving animal arises through a sense of bodily attitude and posture, so the cultural orientation of the human being arises through what we may call the "idealized sense" of his status and situational position. This includes, as we have seen, both some idea of it in its relations and also the felt acceptance of its ends as values for him.

But while orientation is involved in all human action, it may be more or less adequate and complete. No degree of cultural orientation can assure success or prevent mistakes, either as to the means taken or the ends chosen. Probability remains the guide of life; to act in the perspective of social life, as in the perspective of perception, involves taking a leap in the dark. Yet lack of orientation, or its loss, is certain to endanger a success that might otherwise be achieved. This may happen in more than one way. So far as the playing of a role degenerates into mere routine, and is carried by settled habit, there is neither the active intelligence nor the living feeling essential to full orientation. We must not, of course, deny the importance of habit in the playing of any role, since habits economize human energy and make for a useful stability, but they cannot take the place of the plasticity and versatility that only an active intelligence can supply. While some social roles may be carried on by habitual routine for which orientation seems unimportant, its loss even in such cases involves an impairment of social function. A human being makes an inefficient robot. He needs a strong and an "ideal" motivation to sustain the continued performance of routine tasks, such as are, for example, essential to the maintenance of our own industrialized economy. This was evident in the increase of factory production during the war. Workers in war plants maintained a high efficiency through long hours of routine tasks because they had a realizing sense of "contributing to the war effort." They were able to see the immediate ends of their daily acts in the perspective of organized communal action for a valued goal. Under peacetime conditions where the factory worker may work only for a living wage, motivated only by a sense of his own immediate need, his production tends to fall off and he easily becomes a center of social unrest. Adequate orientation depends on the acceptance of status as a standpoint from which the immediate personal ends on one's role fall into the perspective of organized group action. One essential condition for this is the freedom and ability of the individual to assume the standpoints of a variety of roles and to reconcile them with one another. This is possible to the individual only so far as he achieves an integrated personality within the structure of which the differentiated and partial status personalities may find a place.

THE INDIVIDUAL AS A CULTURAL MICROCOSM

Each culture is maintained, as we have seen, by the reciprocal and integrated functioning of its institutions and by the mutual dependence of its social groups. But what holds it together is that which is shared in common by the individuals through whom it must be activated. It is as if the basic pattern of the culture must be reflected in the internal structuring of each individual person; as if the individual were in some sense a microcosm and the culture to which he belongs a macrocosm. Each individual, like a Leibnizian monad, "reflects" the culture of his world from his own point of view and with varying degrees of clearness and confusion. The experienced ethnologist is now able to reconstruct a considerable part of the cultural system from any good informant, using not merely what the informant "knows," or can verbalize, but what he unwittingly reflects in his attitudes and modes of expressive response. And one may hazard the guess that with improved methods of psychological analysis the ethnologist of the future will be able to carry his reconstructions of culture much further than is possible at present.

It is, of course, not all of the culture that is shared in common by all its participants; the necessary differentiation of function and division of labor carries with it a diversity of special goals, of interests and skills. What must be internalized as the framework of individual personality is what is also basic to the culture; the fundamental but implicit terms in which it classifies and interrelates its world of things and men and their modes of action, the implicit standards in accordance with which it evaluates them, its ideals of individual achievement and personal character.

It is the inward possession of basic modes of thought and feeling, the general acceptance by its members of the same fundamental standards of what is "right and proper" that makes possible the functioning of a society through its class groups. Since invidious class distinctions and the dominance of one class by another can be maintained only partially and precariously by force, in a stable society subjects and monarch alike must acknowledge the rights and duties of sovereignty, or employers and employees find a basis for bargaining only within the framework of an accepted economic order. So, too, the servant in an upper class English household could (at least in former days) pride himself on "knowing his place," because he, like his master, accepted the aristocratic tradition as natural and right. It is, of course, not only a static class structure that finds its support in the shared sentiments and beliefs of individuals. The plasticity of a democratic structure within which individuals can move with relative freedom from one status to another can be maintained only so far as there is a widespread sharing of democratic sentiments and attitudes by individuals.

What is basic to a culture is thus not to be identified with any set of specific traits which statistical analysis may discover to characterize a majority of its members. Its basic framework of personality structure is not analyzable into any set of mere similarities between individuals, however widely distributed such similarities may be. Observable differences are equally important and even more significant. The basic structure is rather to be found in the common ground of both their similarities and their differences, the trunk from which divergent personalities branch and by which they are all supported. As the issues over which schools dispute and parties disagree exhibit the basis of common assumptions and standards essential to significant controversy, so the very contrasts and oppositions of personality types we find within any culture evidence by their compossibility their identity of basic structure.[1]

CULTURE AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

It is only as individuals appropriate and make distinctive use of what they share as their cultural heritage that their innate differences can be realized. Every human being may be born as a "free" individual, but he cannot exercise his freedom either in a vacuum or in a structureless medium. Like Kant's "light dove," he can fly only in an atmosphere which at once supports and resists him—and he can freely sustain and direct his flight only if he, like the bird, has developed an internal dynamic structure by which he can co-ordinate his movements with the differential variations of pressure encountered within the medium.

There must, therefore, be a mutual adaptation of the individual to the culture and a "fitness" of the environmental culture to the nature of the individual. This may be, and actually is, neither adequate nor complete. No culture is a completely integrated system. Despite this, many cultures manage to maintain themselves through the acts of individuals who are able to develop only impoverished and frustrated personalities. Yet such cultures could not exist at all unless they provided at least minimum conditions for the achievement of personality. The cultural world into which the child is born represents, on the one hand, a set of *a priori* conditions to which he must conform and by which his personality is molded; on the other hand, it is a heritage awaiting his acceptance. To accept it he does not merely conform to it, but he uses it for his own ends. He lives and acts through and by it, and in so doing at once gives it life and adapts it to his own needs. Even when he becomes a rebellious nonconformist, a criminal, a reformer or a creative genius he cannot help but use the opportunities offered by the culture. He may "manipulate" his culture, but he is unable to do so with his bare hands; he must use the instrumentalities it provides. Whether he is accepted and followed as an innovator, or feared or pitied as a psychotic deviant, the manner and direction of his divergence from the norm are themselves determined by the patterns of the culture. Thus the reformer who condemns current practices and standards of his day must appeal to the more universal standards and ideals implicit in the culture itself. The creative genius differs from the conventional nonconformist not merely in his greater self-originating activity, but in his deeper participation in, and his assimilation of, his cultural inheritance.

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[1] Ruth Benedict made this point in her discussion of one of the papers read at the Conference on Culture and Personality which was held at the Viking Fund in November, 1947.

So a culture, while endowing the individual with an inheritance essential for the development of personality, both enables him to realize his freedom and limits the field within which and the means by which he can exercise it. The basic framework it provides for the formation of his individual personality does not indeed fix its structure, but rather offers possible, but limited, alternatives. Born in another culture, he might have realized potentialities of his nature, the growth of which is stunted in his own surroundings. "Mute inglorious Miltons" and "Cromwells guiltless of their country's blood" may lie not only in a country churchyard of England, but may mingle with the tundra of the Arctic or the dust of ancient caves. Cultures differ not only in the specific alternatives they offer the individual, but in the range and varieties of personality types they permit and foster. As some primitive cultures make limited demands on native mechanical ingenuity or on artistic or intellectual creativity, some may also furnish small scope for the exercise of the higher moral virtues. It seems probable that great numbers of individuals, especially in some of the simpler cultures, have gone through life with their native resources for living and acting untapped. Needs and aspirations which might have been awakened under other conditions have remained dormant. Yet it is by no means certain that such individuals suffer frustration or become maladjusted or neurotic persons. It is when potential needs are aroused and left unsatisfied, when imagination is stirred by glimpses into inviting but prohibited fields, that frustration becomes an active force. And it is the tensions created by conflicting demands and the strain imposed by unbalanced forces that warp or disrupt the structure of personality.

RATIONALITY AND THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

It is evident that a close and also a very complex relationship exists between the personality structure of the individual and his rational intelligence. As we have seen, it is only as a person that an individual can use concepts or engage in any sort of ideal or symbolic form of activity. On the other hand, it is only through the development of his native capacity for these that he can achieve personality. Since his individual needs must be satisfied through the culture, the ends he seeks and the means he uses must be either formulated in cultural terms, or, as implicit in the culture, be expressible through its language. The values around which his personality is organized must attach to something objective and as such have a conceptually determinable place in the culture. On the other hand, it is the development of what we have loosely called generalized habits and of the "idealized" modes of feeling involved in such habits, that makes it possible for the individual to engage in the fully ideal activity of thought. Thus there is a correspondence and mutual dependence between the emotional and intellectual organization which constitutes personality. In the first place, the degree of native intelligence is a determinant of the complexity of personality structure a given individual is capable of achieving. A moron must perforce be a simple person. An individual gifted with great native intelligence may, it is doubtless true, also become a simple person. Whether he develops the complexity and richness of personality of which he is capable will, of course, depend on the complexity of his culture, and the kind and diversity of roles he is called on to play and on the circumstances of his life. A nonliterate culture, if it functions through few and simple institutions, makes limited demands on the native potentialities of its members. If it provides for a compatible satisfaction of basic needs its participants may achieve a simple personality structure which is well integrated with a minimum of conceptual elaboration. A highly complex culture like our own, with a great variety of institutions in process of rapid development and itself poorly integrated, makes great and often conflicting demands on individuals. It stimulates the development of complex personalities but provides no simple basic framework of accepted values within which they may be organized. Moreover, since our culture is both highly literate and conceptually articulate, it becomes important, especially for individuals who participate deeply in the culture, to reach an inner adjustment at a conscious and conceptual level. The very function of conceptual thought may become transformed under such conditions and take on a deeper and more vital importance for human life. The ordering of personal life becomes impossible on a basis of unformulated beliefs and unquestioned values and must rest upon a conscious reformulation and critical appraisal of ideas and values. We must not forget, however, that such an achievement is no mere intellectual feat of constructing an intellectual system of abstract concepts. Critical appraisal must proceed from a value matrix implicit in the culture and appropriated to new and wider uses by the individual.

While the foundation of personality structure must doubtless be laid during the early months and years of childhood, in the inarticulate attitudes and habits unconsciously engendered through personal contacts, the later development and organization of personality derived from these can only be carried out by conscious and articulate means. This is shown by the evidence from psychiatry which indicates that no integration of personality can be achieved without adjustment at the conscious level. The therapy of psychoanalysis involves locating and identifying repressed conflicts and bringing them to the level of consciousness where they may be faced and hence be subject to possible resolution. This is of course no mere intellectual process—if there be any such. The neurotic patient must be emotionally prepared and motivated though the establishment of some sort of personal relationship to his physician before he is capable of recognizing and consciously acknowledging the source of conflict. But the significant point is that it is only at the conscious level where discourse is possible that there is hope of resolving the conflict and preparing a genuine integration. If the psychological theory is sound, it is conflicts which have blocked organization at the conscious level that have been excluded from the field of consciously controlled activity. So long as the neurotic does not suffer a complete breakdown, what remains within the field of consciousness as an object of possible thinking, must be maintained in some sort of conscious interconnection. The neurotic, like any normal person, must continue to live within some "world," however rigidly circumscribed and however insecure and precarious his life within its confines. As a rational being he is under constraint to admit as "reality" only what he can force into some pattern, however much it must be warped and distorted in the process. The internal maladjustments from which he suffers thus not only impoverish and disrupt him as a person, but they affect the development and exercise of his rational intelligence. Rationality is a function of personality. It is only a rational being who can become a person, and it is only a "whole" person who can freely exercise his powers of reason.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA