I. An Overview of Spinoza's Position

In this chapter, I will begin with a rather brief sketch of the meaning of Spinoza's term of substance. I also introduce certain other metaphysical concepts of his, namely, cause and reason. Then I introduce his famous distinction between substance and attribute. This chapter will be devoted to the discussion of one of these concepts, namely, substance. This section will be devoted to the discussion of the concept of substance.

Spinoza's principal aim in this section will be to establish the meaning of the term substance as it is used in his philosophy. To do this, he will define substance as that which is in itself and is not conceived through another.

II. Spinoza's Substance Monism

In this section, I will discuss Spinoza's view of the nature of substance. I will show that Spinoza's concept of substance is monistic, in the sense that all things are considered to be aspects of a single, infinite substance.

Spinoza's monistic view of substance is based on the idea that all things are modes or attributes of a single substance. This substance is considered to be infinite, eternal, and uncaused. The attributes of this substance are thought to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of all things.

Spinoza's monistic view of substance is in contrast to the dualistic view of substance, which is characteristic of many other philosophical systems. The dualistic view of substance is based on the idea that there are two fundamental substances, one of which is物质 (a substance that is in itself and is not conceived through another) and the other of which is reason (a substance that is in itself and is not conceived through another).

In his monistic view of substance, Spinoza argues that the distinction between substance and attribute is a false one. He claims that all things are modes or attributes of a single, infinite substance.

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them as such by appealing to a difference between them, by appealing to those features with regard to which they differ. A version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is at work here:

(PII) If \( x \neq y \), then there is some difference between \( x \) and \( y \) that enables us to conceive them as distinct.

Since Spinoza sees conceiving a fact as explaining it, we can say that for Spinoza

(PII') If \( x \neq y \), then there is some difference between \( x \) and \( y \) that explains their nonidentity.

That the notion of explanation is thus operative in Spinoza's version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles shows that he would defend it, at least in part, by appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which he also accepts. According to that principle, all facts must be explainable. (PII') states how facts about nonidentity in particular must be explained. We will see later in this chapter that there may be another point at which Spinoza employs (PII') in the argument for monism.

There are two challenges to Spinoza's argument in 177 that I explore: first, why, for Spinoza, cannot substances that share the same attribute legitimately be distinguished by their modes? Second, why, for Spinoza, cannot substances that share the same attribute be distinguished by their attributes? After all, if they share some attributes but differ in others, then there would be a way to distinguish them by their attributes. I call the first problem the different modes problem and the second the different attributes problem. I consider them in turn in the next two sections, before examining the later stages of Spinoza's argument for monism.

2. The Different Modes Problem

Suppose that substance a and substance b share attribute x. Suppose further, for the sake of simplicity, that neither substance has any attribute besides x. Spinoza claims that a and b cannot be distinguished by their modes. His reason appears, if we quote in full the sentence I just cited as evidence that Spinoza accepts an indiscernibility principle:

If [two substances are distinguished] by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by \( p_1 \)), if the affections are therefore put to one side [depositis ergo affectionibus] and [the substance] is considered in itself, that is (by \( d_3 \) and \( a_6 \)), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by \( p_4 \)), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute] (177; cf. KV App. 1, Prop. 1, dem.).

Spinoza's point seems to be this: since a substance is somehow prior to its modes, we are entitled to put the modes to the side when it comes to individuating substances. But, as in the case of substances a and b, once the modes are put aside, we seem to have no way to distinguish between a and b; so we must conclude that a = b, after all.

To see why, for Spinoza, the priority of a substance over its modes would make modes irrelevant to the individuation of substances, we must look more closely at what Spinoza means by 'priority'. When he makes the claim of priority in 177, Spinoza says that it is evident from \( 1 d_3 \), the definition of substance, and \( 1 d_5 \), the definition of mode. These specify that a substance is in and is conceived through itself, while a mode is in and is conceived through another. In particular, as I noted, a mode is in and conceived through the substance of which it is a mode.

In asserting priority of a substance over its modes, Spinoza is clearly asserting that a substance and its modes stand in some kind of asymmetrical relation. The definitions of substance and mode suggest the following two claims as constituting the relevant asymmetry:

1. A substance is not in and is not conceived through its modes.
2. The modes of a substance are in and are conceived through that substance.

In invoking 177 in 177, is Spinoza concerned, in particular, with one of these two aspects of his thesis of priority; that is, does Spinoza reject a situation in which substances are individuated by their modes because such a situation would violate a particular one of the above pair of claims? It is clear, I believe, from 177, that Spinoza is more directly concerned with a violation of (1) than with a violation of (2).

To see that this is true, return to the crucial passage from 177:

If [two substances are distinguished] by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by \( p_1 \)), if the affections are therefore put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself, that is (by \( d_3 \) and \( a_6 \)), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by \( p_4 \)) there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute]. (177; my emphasis)

Notice that Spinoza here invokes the definition of substance and the claim, from that definition, that a substance is in itself. Why does he invoke the notion of being in itself? The italicized passage indicates that the following is what Spinoza has in mind. If we do not put the modes aside, that is, if we allow a substance to be individuated by its modes, then we are not considering that substance truly. We will, Spinoza is saying here, be considering it not in itself. Since, for Spinoza, everything is either in itself or in another (171), by considering a substance not in itself, we would, it seems, be considering it in another. This other consists, presumably, of the modes of the substance by which we are individuating the substance.

Spinoza's emphasis on the notion of being in itself in this context, therefore, implies that if we allow modes to individuate a substance, then we are treating that substance not as in itself, but rather as in its modes. Such a result would directly violate the definition of substance and also (1), the first component of the priority relation. Notice, however, that it would not, by itself, violate (2), the other component
The different antinomy problem

3. The different antinomy problem

as a work in progress, is an issue of current concern and threatening to pose serious difficulties to our understanding of the concept of thought. In order to overcome this issue, we must consider the nature of thought, its relationship to consciousness, and the role of language in shaping our understanding of thought. The different antinomy problem arises when we try to reconcile two seemingly contradictory aspects of thought: the intuitive and the analytical.

The intuitive aspect of thought refers to the way we naturally think, forming concepts and making judgments based on our immediate perceptions and experiences. The analytical aspect of thought involves the use of reason and logic to deliberate on the nature of concepts and judge their validity. The different antinomy problem occurs when these two aspects of thought seem to conflict, as in the case of certain metaphysical questions or philosophical debates.

To address the different antinomy problem, we must consider the role of language in shaping our understanding of thought. Language is not only a tool for communication, but also a medium for shaping our thoughts and perceptions. As a result, the way we use language can influence how we think about certain concepts or phenomena. This can lead to contradictions or paradoxes that may seem to undermine our understanding of thought.

In conclusion, the different antinomy problem is a significant challenge for those interested in understanding the nature of thought. By considering the role of language and the intuitive-analytical dichotomy, we can work towards overcoming this problem and gaining a deeper understanding of thought.
The effect of substance on the experience, when each and every one of the substances, that is not in the concentration of the substance is different for each and every one of the substances. We have seen how the experience is different for each and every one of the substances. If we consider the primary effects of the experience, then we can see that the experience is different for each and every one of the substances. When the concentration of the substance is different for each and every one of the substances, we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance. If we consider the secondary effects of the experience, then we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance. If we consider the tertiary effects of the experience, then we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance. If we consider the quaternary effects of the experience, then we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance. If we consider the quinary effects of the experience, then we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance. If we consider the sexennial effects of the experience, then we can see that there is a difference in the experience of the substance.
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for this claim, let us investigate its meaning and the way in which it would obviate the difficulty at hand.

At least part of what, for Spinoza, is entailed by saying that God has more power of existing than ts1 is that if we grant that ts1 exists, we must also grant that God exists. This is true for the following reason. For Spinoza,

(7) Something with lesser power to exist cannot exist if something with greater power to exist does not.

(7) is for Spinoza trivially true. If x, with lesser power to exist, exists and y, with greater power, does not, then the fact that x does exist and y does not shows that, after all, x has greater power to exist than does y.73 Thus, for Spinoza, a nonexisting thing cannot have greater power to exist than an actually existing thing. Given (7) and Spinoza’s view that God has more power to exist than ts1, it follows that

(8) If ts1 exists, then God exists.

With (8) in hand, we can see why Spinoza regards himself as entitled to reject the view that ts1 is a possible substance. (8) shows that the existence of ts1 requires the existence of God as well. Since God and ts1 share an attribute, we can see that the existence of ts1 would require that there be a case of attribute sharing. Since Spinoza thinks that there is, and can be, no such sharing, we can see how, for Spinoza, the existence of ts1 would be impossible.38 This conclusion would obviate the opponent’s argument from the claim that ts1 is possible to the conclusion that ts1 exists but God does not. We can therefore see how, by invoking the claim that God has more power to exist than does ts1, Spinoza would block an important challenge to his argument for substance monism.39

Since this claim about God’s power turns out to be crucial to Spinoza’s argument, it behooves us to investigate how he argues for it. Spinoza makes, in a passage I quoted earlier, that the more reality a substance has, the more power to exist it has (1p11s). Spinoza also says that the more reality a substance has, the more attributes it has (1p9). Thus a substance’s power and its number of attributes are proportional to the same thing, that is, the reality of the substance. This indicates that a substance’s power and number of attributes are proportional to one another. If one substance has more power than another, then it has more attributes than the other, and, conversely, if it has more attributes, it has more power. Since, by definition, God has more attributes than does ts1, it follows that God has more power to exist than does ts1. The connection between attributes and power provides, therefore, the ground for the claim I have called crucial to Spinoza’s argument for monism.

But now, of course, we are led to the question, How does Spinoza argue that attributes and power are correlated in this way? We can discern in Spinoza the following line of thought. With focus again on ts1 and God, let us show why, for Spinoza, God’s having more attributes is correlated with God’s having more power to exist than does ts1. Spinoza holds that

(9) If ts1 exists self-sufficiently, it has the power to do so only because of the fact that it has the attribute of thought.

Similarly, Spinoza would claim that if es1 exists self-sufficiently, that is only because it has extension. Spinoza asserts (without argument) a claim like (9) in Ep 35: “it can only be the result of a perfection that a being should exist by its own sufficiency and force.” The context in this letter and in Ep 36 makes it clear that Spinoza takes attributes to be perfections and that the degree of perfection of a substance is proportional to the number of its attributes. So Spinoza’s point is that a being can exist by its own sufficiency only as a result of its attributes.

With the help of (9), we can reach the claim that:

(10) God has whatever would give ts1 power for self-sufficient existence; but God has further features that also give God power for self-sufficient existence.

(10) follows, in part, from (9) as I now show. (9) claims that its having thought would account for the self-sufficient existence of ts1 (if indeed it did exist). Similarly, its having extension would account for the self-sufficient existence of es1 (if indeed it did exist). Now God has the attribute of thought. So, whatever power thought gives ts1 to exist on its own, it also provides for God. ts1, by (9), has no other power for its self-sufficient existence; but this is not the case with God. Since extension would account for es1’s self-sufficient existence, it would do the same for God, the substance of all attributes. So having extension provides God with a measure of power for self-sufficient existence that is not possessed by ts1. Similarly, each of the other infinitely many attributes that God has provides God with even further power. Thus we can see why (10) is true for Spinoza. Further, it trivially follows from (10) that God has more power to exist than does ts1. This is how Spinoza sees, in Ep 35, to support his assertion that God has more attributes than ts1 and therefore has more power to exist than does ts1.

Spinoza’s argument here is valid. Unfortunately, however, he cannot legitimately rely on it. Spinoza aims to prove that God has more power to exist as a means to showing that God exists and ts1 does not. By showing this, Spinoza would rebut an opponent’s charge that ts1 exists and God does not. In the course of arguing that God has more power, Spinoza asserts (9) without argument. However, Spinoza is not entitled to assume (9), since this is precisely the kind of assertion that Spinoza’s opponent can be seen as denying in his argument that ts1 exists and God does not. The opponent takes seriously the possibility that ts1 has more power to exist than does God. In doing this, the opponent is taking seriously the possibility that some difference between ts1 and God gives ts1 more power to exist than God, and thus that some feature that ts1 has and God lacks is at least part of the reason why ts1 has the power of self-sufficient existence. Since ts1 and God share thought, the opponent is, in effect, claiming that a feature besides thought is (part of) what gives ts1 power to exist. But this is precisely the denial of (9). So we see that, in taking his position, the opponent was, in effect, denying (9) all along. Thus Spinoza is, of course, not entitled to assume it, as he apparently does.
Since we have already noted our cases in which mutations are differentiated by
difference in the number of the subspecies of Apa. In the present case, there are
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To the "two" difference, I will now turn to an example of the "two" difference in the present case.

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more than one "two" difference, though it is not pronounced in the present case, is still
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compare the "two" difference to the "two" difference in the present case.
modes alone, if the thinking substance and the extended substance are to be distinct, they must be distinguished by one or more attributes.

Let us consider whether we can appeal to the attribute of extension in order to distinguish the thinking substance and the extended substance. The extended substance has the attribute of extension, of course, but one might suppose that the thinking substance does not have this attribute and that we could in this way explain their nonidentity.46

Such a strategy, however, does not work. To understand why, we simply need to ask the question. Why, in this situation, does the thinking substance lack the attribute of extension? Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason demands an answer here. I want to show that there can be no explanation of this purported fact. In my argument for this point, the conceptual barrier between the attributes figures prominently.

One attempt to explain why the thinking substance lacks the attribute of extension might proceed as follows: The thinking substance is distinct from the extended substance. Since according to I P5 there is no sharing of attributes between distinct substances, the thinking substance does not have extension. This explanation might seem valid, but since it presupposes the nonidentity of the thinking substance and the extended substance, it cannot be used in a noncircular fashion by one who seeks to explain the nonidentity. So this attempt to account for the thinking substance’s lack of extension must be put aside.

A second attempt might proceed thus: the thinking substance lacks extension because its having the attribute of thought precludes it from having the attribute of extension. On this view, because it has thought, this substance fails to have extension.

Again, this explanation might appear to be good; nevertheless, it is wholly illegitimate in Spinozistic terms, since it violates the conceptual barrier between the attributes. For Spinoza, the proposition that each attribute is conceived through itself (I P10) entails the following important claim:

(11) The fact that a substance fails to have a certain attribute cannot be due to its having a certain other attribute.

That Spinoza accepts (11) and sees it as following from the fact that each attribute is conceived through itself is evident from the fact that immediately after demonstrating the conceptual independence of attributes, he says:

From these things [ex his], it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e. one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer that from that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. (I P10s)

Spinoza is here saying that the very fact that attributes are conceived through themselves shows that from the claim that a certain substance has the attribute of thought, which is conceived through itself, and a certain substance has the attribute of extension, which is also conceived through itself, we cannot conclude that these sub-

stances are not identical. One can see why this claim would be attractive to Spinoza. If a substance is prevented from having the attribute of extension by the fact that it has the attribute of thought, then a fact involving extension—that is, the fact that a certain substance does not have that attribute—would be due to, and thus conceived through, a fact involving thought.46 This would be to allow more of a conceptual or explanatory connection between thought and extension than Spinoza would countenance.

Return now to the attempted explanation of the thinking substance’s failure to have extension by appealing to its having thought as precluding its having extension. Since Spinoza accepts (11), he would reject such an explanation. So we are still without a way of explaining why the thinking substance lacks extension, if indeed it does lack extension.

For similar reasons, the following explanation would also fail: “The thinking substance lacks extension because it has some other attribute which precludes its having extension.” This explanation is ineffective because, just as the conceptual barrier showed that thought cannot preclude a substance’s having extension, it would also show that attribute cannot preclude a substance’s having extension.

I want to consider one further potential explanation of the thinking substance’s failure to be extended, but in order to do so, I need to return briefly to an objection to Spinoza that I have mentioned at a couple of points already. Descartes would object to Spinoza by claiming that it is impossible for a substance to have more than one attribute, and that, therefore, since thought and extension are attributes, a substance’s being thinking precludes it from being extended. Spinoza’s claim (11) denies that one attribute can preclude another in this way. Thus we can see Spinoza as holding that it is possible for a substance to have more than one attribute, and that this is possible precisely because of the conceptual separation among the attributes. The conceptual barrier ultimately provides an answer to de Vries and to the Cartesian objection to Spinoza’s account.47

With this point in mind, let us consider a final attempt to explain the failure of the thinking substance to have extension. One way to explain why a thing possesses or lacks a certain property is to appeal to the fact that it is part of the thing’s nature or essence to possess or lack that property. Perhaps, then, it is part of the nature or essence of the thinking substance that it lacks extension. This would be the case if, for example, it were part of the nature of the thinking substance to have thought and no other attribute. (This might be seen as the nature of the substance I called “ts.”) If this is the case, then we could appeal to the fact that the nature of the thinking substance is restrictive in this way in order to explain why it lacks extension.48

We can readily see that this explanation is unsuccessful. We have already granted that the attribute of thought must exist and that only one substance has it. According to the just-mentioned explanation of the thinking substance’s failure to have extension, it is the nature of that substance to possess only thought. But we are now inevitably led to ask, Why should the one substance that possesses thought be a substance whose nature it is to have only thought? Since Spinoza grants that it is possible for a single substance to have more than one attribute, it is possible that thought is possessed (uniquely) by a substance whose nature it is to have thought as well as
Anyhow, we need to order the proper reservations for our vacation. I have been planning this on our long weekend trip to the mountains for the past two weeks. We have finally settled on a cabin with a private hot tub and sauna. The view of the mountains is breathtaking, and I can't wait to relax in the hot tub after a long day of hiking.

In the meantime, I'm planning on reading a good book and trying out some new recipes for our dinner tonight. We're going to make a big pot of chili with some cornbread to go with it. I'm so looking forward to this weekend!
5. Conclusion

different and less successful than that used in the context
of the image. It is not clear how or why the context
of the image influences the results observed. Further studies
are therefore needed to understand the role of context in
these phenomena.

The general point made from my reading is that certain features of
pictures can influence the way pictures are perceived. This is
especially true for images that are simple, such as those used in
this study. The results suggest that context can play a role in
the way pictures are interpreted, and that this role may depend
on the specific features of the image. Further research is needed
to better understand the nature of these effects and their
implications for picture perception and memory.
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a book or a document, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
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