# Moral mirrorism (theory) - Reconciles objective truth and emotional attitudes in a non-hybrid theory

Abstract

This paper introduces "Moral Mirrorism," a novel theory that intertwines objective truth with emotional attitudes in moral assertions. By critically analyzing moral cognitivism, expressivism, and hybrid theories, as well as naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral realism, the paper seeks to reconcile the conflicting aspects of these perspectives. Moral Mirrorism emphasizes that objective truth and emotional attitudes interactively shape moral assertions, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding moral language. Furthermore, the theory proposes practical applications in policy-making, moral education, and international relations, aiming to enhance consensus-building and moral decision-making. Although cultural diversity and subjectivity present challenges, Moral Mirrorism holds significant potential for further development in moral philosophy.

Keywords： Moral Philosophy；Objective Truth；Emotional Attitudes；Moral Cognitivism；Moral Expressivism

Citation

[[1]](#footnote-1)This paper aims to explore the following core issue: how can the objective truth of moral assertions coexist with emotional attitudes and play a relatively independent role? We will analyze moral cognitivism, moral expressivism, hybrid theory, natural and non-naturalistic moral realism, and specifically discuss the process of moral assertions and the impact of the real environment on objective truth and emotional attitudes, establish a new theoretical model, and propose "moral mirrorism" to solve the above problem. The moral mirrorism framework will reconcile the tension between moral cognitivism and moral expressivism based on the theoretical core of moral cognitivism and moral expressivism, and explain the interaction between the objective truth of moral assertions and emotional attitudes. In addition, we will critically evaluate the existing hybrid theories, explore the practical application of moral mirrorism in policy making, moral education, etc., and demonstrate the limited theoretical contribution and practical value.

[[2]](#footnote-2)In today's exploration of meta-ethics and the nature of moral assertions in classification, there are two extremely important positions that are also the classification of the paper: moral cognitivism and moral expressivism. These two theories provide two different frameworks for understanding moral debates and decisions, affecting many aspects from lawmaking to daily ethical choices. From the perspective of moral cognitivists, assertions such as "honesty is moral" describe objective facts, have independent authenticity, and can be verified mainly through logical reasoning. The basis of this perspective is the structure and consistency of rational arguments; in contrast, moral expressivists believe that such moral assertions mainly express the speaker's emotional attitude, such as "permit or not", and at the same time emphasize the non-descriptive function of moral language.

1. When explaining and discussing issues of complexity and universality, under what circumstances do we make extended arguments?

The complexity of moral language is explained more fully below in preparation for the extended discussion. The problem of universality is one of the characteristics that can express complexity. It is not only a core issue shared by moral cognitivism and moral expressivism, but also a very challenging concept in moral philosophy. How to achieve this without sacrificing theoretical depth? , recognizing and explaining the moral differences that necessarily exist between different contextual cultures . The philosophical exploration of universality itself necessarily involves a discussion of whether universal moral principles exist. [[3]](#footnote-3)Some philosophers question its existence, arguing that concepts such as good and evil should be viewed as universally valid, transcending individual and cultural differences, and not even needing discussion. However, this perspective shows limitations when faced with specific historical social structures. Take the Italian family culture of the 20th century as an example. Family honor is regarded as the supreme moral value (in fact, this is an inevitable "universality"). In this cultural background, personal decision-making and behavior are the primary consideration. What matters is the impact on the family's reputation, not personal interests. The context in which ethical decisions are made reflects the complexity of universal issues—how cultural and economic factors influence individual and collective moral judgments, often challenging the applicability of universal moral principles.

In this process, the moral considerations of individual decision makers will not only be scrutinized, but also the moral image of individuals or "family council members" who represent and implement collective will decisions as agents of decision-making subjects, or further called collective agents, will also be affected. Although the decisions and actions of collective agents are aimed at safeguarding the interests of the entire family, they will still inadvertently shape or strengthen specific moral norms that are often displayed to the outside. The concept of collective agent is particularly critical here because it emphasizes that the moral responsibility of collective behavior is not only attributed to individual actors. Collective agents formulate response strategies based on their internally determined moral standards, which are often formed in the historical and cultural traditions of the collective. Therefore, the moral stance displayed by collective agents in their behavior and decision-making is actually a concentrated reflection of their internal moral cognition and cultural values. This fully reflects the unity of the decision-making logic and values within the collective. Therefore, when collective agents make moral decisions under economic and cultural pressures, this is not only a test of individual moral judgment, but also a challenge and "proof" of the application of collective moral principles and universality. Such decisions demonstrate the complexity of moral principles in practical application, especially when it comes to the trade-off between collective interests and personal values.

In common collective decision-making in modern society, different tendencies toward moral cognitivism and moral expressivism are often reflected. Most large-scale, closely related interest groups, such as businesses and government agencies, are often more inclined to follow the principles of moral cognitivism. These collectives are capable of not only identifying ethical issues but also demonstrating an understanding of and adherence to objective moral principles in their structures and decisions. They have the necessary requirements to comply with laws and social rules, and are also affected by external factors such as transaction public opinion, which force them to take into account the importance of ethical principles in their decision-making.

On the other hand, there are a small number of collective agents, such as marches and rallies, which are small in scale and not closely related to direct interests. These groups are often considered to refer to and identify with moral expressivism, and pay more attention to declaring moral attitudes and expressing emotions, rather than simply following generally accepted moral norms. Such groups may be more inclined to pay attention to social justice, moral feelings, and emotional resonance, rather than making decisions and reactions based on objective truth. This simple and common distinction in the behavior of collective agents reflects the different applications and similar importance of moral cognitivism and moral expressivism in real life . For society, understanding the influence of these two moral concepts can better understand and evaluate the moral responsibility of collective behavior.

In the context of globalization, the application of moral theory first distinguishes and addresses the impact of cultural differences on moral understanding and practice. The performance of these theories in different cultures also reveals the inherent complexity and difficulties in application. Moral cognitivism relies on universal and logical principles, but it faces the adaptability of universal principles in different cultural environments. Some of the most commonly used moral judgments and practices are more closely connected to specific social structures and cultural traditions, but they are not independent of universal rational principles. Moral expressionism itself carries the emotional and social functions of moral language. Therefore, the theory finds convenience in application in areas where the culture attaches great importance to emotional expression and social practice. In cultures that emphasize objective moral standards and individualism, moral assertions are always expected to transcend personal positions to achieve universal truths, which conflicts with the basic premise of moral expressionism.

After the above discussion, it is not difficult to see that the opposition and controversy between moral cognitivism and moral expressivism are too obvious, and will also jump out of theoretical confrontation and turn to real confrontation. This also confirms that the current status of this opposition has limitations in explaining the complexity and diversity of moral language, prompting us to start from a new perspective, that is, to emphasize the essence of moral language while reflecting emotional expression.

Review of traditional hybrid theory, discussion of its limitations and modern criticisms

Some hybrid theories attempt to combine moral cognitivism and moral expressivism to make up for their respective shortcomings and provide a more comprehensive explanation of morality. These hybrid theories attempt to establish a closer connection between cognition and emotion. As a result, they seem to only provide the framework of the target theory, but still better explore the nature of moral judgment, including emotional cognitive theory, emotional judgmentism and cognitive expressivism.

The theory of affective cognition holds that moral judgment not only involves rational evaluation of behavior or situations, but is also deeply affected by individual emotions, and believes that the two are interdependent and act upon each other in forming moral judgments. In addition, the theory of emotional cognition also emphasizes that emotion is not only a natural response to moral cognition, but also an important motivation for driving moral behavior. In general, the theory of emotional cognition is not only consistent with the findings of psychological research, but also clearly derived from daily experience and life intuition. Emotional judgmentalism believes that emotion is not only central but also decisive in forming moral judgments. It regards emotion as the direct source and foundation of moral understanding and emphasizes that emotion itself should be regarded as a cognitive state that enables us to perceive Moral phenomena and making judgments. In addition, emotional judgmentalism also explores the role of emotion in driving moral behavior.[[4]](#footnote-4) It believes that emotion is not only the result of cognition, but also the driving force of behavior, emphasizing the dual role of emotion in moral behavior. Cognitive expressivism is the theory that best embodies the term "mixed" among mixed theories from the perspective of reality and applicability . Under a unique methodology, it believes that moral statements have dual functions of descriptive and expressive functions: they not only convey moral facts , also expresses the speaker's emotions and attitudes. This view gives moral statements the attribute of true or false, but authenticity depends not only on the state of the external world, but also on individual psychological states and social norms.

After introducing the three hybrid theories and evaluating their contributions in moral philosophy, we can see that although these theories provide different perspectives in understanding the complexity of moral judgments, they still have limitations and shortcomings. Therefore, in the detailed separation and expansion of hybrid theory below, we can further refine a new framework based on these theories. It aims to emphasize the reflection and shaping of moral language in reality and provide a more comprehensive perspective. Not only involves improvements to existing theories, but also includes a more in-depth exploration of the functions of moral language, emotion and cognition, and how they jointly shape moral norms and behavior in moral interactions, considering how moral judgments are intertwined between individuals and society. are constructed and understood through the interaction of emotion and cognition.

1. How the moral mirrorism framework was born beyond the criticism of hybrid theory

The problem of theoretical consistency of emotion cognition theory has long been an important point of criticism in the intersection of philosophy and psychology. This criticism focuses on whether the theory can provide an internally consistent and logically coherent explanatory framework when trying to integrate elements of moral cognitivism and moral expressivism, and requires that the theory must be empirically supported by psychology and neuroscience research. However, from a philosophical perspective, for example, the factors that produce things: components, composition methods, and composition environments often determine the basic properties of the thing. We believe that the same is true for moral judgments, and the process of their production determines some of their properties. Therefore, the interaction mechanism and consistency issues between cognition and emotion can be transformed into the issue of exploring the generation of moral judgments. Emotion cognition theory believes that cognitive components and emotional components together constitute moral judgments. If the specific contributions and order of action of cognitive components and emotional components in the generation of moral judgments can be solved, the consistency issues mentioned above will also be answered accordingly. Emotion cognition theory proposes that cognitive components and emotional components jointly participate in the formation of moral judgments and continue to influence this process. However, this theory encounters some problems when actually exploring the generation mechanism of moral judgments. Since the formation of moral judgments has a time process, emotional components are not only the triggering factors of moral judgments, but also have a continuous impact on cognitive components. Throughout the process of moral judgment formation, changes in emotion may lead to constant changes in the evaluation of cognitive components. This dynamic interaction may weaken the objectivity and truth value of cognitive components, and does not take into account their independence in the formation of moral judgments. In system theory, such as engineering and biology, it is also common to see that each component should maintain a certain degree of independence to ensure the normal function of the system. The traditional view is that in the process of moral judgment formation, cognitive components act before emotional components. However, more modern psychology and neuroscience research shows that emotion often intervenes before cognition and has a preliminary directional impact on moral judgments ( Greene et al., 2001). This shows that the influence of emotion on cognitive components is relatively independent and limited, that is, emotion may not be a direct component of moral attributes, but more like an environmental condition that affects the production of moral judgments. Inevitably, this classification simplifies the actual role of emotion in moral judgments. In many cases, emotion directly determines the direction and intensity of moral judgments, which still needs to be discussed, but at least it proves that emotion may not be one of the components.

[[5]](#footnote-5)Affective judgmentism believes that the experience of moral behavior is essentially subjective, but it is limited to the premise that the essence of morality is emotion. After removing the elements of moral expressivism and moral eliminationism, the theory still explores the subjectivity of personal emotions in detail, but this does not mean that moral assertions are just isolated personal feelings, but can be transformed into a shared social practice through expressiveness and interactivity. Affective judgmentism emphasizes the core role of emotion in moral judgment. At the same time, we can further explore how these emotion-based assertions are transmitted and resonate in social interaction. After the moral language is produced, it always passively invites others to participate in a process of empathy, which promotes the understanding and sharing of the emotions behind moral assertions. Here we can again express it from the perspective of collective agents. From a local perspective, collective agents are the key nodes of emotional interaction. While reflecting the emotional reactions of collective members, they also represent how these reactions are integrated and transformed into shared moral concepts in collective discussions. This process involves the expression, understanding and resonance of emotions, and ultimately forms a co-construction model of moral knowledge. At the same time, considering the time dimension in which the collective can exist and develop, it can be considered that in the concept of collective agency, the emotional expression and reception between individuals are quite sufficient. Although there are always irreconcilable differences in the emotional basis between individuals, the internal emotional communication and reception can reach a high degree of sufficiency. This emotional expression of moral assertions can be regarded as a dynamic interactive process, in which individuals, by expressing their emotional reactions, reveal their personal moral positions while promoting the construction of moral consensus among the group. Fully embodied: subjective emotions can be fully expressed and understood in modern society, the interactivity and timeliness of the collective.

Cognitive expressivism is indeed a theory that attempts to find a balance between moral cognitivism and moral expressivism. Its complexity mainly stems from the attempt to capture both cognitive and emotional elements of moral language, which leads to some confusion or redundancy in theory. Therefore, at the structural level, it can be considered that it lacks the basis for an independent theory. At the same time, the overemphasis on practicality will make the theory feel powerless when facing more abstract moral philosophical issues, which may lead to limitations in the theory's ability to explain the deeper functions of moral language. This is a problem that is difficult to avoid for an overly mixed theory. But at the same time, the practicality in cognitive expressivism has also inspired empirical research on the actual effects of moral language, which can in turn support or challenge theoretical assumptions. In the environmental movement, moral language is often used to express the urgency and moral responsibility for environmental protection. For example, the use of a sentence like "We have a responsibility to protect the earth" not only describes a moral fact, but also inspires and expresses strong emotions, encouraging people to take action. In this example, we first separate the over-combination of moral expressivism and moral cognitivism, and then, with the purpose of deepening the theoretical level of this cognitive expressivism, we can get the following explanation: the moral essence of environmentalism, as the cognition of the collective agents participating in the environmentalist collective, is an objective truth with uniqueness and truth value. Although this objective truth comes from the collective, it cannot be fully explained by a certain individual or a collection of several individuals in the collective. Its real power and depth come from the emotional expression of the collective and the emotional expression itself reflected and embodied in each individual. Each individual's internalization and emotional response to this moral truth jointly express a more dynamic and specific moral reality. The more realistic expression of the emotional level is: emphasizing that emotional willingness comes from all individuals. The only thing that the latecomers who recognize environmentalism can fully understand, integrate, and directly provide is the emotional attitude level. This not only shows the collective source of moral language, but also highlights the core role of individuals in forming and spreading moral truth.

Above, we have reviewed traditional hybrid theories and explored their attempts to strike a balance between moral cognitivism and moral expressivism. These theories provide valuable perspectives in understanding the cognitive and affective elements of moral language. By evaluating limitations, we have witnessed the birth of the moral mirrorism framework, which not only draws on the advantages of traditional hybrid theory, but also deepens the understanding of the functions of moral language, especially the complex emotional and cognitive interactions between individuals and collectives. In terms of sexuality, it provides a more comprehensive theoretical framework, emphasizing how moral language affects the formation of moral practice and moral reality through individual and collective internalization and emotional responses in real society. This framework, in its current infancy, demonstrates the depth of moral theory and increases its relevance and effectiveness in practical applications.

1. Detailed explanation, opposition and important expanded thinking of naturalistic moral realism and non-naturalistic moral realism

In the category of moral philosophy, these two are particularly conspicuous in the debate between the Cornell School and the Moore School. They are closely related to moral cognitivism, because the foundation of moral mirrorism is some of the fundamental principles of moral cognitivism. Therefore, , to a certain extent, also refers to naturalistic moral realism and non-naturalistic moral realism. In the discussion of the nature of morality, they bring more radical perspectives and assumptions to the establishment of moral mirrorism. Analyzing, comparing and raising questions about both can also improve moral cognitivism and moral mirrorism to a certain extent.[[6]](#footnote-6)

[[7]](#footnote-7)Naturalistic moral realism is a philosophical perspective that uses natural science methods in ethics to explain moral phenomena. It asserts that moral facts are part of natural facts and can be discovered, understood, and verified through scientific methods. It emphasizes solving moral problems through observation, experiment and logical reasoning. Its fundamental idea is that moral phenomena should be subject to natural laws like natural phenomena. Naturalistic moral realism is highly regarded in modern times because it brings moral issues into the scope of scientific discussion, especially providing a unique way to seek to explain the psychological dimensions of human social and psychological phenomena. Non-naturalistic moral realism asserts that moral facts have unique non-natural properties and cannot be fully explained and verified by the methods of natural science. It is believed that moral norms do not depend on the binding force of specific culture or social environment, but have an objective reality that transcends empirically knowable natural facts. This perspective provides a kind of inherent authority for moral norms that requires almost no discussion, making certain moral rules and judgments not just a reflection of culture or personal preferences, but a reflection of a deeper, universal effective moral order. Therefore, non-naturalist moral realism is often cited in ethics in support of the objectivity and universality of moral judgments.

By comparing the two together, some issues recognized in the philosophical community can be demonstrated and discussed. In terms of epistemology, naturalists tend to adopt an empiricist approach, emphasizing that moral knowledge can be obtained through observing the consequences of actual behavior, experiments and scientific reasoning, and emphasizing the objectivity and verifiability of moral cognition. Non-naturalists, on the other hand, rely on intuition and rational deliberation, believing that moral knowledge originates from direct moral feelings and rational consideration of a priori moral principles, emphasizing the non-empirical and limited a priori nature of moral judgments. As for interpretations of moral language, naturalists generally believe that moral language describes actual facts that can be analyzed scientifically or logically. Non-naturalists, on this view, see moral language as a tool for expressing moral values and principles that transcend the realms of experience and natural science. These contrasts not only reveal profound differences between two kinds of moral realism, but also have two fundamental implications for the way we understand and deal with moral issues.

After the explanation and comparison of the two theories, there are still some contents worth thinking about and expanding. This part is undoubtedly the most important part of the discussion of naturalistic moral realism and non-naturalistic moral realism in the paper. All along, the two doctrines have two directions of relative independence and absolute separation, but there are still unresolved intersections and fuzzy dividing lines. These problems challenge the clear boundaries of the two theories, but at the same time they can also serve as directions for future research.

Moral language ontology is often discussed and discussed outside of the two doctrines, but this is one of the issues on the dividing line. Moral language has the dual characteristics of descriptive and normative, but both doctrines try to explain the function and meaning of moral language from their own perspectives. Therefore, the current situation is that naturalism tends to emphasize the descriptive nature of moral assertions - describing the consequences of behavior, while non-naturalism emphasizes normativeness - pointing out the moral obligations of behavior. These two properties that are forced to be explained separately indicate that moral language may rely on both empirical facts and transcendental moral principles, which breaks the strict boundaries between the two doctrines. More dual-process models of moral decision-making can be established to study how the interaction between descriptive and normative factors in moral decision-making jointly affects the moral judgments and behaviors of individuals and groups. For example, existing studies have included the social intuitionism model (Jonathan Haidt, 2001). Establishing more dual-process models will help us understand this. However, the dual-process model of moral decision-making often requires interdisciplinary research. Under the current progress of moral philosophy research, the demand for empirical research is very urgent.

Non-naturalism always emphasizes the importance of moral intuition in acquiring moral knowledge, but the discussion of moral intuition under the naturalistic framework has also achieved results. They connect moral intuition to the natural field, such as evolutionary background, etc. This is also It is desirable, but they still have not given up adhering to the principle of naturalistic moral realism and believe that moral intuitions may also have natural origins and functions. The current direction of discussion is how to analogize moral intuitions to natural psychological tendencies. This perspective can help bridge naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories, and at the same time provide a unified theoretical framework under psychological classification. Being able to demonstrate real-world applications of non-naturalistic moral realism outside of naturalism could be the ultimate goal pursued in this direction. After a simple argument, it is not difficult to find that psychological tendencies cannot fully cover all dimensions of moral intuition, such as moral intuition after complex thinking and rational analysis. This aspect is particularly similar to a key concept in moral emotionalism: "transcendental". Through a simple discussion, it is not difficult to find that moral intuition, psychological tendency, and "transcendental" in moral emotionalism all emphasize sources such as moral judgment. It is based on the inner instinctive reaction, not just the logical analysis of external information. However, they are still different in timeliness, source and automaticity. Therefore, we should use psychology to view their common points by analogy; successfully identify and then Analyzing the differences will certainly contribute to the study of moral intuition.

1. The establishment, coordination and practical application of moral mirrorism

In the previous section "Reviewing the traditional hybrid theory and discussing its limitations, and how the moral mirrorism framework was born in addition to criticism", we optimized the traditional hybrid theory while innovatively developing the definition of moral mirrorism.

Based on the understanding and partial foundation of the emotional cognitive theory, we preliminarily determined that "moral substance is only objective truth, and that emotions may not be a direct component of moral attributes, but more like environmental conditions that affect the production of moral judgments." Secondly, through the continued thinking of emotional judgmentism and the application of the concept of agent, it is confirmed that although "emotions are subjective, they can still be fully understood and expressed through interactivity and time extension." Finally, we deconstruct cognitive expressivism and, through the example of environmentalism, confirm that "the substance of moral assertions as objective truths can only be fully understood by the subject of the behavior that makes moral judgments, and emotional attitudes as expressions have power and motivation."

In addition, moral mirrorism also includes some theories that do not require complicated discussions. For example, emotional attitudes are regarded as passive expressions of moral assertions, originating from the moral assertions themselves, but will also be affected by the emotional attitudes of the actors. In more complex social models, Among them, the social status and life status of the actor will further affect its expression.

The word "mirror" is my visual description of this theory: objective truth (the essence of moral assertions), as a "real object", only exists in reality, symbolizing the uniqueness of the truth expressed by moral assertions - it can only be understood by the agent. etc.; but emotional attitudes can be used as "images", appearing in the mirror and in reality, symbolizing emotional attitudes as a form of expression of moral assertions that can be fully understood by others.

Moral mirrorism has significant potential for philosophical reconciliation. The theoretical framework is not only based on a variety of hybrid theories, but also implements the core principles of moral cognitivism and moral expressivism during the establishment process, which has an obvious basis for argumentation. From the perspective of hybrid theory, the same thing is that moral mirrorism, like other isms, attempts to alleviate and overcome the most common binary oppositions in traditional ethics. It also reveals the essence of moral assertions as objective truth while expressing emotional attitudes. The difference is that emotional attitudes not only reflect individual reactions, but also reflect social expectations more closely according to moral expressionism, and are even more proactive and intentionally echo social consensus. In addition, the emotions passively expressed by individuals in the collective through moral assertions are an integral part of the emotional attitude expressed by the collective, and contain the power of identification or disidentification (in a broad sense). It is true that the fundamental reason for this different interpretation is to avoid the "mixing" of hybrid theory. While moral mirrorism jointly elaborates objective truth and emotional attitudes, it also successfully ensures a certain degree of independence between the two. Previously, we could only see relatively independent expressions of emotional attitudes from traditional moral expressionism.

The possible real-life applications are an extremely stringent quality test for a theory born from development innovation, but the moral mirror theory is fully prepared for this and is believed to be able to provide new perspectives and solutions in many fields, especially in dealing with Questions that have both moral facts and emotional responses.

The formulation of social ethical norms, public policies and laws is a process involving important and serious social nature and interests. Policy formulation is particularly critical when facing: cultural sensitivity, intense social discussions, complex but unavoidable issues, such as refugee reception and social welfare issues. Under the theoretical framework of moral mirrorism, we can look at the formulation of these norms and policies from a new perspective. It not only includes the rules themselves, but also the emotional attitudes that the makers want to convey. This emotional attitude is believed to be fully perceived and interpreted by all those who are willing to understand, although different individuals may have different ways of understanding. Therefore, policymakers can make the expression and dissemination of emotional attitudes a core component of policy design. Although it is too absolute and unrealistic to formulate policies based solely on emotional attitudes, emotional attitudes as a manifestation of policies will be pre-perceived by everyone. Another reason is that the public will also make moral evaluations in a broad sense when interpreting policies. In the process of policy formulation, it should be considered how to make policy recipients understand and accept these emotional attitudes more quickly. In addition, it is also crucial to build trust with policy recipients. This not only requires transparency of policy content as always, but also includes optimizing the interactive process of policy in terms of emotional transmission. In this way, the policy can not only convey moral cognitive standards more effectively, but also greatly improve the effectiveness of its emotional expression (because the emotional transmission of current policies is really poor), thereby improving the acceptance and implementation of policies. This policy-making method with emotional expression and understanding as one of the cores helps to promote a wider social consensus and enhance the public's trust and support for policies, which not only enhances the effectiveness of policies, but also builds and respects social moral harmony.

There is a considerable degree of overlap between international relations, conflict mediation and policy making, especially in terms of understanding and communicating moral standards and emotional attitudes, which can be seen as a specific area of policy making, with different application contexts and specific practices. I personally have a strong desire to discuss this aspect. I am eager to contribute my own strength and influence timely policy making by applying these theories. Although there are both deficiencies in practice and discussion of specific issues, I sincerely hope that moral philosophy can be more widely understood and considered today, so that the world can return to peace as soon as possible.

Similarly, business operations, product design and policy formulation also have similar behavior patterns, but these contents often overlap with economics, market management, etc., and moral mirrorism is also reflected in many market rules that have become popular. Although the theoretical ontology cannot directly affect operations or product design communication or trigger major changes, it is still valuable to conduct market research from the perspective of moral mirrorism.

In existing moral education, the expression and understanding of emotional attitudes are usually emphasized, tending to the educational model under moral expressionism. In the general environment, it is caused by the low popularity of moral philosophy theoretical knowledge and the unstable social and moral harmonious environment. The direct reason is that teaching convenience makes the understanding of emotional attitudes simpler and easier to understand. Even in the more advanced moral education environments in society, moral education is often simplified to how students express personal emotions and understand positions, and lacks in-depth teaching and discussion of moral theories, especially the direction of moral cognitivism, which treats morality as The theoretical basis for the existence of objective truth. From the perspective of moral mirrorism, the importance of emotional attitude in moral education is still recognized, and it is also emphasized that it must be combined with the understanding of moral truth and reverse reasoning. It must be admitted that the current tendency of moral education towards the educational model of moral expressionism still contributes to part of the success of moral education: it makes people more proficient in understanding and expressing their emotional attitudes, and the understanding and expression of emotional attitudes in society and education is also very mature. . With such a foundation, it is also facilitated to learn how to extract moral meaning from the emotional attitudes expressed by others, and to understand how these emotions reflect broader social values and moral standards. Encouraging students to develop critical thinking skills in this way enables them to analyze and evaluate different emotional attitudes and the moral reasons behind them. It can also help educators and students break out of their current limitations and transition to a more comprehensive moral education.

1. Self-criticism and prospect as a conclusion

Moral mirror theory also has inevitable limitations in theory and practical application. There are two obvious problems at the theoretical level. The first is that it fails to take into account the diversity of moral concepts and emotional expressions of individuals in different cultures. Because moral mirror theory emphasizes that individuals can fully express and understand emotional attitudes under interactivity and time span, but in situations that require rapid response and immediate results, moral mirror theory is often not fully applied. In different social and cultural backgrounds, there are not only emotional attitudes, but also significant differences in the belief in different moral truths. In addition, moral decision-making and judgment under moral mirror theory are still inevitably subjective. Although moral sentimentalism does not place emotional attitudes at the core of moral decision-making and has avoided most of the subjectivity, it does not fully recognize the foundation of moral cognitivism and believes that the objective truth expressed can only be fully expressed and understood by the subject of behavior. When expressing, it may be selectively described out of self-interest, which leads to the one-sidedness of moral decision-making and weakens predictability. This subjectivity comes not only from the imperfection of moral mirror theory, but also from the lack of in-depth analysis of language philosophy and the imperfection of the language expression system itself. Such problems make it particularly important to supervise the process of making moral decisions and judgments, and to avoid the self-interested selective description of objective truth by the subject as much as possible, which can also reduce subjectivity to a certain extent. More integrated research on observations of moral intuition, psychological tendencies, etc., as well as the establishment of analytical prediction models for individuals who make moral decisions and judgments, can also overcome most of the weak predictability.

When discussing the limitations of moral mirrorism, we must also point out a problem that is completely unsolvable at present - insufficient participation in academic discussions and practical applications, and the theoretical depth and practical effects still await extensive academic criticism and practical testing.

The academic community does not pay sufficient attention to moral philosophy, and this low density of discussion will hinder the enrichment and perfection of all theories. In addition, there is a lack of examples of applying the theory to specific ethical decision-making situations, making it difficult to evaluate the validity and applicability of this theory in policy formulation, educational practice, and personal moral judgment.

In order to overcome these limitations, moral mirrorism awaits wider discussion and criticism, while being tested in a variety of practical settings. It is expected that through this open criticism and practical exploration, moral mirrorism can be used in future ethics research. Occupy a more important position.

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1. Reference Berit Brogaard and Michael Slote, .This paper was very inspiring for me. I started writing after reading two-thirds of it, but the description of moral sentimentalism is too radical. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Reference Mackie, J.L. 1977. Mackie argues that the two perspectives reflect distinct approaches to understanding moral language and its role in ethical decision-making. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Reference Mackie, J.L. 1977. Mackie provides a critical assessment of the universality of concepts like good and evil. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Reference Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. Haidt's research shows that emotion plays a central role in moral judgment and also acts as a driving force for moral behavior. I'm in favor of the latter [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Reference Hormio, The author's interpretation of collective agents is very comprehensive; I can almost 'borrow wholesale.' However, I must admit that my referenced arguments lack depth, and of course, collective agents themselves are not the only way to prove this. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Moore introduces the concept of non-naturalistic moral realism in his book Principia Ethica, which is a key theoretical source for Moral Mirrorism, so this work needs to be cited. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Reference Joyce, Richard. 2006. Joyce provides a comprehensive analysis of naturalistic moral realism, offering insights into the evolution of human moral behavior. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)