

UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE, AND
HUMAN SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Victor Gonçalves de Sousa

PRACTICAL REASON AND ITS ROLE IN DETERMINING THE ENDS OF ACTION
IN ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

CORRECTED VERSION

São Paulo
2024

Victor Gonçalves de Sousa

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CORRECTED VERSION

Dissertation presented to the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy, Languages and Literature, and Human Sciences of the University of São Paulo as partial requirement to obtain the degree of Doctor in Philosophy.

Supervisor: Dr. Evan Robert Keeling

São Paulo
2024

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Catálogo na Publicação
Serviço de Biblioteca e Documentação
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d725p de Sousa, Victor Gonçalves
Practical Reason and its role in determining the
ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy /
Victor Gonçalves de Sousa; orientador Evan Keeling -
São Paulo, 2024.
616 f.

Tese (Doutorado)- Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e
Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo.
Departamento de Filosofia. Área de concentração:
Filosofia.

1. Aristotle. 2. Ethics. 3. Practical Reason. 4.
Ends of action. I. Keeling, Evan, orient. II. Título.

Name: Victor Gonçalves de Sousa

Title: Practical Reason and its role in determining the ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this Dissertation, I have benefitted from the feedback and help of more persons than I could thank here.

Evan Keeling's supervision, trust, and support since my Master's has been invaluable. In him I have found an exacting reader that allowed me to make my arguments clearer and philosophically appealing. I am deeply grateful for all the help he provided me with over the years.

I am also deeply grateful to my examining committee, Professors David Charles, Paulo Fernando Tadeu Ferreira, and Marco Zingano.

Marco Zingano's intellectual generosity and comments on earlier versions of this Dissertation were fundamental in accomplishing this project. I cannot thank him enough for all the opportunities he provided me with and for the intellectual environment he built in São Paulo, which taught me how to do Ancient Philosophy.

I also would like to thank Paulo Fernando Tadeu Ferreira's careful comments and incentive over the years. Not only do I owe Paulo for first introducing me to the work with mss., but his comments on an earlier version of this Dissertation shaped some of the directions it ended up taking.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Professor David Charles not only for accepting the invitation to be part of the examining committee of this Dissertation, but also for his careful reading and precise and enlightening comments, which greatly benefitted me.

During my PhD, I had the chance to spend a year as visiting scholar at the University of Pittsburgh, during which I had the opportunity to discuss large sections of this Dissertation with Jennifer Whiting. Jennifer's feedback was also invaluable and had a deep impact on the formulation of many of my arguments. I cannot thank her enough for the support and help she provided me with.

During this period, I also benefitted from interactions and feedback from Sara Magrin and Christian Wildberg, and Andrew Wein. I learned a lot in their seminars and from comments on presentations I gave during my stay at Pittsburgh.

Over the years, many persons had an impact on the writing of this Dissertation, all of whom I am deeply grateful to: Daniel Nunes Lopes, Roberto Bolzani Filho, Fernando Gazoni, Eduardo Wolf, Breno Zuppolini, Vicente de Arruda Sampaio, Simone Seminara, Raphael Zillig, Dionatan Tissot, Daniel Simão Nascimento, Daniel Vazquez, Daniel Wolt, Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro, Bruno Conte, Alcides Devides Moreno, Rodrigo Uemura, Marcus Tadeu Miranda, Antonio Kerstenetzky, Luiz Fernando Pereira de Aguiar, Pedro Dotto, Lucas Angioni, Angelo Antonio de Oliveira, and Nuno Coelho.

I would also like to thank Hendrik Lorenz, Benjamin Morison, André Laks and other participants of the Princeton-USP-Panamericana Consortium in Ancient Philosophy Workshops I had the chance to interact with over the years.

In addition to that, Christopher Rowe provided me with access to his new edition of the *EE* before its official publication, which allowed me to take it into account when I was revising my **Chapter 2**. I thank him for this.

During my stay in Pittsburgh, I also benefitted from the feedback given by Joe Karbowski on my **section 1.3.3.1** and from the feedback given by Harry Alanen on my **section 1.3.1**, I thank them for this and for all the conversations on Aristotle I had with them.

I would also like to thank all students from the CPAS program with whom I had a chance to interact during my time at Pitt. Moreover, I would also like to thank Abigail Fritz, Agatha Gutierrez, Joshua Kramer, and Hassan Saleemi for the conversations and philosophical *symposia* that made my year in Pittsburgh much more pleasant.

I cannot stress enough how much I owe to Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro. Without her companionship over the years I would have not been able to complete this work, which I dedicate

to her. Her support and her help with many difficult passages and manuscript ligatures that she discussed with me was indispensable, and I also owe her a couple of arguments that I have duly acknowledged.

Finally, I have to thank the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) for the funding without which this Dissertation would not have been written: grant #2019/05555-7 and grant #2022/03987-0.

‘And it is obvious that a small change taking place in the beginning produces many major differences further ahead.’ (Aristotle, *MA* 7 701^b24-26: ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γιγνομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἄπωθεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον)

‘From a mistake that is first in place at the beginning it is impossible for a certain evil not to occur in the long run’ (Aristotle, *Pol.* V.1 1302^a5-7: ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακόν τι.)

‘For the mistake takes place at the beginning, and “beginning” is said to be half of the whole, so that even a small mistake at the beginning is proportional to the mistakes in the remaining parts’ (Aristotle, *Pol.* V.4 1303^b28-31: ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ἢ δ’ ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμισυ εἶναι πάντος, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρόν ἀμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν.)

‘Wise persons pursue these things [sc., appropriate actions] availing themselves of nature as a guide; but persons who are imperfect and yet are endowed with an excellent character are frequently moved by honour, which has the image and the appearance of fineness. But if <such persons> could completely see fineness in itself, which is utterly perfect and unconditional, a single thing that is the most excellent of all and maximally praiseworthy, with how much joy would they be filled, given that they delight so much in its outline picture?’ (Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, V, §69, 868-874: *Quae quidem sapientes sequuntur utentes tamquam duce natura non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. Quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam, rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tantopere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur?*)

RESUMO

de Sousa, V.G. (2024). *Razão Prática e seu papel na determinação dos fins da ação na filosofia prática de Aristóteles*. (Tese de Doutorado). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.

O objetivo desta tese é determinar o papel que a razão tem na determinação dos fins da ação na filosofia prática de Aristóteles. Eu argumento que Aristóteles está comprometido com uma resposta a esta pergunta segundo a qual virtude em sentido próprio (*ἀρετὴ κυρία*) *possibilita* que se vise fins belos com vistas a eles próprios, que se decida realizar ações virtuosas com vistas a elas próprias, e que se realize ações virtuosas com vistas a elas próprias. No entanto, na minha leitura, a virtude em sentido próprio não seria necessária para se visar fins belos (embora ser virtuoso *em algum sentido* seja necessário para isto), o que é suficiente para garantir que agentes que não são virtuosos em sentido próprio tal como os continentes e os incontinentes sejam capazes de visar fins que são corretos, desde que eles não possam visar fins deste tipo com vistas a eles próprios.

Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; Ética; Razão Prática; Fins da Ação.

ABSTRACT

de Sousa, V.G. (2024). *Practical Reason and its role in determining the ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy*. (PhD Dissertation). Faculty of Philosophy, Languages and Literature, and Human Sciences. Department of Philosophy, University of São Paulo, São Paulo.

The aim of this Dissertation is to ascertain what role reason has in determining the ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy. I argue that Aristotle is committed to an answer to this question according to which full virtue (*ἀρετὴ κυρία*) enables one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. Yet, on my reading, full virtue would not be necessary for aiming for fine ends (although being virtuous *in some sense* turns out to be necessary for that), which is sufficient for securing that agents who are not fully virtuous such as the continent and the incontinent are able to aim for ends that are right, provided they cannot aim for such ends for their own sakes.

Keywords: Aristotle; Ethics; Practical Reason; Ends of Action.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this Dissertation is to ascertain what role reason has in determining the ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy (henceforth the End Question). This is a fundamental question for understanding Aristotle's views on practical reason and is particularly relevant to the debate about Aristotle's claim that deliberation is restricted to the means to an end. The history of the discussion of End Question coincides, to some extent, with the different attempts to make sense of this restriction in the face of the Kantian requirements of morality. If it turns out that, for Aristotle, practical reason does not deal with ends (as would seem to be the case if practical reason is limited to deliberation and if deliberation is conceived of instrumentally), then Aristotle's views could be charged of being Humean. For that reason, the debate about the End Question has been, since the late 19th century, dominated by the discussion about the relationship between deliberation and the ends of action.

No doubt Aristotle's view on practical reasoning is of great importance for understanding his ethics and his moral theory,¹ but I would like to argue that an investigation centred on whether deliberation is about the means only or about the ends as well² and on how Aristotle conceives of the deliberative process is not as central for assessing his views on morality and on the End Question as has been assumed by the scholarship.

In this Dissertation, I wish to frame the End Question differently, so that what is central for ascertaining Aristotle's position on this matter is not so much how he conceives of deliberation, but 1) how he distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who fail to be fully virtuous (a question whose answer is fundamental for understanding how virtue might

¹ I thus agree with Millgram's claim (1997/2005, p. 312) that 'a moral philosopher's view of practical reasoning is likely to account for many of the deeper structural features of his or her moral theory,' and think it applies to Aristotle.

² An issue that has been rightly described as 'the most useless of the perennial controversies about the role of practical intellect in Aristotle's theory' (Richardson, 1987, p. 253).

make the ends right—a claim whose meaning is fundamental for answering the normative version of the End Question, as we shall see), and 2) how he conceives of *βούλησις*.

As will become clear below, my hypothesis is that (full) virtue makes the ends right in that it enables one to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (i.e., having decided on them on their own account), to decide on (or to conclude through deliberation that one should perform) virtuous actions on their own account, and to aim for fine ends for their own sakes. In that case, reason (presumably some sort of right reason) would be necessary and sufficient for aiming for ends that are fine (and thus right in a sense), but not sufficient for aiming for ends that are right in this precise sense I have just sketched, which require the agent to be fully virtuous.

Yet the End Question is an ambiguous question, as we shall in the first part of this **Introduction** (section 0.1). Accordingly, before attempting to reframe it and beginning to sketch an answer to it, we should first get clear on the ambiguities it involves. Thus, to present this question and how I intend to deal with it in this Dissertation, I shall divide this Introduction into three parts. In the first part (section 0.1), I shall frame the End Question, paying special attention to its ambiguity, and shall present my hypothesis about how it should be answered. In doing so, I would like to indicate the assumptions I have made in framing this question and my reasons for making these assumptions, and to present some questions regarding which I think any answer to the End Question should take a clear position.

In the second part (section 0.2), I shall discuss previous attempts at answering the End Question in light of the conceptual schema presented in the first part, after which I intend to show how this Dissertation will be structured. In doing so, I shall give clear indications of what questions presented in the first part of the Introduction I shall deal with in each of the Chapters and how each Chapter contributes to answering them.

The third and final part of this **Introduction** (section 0.3) is of a philological character. In this part, I shall talk a little about the editions I have consulted and my translation practices and shall present the philological hypotheses I have adopted in dealing with Aristotle's texts. In particular, I shall focus on the philological hypotheses I have adopted regarding the text of the *Ethica Nicomachea* and of the *Ethica Eudemia* (which will show themselves to be fundamental for my reading of some key passages of the *Ethicae*) and regarding the common books.

This is particularly relevant in the case of the *EN*, since, for all passages of the *EN* I quote and discuss in this Dissertation, I have freshly collated eight mss. and compared their readings with the text transmitted by the Arabic translation of the *EN*, in an attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about the transmission of the *EN*.

0.1 The End Question and a hypothesis as to how it should be answered

The question about what reason's role is in determining the ends of action in Aristotle's practical philosophy (the End Question) is an ambiguous question. By 'end of action' three quite distinct things may be intended.

'End of action' is either that end for whose sake one acts, and which is thus part of the causal explanation of action, i.e., our motivating end (henceforth end₁); that end figuring in the conclusion of one's deliberation, and which, for the agent, is something that counts in favour of³ the action they are to decide on (henceforth end₂); or else that end one intends to achieve in action and for whose sake one may deliberate (henceforth end₃). That these ends are different is clear: not all ends₁ are ends₂ (although some of them certainly are ends₂ as

³ With talk of counting in favour of, I mean merely that the end that figures in the conclusion of one's deliberation tells in favour of a course of action in that that course of action is taken to be effective and appropriate means to attain that end. Thus, an end₂ gives us reason to decide on (or to perform) a certain course of action in so far as this course of action is taken to be good *qua* something that promotes that end₂ in action (a relation that can be construed in several different ways).

well); and, depending on how we construe Aristotle's theory of decision (*προαίρεσις*), ends₂ will not always count as ends₁. Besides, ends₃ are clearly different from both ends₁ and ends₂.

Let me say something to justify these claims:

First, that not all ends₁ (i.e., motivating ends) are ends₂ (i.e., ends that figure in the conclusion of our deliberations) is made clear by the fact that, for Aristotle, our actions are not always the result of deliberation and decision, but are sometimes performed due to, say, non-rational motives such as fear and pleasure.⁴ Besides, as we shall see, it is also possible to act on the basis of reason without thereby acting on the basis of *προαίρεσις*, since it is possible to act in accordance with *βούλησις* without having deliberated (and thus *οὐ προαιρούμενος*), which is further reason for distinguishing between ends₁ and ends₂. For instance, one may have a wish (i.e., a rational desire) to be honoured and, without deliberating, recognise that helping someone cross the street right here and right now will lead them to honour. In that case, their end₁ corresponds to honour, but they do not have an end₂, since they have not even deliberated about what to do in these particular circumstances.

Second, the truth of the claim that ends₂ not always count as ends₁ depends on how exactly we describe ends₂. If ends₂ are those ends that figure in one's *προαίρεσις*, and if Aristotle admits the existence of something like ineffective *προαιρέσεις*, ends₂ will not always be ends₁. I mean, if *προαιρέσεις* in the proper sense of the word can be ineffective such that weak agents (*ἀσθενεῖς*),⁵ for instance, can be said to arrive (when or right before they are

⁴ Animals do many things on the basis of *φαντασία*, either because they do not have reason (as is the case irrational animals—*θηρία*) and are thereby led by their *φαντασίαι*, or else because although they have reason (as human beings do), their reason is somehow obscured by emotion, sickness, or sleep, to the effect that they are led to act on the basis of mere *φαντασία* as well (cf. *DA* III.3 429^a5–9: *πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς [sc., φαντασίαι] πράττει τὰ ζῶα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσῳ ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι*).

⁵ Weak agents (*ἀσθενεῖς*) are those incontinent (akratic) agents who experience *ἀκρασία* after having deliberated (and thus act against a deliberative conclusion they have arrived at at the circumstances they are faced with), and are to be contrasted with impetuous agents (*προπετεῖς*), who are incontinent (akratic) agents who experience *ἀκρασία* without having deliberated (and thus are not acting against a deliberative conclusion they have arrived at at the circumstances they are faced with)—cf. *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7]

experiencing incontinence) at *προαιρέσεις* in the proper sense of the word about what they should do in the particular circumstances they are being faced with, then not all $ends_2$ would be $ends_1$, for some $ends_2$ would not be part of the causal explanation of the actions we perform, since in episodes of incontinence we do not act on the basis of decision (i.e. *προαιρούμενος*), but rather *παρὰ προαίρεσιν* (cf. *EN* III.4 [=Bywater III.2] 1111^b13–14, VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a4–10, 13–17, 8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^a25–27, 9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a5–7). But if arriving at a *προαίρεσις* in the proper sense of the word is something that only agents who act *προαιρούμενοι* (i.e., on the basis of decision) actually do,⁶ then it would seem that all $ends_2$ are $ends_1$ as well. Yet it is not necessary to construe $ends_2$ in one of these two fashions, since $ends_2$ can be described simply as those ends that figure in the conclusion of one's deliberation instead (irrespective of whether this counts as a *προαίρεσις* or not and of whether *προαιρέσεις* are necessarily connected to action), which is how I have described them above,⁷ the upshot being that not all $ends_2$ will count as $ends_1$ irrespective of how we understand Aristotle's theory of decision. For instance, if someone concludes by means of deliberation that they should stand their ground in battle for the sake of saving someone else's life (which is a goal they deem to be fine in the circumstances), this does not necessarily imply that the agent who arrives at this deliberative conclusion (irrespective of whether it counts as a *προαίρεσις* or not) will act accordingly, for the agent may flee due to fear. Thus, their end_2 would be saving someone else's life and their end_1 would be the fear that leads

1150^b19–22 and 25–27, and *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a1–5.

⁶ This view is already seen in Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 137.24–26 and 141,6–7), for instance. On how these passages of Aspasius' commentary should be construed, see Sedley (1999, p. 169n14). I shall come back to this issue below in footnote 121.

⁷ In doing so I intended to safeguard the possibility of $ends_2$ not being merely a class of $ends_1$ irrespective of how we construe Aristotle's theory of decision. In fact, if $ends_2$ are not the ends for whose sake one actually decides, but the ends that figure in the conclusion of one's deliberation (which may not always be a *προαίρεσις*, if we construe *προαίρεσις* as necessarily involved in the causal explanation of what the agent does), then not all $ends_2$ would count as $ends_1$, but only those that are really effective in eliciting action. I shall come back to the issue of how we should conceive of *προαίρεσις* below in footnote 121.

them to flee.

Third, that the ends for whose sake we deliberate (ends₃) do not always coincide with the ends for whose sake we act (ends₁) is a claim evinced by episodes of ἀκρασία, since impetuous agents (προπετεῖς—see footnote 5) perform vicious actions (motivated by, say, pleasure) despite being in some sense committed to performing virtuous actions (which is why they are said to act ‘παρὰ προαίρεσιν’⁸ even though they have not deliberated at all and hence do not have an end₂—something about which Aristotle is explicit when dealing with impetuosity, προπέτεια).

Finally, that ends₃ (i.e., the ends for whose sake we deliberate) do not always coincide with the ends that figure in conclusions arrived at by means of deliberation (ends₂) is a claim whose exact explanation depends on how we describe ends₃. The matter is intricate, and I shall discuss it in more detail later below (in section 0.1.2.1.4). At any rate, the fact that an end₂ is an end that figures in the conclusion of one’s deliberation seems sufficient to distinguish ends₂ from ends₃, since there are many cases not only in which people determine what they should do for the sake of an end₃ without having deliberated (say, by means of εὐστοχία or ἀγχίνοια—on that, see footnote 52 below),⁹ in which case they will have an end₃ without also having an end₂; but there are also many cases in which people act against their end₃ without

⁸ No doubt how exactly this should be spelled out depends fundamentally on how we understand Aristotle’s theory of decision. Yet I think that even if incontinent agents do not really make decisions in episodes of incontinence (even though they are said to act ‘παρὰ προαίρεσιν’—more on that below in footnote 121), they can still be said to be committed to performing virtuous actions. This would seem to be so either because they concluded a deliberation that recommended that they should so act (as weak agents do), or else because given the ends₃ they are committed to (or given how they can be said to conceive of their end₃—more on that below), they would also be committed to performing such actions (as impetuous agents would be) or, at the very least, are committed to not performing vicious actions (see the discussion below at pages 61–64). As Aristotle puts it, incontinent agents act against their βούλησις and do not do the things they think they should do (cf. *EN* V.11 [=Bywater V.9] 1136^b5–8), that is, they have appetites conflicting with their βουλήσεις, and thus with what they take to be good (cf. *EN* IX.4 1166^b7–10).

⁹ See, for instance, *EE* II.8 1224^a3–4, a passage in which Aristotle appears to admit the possibility of doing things on the basis of βούλησις without decision and deliberation (see footnote 15 below, in which I translate this passage).

having deliberated (and hence also without having an end_2), as in episodes of impetuosity.¹⁰

Accordingly, in asking the End Question, one might be raising one of at least three different questions: (a) what influence reason has in determining our ends_1 , that is, how exactly reason determines our motivating reasons; (b) what influence reason has in determining our ends_2 , which are considerations that we take to favour concrete courses of action as a consequence of having deliberated;¹¹ and (c) what influence reason has in determining the object of *βούλησις* for whose sake we can deliberate.¹²

¹⁰ As I have already indicated above in footnote 5, that impetuous agents have not deliberated about the actions they fail to perform in episodes of impetuosity is made clear by a series of passages. I shall come back to this below in footnote 121.

¹¹ I mean by this that ends_2 correspond to those considerations we take to be normative reasons for action (or omission) *due to having deliberated*, even though in some cases we may be mistaken in that regard. In other words, ends_2 will correspond to those considerations that render some course of action rational to us in so far as we have deliberated about it, even though it may turn out that we have *no normative reason* for pursuing it, since, as Parfit (1997, p. 99) puts it, (normative) reasons are provided by facts, whereas the rationality of our desires stems from what we believe. In fact, the conclusion of a deliberation can be construed as recommending the performance of (or the forbearance from) an action ϕ in the circumstances *C for the sake of an end_2* . That is, an end_2 is what the agent takes to justify the performance of (or the forbearance from) ϕ in the circumstances *C*, irrespective of whether it really justifies that action (or omission) thus counting as a normative reason for its performance (or omission).

Notwithstanding this, matters seem to be a little more complex, as we shall see. In fact, if it turns out that, for Aristotle, action possesses some sort of double teleology (cf. Price, 2013, p. 30), then what we decide on is rather performing an action ϕ that achieves some external goal *G* (perhaps an end_3 —if these ends turn out to be situation-specific goals) in circumstances *C for the sake of an end_2* , i.e., because in circumstances *C* achieving (or attempting to achieve) *G* by means of ϕ either consists in acting well (in which case one could in some cases be said to decide on that— ϕ -ing-for-the-sake-of-*G* in circumstances *C*—for its own sake) or else contributes (or is taken to contribute) to acting well in some other way (say, because *G* amounts to some external good required for performing a virtuous action, and thus for acting well as one conceives of it). In any case, there are several ways of construing this double teleology, since it might be argued that the external goal that characterises the action one voluntarily performs is one of the particulars ignorance of which makes the performance of the action involuntary (cf. *EE* II.9 1225^b1–6, *EN* III.2 [=Bywater III.1] 1110^b30–1111^a6, and V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^b11–16). In that case, merely saying that one decides on ϕ -ing in such and such a way in circumstances *C* for the sake of the fine would already imply that one has decided on ϕ -ing in the way one should aiming at the external goal one should in circumstances *C*, since one would decide on ϕ -ing in so far as, if performed in such and such a way in circumstances *C*, it is taken to be fine in itself. As we shall see below, this issue is connected to what ϕ amounts to: something like a courageous action, or an action that, in itself, is neither courageous nor bold or cowardly, but can be either of these depending on how it is performed, on the particular circumstances involved in its performance, and, most importantly, on how these two things interact with each other. I shall touch on this issue below in presenting question (V).

¹² An indirect connection between *βούλησις* and deliberation is made by Aristotle in a series of passages (most of which are directly connecting *βούλησις* and *προαίρεσις*): *DA* III.10 433^a24–25 ‘whenever one is moved on the basis of reasoning, one is moved on the basis of wish as well’ (*ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται*); *EE* II.10 1226^b2–5 ‘Thus, since decision is neither opinion nor wish taken individually, nor both of them [...] therefore it is <opinion and wish> in so far as it comes from both of them, for both of these pertain to the person who has made a decision’ (*ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε*

Notwithstanding this, (a) is too broad as it stands, since it covers cases in which reason's role is merely accidental.¹³ One alternative would be to ask (a') what influence reason has in determining *some* of our motivating reasons, namely those that depend on rational considerations about the goodness or fineness of some object or action (henceforth rational

δόξα οὔτε βούλησις ἐστὶ προαίρεσις ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω [...] ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῶ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα); 1226b17-19 (depending on a reading found in a Latin translation and in a suggestion made by Vettori in his copy of the Aldine edition and on a reading found in only one ms.) 'for everyone wishes those things they also decide on, although they do not decide on all those things they wish' (ἅπαντες γὰρ βουλόμεθα [VΛ¹: βουλευόμεθα PCLB(f.58v)] ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλόμεθα [P¹: βουλευόμεθα P²CLB(f.58v)], πάντα προαιρούμεθα); and *EN* III.5 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a11-12 (only in two mss. and in Aspasius commentary) 'for, having judged as a result of having deliberated, we desire on the basis of wish' (ἐκ τοῦ βουλευέσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν [MbGa(f.18v)Asp.: βούλευσιν rell.]). No doubt something quite similar to deliberation may take place when one looks for ways of satisfying one's ἐπιθυμία, for instance. Yet this sort of reasoning is not quite what Aristotle calls deliberation, since, for him, it appears that deliberation is necessarily connected to βούλησις, whereas reasonings that look for ways of satisfying one's ἐπιθυμία are not always associated with a βούλησις for that object. See Anscombe (1965, pp. 144, 147-148) for a similar claim.

Yet that this connection between deliberation and βούλησις implies that βούλησις initiates deliberation is a claim that has been recently challenged by J. Müller (2016, pp. 187ff), who argues that deliberation can be initiated, in some cases at least, by non-rational desires. On Müller's view, βουλήσεις would be involved in deliberation in so far as 'they act as a filter through which the agent's non-rational desires must pass in order to be acted on.' However, Müller does not think that this is the only way that βούλησις is involved in deliberation, for he also countenances that such deliberations (which are initiated by non-rational desires) would require 'some general (perhaps even implicit) wish to act on one's non-rational desires provided there are no rational objections to so acting.' Thus, his contention is not quite that non-rational desires can, by themselves, initiate deliberation, but rather that there are some cases in which, to initiate deliberation, βούλησις must be associated with non-rational desires, and that in these cases the object for whose sake we deliberate is good only in so far as it is pleasant and does not interfere with the pursuit of one's long-term wished-for ends, and not because it is in some sense a means to εὐδαιμονία. The problem with this view is connected to one I shall raise below in footnote 55, which has to do with the existence of βουλήσεις which, at face value, do not seem to have any connection with one's current conception of εὐδαιμονία or εὐπραξία such as idle and sudden βουλήσεις (the relationship between εὐδαιμονία and εὐπραξία is a contentious matter). In fact, it is because Müller thinks that the pursuit of harmless pleasures is neither instrumental to nor constitutive of εὐδαιμονία that he thinks that deliberations about how to pursue these pleasures are not initiated by one's βουλήσεις alone. I cannot fully address this difficulty in this Dissertation, but the fact that there is a virtue that regulates the way in which we pursue the pleasures of humour, for instance, (namely, wit—εὐτραπελεία) points to a connection between harmless pleasures and εὐδαιμονία, to the effect that pursuing these pleasures in some circumstances not only is something that is choiceworthy for its own sake and fine, but is also directly connected to εὐδαιμονία somehow, since it amounts to an exercise of virtue. Moreover, given that Aristotle conceives of pleasures as a kind of ἀναπαύσις in *EN* X.6 1176^b6-1177^a1, it seems that most harmless pleasures could be for the sake of εὐδαιμονία in so far as ἀναπαύσις may be for the sake of εὐδαιμονία in that it is for the sake of activity. Thus, it seems that if one's non-rational desires are sufficient to initiate a deliberative process this should be because one provisionally sees the object one has a non-rational desire for as something good to pursue in such and such circumstances, in which case one would also have a βούλησις for that object, and not simply because one sees that object as pleasant and non-objectionable (although, of course, being pleasant and non-objectionable may be taken as a sign of its goodness).

¹³ Take, for instance, cases in which thinking that an object is pleasant leads one to have an ἐπιθυμία for it (cf. Pearson, 2012, p. 172; Tuozzo, 1992, p. 345; and *EN* VII.7 [=Bywater VII.6] 1149^a34-^b1) and cases in which reason makes us have an ἐπιθυμία for something not in so far as that thing is thought to be in

motivating reasons). Another alternative consists in asking (a'') what influence reason has in determining *some* of our rational motivating reasons, namely those that occupy the position of end in the decision on the basis of which one acts¹⁴ (henceforth deliberative or prohairetic motivating reasons). (a') asks about all cases in which reason's involvement is necessary for action, irrespective of whether one has deliberated or not.¹⁵ (a''), in turn, asks about reason's effectiveness in leading to action in just those cases in which one has previously deliberated and acts on the basis of *προαίρεσις*.

As expected, (a'') and (b) are directly connected. In fact, the ends₁ that can answer (a'') are always ends₂ as well, since the ends that can answer (a'') are ends that figure in one's *προαίρεσις* and hence are also ends that figure in the conclusion of one's deliberation. Yet not all ends₂ are ends₁ of this sort (as I have already indicated above, not all ends₂ count as ends₁ because it is possible to determine what to do by means of deliberation and still fail to act on the basis of that deliberative conclusion).

But how should we describe the relationship between the ends₁ that can answer (a'') (which we could perhaps call ends_{1''}) and ends₂?

itself pleasant, but in so far as it is thought to be, in some way, a means to a proper object of *ἐπιθυμία* (cf. Corcilius, 2008, pp. 140-141)—ultimately I think this second case can be subsumed to the first, but this should not matter for my current purposes. What should be stressed here, however, is that *ἐπιθυμία* does not depend on reason for being triggered, since non-rational animals also have *ἐπιθυμία*. Moreover, note that since Aristotle admits that desirability characterisations made by *φαντασία* and by mere perception can make one desire something and thus act, there is a case to be made to the effect that, for Aristotle, reasons for action do not necessarily involve rational cognition, but can be had as a result of non-rational forms of cognition such as *φαντασία* and perception as well (see also Pearson, 2012, p. 225). Yet, for my current purposes, I shall restrict talk of reasons to those cases in which rational cognition is involved, and I would also like restrict my question to reasons that are due to rational cognitions about the good and the fine, as I shall do in the sequel.

¹⁴ Note that, for Aristotle, a *προαίρεσις* is always *of something* and *for the sake of something* (cf. *EE* II.11 1227^b36–37: ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἔνεκα τινός).

¹⁵ As I take it, (a') is a question not only about acting on the basis of *προαίρεσις*, but also about acting, without having deliberated, on the basis of *βουλήσεις* for particular things. In *EE* II.8 1224^a3–4, Aristotle appears to make this very distinction in pointing out that we do many things on the basis of *βούλησις* suddenly, but no one decides on something suddenly (*πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἑξαίφνης, προαιρέται δ' οὐδείς οὐδὲν ἑξαίφνης*). That is, it is possible to act on the basis of rational considerations about the goodness or fineness of something (since these are required for having a *βούλησις*) without having deliberated, and hence without having made a *προαίρεσις*.

A first alternative is to say that ends_{1''} are related to ends₂ in the same way as active causes are related to potential causes,¹⁶ which is sufficient for saying that they are not mere chance homonyms. In fact, if ends₂ and ends_{1''} are related to one another as active causes are related to potential causes, ends₂ would be defined in terms of ends_{1''} (but not in terms of ends_{1'} or ends₁ in general).

Yet although it is true that ends₂ are potential causes of action and that ends₁ are actual causes of action, one could resist this conclusion and say instead that ends_{1''} and ends₂ differ *qua* ends in that the former are a species of the latter (in which case the definitional priority would go the other way around).¹⁷

In both cases, however, all that matters for my purposes is that ends_{1''} and ends₂ are

¹⁶ Indeed, the items that are causes *ὡς ἐνεργούντα* seem to be causes *ὡς δυναμένα* too (since effectively causing something implies being capable of doing so), but things that are causes *ὡς δυνάμενα* are not necessarily causes *ὡς ἐνεργούντα* as well (since such causes can be ineffective), so that not all ends₂ (which, on this reading, would be causes *ὡς δυνάμενα* of action) would be ends_{1''} as well (which would be causes *ὡς ἐνεργούμενα* of action). For the Aristotelian distinction between causes *ὡς ἐνεργούντα* and causes *ὡς δυνάμενα*, which seems to apply to all Aristotelian causes, see *Phys.* II.3 195^b3–6; for a discussion of this distinction as it applies to causes of action (in light of *Div. Somn.* 2 463^b22–31), see my Master's Thesis (de Sousa, 2018, pp. 86–102).

¹⁷ The overlap between ends_{1''} and ends₂ indicates that the homonymy that causes the ambiguity between (a'') and (b) is not complete, but moderate, to the effect that although ends_{1''} are indeed different from ends₂, it would seem that they still form some kind of conceptual unity. The exact sense in which ends_{1''} ends₂ are conceptually unified, however, will not matter for my purposes.

At any rate, if these two types of ends are indeed related to one another in the way in which actual causes are related to potential causes, it seems that ends₂ would be defined in terms of ends_{1''}, since Aristotle subscribes to a general principle according to which actual Xs are prior to potential Xs in definition and essence, so that the latter are defined in terms of the former (cf. *Met.* Θ.8 1049^b12–17 and *DA* II.4 415^a18–20). But if ends_{1''} are species of ends₂, the definitional priority will go the other way around.

Now, It may be argued that ends_{1''} and ends₂ do not exhibit the same behaviour as causes *ὡς ἐνεργούντα* and causes *ὡς δυναμένα*: it is not merely the case that a given X can be both an end_{1''} and end₂ (as in the case of causes *ὡς ἐνεργούντα* and causes *ὡς δυναμένα*—see footnote 16). Rather, ends_{1''} *as such* are also ends₂.

For the idea that Aristotle would distinguish between things that are mere chance homonyms (*ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμοι*) or, what amounts to the same, things that are said in a way that is completely homonymous (*πάμπαν λέγεται ὁμωνύμως*)(on these notions, see *EN* I.4 [=Bywater I.6] 1096^b26–27 and *EE* VII.2 1236^a17 respectively) and what we could call attenuated or moderate homonyms (which, as such, do not admit of being seen as members of a single genus, but must be unified either *πρὸς ἓν, κατ' ἀναλογίαν, κατ' ἐφεξῆς*, or in some other way) see Zingano (2013; 2015a; 2015b), and, for a less generous version (which does not recognise as many ways of unifying a concept), see G.E.L. Owen's classic text (1960). Similarly, see Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* (9a4–a6 : ταῦτῶ δ' ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἀριθμῶ καὶ εἶδει καὶ γένει καὶ ἀναλογία, καὶ εἰ ἄρα παρὰ ταῦτα διαίρεσεις) for an open list of different ways of unifying a concept about which we can have knowledge.

relevantly distinct.

The ends₁ that can answer (a'), in turn, are not always ends₂, for there are some rational motivating reasons that are not the result of deliberation (see footnote 15), and hence do not correspond to those considerations that i) count in favour of a particular course of action and ii) result from deliberation. For that reason, I shall put (a') aside, and, for simplicity's sake, shall henceforth refer to the ends₁ that can answer (a'') as ends₁ without any further qualification.¹⁸

Now, it seems that the level of influence one can attribute to reason in answering (a'') cannot go beyond that attributed to it in the answer given to (b). For example, if reason is necessary but not sufficient for determining one's ends₂, it cannot be both necessary and sufficient for determining one's ends₁. Yet the level of influence attributed to reason in the answer given to (a'') can fall short of the level of influence attributed to it in (b): it may turn out that despite reason being necessary and sufficient for determining the ends that figure in the conclusion of our deliberations (ends₂), it is not sufficient for leading us to act on the basis of decision, and thus for determining our end₁.

How one answers (c), in turn, may be completely independent from how one answers (a'') and (b). As a matter of fact, even if reason has no influence in establishing the ends₃ for whose sake we can begin deliberating (if they are determined by nature, for instance), it may still be the case that reason is both necessary and sufficient for establishing our ends₂.¹⁹

¹⁸ It is certainly possible to distinguish between ends₁, ends_{1'}, and ends_{1''} depending on whether one is preoccupied with (a), (a'), or (a''). But since I shall focus on (a''), I shall refer to ends_{1''} simply as ends₁.

¹⁹ As I take it, Aristotle endorses a version of this claim in *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25 (my T 50), a passage in which he marshals an argument to the effect that even if our ends are determined by nature, the actions we perform would still be up to us. If we introduce the distinction between ends₁₋₃ in this claim, it might be argued that what Aristotle means is that even if our ends₃ are determined by nature, the ends₁₋₂ that explain and are taken to justify the performance of our actions are up to us. Thus, even if reason has no influence in determining our end₃, it could still be both necessary and sufficient for determining our ends₁ and our ends₂. I shall discuss this passage in detail below in **Chapter 3**, in **Section 3.2.1**.

How exactly this is to be formulated, however, will depend on how we describe ends₃ and their relation to ends₂, as we shall see below.

This ambiguity does not go completely unnoticed by scholars dealing with the End Question, even though they are not as explicit in making these distinctions as one would like them to be. In fact, distinguishing between questions (b) and (c) seems to be a common strategy for reconciling two apparently inconsistent claims that may be attributed to Aristotle—namely, the claim that virtue makes the end right (henceforth C1) and the claim that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for ends that are fine (and thus in a sense right as well) (henceforth C2). Yet, in so far as many of these scholars admit that agents who are not fully virtuous can arrive at the same ends₂ as fully virtuous agents (even though they would not be able to do so reliably and consistently), they impose unwarranted limits on C1, such that virtue would not be really necessary for having a right end₂, although it may be sufficient for that. This is problematic, as we shall see, because Aristotle not only says repeatedly that virtue makes the end right (a claim that is indeed ambiguous as to whether virtue is necessary or not for having right ends²⁰), but also claims that the best end (literally, *the end and the best*) does not manifest itself but to the good person (cf. *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a34: τοῦτο [sc., τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον] δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται)—a claim that strongly suggests that there is a sense in which full virtue is necessary for having right ends (assuming that being good here is tantamount to being fully virtuous—as I shall argue it is—, as the context of *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] seemingly suggests).²¹

²⁰ As we shall see, there are at least two sources of ambiguity in this claim: one concerning the identity of the virtue that makes the end right (see the discussion of my Question [II] below in section 0.1.2.1.2), and another concerning the sort of rightness secured by that virtue (see the discussion of my Question [I] below in section 0.1.2.1.1). Depending on how we identify the virtue in question on this claim and the sort of rightness it secures, it may be the case either that virtue is necessary for making the ends right or that it is not necessary (see the discussion of my Question [III] below in section 0.1.2.1.3).

²¹ I shall discuss this passage and the issues involved in its interpretation below in section 1.3.3.1, in Chapter 1.

The upshot is that there might be different senses of rightness at stake in claiming that virtue makes the ends right (i.e., C1) and in claiming that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for fine ends and hence for ends that are in some sense right (i.e., C2).

Merely distinguishing (a'') from (b) and (c), in turn, does not put one in a better position. In fact, if it is still admitted that agents who are not fully virtuous can have the same ends₂ as fully virtuous agents, and that, in some cases, agents who are not fully virtuous can share the ends₁ that explain the virtuous actions performed by fully virtuous agents,²² one is forced to admit either that the contribution of virtue is once more not necessary for making one's ends₂ right, or even, more specifically, that it is purely conative.²³

As I shall argue, to avoid imposing such unwarranted restrictions on C1, what is required is a particular way of answering questions (b) and (c)—to the effect that some ends₂ are exclusive to fully virtuous agents in so far as only fully virtuous agents are committed to fine ends₃ for their own sakes, and thus can decide on, and perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes. Acknowledging the distinctiveness of (a''), in turn, serves the purpose of making one's position clearer on some important points (especially regarding continence and incontinence). Besides—and this is crucial—I intend to show that Aristotle conceives of virtuous activities (i.e., the performance of virtuous actions on the basis of virtue) in such a way that their end is relative to the disposition on which basis such activities are brought off (i.e., the

²² As would seem to be the case, for instance, when we are dealing with continent agents.

²³ This is an issue faced by the views defended by Richard Loening (1903), who appears to argue that reason is both necessary and sufficient for determining our ends₃, but is not sufficient for leading us to action, since it is not sufficient for making us actively desire these ends, something that Loening takes to be equivalent to having a desire that leads one to action (pp. 18ff). As result, Loening appears to be implicitly distinguishing between (a'') and (c). Now, as I shall point out below, even if virtue is sufficient for making our ends_{2,3} lead us to action (thus determining our end₁), it is ultimately not necessary for that, since continent agents do indeed desire, and thus perform accordingly, what they take to be good. As a result, even though virtue might be responsible for making one's end₁ right, it would either not be necessary for that (since continent agents can also be led to action by means of reason), or else its contribution would not be making one's end₁ morally right, but rather securing that one is not conflicted while acting as reason prescribes, in which case the contribution given by virtue would be merely conative (I shall come back to this below in **section 0.2.1**). As I intend to show, there is reason for rejecting both these alternatives in favour of a third one.

disposition of which they are actualisations), which implies that at least the ends₁ that explain the performance of virtuous actions by fully virtuous agents are exclusive to agents who are fully virtuous.

If this diagnosis is correct, then disagreement about how to answer the End Question ultimately stems from disagreement about how questions (a''), (b), or (c) should be answered and, in particular, about how C1 and C2 should be construed. As I take it, C1 and C2 are central for understanding the End Question, for this question can also be formulated normatively (and it is frequently formulated in such a fashion): asking about the role of reason in making the ends *right*. For that reason, C1 and C2 have been at the centre of most of the controversy regarding the End Question. Indeed, correctly understanding the role of virtue in making the ends right (i.e., C1) and the exact sense in which agents who fail to be fully virtuous can aim for ends that are right (i.e., C2) is fundamental for seeing how far reason can go in determining the ends of action. In other words, a complete answer to (a''), (b), and (c) depends upon correctly understanding C1 and C2 and how these two theses are related to one another.

In any case, addressing the ambiguities of the End Question and discussing C1 and C2 does not provide us with a solution to our problem, but simply allows us to formulate more clearly what questions should be answered in order to arrive at a more consistent answer to the End Question.

0.1.1 My hypothesis about how the End Question should be answered

In this Dissertation, I shall contend that Aristotle holds a position according to which despite being both necessary and sufficient for determining one's ends₃ and one's ends₂, reason is i) not completely independent from one's character disposition in performing either of these

tasks (since otherwise it would be sufficient for making these ends *right* in the precise sense they are right for fully virtuous agents), and ii) is not even sufficient for making one act on the basis of *προαίρεσις* (thus determining one's end₁).

In saying that reason is both necessary and sufficient for determining one's ends₃ I mean more specifically that being convinced about the goodness (or fineness) of an end is both necessary and sufficient for having a *βούλησις* for it (and thus for having an end₃). No doubt it might be argued that having one's convictions about the goodness or fineness of something changed does not depend solely on reason, but on one's character disposition as well, to the effect that reason alone may not be able to change the views some sorts of agent have about the good, and would thus not be really sufficient for determining one's ends₃. I cannot address this issue in this Dissertation, but irrespective of how we deal with it, being convinced about the fineness or goodness of something would still be both necessary and sufficient for having a *βούλησις* for it, and thus for having an end₃, although one's character disposition may be said to condition somehow the things one can be convinced of by means of reason.²⁴

Now, as I have already pointed out, how one answers (c) may not have any bearing on how one answers (b). Thus, irrespective of how one's character disposition conditions the influence reason has in determining one's ends₃, reason may still be completely independent from one's character disposition in determining one's end₂ or may be conditioned by one's

²⁴ For instance, it may seem that completely virtuous agents *qua* completely virtuous cannot really be mistaken about their views about the good. Similarly, it may seem that completely vicious agents *qua* completely vicious cannot be convinced that things that are really good for them are in themselves good for them, but only in so far as these things contribute to other ends they have. If this were not so, these agents would cease to be completely virtuous and vicious, respectively. Now, it might be argued that, *qua* human beings, agents can have their moral outlook transformed regardless of their character disposition—similarly, for an argument that distinguishes between Aristotle's theory of action and his views on character, to the effect that, on one perspective (that of the character disposition), people do not seem to be liable to change, but from another perspective, that of the Aristotle's theory of action, they are able to act against their character disposition provided they are willing to bear the psychological costs of so acting, see Zingano (2016). In any case, dealing with this issue lies outside the scope of this Dissertation.

character disposition in an entirely different way.

My contention is that reason is not completely independent in determining one's ends₂ in the precise sense that *some* ends₂ are exclusive to agents of a certain character disposition, and that this suggests that there is a further way in which one's character disposition conditions one's ends₃. In particular, I intend to argue that reason cannot lead agents who are not fully virtuous to conclude (by means of deliberation) that they should decide on virtuous actions *for their own sakes*, for such agents do not really value virtuous actions, *qua* virtuous, as choiceworthy on their own account (even though these agents might be virtuous to some extent and might decide on virtuous actions).²⁵ As a result, even in those cases in which reason is effective in eliciting action, it would still be the case that it is limited in this task by one's character disposition. As a matter of fact, fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions in a way that is exclusive to them (or so I shall argue), since only such agents can perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (or, what may be taken to be the same, for the sake of the fine). As I take it, this is because it is only for fully virtuous agents that virtuous actions are things to be done for their own sakes, to the effect that only fully virtuous agents really see virtuous actions as morally (and not merely prudentially)²⁶ required.

This raises some questions about what exactly Aristotle means by the 'for its own sake' clause and by the 'on its own account' clause. As I take it, with talk of deciding on virtuous

²⁵ In other words, being choiceworthy *δι' αὐτό* does not belong to a virtuous action V as such (*ἢ αὐτό*), i.e., *qua* V. Similarly, see the three requirements that must be satisfied by a predication if it is to count as a 'universal predication' according to *APo* I.4 73^b26–27, the third of which says that P belongs to S *ἢ αὐτό*.

²⁶ In making this contrast, I am not thinking in strict Kantian terms, since, for Kant, moral imperatives command one irrespective of one's ends (cf. *GMS*, Ak. IV, p. 414.12–17, *Moral Mrogonovius*, Ak. XXVII, p. 1400.14–18). What I have in mind is rather that, for fully virtuous agents, virtuous actions are required not only in so far as they contribute to their *εὐδαιμονία* in any old way, but in so far as they are, as such, constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* (even though, as we shall see, the performance of such actions may not always satisfy the requirements of *εὐδαιμονία* depending on the circumstances), and are thus choiceworthy on their own account. For Aristotle, then, what distinguishes the moral and the prudential as values would not be the reference to an end (as it is for Kant), but the way in which what reason commands one to do is related to one's ultimate end.

actions on their own account Aristotle is pointing out not merely that such actions are seen by the agent as intrinsically valuable, but rather that these actions are intrinsically valuable *and* are seen as such by the agent.

To put it more clearly, deciding on a virtuous action on its own account is not merely a matter of seeing things somehow, but rather a matter of things both being a certain way and *being recognised as such*. That is, satisfying this condition in the case of virtuous actions requires not only that one takes one's actions to be intrinsically fine, but also that one correctly grasps that intrinsic fineness. In other words, deciding on a virtuous action on its own account would amount to deciding on it for that very thing that makes it virtuous. As a result, merely holding that an action performed in such and such a way is choiceworthy on its own account (even if performing this action in such and such a way amounts to performing a virtuous action) is not enough for saying that one holds that *a virtuous action* is choiceworthy on its own account, for it is possible that what the agent holds to be virtuous or fine does not correspond to what fineness or virtuousness really is: even in cases in which one is right in holding that a certain action is virtuous, it might be that one does not think this due to recognising what about that action is virtuous. Hence, such an agent cannot be said to be holding that an action is choiceworthy on its own account *qua* virtuous or fine, but, if anything, *qua* something else, since they would not be thinking that that action is choiceworthy due to that very thing that makes it virtuous or fine.²⁷

²⁷ So construed, this requirement is somewhat similar to Sliwa's (2016) 'Rightness Condition,' which includes a knowledge requirement according to which agents who act correctly on the basis of justified true beliefs about what the right thing to do is do not really know what the right thing to do is, and, accordingly, do not perform actions that are morally worthy. Different from Sliwa, however, I think that this criterion should be construed in an even more demanding way: not in terms of mere knowledge, such that actions performed under the guidance of reliable moral advisors satisfy this criterion in some cases, but in terms of sort of understanding. With this I mean that *φρόνησις* would be a sort of understanding with requirements analogous to those of *ἐπιστήμη*. Moreover, as we shall see in the Conclusion, I do not think that we should understand moral worth in these restricted terms, but that it should be thought of as coming in degrees, so that even agents who voluntarily do the right thing but who are not motivated by the intrinsic moral value of what they do, and thus lack *φρόνησις*, count as morally worthy and as doing morally worthy

In this respect, the ‘on its own account’ clause, and for this matter also the ‘for its own sake’ clause, may seem to play a role to some extent parallel to that played by the notion of a primary cause in Aristotle’s theory of science.²⁸ In fact, adequately demonstrating a conclusion involves a middle term that satisfies extensional and intensional requirements that make it a primary cause of the conclusion to be demonstrated.²⁹ For now, I would only like to point out that what we could perhaps call a ‘primary’ motive corresponds to what characterises an action as virtuous, to the effect that even if one is motivated by some feature of the virtuous action one performs that is, say, coextensive with it (as would be the case of honourableness if this concept is rightly conceived and identified), this is not enough for having a ‘primary’ motive for action, since being a proper object of honour is *not* what makes a virtuous action virtuous, but something that is consequent upon it’s being virtuous, and the same would hold for features such as praiseworthiness and pleasantness. Thus, for fully virtuous agents, having ends₁₋₂ that are right would be equivalent to having a ‘primary’ reason for action: in the case of ends₂, a ‘primary’ normative reason for action; in the case of ends₁, a ‘primary’ motivating reason for action, and thus a ‘primary’ motive.

Furthermore, depending on the description under which the agent is thinking of an action that is virtuous, it may not even be adequate to say that they are holding that it is choiceworthy on its own account. For instance, if it turns out that they are actually thinking that a pleasant action that also happens to be virtuous is choiceworthy on its own account (that is, that an action is choiceworthy due to its intrinsic pleasantness), Aristotle would not always say that they are thinking of this action as choiceworthy on its own account, since, depending

things, although of course they would not be as morally worthy as agents who act well motivated by the intrinsic moral value of what they do (as *φρόνιμοι* are).

²⁸ I shall further explore the parallel between the practical and the theoretical domain below in section **section 1.3.3.1** of **Chapter 1**.

²⁹ For a discussion of some of these requirements see, for instance, Angioni (2015; 2016; 2018) and Zuppolini (2018).

on the type of pleasure one has in mind, being pleasant may be tantamount to being productive of pleasure,³⁰ and being productive of something is a way of being choiceworthy due to something else, and not on its own account (cf. *Top.* VI.12 149^b31–39).³¹ Therefore, Aristotle would not countenance that someone who thinks that, say, an action is choiceworthy due to being (bodily) pleasant (see footnote 30) is holding that this action is choiceworthy on its own account, for, in Aristotle’s jargon, such a person would be holding that this action is choiceworthy due to something else, and not on its own account. Similarly, someone who thinks that an action is choiceworthy because it is productive of virtue is not thinking of this action as choiceworthy on its own account, even though actions that are productive of virtue are indeed virtuous and thus choiceworthy on their own account,³² their being productive of virtue is not what makes them choiceworthy on their own account.

Matters are not so clear when we think of other descriptions of virtuous actions such as being honourable.³³ In fact, there is no indication in the *corpus* to the effect that being honourable (τίμιον) is tantamount to being productive of honour. Thus, *qua* honourable it seems that virtuous actions can indeed be thought to be choiceworthy on their own account

³⁰ On being pleasant as a property that pertains to things that are productive of pleasure, see *Rh.* I.11 1369^b35–1370^a3: ‘if such a thing is pleasure, it is evident that what is productive of the mentioned disposition is pleasant and that what is destructive <of it> or productive of the contrary condition is painful’ (εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν). Yet this cannot be extended to all Aristotelian pleasures, but seems to apply only to bodily pleasures that have to do with restabilising a natural condition, in which case it would seem that thinking an action choiceworthy due to its pleasantness is compatible with thinking of it as choiceworthy on its own account *qua* pleasant when we are not dealing with bodily pleasures (on non-harmful pleasures—i.e., non-bodily pleasures—as examples of things choiceworthy on their own account, see, for instance, Plato *Resp.* II 357b4–b8 and *EN* X.6 1176^b9ff). However, it should be noted that this is still considerably different from saying that a virtuous action is choiceworthy on its own account *qua* virtuous. Similarly, for the idea that pleasant actions count among actions valued for their own sakes along with fine (noble) actions, see Kenny (1996, pp. 3, 9).

³¹ I shall discuss this passage below in **Chapter 1**, see **T 5**. Note, however, that Aristotle distinguishes between different senses of being ‘productive of’ in *Rh.* I.6 1362^a31–34, and not all of them seem to imply that the thing that bears that property is for the sake of something else.

³² As we shall see below in **Chapter 1** when we analyse *Top.* VI.12 149^b31–39 (**T 5**), nothing hinders something that is choiceworthy on its own account from also being choiceworthy due to something else.

³³ And the same might apply to at least some non-bodily pleasures, as I have suggested above in footnote 30.

(in fact, there are plenty of examples of Aristotle talking of things that are honourable in themselves³⁴), but this is still quite different from holding that *virtuous actions*, as such, are choiceworthy on their own account, for this amounts rather to thinking that an action is choiceworthy on its own account *in so far as it is virtuous*, and not in so far as it is honourable (which is a feature that actions appear to have as a consequence of being virtuous).

As I take it, this suggests that perhaps agents who are not fully virtuous do not really grasp the value of the fine ends₃ to which they may be committed, the upshot being that one's character disposition would condition one's ends₃ in a way that is more specific than the one I have described above. I mean, if it is true that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account and thus perform such actions for their own sakes, but only for reasons that are different from their intrinsic fineness,³⁵ then there is good reason for thinking that they are not really committed to fine ends *in so far as these ends are fine*.³⁶ How exactly we should spell this out depends on how ends₃ are described:

³⁴ Cf. *Top.* III.1 116^b37–117^a4, III.3 118^b23–26, IV.5 126^b4–6.

³⁵ In talking of intrinsic fineness here, I mean to suggest that being fine is a property that is predicated *per se* of actions of a certain sort. The exact sense of *per se* in question here is not so clear, and I shall argue below in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1, and in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, that being fine is a *per se₄* of virtuous actions, since a virtuous action is fine precisely because it is virtuous, and it is virtuous because it hits the mean, to the effect that an action that hits the mean is fine precisely because it hits the mean. For the claim that being in some sense *per se* amounts to being in some sense an intrinsic property or feature of something, see Zingano (2021a, pp. 29–30). There is a debate about whether *per se₄* predications concern the relationship between subjects and predicates or the relationship between complex events (like beheading an ox and killing that ox). For an intermediate position, according to which *per se₄* comprises both the relationship between subjects and predicates and the relationship between complex events, see Terra (2014, p. 41n20).

³⁶ This may cause some worries if we describe ends₃ as situation-specific goals, as we shall see in more detail later. Situation-specific goals appear to be assumed only provisionally, not in so far as they are always worth pursuing, but in so far as, in such and such circumstances, they seem to be worth pursuing, even though, upon closer analysis, the particular circumstances at hand may show that the end₃ we provisionally assumed turns out not to be really worth pursuing in these circumstances (in which case we may set this end aside in these circumstances). Thus, an end *qua* a situation-specific goal is something that is fine or not relatively to some particular set of circumstances: an end that is generally fine in such and such circumstances may turn out not to be fine relatively to the particular circumstances one is currently being faced with due to some particular feature of these circumstances that distinguish them from the circumstances in which such an end is generally fine (even though the circumstances one turns out to be faced with subsume the circumstances one initially thought one was being faced with). Yet, even when we are dealing with situation-specific goals that prove to be not really worth pursuing in the circumstances one turns out to be faced with (i.e., situation-specific goals that one has reason to set aside in the circumstances one is being faced with upon closer inspection of these circumstances), it seems that the way fully virtuous agents would pursue these

If ends₃ are not those ends around which we may be said to rationally organize our lives, but merely situation-specific goals that function as starting-points of deliberation, then one's character disposition may be said to condition the grounds on which we value these ends (i.e., our valuations of these ends). For instance, it might be the case that only fully virtuous agents are committed to fine ends due to seeing them as intrinsically fine, whereas agents who fail to be fully virtuous would only be committed to such ends due to some feature of these ends different from their fineness (but which they may nevertheless conflate with it). Again, this would not mean that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot hold the thought that fine situation-specific goals are fine, but merely that in holding that thought they would not be conceiving of fineness correctly, and thus would not be really thinking of these ends *qua* intrinsically fine, otherwise they would be able to perform virtuous actions motivated by the very fact that these actions are fine, hit the mean, or are the right thing to do *hic et nunc*.³⁷

Alternatively, if one's end₃ correspond to one's ultimate end (i.e., the end around which one may be said to rationally organize one's life), it would then seem that our character disposition conditions rather how we conceive of this end, since, in a sense, this end is the same for everyone: *εὐδαιμονία*³⁸ or *εὐπραξία*.³⁹ In that case, only fully virtuous agents would be

ends is to be distinguished as well: they would hold that these ends are fine for the very thing that makes them fine to pursue in the type of circumstances they think they are being faced with, although they may find out in the course of deliberation that circumstances are not quite as they initially thought (since, in this example, the circumstances they thought they were being faced with proves to be but an aspect of the more complex circumstances one is actually being faced with). For a clarifying analysis of practical judgements as holding relatively to circumstances or aspects thereof, to the effect that the same judgment can be said to hold relatively to a set of circumstances Circ.₁ but not relatively to a set of circumstances Circ.₂ that subsumes Circ.₁ (the latter being then be an aspect of Circ.₂), see Price (2008, pp. 43–45, 53–59).

³⁷ These are but a few different descriptions under which someone can be motivated to perform a virtuous action that may count as being motivated to perform that virtuous action for its own sake.

³⁸ For the claim that, in a sense, everyone aims for the same end, see *Pol.* VII.13 1331^b39–40: 'everyone strives for living well and for happiness' (τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται πάντες); *Pol.* VII.15 1334^a11–12: 'Since the end seems to be the same for people both collectively and individually etc.' (Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κτλ.); and *EN* X.6 1176^b30–31: 'For people choose everything, roughly speaking, for the sake of something else with the exception of happiness' (ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας)—this is a passage whose translation is disputed, but at the very least it seems to imply that the only thing that is not chosen for the sake of something else is *εὐδαιμονία*, so that because everything else is chosen for the sake of something else,

in condition of correctly grasping (or understanding) what *εὐδαιμονία* is all about, since fully grasping this ultimately depends on having been rightly educated, to the effect that agents who fail to be fully virtuous would not really understand the value of *εὐδαιμονία*.⁴⁰ For that reason (on this reading at least—that is, assuming that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot decide on, and perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes⁴¹), such agents will neither be committed to fine situation-specific goals for their own sakes, nor will they be able to decide on, and to perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes.

In any case, although these two readings disagree as to what our ends₃ are (which has important consequences for how we understand the role of reason in making the ends right),

everything is, in a sense, chosen for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία*.

For the claim that we can nevertheless be mistaken about what this end consists in, see, for instance, *EN* I.2 [=Bywater I.4] 1095^a20–28: ‘people disagree about what *εὐδαιμονία* is, and the many do not answer <this question> in the same way as the wise. That is, some people <consider> that it is something palpable and manifest, for instance pleasure, wealth, honour, and different people <consider it to be> different things—and many times even the same person thinks it is something different, for when they fall sick they think it is health; when they are poor, they think it is wealth; and when they are conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those who talk of something great and above them—; whereas some other persons believe there is, beyond all those goods, something else which exists in itself, which is also cause of the fact that all those things are goods’ (περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ’ ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ’ ἐαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ’ ὄντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πάσῃ αἰτίῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ)—similarly, see *Pol.* VII.15 1334^b10–12, a passage in which Aristotle talks of the possibility of reason being mistaken about the best supposition (τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως), which claim can perhaps be interpreted as being about one’s end (yet it is not clear whether what is meant by this would be one’s ultimate end or else some situation-specific goal). In other words, formally speaking we all aim for the same ultimate end, but materially for different ends (for the distinction of formal and material ways of talking of the good, see Aquinas [*ST IIa IIae*, 47, 4, resp.]; for an argument that explores this distinction as to explain the difference between one’s ultimate end and the different ways of conceiving of it, see Zingano [2007c, p. 104]).

³⁹ The exact relationship between *εὐδαιμονία* and *εὐπραξία* is a contentious matter. For some, they are to be identified somehow, in so far as ‘[a] conception of eudaimonia is a conception of *eu praxtein*, doing well’ (McDowell, 1995, p. 201). Yet one may be led to distinguish between *εὐδαιμονία* and *εὐπραξία* on the grounds that achieving *εὐπραξία* (i.e., engaging in a virtuous activity) does not always lead one to *εὐδαιμονία*, in which case *εὐπραξία* would seem to be connected with *εὐδαιμονία* only in favourable circumstances, i.e., in those circumstances in which engaging in virtuous activities satisfies the requirements of *εὐδαιμονία*. This is not always the case, however, since it may be argued that one can engage in virtuous activities even when *εὐδαιμονία* cannot be truly attained given the external circumstances, in which case the virtuous activities one is engaging in are not even for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία* (cf. Heinaman, 1993; Hirji, 2018; Hirji, 2020b; Chappell, 2013).

⁴⁰ As we shall see below, there are at least two different ways of construing this claim.

⁴¹ An assumption we do not necessarily need to make in construing ends₃ in this way, see below.

they are not incompatible in one important respect. In fact, perhaps concern with *εὐπραξία* or *εὐδαιμονία* ‘is more likely to be part of the frame of the agent’s deliberations than an item in those deliberations: normally at least it will be, not so much another thing she [sc., the agent] deliberates about, as a condition on how she deliberates about anything’ (cf. Chappell, 2013, p. 169, on the concern with *τὸ καλόν*), or, as Broadie (1991, p. 239) puts it, ‘[t]he formal good is not the object which he [sc., the agent] has in view when deliberating, but shows up, rather, in the way in which he decides to pursue that object. He decides to pursue it only on condition that in so doing he is pursuing what is here and now best to pursue.’ As Price (2011b, p. 40) magisterially puts it: ‘[r]easons for action are eudaimonia-regarding, just as reasons for belief are truth-regarding.’

In other words, even if we never deliberate for the sake of our ultimate end (so that it is not, properly speaking, an end_3), but always for the sake of some situation-specific goal, it may still be the case that our commitment to our $ends_3$ is in some way reflective of how we conceive of (or may be said to conceive of) *εὐδαιμονία*⁴² and that in deliberating for the sake of a situation-specific goal we are ultimately assessing whether that end *should be pursued in the circumstances at hand*, i.e., whether, *in the circumstances at hand*, it contributes somehow to *the value in light of which we assumed it in the first place: εὐδαιμονία*.⁴³

Some clarifications are in order: in saying that *our commitment to our $ends_3$ is in some way reflective of how we conceive of (or may be said to conceive of) εὐδαιμονία* I do not mean that the ends for whose sake one deliberates make direct reference to the agent’s explicit

⁴² For the idea that the cognition of something as an end to be pursued is reflective of one’s conception of the noble or the good, see Mele (1984b, p. 131). However, it should be noted that there are several different ways of construing this claim, as I shall point out below.

⁴³ If indeed *εὐδαιμονία* is not an end for whose sake we deliberate, but rather an end that regulates our pursuit of our ends and that reflects how we pursue these other ends, it seems that it would fulfil the same role of what A. W. Müller (1994, p. 164) calls ‘quasi-ends’ (Quasi-Ziele) or ‘limiting-ends’ (einschränkenden Ziele)—see below footnote 85

conception of *εὐδαιμονία*,⁴⁴ nor that they are merely reflective (or expressive) of an embodied conception of *εὐπραξία* or *εὐδαιμονία* (I take this expression from Pearson [2012, p. 142]),⁴⁵ nor still that they are completely determined by one's (explicit or embodied) conception of *εὐπραξία* or *εὐδαιμονία*. Rather, I mean that in pursuing a certain end the agent does so either because they think that this end is in itself morally good or because it contributes to something that they take to be morally good in itself (ends of this latter sort seem to be similar to the ends of the *τέχναι*—cf. *EN* VI.2 1139^b1–4⁴⁶). Moreover, the things one takes to be morally good in themselves are either all desired under desirability characterisations⁴⁷ that make reference to a single value around which these agents may be said to rationally organise their lives (in which case one could attribute to them a consistent and coherent conception of *εὐπραξία* or *εὐδαιμονία*—which may be mistaken nevertheless—, even if they do not have any articulated conception of it) or else are desired under desirability characterisations that cannot be reduced to a single value around which these agents may be said to organise their lives, in which case they could be said to have an incoherent or inconsistent conception of *εὐπραξία* or *εὐδαιμονία* and could thus be said to be foolish (cf. *EE* I.2 1214^b6–11).

In other words, one's conception of *εὐδαιμονία* or *εὐπραξία* would not be something that determines the ends one pursues, but what one can be said to be committed to due to the way in which one pursues one's ultimate end, which is something that can be seen in how one pursues situation-specific goals.

⁴⁴ Which would commit us an 'Grand End' view of the sort that is rightly criticised by Broadie (1991).

⁴⁵ With the notion of an embodied conception of *εὐδαιμονία*, Pearson is thinking of the way in which John McDowell understands what is implied in a conception of *εὐδαιμονία* (1996a, p. 23; 1998b, p. 30).

⁴⁶ I shall discuss this passage in more detail below. In general lines, it says that the end of production (the product) is not an end without qualification, whereas what is object of action is an end without qualification, for *εὐπραξία* is an end and what is desired. This suggests that in producing something, one is producing it for the sake acting well (there are indeed several ways in which producing something may be said to contribute to acting well—for different ways in which something may be said to contribute to an end, see, for instance, Thompson [2008, p. 94]).

⁴⁷ I take this expression from Anscombe (1963, §§37ff).

For instance, fully virtuous agents would pursue fine things in so far as they grasp and value the intrinsic fineness of such things (for which reason they can be said to have a correct conception of *εὐδαιμονία*), in contrast to agents who are not fully virtuous, who would only seem to be able to pursue fine things due to features of these things different from their fineness (say, due to their pleasantness or due to their honourableness or praiseworthiness). No doubt agents who are not fully virtuous could really believe that fine things are fine in themselves (as I have already indicated), but they would only be able to hold that under a mistaken conception of *εὐδαιμονία*. Accordingly, in holding that fine things are fine, they would not be really conceiving of them *qua* fine, but, say, *qua* honourable or praiseworthy. For instance, one may hold that withstanding fearful things in such and such a way is fine not because doing so in this way hits the mean in action (which is what makes it fine), but because doing so in this way is honourable. So, in thinking that such things are to be pursued for their own sakes, they would be thinking that they should be pursued due to their intrinsic honourableness or praiseworthiness, which is what they take fineness to be, and not for their own sakes in the normative sense in which Aristotle uses the ‘for its own sake’ clause (as I have observed above at pages 40 to 44).⁴⁸ As a result, agents who are not fully virtuous could not be said to conceive of their ultimate end in the same way as fully virtuous agents (irrespective of whether they have an articulated conception of it), and hence even in those cases in which they are committed to fine ends₃ they can still be distinguished from fully virtuous agents in that they would not be committed to such ends *in so far as they are intrinsically fine*.

⁴⁸ This way of putting things may raise some worries as to how to accommodate the existence of idle and sudden *βουλήσεις* or of *βουλήσεις* that are uncharacteristic of the agent, which, at face value, do not seem to have any connection with one’s current conception of *εὐδαιμονία* or *εὐπραξία* (Pearson, 2012, pp. 145-147; Philpot II, 2021, pp. 69-71)—irrespective of how we understand the idea of a conception of *εὐδαιμονία*—, and as to what the exact relationship between fineness, *εὐδαιμονία*, and *εὐπραξία* is.

The first set of worries can be easily dealt with—see, for instance, Zingano (2021c, p. 4), whose views on the matter of how seemingly aimless actions should be integrated with one’s ultimate end I cannot discuss in this Dissertation. The second set of worries, in turn, will be addressed throughout this Dissertation.

In sum: reason would be, in one sense at least, sufficient for determining one's ends₃, but one's character disposition would limit the reach of one's reason in some important respects, for reason would not be sufficient for making one aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes (i.e., for making one aim for ends₃ that are right in the way these ends are right for fully virtuous agents).

That being said, let me now briefly discuss the role of reason in determining our ends₁.

In saying that reason is not sufficient for leading one to action (thus determining one's end₁), I mean that being convinced of the goodness or fineness of something is not always enough for leading one to action.⁴⁹ Let me explain this by making two observations:

First, merely having a βούλησις for an end₃ (which implies that one is convinced that what one has a βούλησις for is, in some sense, good⁵⁰ for oneself) does not entail that one is

⁴⁹ Why exactly this is so is a contentious matter whose full clarification would depend on an attentive discussion of the failings of reason in episodes of ἀκρασία and μαλακία that I cannot pursue in this Dissertation. In rough lines, there are two different ways of accounting for the failings of reason in episodes of ἀκρασία. On one account, the issue in these cases has something to do with the motivational strength of one's βούλησις and προαίρεσις. On another account, the issue is that although the agent is indeed convinced about the goodness or fineness of some end, say, the end of not tasting sweets, they are not (and maybe cannot be) convinced of the goodness or fineness of the concrete course of action that is conducive to it in the circumstances they are currently faced with (e.g., not tasting this sweet), for they do not (and perhaps cannot) grasp that conclusion appropriately while experiencing episodes of ἀκρασία or μαλακία. The first sort of account is suggested by some examples mentioning ἀκρασία given by Aristotle in book II of the *Ethica Eudemia* (and perhaps also in *EE* VII.2 1238^b2–5, depending on how reference to προαίρεσις is construed in this passage in the case of incontinent agents), whereas the second sort of account is suggested by the treatment of ἀκρασία offered in *EN* VII.

In this Dissertation, I shall assume that failings of reason in episodes of ἀκρασία and μαλακία should be construed according to the second account, for which reason I shall bracket the discussion of the extent to which Aristotle's views of ἀκρασία in the *EE* are compatible with those presented in the common books and in the books that are indisputably *Nicomachean* (for a defence that *EN* VII is *Eudemian* and offers no difficulty for the account presented in *EE* II in that Aristotle explicitly begins *EN* VII announcing that he is assuming a different principle, so that he is introducing a fresh approach to incontinence, see Kenny [1978/2016, p.279]).

Note, moreover, that I am construing the failure of grasping characteristic of ἀκρασία as a failure to grasp the conclusion of the practical syllogism against which the incontinent agent acts, a reading that goes back to Walter Burleigh's commentary (*Expositio*, L 7 Tract. 1 Cap. 3, f. 121ra) and which has more recently come once again under the spotlight due to the works of Kenny (1966), Charles (2009), and others. This is not, however, the only way of construing this failure, since it is also possible to construe ἀκρασία as a failure to properly grasp the minor premise of that syllogism, as has been usual since Albert the Great (e.g., *Ethic.* Lib. VII, Trac. I, c. V, §12 [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 475]). For a discussion of Burleigh's views on ἀκρασία, see Saarinen (1999), and, more recently, Limonta (2024).

⁵⁰ In fact, good is a πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον. In rough lines, what I have in mind here is simply that things

motivated to perform the actions that contribute to this end, for it does not imply that one is also convinced that a concrete course of action contributes to that end and is fine to achieve,⁵¹ even though it might be the case that one is in some sense aware of such a concrete course of action. Indeed, in some cases, the agent is unable (due to their emotions) to rationally endorse the proposition stating that a concrete course of action that contributes to the end they have a *βούλησις* for (see footnote 49) is to be performed, and this happens not only because, in some cases, not having deliberated, agents do not even have an *end*₂, for, as pointed out in footnote 15, nothing hinders one from acting on the basis of reason without having deliberated. Although impetuous agents have not deliberated in episodes of impetuosity (cf. *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^b19–22 and 25–27, and *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a1–5), it appears that nothing would hinder some of them from being explicitly aware of what they should do by means of, say, *εὐστοχία* or, more specifically, *ἀγχίνοια*.⁵² And yet they would

can be good and thought to be good either because they are (or are taken to be) intrinsically good or else because they contribute (or are taken to contribute) somehow to something that is (or is taken to be) intrinsically good (in which case they are—or are taken to be—useful or beneficial). On that distinction, see, for instance, *EE* VII.2 1236^a7–8. There may be more complex cases, however.

⁵¹ That is, someone might be convinced that a certain end is good, while not knowing how to go about achieving it. Similarly, see Morison (2011, pp. 43–53) on the Aristotelian distinction between knowing universally and knowing *simpliciter* as it applies to action, and, in particular, to *ἀκρασία*. In any case, even though having a *βούλησις* for an *end*₃ is not sufficient for motivation and for performing an action that contributes to this end, I think it is still sufficient grounds for saying that the agent is committed to the particular courses of action that contribute to this end, otherwise it would be quite difficult to make sense of impetuosity, since impetuous agents do not have an *end*₂ and are not necessarily aware of the ways in which their *end*₃ should be pursued in the circumstances at hand, but are still said to act *παρὰ προαίρεσιν*.

⁵² *εὐστοχία* and *ἀγχίνοια* are both distinguished from deliberation in *EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b2–6. *εὐστοχία* is not deliberation because it does not involve reasoning and is somewhat sudden, whereas deliberation demands a long time (cf. 1142^b2–5: *ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλευόνται δὲ πολλὸν χρόνον*). *ἀγχίνοια*, in turn, is distinguished from deliberation in so far as it is a kind of *εὐστοχία* (cf. 1142^b5–6: *ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια*). How exactly *ἀγχίνοια* differs from *εὐστοχία*, however, is not so clear. Perhaps *ἀγχίνοια* is just the *εὐστοχία* that is concerned with identifying explanatory items, as is suggested by the anonymous paraphrast (*CAG*. XIX.2, 126.9–11: *καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν εὐστοχία ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς προτεθέντος εὐεπηβόλως εἰπεῖν, ἡ δὲ ἀγχίνοια τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ προτεθέντος ζητήματος ἀπόδοσις ταχεῖά ἐστιν*). The treatment of *ἀγχίνοια* in *APo* I.34 points in the same direction, since it describes *ἀγχίνοια* as an *εὐστοχία* of the *μέσον* (*APo* 89^b10–11: *ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοια ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου*). In that case, it would seem that being aware of what one should do without having deliberated would be something due to *ἀγχίνοια* more specifically, for concrete courses of action that contribute to an end that accounts for the goodness of these courses of action are efficient causes of that end (cf. *EE* I.8 1218^b20–22).

Now, that nothing would hinder agents who have not deliberated from becoming aware of what

still act against their *βούλησις* in episodes of impetuosity, which suggests that even if we concede that they can be aware of what they should do, their emotions impede them from having credence (*πίστις*) that this is what they should do.⁵³

Second, even agents who have deliberated, and thus have an *end*₂, sometimes fail to endorse a particular course of action this *end* counts in favour of.⁵⁴ Hence, merely having

they should do (e.g.) by some other (i.e., non-deliberative) means is not a claim that Aristotle explicitly entertains in his works. Yet, in so far as deliberation is not necessary for determining what one should do, it seems reasonable to suppose that there might be some cases in which impetuous agents may have some idea of what they should do in the circumstances they are being faced with even though they are led to act (against their *βούλησις*) before they can begin deliberating, and that in some of these cases awareness of what should be done is due to *ἀγχίνουα*.

⁵³ What happens in episodes of *ἀκρασία*, then, would not be merely that one does not use one's universal knowledge. Rather, in such cases, the agent is *unable* to use that knowledge due to the sort of physiological condition they are in because of their emotions (cf. Lorenz, 2006, p. 197n27), a distinction that is labelled by Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L VII, 3 173–193) as one between a *habitus solutus* and a *habitus ligatus*. In making that distinction, Aquinas is perhaps drawing on the second commentary of Albert the Great (*Ethic.* Lib. VII, Trac. I, c. X, §12 [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 473]), who describes the condition of someone who in one sense has and in another sense does not have knowledge as one in which one has knowledge *in habitu*, but is not able to bring that knowledge into activity unless one's knowledge is free (*soluto*) of the impeding thing that hinders (*ligat*) the principles of, and the capacities for, the actions (*nisi soluto oppilante quod ligat operationum principia et potentias*), which claim foreshadows the dichotomy between *habitus solutus* and *habitus ligatus* we find in Aquinas, but which is absent in Albert's first commentary to the *EN*, to which Aquinas undoubtedly had access.

⁵⁴ This failure may be construed in two different ways, namely either as a failure to arrive at a *προαίρεσις*, or else as a failure to act on the basis of one's *προαίρεσις*. In the latter case, however, we would have to conceive of *ἀκρασία* as a phenomenon in which one's *προαίρεσις* is defeated by one's non-rational desires, to the effect that the agent fully grasps what they should do in the circumstances they are faced with, but fails to endorse the concrete course of action on which they have decided in that they fail to act on the basis of their *προαίρεσις*. Then, on this reading, one's failure would be one in giving one's practical endorsement to the concrete course of action that contributes to one's *end*₂, and not necessarily one in giving one's rational endorsement to that course of action as the one to be pursued (cf. Charles, 1984, pp. 165–167). Yet, as Lawrence (1985, pp. 225–230) shows, this interpretation faces several issues. In particular, it simply cannot make good sense of the idea presented in 1147^a22–24 and in 1147^b11–12 that incontinent agents, just like actors and drunks, do not know, but merely utter (*λέγειν*), which appears to point not merely to a failure of desire, but rather to a cognitive failure. For that reason, for the purposes of this Dissertation, I shall assume instead that one does not fully grasp what one should do while in episodes of *ἀκρασία* in the precise sense that incontinent agents fail somehow to grasp the good conclusion of the syllogism that would explain the action they failed to perform while experiencing *ἀκρασία* (as has also been defended by Charles more recently). Now, I think that this failure to grasp should be construed in terms of a failure to rationally assert the good conclusion (i.e., to have credence on that proposition), which is compatible with, in some cases, one still being able to entertain, and thus to be aware of, the good conclusion, since entertaining, and even uttering, this conclusion does not imply that they are actualising their knowledge (cf. Whiting & Pickavé, 2008, pp. 345–346). Yet, for my current purposes, how we construe the failure of grasping that characterises *ἀκρασία* will not be decisive. Besides, already in *EN* III.1 1110^a30–31 Aristotle can be understood as making reference to incontinent agents as those who do not abide by their judgments (*ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν*), a claim that can also be interpreted as saying that they do not abide by their deliberative conclusions (as in the case of weak incontinent agents) or by their explicit or implicit commitments about what the right thing to do would be (as in the case of impetuous agents),

an end₂ would also not be sufficient for action. In fact, in episodes of weakness (*ἀσθένεια*), agents have concluded their deliberation, but they still act against the deliberative conclusion at which they arrived.

Therefore, it seems that reason alone would not be enough for leading one to action, for one's emotional state can render it ineffective in some circumstances, since it can impede one from giving credence to the particular proposition that states what the agent should do *hic et nunc* (although it may not impede one from merely entertaining that proposition).⁵⁵ To put it differently, reason is not sufficient for having an end₁, a motivating end.

Besides, as I have pointed out above, in saying that reason is not completely independent in determining one's ends₂, I meant that some ends₂ are exclusive to agents of a certain character disposition, so that reason cannot lead agents who are not fully virtuous to the conclusion that they should decide on virtuous actions on their own account.⁵⁶ As a result, even

irrespective of whether those who have arrived at deliberative or non-deliberative conclusions about what should be done give credence to these conclusions while in episodes of incontinence.

⁵⁵ There is a further issue that can be raised in this connection: it seems that, in some cases at least, reason can prevent one from getting into the emotional state that is characteristic of episodes of *ἀκρασία*. In fact, in *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^b19–28 Aristotle appears to hold that at least impetuous agents can be cured of impetuosity by means of some reasoning strategy, to the effect that although being convinced that something is good or fine is not enough for leading one to action, reason can adopt some strategies to avoid episodes of at least one sort of *ἀκρασία*.

⁵⁶ As I have already pointed out above on pages 40 to 44 and in footnotes 26 and 42, I do not mean that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot reach the conclusion that 'an action that happens to be virtuous is to be decided on on its own account,' but rather that even if they reach such a conclusion, they would not be really thinking that virtuous actions are to be decided on on their own account, for they do not grasp the intrinsic fineness of such actions. In other words, although it may be the case that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can believe that actions that are virtuous are worth pursuing for their own sakes, they would not really hold that such actions are worth pursuing in the same way as fully virtuous agents, for they would not conceive of fineness as fully virtuous agents do, and thus would not be holding that virtuous actions are worth pursuing in so far as they are virtuous, but in so far as they are something else. That is, they do not conceive of fineness correctly in the first place, but conflate it with honourableness, praiseworthiness, or some other value that is at least intensionally distinct from fineness or virtuousness. To put it in Aristotelian terms, the *πάθηματα* of their soul are different, even though the words by means of which they express these thoughts might be the same. In saying this, I am assuming, taking my cue from the work of Noriega-Olmos (2013, esp. pp. 127–133), that the theory of language presented by Aristotle at the beginning of the *de Interpretatione* is normative, which is the reason why he says that the *πάθηματα* of the soul are the same for everyone. Thus, this would hold only for people who use language based on essences and real knowledge of things in the world, which is still compatible with some people using language to express mere *δόξαι*. For a different account, according to which the thinker's understanding of a term do not determine the signification of that term, see Charles (2000, pp. 104ff) and, for some objections

in those cases in which reason is effective in eliciting action, it would still be the case that it is limited in this task by one's character disposition, since it would not be sufficient to lead one to perform, say, a virtuous action for its own sake, for agents who are not fully virtuous *cannot* decide on virtuous actions on their own account (*δι' αὐτά*). In other words, reason is not sufficient for making one's ends₁₋₂ right in the sense they are right for fully virtuous agents.

In sum: even though there are cases in which reason 1) establishes an end for whose sake we can deliberate (i.e., an end₃), 2) leads us, by means of deliberation, to the conclusion that an action is to be decided on for the sake of a certain end (an end₂), and 3) is effective in eliciting action as a result of us having so deliberated (thus determining an end₁), one's character disposition still conditions one's rational motivating reasons (and so also one's deliberative motivating reasons), such that acting for the sake of the fine is only possible to fully virtuous agents. In that case, one's character disposition would do this because it also functions *as a necessary enabling condition* for having *some* ends₂, which implies that is also a necessary enabling condition for aiming for fine ends₃ for their own sakes (but not for merely aiming for fine ends₃).

In so arguing, I would like to make two things clear:

First, that, for Aristotle, reason cannot lead one to decide on virtuous actions on their own account—and hence to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes—unless one is fully virtuous. In fact, as I intend to show, virtuous actions cannot be really seen as fine by agents who are not fully virtuous—as Aristotle puts it in the *EE*: fine things do not belong on their own account to agents who are not *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* (cf. **T 39**,⁵⁷ or as he puts it in the *EN*:

to Noriega-Olmos interpretation of *de Interpretatione* 1, see Charles (2014). But even if Charles is right about the theory of signification presented in *Int.* 1, it seems nevertheless true that Aristotle would admit that people may use the same words to convey different ways of conceiving a same thing, in which case their use of these expressions is relevantly different.

⁵⁷ I shall explore the connection between full virtue and *καλοκαγαθία* below in **Chapter 2, section 2.3**.

to each person the activity on the basis of their own disposition is the most choiceworthy activity, and to the virtuous person the activity on the basis of virtue is the most choiceworthy activity (cf. T 55)⁵⁸).

Although reason is both necessary and sufficient for determining the ends for whose sake one deliberates (one's ends₃) and for leading one to the conclusion that such and such an action should be decided on for the sake of such and such an end (an end₂), the end for whose sake one can decide (i.e., the end that figures in the object of decision—one's end₂)⁵⁹ is conditioned by one's character disposition, for virtuous actions are only fine for fully virtuous agents, since it is only for fully virtuous agents that the performance of these actions counts as an activity on the basis of virtue (i.e., a virtuous activity⁶⁰), and is thus something that is, in itself, constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* rightly conceived (or so I shall argue).⁶¹ In other words, even though reason would be both necessary and sufficient for having an end₃ and an end₂, it would not be sufficient for having ends₃ and ends₂ that are right in the sense these ends are right for fully virtuous agents. Therefore, even in those cases in which reason is sufficient for

⁵⁸ I shall explore the passages from the *EN* in which Aristotle presents different versions of this claim below in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.2.2**.

⁵⁹ I am talking of the object of decision (the *προαιρετόν*) instead of decision itself, because (as pointed out above) it may be the case that there is no such thing as ineffective *προαιρέσεις*, in which case reason would be enough for determining the *προαιρετόν*, but not for leading one to make a *προαίρεσις*.

⁶⁰ I shall come back to the notion of virtuous activity later in this **Introduction**, in discussing question [V] (see also footnote 103 below).

⁶¹ There are two problems I should address in advancing this argument. The first comes from the fact that not all actions on the basis of virtue seem to contribute to *εὐδαιμονία*, since actions performed by unfortunate agents who cannot achieve *εὐδαιμονία* in the circumstances in which they are do not seem to be actions that are productive of *εὐδαιμονία* even if performed virtuously by a fully virtuous agent (on that, see, for instance, Heinaman [1993]). In fact, Aristotle's treatment of unfortunate agents in *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b22ff, and his description of *εὐδαιμονία* in *Pol.* VII.13 can be taken to support the idea that not all virtuous actions performed virtuously are for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία*, and hence it would seem that not all virtuous actions performed virtuously are constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* rightly conceived. The second problem is related to how virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous are related to their *εὐδαιμονία*, and if in performing such actions some agents who are not fully virtuous can perform them in so far as such actions contribute in some way (directly or indirectly) to a right conception of *εὐδαιμονία* held by these agents, or if all agents who fail to be fully virtuous and who perform such actions do not conceive of *εὐδαιμονία* correctly. This second issue, as we shall see, is directly connected to a question I shall raise below—see question (V) below. I shall address these issues in the **Conclusion** (briefly) and in **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3** respectively.

making one act on the basis of decision (thus determining one's end₁), it is still the case that the relationship between the actions one decides on and the ends one aims for is constrained by one's character disposition, such that only fully virtuous agents can see virtuous actions as fine, and thus only such agents can decide on, and perform, virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.

The second thing I would like to make clear is that C1 (i.e., the claim that virtue makes the end right) and C2 (i.e., the claim that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for ends that are fine, and thus right in a sense) are perfectly compatible. On my reading, in saying that virtue makes the end right (C1), what Aristotle means is that virtue enables one to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (or for the sake of the fine) since virtue and only virtue enables one to decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes (or, what I take to be the same, on their own account). But in holding that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for fine ends (C2) what he means might be only that such agents can have *βουλήσεις* for ends that happen to be fine, and not that they can desire fine ends for their own sakes as well. That is, there are two different senses of rightness at stake in C1 and C2 (as already suggested above), to the effect that the sort of rightness caused by virtue is not exhausted by fineness, but has further requirements.

No doubt desiring fine ends for their own sakes might still be compatible with one not being able to decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and hence with one not being able to perform virtuous actions as fully virtuous agents do as well: for instance, if one performs virtuous actions for the sake of becoming virtuous, i.e., because virtuous actions are productive of virtue.⁶² Yet holding that some agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for

⁶² Which would not be the reason why a virtuous action is morally right, and hence would not count as a case in which a virtuous action is performed for its own sake. As Nielsen (2006, p. 7) puts it, the reason something is morally right is that it contributes to one's *εὐδαιμονία*, and not that it perfects the agent's character. Besides, being productive, as I have already indicated above, is a way of being choiceworthy due

fine ends for their own sakes faces some serious difficulties, as I intend to show, for which reason I think this latter interpretation of C2 should be avoided.

Needless to say, my proposal is not the only way of making C1 and C2 compatible. However, as I would like to argue, it has several advantages over other ways of making these two claims compatible, especially because it does not involve qualifying the claim that virtue makes the ends right to the extent that full virtue becomes superfluous for having right ends. Rather, it involves only saying that the sort of rightness in question in each of these claims is different. As we shall see, a great number of construals of C2 imply that (full) virtue is not required for aiming for a fine end₃ for its own sake, for arriving at the conclusion that a virtuous action is to be performed for its own sake, and, in some cases, for performing a virtuous action for its own sake, but only for securing that the agent can do those things on a regular basis. On these readings, virtue would be responsible not for making the ends right, but for making the ends *consistently right*.

Therefore, on my reading, in saying that virtue makes the end right, Aristotle would not mean merely that virtue secures that one's ends₂₋₃ are fine,⁶³ nor still that it secures that the ends that lead one to action (i.e., one's ends₁) are consistently so. But, more specifically, that it *enables* one to perform fine actions for the very reason that they are fine. In other words, virtue would not only secure that one's ends₁₋₃ are fine, but would also 1) make one's ends₁₋₂ correspond to the fineness of the actions one performs, and, moreover, 2) make one committed to fine ends₃ *for their own sakes*.

In that case, the sort of rightness caused by virtue would not be exhausted by the moral

to something else, so that deciding on something because it is productive of virtue amounts to deciding on it not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else.

⁶³ Pace Price (2011a, p. 137), for instance, who claims that: '[e]ven if this [sc., orientation towards the mean and the noble] might also be achieved by a state of character that was high-minded or self-deceived and yet gravely misdirected (say by a systematically skewed locating of the mean), as also by states of self-control (enkrateia) or lack of self-control (akrasia) that have good ends but pursue them conflictedly, it is secured by virtue.'

rightness or fineness of the ends one aims for, nor by the moral rightness or fineness of the ends that lead one to action, but would have further requirements. This view gains some plausibility in view of the fact that Aristotle himself states in *EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b17ff that rightness (or correctness) is said in many ways (*ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς κτλ.*). This claim is made by Aristotle immediately after describing *εὐβουλία* as a sort of correctness of deliberation (1142^b16: *ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς*), and it allows him to assert that *εὐβουλία* is not just any sort of correctness of deliberation, since incontinent and vicious agents can be said to have deliberated correctly as well, for they obtain from reasoning what they intended to consider (*EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b18–19: *ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται*), even though they achieve a great evil (1142^b20: *κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς*). In fact, the sort of correctness of deliberation that consists in *εὐβουλία* must be one that achieves something good (cf. *EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b20–22: *δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτικῆ*). Yet merely achieving what one should is not yet *εὐβουλία*, since one can achieve what one should, but not through what one should⁶⁴ (*EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b241142b26: *ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὐ ἔδει*), which is the aspect of the rightness involved in *εὐβουλία* that I take to be central for understanding the sort of rightness of the ends that is caused by virtue and which, as

⁶⁴ The exact meaning of this requirement is an object of dispute. Aristotle's own example of a case that fails to satisfy it concerns arriving at the right conclusion by means of a false *συλλογισμός*, which, at face value, seems to imply either that one arrives at the right conclusion by means of a false premise, or else by means of a merely apparent *συλλογισμός*, in which case the conclusion would not follow from the premises. Some have argued, however, that what Aristotle has in mind here are cases in which one arrives at the right conclusion but that conclusion involves doing the right thing through the wrong means. Yet, as Irwin (1988d, p. 85n23) has observed, this makes poor sense of the idea that the person is achieving what one should, since doing something through the wrong means could hardly count as doing what one should. In fact, although there are cases in which in order to do the right thing one must employ means that, taken by themselves, are morally inadequate—as would be the case in mixed actions that are praiseworthy—, this would not be a case of choosing wrong means, but the only means adequate given the circumstances.

already suggested above, may have a parallel in the domain of the theoretical sciences.⁶⁵

Now, the sort of failure involved in the deliberation of incontinent and vicious agents is a matter of dispute. In fact, there is dispute even over the sort of agents Aristotle is talking about here.⁶⁶ For now, I would only like to contend that if what is meant by the claim that virtue makes the ends right is that it not only secures that one's ends are morally good, but also enables one to perform virtuous actions *for their own sakes* and makes one aim for fine ends for their own sakes, then the sort of correctness secured by virtue is remarkably similar to the correctness involved in *εὐβουλία*, since it would not be merely a matter of aiming for fine ends, nor of performing fine actions for the sake of a fine end, but of aiming for fine ends *for the right reasons* (i.e., due to their intrinsic fineness and not in so far as these ends contribute to securing, say, honour or pleasure) and of performing fine actions for the right motives as well: i.e., because these actions are fine, and not because they are productive means to, say, honour or virtue, even if being productive of honour (rightly conceived) or virtue is necessarily coextensive with being fine: intentionality is a hyperintensional phenomenon, and actions that are characterised by motives that are necessarily equivalent such as honour and

⁶⁵ Similarly, Charles (2015, p. 61) connects the middle term *δι' οὗ* one should draw a right practical conclusion with the final cause which deliberation is responsible for examining according to *EE* II.10 1226^b23–31. In that case, it would seem that the problem with the deliberation of agents who do not arrive at the right conclusion through that through which they should is that they do not arrive at this conclusion having in view the end they should.

⁶⁶ Burnet (1900, p. 276) thinks that Aristotle has in mind here both incontinent agents and vicious agents, in which case we would need to admit that Aristotle has in mind here incontinent agents who deliberate instrumentally about how to attain the pleasure they appetitively desire (similarly, see, for instance, Lorenz [2006, p. 184n18] and Reeve [2013, p. 219]). Another alternative that maintains that Aristotle has in mind here both the incontinent and the vicious agent is the one advanced by Angioni (2009b, pp. 326–327), who maintains that the incontinent and the vicious are said to deliberate correctly for different reasons: the incontinent deliberates correctly in that weak agents deliberate well about how to attain the fine end they aim at, although they end up acting in contrariety to their deliberation (for which reason they end up achieving a great evil), whilst vicious agents deliberate well in that they determine means that are effective for obtaining the bad end for whose sake they deliberate—i.e., their deliberation is instrumentally correct. A third alternative is proposed by Charles (2010b, p. 52n12), who thinks that in talking of the incontinent and the bad person, Aristotle means to talk of the *the bad incontinent person* (i.e., this would be a hendiadys), in which case Aristotle would be thinking of the worst case of *ἀκρασία*, namely weakness, since weak incontinent agents deliberate well in a sense but end up acting in contrariety to the deliberative conclusion they arrived at through deliberation.

fineness are nevertheless to be distinguished since the substitution of necessary equivalents is not guaranteed to preserve truth value when we have a hyperintensional position in a sentence (as we have when we are dealing with motives of action).

As a result, only fully virtuous agents would be able to decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes or on their own account, and thus to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (or for the sake of the fine). Besides, although agents who are not fully virtuous can determine fine ends as goals to be pursued (since their reason would be sufficient for their aiming for ends₃ that are fine), only fully virtuous agents would be committed to fine ends for the very reason that they are fine, i.e., for their own sakes. That is, reason would not be sufficient for leading such agents to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes not only because reason in many cases is impeded from leading one to action, but also because even in those cases in which reason is effective in leading one to action, it can only lead one to perform a virtuous action for its own sake if enabled by a fully virtuous character disposition, since, as I shall argue, virtuous actions are only fine for fully virtuous agents. Therefore, agents who are not fully virtuous do not really see the intrinsic fineness of the virtuous actions they perform (even though they might give credence to the thought that these actions are fine),⁶⁷ and thus they would not really value fine actions as intrinsically fine.

On this perspective, discussing how exactly Aristotle distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who fall short of full virtue is central. Accordingly, the argument from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] becomes of utmost importance for assessing Aristotle's actual position on the matter. In *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], Aristotle advances an argument to the effect that there are three criteria⁶⁸ that must be satisfied if one is to be said to have performed

⁶⁷ As already indicated above at pages 40 to 44 and in footnotes 26, 42, and 56, what I have in mind here is that their conception of fineness is mistaken, to the effect that in holding that fine actions are fine, they would not be really thinking of these actions as intrinsically fine, for their conception of fineness does not correspond to what fineness is precisely.

⁶⁸ Or four criteria, depending on how one construes the second criterion, which says (according to the

a virtuous action virtuously: one has performed a virtuous action virtuously if one has not only done something that coincides extensionally with what a virtuous person would do, but if one has done it being in a certain condition as well, i.e., if one has done it (1) *εἰδώς*, (2) *προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*, and (3) *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*. The meaning of each of these three criteria is disputed, as we shall see in more detail in **Chapter 3**. For now, I would like to emphasise only that performing a virtuous action in a way that satisfies these criteria appears to be sufficient for being fully virtuous,⁶⁹ such that it is not the person who merely performs virtuous actions who is said to be virtuous, but rather the person who performs such actions in the way virtuous agents perform them (cf. 1105^b7–9), i.e., the person who engages in *virtuous activities*. According to the orthodox reading of these criteria, Aristotle admits that agents who are not fully virtuous can perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account (i.e., they can satisfy [2]), but they would not be able to do that consistently, since they would not perform such actions on the basis of a stable and unchanging disposition (i.e., they cannot satisfy [3]).⁷⁰

reading of some of the mss.—V (Vind. Phil. 315), F (Barb. 75), E^a (Vat. 506), M^b (Marc. 213), and G^a (Marc. 212)—, of the *recensio pura* of Grosseteste's translation, and of the Arabic translation) that one must perform virtuous actions *προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*, a requirement that is broken down in two by some commentators (see, for instance, Magirus, *Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 139). I shall discuss this in more detail below in **Chapter 3**.

⁶⁹ Pace Gibson (2019, pp. 144ff), who argues that continent agents, who are agents who fail to be fully virtuous, can satisfy these criteria as well, although they can only do that in a second best way: they satisfy these criteria in a second best way in that the decision on which basis they act, despite being a decision to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, is imperfect in that it includes explanatorily otiose considerations that are necessary for them to perform virtuous actions, thus overcoming their conflicting desires (different from what happens with fully virtuous agents, for whom the moral value of the virtuous actions they decide on is sufficient to motivate them to perform them).

⁷⁰ For this reading, see, for instance, Hardie (1980, p. 403), Burnyeat (1980/2012a, pp. 87–88), Sherman (1989), Broadie (1991, pp. 91–92, 93), Bostock (2000, p. 44), Broadie (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, p. 301), Whiting (2002a, p. 277), Pakaluk (2005, p. 104), Leunissen (2017, p. 128), Hampson (2019, pp. 312, 315; 2022, p. 3n7), and Jimenez (2020, pp. 23, 33, 42, 43, 77, 173, 177). Other scholars who also admit that agents who are not fully virtuous can perform actions that are really virtuous (and not merely homonymously virtuous or not virtuous in the full sense of the word) are not explicit about this, but their interpretation of the three criteria is compatible with that possibility as well, as is the case of Burnet (1900, p. 87), Dirlmeier (1959), and Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 130), for instance. I shall discuss these positions in more detail below in **Chapter 3**.

Now, in this Dissertation, I would like to dispute this reading, arguing instead that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account (or for their own sakes), in which case we should admit either that (3) can be satisfied by agents who are not fully virtuous, whilst (2) cannot, or else that (2) cannot be satisfied independently from (3)—as I think is the case. Moreover, I shall contend that (3) should not be understood as being about the stability and unchangeability of one's *ἔξις* (as it is usually taken), but instead as being about the stability and unchangeability with which one performs virtuous actions. There are, however, at least two different ways of construing the third criterion so understood: as consistency requirement that can perhaps be satisfied by agents who are not fully virtuous⁷¹ or as a motivational requirement that can (and perhaps should) be construed as being satisfiable only by fully virtuous agents—which is the option I shall argue in favour of.⁷² As I intend to show, interpretations along these lines have several advantages:

First, they make Aristotle's position in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] a refinement of that found in *EE* II.11 and VIII.3 and in the common books—texts in which Aristotle appears to be committed to the claim that performing a virtuous action having decided on it for its own sake or on its own account is sufficient for full virtue, as we shall see—, the upshot being that Aristotle's view in the *EN* would not radically depart from the views found in these texts,⁷³ but would rather clarify them by spelling them out in more detail, since performing a virtuous

⁷¹ As Zingano (2008, p. 117) argues. More recently, Gibson (2019, pp. 144-145, 145n92) also defended that (3) can be satisfied by agents who are not fully virtuous. Yet he does not argue that (3) is a mere consistency requirement, but rather that agents who are not fully virtuous such as continent agents can have stable and unchanging *ἔξις* (a position which is to some extent anticipated by Lawrence [1985, pp. 75-81], who claims that continence and incontinence are *non-transitional states*).

⁷² Something along these lines has been entertained by Angioni (2009b, p. 200n30), according to whom doing something *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* would amount to doing it without internal conflict and hesitation about its correction, a condition which he suggests would be demanding to the extent that it cannot be satisfied even in the case in which virtuous actions are performed by continent agents.

⁷³ *Contra* London (2001), who holds that *EN* II.3 [=II.4] is raising an issue that is completely neglected in the *EE*, for which reason the view advanced in *EN* II.3 [=II.4] would differ from those we come across in the *EE*.

action for its own sake would also be sufficient for full virtue in the *EN*.

Second, they allow us to solve some issues related to the reasons behind Aristotle's commitment to the thesis of the reciprocity of the virtues in so far as correctly understanding the value of virtuous actions would depend on having been well brought up and habituated in all (or, at the very least, in the majority and most important) domains of one's life, to the effect that Aristotle would be committed to a version of the unity of the virtues thesis⁷⁴ (this seems to imply that he is committed to a sort of holism with regards to knowledge in the practical domain—even if there is reason for thinking that he is not a holist when it comes to some theoretical disciplines such as mathematics, to the effect that one can have *ἐπιστήμη* of a theorem without having full mastery of that field).

Third, it has the upshot that Aristotle's claims to the effect that virtue makes the end right become just another way of saying that virtue makes one perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine. So understood, the claim that virtue makes the end right would be at the centre of both how Aristotle characterises the particular virtues and how he distinguishes between fully virtuous and non-fully virtuous agents, for only the first seem to perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine. The upshot being that the claim that virtue makes the end right, which is only explicitly formulated in the *EE* and in the common books, would also have a central role in the argument advanced in the books that are indisputably *Nicomachean*.

⁷⁴ If I am right, what I have in mind here would vindicate the fifth argument advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias in section 18 of his Supplement to on the Soul (*de Anima libri Mantissa*, 18) to defend the thesis of the reciprocity of the virtues, where he draws on the idea that the virtues make us perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine to show that the virtues reciprocate. In fact, *φρόνησις* conceived as a kind of knowledge about the fine which intermediates the reciprocity of the virtues may allow us to see Aristotle as also committed to a very particular version of the thesis of the unity of the virtues, and not merely a thesis of the mutual implication of the virtues (*contra* Sharples, 2000), and a version of the thesis of the unity of the virtues that finds some support in Theophrastus' fragments 449A (Stob. 2.7.20 [=Wachsmuth vol. 2, pp. 140.7-142.13]) and 460 (*de Anima libri Mantissa*, 18 156.21-27). See also *EE* VII.2 1237^a7-9, where Aristotle says that whenever pleasure and fineness disagree one is still not fully virtuous, since it is possible for *ἀκρασία* to take place (*ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὕτω σπουδαῖος τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν*), which suggests that if one is not minimally virtuous in all domains of one's life, *ἀκρασία* is still a possibility, so that one will lack *φρόνησις*. I cannot discuss this issue in this Dissertation.

Finally, this reading avoids a serious difficulty that can be levelled against readings according to which the main difference between virtuous actions performed by fully virtuous agents and virtuous actions performed by agents who fall short of full virtue rests on the idea that fully virtuous agents are characterised not merely as performing virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes but as being able to do that *consistently*, whereas agents who are not fully virtuous, despite being able to perform such actions due to having decided on them for their own sakes, cannot *consistently* perform virtuous actions in such a way (for they would be ultimately prone to fail on some occasions—even if there may be some such agents who do not really fail to perform virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes in the course of their lives). As I would like to show, such a strategy is at odds with how Aristotle describes the difference between the *ἔργον* of something, and the *ἔργον* of the virtue of that thing,⁷⁵ and thus with how he would distinguish between virtuous actions *qua* the *ἔργον* of full virtue from virtuous actions as performed by agents who fail to be fully virtuous. As a matter of fact, given the disanalogy between the *τέχναι* and the virtues presented by Aristotle in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]—according to which the good in action is not only a matter of performing an action of such and such a sort (which is all that is necessary for saying that the product of a *τέχνη* is a good product of that sort), but also of being in a certain condition when performing that action—, one would expect there to be a sense in which the activities brought off on the basis of virtue are different in kind from the activities of learners and agents who are not fully virtuous. I mean, one would expect that learners and other agents who are not fully virtuous are simply not able to engage in activities of the same sort as those in

⁷⁵ I shall present this difficulty in more detail below, in the second part of this **Introduction**. I have previously resorted to a similar argument to claim that Aristotle thinks there are two different kinds of practical truth (one characteristic of agents who are not *φρόνιμοι*—which would be the *ἔργον* of practical reason—, and another characteristic of agents who are *φρόνιμοι*—which would be the *ἔργον* of the virtue of practical reason, or, in other words, *τὸ εὖ* of practical reason) in my master's Thesis—see de Sousa (2018, pp. 12–13, 20–24, 149–157).

which fully virtuous agents engage in performing virtuous actions (although of course there is a sense in which they engage in activities that are *similar*—otherwise moral habituation would not be possible), and not that they can perform actions that are precisely the same as those performed by fully virtuous agents (even in motivation) but cannot perform these actions consistently. The oddness of this latter view I am rejecting is that a mere difference in consistency would be said to account for the difference in kind between the activities of virtue and the virtuous actions performed by agents who do not possess full virtue. As I intend to show, it is indeed true that agents who are not fully virtuous may ultimately not be consistent in performing virtuous actions, but this is not quite what explains their being different from fully virtuous agents, but rather a consequence of their not valuing virtuous actions as intrinsically fine.

But before going into more detail on these issues, some clarifications are in order.

0.1.2 Further clarifying the End Question

In presenting my hypothesis as to how the End Question should be answered, I made several assumptions without argument. But before justifying these assumptions (which I shall do throughout this Dissertation), I would like to present first the questions I think should be answered in any attempt to answer the End Question and to give some indications of how I intend to answer them.

These questions will pave the way not only for the arguments I shall advance in this Dissertation in defence of my hypothesis but also for the analysis of the different positions in the debate about the End Question that I shall present in the second part of this **Introduction**.

To begin with, I shall present the questions I think stand behind the different ways of construing C1 and C2, questions whose answer will turn out to be central to how one

construes the End Question in its normative version. After that, I shall present a remaining question regarding the status of *βούλησις* as a rational desire.

0.1.2.1 THE MEANING OF C1 (THE CLAIM THAT VIRTUE MAKES THE END RIGHT)

0.1.2.1.1 *Question (I): in which sense does virtue make the end(s) right?*

C1 can be construed in several different ways. First of all, it is not clear (I) in what sense virtue makes the end(s) right. As indicated above in the discussion of *ὀρθότης* on pages 57 to 60, Aristotle thinks rightness (*ὀρθότης*) is said in many ways, so that in trying to assess the level of influence reason has in determining the ends of action (in senses [a''], [b], and [c]) we should try to get clear about the exact sense in which virtue makes each of these ends right.

0.1.2.1.2 *Question (II): which virtue makes the end(s) right?*

Second, depending on (II) which virtue makes the end(s) right (e.g., natural, habituated, or full virtue), the answer we should give to (I) will differ. Yet, even if it turns out that in those passages in which C1 is presented what Aristotle means is that, say, natural virtue, and not full virtue, is responsible for making the end(s) right, it is still a *desideratum* that the way in which *full virtue* makes the end(s) right is different from the way in which natural virtue would make the end(s) right (or so I shall argue). Thus, since my contention is that full virtue is distinguished from other types of virtue and *quasi-virtuous* dispositions by reference to the fact that it enables its possessors to perform virtuous actions due to a motive that is exclusive to them,⁷⁶ determining which virtue is said to be responsible for making the end(s) right in the passages in which C1 is presented is secondary, for Aristotle would also be committed

⁷⁶ Which implies, as I take it, not only that some ends₁ are exclusive to them, but also that some ends₂ are exclusive to them.

to C1 understood as a claim to the effect that *full virtue* makes the ends right, which is the version of C1 I am interested in.

As a result, in answering the normative version of the End Question, I would like to determine in what way *full virtue* makes the ends right, for I think it should do so in a way that is different from the way in which natural or habituated virtue could be said to make the ends right (provided such virtues do indeed make the end right in some sense in the first place. I think they do not, unless what one has in mind by ‘making the end right’ is being a merely necessary condition for having a right end⁷⁷). In any case, as I intend to show, there is reason for thinking that the version of C1 we come across in Aristotle’s texts is the one concerning full virtue. If this is correct, then we should answer (II) saying that full virtue makes the end(s) right without further hesitation.⁷⁸

0.1.2.1.3 *Question (III): is virtue necessary for making the end(s) right?*

Third, our answer to (I) may change considerably depending on whether (III) virtue is necessary or not necessary for making the end(s) right, i.e., depending on the extent to which the division of labour between virtue and reason is exclusive. In fact, in the passages in which Aristotle makes claims to the effect that virtue makes the end(s) right, he is presenting us divisions of labour between virtue and reason (or rather *φρόνησις*), and it is therefore arguable whether only virtue makes the ends right, or if reason can do that even in the absence of virtue.

⁷⁷ This may raise some worries given that I have described above the role of virtue in making the ends right in terms of its being a necessary enabling condition for having right ends. Yet necessary enabling conditions, different from merely necessary conditions, are also sufficient for their effects when in conjunction with the causes of their effects. Merely necessary conditions, in turn, need to be conjoined with further conditions to be sufficient for their effects when in conjunction with the causes of their effects. In other words, necessary enabling conditions are sufficient for saying that that of which they are a condition is possible, whereas merely necessary conditions are not necessarily sufficient for saying that that of which they are a condition is possible.

⁷⁸ Similarly, see Irwin (2019, p. 155) on the virtue that makes *προαίρεσις* right (which is something that virtue seems to do by making the end of *προαίρεσις* right): ‘[t]he virtue that makes decision correct is not virtue without prudence, but the full virtue that requires prudence.’

As I have already indicated above in **Section 0.1.1**, my contention is that even if (full) virtue is not really necessary for securing some sort of rightness of the ends (and I think it is not necessary merely for aiming for ends that are fine), it is required if the ends are to be right in the way they are for fully virtuous agents. For, only full virtue would make the ends right in such a way that the agent can perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, i.e., making it the case i) that one's ends₁₋₂ are not only fine but actually make reference to the fineness of the virtuous actions one performs, and ii) that one's ends₃ are not only fine but also aimed at for their own sakes—for the sense of rightness implied in these claims, see the discussion of *ὀρθότης* at pages 57 to 60 above.

0.1.2.1.4 *Question (IV): how should ends₃ be described and how are they to be distinguished from one's end(s)₂?*

Finally, as already indicated above, it is not so clear how exactly ends₂₋₃ should be described and distinguished from one another, and a decision in this regard directly impacts the way in which the answer to (I) is to be formulated. Ends₃ as I have characterised them above are ends that function as starting-points of deliberation. But so conceived, ends₃ can be construed in two different ways, as I have already indicated.

The first alternative is to say that ends₃ are situation-specific goals such as saving someone else's life, being agreeable, or telling the truth, which are goals that characterise actions as actions pertaining to a certain domain (say, that of courage, friendliness, or truthfulness).⁷⁹

The second alternative is to say that one's end₃ corresponds to one's ultimate end, that is, *εὐδαιμονία* (or *εὐπραξία*).

In this connection, we should ask (IV) how exactly end(s)₃ should be described and

⁷⁹ On such situation-specific goals see, for instance, Lorenz (2019, p. 203).

how exactly they are to be distinguished from one's ends₂.

As already indicated above, irrespective of how ends₃ are characterised, ends₃ and ends₂ differ in so far as one can have an end₃ without thereby having an end₂, as is evinced by episodes of impetuosity (in which agents do not deliberate—and thus do not have an end₂—and act against an end₃) and by the fact that people can rationally determine what they should do through non-deliberative means (say, by means of ἀγχινοια). Yet, depending on how ends₃ are described, this will not be their only difference to ends₂.

To begin with, *qua* situation-specific goals ends₃ seem to offer merely *prima facie*⁸⁰ reasons for action. Thus, when one deliberates, one can either reach an end₂ that confirms that one's end₃ really offers reasons for action in the circumstances one is being faced with (i.e., is situationally adequate), or else arrive at the conclusion that the end₃ for whose sake one began deliberating does not truly offer reasons for action in the circumstances one is

⁸⁰ As Hurley (1989, p. 133) puts it, '[p]rima facie reasons are like rules of thumb, that give us reasons provisionally but may turn out not apply when we learn more about the situation at hand, in which case they have no residual reason-giving force,' which are to be contrasted with *pro tanto* reasons, which continue to give us reason even against our all things considered judgments. Now, this may raise some worries regarding *akrasia*, since Hurley also thinks that reasons for action admit of *akrasia* precisely in so far as they are *pro tanto* rather than *prima facie*. Yet this appears to presuppose a conception of *akrasia* quite different from the Aristotelian: even though Aristotle admits that one can act against one's end₃, as one does in episodes of ἀκρασία and μαλακία, these do not constitute cases in which one's ends₃ are merely outweighed by one's non-rational desires. In fact, as I have assumed above in footnotes 49 and 54, episodes of ἀκρασία and μαλακία involve rather a condition in which the agent cannot but entertain the claim that a particular course of action achieves, or contributes to the achievement of, a right end₃ to which they are committed. Therefore, in acting against an end₃, incontinent or soft agents still have reason for performing the action this end₃ counts in favour of, since their failing to act on that reason is not the result of their learning that what they provisionally assumed as a reason does not apply to the situation at hand, but rather of a cognitive failure. Similarly, see how Scanlon (1998, pp. 377n19, 40) responds to Hurley, and how he describes *akratic* actions, which he also takes to present cases in which the person's rational capacities have malfunctioned, and 'not cases in which these capacities are overmastered by something else, called desire,' the upshot being that reasons for action being *prima facie* would not be incompatible with *akrasia* (note, however, that Scanlon conceives of moral psychology in a way that is fundamentally different from Aristotle, which makes their views on *akrasia* also fundamentally different). The idea that, for Aristotle, situation-specific goals offer merely *prima facie* reasons for action is to some extent anticipated by Sherman (1989, p. 84), who, in discussing how one can set aside an end due to considerations that are not directly related to the means through it can be achieved, but with other ends and interests of the agent, claims that, in those cases, one may not choose the action that achieves this end or may change one's mind about doing it 'if other considerations based on other ends and interests overrule its prima facie desirability.' For a contemporary perspective on how coherence between different ends comes into play in process of making a decision, see Thagard and Millgram (1995).

being faced with. This can happen for two different reasons: because it is simply impossible, in these circumstances, to achieve that end₃ for whose sake they were deliberating; or because the agent comes to think (as a result of having deliberated) either that there are no justifiable means of achieving that end₃ for whose sake they were deliberating or that that end is not the best thing to achieve in these circumstances, and hence that it does not really offer reasons for action in these circumstances.⁸¹ In case one arrives at the conclusion that the end₃ for whose sake one began deliberating does not truly offer reasons for action in the circumstances one is being faced with (although it might offer reasons for action in light of an aspect of the circumstances one is being faced with, which is perhaps what made it salient in the first place—see footnote 36), one may then continue deliberating assuming a different end₃ so that the end₂ that will figure in the conclusion of one's deliberation will have no direct connection with the end₃ that first initiated that episode of deliberation.

⁸¹ By this I do not mean that, in all cases in which achieving an end₃ such as saving someone else's life involves doing something taken to be disadvantageous to the agent, this end₃ is not sufficient for determining that an action that achieves it is the thing to be done. I mean rather that, in those cases in which the things one must do in order to achieve that end₃ are taken to amount to a greater evil than the death of the person whose life one intended to save in the first place, this end₃ is not seen as really counting in favour of the performance of the action that achieves it. By contrast, in those cases in which the things that must be done in order to achieve such an end are taken to amount to a lesser evil than the death of the person whose life one wants to save, saving that person's life may be described as a mixed action, and, in those cases in which these things are not only taken to be a lesser evil, but are really so, the agent's performance of these things is even praiseworthy and such an action may be said to stem from virtue (cf. *Pol.* VII.13 1332^a10–15). Besides, setting aside one's initial end₃ is something that may occur not only in cases in which the action that achieves that end₃ involves doing something that is (or is taken to be) disadvantageous to the agent, but also in cases in which performing that action implies an omission that is (or is taken to be) morally relevant. For instance, in those cases in which achieving a certain end₃ implies not achieving another end₃ that is also salient to the agent in the circumstances they are faced with and whose achievement is taken to be better than the achievement of the end₃ for whose sake one began deliberating. In fact, depending on the circumstances, there may be cases in which the end₃ for whose sake one began deliberating should not be achieved not because there is anything intrinsically wrong with it or with the means through which it can be achieved, but because achieving it implies not achieving another end₃ whose achievement is taken to be better at the present circumstances (similarly, cf. Sherman [1989, pp. 84–85], and Kenny [1996, p. 2: a course of action which is genuinely an appropriate means to a good end may be (because of its relationship to other ends or norms) an objectively bad action]). As a result, even when compared to other ends₃, ends₃ *qua* situation-specific goals still offer merely *prima facie* reasons for action, for if the agent comes to think that achieving a certain end₃ is not what is *the best possible* given circumstances at hand (even though it would be indeed good), then that end ceases from offering reasons for action in those circumstances.

On this reading, it seems that, at first glance at least, the rightness of one's ends₃ can be reduced to their situational appropriateness. Yet this raises the question as to what value accounts for their being situationally appropriate in the first place.⁸² Notwithstanding this, I think that the fact that Aristotle thinks of ends₂ and ends₁ as right when they correspond to the fineness of the actions they count in favour of and explain (so that agents can be said to decide on and to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes) points to a possible way of dealing with this issue: ends₃ may also be said to be right not merely because they turn out to be situationally adequate, but because besides turning out to be situationally adequate they are provisionally aimed for *precisely due to being justifiable candidates for what is indeed best to achieve in the circumstances one is faced with*. On this sense of rightness, ends₃ would be right not only because they are fine relatively to the circumstances one is faced with or relatively to an aspect thereof, but because besides being fine, they are aimed at *because they are fine* (i.e., for their own sakes).⁸³

Now, whether virtue merely secures that one's ends₃ are consistently right in this way or else acts as an enabling condition for their being right in this way is an issue that depends on how we answer (I) and (III), since this more demanding sense of rightness could be something for which virtue is necessary (a possibility I have already entertained above).

Furthermore, nothing hinders ends₃ that are justifiable candidates for being situa-

⁸² Similarly, see Scanlon (1998, p. 70): 'the fact that an intention alters one's subsequent reasons only so long as one does not have reason to reconsider its adoption indicates that the normative force of this intention depends on the substantive reasons that made it worth adopting in the first place.' Indeed, given that ends₃ *qua* situation-specific goals are intentions whose adoption we can reconsider depending on what we discover by means of deliberation and/or by our assessment of the particular circumstances we are being faced with, it seems that our commitment to these ends ultimately depends upon certain values in the light of which these ends seemed to be worth pursuing in the first place and which explain why in some circumstances some of these ends turn out not to be worth pursuing.

⁸³ Similarly, see Broadie (1991, p. 247): 'there are two elements in Aristotelian practical deliberation: a wish for O (which is a provisional affirmation of O as end) and an intelligent grasp of particulars. We must take it that the latter includes a grasp of particulars as instancing relevant causal relations. This factual awareness converts the wish into rational choice according to the formal requirement of the best.'

tionally adequate from turning out not to be situationally adequate on a closer analysis of the circumstances that reveal that despite the fact that these ends are situationally adequate relatively to what turns out to be an aspect of the circumstances one is being faced with (call it Circ.₁), they are not really adequate to pursue relatively to the circumstances one is being faced with taken as whole (call it Circ.₂, a set of circumstances that would encompass Circ.₁)—see footnote 36. Even fully virtuous agents may provisionally assume ends₃ that are justifiable candidates for being situationally adequate⁸⁴ and then set them aside in the course of deliberation due to finding out that they are not really situationally adequate. Thus, an even bigger problem surfaces when we take impetuous agents into account. Impetuous agents do not deliberate (or, at least, have not finished their deliberations) in episodes of impetuosity. Accordingly, if they are to be described as aiming for a right end₃, this may not be always because the end₃ for whose sake they would begin deliberating had they not experienced impetuosity would turn out to be situationally adequate relatively to the circumstances they are being faced with taken as a whole. Therefore, if we are to say that impetuous agents experiencing episodes of impetuosity aim for ends₃ that are right, this might be merely because they are committed to an end₃ or to a group of ends₃ (i.e., a group of ends that are salient to them in the circumstances they are being faced with and that are thus taken by them to be justifiable candidates for being situationally adequate)⁸⁵ *in such a way that they would not*

⁸⁴ Because they are, say, for the most part situationally adequate (as would be the case of an end such as pleasing someone—which is an end that characterises an action as pertaining to the domain of friendliness) or more specifically because they are situationally adequate in circumstances that are relevantly similar to the circumstances one is being faced with (as would be the case of an end such as displeasing someone—which is also an end that characterises an action as pertaining to the domain of friendliness but which is not for the most part situationally adequate, but only in some sorts of circumstances). I shall come back to this below in **Section 3.3** of **Chapter 3**. Similarly, see Fernandez's (2021, p. 386) claim to the effect that Aristotle would distinguish between actions that are generically virtuous and actions that are virtuous due to the way in which they are performed in a particular circumstance: '[i]t is impossible to give a generic description of an action that will be in a primary sense just, no matter how it is realized in the particular situation,' whose argument comes from an interpretation of some passages from *EN V I* shall discuss below in **section 1.3.1**.

⁸⁵ Alternatively, we could think here of what A. W. Müller (1994, p. 164) calls 'quasi-ends' (Quasi-Ziele),

*be relevantly committed to performing the vicious actions they perform in episodes of impetuosity*⁸⁶

(irrespective of what end₃ they might initially find more adequate to attain in such circumstances). That is, they can be said to aim for a right end₃ because they are committed to an end₃ or to a group of ends₃ that allows them to see that the action they perform in episodes of impetuosity is not to be performed in that this end₃ or to that group of ends₃ to which they are committed *entails that the action they end up performing in episodes of impetuosity is not to be performed*.⁸⁷ Other agents who fail to be fully virtuous, in turn, could be said to have a right end₃ in that their end₂ confirms an end₃ that is indeed situationally adequate (irrespective of whether this is the end₃ for whose sake they began deliberating). That is, they may not always begin to deliberate for the sake of ends₃ that are right in that they are situationally adequate, but, in so far as they are in some sense good deliberators, they arrive at an end₂ that confirms an end₃ that is indeed situationally adequate. As a result, if virtue is to account for the con-

which are values 'that, taken by themselves, in general do not prompt any action tendency, but which require omissions and hence restrict the choice of means to "real" ends' (die zwar, für sich genommen, im allgemeinen keine Handlungstendenz in Gang setzen, die aber Unterlassungen verlangen und so die Wahl von Mitteln zu "echten" Zielen einschränken.). Note, however, that when A. W. Müller (1992, p. 48) applies this distinction to the Aristotelian perspective, he assumes that what fulfils the function of quasi-ends or limiting-ends (einschränkenden Ziele) is, first of all, the way of life one chooses, and, secondarily, one's nature as a rational being, both of which would provide one with considerations that limit the choice of the means to one's 'real' ends. Yet I think it may be possible to think of quasi-ends in Aristotle without appealing to an articulated conception of *εὐδαιμονία* one holds or to one's rational nature, for the ends and values one is committed to may fulfil the role of quasi-ends when they are not ends for whose sake one is deliberating but are nevertheless somehow relevant given the circumstances one is being faced with. In any case, the idea would be that incontinent agents are committed to ends that allow them to see that the action they are performing in episodes of incontinence should not be performed (even if their reason does not end up asserting that).

⁸⁶ Similarly, see Whiting and Pickavé (2008, p. 360) on the issue of whether the *φυσικῶς* segment of *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] can refer to impetuous *ἀκρασία* in so far as it mentions a *δόξα* that says that a particular sweet thing should not be tasted: '[t]he point may simply be that the prohibiting doxa "says" that this should not be tasted only in the sense that the prohibiting doxa entails that this should not be tasted.' In other words, impetuous incontinent agents have a *δόξα* that entails that they should not taste a particular sweet, which is compatible with them not having an occurring *δόξα* whose propositional content is that a particular sweet thing should not be tasted.

⁸⁷ Besides, if some impetuous agents, as I have suggested above, can be aware of what they should do by means of *ἀγχίνοια* (see footnote 52 and the discussion at pages 50 to 52), this becomes even clearer, since some impetuous agents would be aware of the particular thing they should really do in the circumstances they are faced with (although they do not have an end₂—since they have not deliberated), and hence of the fact that what they end up doing is not what they should do.

sistency with which one aims for right ends₃, it must also account for the value(s) in light of which virtuous agents aim for right ends₃ and on the basis of which they can consistently assess, through deliberation, whether a particular end₃ is worth pursuing in the circumstances at hand.

My hypothesis, as already mentioned, is that virtue secures this because it makes one aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes, which implies not only that virtue makes our ends₃ consistently right in that it consistently makes us aim for ends₃ that are fine, but also that it makes our ends₃ right in that it makes us aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes, thus securing that the ends₃ we aim for are consistently fine. While the first sort of rightness (mere fineness) is something that can pertain to the ends of agents who fail to be fully virtuous, the second sort of rightness (fineness + being aimed at for its own sake) is something that pertains exclusively to the ends of agents who are fully virtuous (or so I shall argue).

But if one's end₃ corresponds to one's ultimate end instead, then one's end₂ will differ from one's end₃ also in that it is either a specification of the latter or else something merely necessary if one's ultimate end is to be achieved. In the first case, one's end₂ would correspond to something that one takes to be a constituent (or a specification of a constituent) of one's ultimate end, whereas in the second case one's end₂ would be part of the necessary conditions for the achievement of one's ultimate end, and not a part of one's end₃ as such.⁸⁸ On this reading, it seems that the rightness of our end₃ (i.e., our ultimate end) is to be identified with the rightness of our conception of this end.⁸⁹ Indeed, as I have already indicated above, even though there is a sense in which everyone shares the same ultimate end (see footnote 38),

⁸⁸ As we shall see in more detail below in footnote 209, Aristotle appears to think of external goods not as constituents of *εὐδαιμονία*, but rather as necessary conditions for it (cf. *EN* I.10 [=Bywater I.9] 1099^b26ff and *EE* II.8 1214^b24–27), so that in those cases in which we deliberate about how to obtain an external good, we are deliberating for the sake of an end that is not a constituent of *εὐδαιμονία*, but a necessary condition for it.

⁸⁹ As I have already indicated above on pages 47 to 49, there are several different ways in which talk of one's conception of *εὐδαιμονία* can be spelled out.

people can nevertheless be mistaken about this end. How exactly these mistakes are to be spelled out, however, is not so clear.

A first way of understanding this is to say that agents can be mistaken about their ultimate end depending on the value with which they think it is to be centrally identified.⁹⁰ For instance, someone who thinks of *εὐδαιμονία* by giving a central place to pleasure errs as to what *εὐδαιμονία* really is (since pleasure is not a central good around which, and in light of which, the other goods should be pursued,⁹¹ for pleasure is not even an end itself⁹²). In that case, the rightness of one's end₃ would be a matter of correctly grasping the value(s) that are constitutive of it and, if it is constituted by more than one value, of understanding how these values structure it hierarchically in the way in which one conceives of it.⁹³ In other words, it

⁹⁰ There are different ways of construing the relationship between one's ultimate end and the things one takes to be constituents of it depending on whether one's ultimate end is taken to be a dominant end, an inclusive end, or else a second order end. For a detailed discussion of these three ways of conceiving of one's ultimate end that favours the third alternative, see Zingano (2007c). For a general and recent presentation of the debate between dominant and inclusive accounts of the ultimate end in terms of a dispute between monist or pluralist construals of *εὐδαιμονία*, inclusivism being an extreme version of pluralism, see Aufderheide (2020, pp. 10ff). This is a controversial issue which I cannot settle in this Dissertation. It is important to note, however, that there are two different questions that should be distinguished here: The first one concerns the relationship between the activity of contemplation and the activity on the basis of moral virtue in a happy life; the second one concerns what *εὐδαιμονία* is. As I take it (influenced by Zingano), the pluralist-monist debate about *εὐδαιμονία* conflates these two questions in that it assumes that in the answer to the first question lies Aristotle's very definition of *εὐδαιμονία*, so that determining the relationship between the activity of contemplation and the activity on the basis of moral virtue in a happy life is inseparable from answering what *εὐδαιμονία* is. Yet there is an alternative: saying that both the activity of contemplation and the activity on the basis of moral virtue satisfy the criteria for counting as *εὐδαιμονία*, so that determining how these two kinds of activities should be related to one another in a life and thus which of them is superior is a different matter, whose answer hangs on an independent argument, as Zingano (personal communication, 2023) proposes.

⁹¹ Activity on the basis of moral virtue, in turn, would be a central good around which, and in light of which, the other goods should be pursued, although it would not be the best central good around which one can organise one's life, since, for Aristotle, that position should be preferably occupied by contemplation.

I cannot discuss this issue further here, but one observation is in order:

This account, if correct, seems to capture only what Aristotle thinks in the context of the *EN*. In fact, there is reason for thinking that, in the *EE*, there is no such thing as a happy life without contemplation, or a happy life without full virtue. See also footnote 211.

⁹² As is made clear in *EN* X.1-5, since pleasure is there conceived not as an activity and an end, but as something that supervenes upon an activity making it perfect.

⁹³ This caveat is necessary if we are to secure that the practical/political conception of *εὐδαιμονία* is not a mistaken conception of *εὐδαιμονία*: although Aristotle thinks that contemplation is a final end that is superior to activity on the basis of moral virtue, both are final ends that can function as the central good around which one organises one's life.

would be a matter of correctly identifying what final ends⁹⁴ are constitutive of it and, if they are more than one, how they are related to one another hierarchically.⁹⁵

A second alternative is to say that this is not the (only) way in which people can be mistaken about their ultimate end, for it may be the case that even agents who correctly identify *εὐδαιμονία* still do not fully understand it in so far as they do not reliably identify what actions are called for for its sake. That is, even though they would be able to correctly identify what final ends are constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* and, if they are more than one, their hierarchy, they would still not fully know how to value *εὐδαιμονία*, for they would not be able to reliably identify the actions that should be done to promote it.⁹⁶

As I take it, which of these two construals of the second way of describing ends₃ is to be preferred also depends on how we deal with (III) (The question about whether virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right). If virtue is not necessary for making the ends right, it seems that the first construal is to be preferred. In fact, on the first construal, agents who fail to be fully virtuous may be said to have a right end₃ in that they may correctly identify the values constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* and how they are related to one another hierarchically

⁹⁴ The idea that *εὐδαιμονία* is materially constituted by a final end or a group of final ends that cannot be reduced to one another *qua* goods—for instance, pleasure, honour, and/or knowledge—is foreshadowed by Aristotle in *EN* I.4 [=Bywater I.6] 1096^b23–25. For what, for Aristotle, a final end would be and what its difference relatively to one's ultimate end would be, see Zingano (2021c).

⁹⁵ This caveat is necessary if we are to account for the way in which Aristotle appears to conceive of *εὐδαιμονία* in the *EE*.

Besides, note that what I have in mind here is considerably different from inclusivism conceived of in such a way that *εὐδαιμονία* is a composite good that includes within it all other intrinsic goods. As a matter of fact, I am assuming that external goods are not a part of *εὐδαιμονία*, but mere necessary conditions for it (on this, see footnote 209).

⁹⁶ For a similar distinction about what is required for understanding the value of something, see Scanlon (1998, p. 99): '[u]nderstanding the value of something is not just a matter of knowing how valuable it is, but rather a matter of knowing how to value it—knowing what kinds of actions and attitudes are called for.' What I have in mind here drawing this comparison is that, on this reading at least, seeing how valuable *εὐδαιμονία* is would be a matter of correctly identifying what final ends that are constitutive of it and, if they are more than one, how they are hierarchically related to one another. Thus, it would seem that one can be right in identifying the components and the structure of *εὐδαιμονία*, while still failing to fully understand it, for one may still fail to see reliably the actions that should be performed to achieve *εὐδαιμονία* as one conceives of it.

(for which reason their end₃ would be right) even if they may be prone to fail to perform and even to identify the actions that contribute to *εὐδαιμονία* as they conceive of it. On that reading, the upshot would be that virtue is not necessary for having a right conception of one's ultimate end, nor for identifying the actions that really contribute to fulfilling that conception, but rather for being able to reliably identify those actions.

But if virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right, then it would seem that the second construal is to be preferred. In fact, if i) all there is to having a right conception of one's ultimate end were being able to identify the central value around which one's life should be rationally organized—i.e., if the first construal is assumed—, and if ii) virtue is necessary for making the ends right, then it would seem that virtue would act as an enabling condition for attaining a right conception of one's ultimate end, to the effect that only fully virtuous agents would be right about what *εὐδαιμονία* consists in and about how it is structured. Yet it is far from clear how C2 (the claim that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for ends that are fine and thus in a sense right as well) can be held on this assumption: if one's end₃ corresponds to one's ultimate end and if one does not identify correctly the value with which *εὐδαιμονία* is to be centrally identified to begin with (and thus does not have a right end₃), one's end₁₋₂ could not correspond to the fineness of the actions one performs. As a result, it would be far from clear how exactly agents who fail to be fully virtuous could aim for ends that are right. Thus, if virtue is necessary for making the ends right, it would seem that having a conception of one's ultimate end made right by virtue involves rather fully understanding the value of one's ultimate end. As a result, the rightness at stake in the claim that virtue makes the ends right would not be the same rightness at stake in the claim that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for right ends: the first sort of rightness involves correctly understanding one's ultimate end, whereas the second sort of rightness can be attained without satisfying

this requirement. Accordingly, agents who fail to be fully virtuous may be said to have a right end₃ in that they may correctly identify the values constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* and how they are related to one another hierarchically (for which reason their end₃ would be right) even if they do not fully understand their ultimate end. Yet, precisely because they do not fully understand their ultimate end, they would be prone to fail at least in some circumstances,⁹⁷ the upshot being that virtue is not necessary for having a conception of one's ultimate end that is in some sense right, nor for identifying the actions that really contribute to fulfilling that conception, but rather for correctly *understanding* one's ultimate end and thus for having a conception of it that is right in a more robust sense.

Yet both these construals face the same issue in so far as saying that one's end₃ corresponds to one's ultimate end is simply implausible from a psychological point of view. Even if we concede that we can deliberate for the sake of our ultimate end, it is hardly plausible that this is an end we always explicitly have in view when deliberating. In fact, it seems that some agents (and even some of those we would count as fully virtuous) do not even have an explicit and fully articulated conception of their ultimate end (but, if anything, a potentially articulable conception of that end),⁹⁸ which makes the idea that one's ultimate end is an end for whose sake we deliberate (an end₃) much less plausible.

Accordingly, charity suggests that we should either reject the claim that our end₃ is our ultimate end, or else adopt a reading according to which even though it is possible to deliberate for the sake of our ultimate end, this is not how deliberation typically unfolds.

Besides, the second construal of ultimate ends *qua* ends₃ faces a further issue that is

⁹⁷ For some fortunate agents, however, this proneness to fail may remain a mere possibility that does not materialise itself in episodes of failure in the course of these agents' lives.

⁹⁸ For the idea that the way in which one pursues situation-specific ends may in some sense point to *εὐδαιμονία* conceived in a particular way, even though the agent may not actually have a fully articulated conception of what *εὐδαιμονία* is or make reference to *εὐδαιμονία* when deliberating, the upshot being that *φρόνιμοι* 'have a potentially articulable Grand End,' even though articulating this is not required for their being good deliberators, see Broadie (1991, pp. 239, 262n51).

specially worrying: in saying that virtue makes one's end₃ right in so far as it enables one to fully understand it, it appears to commit us to the idea that virtue's contribution is merely conative, since the only difference between agents who fully understand their ultimate end and agents who correctly identify the value that is centrally constitutive of their ultimate end would be the fact that the latter are not consistently able to identify and to perform actions that promote their ultimate end. This is something that, most plausibly, would be due to how they understand the circumstances they are being faced with when determining how they should act, and which is thus directly connected to their perceptive responses to features of these circumstances (which in the case of practical perceptions appear to be responses involving pleasure and pain).⁹⁹ It does not need to commit us to that, however. As we shall see in the next section, Irwin (1988d) holds a version of this view according to which virtue 'protect[s] us against the distorting influences of non-rational desires' (p. 83) in such a way that 'the wise person is not persuaded to change his mind about the comparative value of different options simply because a strong non-rational desire for one of them happens to be present' (p. 81). Yet this alternative construal faces problems of its own in that it does not allow us to distinguish intermediate agents from fully virtuous agents in those domains of the lives of intermediate agents in which they are civically virtuous or come close to virtue in some other way (see the

⁹⁹ For the idea that what ultimately distinguishes virtuous agents from continent or incontinent agents is the way in which they perceive the practical circumstances, see McDowell (1979/1998c, p. 56): 'the incontinent or continent person does not fully share the virtuous person's perception of the situation;' and, more explicitly, Lovibond, 1996, p. 79: 'when you display moral weakness, you retain a capacity for correct *judgement* as to how you should act in a given situation (indeed, if you had never entered the mental world of the virtuous, the conflict constitutive of *akrasia* could not have arisen), but your *perception* of the situation may differ in being no longer "clear" but "clouded by desire".' Similarly, for the idea that emotions are 'ways of *tracking* the morally relevant "news",' in which case moral saliency would depend fundamentally on emotional responses, see Sherman (1997, p. 68). What I have in mind here, however, is a bit more general than what Sherman has in mind, since it only requires perceptual responses in terms of pleasure and pain, and not necessarily emotions, and even though it may come close to the idea advanced by Moss (2012) that perceptions of pleasure and pain are at the root of judgments of goodness and badness, it does not necessarily commit us to it, since it may turn out that being experienced as pleasant or painful is only a sign of goodness or badness, in which case such perceptive responses would account for what is salient to us as good or bad, but not for what is good and bad and for what we take to offer more than *prima facie* reasons for action.

discussion on pages 102 to 105 below).

In any case, a decision about how to proceed in regard to (IV) depends on how we understand (III), and hence a decision about (I), i.e., about how exactly full virtue makes the ends right,—assuming that we can answer (II) as saying that full virtue makes the ends right as I have argued above—would depend on first getting clear on both (III) and (IV).

0.1.2.1.5 *Question (V): how does Aristotle conceive of virtuous actions?*

Yet this schema presented above depends on an assumption I have left so far undiscussed, namely that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can perform actions that are virtuous in the proper sense of the word. That is, actions that are not merely homonymously virtuous, but are rather virtuous and intrinsically valuable from a moral standpoint.¹⁰⁰ For that reason, we should also investigate (V) what makes an action virtuous and morally valuable and whether agents who are not fully virtuous can perform actions that are so. This is not a minor issue. To begin with, not only may ‘virtuous actions’ stand for quite different expressions used by Aristotle, but it is also unclear what exactly accounts for their being virtuous and fine in the first place.

On the one hand, ‘virtuous actions’ can refer to ‘things brought off from virtue’ (τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς γινόμενα)¹⁰¹ or to ‘actions that stem from virtue’ (τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς or

¹⁰⁰ *Contra* Stewart (1892, vol. 1, p. 183), who thinks that virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous are only homonymously virtuous, and *contra* Korsgaard (1996, pp. 205, 213), who thinks that ‘what gives an action moral value is the fact that it is chosen for its intrinsic rightness,’ to the effect that although virtuous actions would be in themselves valuable, what makes them morally valuable would be their being chosen in a certain way. On the interpretation I shall argue in favour of, virtuous actions are, in themselves, morally valuable, irrespective of how they are performed and valued by the agent, although one could still say that a virtuous action that is not performed due to having being decided on on its own account is not as fully virtuous as a virtuous action performed in this way, for it would only hit the mean in action and not the mean in emotion as well.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Rh.* I.9 1366^b25–27, a passage in which Aristotle talks of ‘τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς γινόμενα’ in contrast to ‘τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς.’ I think this expression should be contrasted with expressions such as ‘τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα’ (see *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a27–28), which seems to refer to the things produced by the arts without implying that they have been produced by someone who has a τέχνη. In talking of things that are produced ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς here in the *Rh.*, in turn, Aristotle appears to be implying something

αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς).¹⁰² Both these expressions can be taken to pick out activities that are brought off on the basis of virtue (as the contrast in *Rh.* I.9 suggests—see footnote 101), and that are thus characteristic of agents who are virtuous already. I shall henceforth refer to these actions as *virtuous activities*.¹⁰³

However, it is not so clear whether this is always the case for the second sort of expression (τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς or αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς), for in *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] (at 1147^a18–19) Aristotle concedes that saying the things that come from ἐπιστήμη is not a sign of ἐπιστήμη (τὸ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημείον), which argument may suggest that one can do something that comes from virtue without being thereby virtuous.¹⁰⁴ In any case, the contrast in *Rh.* I.9 makes clear that at least in some contexts these expressions pick out virtuous activities in contrast to virtuous actions that are not performed on the basis of virtue.

On the other hand, Aristotle talks of ‘actions on the basis of virtue’ (αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις),¹⁰⁵ ‘things that occur on the basis of the virtues’ (τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα),¹⁰⁶ and ‘activities on the basis of virtue’ (αἱ ἐνέργειαι αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν),¹⁰⁷ and it might be argued that at least in some contexts similar expressions (with κατὰ + acc.) make reference to virtuous actions regardless of how they are performed, although these expressions (specially the third

stronger: that these things have been produced on the basis of virtue.

¹⁰² The first expression is used in *EE* VIII.3 1248^b37, and the second is used in the accusative plural (τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς) in *EE* I.5 1216^a21. Similarly, in the *Magna Moralia*, we come across with ‘τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς πράξεις’ in *MM* B.IX.3 1207^b30.

¹⁰³ See Hirji (2018) for a distinction between virtuous activities (which amount to virtuous actions performed virtuously) and virtuous actions (which are virtuous regardless of whether they are performed by agents who are fully virtuous). My account will differ from Hirji’s in some respects, however, since I argue that virtuous activities are, in a sense, more virtuous than mere virtuous actions, in that the latter only hits the mean in action, whilst the former hits the mean both in action and in emotion. In any case, this does not imply that Aristotle is a virtue ethicist in regards to value, since the moral value of virtuous activities is not derived from virtue. On the contrary, virtue appears to be valuable precisely due to its connection with virtuous activities, i.e., due to its being such as to hit the mean in action and in emotion.

¹⁰⁴ As we shall see in **Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3**, this will be relevant for my interpretation of *EE* VIII.3.

¹⁰⁵ E.g., *EN* IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a23 and *EN* X.6 1176^b8.

¹⁰⁶ See *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a28–29.

¹⁰⁷ This expression occurs in the accusative in *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b13.

one) can also pick out virtuous activities in different contexts.¹⁰⁸ Aristotle also talks of courageous, generous, and just actions, and also of other particular instances of virtuous actions, which are referred to in a variety of ways as well, and in these contexts there is no doubt that he is thinking of merely virtuous actions, and not of virtuous activities. He talks of ‘τὰ δίκαια’ and ‘τὰ σώφρονα,’ for instance, and, more specifically, of just and temperate states of affairs (cf. *EN* II.4 [=Bywater II.3] 1105^b5ff: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται κτλ.); and, in *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^a16–23, he distinguishes doing τὰ δίκαια and τὰ ἄδικοα from doing wrong (ἀδικεῖν) and from performing just acts (δικαιοπραγεῖν), which, in turn, amount to the voluntary performance of τὰ δίκαια and τὰ ἄδικοα respectively, or, as he also puts it, to the performance of a just act (δικαιοπράγημα) or of a wrong (ἀδίκημα).

This way of referring to virtuous actions is central to Aristotle’s account of moral habituation, for one becomes virtuous not by engaging in virtuous activities, i.e., by performing virtuous actions on the basis of virtue (say, αἱ ἐνέργειαι αἱ κατ’ ἀρετήν)—indeed, it seems that one cannot perform such actions unless one is virtuous already—, but by voluntarily doing virtuous things: τὰ δίκαια, τὰ σώφρονα, etc. Yet, when it comes to characterising the particular virtues (with the exception of justice), Aristotle shifts from talking of, say, courageous or generous actions, to talking of withstanding fearful things in the way one should, when one should, etc., or of giving money to whom one should, when one should, from the sources one should, etc. In this context, virtuous actions appear to be described in terms of more basic acts

¹⁰⁸ See, for instance, Irwin (1991), who suggests that *κατα* + accusative phrases such as these make reference to the regulative role of virtue, which does not imply that something is a full manifestation of virtue. Thus, in saying that some activity is *κατὰ ἀρετήν* or *κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς*, Aristotle would not be saying that it is brought off on the basis of virtue. This is most clear in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a28–29, where Aristotle talks of performing τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα temperately or justly, which seems to imply that τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα are not virtuous actions performed virtuously, but virtuous actions that can be performed virtuously or in other ways. This is not conclusive, though, for in some instances Aristotle clearly uses such *κατὰ* + accusative phrases differently, to indicate that he is talking about activities brought off on the basis of virtue: for instance, when he describes *εὐδαιμονία* as an activity *κατὰ ἀρετήν* (e.g., *EN* I.7 [=Bywater I.6] 1098^a16–17).

(such as withstanding fearful things) *performed in a way that hits the mean in action*,¹⁰⁹ and virtuous agents are said to perform these not only voluntarily, but also for the sake of the fine, which seems to imply that their performance of these actions also hits the mean in emotion besides hitting the mean in action.

Understanding this shift is central for getting clear on what makes virtuous actions virtuous and for understanding some other important claims in Aristotle's account of moral habituation that will be central for my purposes. In fact, if virtuous actions consist in performing more basic acts like withstanding fearful things in a way that happens to hit the mean in action, then there is good reason for thinking that such actions are virtuous irrespective of the agent's motive and of whether they are performed voluntarily.¹¹⁰ Besides, properly distinguishing between virtuous actions and these more basic acts that are components of virtuous actions give us some reason for thinking that all that is required for becoming virtuous is the

¹⁰⁹ Perhaps, in talking of things such as *τὰ δίκαια* and *τὰ σώφρονα*, Aristotle means to describe what we should perhaps call a 'virtuous practice,' in which case, as Rawls (1955, p. 25) would put it, 'unless requisite properties are fulfilled, whatever one does, whatever movements one makes, will fail to count as a form of action which the practice specifies. What one does will be described in some other way.' I mean, an action would only count as a case of, say, *τὰ δίκαια*, if it amounts to doing something characteristic of the domain of particular justice and injustice (which has to do with honour, property, and the preservation thereof—cf. *EN* V.4 [=Bywater V.2 1130^b2]) in a way that hits the mean in action. The early Rawlsian conception of practice does not fit perfectly into the Aristotelian framework, however. For a discussion of early Rawlsian conception of practice that attempts to refine it (in light of Rawls own later views in his *A Theory of Justice* and of other considerations), see Thompson (2008, pp. 167-210). Similarly, Korsgaard (2009, pp. 9-14) sees in Aristotle a distinction between 'acts' and 'actions' according to which actions are 'acts-for-the-sake-of-ends.' Yet she thinks that the aim included in the description of an action is the aim that the agent chooses (p. 10). I do not think this is correct in the case of Aristotle, though. In fact, this is true of activities such as virtuous or vicious activities, but is not true of the things Aristotle describe as *τὰ δίκαια* and *τὰ σώφρονα*, whose constitutive goals are not always to be identified with the goals aimed at by the agent performing them, be it because the agent is simply doing these things involuntarily or for a reason different from their constitutive goals, be it because they are aiming at their constitutive goals under a different description.

¹¹⁰ This idea would be strengthened if what Aristotle has in mind here are something like 'virtuous practices' (as suggested in footnote 109), since one's actions would fall under a practice (say, the practice of courage) by complying with the rules characteristic of this particular practice, and rule compliance is a condition that can be satisfied irrespective of the agents motivation and irrespective of whether the agent is aware of his compliance (in which case the agent would be engaging in the said practice involuntarily). Yet, in the Aristotelian framework, the 'rule' compliance with which makes an action fall under a virtuous practice is what is circumstantially recommended by right reason (*ὀρθός λόγος*), which is not properly speaking a rule (despite suggestions otherwise—for an overview of the debate on the nature of *ὀρθός λόγος* see Moss [2014a]).

voluntary performance of virtuous actions. That is, there would be no further motivational requirements for a virtuous action to be productive of virtue,¹¹¹ although it is true that some motives may allow one to perform these actions more consistently, for which reason they would be more effective in leading one to virtue.

Furthermore, since more basic acts such as withstanding fearful things are not, without qualification, virtuous, we can see the precise relationship between performing an action for its own sake and performing an action for the sake of the fine. Aristotle talks of performing virtuous actions such as courageous actions for their own sakes, because, in these cases, the ‘for its own sake’ clause picks out what makes such an action virtuous, whereas talking of withstanding fearful things for its own sake is clearly different from withstanding fearful things for the sake of the fine. In fact, withstanding fearful things for its own sake seems to be an expression of madness rather than of courage.¹¹² There are many ways in which one can withstand fearful things, and it is only when one does so in the way one should that what

¹¹¹ *Contra* Jimenez (2016; 2020, pp. 23, 43, 49, 85), who argues that only virtuous actions that are performed for the sake of the fine (as she argues is the case of actions performed due to shame) contribute to virtue, a claim that she ultimately grounds on the idea, presented in *EN* I.1 1103^a26–32, that we acquire the virtues by first exercising them. Jimenez interprets this claim in light of *Met.* 0.8 1049^b29–1050^a2, a passage in which Aristotle says that the learner must possess something of the science they are learning, in which case it would seem that, to become virtuous, one must exercise a condition that has something of virtue already. As a result, one’s actions would seem to need to be performed well to some extent if they are to contribute to virtue, and, as Jimenez takes it, this would be the case if ‘learners do not aim at the right outcome under a different “motivationally-neutral” description, but rather they aim at the noble goal in so far as it is noble.’ Therefore, it would be possible for non-virtuous agents to, in some cases, aim at fine goals for their own sakes, ‘even if this aiming might be occasional and lack the reliability and firmness that the possession of virtue confers,’ which would account for the presumed fact that some agents repeatedly perform actions that resemble those of courageous people but ultimately do not become courageous, as would be shown by the different kinds of apparent courage (p. 41).

I do not think that this is a correct description of the different kinds of apparent courage, though, for there is good reason for thinking that, with the exception perhaps of citizen soldiers who have a sense of shame, agents who have other courage-like dispositions, for instance, cannot perform courageous actions with the consistency required for acquiring virtue, in which case it would not be so much the fact that they do not perform courageous actions for the sake of the fine that explains why they do not become courageous, but rather the fact that their motives do not track fineness consistently, whereas a sense of shame, even if construed as always giving one heteronomous motives for action, can track the fineness of virtuous actions with a good degree of reliability. Thus, there would be no need to argue that it is only virtuous actions performed for the sake of the fine that contribute to virtue.

¹¹² I thank Daniel Simão Nascimento for this point.

one does happens to be something fine. As a result, the ‘for the sake of the fine’ clause is used when the actions in question are not intrinsically fine, but are fine depending on how they are performed, so that withstanding fearful things for the sake of the fine would amount to withstanding-fearful-things-in-the-way-one-should (i.e., performing a courageous action) for its own sake.

A remaining issue connected to this that should be addressed concerns the relationship between virtuous activities and virtuous actions: are activities brought off on the basis of virtue (i.e. virtuous activities) to be defined in terms of the virtuous performance of virtuous actions?¹¹³ Or are virtuous activities prior to virtuous actions, so that virtuous actions are to be defined by reference to activities on the basis of virtue?¹¹⁴ These two questions are central for understanding the exact reason why virtuous actions are morally valuable, and thus are central for answering (V).

These questions being posed, let me now ask some questions about C2.

0.1.2.2 THE MEANING OF C2 (THE CLAIM THAT AGENTS WHO ARE NOT FULLY VIRTUOUS CAN AIM FOR ENDS THAT ARE FINE AND THUS IN A SENSE RIGHT AS WELL)

C2 is not only ambiguous, but, in some of its formulations, controversial as well. No doubt there is a sense in which C2 is completely trivial. If what is meant by aiming for an end that is fine is understood extensionally, then what we have is a truism, for nothing hinders one from aiming for something that just happens to be fine, even if unbeknownst to the agent. So understood, C2 is perfectly compatible with C1, but if this is all there is to C2, then it may seem that we have paid too high a price to reconcile it with C1, for it would seem to imply that all agents who are not fully virtuous are fundamentally mistaken about their moral

¹¹³ This is the ‘adverbial reading’ of virtuous activities, different versions of which can be found in Hirji (2018), Jimenez (2016; 2020), and Hampson (2019; 2021; 2022).

¹¹⁴ Something along those lines has been recently proposed by Fernandez (2021).

values, for, as long as they are not fully virtuous, they will not see fine ends as worth pursuing *for their own sakes*, but only for some further non-fine reason.

This is certainly true of some agents who are not fully virtuous, but one might still think that it need not be true of all of them. Indeed, in *EN* VII.10 1152^a8–9, for instance, Aristotle appears to suggest that there is a sense in which the *φρόνιμος* and the incontinent agent share the same knowledge about what they should do (*ἔτι οὐ τῶ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς οὐ πρακτικός*), except that the incontinent has knowledge not as someone who knows in the sense of contemplating, but as someone who is asleep or mildly drunk (VII.10 1152^a14–15: *οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος*).¹¹⁵ What this appears to imply is that some agents who are not fully virtuous (like the incontinent) are not completely in the dark when it comes to determining what they should do, even though their success may indeed be in some sense accidental (since it could still be the case that they are not guided by the intrinsic fineness of the actions they intend to perform, but by some feature of these actions that is different from their intrinsic fineness). If this is correct, it would seem that intermediate agents can, to some limited extent at least, share the agential perspective of fully virtuous agents.¹¹⁶ An obvious way of making

¹¹⁵ Similarly, see Whiting and Pickavé (2008, p. 356). Pace J. Müller (2022, p. 150), who states that Aristotle never says that the incontinent (and the continent) ‘have knowledge of the good, even as he says that their reason is praised (because it urges them towards good things) and that they reason correctly and decide on the right actions.’ As we shall see below, there is still a sense in which such agents do not have such knowledge. In any case, it is hard to deny that *EN* VII.10 1152^a8–15 is attributing some sort of knowledge about the good to incontinent agents. Similarly, in *Pol.* VII.15 1334^b10–12, Aristotle states that ‘it is possible for reason to be mistaken about the best supposition, and for one to be carried away in a similar fashion by one’s habits’ (*ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἡχθαι*), a claim that is compatible with the idea that some agents hold a correct supposition about what they should do while still being led astray by their habits, which would seem to be a possible description of what happens in episodes of incontinence and of softness.

¹¹⁶ The idea that adopting someone else’s agential perspective is central in the process of becoming virtuous comes from Hampson (2019; 2022), who thinks that attempting to see things as the virtuous person does is fundamental for bringing into view the features of an action in which its fineness is manifested, and thus for learning how to truly appreciate the fine (similarly, see Lovibond [1996, p. 87] for a description of this phenomenon in terms of connivance). However, different from Hampson, I do not think that we should concede that, *qua* learner, one can adopt that perspective in such a way that one can decide on virtuous actions on their own account without thereby being fully virtuous (even though, on Hampson’s view, one

sense of this is to grant that such agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes so that they could, for instance, decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, or else for the sake of, say, becoming virtuous (in the latter case they would decide on virtuous actions not due to their intrinsic fineness, but due to the fact that they are productive of virtue, which is something fine that is necessary if these agents are ever to be *εὐδαίμονες*).

However, these are not the only alternatives.

It is worth noting that Aristotle never explicitly describes the sort of knowledge shared by the incontinent as being about the good and the fine as such. In the only passage in which Aristotle gives content to the knowledge of the incontinent and of the continent, he rather says that the incontinent ‘<acts> due to emotion *despite knowing that they do base things*’ (1145^b12–13: *ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος*) and that the continent ‘does not follow <their appetites> due to reason *because they know their appetites are base*’

would not be able to do that consistently if one lacks full virtue). I shall argue that only full virtue allows one to properly grasp and value the fineness of virtuous actions, even though, in adopting *to some extent* the agential perspective of a fully virtuous person, one may be able to track fineness with some consistency even before becoming fully virtuous oneself. Thus, there will be different degrees to which one can adopt the agential perspective of a fully virtuous agent. A full adoption of that perspective allows one to grasp the fineness of virtuous actions and to be thereby motivated to act, but, as I take it, only fully virtuous agents can do that. However, one may also be said to adopt that perspective either in so far as i) one in some way subscribes to a correct conception of *εὐδαιμονία* (either explicitly in a fully articulated and coherent way, or else implicitly by being committed to things that point to a potentially articulable correct conception of *εὐδαιμονία*) so that one can see virtuous actions as contributing to it somehow—for instance, in so far as voluntarily performing these actions will lead one to virtue—, or else in so far as ii) one knows what things are base or fine, but not under the correct conception of baseness and fineness, for agents who are not fully virtuous simply cannot grasp and value the intrinsic fineness of virtuous actions and the intrinsic baseness of vicious actions, but, if anything, some other feature of these actions that is different from their fineness and baseness respectively, but that may still be fundamentally connected to it (and that may even be coextensive with it), to the effect that grasping these features is enough for knowing *that* these actions are fine or base, even though these features would not capture the reason *why* these actions are fine or base.

For the idea that the incontinent must share the agential perspective of the fully virtuous agent only to a limited extent, see McDowell (1996b, §5): ‘[t]he essential thing is to realize that Aristotle’s aim in connection with *akrasia* is to characterize a person whose practical thought comes as close as possible, consistently with a failure of action, to matching the practical thought, not of a possessor of just any kind of practically oriented intellectual excellence, but specifically of a person who has “practical wisdom” (*phronēsis*).’ However, as we saw in footnote 106, it seems that McDowell would say that the incontinent does not fully share the agential perspective of a fully virtuous agent in that they do not fully share the virtuous person’s perception of the situation. Yet, as I have suggested, perhaps the extent to which agents who fail to be fully virtuous can share the agential perspective of a fully virtuous agent is even more limited.

(1145^b13–14: ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον).

No doubt the claims in these two passages may not express, so formulated at least, Aristotle's own view, since these claims are advanced in the listing of ἔνδοξα that begins in 1145^b8ff. Yet if this is indeed Aristotle's position,¹¹⁷ two things are noteworthy:

First, these passages may be taken as ascribing to incontinent and continent agents only knowledge that something is base or is to be avoided, but not knowledge that something is good.¹¹⁸ Second, it might be argued that continent and incontinent agents do not have knowledge of what is base as such or of what is good or fine as such, and thus of the goodness or fineness of their ends₃, but only knowledge *that* an action is base or fine, which is still compatible with their not having knowledge in the same way as the fully virtuous agent has.¹¹⁹

The first observation should not worry us now and there may be some ways around it, although it may be thought to be relevant for distinguishing conflicted agents such as those who are continent and incontinent from civically virtuous agents (even though, as we shall see, nothing hinders continent and incontinent agents from having civic virtues, at least at first glance—note, however, that they would not be, in any sense, virtuous in those domains of their lives in which they are such as to experience continence or incontinence).

The second observation, in turn, seems to offer us a way of making sense of the idea that some agents who are not fully virtuous share the agential perspective of the φρόνιμοι

¹¹⁷ Perhaps the only difference between what Aristotle holds and what these claims convey is that, for Aristotle, incontinent agents do not know, without qualification, that what they do is base, but only know it *universally*. For the Aristotelian distinction between knowing *universally* and knowing *simpliciter*, see Morison (2011).

¹¹⁸ Similarly, later in *EN* VII, in chapter 5 [=Bywater 3], Aristotle describes the conclusion made by reason in the syllogism that causally explains the incontinent action as stating that *this sweet thing is to be avoided*, and this conclusion comes from a universal premise stating that one should avoid tasting sweets.

¹¹⁹ In that case, the 'βελτίστη ὑπόθεσις' mentioned in *Pol.* VII.15 1334^b10–12 (quoted in footnote 115) would perhaps not be making reference to how one conceives of one's ultimate end or one's situation-specific goal (possibilities that I have entertained above in footnote 38), but to the true proposition about what one should do that even incontinent agents may entertain, a proposition that may not necessarily convey the reasons that normatively justify doing what one should.

without constraining us to countenance that they can aim for fine ends for their own sakes.

In fact, it is perfectly possible that continent and incontinent agents hold that, say, virtuous actions are fine or that vicious actions are base not due to the intrinsic fineness or baseness of such actions, but in so far as they see virtuous actions as, say, honourable or pleasant and vicious actions as, say, shameful or painful.¹²⁰ In that case, it seems that at least some agents who are not fully virtuous would be able to share the agential perspective of fully virtuous agents to the extent that they know (at the very least universally) which actions are base and which actions are fine, although they do not hold that for the right reasons, since they do not properly grasp the fineness of virtuous actions (and, conversely, the baseness of vicious actions).

Now, in asking whether agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for fine ends, I shall only examine whether *some* agents who are neither completely virtuous nor completely vicious can do that. I do not intend to ask whether any agent of that sort can aim for fine ends, but only if those who are on the continuum between continence and incontinence and who are

¹²⁰ There are different ways of construing this claim. For now, I would only like to point out that it is not so clear whether the same would apply to ends of action as well depending on how we describe them. The view that agents who are not fully virtuous can have correct beliefs about the goals of action and can even think that they are fine is advanced by Coope (2012, p. 159), who claims that continent agents ‘can have the right beliefs about the goals of action (and even about whether or not those goals are fine),’ to which she adds that, because they are not virtuous, these goals do not strike them as fine. Yet matters may not be quite so, for goals of action may be taken to behave like immediate propositions in that they do not admit of explanations (cf. *EE* II.11 1227^b22–33—see **T 29** below). In that case, in holding that fine goals are fine, agents who are not fully virtuous would not think of these goals *qua* intrinsically fine, but *qua* something else, since they 1) do not really grasp the intrinsic fineness of these goals, and 2) conflate fineness with some value distinct from it (for instance, pleasantness or honourableness)—see footnote 56. Yet it is not so clear whether all goals of action are immediate propositions of the same sort, since, in a sense, all goals that are for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία* can (on some interpretations at least) be said to be good in so far as they contribute to *εὐδαιμονία* somehow. In that case, there would be a difference to be drawn between one’s ultimate goal (which would behave like a primary subject kind in a science) and one’s situation-specific goals (which would behave like subordinate subject kinds of a science, whose *that it is* can be demonstrated). In fact, the goodness of the latter would not be underived, but dependent upon their contributing to *εὐδαιμονία*, for their being intrinsically fine would be, in a sense, explained by their being constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* rightly conceived (irrespective of how the agent aims for these ends and of how they conceive of their own *εὐδαιμονία*). As I take it, settling this issue depends on another issue I have already touched upon in footnote 61, which had to do with Aristotle’s views on morality and on the relationship between fine actions and *εὐδαιμονία*.

in some way committed to¹²¹ performing virtuous actions can do so—such as agents who are, without qualification, continent, resistant, soft, or incontinent (*ἐγκρατεῖς*, *καρτερικοί*, *μαλακοί*, or *ἀκρατεῖς* respectively), as well as some of the agents that are so called in a qualified

¹²¹ This caveat is necessary to account for impetuosity (*προπέτεια*), since Aristotle denies that impetuous agents have deliberated (or have finished their deliberations) in episodes of impetuosity (see *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^b19–22 and 25–27, VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a1–5), for which reason it seems that they have not actually decided to—or, at least, concluded through deliberation that they should—perform virtuous actions while in an episode of impetuosity. Moreover, as we saw at the initial paragraphs of section 0.1, it is not so clear whether weakness (*ἀσθένεια*) involves *προαίρεσις* as well, although weak agents are said to have deliberated. At any rate, all incontinent agents are said to act *παρὰ προαίρεσιν* (cf. *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a4–11 and VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a5–10—on the significance of this claim, see Cagnoli Fieconi [2018, pp. 233ff]).

Notwithstanding this, it seems that this claim can be understood as implying considerably different things:

A first alternative is to understand it as implying that (i) not all moral decisions are actually deliberated, so that ‘even when there has actually been no deliberation, the attempt to explain what one has done will take the form of setting out a course of deliberation by which one might have decided to do what one has done, and which contains the reasons one actually had in acting’ (Cooper, 1975, pp. 9–10; similarly, see McDowell, 1979/1998c, p. 66n22), in which case impetuous agents could be described as making undeliberated *προαιρέσεις*, which, if asked, they can latter ground offering deliberative reasons.

A second alternative is to understand it as implying that (ii) impetuous agents are committed to performing virtuous actions in some other way, in which case *προαίρεσις* (in *παρὰ προαίρεσιν*) either (a) is being used in a non-technical sense, and picks out the commitment to perform a virtuous action in so far as it reflects one’s commitment to act on one’s conception of the end (for this line, see Cagnoli Fieconi [2018, p. 240], whose view is to some extent anticipated by Aubenque [1963/1993, p. 120], who thinks that in *EN* VII Aristotle uses *προαίρεσις* to talk about one’s intention, and not, more specifically, about one’s decisions); or (b) refers to some prior decision made by the impetuous agent that may function as a sort of general policy by exercising its causal influence indirectly (for this line, see Irwin [1988d, p. 59]).

Deciding between (i), (iia), and (iib) depends on two things: on how we construe Aristotle’s theory of decision, and on how exactly we understand *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater *EN* VII.4] 1148^a6–10, a passage in which Aristotle characterises as incontinent *sans phrase* the person who pursues excessive pleasures not due to having decided on it, but *παρὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν*. I think that there are two suitable ways of understanding this passage: first, taking the *καί* as introducing an alternative, such that Aristotle would be saying that incontinent agents act either against a decision or against their thought (this latter case would be picking out impetuous agents); second, taking the *καί* as expegetic, such that Aristotle would be saying that all incontinent agents act against something which is not properly speaking a decision, but is rather closer to thought (this also seems to be the view of Aspasius on the *προαίρεσις* of incontinent agents—see *CAG*. XIX.1, 137.24–26 and 141.6–7). In either case, I think that something along the lines of (iia) would be preferable, even though both (i) and (iib) can also make sense of this passage, since *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a6–10 can be interpreted as saying that incontinent agents act against both their decision and thought, which would require us to admit either the existence of something like undeliberated decisions (i.e., [i]) or that previous decisions can have some indirect influence on matters which one has not even deliberated about (i.e., [iib])—such that, in a way, even in circumstances in which an incontinent agent has not made any decision, it can still be said that they are acting *παρὰ προαίρεσιν*.

Alternatively, (iii) Segvic (2009, pp. 152–153) holds both that ‘[i]n saying that the quick-tempered and the ardent fail to “wait for reason,” Aristotle probably wants to say that they do not pause to reflect on their action, or to calculate its consequences’ and that ‘both the impetuous and the weak akratics have exercised their deliberative abilities well enough to be credited with having the right choice,’ to the effect that impetuous agents would not have deliberated in the narrow, more calculative, sense of the word, but

manner.¹²² For short, I shall henceforth refer to these agents as *intermediate agents*.

As a result, I do not intend to extend my claims to completely vicious agents or to agents who are on the continuum between continence and incontinence but are not in a relevant sense committed to performing virtuous actions.¹²³ I shall only ask whether *some* agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for fine ends, namely intermediate agents.¹²⁴ Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that continent and incontinent agents really are, in some sense, virtuous and vicious respectively (in that regard, see *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a24–25, VII.11 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b28–30, 1152^a15–17, *EE* II.11 1227^b16, and *EN* III.15 [=By-

would have deliberated in the sense that they have arrived at a decision. Yet saying that Aristotle has a non-technical account of deliberation in mind when he discusses impetuous akrasia is highly implausible, as Cagnoli Fiecconi (2018, p. 235) argues, for which reason I think we should reject (iii).

At any rate, my contention is twofold: first, that being committed to performing virtuous actions would not necessarily be tantamount to having deliberated about performing a virtuous action, but would only imply that the agent has an intention to perform virtuous actions given the ends they are committed to even if they have not decided on it or deliberated about it in face of the circumstances they are faced with; and second that acting against such a commitment is all that is necessary for characterising an episode of *ἀκρασία*, such that not all incontinent agents (and perhaps no incontinent agent) must be characterised as acting against decisions in the technical sense of the word. For a very subtle distinction between acting with an intention, on purpose, and deliberately, see Austin (1966, pp. 437–440).

¹²² This should not include agents who are, for instance, ‘inverse akratics,’ since it is possible to argue that they actually decide on, or are in a relevant sense committed to, performing vicious actions, but end up, due to their character disposition, performing virtuous actions (though not on the basis of decision). For a different view, according to which inverse akratics are also committed in a relevant sense to performing virtuous actions in so far as the desire that leads them to perform virtuous actions (in opposition to their *βούλησις*) would be another *βούλησις*, see Cagnoli Fiecconi (2018, pp. 245–254). Frede (2019, p. 110) also thinks that there would be a type of *ἀκρασία* due to *βούλησις*, though she does not develop what the implications of that would be. Yet, in her commentaries on inverse *ἀκρασία* (Frede, 2020, vol. 2, p. 772), she only says that the case of Neoptolemus is about a fine pleasure that springs from truthfulness, and not a physical pleasure, but she does not specify whether this sort of incontinent agent acts on the basis of a rational desire; earlier, in her commentary on the *aporia* of inverse *ἀκρασία* (Frede, 2020, vol. 2, p. 730), she only observes that Neoptolemus’ not acting on the basis of his decision is not due to his appetite, his decision being overridden by a good emotion instead, namely the pain of misleading Philoctetes.

¹²³ As pointed out in footnote 122, this would exclude all agents who are not rationally committed to performing virtuous actions.

¹²⁴ Note that in doing so I shall not be concerned with whether completely vicious agents can be convinced by true claims about the intrinsic goodness of the end they should aim at (even if this means that they are not completely vicious anymore), and hence with whether they can become better by means of the exercise of reason (as already indicated in footnote 24). I mean, I shall not examine whether they can voluntarily perform virtuous actions by means of an exercise of reason that opposes their non-rational desires and do that for the sake of a fine end. In any case, it seems that if they can do that, they would cease from being completely vicious, in which case, *qua* completely vicious agents, people cannot aim for morally good ends, but they may still be able to improve *qua* human beings—it remains to see, though, whether ceasing from being vicious is really up to the agent, or depends instead on things that are not up to them, for instance, on punishment and other educational measures aimed at improving people’s moral character (see also footnote 160 below). At any rate, this issue lies out of the scope of this thesis, as already mentioned in footnote 24.

water III.9] 1128^b33–34),¹²⁵ and that the same is certainly true of intermediate agents in general, although Aristotle is silent about that.

0.1.2.2.1 *C2 as a claim about intermediate agents*

Restricting the scope of the investigation regarding **C2** to intermediate agents is not inconsequential, but is directly connected to two claims I would also like to defend, namely that virtues that are natural or habituated are not sufficient for one's ends₁₋₃ to be fine (for which reason they would not be enough for making one's ends *right* in some sense)¹²⁶—**C2.1**—, and the claim that intermediate agents, as conceived of by Aristotle, are characterised as committed to an end that is right in some sense, even though they are not committed to such ends for their own sakes, i.e., *qua* something fine—**C2.2**.

This second claim (i.e., **C2.2**) faces two issues that are deeply connected. First, it is not immediately clear how exactly the ends aimed at by intermediate agents would be right. Indeed, depending on how we answer (III) and (IV), our answer to this question will differ considerably.

¹²⁵ There is a question as to whether it would not be better to say that intermediate agents are rather neither good nor bad. Yet I do not think that this would be adequate for describing intermediate agents in the Aristotelian jargon.

¹²⁶ My contention here is that making an end right is something that requires reason, such that a condition of one's non-rational part of the soul is not sufficient for that, although it might be in some sense necessary. As we shall see, there is a compelling case for thinking that natural and habituated virtues are conditions that make one's non-rational desires aim for what they should (although, as Aristotle says in *EN* VI.13 1144^b8–9, without *νοῦς* natural virtue seems to be harmful), and which, by themselves, do not make one's *βούλησις* right as well. In fact, there is a good case to be made to the effect that natural virtues are exemplified by conditions such as the courage of *θυμός*, in which case natural virtues would not be enough to secure the rightness of one's ends₁₋₃, although they may lead one to perform virtuous actions with some degree of reliability. Yet, if habituated virtues are not only conditions related to one's non-rational desires (like natural virtue) but include dispositions such as civic virtue, then although agents who have habituated virtues would have ends₃ that are fine, their ends₁₋₃ will not still be right in the sense secured by full virtue, since civically courageous agents, for instance, do not perform courageous actions because these actions are fine, but rather for the sake of external goods such as honour. As a result, habituated virtue would not be enough for securing that one's ends₁₋₂ are fine, but, if anything, for securing that they are good. Yet, as I shall point out below, nothing hinders civically virtuous agents from adopting ends that are indeed fine, provided they are not committed to these ends for their own sakes, i.e., provided they are not committed to these ends under a correct conception of fineness (see footnote 56).

If we answer (III) saying that virtue is not necessary for making the end(s) right, then irrespective of whether our ends₃ are situation-specific goals or correspond to our ultimate end, it seems clear that, on this reading, the ends₁₋₃ aimed at by intermediate agents can be said to be right in the same way as the ends₁₋₃ aimed at by fully virtuous agents, except that intermediate agents would not be able to aim for right ends₁₋₂ and to fulfil their right ends₃ consistently,¹²⁷ for they would be prone to err in some circumstances. In fact, on this reading, nothing would hinder intermediate agents from having ends₁₋₃ that are fine and from aiming for right ends₃ for their own sakes.

But if we answer (III) saying that virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right, then matters are not so simple.

If ends₃ are assumed to be situation-specific goals, it seems that the only way of maintaining that full virtue is necessary for making these ends right while still conceding that intermediate agents can aim for ends that are right is to distinguish between two different levels of rightness. As a result, although intermediate agents would be able to aim for ends₃ that are fine (and, thus, in a sense right), they would be committed to such ends not for their own sakes or on their own account, but due to some feature of these ends that is to be distinguished (at the very least in hyperintension) from their intrinsic fineness. Yet, in that case, their ends₁₋₂ would also not be right in the sense these ends are right for fully virtuous agents, since intermediate agents would not conclude by means of deliberation that virtuous actions (*qua* virtuous) are to be decided on on their own account, and hence would not be able to perform such actions for their own sakes. The upshot is that *only their ends₃* could coincide

¹²⁷ In case our end₃ corresponds to our ultimate end, it seems that the idea is not quite that intermediate agents do not consistently aim for their ultimate end conceived of correctly, but rather that they are not consistent in doing things that contribute to it even though they may correctly see what it consists in and how it is structured, which would explain why their ends₁₋₂ would not always be right and why subordinate ends₃, which are intermediate between their ultimate end and their ends₂, are not always right as well (I shall distinguish between subordinate and superordinate ends₃ below).

with the ends₃ of fully virtuous agents, although the ends₃ of intermediate agents would not be right in the same sense as the ends₃ of fully virtuous agents, which besides being fine are also aimed at for their own sakes.

But if one's end₃ corresponds to one's ultimate end, then intermediate agents may be said to have a right end₃ in that they may correctly identify the values constitutive of *εὐδαιμονία* and how they are related to one another hierarchically (for which reason their end₃ would be right). Yet they would still not have an end₃ that is right in the same way as the end₃ of a fully virtuous agent, for they would not fully understand the value of their ultimate end. Accordingly, they would be prone to fail to identify the actions that are called for for the sake of their ultimate end in some circumstances¹²⁸ (a tendency that may nevertheless remain an unfulfilled possibility in the course of the lives of a few fortunate agents¹²⁹). On this reading, not only would the end₃ of intermediate agents coincide with the end₃ of fully virtuous agents, but intermediate agents may also be said to be right in regard to ends they take to be for the sake of their end₃ but which still do not correspond to their end₂:

For instance, if i) in the course of deliberation someone assumes that in order to fulfil one's ultimate end as one conceives of it one must, in the current circumstances, do something that achieves the goal of, say, saving someone else's life and deliberates about how to do that, and ii) if saving someone else's life happens to be something fine to achieve in the

¹²⁸ As Irwin (1988d, p. 71) puts it: '[i]n this case, he [sc., the incontinent] will have the right view about what his good consists in, and he will be wrong about the occasions on which it is rational for him to follow his conception of his good.'

¹²⁹ Similarly, see Irwin (1988d, p. 87n36), who contrasting his view of Aristotle's account of continence with the account advanced by Woods (1986) says: 'I am more inclined to say that they [sc., continent people] lack the right counterfactual stability in their judgments (i.e., they would still be merely continent even if they never faced the sort of situation where the difference between their outlook and the virtuous outlook is exposed in their action),' which stability Irwin takes to signal that the continent (just like the incontinent) do not conceive of their end correctly in the first place, the idea being that '[s]ince they do not think properly about these counterfactual circumstances, they do not realize that they have the wrong view about them; and so, if the circumstances actually arise, incontinents reveal the wrong view they held all along' (p. 71).

current circumstances if achieved in one of the ways it is possible to achieve it in the current circumstances, then the agent who aims for this end can be said to aim for a right end for its own sake (since pursuing this end in such a way is constitutive of one's ultimate end as one conceives of it).

These other right ends aimed at by intermediate agents would be ends located between their ultimate end (an end_3) and the $ends_2$ to which they may be committed for the sake of their ultimate end. Thus, it may perhaps be useful to distinguish between two types of $ends_3$, so that one's ultimate end as one conceives of it¹³⁰ would be one's superordinate (or second order) end_3 , and those ends for whose sake we may deliberate in trying to determine by means of deliberation how our ultimate end is to be fulfilled would be our subordinate (or first order) $ends_3$.

Provided with this distinction, one could say that intermediate agents, despite not conceiving of their ultimate end correctly in that they do not fully understand it, would still be able to aim at subordinate $ends_3$ that are fine and to hold a conception of their ultimate end that is right in so far as they correctly identify the constituents of their ultimate end and their relationship to one another. Yet they would still not be fully reliable in identifying justifiable means for attaining those subordinate $ends_3$ and even in identifying subordinate $ends_3$ that are situationally adequate. Besides, it seems that, on this reading, nothing would really hinder intermediate agents for having the same $ends_{1-2}$ as fully virtuous agents in some circumstances, although they may not always share these ends with fully virtuous agents in so far as they are such as to fail to identify what must be done for the sake of their right superordinate and subordinate $ends_3$. Yet, as I have already pointed out, there are difficulties that suggest that this reading should be rejected.

¹³⁰ On what I have in mind here talking of one's ultimate end as one conceives of it, see pages 47 to 49.

In either case, if virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right, intermediate agents may be said to share the agential perspective of fully virtuous agents in being committed to ends₃ that are fine even if, as in the first case, they are not committed to these ends for their own sakes but due to some other feature of these ends that is still different from their fineness (even though it might be connected to their fineness in such a way that it is coextensive with it), or if, as in the second case, they do not fully understand the value of these ends.

Besides, as I have already indicated, even if ends₃ are construed as situation-specific goals, one's ultimate end (and how one can be said to conceive of it) may still have a central place, not because it might be the case that some agents can deliberate for the sake of their ultimate ends in some circumstances (for instance, in circumstances in which what should be done is not so clear to them), but because the way in which they aim for situation-specific goals may be reflective of how they pursue their ultimate end, and thus of how they can be said to conceive of their ultimate end in that the desirability characterisations under which they aim for the situation-specific goals they aim for are dependent (in some way) on a single value around which these agents may be said to organize their lives, even if they have no articulated (or fully articulated) conception of their ultimate end (cf. the discussion in **pages 47 to 49**).

The second issue connected to the claim that intermediate agents are characterised as committed to an end that is right (i.e., **C2.2**) is whether the fact that intermediate agents are committed to such ends depends on their being in some sense virtuous in areas of their lives in which they are not such as to experience those psychological conflicts that characterise them as intermediate agents. For instance, whether the possibility of a person who is *sans phrase* incontinent (and thus has shameful *ἐπιθυμίας* for bodily pleasures) aiming for ends that are right depends on their being, say, naturally generous and/or courageous, although they are not naturally temperate, since in this area of their lives their character disposition is closer to that

of an intemperate person. Now, since this issue is connected to that regarding the condition required for being convinced about the goodness or fineness of things that are really good or fine (see footnote 24), I shall refrain from fully discussing it.

In any case, as already suggested in footnote 126, I would still like to argue that being to some extent *σπουδαῖος* is not sufficient for having an end that is in some sense right (i.e., my C2.1)—in contrast to being *fully σπουδαῖος*¹³¹—, even though it might turn out to be necessary for that.¹³²

I think that we should restrict C2 to intermediate agents because they are the best candidates for agents who can aim for fine ends for their own sakes. Yet, as should be clear by now, this is not the only way in which intermediate agents may be committed to fine ends, for it might be the case (as I think it is) that they are committed to right ends only in that they aim for ends that are fine, but not for their own sakes (even though they may be committed to fine ends for reasons that can reliably track their fineness).¹³³

0.1.2.2.2. Question (VI): can intermediate agents aim for fine ends for their own sakes?

In order to determine the exact meaning of C2, I shall then ask (VI) whether *intermediate agents* can aim for fine ends for their own sakes. My hypothesis, as should be clear, is

¹³¹ Aristotle uses the language of being fully *σπουδαῖος* in *EE* VII.2 1237^a6–9 implicitly suggesting that incontinent agents are *σπουδαῖος* to some extent: ‘the way is through what is pleasant, for it is necessary for fine things to be pleasant. But whenever these things are in disagreement, <it is necessary> that one is still not fully virtuous, for it is possible for incontinence to arise, since the good disagreeing with what is pleasant in the emotions is incontinence’ (διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὀδός· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνῆ, οὐπω σπουδαῖος [codd.: σπουδαῖον Richards Walzer & Mingay Rowe] τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τὸ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ ἡδέι ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν).

¹³² I thank Professor Marco Zingano for pressing me to take a position on this point.

¹³³ And, in case ends₃ are not situation-specific goals, this could be construed as saying that intermediate agents can heteronomously share the agential perspective of agents who are fully virtuous (to which extent they need to share that perspective, however, is not so clear). In that case, even if they are mistaken about their ultimate end in that they do not correctly identify its constituents and/or how they are related to one another hierarchically, they may be committed to subordinate ends₃ that are fine. Yet, as already indicated, this faces some issues in so far as thinking of one’s ultimate end as an end₃ is in some regards implausible, since in many cases it is simply not an end for whose sake one deliberates.

that they can aim for fine ends, but not for their own sakes.

But why should we ask about fine ends in the first place? As I shall argue, for Aristotle, τὸ καλόν indicates what is, in itself, *morally good*, in contrast to things that, in themselves, are not morally good, but good nevertheless. Thus, by ‘aiming for an end that is fine’ I intend to ask whether intermediate agents can have a βούλησις for an end that is, in itself, morally right. No doubt this can be understood as compatible with aiming for ends that someone does not aim at for their own sakes, but due to some further end (even though these ends are indeed morally right),¹³⁴ since, as already indicated, if this claim is understood extensionally, then

¹³⁴ In fact, although Aristotle says that βουλήσεις are mostly of the end (cf. *EE* II. 1226^a13–14: βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος; similarly, see *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a15 and *MM* A.XVII.2ff 1189^a11ff), this claim is seemingly compatible with one having a βούλησις for a means to this end, provided this βούλησις somehow depends on the βούλησις one has for that end. There are signs of this in *EE* II.8 1224^a3–4 (see footnote 17) and in *EE* II.10 1227^a3–5, a passage in which a βούλησις resulting from deliberation is described as one of the components of προαίρεσις (alongside with an opinion resulting from deliberation). More decisive evidence that this is Aristotle’s position can be found in *EE* VII.2 1238^b8–9, a passage in which Aristotle explains the claim that the friend will wish for the unqualified goods unqualifiedly and for things good for him *ex hypothesi* (in so far as poverty or disease are beneficial, these things being for the sake of what is unqualifiedly good, just like also drinking medicine itself) saying the following: ‘for one does not wish <this thing> [sc., drinking medicine itself], but wishes <this thing> for the sake of this [sc., what is unqualifiedly good]’ (οὐ γὰρ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ’ ἕνεκα βούλεται). Despite the compressed argument in this passage, it is at any rate clear that Aristotle is here admitting that one can have a βούλησις of the means in that one can have a βούλησις of the means as being for the sake of their end.

If this is correct, the claim made by Aristotle in *EN* III.4 [=Bywater III.2] 1111^b26–27, which contrasts βούλησις and προαίρεσις by saying that the latter is of the means to an end, whereas the first is μάλλον of the end should be understood as saying not that βούλησις is only of the end (in which case μάλλον would be translated as ‘rather’), but that it is more of the end than it is of the means to an end, since one can only have a βούλησις for a means to an end if one also has a βούλησις for that end as well (for βουλήσεις for means are βουλήσεις for means as being for the sake of an end for which one also has a βούλησις). That is, βούλησις would be primarily of the end (similarly, see Zingano [2008, pp. 167–168]).

It should be noted that the same is not true of προαίρεσις. In fact, although it is grammatically possible to construe *EN* III.4 [=Bywater III.2] 1111^b26–27, as Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 195) proposed, taking the μάλλον from the first clause of ‘ἔτι δ’ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλλον, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος’ to be understood in the second clause as well (or, by the same token, construing *EE* II.10 1226^a16–17 taking the μάλιστα from the first clause of ‘βούλεσθαι μὲν καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν’ to be understood in the second clause as well), this is at odds with what Aristotle says in other passages. If μάλλον is understood as indicating not only that βούλησις is primarily (but not exclusively) of the end but also that προαίρεσις is primarily (but not exclusively) of what contributes to the end, then Aristotle would be admitting that προαιρέσεις, in the technical sense Aristotle has in mind here, can also be something one has of ends. Yet he is explicit in saying that no one deliberates about ends (cf. *EN* III.5 [=Bywater III.3] 1112^b11–12: βουλευόμεθα δ’ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη). As a result, given that the object of προαίρεσις and the object βούλησις only differ in that the first has been determined already (cf. *EN* III.5 [=Bywater III.3] 1113^a2–4: βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν), it would not make sense for Aristotle to say

it would be possible to say that one aims for a morally right end if one aims for something that just happens to be what is morally required, irrespective of whether the agent is in some sense aware of its rightness and of whether they aim for it *qua* something morally right. In that case, claiming that intermediate agents can aim for morally right ends may be completely trivial (though, as we saw, not necessarily), since someone could even argue that vicious agents are able to aim for fine ends, provided they do not desire these for their own sakes.¹³⁵ Yet it need not be trivial, since one may aim for fine ends due to some feature of fine ends that is different from their fineness but which can still track fine ends with some reliability (say, in so far as fine ends are honourable *and* not shameful).¹³⁶

that ends are not object of deliberation, but are nevertheless object of decision. Similarly, for the idea that *βούλησις* is a desire for a rationally conceived goal, and, derivatively, for constituents of it and means to it, seen as such,' see Nussbaum (2009, pp. 335-336). This does not mean, however, that Aristotle would here completely agree with Kant's claim about imperatives of prudence to the effect that whoever wills the end also wills the mean (cf. *GMS*, Ak. IV, p. 417.8-10, pp. 417.30-418.1) depending on how one construes this, for in many cases having a *βούλησις* for an end does not necessarily imply that one will also have a *βούλησις* for what contributes to this end, for there might be cases in which the agent may forbear desiring the means in that they think it is not justifiable to pursue that course of action through these particular means in the circumstances they are being faced with. And if these are the only means through which that end can be achieved, the agent may forbear achieving that end in the circumstances they are being faced with: although the agent initially wills the end, they end up not willing the end anymore when they correctly assess the circumstances they are being faced with, for which reason they do not end up willing the means to these ends.

¹³⁵ That is, it would be possible to say that a vicious agent can aim for a right end if they take it to be, in some sense, a means to a bad end they desire. Yet this argument would seem to depend on vicious agents being able to voluntarily perform virtuous actions in so far as these actions could be taken by them as intermediate ends that contribute to an end they actually desire in itself. For the claim that vicious agents can perform virtuous actions, see, for instance, Gauthier (1958, p. 75). Now, it seems that some qualifications are necessary to make this a feasible claim. In any case, if we admit that aiming for fine ends is a claim compatible with aiming for an end that is desired only in so far as it is an instrumental means to a further end, it could be admitted that intermediate agents aim for morally right ends even if they pursue these ends only in so far as they contribute to the acquisition of external goods, like the civically virtuous agents described in *EE* VIII.3 do (more on that below in **Chapter 2, section 2.3.3**).

¹³⁶ The reliability with which honourableness and non-shamefulness can track fine ends depends on how one conceives of these values in the first place. No doubt only virtuous actions are proper objects of honour (to the effect that being honourable would be coextensive with being virtuous), but it is not so clear how agents who are not fully virtuous can see which actions are proper objects of honour depending on how they have been brought up and on how honour is conferred by those they think are virtuous in the city and on whose judgment they trust and respect. Moreover, although vicious actions are proper objects of reproach (to the effect that being reproachable is coextensive with being vicious), depending on how one has been brought up and on how reproaches and reproaches are imposed by the laws of the city, one might not always be able to avoid vicious actions in avoiding actions one takes to be shameful, for one would not conceive of shameful actions correctly unless one were fully virtuous. Despite these shortcomings, however, the pursuit of honour and the avoidance of reproach seem to be quite good guides for the practice of virtuous actions

Thus, (VI) is a more interesting question if it asks whether at least some of the ends₃ desired by intermediate agents are not only desired by them for their own sakes (besides being choiceworthy for their own sakes), but also praiseworthy for their own sakes, i.e., are not only taken to be fine (*καλά*), but are really fine.¹³⁷ In fact, if only the first condition were met (that is, if the ends in question were desired for their own sakes and were choiceworthy for their own sakes, but were not praiseworthy in themselves, i.e., were not fine), we would have once again an almost trivial claim, since there are some genuine ends (things that are choiceworthy for their own sakes) that are morally relevant only incidentally, such as health or strength.¹³⁸

and the avoidance of vicious actions when combined (and, as we shall see, it seems that, for Aristotle, they are indeed combined in agents who have a sense of shame), even though they may fail on some occasions. Besides, if intermediate agents turn out to be indeed virtuous to some extent in those domains of their lives in which they are not such as to experience the psychological conflicts by which they are characterised, it seems that their virtuous characters in these domains may save them quite frequently from errors they can be led to in reasoning about how to pursue honour and to avoid shame—see the discussion of *EE* VII.2 1247^b18–38 (T 40) below in **Chapter 2, section 2.3.3**.

¹³⁷ On a minimal interpretation of *EE* VII.3 1248^b18–26, *καλά* are those ends (understood as good things that are choiceworthy for their own sakes) that are praiseworthy while being choiceworthy in themselves, that is, are goods in themselves that are also praiseworthy in themselves. Similarly, *Rh.* I.9 1366^a33–35 describes τὸ καλόν as ‘what is praiseworthy while being choiceworthy in itself or what, while being a good, is pleasant because it is good’ (*καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστω, ὃ ἂν δι’ αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἦ, ἣ δ’ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἦδὲ ἦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν*), and the first alternative seems to correspond to the description found in *EE* VIII.3. As we shall see in more detail below, these are not definitions of the fine, for they do not explain us what makes something fine. Notwithstanding, they allow us to identify which things are fine, so that what we find in *EE* VIII.3 1248^b18–26 and *Rh.* I.9 1366^a33–35 would be extensional descriptions of what things are fine. These passages will be discussed in detail in **Chapter 2, throughout section 2.3**, whereas the passages of the *EN* concerning the fine will be discussed in **Chapter 3, in section section 3.3**.

¹³⁸ They have only incidental moral relevance because they are praiseworthy only on account of something else, and not in themselves, even though they are indeed good in themselves. On strength as something choiceworthy in itself, but praiseworthy not in itself, but only on account of something else, see *Top.* III.1 116^b37–117^a4. As I take it, the same point should also be made regarding wealth, which not only is presented in the same passage of the *Topics* as something which is not honourable in itself (a notion that is neighbour to the fine according to *Rh.* I.9 1367^b11–12), in contrast to friendship (which is in itself honourable), but can also be taken as an end (see *EE* I.2 1214^b6–11, 7 1217^a36–49, and *EN* I.2 1095^a22–25). In fact, Aristotle is explicit in counting wealth among things that are not necessary but are rather choiceworthy in themselves at *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1147^b29–31. Yet this is at odds with our conception of wealth as an instrumental good, and with the fact that wealth does seem to be an end that is generally chosen on account of something else (see *EN* I.3 [=Bywater I.5] 1096^a6–7), in which case it would not seem to be an end in the sense of *EE* VII.3 1248^b18–26, for, if it were, it would need to be a good that is choiceworthy in itself. At any rate, in *EN* V.2 [=Bywater V.1] 1129^b3–4 those goods that are subject to good and bad fortune are said to be always unqualifiedly good, but not always good for some persons. Thus, even though wealth is not always good for some people, it is still a good *simpliciter*.

Now, irrespective of how we conceive of wealth, it seems that the distinction between goods that are choiceworthy in themselves but are not praiseworthy in themselves and goods that are neither choiceworthy in themselves nor praiseworthy in themselves is still legitimate, in spite of it not corresponding

Yet there is no issue if the first condition is not fully met, that is, if intermediate agents aim for ends that are choiceworthy for their own sakes without aiming for them for their own sakes. In that case, we would have a version of the extensional claim I have discussed above, since although C2 would concern ends that are morally relevant in themselves, these ends would not be desired for their own sakes (a claim that can still be construed in several different ways). As I would like to argue, to say that intermediate agents can aim for ends that are right is a philosophically interesting claim in either of two cases: first, if it implies that it is possible for them to aim for something that is fine for its own sake so that they can, for instance, perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (which I think they cannot)¹³⁹ or, at least, aiming at something fine that is different from the intrinsic fineness of the actions they perform, as would be the case, for instance, of becoming virtuous or performing virtuous actions on the basis of virtue (which faces strong objections as well).¹⁴⁰ Or second, if it implies

exactly to the modern distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental goods (for an illuminating discussion of this issue and of the place of wealth in Aristotle's divisions of the good, see Tuozzo [1995]). Similarly, in *Rh.* I.1 1355^b2–7, strength, health, wealth, and military strategy are listed as goods whose use determine whether they are beneficial or harmful (in contrast to virtue, which cannot be used unjustly to do harm), a feature of these goods that is also mentioned in *EN* I in support of those who claim that the good is only by convention, since goods of this sort are, in some circumstances, beneficial, and in other circumstances, harmful. As we shall see, matters are a bit more complex, since in *EE* VIII.3 Aristotle also claims that external goods such as wealth are fine for the virtuous person. These issues will be discussed in **Chapter 2**, in **section 2.3**, and in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.3**.

¹³⁹ In fact, if performing a virtuous action for its own sake amounts to performing it because it is, say, constitutive of one's *εὐδαιμονία*, it is not so clear if they can be done in such a fashion by intermediate agents if they conceive of their *εὐδαιμονία* correctly. For if *εὐδαιμονία* correctly conceived consists in an activity carried out on the basis of virtue, it is clear that virtuous actions performed by intermediate agents are not instances of such an activity, for they do not have a virtue.

¹⁴⁰ Someone might argue that these are not the only options, for Aristotle also seems to recognise some other things besides virtues and virtuous actions as fine. In fact, although *EE* VIII.3 gives virtues and virtuous actions as examples of *τὰ καλά*, Aristotle would have some reason to think that things such as honour are fine (that is, provided that these things are for the sake of something fine). In fact, in *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1116^a27–29, while describing a disposition that is similar to courage (the so-called civic courage), Aristotle says that it may be due to a virtue (for it is due to shame) and that it is a disposition on the basis of which people perform courageous actions either due to shame or due to a desire for the fine (for, as Aristotle says, it is a desire for honour) or due to an aversion to blame, which is base. Similarly, honour is mentioned in 1097^a34–^b5 alongside reason, pleasure, and every virtue among the things that are both chosen for their own sakes (which we would choose even if nothing resulted from them) and for the sake of happiness, on the belief that we shall be happy by means of them. However, in *EN* V.12 [=Bywater IV.9] 1136^b21–22 he contrasts goods such as reputation (*δόξα*) to what is simpliciter fine, and, in *EE* VIII.3, honour is listed among natural goods that are not fine by nature, but that are nevertheless

that, despite not aiming for something fine for its own sake, intermediate agents can to some extent share the agential perspective of fully virtuous agents in that they are committed to fine ends for reasons different from their intrinsic fineness but which can still track fineness with some degree of consistency. In that case, intermediate agents would not be completely in the dark in determining what they should do, but would indeed know that the virtuous actions they perform (or are in relevant sense committed to performing) are fine and that the vicious actions they avoid (or are in a relevant sense committed to avoiding) are base, even though they would not hold these views due to grasping the intrinsic fineness or baseness of these actions.

Admitting that intermediate agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes without also granting that they can decide on, and perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes (in which case they would seem to perform these actions due to their being productive of virtue) is perfectly reasonable at first glance. Yet I shall not explore this option further because I think it faces two serious objections. The first one shows up when we think of intermediate agents in domains of their lives in which they are not such as to experience those psychological conflicts by which they are characterised. The second one comes up when we ask ourselves how intermediate agents can grasp the fineness of an end such as becoming virtuous if they are not such as to see fine things as fine.

What I have in mind with the first objection has to do with how exactly intermediate agents differ from civically virtuous agents. It seems that nothing hinders intermediate agents from being in some sense virtuous (say, naturally or civically virtuous) in some domains of their lives. However, if such agents are characterised as having the right views about what

fine for the virtuous person, which suggests that those things are not fine in themselves, but only due to something else. This will be discussed in more detail in **Chapter 2**, in **section 2.3**, and in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.3**.

they should do in that they can aim for fine ends for their own sakes, it is not so clear why they would not be fully virtuous in these domains in which they are also virtuous, since they would not be merely naturally virtuous agents (although they would have natural virtues in these domains), nor would they be merely civically virtuous agents (for they would not pursue virtuous actions merely for the sake of external goods), but they would also see external goods as worth pursuing in so far as they contribute to *εὐδαιμονία* rightly conceived.¹⁴¹ Now, I think they are not fully virtuous in these domains because they cannot see virtuous actions as worth performing for their own sakes, and thus cannot perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, unless they become fully virtuous. But what are they?

One alternative is to say that, in those domains in which they come close to virtue, they are not merely naturally virtuous, but rather continent, since there may be still some circumstances in which they experience psychological conflicts, since there may be some overlap between the domains of the different virtues, to the effect that even in those domains in which their character disposition comes close to virtue, they are still such as to experience continence.

Another alternative is to conceive of habituated virtue as including not only cases in which one is mistaken about the value of external goods, but also cases in which one values the external goods only in so far as they contribute to *εὐδαιμονία*, so that it may be the case that some civically virtuous agents perform virtuous actions for the sake of external goods which they value not as choiceworthy for their own sakes, but only in so far as they are required for *εὐδαιμονία*.

I cannot fully discuss these alternatives here, since it would demand a detailed dis-

¹⁴¹ And since, on this reading, intermediate agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes, it seems that we can say that they conceive of *εὐδαιμονία* correctly in so far as the fine ends they aim for can be reduced to a single value around which these agents may be said to organise their lives and this value coincides with something that satisfies the conditions of *εὐδαιμονία*—see footnote 38 and the discussion on pages 47 to 49.

cussion of the character dispositions of intermediate agents that is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. Yet I would like to suggest that both these alternatives are inadequate:

The second one because it begs the question about how these agents can rely on *εὐδαιμονία* to determine how they should pursue the external goods if they do not fully understand *εὐδαιμονία* (given that they are not fully virtuous).

The first one, in turn, because it implies either i) that what makes intermediate agents fail to be fully virtuous in domains of their lives in which they come close to virtue is something that has to do not with how they typically perform virtuous actions in these domains, but rather with the fact that they are prone to be conflicted in some cases, or else ii) that the unruly desires of intermediate agents tempt them to organise their lives around, say, pursuing pleasure in every circumstance of their lives, so that they are always conflicted somehow when they act (in which case even in circumstances in which those things about which they experience those conflicts by which they are characterised are not directly involved they would be tempted to act so as to promote somehow the pursuit of those things).

The problems with saying that the issue with intermediate agents is merely that they cannot consistently perform virtuous actions have already been explored above (see pages 63 to 65).

Saying that the issue with intermediate agents has to do with the way in which their unruly desires tempt them, in turn, is problematic in that it is at odds with the idea that experiencing incontinence, for instance, is something that is comparable to epilepsy (cf. *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1150^b32–35). This suggests that one is incontinent not because one always experiences those conflicts characteristic of incontinence, but because one is such as to experience those conflicts, a claim that can be reasonably extended to continence. In that case, being continent would not imply that one always experiences those conflicts characteristic of

continence, but merely that one is such as to experience those conflicts.

In any case, even if there is some way around this first objection (which concerns the exact difference between intermediate agents and civically virtuous agents), the second objection I mentioned—which comes up when we think about how intermediate agents can grasp the fineness of an end such as becoming virtuous if they are not such as to see fine things as fine—remains, and would still offer us reason for rejecting the idea that intermediate agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes even if this is construed in a way that is compatible with intermediate agents not being able to decide on, and to perform, fine actions for their own sakes.

Now, the strength of the second objection lies in the fact that it is hardly plausible to hold that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for fine ends for their own sakes if it is indeed true that they cannot grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine things. As a matter of fact, how could they grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine ends, and hence aim for these ends because they are fine, if they do not grasp the fineness of fine things to begin with? It remains for me to show, then, that Aristotle really thought that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot grasp the fineness of fine things.¹⁴²

Right ends appear to be, then, a class of good ends, specifically those that are morally relevant *in themselves*, i.e., are fine by nature. How exactly Aristotle distinguishes between goodness and fineness and what his conception of morality is are matters that cannot be settled so easily, though. In any case, I would like to offer some indications as to how we should deal with these issues throughout this Dissertation, since the two sorts of rightness I am interested in—the sort of rightness reason can secure for the ends we aim for and the sort of rightness of the ends for which virtue is necessary—are both notions of moral rightness.

¹⁴² I shall argue that this is Aristotle's position in the common books (in **Chapter 1**), in the *Ethica Eudemia* (in **Chapter 2**), and in the *Ethica Nicomachea* (in **Chapter 3**).

For now, it should be noted that I do not think that, for Aristotle, considerations about morality are fundamentally different from considerations about goodness (to the effect that Aristotle would be some sort of dualist with regards to practical reason), such that considerations about the fineness of something are moral considerations, whereas consideration about the goodness of something are not so.¹⁴³ But nor do I think that considerations about the fine are fundamentally different from considerations of *εὐδαιμονία*,¹⁴⁴ even though there are indeed circumstances in which there is nothing one can do that really satisfies the conditions of *εὐδαιμονία*. As we shall see, it is rather that fineness picks out a particular sort of goodness, namely that which is characteristic of unconditional (or final) ends,¹⁴⁵ in contrast to the sort of goodness that is characteristic of conditional ends such as those of the *τέχνηαι* (cf. *EN* VI.2 1139^b1–4), to the effect that being an end that is good in itself would only be enough for securing that something is morally good when the good end in question is unqualified or final, since moral goodness ultimately depends on whether something is in itself fine (and thus an unconditional or final end) or else merely contributes to an end that is in itself fine (in which case it would be a conditional end that happens to be morally good when it contributes to a further end that is in itself fine).¹⁴⁶ In any case, it should be clear that, so construed, C2 is far

¹⁴³ I thank Professor Paulo Ferreira for pressing me on this issue.

¹⁴⁴ Pace Heinaman (1993), Chappell (2013), and Hirji (2020a).

¹⁴⁵ This idea seems to be present already in Cicero's *de Officiis* I, 6, in which Cicero claims that nothing can be said about duty (*officium*) except by those who posit *honestas* (i.e., τὸ καλόν) as the only thing worth pursuing on its own account and by those who posit *honestas* as what is maximally worth pursuing on its own account. Cicero then adds that, accordingly, this subject matter is proper to the Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics, thus including them among those who conceive of *honestas* in one of the two ways described. As I take it, the Peripatetics are those who conceive of *honestas* as what is maximally choiceworthy on its own account, in contrast to the Stoics, who think that *honestas* is the only thing choiceworthy on its own account. Similarly, see McDowell, 1995, p. 211 on *εὐδαιμονία*: '[t]his latter claim [sc., that eudaimonia is the good] does not say that eudaimonia embraces all possible reasons for acting (all goods, in one obvious sense; see 1094a1-3). The point is that the relevant dimension of desirability is not just one dimension among others. Choiceworthiness along the relevant dimension—the choiceworthiness that actions are rightly seen as having when they are seen as noble, in trained perception of a virtuous person—is choiceworthiness par excellence.'

¹⁴⁶ A consequence of this, as we shall see, is that although Aristotle conceives of goodness in a way that is very different from the Stoics, his conception of the moral goodness of external goods comes quite close to the idea that external goods are indifferents, since, in themselves, they are indeed morally indifferent.

from being an uncontroversial thesis.

0.1.2.3 Βούλησις AND REASON

0.1.2.3.1 *Question (VII): in which sense is βούλησις a rational desire?*

Lastly, given that I intend to argue that being convinced about the goodness or fineness of something is enough for having an end₃, it must be shown that βούλησις is a rational desire in the sense that having a belief about the goodness or fineness of something is sufficient for it.¹⁴⁷ In fact, it is only if something along these lines is secured that it would be possible to claim that intermediate agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes or for the sake of some good feature of these ends that is different from their fineness even if they are not fully virtuous (irrespective of whether being convinced about the goodness or fineness of a really good or fine object depends upon one not being fully vicious, and thus virtuous in some sense at least—see footnote 126). We should determine, then, (VII) in which sense exactly βούλησις is a rational desire.

Yet Aristotle's recognition of external goods as things that are truly good and choiceworthy for their own sakes is not inconsequential, but is directly connected to the claim that some amount of external goods is a *conditio sine qua non* of εὐδαιμονία (a point that is at some moments underlined by Cicero in contrasting the Peripatetics and the Stoics. Yet note that Cicero claims that this is Theophrastus' position rather than Aristotle's), even though these goods are not part of εὐδαιμονία as such (see footnote 209 below). Moreover, as we shall see (below in section 2.3.3), external goods are indeed fine when they are used for the sake of things that are fine in themselves and base when they are used for the sake of things that are base, so that when integrated in a moral outlook, they are not morally indifferent anymore.

¹⁴⁷ Note that all that is required is to secure that βούλησις is a rational desire in a limited sense, such that reason is necessary for cognising the object of βούλησις, and thus for having a βούλησις. This is close to what Tuozzo (1992, p. 542) calls a 'conceptualized desire,' and it does not necessarily commit one to the idea that βούλησις is a desire located in the rational part of the soul, since it is also compatible with βούλησις being located in the non-rational part of the soul, in which case it would seem that it is located in the desiderative part of the soul *qua* a part of the soul that is responsive to reason. More on this below in the Conclusion

0.1.2.4 SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

As I take it, getting clear on (I)-(VII) is fundamental for spelling out one's position regarding (a''), (b), and (c), since it forces one to be explicit about how one construes C1 and C2, and thus about how one answers the End Question formulated normatively. Yet this is not how scholars usually frame the End Question. This not only leads them to a good degree of unclarity in their views, but also blurs the importance of some issues I take to be central. Moreover, in so far as they generally subscribe to orthodox readings of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], many of them end up committed to the idea that virtue is the cause not of the rightness of one's ends, but merely of one's ends being *consistently and reliably right*, a claim that, as I have suggested, is hopelessly problematic.

0.2 The *status quaestionis* and the structure of the Dissertation

It was only in the 19th century, after the work of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1855; 1867), that the End Question was put at the centre of the discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of practical reason.¹⁴⁸ In Trendelenburg's view, practical reason is responsible, in the form of *νοῦς ἐν*

¹⁴⁸ In fact, this is an issue about which Zeller, for instance, is silent in the first edition of his 'Die Philosophie der Griechen' (1846, pp. 503-523), but which he explicitly discusses in the second and third editions of his 'Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung' (1862, pp. 450, 504n4, 507-508; 1879, pp. 653, 657), which were both published after Trendelenburg's work (1855) and after Brandis (1857, pp. 1448n298) explicitly endorsed Trendelenburg's interpretation of practical *νοῦς*. This does not mean, however, that commentators were silent about this issue prior to Trendelenburg. As Walter (1873) shows, Trendelenburg's own views are to some extent anticipated by several other commentators beginning with Albert the Great. Moreover, already in Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 136.19-22) we find an answer (although a quite obscure one) to the question of the role of reason in determining the ends of action. In addition to that, it should be noted that Trendelenburg is not even the first to say something on this issue in the context of the Kantian reception of Aristotle, for already at the time of Kant Christian Garve (1798, §3, pp. 11ff) held that, for Aristotle, reason can regulate our non-rational desires, making us perform our duties to the detriment of the enjoyment of our sensible pleasures, a task in which it can fail, however. Thus, Garve may also be taken to hold that, for Aristotle, reason has some influence in determining the ends we pursue. Yet this is far from being explicit in Garve (since his main concern is defending Aristotle's doctrine of the mean from the critique Kant directed to it), whereas Trendelenburg (1855, p. 378) explicitly claims that 'the essence of practical reason lies in the determination of the end' (*Das Wesen der praktischen Vernunft liegt in der Bestimmung des Zweckes*).

ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, for setting the end of action, and, in the form of φρόνησις, for determining means to these ends,¹⁴⁹ by which he appears to mean that reason (in the form of νοῦς ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς) is responsible for determining the particular ends for whose sake we deliberate (i.e., our ends₃ seemingly conceived of as situation-specific goals).

Despite being unsatisfactory as an interpretation of Aristotle's text and of Aristotle's conception of νοῦς ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς,¹⁵⁰ this view had an important place in the debate that took shape in the late 19th century.¹⁵¹ The End Question is seemingly framed by Trendelenburg as a question about how exactly practical reason is connected to the ends we aim for. There are, however, different ways of construing this relationship. As I have indicated, Trendelenburg himself distinguishes between φρόνησις and practical νοῦς, arguing that the latter would be responsible for determining the ends, whilst the first would not. As we shall see in more detail below, other scholars will deny that practical νοῦς can play such a role, for which reason they will either deny that practical reason is involved in determining the ends of action,¹⁵² or else will claim that it is actually φρόνησις that determines the ends of

¹⁴⁹ See Trendelenburg (1855, pp. 378–379, 382–384).

¹⁵⁰ It is particularly problematic in what concerns his view on νοῦς ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς as responsible for establishing the end of action. Trendelenburg holds that this sort of νοῦς determines the concrete end that one should aim for in action and, moreover, that in so doing, this sort of νοῦς would allow one to inductively grasp the universal end, i.e., what would be one's εὐπραξία, which, for Trendelenburg, would be an universal end in the same way as the πρᾶξις πλήρης of the body, which is the end for whose sake the activities of the parts of the body are brought off (cf. *PA* I.5 645^b14). The idea here appears to be that this sort of νοῦς sets situation-specific goals for whose sake we deliberate, and by doing that, it somehow determines our ultimate end, which would be the end these particular ends ultimately contribute to. The exact role that virtue and moral character play in this, in turn, appears to be specified by Trendelenburg in terms of an enabling condition, such that virtue, and thus a correct direction of pleasure and pain, is required if one is to grasp moral truths about the end of action (1855, pp. 384–386). The unattainability of Trendelenburg's conception of practical νοῦς has been shown in detail by Walter (1873), and, as we shall see, the main problem with Trendelenburg's view has to do not so much with some claims Trendelenburg is committed to (some of them may even be saved from Walter's criticism), but with the idea that it is νοῦς that is responsible for these activities. For a recent attempt to make sense of the notion of νοῦς ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς that goes in a direction quite different from Trendelenburg's, but which has some affinities with the view defended by Hartenstein (1859)—which is also criticised by Walter—, see Morison (2019a).

¹⁵¹ In fact, as already mentioned, it was shared by both Brandis (1857, p. 1448n298) and Zeller (1862, pp. 450, 504n2, 507–508), and was later rebuked by Walter (1873; 1874), whose views are also fundamental for comprehending how the End Question is usually framed.

¹⁵² As Walter (1873; 1874) does.

action—either because it is not merely a deliberative capacity but involves some sort of intuition as well,¹⁵³ or because it can determine the ends we aim for by means of deliberation (some claiming that we can deliberate about what is constitutive of our ultimate goal,¹⁵⁴ others claiming that it is merely by endorsing or rejecting some situation-specific goal by means of deliberation that we determine our ends¹⁵⁵). Other scholars, in turn, will advance views that do not depend on deciding whether it is by means of deliberation or of some kind of intuition that we can determine our ends, but hold nevertheless that practical reason has a fundamental role to play, since reason is required for having a rational desire (a *βούλησις*), and thus for aiming for something *qua* an end.¹⁵⁶ I shall come back to this schema in a moment. In any case, what is fundamental for the End Question as framed after Trendelenburg is determining if, and if so, how reason can influence our ends.

My contention is that despite the importance of determining if, and if so, how reason can influence our ends has for getting clear on Aristotle's views on practical rationality, these are not central for answering the End Question, whose answer is compatible of different ways of answering the questions posed after Trendelenburg.

Now, it should be clear that even if, for Aristotle, reason has no role in determining our ends, practical reason operates independently in determining, through deliberation, the means to our ends.¹⁵⁷ According to the argument from *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25 (my

¹⁵³ As is held by Cooper (1975) and Engberg-Pedersen (1983, pp. 184–186), for instance.

¹⁵⁴ As is most famously claimed by Irwin (1978), for instance.

¹⁵⁵ As is defended by Aubenque (1963/1993), Sherman (1989, pp. 65–66), Broadie (1987; 1991), Chateau (1997), McDowell (1998b, pp. 30ff; 1979/1998c, p. 73), Price (2011a; 2011b), and others.

¹⁵⁶ See, for instance, Teichmüller (1879), Loening (1903), Allan (1953/1977), Lorenz (2006; 2019), Zingano (2007a; 2016), and Moss (2012; 2014b). As we shall see in more detail below, there are several different versions of this reading, and this grouping is far from having unity.

¹⁵⁷ This claim is directly connected to one I have already made above in saying that our position towards (a'') and (b) may be completely independent from how we deal with (c)—see footnote 19. In fact, the answer one gives to (c) may have no bearing on how one answers (b) and (a'') precisely because, for Aristotle, reason operates independently in determining the means to our ends, to the effect that, even if we begin deliberating for the sake of a situationally inadequate end₃ or for the sake of our ultimate end, but misconceive it, it is still the case that we can conclude, by means of deliberation, that we should make a

T 50—which will be discussed in more detail in **Chapter 3**),¹⁵⁸ even if we concede that our ends are established by our moral dispositions (i.e., by our nature), it is still the case that practical reason does not perform a merely instrumental role in regard to the ends aimed at by the agent, for it can effect a change in the agent’s moral disposition thereby altering the end it establishes. In fact, deliberation may be taken to lead to one of two conclusions. First, it might lead to the conclusion that there are no morally appropriate means to achieve the end aimed at. In that case, the agent may forbear from acting thereby not promoting a morally bad end¹⁵⁹ (even though this end may actually be the end aimed at by the agent). And, if this happens repeatedly, the agent’s moral disposition, which determines the ends the agent aims for, might be altered.¹⁶⁰

A second possibility is that deliberation may lead to the performance of a morally good action in spite of the morally bad end aimed at by the agent. In that latter case, if the agent repeatedly performs such actions voluntarily—which are not means to a morally bad end, but to a conception of the end that is opposed to the end aimed at through desire—,¹⁶¹

decision for the sake of a different end (or for the sake of our ultimate end conceived in a way different from the way we conceived of it before starting to deliberate), be it because we forego the situationally inadequate goal for whose sake we began deliberating in favour of another situation-specific goal, be it because we change, as a result of deliberation, our initial conception of our ultimate end.

¹⁵⁸ For a detailed analysis of the argument marshalled by Aristotle in this passage and of its philosophical consequences, see Zingano (2007b).

¹⁵⁹ Whether this possibility is open for all types of agent is a contentious matter. In particular, one could question whether completely vicious agents are able to voluntarily refrain from performing vicious actions.

¹⁶⁰ Perhaps in the way described in *Cat.* 10 13^a22–31. Yet whether this is something a vicious person can do without the help of someone else, and whether completely vicious agents can become better is not so clear. In any case, when in *Cat.* 10 13^a23–25 Aristotle says that ‘ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπιδοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι,’ he may be quite reasonably understood as saying that the vicious person can advance a bit, although just a little, towards being better not if they lead themselves (ἀγόμενος) towards better practices and reasons, but instead if they are led (ἀγόμενος) towards better practices and reasons, in which case the agent’s reason alone would not be enough if they are to improve: I mean, the possibility of their improvement would depend on something happening to them in the first place, so that they become, in some sense, discontented with their vicious practices. For an alternative view, to the effect that there are some psychological mechanisms by which means vicious agents can make themselves discontented with their vicious practices (but which also ultimately depend on their being faced with novel facts about their practices), see Pearson (2020, pp. 188–191).

¹⁶¹ This is how Julius Walter (1874, pp. 206–209) construes the possibility of acting well in spite of a bad end. He holds that an agent can act well despite the particular ends they desire in so far as, by means of deliberation, they can establish a conception of the end (a Zweckbegriff) that is opposed to the particular

a transformation of their moral disposition may ensue as well.

These are not the only ways of construing the argument of *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5], however. Depending on how we answer (IV)—which was a question about how ends₃ and ends₂ are to be distinguished—and on which ends (ends₁, ends₂, or ends₃) we take to be determined by our character disposition according to *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5], it will be possible to construe this claim in quite different ways. In fact, the two readings I have sketched above appear to assume that our character disposition determines our ends₃.

In any case, irrespective of how we construe the argument of *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5], it should be noted that this argument is not only central for answering the End Question (despite being ignored by most scholars in connection with this question), but also clearly indicates that there is an important sense in which Aristotle's account of practical reason is not Humean, for deliberation would not be not a mere instrument of the passions,¹⁶² but can

ends desired by them. This may seem to be reminiscent of the Kantian idea that because inclinations tempt one to ends that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason cannot fight this influence but by means of an opposing moral end that must be given independently of inclination and *a priori* (cf. Kant's *MS*, Ak. VI, pp. 380.25-381.3: „Denn da die sinnlichen Neigungen zu Zwecken (als der Materie der Willkür) verleiten, die der Pflicht zuwider sein können, so kann die gesetzgebende Vernunft ihrem Einfluß nicht anders wehren, als wiederum durch einen entgegengesetzten moralischen Zweck, der also von der Neigung unabhängig a priori gegeben sein muß“). However, since Walter can also be taken to hold that reason cannot determine our will (that is, our *βούλησις*), which, for him, is determined by our moral character, he portrays Aristotle's view as fundamentally different from that of Kant, for which reason he will later reproach Aristotle's views on practical wisdom on the grounds that, for instance, 'only in Kant there is a practical knowledge that has in itself an epictactic form' (1874, p. 499: [n]ur bei Kant giebt es eine praktische Erkenntniss, die an sich epiktaktische Form hat).

¹⁶² Note that *προαίρεσις* (which is a result of deliberation) is conceived of by Aristotle as a thought that issues in desire or as a desire that is produced by thought (*EN* VI.2 1139^b4-5: ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική)—for an explanation of this according to which *προαίρεσις* is either an act of thought according to which desire is produced or an episode of desire in which desire is directed by thought, see Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L VI, 2 207-213; *ST Ia IIæ*, 13, art. 1, resp.). Moreover, as Crubellier (2020) has recently pointed out, this is perhaps better understood not as giving two alternative definitions of *προαίρεσις*, but as making explicit the double role it performs as a principle of action, since it is counted both as a desire and as a form of cognition in *MA* 7 700^b22-25. Similarly, see Whiting (2020, p. 325), who claims that 'these are not genuine alternatives, but rather two different ways of describing the same state of soul, a state that can be characterized equally well as a kind of thought and as a kind of desire: neither characterization is privileged.' Yet, given that adjectives ending in *-ικος* are ambiguous in Aristotle (in some cases having a passive sense, in other cases having an active sense), it is possible to construe this two alternatives as giving a more fundamental role to thought, which would be the source of the desiderative element of *προαίρεσις* in both characterisations, as Aquinas does, which is the alternative I favour. As a result, although Aristotle would be indifferent as to whether *προαίρεσις* should be described

commit one to the performance of morally good actions despite the agent's passions.¹⁶³ In other words, it is a source of motivation that is not derived from one's pre-existing desires.¹⁶⁴ Yet the exact role reason performs in establishing the ends of action is a disputed matter.

It is not clear whether, besides being able to influence the establishment of the ends due to having a part in the process of habituation whereby our moral dispositions can be transformed, reason has a more direct role in establishing the ends of action as well. Nor

as a desire or as thought, he would not be indifferent about what is the hierarchically superior element in *προαίρεσις*, since that role would be fulfilled by thought.

¹⁶³ Note, however, that passions may be an obstacle for the performance of virtuous actions, for they can somehow impede reason from leading one to act, as in episodes of *ἀκρασία* or *μαλακία*. Moreover, dispositions to feel passions that are bestial or that are caused by some maiming or sickness can render reason completely inoperative as a principle of action, and not only ineffective (see *EN* VII.7 [=Bywater VII.6] 1150^a1–5).

¹⁶⁴ Thus, practical reason would motivate without requiring an underived (or unmotivated) desire, or else a desire that can be traced back to a desire of that sort (for the distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires, see Nagel [1978, pp. 29ff]). There are, though, different ways of construing this claim, which, as we shall see, is directly connected to question (VII) I raised in the first part of this **Introduction**, which concerned the sense in which *βούλησις* is a rational desire. One of them would be to say that practical reason is a source of motivation that can operate despite one's desires (as Walter's view can be taken to imply); another one, which I reckon as closer to the view held by Aristotle, is to contend that the desire upon which practical reason depends is rational in the sense that it depends on one being convinced that something is good. As a result, beliefs about what is good, for instance, would motivate us by bringing about rational desires of this sort. In this respect, Aristotle would be subscribing to a sort of 'motivated desire theory of motivation,' rather than to a Humean 'motivating desire theory of motivation' or to a 'pure ascription theory of motivation' (on these distinctions, see Dancy [1993, pp. 7–36]). In fact, if *βουλήσεις* are rational in so far as they are triggered by one's convictions about the good, then there is room for motivated desires in Aristotle's moral psychology. Moreover, if desires are a part of the causal chain that leads to action as existences independent of (though not necessarily intelligible without) thought, Aristotle's theory of motivation cannot be read as a pure ascription theory of motivation, different from Kant's, since Kant can be taken as holding a pure ascription theory of motivation in so far as feelings such as the respect for the law can be construed as being only consequent upon the observance of the moral law, without any causal role in acting from duty (note, however, that the exact nature and role of the respect for the law is disputed, for an overview of the debate see Nauckhoff [2003]). But, as we shall see below, if one construes Aristotle's views on practical reason as David Charles suggests they should be construed (as we shall see in more detail below), it might seem that desires and beliefs are not distinct existences, in which case it would seem that having a *βούλησις* is tantamount to having a belief about what is good for oneself (even though they would still be definitionally different), such that Aristotle's theory of motivation would allow of being construed as pure ascription theory of motivation, since the causal role of desires and of practical thought in eliciting action would be inextricable. In Charles own words: '[o]n this understanding, to choose preferentially excellently is to grasp what is good (or best) to do, where the relevant type of grasping is one in which the chooser is attracted to acting accordingly. It is not that intellectual judgment leads to desire: rather to see (or judge) something as the good thing to do (in this way) just is to desire to do it' (Charles, 2015, p. 73). I do not think, however, that Charles' inextricabilism gives us sufficient grounds for construing Aristotle as committed to a pure ascription theory of motivation, since the causal roles of reason and desire in leading to action, although dependent and not intelligible without one another, are still distinct, which seems to be sufficient grounds for saying that reason and desire are, for Aristotle, distinct existences for the purposes of his action theory. More on that below.

is it clear how independent reason would be if it had such a role in establishing the ends of action. Besides, as I have already pointed out, this is a question that may have different answers depending on the sort of end we have in mind (ends₁, ends₂, or ends₃), on whether virtue is necessary or not necessary for making the end(s) right (i.e., on how we answer [III]), and on how we distinguish between ends₂ and ends₃ (i.e., on how we answer [IV]).

Above I have suggested that scholars generally disagree with Trendelenburg in that they deny that practical *νοῦς* can play the role Trendelenburg assigns to it. On that schema, the answers to the End Question differ depending on if, and if so, on how reason can determine our ends. I do not think, however, that this captures the whole story, for some scholars admit that practical *νοῦς*, or perhaps some form of intuition that is not to be identified with practical *νοῦς*, can play a role quite similar to that attributed by Trendelenburg to practical *νοῦς* while still holding views that are importantly different from Trendelenburg's.

Besides, as I have already indicated, some readings do not depend on deciding whether it is by means of deliberation or by some form of intuition that reason can influence the ends we aim for,¹⁶⁵ but instead give central place to the claim that it is by being convinced that something is good (or fine) that one can determine their ends through reason.

That being said, what I would like to suggest is that the main point of disagreement with Trendelenburg is to be located not so much in the fact that some scholars deny that practical *νοῦς* determines the ends of action in the way Trendelenburg wants it to, but rather in the fact that they claim that reason has, at most, an indirect role in determining the ends. Properly speaking, ends are established not by reason, but by our desires, and it is only in so far as reason can influence our desires that it can determine our ends.

So formulated, the End Question is more precisely a question about how directly

¹⁶⁵ Although of course some of their proponents take a stand on this issue, like Loening, who takes Aristotle's description of practical thought as being *ἐνεκα του* as implying that it is thought about the end.

reason can influence our desires, and, more specifically, about the rational nature of *βούλησις* (i.e., our question [VII]).

0.2.1 A brief survey of the current ways of answering the End Question

In general lines there are three different groups of strategies for answering the End Question formulated as a question about how directly reason can influence our desires.

The first group consists of (1) interpretations claiming that practical reason is responsible only for determining the means towards the ends aimed at by desire, which it would do by means of deliberation, the upshot being that reason can determine our ends in determining the means to these ends (either constitutive means or productive means). As I take it, these interpretations are compatible with reason not determining our ends₃, since they hold that reason is independent from character disposition in determining our ends₁₋₂. Notwithstanding this, this claim can be construed in ways that are radically different.¹⁶⁶

A first way of construing (1) consists in (a) allowing the agent to act well despite the morally bad ends pursued by desire and/or to forbear acting in a way that promotes these morally bad ends—something which, if sufficiently repeated, could change the agent's character disposition thereby changing the end their desire pursues. As a result, deliberation would allow the agent to have the end they initially pursue changed in that it may transform their

¹⁶⁶ For which reason someone might argue, drawing on Mele (1984a, pp. 125, 134), that readings like (1a)—see below—are fundamentally different from (1b) and (1c) in that (1a) readings claim that all that *φρόνησις* does is to consider means to desired ends, whereas (1b) and (1c) readings argue instead that practical reason has a direct relation to our ends. That is true, but I think that (1a), (1b), and (1c) all share a common ground in that they share the assumption that it is by deliberating about means that we can change our ends, be it because by performing or not performing an action that promotes the end we aim for we can thus eventually change our character disposition, thus changing our end (which on this construal would be determined by our character disposition); be it because we can ultimately deliberate about what *εὐδαιμονία* consists in, thus determining its content; be it, finally, because we can reject or accept, by means of deliberation, some situation-specific goal (an end₃) that is initially salient to us, thus ultimately determining the end we actually pursue (or end up committed to pursuing) in action, i.e. our ends₁₋₂.

character disposition eventually.¹⁶⁷ (1a) seems to be the sort of view held by Julius Walter (1873, pp. 208–212, 214–217). As I have pointed out above, it depends on a particular way of construing the argument advanced by Aristotle in *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5]. Walter in particular thinks that III.7 secures the possibility of performing virtuous actions due to a certain conception of the end that is opposed to the particular end one desires. Yet he does not think that acting for the sake of such universal conception of the end amounts to having a *βούλησις* for that end, for he does not think that reason is enough for determining our will (i.e., our *βούλησις*)—see footnote 161.

This view raises some questions about the ends aimed at by intermediate agents. Walter himself is silent about this. In fact, continence and incontinence are only mentioned passingly in his book, specifically when he is analysing passages on *φρόνησις* or on deliberation and practical reasoning in which continence and incontinence are explicitly mentioned. All he says about continent agents is that their reason controls their appetites (pp. 170, 258), and that, for having motivational force, it presupposes some quality of character (pp. 259–260). About incontinent agents, in turn, besides repeating that their reason is ineffective and that they act in opposition to its commands (pp. 258–259), and that their reasoning is in some sense correct (like that of vicious agents) (p. 460), he also claims that they are not *φρόνιμοι* due to mere knowledge not being enough for *φρόνησις*, which requires action in correspondence to that knowledge, for incontinent agents do not act in correspondence to their knowledge (p. 492). This may suggest that they have knowledge about the ends they should pursue, but is still inconclusive in so far as Walter also holds that conceiving of the end is some sort of knowledge about the means, and that one's conception of the end can be opposed to one's *βούλησις*.

¹⁶⁷ That is, although one's end₃ would be set by nature, one can change one's ends₁₋₂, and, by repeating this process, change one's nature and thus one's end₃ as well.

In any case, in light of these passages, it seems that charity to Walter should constrain us to thinking that, for him, intermediate agents are not agents who can act well despite the bad ends they aim for, but are rather agents that aim for good ends in that they have *βούλησεις* for right ends. Therefore, it seems that the thesis according to which one can act well despite one's end would hold for some non-fully virtuous agents other than intermediate agents (it remains to see, though, whether it would apply only to qualifiedly bad agents, or also to completely vicious agents). Some support for that limited version of this thesis can be gathered from *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114a31-b25 (which shall be analysed in **Chapter 3**, in section 3.2.1—see **T 50** below), and from *Pol.* VII.13 [=Newman IV.13].

A second way of construing (1) is to claim that (b) reason determines the content of the ends aimed for by specifying their constitutive means, a process that can ultimately determine the constitutive means to *εὐδαιμονία*.¹⁶⁸ In that case, deliberation can directly influence how we desire *εὐδαιμονία*, for it would determine what *εὐδαιμονία* ultimately consists in and how it is structured. In that case, even though our conception of *εὐδαιμονία* is initially determined by our character disposition, reason would be able to change it progressively by means of deliberation.¹⁶⁹

A third way of construing (1) is to claim that (c) in deliberating about how to pursue some situation-specific goal one aims for, the agent is also to some extent asking whether they should pursue that end in the circumstances at hand (i.e., whether that end is situationally adequate), in which case they may forgo pursuing the end they initially found worth pursuing

¹⁶⁸ There are several formulations for this version of (1). See, for instance, Sorabji (1974, pp. 110-111), Wiggins (1975, pp. 31, 33, 37-38), Irwin (1975, pp. 570-576; 1978, pp. 253, 256-257, 261-262; 1988a, pp. 337-338), Nussbaum (2009, p. 297), and Nielsen (2006, pp. 235-245). Against this sort of reading, see the objections raised by Tuozzo (1991, pp. 196-205), Broadie (1991, pp. 232ff), Zingano (1993, p. 372; 2007d, pp. 221ff), McDowell (1998b, p. 33), Angioni (2009b, p. 194), Price (2011b, pp. 209-210), and Moss (2014b, pp. 223-226).

¹⁶⁹ That is, even though one has an *end₃* that is determined by one's character, this *end₃* can be transformed through deliberation.

in favour of another end they think appropriate to pursue in the circumstances they are being faced with as they deliberate and assess the actual circumstances they are being faced with. The upshot of this is that reason would be able to make one refrain from pursuing ends that, by means of deliberation, the agent comes to find inappropriate in so far as they see no morally justifiable means to achieve them in the circumstances they are being faced with.¹⁷⁰

At first glance, (1c) may seem to be quite similar to (1a), but they are different in some fundamental points. Different from (1a), (1c) views do not hold that reason can only make one refrain from acting for the sake of a particular end by conceiving of this end in some particular way, i.e., by means of some universal conception of the end aimed for, which can lead one to act well despite the bad (or inappropriate) end aimed for. Rather, (1c) maintains that the agent can forgo pursuing an end in a particular situation because they find no morally adequate means for achieving it (irrespective of whether the agent has or not an articulated conception of their ultimate end, i.e., the end for whose sake they are ultimately pursuing these situation-specific goals).

In rejecting an end because it is inadequate in the circumstances they are being faced with, agents would be able to aim for other ends that they still see as adequate to pursue in the same circumstances. As a result, what (1c) views claim is that deliberation can determine the ends we pursue in so far as it is able to assess whether the particular end for whose sake we deliberate is adequate to pursue in the circumstances at hand. In other words, by searching for morally good ways of achieving these ends, we come to find out whether these ends are

¹⁷⁰ Proponents of (1c) are, for instance, Aubenque (1959; 1965), Sherman (1989, pp. 65-66), Brodie (1987; 1991, pp. 239-260), McDowell (1998b, pp. 30ff; 1979/1998c, p. 73), and Price (2011a). Similarly, Chateau (1997, pp. 219-220) holds that even if our character disposition determines our ends (as is said in *EN* III.7), virtue and *φρόνησις* are connected in such a way that ends and means are inseparable when we are dealing with full virtue, such that the end one desires becomes what the good deliberation of the *φρόνιμος* has made of it, which appears to suggest that reason can change or improve, by means of deliberation, the end initially suggested by desire, which appears to commit Chateau to a version of (1c) as well.

really to be pursued in the circumstances in which they are assumed as ends. And if we think they are not, we forgo pursuing them and begin to deliberate assuming some other end that also seems to be adequate in the circumstances at hand.

The second group of strategies for answering the End Question I would like to distinguish consists of (2) interpretations whose central claim is that an operation of reason is required for establishing the ends of action in so far as in order to have a *βούλησις* for an end the agent must conceive of this end as something good,¹⁷¹ irrespective of the role played by deliberation in this process.¹⁷² On these interpretations, reason appears to be sufficient for determining one's ends₃ and one's ends₂, but is not sufficient for determining one's ends₁. There are, however, two importantly different ways of construing (2).

A first way of construing (2) is to claim that (a) this assessment of the end as something good depends somehow on the agent's character, to the effect that determining an end₃ that is in some sense right (say, fine) would depend on a character disposition that is minimally responsive to reason.

¹⁷¹ This is the main thesis defended by Richard Loening (1903). As we shall see, it is a disputed matter whether his views fit better into (2a) or (2b)—see below. I shall present it in more detail below under (2b). Moreover, as I shall argue below in **Chapter 1, section 1.4**, although Loening thinks that some knowledge of the good is a condition for having a *βούλησις*, he also holds that it is not enough for actively desiring what one holds to be good, in which case reason's effectiveness in determining the ends we aim for would be fundamentally conditioned by our moral characters, and hence reason would not be autonomous in determining the ends of action. In any case, Loening makes a fundamental contribution in distinguishing between desiring some x, and cognising it as a good, which is a condition for its being desired. As we shall see, this opens the way for construals of Aristotle's views that are more generous about the role of reason in determining the ends of action.

¹⁷² This is precisely what allows us to distinguish between (1), in particular (1b), and (2), since interpretations of the latter sort do not depend on saying that deliberation has a role in determining the ends one aims for in determining the constitutive means to *εὐδαιμονία*. I mean, according to (2), reason would be said to determine our ends not in so far as we can deliberate about how to achieve *εὐδαιμονία* (namely, determining the components of *εὐδαιμονία*), but by being required for having ends₃, and thus for conceiving of *εὐδαιμονία* in some way (irrespective of whether one has or has not an articulated conception of *εὐδαιμονία*). Thus, reason would not determine our ends by merely determining the means that are constitutive to *εὐδαιμονία*, but by being required for having *βουλήσεις*. No doubt (1b), and even (1c), are compatible with (2). In fact, nothing in (2) hinders deliberation from having a central role in determining our ends, be it because we can deliberate for the sake of our ultimate end, thus determining our subordinate ends₃, be it because in deliberating for the sake of situation-specific goals we are able to determine our ends₁₋₂ and may even refine our beliefs about the goodness of our situation-specific goals. Yet, according to (2), deliberation as such is not required for determining our ends.

(2a) can also be formulated in several different ways, but all its different formulations seem to be committed to some species of intuitionism according to which basic moral propositions can only be grasped by agents who are minimally virtuous (in that they have character dispositions that are minimally responsive to reason). Jessica Moss (2012, pp. 226–228; 2014b, p. 234), for instance, claims that *βουλήσεις* rest on conceptualized assents to non-rational cognitions, that is, that *βουλήσεις* require reason to assent to things that seem good to us through *φαντασία*. More recently, Lorenz (2019) advanced a view similar to Moss', according to which, in the *Ethica Eudemia*, 'it is through an exercise of reason that the person endorses and adopts the situation-specific goal that is identified and rendered salient by character-virtue' (p. 206) and 'it is not by exercising rational capacities that virtuous people discern suitable situation-specific goals and feel initially motivated to accomplish them' (p. 210), whereas in the *Ethica Nicomachea*, 'it is always and exclusively through practical nous, and so through an act of reason, that virtuous people identify correct goals for action,' although, '[o]n the Nicomachean conception, Aristotle can allow that in some cases virtuous people identify goals for action by exercising capacities for non-rational desire,' for '[i]n the Nicomachean Ethics too, Aristotle holds that it is character virtue that makes the virtuous person's goal correct (6.12, 1144^a7–9; cf. 6.13, 1145^a2–6),' and '[w]hile practical nous may well be an aspect of character-virtue, as it is conceived in the Nicomachean Ethics, character-virtue (in the Nicomachean Ethics) still includes as constituents the good, properly habituated conditions of the capacities for non-rational desire' (p. 216). In any case, the idea seems to be that determining an end_3 amounts to giving assent to something that appears salient (perhaps through *φαντασία*) due to one's character disposition.

Yet, on these views, full virtue is not necessary for making the ends right (as might seem to be the case if what seems good to us is due to our character disposition). This is most

explicit in Moss (2012, pp. 225-226), since she thinks that agents who are not fully virtuous such as incontinent and continent agents can establish their ends (and she takes their ends to be right) by means of reason provided ‘her [i.e., the akratic’s] character is good enough to make her responsive to arguments about the good life, or to make her admire virtuous people, and thus acquire correct beliefs about the goal in these ways.’ Similarly, Mele (1984a, pp. 132, 137, 142) not only holds that desiring an end on a particular occasion is reflective of one’s conception of the noble and the good, and that *λόγος* can provide a person with a true belief that something is the ultimate end or with a ‘telling argument for a conception of the ultimate end,’ but at the same time also claims that ‘*λόγος* cannot cause the end to become internalized in such a way that it guides the person’s actions,’ and that ‘the person who has not been corrupted may (unlike his vicious neighbor) rightly be persuaded by an argument for a proper conception of happiness,’ in which case having a character disposition that is minimally responsive to virtue would seem to be a necessary condition for arriving at a right conception of happiness, just like it is for Moss.¹⁷³ Lorenz, in turn, is not so clear on how right ends can be set for agents who are not fully virtuous. Although he entertains the possibility of reason itself being able to ‘account for the identification, and salience to the agent, of suitable situation-specific goals,’ in which case ‘one could work out, just by employing one’s rational powers, how best to act in one’s circumstances,’ and ‘[t]his might take the form of deliberating how best to promote the human good’ (Lorenz, 2019, pp. 207-208), he ultimately rejects that this is Aristotle’s view. It is not so clear, however, whether his rejection of this alternative is merely of this as a model for explaining how virtuous agents determine their ends (in which case his view may also be construed along the lines of [2b]—see below), or of this as a model for explaining how ends are determined in general (in which case he would still endorse a

¹⁷³ Note, however, that in his 1981 paper (cf. Mele, 1981, pp. 421-422), Mele is not as clear in this regard, and his views there can also be construed as a version of (2b).

version of [2a]). But it is at any rate clear that he would admit that non-virtuous agents can aim for right ends despite the fact of these ends not being salient to them as they are to fully virtuous agents. As a matter of fact, Lorenz seems to think that character-virtue is responsible for the correctness of one's goals in so far as character-virtue ensures that decisions reliably aim for correct goals (p. 202), which is compatible with non-virtuous agents' decisions also having correct goals, though not reliably as those of virtuous agents. As will become clear below, this construal of the view held by Lorenz may seem to fit better into (2b), since, as I have pointed out, Lorenz' view could be construed as holding that reason can determine the ends despite one's character disposition. Moss's view, in turn, would still be a clear example of (2a), since the possibility of reason determining a good end would depend on a moral character that is minimally responsive to reason, in which case it would seem that reason is not able to determine ends for agents who are completely vicious or for bestial agents. In other words, for agents whose reason is either corrupted or not even present.

A second way of construing (2) is to claim that (b) this assessment of the end as something good is purely rational, such that irrespective of one's character disposition, reason can determine right ends₃.

A first formulation of (2b) can be found in Loening (1903), and, more recently, different formulations may be found in the works of Gauthier (1958; 1963), Cooper (1975; 1988/1999c; 1996/1999b), Zingano (2007a, pp. 167-211; 2016, p. 119n18), and Coope (2012).

As I take it, this view is most explicit in Cooper. In fact, in holding that the ultimate end of action is known by some kind of intellectual intuition (see 1975, pp. 58-71), Cooper also appears to think that reason alone is enough for establishing the ends of action. In fact, to the extent that he holds i) that reason is a source of motivation independent of one's non-rational desires (1988/1999c, p. 240; 1996/1999b, p. 256) and ii) that its aiming for something

that is truly good for us does not depend on one having learned to take pleasure in what is good for oneself or in doing whatever one takes to be good for oneself, or, in general, on one's previous non-rational likes and dislikes having been developed in a way that enables one's opinions to trigger a desire for the good (see 1996/1999b, p. 267), he seems to be committed to the idea that reason can determine the ends of action in a manner that is purely rational and independent of one's character-disposition. Thus, for Cooper, intermediate agents and other agents who fail to be fully virtuous would be able to aim for morally good ends despite their defective character dispositions.

I take Cooper's view to be the most explicit because the exact interpretation of Loening's views has been an object of dispute: Allan (1953/1977, pp. 75-78), when presenting Loening's views on reason's judgment as required for desire to establish an end, holds that, for Loening, virtue somehow conditions the possibility of reason determining one's end, in which case it would seem that Loening's view would fit better into (2a). Allan thinks that Loening interprets Aristotle's claims to the effect that *σωφροσύνη* preserves *φρόνησις* (cf. *EN* VI.5 1140^b11–13) as meaning that *σωφροσύνη* 'is a necessary condition of true judgment about the good,' that is, '[n]ot only is *sôphrosunê* necessary if a man is always to be guided by his knowledge, but in its absence a man drifts into a state in which no general principle at all is recognised,' in which case Loening's views (and Allan's too, of course) would perhaps be better construed as a version of (2a).

No doubt Loening thinks that *σωφροσύνη* is a condition for the knowledge of the good attained by *φρόνησις* (cf. 1903, p. 55). Yet he understands this in a sense that is compatible with incontinent agents knowing the good as a principle of action, for, as he takes it, they know what is good and that what they do is not good (p. 55), and he even says that, regarding its content, the knowledge of the good had by the *φρόνιμος* is no different from

that had by an incontinent agent (p. 78). In fact, Loening (1903, pp. 56-58) explicitly thinks that the cognitive function of *φρόνησις* is conditioned by one's moral character in the specific sense that it depends on the right functioning one's desires for one's knowledge to be effective in eliciting action. As a matter of fact, later in his book, Loening will spell out the role of virtue in making the end right in terms of it (also) directing one's *ἐπιθυμίας* and *θυμοί* at the good (p. 90). Then, for Loening, virtue would make the end right by, among other things, making one's non-rational desires responsive to reason in such a way that they aim for what reason determines as good for oneself.

Yet there is a further problem in the interpretation of Loening's view, since, besides holding that the absence of virtue does not really impede one from knowing what is good for oneself, thus determining something morally good as an end to be pursued, Loening also seems to hold, as Natali (1989/2001, p. 201n22) rightly observes, that virtue secures somehow that one's *βούλησις* aims for what reason takes to be good in so far as some responsiveness to reason is required if one is to have an active desire for something (i.e., a desire that really leads to action), so that a full responsiveness to reason (which is what virtue implies) would make one always have active desires for what one takes to be good. I cannot pursue this in detail at this moment (I shall present this issue in **Chapter 1, section 1.4**, where I shall briefly discuss some of its unwanted consequences). In any case, I think that the thought is that Loening holds that cognising the good is a task wholly independent from one's character disposition (in which case he and Natali would still be representants of [2b]), although the effectiveness of reason in making one act on the basis of what it discriminates as an end (thus determining one's end_1) would depend on the agent's character disposition, an argument that is significantly different from that advanced by Moss, for whom some minimal responsiveness to reason is required if one is to acquire correct beliefs about the end in the first place, and

hence for determining one's end₃.

As a result, although Loening holds that reason is independent in assessing whether something is good (and thus in determining one's end₃), and this knowledge is required if one is to actively desire an end (thus determining one's end₁), this knowledge is not enough for triggering desire, in which case, as Zingano (2007a, pp. 174-175) puts it, an important part of Loening's view consist in saying that there is a naturalness to desire that renders the Aristotelian ethics hopelessly heteronomous, since reason would not be able, by itself, to determine our desires, for there would be no purely rational desires, since, for Loening, determining an end₃ would not be tantamount to desiring it, since desiring it implies acting on its basis, i.e., making it an end₁ as well.

Zingano's own version of (2b) (2007a, esp. pp. 206-211), as I take it, retains the idea that our desires depend fundamentally on representations, such that desiring something depends fundamentally on our representing it as valuable in some sense to us (though not necessarily as good for us). In the particular case of *βούλησις* (whose object can then be further determined in a *προαίρεσις*), it seems that this would be expressed in terms of our cognising something as good for ourselves, or in our assenting to something that we already desire (epithumetically or thumetically) in so far as we take it to be a good as well, in which case Aristotle would hold that our reason can, actively and autonomously, determine whether something is good for ourselves, thus determining our ends₃. Therefore, reason would not only be necessary if we are to aim for ends₃ that are morally good, but would also be sufficient for that.

Coope (2012, p. 159), in turn, presents the least explicit formulation of (2b). She only contends that, say, continent agents 'can have the right beliefs about the goals of action (and even about whether or not those goals are fine),' to which she adds that, because they are not

virtuous, these goals do not strike them as fine, in which case it seems that reason would be enough for determining one's ends₃₋₂, and would also determine our ends₁ in some instances. Yet this is a claim that can still be construed in several different ways (and perhaps also as a version of [2a] depending on how one fills up the details).

Finally, the third group consists of interpretations claiming that (3) practical reason includes a certain activity of desire in such a way that, even though *reason* does not have a role in determining the ends of action, *practical reason* would have a role in determining the ends of action (irrespective of whether it is an end₁, an end₂, or an end₃), for it would consist in a sort of intersection of reason and desire. As a result, practical reason would be able to directly determine our ends in that making a practical judgment about something is inextricable from desiring or avoiding that object.

This sort of view has been first defended by Gustav Teichmüller (1879, pp. 40-41, 60, 103, 135, 145, 248, 270) and, more recently, has been further developed by David Charles (2006, p. 35; 2007, pp. 204-207; 2015; 2018, pp. 165-168; 2021, pp. 217-220). Teichmüller claims that practical reason and desire are conceptually distinguishable despite being the same in reality. Charles, in turn, goes further, holding not only that practical reason would not be decomposable into two separate components (a position he has recently called *inextricabilism*), being more than ordinary intellectual cognition, such that 'one cannot define goodness in practical intellect without essential reference to goodness in desire' (Charles, 2009, p. 66), but also, as already pointed out in footnote 164, that Aristotle's idea 'is not that intellectual judgment leads to desire: [but] rather [that] to see (or judge) something as the good thing to do (in this way) just is to desire to do it' (Charles, 2015, p. 73). John Austin (as transcribed in Price, 2018, pp. 97-100) seems to have entertained a view similar to Charles' in so far as he entertains the possibility of the relationship between rational and perceptual souls (and

hence also between reason and desire) being such that the perceptual soul functions as matter for the rational soul, in which case desire would be the matter for the operations of practical reason (like *φαντασίαι* may be seen as matter for the operations of reason in general). On that perspective, it is possible to argue that virtue sets one's ends₃ not as an isolate condition of one's desiderative soul, but rather as a condition that functions as the matter of one's rational soul.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Something along those lines is also held by McDowell (1998b) and Whiting (2002b; 2019; 2022).

A remaining issue concerns what exactly distinguishes (3) from (1) and (2). In fact, it seems that some versions of (3) are also compatible with either (1) or (2). For instance, Teichmüller seems to hold a version of (3) that allows of being construed as a version of (2a) as well—*pace* Loening (1903, p. 28), who charges Teichmüller of not determining the precise relationship between reason and desire. As Zingano (1993, p. 120n24) rightly notices, Teichmüller proposes that practical reason, in contrast to mere reason, has an organ, the heart (1879, pp. 133–145). As a result, it would seem that, for Teichmüller, the activity of practical reason depends fundamentally on the condition on which its organ is. Hence it would seem that the agent's character disposition can either enable or impede reason from determining the end (as I take it, perhaps the physiological effects associated with practical reason that Teichmüller intends to account for by claiming that the heart is the organ of practical reason are better accounted for if we explain why pleasure and pain are always involved in eliciting action by reference to a version of motivational hedonism according to which pleasure is physiologically required for movement, but I cannot pursue this in more detail in this Dissertation—for a defence of the claim that Aristotle is committed motivational hedonism in these terms, see Corcilius [2008, pp. 15, 94–98, 162–165]).

Determining Austin's view, in turn, is trickier, since his full lecture notes are not available for public consultation. In any case, in so far as he entertains the possibility of explaining *ἀκρασία* as a matter of one's rational soul being able to, 'at times, relapse into mere *αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ*, such that 'ἀκρασία is not a conflict between two parts of the soul, but rather between two souls, a higher & a lower type, which struggle for possession of the body; since the lower type of soul is *ἕλη* of the higher type, it also, as *στέρησις*, conflicts with it,' it seems that Austin would explain the role of virtue in making the end right by saying that one's non-rational character must cooperate with reason, thus making one's grasp of the end reliable (similarly, see Price [2018, p. 120n139]), in which case Austin's reading would allow of being construed as a version of (2a) as well.

Now, I think that what makes Austin and Teichmüller representants of (3) rather than mere representants of (2a) is the fact that, for them, what explains practical reason having a role in determining the ends of action is not something that has to do with their commitment to claims characteristic of (2a), but the fact that they both hold that practical reason is in a sense indistinguishable from desire, so that in making a judgment about the goodness of something reason would determine our ends directly, since such judgments are inextricable from having a rational desire. In any case, this raises some questions as to whether (3) is indeed a true alternative to (1) and (2). Something similar may be said of McDowell (1998, p. 30) (whom I have listed above as a representant of (1c)), since his views may also be said to represent primarily (3), for besides holding that '[h]aving the right end is not a mere aggregate of concerns,' but 'requires the capacity to know which should be acted on when'—which leads him to the idea that it requires 'the capacity to get things right occasion by occasion,' since he rejects that this capacity can be identified with the mere acceptance of a set of rules—, he also holds that 'the premise of the good, and the selection of the right feature of the situation to serve as premise of the possible, correspond to a single fact about the agent, which we can view indifferently as an orectic state or as cognitive capacity,' a claim which, given McDowell's (1978/1998a) own construal of how moral motivation works, can be reasonably interpreted as a pure ascription theory of motivation, such that desire would not be an independent existence (that this is how McDowell's views on moral motivation should be construed is made clear by Dancy [1993, pp. 18ff]).

0.2.2 A critical assessment of the current ways of answering the End Question

The tentative division I presented in the previous section is not only far from being exhaustive,¹⁷⁵ but it is also to some extent arbitrary: besides separating views that are to some extent compatible,¹⁷⁶ it groups together views that are quite different regarding (I) the sense in which virtue makes the end right; (II) which virtue makes the end right; (III) whether (full) virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right; and (IV) how ends₃ and ends₂ should be distinguished. Moreover, it groups together readings that also have important differences regarding (V) what makes an action virtuous and morally valuable and whether intermediate agents can perform such actions; (VI) whether *intermediate agents* can aim for fine ends for their own sakes; and (VII) the sense in which *βούλησις* is a rational desire.

(I)-(IV) are the main issues at stake in the so-called ‘goal passages,’ some of which present a division of labour between virtue and reason according to which virtue is responsible

As a result, McDowell may be taken to hold a version of (1c) that allows of being construed in terms of (3), since in some contexts he also seems to take claims characteristic of (3) to be sufficient to explain the role reason has in determining the ends of action.

Charles, in turn, explicitly takes his inextricabilism to offer an alternative to intellectualist views characteristic of (2b) and to non-intellectualist views characteristic of (2a), although his views also imply commitment to some theses characteristic of (2a).

¹⁷⁵ For instance, I have not included in it the ‘moderate desire-based theory of the acquisition of goals’ that Charles (1984, pp. 184ff) proposed in his 1984 book, according to which ‘the structure of desires determines which goals are seen as good (and best) and are selected by the wise as elements of well-being,’ but does not really preclude non-virtuous agents from valuing a life of virtuous activity as worth pursuing, except that some of their strong desires are not valued as contributing to their well-being, which is clearly a version of (2), but it is not so clear whether it would fit better into (2a) or (2b), since Charles is unclear there as to whether non-virtuous agents valuing a life of virtuous activity as worth pursuing is something that is somehow dependent on their character disposition, or is instead a possibility that is open to agents irrespective of their character disposition.

¹⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, both (1b) and (1c) are compatible with (2) views, as mentioned in footnote 171. That is, it is possible to claim that deliberation can either determine the content or somehow test the ends one aims for while also holding that these ends must necessarily be endorsed by reason if they are to be ends one aims for. As a result, although (1b) and (1c) do not rely on the idea that reason is a condition for desiring an end, there are versions of (2) that are committed to ideas that are characteristic of either (1b) or (1c). Besides, as I have mentioned in footnote 174, there are some versions of (3) that are also compatible with (1c) and with (2a). Moreover, as I shall discuss in more detail below, depending on how we formulate the idea that beliefs about the goodness or fineness of something and rational desires are (or are not) distinct existences, it seems that some version of (3) would be trivially true (for instance, if being distinct existences is tantamount to being numerically distinct) and perhaps would not be enough for explaining the sense in which reason can determine the ends of action.

for making the ends right, whereas reason (or, more precisely, *φρόνησις*) for making right what contributes to the end.

(V), in turn, is a question fundamental for understanding Aristotle's account of moral habituation and for determining how he characterises intermediate agents and other agents who fail to be fully virtuous but who still seem to come close to virtue in their actions (such as agents who are civically virtuous).

(VI)-(VII), finally, are central questions for determining the level of independence of reason in determining the ends of action: as Richard Loening contends, 'the most convincing evidence against the assumption that Aristotle wanted to assign to moral virtue the determination of the right principles of action is offered by his description of the *ἀκρατής*, who has no moral virtue, but has nevertheless knowledge of those principles' (1903, p. 90).¹⁷⁷ In other words, if intermediate agents can aim for fine ends (i.e., if some version of C2—the claim according to which agents who are not fully virtuous, such as intermediate agents, can aim for fine ends—is true),¹⁷⁸ a *desideratum* would be that, in making the end right, virtue either is not responsible for setting those ends that are starting points for deliberation (ends₃), or at least is not responsible for doing that in such a way that intermediate agents cannot deliberate

¹⁷⁷ 'Den bündigsten Gegenbeweis aber gegen die Annahme, daß Aristoteles der ethischen Tugend die Bestimmung der richtigen Prinzipien des Handelns habe zuweisen wollen, bietet seine Charakteristik des *ἀκρατής*: dieser besitzt gar keine ethische Tugend und hat trotzdem die Erkenntnis jener Prinzipien.'

¹⁷⁸ Note, however, that Loening can be reasonably construed as denying that incontinent agents really aim for morally good ends, since he thinks that merely having knowledge about the end is not enough for really desiring it (which implies acting accordingly). I shall come back to this in **Chapter 1, section 1.4**. In any case, if we distinguish between ends₁ and ends₂ as I have done in the first part of this **Introduction**, then there is no issue in saying that incontinent agents aim for morally good ends in that they have ends₃ that are fine, although these fine ends they aim for are not ends₁ as well, since they rather act on the basis of *ἐπιθυμία* or *θυμός*. Besides, note that, on my reading they would not have ends₂ that are fine, since they would not be able to conclude through deliberation that virtuous actions are to be performed for their own sakes, but even if they might use the 'for its own sake' or the 'on its own account' language to describe their decisions, they would not decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes or on their own account, for they would not conceive of virtuousness and fineness correctly to begin with, the upshot being that the feature of virtuous actions that motivates their decision is not the very thing that makes these actions fine or virtuous, but some other thing which might even be connected to the fineness or virtuousness of this action (being coextensive with it), but which is not what grounds the fineness or virtuousness of that action.

(and perhaps even decide) for the sake of morally good ends. And if this is correct, reason must be to some extent sufficient for having a *βούλησις* for a fine end, although it might not be sufficient for making one's ends right in the sense they are for fully virtuous agents, e.g., for making one aim for fine ends for their own sakes and for enabling one to decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes.

The difficulty formulated by Loening seems to capture one of the main reasons why scholars tend to impose heavy restrictions on C1, answering (III) in such way that virtue is not necessary for making the end right, although it may be said to be sufficient for that. Another important reason behind this move, as I take it, is the fact that many assume orthodox readings of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], to the effect that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can decide on, and even perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes, although they would not be able to do that on the basis of a stable and unchanging character disposition. As a result, virtue would be necessary not for aiming for fine ends, but for being able to do this reliably and consistently or without experiencing psychological conflicts.

This is most explicit in (1c) views, since such views take virtue to make the end right in that it secures that the ends for whose sake one decides, one's ends₂ (which do not necessarily confirm that the ends that initially seemed to be worth pursuing and for whose sake one began deliberating are situationally adequate), are morally good and appropriate relatively to the circumstances in which they are being pursued. This claim is compatible with intermediate agents such as continent agents, for instance, deciding on virtuous actions for the sake of morally good ends that are appropriate relatively to the circumstances they are being faced with, except that these agents would be perhaps prone to err on some particular occasions due to their lack of virtue.

As a result, virtue would not be necessary for aiming for and for acting for the sake

of right ends (which would be ends that are both morally good and appropriate), although it would be necessary for doing this consistently. In other words, intermediate agents would be able to aim for ends that are morally right in that they decide or reach, by means of deliberation, the conclusion that a fine action is to be performed for its own sake, although, due to not being fully virtuous, they would not be able to reach these conclusions or decisions consistently, but will be rather prone to err on some circumstances.

By the same token, Lorenz (2019, p. 202), who I portrayed above as a representative of (2a),¹⁷⁹ understands the claims made in the *EE* to the effect that virtue makes the end right as saying that virtue is ‘responsible for the correctness [...] of the goals that the decisions of virtuous people aim for,’ and by correctness he says he means ‘the reliable correctness,’ which suggests that it is not only the decisions of virtuous persons that aim for morally good ends, although only these decisions would have ends that are reliably correct. In regard to the role of virtue in the *EN*, Lorenz’s position is a bit different (2009; 2019), for he thinks that, in the *EN*, virtue is not merely a condition of the non-rational part of the soul, but is a condition of the rational part of the soul as well, but one which does not overlap with *φρόνησις*.¹⁸⁰ This leads him to the conclusion that, in the *EN*, ‘it is always and exclusively through practical *nous*, and so through an act of reason, that virtuous people identify correct goals for action’ (Lorenz, 2019, p. 210), a claim that seems to be nevertheless compatible with the non-virtuous agents also being able to identify and to endorse correct goals for action. As a result, Lorenz would seem to hold that the virtue is not necessary for making the end right, since non-virtuous agents can also aim for correct ends, even though they may not do this consistently.

Moss, another representant of (2a), thinks that intermediate agents can aim for fine

¹⁷⁹ Although, as I indicated above, it is arguable whether his positions fit better (2a) or (2b) depending on how we construe his position regarding whether a particular sort of character disposition is required for one to be able to aim for fine ends.

¹⁸⁰ See Irwin (2017, p. 43) for a critique of this conception of moral virtue.

ends in a way that differs from fully virtuous agents in that ‘one can have a wish for something one believes good without having the corresponding appearance—i.e. that one can get the belief by testimony or reasoning or some other way’ (2012, p. 225), which would be the case of intermediate agents such as the continent and the incontinent, who have correct wishes but lack good character dispositions. It is because intermediate agents have character dispositions that are good enough to make them ‘responsive to arguments about the good life’ that they can acquire correct beliefs about the goal, and thus can have the right goal and make right decisions. Moss takes this to suggest that the intermediate agents’ grasp of the right goals is defective, which defectiveness would also explain their being prone to *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκρατεία*. Notwithstanding this, she does not deny that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can decide on virtuous actions on their own account and that they may even perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (which would be more frequent for continent agents). Thus, although virtue would explain a difference in grasp in that it accounts for the appearances of goodness due to *φαντασία* which are at the basis of one’s grasp of the good, this would not imply that agents who fail to be fully virtuous cannot aim for fine ends for their own sakes. For Moss, then, virtue makes the ends right because it is necessary for making right these appearances of goodness, and not because it is necessary for having right goals and for making right decisions. As she puts it, habituation *ensures* that our decisions have the right ends (Moss, 2011, pp. 210–211), which is clearly compatible with habituation not being necessary for our decisions to have right ends.

Richard Loening, in turn, whose answer to the question of the role of reason in determining the ends of action is best understood as a version of (2b), claims that when Aristotle says that virtue makes the end right, he should be understood as claiming that full virtue makes the end right. So, because full virtue requires *φρόνησις*, this claim actually attributes

the role of making the end right to reason, and not to one's non-rational character, whose role would be only conative, such that all it does is making the agent properly motivated to pursue what reason commands.¹⁸¹ Moreover, Loening also seems to hold that intermediate agents can determine morally good ends as worth pursuing for their own sakes, since continent agents not only know what is good for themselves, just like the incontinent (on the latter, see Loening, 1903, pp. 55, 59, 90), but also act as their reason commands (1903, pp. 116-117). As a result, being properly motivated to pursue what reason commands would not be necessary for reason determining something morally good as the end to be pursued by the agent, although it would be necessary for actually desiring and pursuing that with all types of desire (and not only with *βούλησις*).

(1a) readings seem to be more nuanced in this regard:

No doubt Walter, whose reading falls into (1a), seems to think that intermediate agents have knowledge about what they should do except that it does not motivate them in the same way as it motivates fully virtuous agents. In that case, nothing would hinder agents who fail to be fully virtuous from being able to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, except that perhaps they would not always act on such ends. In other words, their fine ends₃₋₂ would fail to become ends₁ in some cases. Virtue, in turn, would secure that one's ends₃₋₂ are consistently effective in eliciting action, thus becoming ends₁.

Yet it is not necessary to construe (1a) in this way. For, in principle, (1a) can also be formulated in such a way that intermediate agents are agents that act well or intend to act well despite the bad ends they aim for. But it is less plausible that Aristotle held such a view.

But these are not the only ways of responding to the difficulty raised by Loening. It is also possible to claim that virtue is necessary for making the ends right not in so far as it is

¹⁸¹ See Loening (1903, pp. 71, 90, 266n22).

necessary if one is to aim for a fine end, but in so far as it is necessary if one is to be able to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, and thus for enabling one to decide on, and to perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes.

(1b) can be construed in a way that comes quite close to this. Irwin (1988c, p.56), for instance, claims that, ‘in one sense, or in one respect, the incontinent has the right decision and first principle, and in another sense he lacks it,’ and that ‘the virtuous and prudent person is the only one who grasps the correct end of deliberation’ (Irwin, 2019, p. 157). He seems to have in mind here two different senses of rightness, since he also thinks that Aristotle must say that ‘there is something right about the incontinent person’s decision, but still something different from what is right about the virtuous person’s decision’ (1988d, p. 63). Yet Irwin has something slightly different in mind, especially because he construes intermediate agents as lacking a stability of judgment that is expressed in a lack of ‘appropriate knowledge about the right occasions and circumstances’ (1988d, p. 70). In other words, although intermediate agents can have a right conception of happiness, their conception is defective in that there are i) circumstances in which they do not connect their judgments about what they should do with that conception (as happens in episodes of incontinence), and ii) circumstances in which, in becoming aware of their strong appetites, their rational judgment is distorted, such that they falsely believe they are making a major sacrifice in frustrating their appetites (as happens in episodes of continence) (cf. 1988d, p. 79-80). I cannot fully address the issues in Irwin’s view in this Dissertation, for this would force me to discuss in detail Aristotle’s views of *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκρατεία*. At any rate, it is an advantage of my way of answering to the problem raised by Loening that it is compatible with different ways of explaining phenomena like *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκρατεία* (for brevity’s sake, I’m assuming what I take to be the most plausible account of *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκρατεία*—see footnotes 49 and 53—, but my claim can, in principle, be

made compatible with other accounts of *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκρατεία*).

(3) readings, in turn, seem to be committed to a view closer to mine. In particular, Charles' version of (3) implies that differences in desiderative responses to judgments about the good entail differences in these judgments, since, on his view, practical judgements are definitionally dependent on a certain activity of desire (which, in turn, is also definitionally dependent upon practical judgments). As a result, because intermediate agents do not desideratively respond to their judgments about the good in the same way as fully virtuous agents, they would not grasp the good in the same way as fully virtuous agents.

This is perfectly compatible with the claim I intend to advance in this Dissertation, since this reading implies that agents who fail to be fully virtuous do not grasp, and thus do not aim for, fine ends in the same way as fully virtuous agents. Yet it is an advantage of my reading that it does not depend on subscribing to a version of inextricabilism, but can be defended on independent grounds. In fact, it can also be formulated in intellectualist terms, provided we conceive of virtue of character as playing a role analogous to that played by *ἐμπειρία* in certain natural sciences in that it enables one to grasp the principles in that domain.¹⁸²

That being said, let me go back to *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. As I pointed out above, most scholars answer (III) in such a way that virtue would either not be necessary for making the ends right or else would make ends right in a way that is compatible with agents who are not fully virtuous being able to aim at right ends for their own sakes and to decide on and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. This is because they take the argument of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] to imply that one can perform a virtuous actions having decided on it on its own account without thereby performing a virtuous action virtuously, either because some agents who perform virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes would not

¹⁸² I shall come back to this in **Chapter 1, section 1.3.3.1**.

satisfy all three criteria of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]—for instance, because they cannot perform virtuous actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*—or else because they do not satisfy the criteria of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] in the same way as fully virtuous agents, but in a second best way (yet, as I have already pointed out in the first part of this **Introduction**, this latter reading seems to assume that satisfying these criteria is not sufficient for being virtuous—see footnote 69). In this Dissertation, I would like to dispute this reading (I shall do this in **Chapter 3**, in section 3.1).

0.2.3 An outline of the Dissertation

In this Dissertation, I intend to show two things. First, that Aristotle's claims to the effect that virtue makes the end right should be understood as saying that virtue makes the agent perform virtuous actions *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα* (for the sake of the fine), *διὰ τὸ καλόν* (due to their fineness), or *ὅτι καλόν* or *διὰ καλόν* (because they are fine), and that this is intrinsically connected to (if not identical to)¹⁸³ saying that virtuous actions, when performed virtuously,

¹⁸³ This identification is explicitly made, for instance, by Burnet (1900, p. 87), Gauthier (1958, pp. 76-77), Kraut, 1976, p. 235n23, Taylor (2006, pp. 86-87), Moss (2012, pp. 207, 217–218), Hitz (2012, p. 277), and Meyer (2016, p. 52). It is rejected by B. Williams (1995, p. 16) on the grounds that acting for the sake of the fine 'does not tell us what it is to do a particular sort of V[irtuous] thing for its own sake,' leaving us with the problem of distinguishing the virtues, which leads Williams to look for reasons that are specific to each virtue. Yet B. Williams (1995, p. 19) finds some difficulty with courage and temperance, since he thinks that courageous and temperate actions 'are not done "for their own sake," and doing them for their own sake would be something quite special: something like doing a certain thing in a certain situation to display or develop one's courage or self-control [sc., one's temperance, see B. Williams (1995, p. 18) on why he translates *σωφροσύνη* as self-control],' and, as Hursthouse (1995, p. 24) notices in her reply to Williams, there seems to be 'something perverse in an interpretation of II.4 [i.e., Bekker's II.3] that not only makes justice a slightly special case [i.e. in so far as, for Williams, only just actions are done because they are just, that is *qua* what they are read *de dicto*, whereas this would only be true of the other virtues—except for courage and temperance—if the *qua* what they are clause is read *de re*] but also makes courage and temperance not fit, the two virtues (along with justice) that Aristotle mentions time and again to illustrate his general claims about the virtues in book II, and thereby (one might plausibly say) the two he is least likely to have forgotten about when claiming that the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions "for their own sake".'

Kenny (1996, p. 14) rejects this identification on different grounds: he argues, on the basis of Broadie's interpretation of *EE* VIII.3, that merely good agents (like the Spartans) can perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (for, Kenny says, otherwise they would not be good), but cannot perform such actions because they are fine (noble). Now, the discussion of the meaning of the 'for its own sake' clause above (pages 40 to 44) suggests that something is off in this interpretation, since if virtuous actions are

are performed for their own sakes. A claim that I take to be equivalent to saying that virtue makes the end right by 1) making the agent's fine ends₃ to be fine for the agent (thus enabling the agent to aim for these ends for their own sakes), in which case they are also the ends that ultimately lead them to perform virtuous actions.

And second, that this does not hinder intermediate agents from aiming for morally good ends. As a result, making the end right would be tantamount to making it fine for the agent, since it is only for virtuous agents that fine things are fine, for which reason only virtuous agents are doers of fine things for their own sakes, i.e., for the sake of the fine. The upshot of this strategy is that Aristotle's claims to the effect that virtue makes the end right become just another way saying that virtue makes one perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, in which case the role of virtue in making the end right would be at the centre of both how Aristotle characterises the particular virtues and how he distinguishes between virtuous and non-virtuous agents, since only the first seem to perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.

In **Chapter 1**, I shall go through the relevant arguments in the common books, giving central attention to *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13], which I shall discuss in full. As I intend to argue, the common books challenge the orthodox reading of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], forcing us either to claim that the common books have not been completely revised so as to

intrinsically fine (noble), it seems that performing such actions for their own sakes would be tantamount to performing them because they are fine (noble). I shall offer further reasons for rejecting Kenny's view below in my discussion of *EE* VIII.3 in **Chapter 2, section 2.3**.

More recently, this identification was also rejected by Jimenez (2016, p. 30) on the grounds that learners of virtue can perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, but not yet for their own sakes, since she takes the learners not to have stable dispositions yet, and Aristotle suggests at *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^b2–5 that doing something having decided on it for its own sake is something that comes from habituation. I think this is not how II.3 should be understood, and different from Jimenez, I do not think there is an issue if we concede there is some sort of motivational gap between virtuous and non-virtuous agents (more on that below in **Chapter 3**). In any case, as I have already indicated above in the first part of this **Introduction** (in discussing question [V]—see **section 0.1.2.1.5**), I think this identification should be rejected on different grounds: because Aristotle uses expressions such as 'for the sake of the fine' or 'because it is fine' when he is not talking about actions that are intrinsically virtuous, but that can be performed in a way that does not hit the mean as well.

harmonise with *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]—in which case the common books would preserve a view which Aristotle recanted or revised in the *EN*—, or else that the orthodox reading of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] should be abandoned. Besides, the analysis of the argument from *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] and some other passages from the common books will allow me to give a more detailed response to some of the alternative views I have sketched in this Part of the Introduction. In particular, in section 1.3.3.1, I shall briefly respond to Jessica Moss' and to Richard Loening's views on the role of virtue in making the ends right.

In Chapter 2, I shall go through the relevant arguments in the *Ethica Eudemia*. I shall closely analyse the text of *EE* II.11 and some passages from the treatment of the particular virtues in the *EE*. Then, in the second part of this Chapter, I shall analyse *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17. As I take it, the view advanced by Aristotle in *EE* II.11 and in the *Eudemean* discussion of the particular virtues is closely related to that advanced in the common books, with the difference that Aristotle is even more explicit about the role of virtue in the *Ethica Eudemia*, since, as I shall argue, he even seems to specify that virtue makes the goal right by making one act for the sake of the fine. Besides, *EE* VIII.3 will allow me to take a further step, connecting the claim that virtue makes the end right by enabling one to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes with the claim that virtue makes fine things fine for agents who are fully virtuous (in that fine things belong on their own account only to fully virtuous agents), thus suggesting that virtue is at the basis of one's grasp of fineness in that it is what enables one to grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine things.

Finally, in Chapter 3, I shall go through the evidence in the *EN*. In this chapter, I shall propose that *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] should be read in light of Aristotle's claims to the effect that the particular virtues make one act for the sake of the fine and in light of a series of passages in which Aristotle says that the end of virtuous activities (i.e., the end that motivates

the virtuous performance of virtuous actions) is dependent on the disposition on the basis of which these activities are brought off, passages which, taken together with the difficult and neglected argument advanced by Aristotle in *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25, strongly suggest that the motive behind the performance of virtuous actions by fully virtuous agents is not shared with agents who fail to be fully virtuous. If this is correct, *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] should be read as saying something not fundamentally different from what we find in the common books and in the *EE*. To confirm this, I shall, in the second part of **Chapter 3**, go through what Aristotle says in the *EN* about agents who fail to aim for virtuous actions for their own sakes and thus failing to perform actions that hit the mean for the sake of the fine, so that we can get a clearer picture of what is involved in not acting for the sake of the fine.

If this is correct, then this Dissertation will have shown at least three things: First, that (I) virtue makes the ends right by making one i) aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes, ii) decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes (thus making one end₂ be right in that it corresponds to the intrinsic fineness of the virtuous actions one performs), and iii) perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (thus making one end₁ be right in that it corresponds to the intrinsic fineness of the virtuous actions one performs). Second, that (II) *full virtue*, rather than natural or habituated virtue, is responsible for making the ends right in this way. Third, that (III) full virtue is *necessary* for making the ends right in this way. Besides, in showing these three things I intend to also give some indications as to how (IV) and (V) should be answered. In fact, not only these answers to (I)–(III) suggest a particular way of answering (IV) along the lines I have sketched in this **Introduction** (such that ends₃ are situation-specific goals, whereas our ultimate goal frames somehow our deliberations), but in analysing the relevant texts for answering these questions throughout **Chapters 1 to 3** I shall also suggest

that Aristotle consistently holds, regarding (V), a view according to which agents who fail to be fully virtuous can voluntarily perform virtuous actions in that they can voluntarily do things that hit the mean in action, but that they cannot engage in virtuous activities: i.e., perform virtuous actions that hit the mean both in action and in emotion, which I shall argue can only be achieved by agents who satisfy the three agential requirements presented in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4].

In the **Conclusion**, I shall deal with some remaining problems that were not discussed in the Chapters that precede it, whose discussion will further clarify my answer to the End Question: I shall briefly summarise the results I expect to have obtained from the previous Chapters, stating clearly what my position as to how questions (I)-(VII) should be answered is, and what consequences this has for my answer to the End Question. After this, I shall briefly come back to my question (VII), and shall discuss some issues regarding it that were left open throughout this Dissertation.

0.3 Some introductory philological remarks on the texts and translations

All translations in this Dissertation are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

The critical editions I rely on are mentioned in the references. I have, as a rule, relied on the most recent editions of the texts. So, in the cases in which there are several different editions mentioned in the references (as is the case of the *Politica*, for instance), the one I am relying on for the Greek text is the most recent one.

This is not true about the *EN*, however. As I shall make clear below in section 0.3.2, for the text of the *EN* I have freshly collated eight mss., so that the text I am using in the passages from the *EN* I quote and translate in this Dissertation depart from the that printed in previous editions in a number of passages.

I have provided the Greek text for all passages I analyse in detail (those that are listed in my List of Texts above). As a rule, whenever the text I am quoting departs from the edition I am using, I have provided an *apparatus* indicating the variant I am giving preference to. Moreover, whenever there are textual problems relevant for the interpretation of the passage, I have also, as rule, indicated the variants in the *apparatus*, even in cases in which the text I print turns out to be the same printed by the edition I am relying on.

To indicate Bekker line breaks, I have employed ‘|’, and, for line breaks that corresponds to the beginning of a line multiple of five or to the beginning of a new Bekker column or Bekker page, I have employed ‘||’.

Below, in **section 0.3.1** I shall say something about some assumptions I have made regarding the text of the *EE*, whereas in **section 0.3.2** I shall say something about my assumptions regarding the text of the *EN*. Finally, in **section 0.3.2.1** I briefly turn to the question regarding the provenance of the common books, and express my position regarding them providing some reasons for thinking that they are originally *Eudemian* and have not been subject to revision before being incorporated into the *EN*, even though many passages from the common books admit of being read in light of *EN* in such a way that they convey something different from what they seem to imply when read in the context of the *EE*.

0.3.1 The text of the EE

For the text of the *EE*, I rely on Christopher Rowe’s new edition of the text (Rowe, 2023b) and on the critical edition of the Latin translation of *EE* VIII.3 made by Dieter Wagner (1970, pp. 179-196).¹⁸⁴ I have departed from the text printed by Rowe on a considerable

¹⁸⁴ The Latin translation of *EE* VIII.3—Rowe’s *FL*, Walzer & Mingay’s Λ^3 , and Harlfinger’s *La*—was first edited by George Lacombe—(1939). *Aristoteles Latinus. La Libreria dello Stato*—, to whose edition I have had no access. Wagner’s edition was not taken into account in Walzer & Mingay’s edition, which is specially worrying in so far as Lacombe’s edition is based only in one of the three mss. of this Latin translation (Pa—cod. Parisinus Nouv. Acq. Lat. 633) and prints its readings wrong in for at least eight

number of passages, but his edition is an undeniable improvement over the edition by Walzer & Mingay: not only his collations are much more accurate and his apparatus much more complete, but his edition also takes into account a ms. whose source (hyperarchetype α') he argues is the ultimate source of the source (sub-hyperarchetype α) from which P (Vat. gr. 1342) and C (Cant. gr. Ii.5.44 (1879)) were copied, which leads him to change slightly the *stemma* proposed by Harlfinger (1971). Moreover, the companion volume to Rowe's edition (Rowe, 2023a) not only provides us with justifications for many of the decisions made in his edition, but also has an appendix in which one can verify the data relevant for establishing the relationship between PCBL.

Notwithstanding this, I have retained the punctuation of Walzer & Mingay's edition in a number of places, and have also favoured the readings of the mss. whenever this seemed possible to me, and in a number of cases this implied reading a text different from the one printed by Rowe.

In all central passages of the *EE* I quote in this Dissertation (those that figure in the **List of Texts** above), I have strictly followed Bekker's lineation even in those places in which it does not correspond exactly to what is printed in Rowe's edition.

Besides, in all places in which the text I am reading departs from what is printed in Rowe's edition or where the text printed by Rowe departs from the text printed by Walzer & Mingay I have provided an *apparatus* with the relevant variants, making clear the text I am reading. I have also checked the sources for the conjectures and emendations mentioned by Susemihl, Walzer & Mingay, and Rowe in all passages where the text I am reading departs from the text printed by Rowe or where Rowe's edition prints something different from Walzer & Mingay's edition.

passages (see Wagner [1970, p. 184]).

The relevant sigla of the mss. of the *EE* that will be mentioned in this work are:

P Vat. gr. 1342¹⁸⁵

C Cant. gr. Ii.5.44 [=1879]¹⁸⁶

B Mon. gr. 635

L Laur. plut. 81.15

Ambr. Ambr. gr. E 40 sup.

M^b Marc. gr. 213

BF *Liber de bona fortuna*—Latin translation of *EE* VIII.2 and 1248^{b7}

FL *Liber de bona fortuna*—Latin translation of *EE* VIII.3

Besides, I shall also make reference to the three mss. of *FL*:¹⁸⁷

Sa Salamancensis 2705

Co Hispalensis 7.6.2

Pa Parisinus Nouv. Acq. Lat. 633


Below I reproduce Harlfinger's *stemma* as modified by Rowe:¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ As we shall see below, this mss. is also relevant for establishing the text of the *EN*. However, I shall use a different siglum to refer to it in the context of the *EN*, where it is usually referred to as P^b.

¹⁸⁶ Like P, this mss. too is relevant for establishing the text of the *EN*, and I shall also use a different siglum to refer to it in the context of the *EN*, where it is usually referred to as C^c.

¹⁸⁷ See Wagner (1970, pp. 181-185) for a discussion of these mss.

¹⁸⁸ For more details about this *stemma*, see Harlfinger (1971) and Rowe (2021; 2023b; 2023a).



0.3.2 The text of the *EN*¹⁸⁹

Matters are importantly different in the case of the *EN*. Despite the effervescent discussion around text of the *EN* that took place in the nineteenth century after the publication of Bekker's edition of Aristotle's works and which led to the publication of what are presently taken to be the two main editions of the *EN*: namely, the edition made by Susemihl (1887)—which was later revised by Apelt (in Susemihl & Apelt, 1912)—, and the edition

¹⁸⁹ In this section, I am developing, expanding, and repeating some ideas from my de Sousa (2024b).

made by Bywater (1894), Gauthier was led to complain, in 1970, that we have no true critical edition of the *Ethica Nicomachean* (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol.1, p. 301).¹⁹⁰

What is unfortunate, however, is that Gauthier is correct in his complaint. Not only Bywater's and Susemihl's editions do not depend on a complete recension of the witnesses of the *EN*, but also they do not rely on a *stemma* or on some sort of classification by reference to which the value of each of the witnesses can be assessed.

This picture has now changed considerably with the publication Pelagia-Vera Loungi's *Die Manuskripte und die Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles (Buch I)* (2022). Loungi carried out a thorough examination of all the witnesses of the *EN*: for book I, she freshly collated all mss. of the *EN*, and, for book II, what she concluded are the main mss. On the basis of this evidence, Loungi has for the first time proposed a *stemma* for the text of the *EN*, which is carefully grounded on the evidence gathered from her collations.

Now, a fundamental problem that remains after Loungi's work (as she herself recognises) concerns the unity of the transmission of the *EN*.

Although it is somewhat uncontroversial that the mss. of the *EN* constitute two main families (for Susemihl, these are Π^1 and Π^2 ; Loungi calls these α and β), there is reason for thinking that the members of these families differ depending on the books of the *EN* one has in view.

For Susemihl (1887, p. VIII), the α family (Susemihl's Π^1) is made up of K^b and M^b in books I, II, VI, VII, IX, and X, and of K^b and O^b in books III, IV, and VIII, whereas the β family (Susemihl's Π^2) is made up of L^b and O^b in books I, II, VI, VII, and IX, of L^b and M^b in books III and IV, of M^b for book VIII, and of L^b for book X. Matters are a bit more complicated in the case of book V, since Susemihl distinguishes between Π^1 and Π^2 on the

¹⁹⁰ 'Il n'existe pas encore d'édition critique du text grec de l'*Étique à Nicomaque*.'

one hand, and between Π^a and Π^b on the other, and claims that, in book V, sometimes we have, on the one hand, K^b and L^b forming Π^1 and M^b and O^b forming Π^2 , and sometimes K^b and O^b forming Π^a and L^b and M^b forming Π^b .

A slightly different grouping of these mss. can be found in Gauthier (1972b, p. 312), who also takes into account some mss. not considered by Susemihl.

What matters for my current purposes is that this variation in the grouping of the mss. suggests that if indeed Loungi's results regarding the transmission of book I turn out to be correct, it may be the case that they cannot be generalised to the whole *EN*. In fact, although it seems that for books I, II, VI, VII, and IX (and depending on whether one follows Susemihl or Gauthier, for book X as well) Loungi's hypothesis may be valid, it is possible that the mss. are grouped in a different way in other books of the *EN*.

On Loungi's hypothesis, the most important mss. for determining the readings of the α family are Laur. Plut. 81.11 (K^b), Vat. gr. 1342 (P^b), Cant. gr. li.5.44 [=1879] (C^c) together with the Arabic translation, whereas the most important mss. for determining the readings of the β family are Laur. Plut. 81.18 (L), Par. gr. 1854 (L^b), Ricc. 46 (O^b), Ambros. B 95 sup. [=Martini-Bassi 117] ($B^{95\text{sup}}$). Accordingly, to settle the issue about the grouping of the mss., evidence outside books I and II (and, if possible, outside books I, II, VI, VII, and IX) must be taken into account.

In another work (de Sousa, 2024b), I have freshly collated these eight mss. together with M^b for the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and I concluded that, among these mss., the only ones that exhibited a behaviour that is not fully explained by Loungi's *stemma* were O^b and M^b . However, the evidence from *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] was insufficient to settle the issue about their place in the *stemma*, although there is reason for thinking that O^b is contaminated by K^b or by some other non-extant mss. closely related to it. As we shall see

later in this Dissertation, there are a couple of passages I shall analyse that will strengthen this suspicion.

Now, as I have already observed elsewhere (de Sousa, 2024b), the Arabic translation and four of the eight mss. Loungi takes to be the most important for establishing the text of the *EN* (namely, C^c, L, B^{95sup.}, and V) were not taken into account by previous editions of the text. As I have explained there, in the case of the Arabic translation, this is due to the fact that the two parts of its only extant ms. were discovered only recently, in the fifties (by A.J. Arberry and by D.M. Dunlop), much later than the most recent edition of the *EN* (namely, most recent edition of Apelt's revision of Susemihl's edition, which is from 1912).¹⁹¹

In the case of L, B^{95sup.}, and V, it seems that they were not taken into account by previous editions due to the fact that their dating was changed only recently. L was dated as belonging to the 14th century until the work Brockmann (1993, pp. 49-50) showed that it belongs to the 12th century instead and that it is the result of the work of Ioannikios and his *scriptorium*.¹⁹²

V and B^{95sup.} were also both dated as belonging to the 14th century. However, Brockmann (1993, p. 49n27) has shown that V comes from the 11-12th centuries, since he identifies the copyist of this ms. with that of Par. gr. 1808, a ms. important to the transmission of Plato's works that dates from 11-12 centuries. Similarly, Loungi (2022, p. 154n204) provides us with some reasons for thinking that B^{95sup.} comes from the end of the 12th century or from the

¹⁹¹ For Arberry's report of his discovery, see Arberry (1955). For Dunlop's report, see Dunlop (1962). This text was first partially edited in 1968 by Dorothy G. Axelroth, in her doctoral dissertation—*An Analysis of the Arabic Translation of Book Ten of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*—, which contains an edition and English translation of the Arabic version of *EN X* (I did not have access to this work). The first full edition of this text was made by Badawi in 1979, and, more recently, it was edited again by Akasoy and Fidora (2005). On the different objectives of these two editions (most notably, the fact that only the latter purports to be a critical edition), see Akasoy and Fidora (2005, pp. ix, ixn1), Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 1, pp. 14-15), and Schmidt and Ullmann (2012, pp. 9-10). However, as Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 1, pp. 15-21) stresses, there are reasons for thinking that Akasoy & Fidora's edition is, at some points, as unreliable as Badawi's.

¹⁹² On Ioannikios and his *scriptorium*, see Wilson (1983)

beginning of the 13th century.

Another ms. whose dating was recently revised is O^b : although O^b was taken into account by all previous editors, it was thought to belong to the 14th century as well. Yet, as has been shown by Baldi (2011), it belongs the 12th century.¹⁹³

The issue is a bit different in the case of C^c . It has been thought since the work of Jackson (1876) that C^c is actually a copy of P^b . As a result, despite the agreement between C^c and K^b —which has been shown by Stewart (1882, p. 3), who made a full collation of C^c for book X and a partial collation of it for the other books of the *EN*—, the value of C^c was taken to depend on the value of P^b . Yet, because P^b was not taken to be of much value,¹⁹⁴ C^c was generally disregarded.

This situation changed with the work Harlfinger (1971) on the transmission of the *EE* and with the work of Brockmann (1993) on the transmission of the *MM*, for they made clear that, despite the fact that P^b and C^c are closely related to one another, C^c is not a copy of P^b , but they are copies of the same exemplar made by the same copyist: Nicolaus Damenus. In addition to that, Loungi (2022, pp. 113-126) provided us with reasons for thinking that, in the case of the *EN*, P^b and C^c , despite being closely related to K^b , are not copies of it (see her *stemma* below).

In the face of this, I was led to freshly collate, for all passages from the *EN* I translate in this Dissertation, the eight mss. Loungi takes to be the most important for establishing the text of the *EN*: namely, $K^b P^b C^c LL^b O^b B^{95sup} V$. In addition to that, I have also collated M^b for a couple of passages, and in some other difficult passages I have also consulted G^a (Marc.

¹⁹³ More recently, see Martinelli Tempesta (2016) on this.

¹⁹⁴ On the value of P^b in comparison to other mss., see Jackson (1879, p. xi) and Susemihl (1878, p. 631). Jackson's judgment is based on his collation of P^b for book V of the *EN*, whereas Susemihl's judgment concerns the value of P^b in 1176a11-1177a30, a part of book X for which von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff collated P^b on his behalf.

gr. 212), E^a (Vat. gr. 506), Grosseteste Latin translation of the *EN* (in Gauthier, 1972b), and the Latin version of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* (in Felicianus *et alli* 1562; Woerther, 2018). Finally, for a single passage (see T 4 below), I have taken into account evidence from a Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, 1989-2023, I.1*, p. 263, IV.2 [I.1 & III], Tav. 185), which proved to be central for deciding what text to print.

I have also taken readings of the Arabic translation of the *EN* (as edited by Akasoy & Fidora [2005] and taking into account the corrections proposed by Ullmann [2011-2012, vol. 2, pp. 123-274]) into consideration for all passages flagged by Akasoy and Fidora (2005) and by Schmidt and Ullmann (2012) as relevantly departing from the text printed by Bywater and by Susemihl, and also for a couple of other passages that were not mentioned by them in this connection but for which this translation nevertheless turned out to be decisive. In all cases in which I thought the reading of the Arabic translation was relevant, I have mentioned it in the *apparatus*.

The relevant sigla for the mss. I have mentioned in this Dissertation are:

K^b Laur. Plut. 81.11

P^b Vat. gr. 1342

C^c Cant. gr. li.5.44 [=1879]

L Laur. Plut. 81.18

L^b Par. gr. 1854


O^b Ricc. 46

B^{95sup.} Ambros. B 95 sup. [=Martini-Bassi 117]

Arab. the Arabic Translation

Aver. the latin version of Averroes commentary (as edited by Woerther, 2018 [for book X] and as printed in Felicianus *et alli* 1562 [for the remaining books])

Below there is a slightly modified version of the *stemma* for *EN* I proposed by Pelagia-Vera Loungi (2022, p. 419) followed by the relevant sigla for interpreting it:



1500

Sigla:

Burg. = Burgundio of Pisa's Latin translation (edited by Gauthier, 1972a)
 B^{95sup.} = Ambros. B 95 sup. (Martini-Bassi 117)
 F = Vat. Barb. 75
 C^c = Cant. gr. li.5.44 (1879)
 I^b = Par. Coisl. 161
 E = Par. gr. 1853
 E^a = Vat. gr. 506

G^a = Marc. gr. Z 212
 H^a = Marc. gr. Z 214
 K^b = Laur. Plut. 81.11
 L = Laur. Plut. 81.18
 L^b = Par. gr. 1854
 M = Vat. Urb. 37
 M^b = Marc. gr. Z 213
 N^b = Marc. IV. 53
 O^b = Ricc. 46
 OCC 115 = Oxon. CC 115

P^b = Vat. gr. 1342
 Q = Marc. gr. Z 200
 S = Laur. Plut. 81.01
 TrL = Translatio Lincolnenses, i.e. the recensio pura of Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation (edited by Gauthier, 1972b)
 V = Vind. Phil. 315
 W = Vat. gr. 1026

This departs from Loungi's *stemma* in a couple of places. First of all, it refers to Burgundio of Pisa's translation as Burg. instead of B (so as to avoid confusion with the siglum for Mon. gr. 635—a ms. important for the *EE*, as we saw). Second, it uses the siglum V for Vind. Phil. 315 (Loungi does not use a siglum to talk of this ms.). Third, it uses the siglum F for Vat. Barb. 75 (Loungi also does not have a siglum for this ms.).

In addition to that, I have, as a general policy, tried to avoid branches overlapping in ways that could produce ambiguities, for which reason I have repositioned some of the mss. so as to avoid ambiguities as to their filiation (while also trying to maintain their position in the vertical timeline).

0.3.2.1 THE COMMON BOOKS

Since the work of Kenny (1978/2016), it became generally admitted that the common books are originally *Eudemian*. This is not all that Kenny (1978/2016) wants to claim in his work, for another claim of his is that the *EE* is later than the *EN* and is Aristotle's mature work on *Ethics*. However, this later claim has not enjoyed as much success as his claim regarding the common books.

Now, although most scholars countenance that the common books have indeed been incorporated into the *EN* from the *EE*,¹⁹⁵ it has also been argued that these books were revised (maybe by Aristotle himself) before being incorporated into the *EN*.

Here I would like to suggest that what I take to be the most promising arguments for accepting that the common books were revised before being incorporated into the *EN* are ultimately inconclusive. Besides, I would like to briefly suggest that there remain in the common books some views that are simply incompatible with views held by Aristotle in the

¹⁹⁵ An exception that is worth mentioning is Rowe (1971).

EN, which strongly suggest that the common books have not undergone any revision before being incorporated into the *EN*.¹⁹⁶

A first argument for thinking that the common books have been revised before being incorporated into the *EN* concerns the conception of moral virtue that we come across in the common books. Hendrik Lorenz (2009; 2019), for instance,—as we saw above in **section 0.2.2**—argues that in the *EN* and in the common books moral virtue is not merely a condition of the non-rational part of the soul, but is a condition of the rational part of the soul as well, but a condition that is to be distinguished from *φρόνησις*. Lorenz’s argument is very compelling in that it is very interesting philosophically. However, this move of Lorenz’s is not necessary to make sense of the idea that moral virtue does not depend solely on facts about the condition of one’s non-rational part of the soul. As a matter of fact, as Irwin (2017, p. 43) argues, ‘the perfection of the non-rational part may involve the perfection of some of the rational part as well’ in that the moral virtues perfect the non-rational part of the soul ‘because they relate it to the right conditions of the rational part of the soul.’ In other words, ‘[i]f something’s perfection essentially consists in its playing its part in some system that functions well, it achieves this perfection only in so far as the rest of the system functions well.’ Accordingly, the fact that in the common books and in the *EN* moral virtue is explicitly conceived of as involving somehow a condition of the rational part of the soul does not need to be taken as implying that in the *EN* moral virtue is not merely a condition of the non-rational part of the soul, for it may well be the case that, just like in the *EE*, it is rather a condition of the non-rational part of the soul that is relative to a good condition of the rational part of the soul, upon which it is directly dependent. Thus, Lorenz’s argument is inconclusive about whether the common books have been revised before being inserted into the *EN*, for the conception of

¹⁹⁶ The assumption that the common books have not been revised before being incorporated into the *EN* is also shared by Zingano (2021b).

moral virtue we come across in the common books may also be construed as being perfectly in line with what we find in the *EE*.

A second argument for thinking that the common books underwent some revision before being incorporated in the *EN* concerns the treatment of *ἀκρασία* in the *Eudemian* discussion of voluntariness and in the common books. This argument, which was advanced by Frede (2019), consists in saying that in *EE* (esp. book II), *ἀκρασία* is conceived of in terms of a conflict between different parts of the soul in which the desiderative part of the soul overcomes reason, whereas in the common books *ἀκρασία* is conceived of instead in terms of a cognitive flaw, such that there is no contest of strength between different parts of the soul behind *ἀκρασία*. Moreover, Frede says, in book VII, ‘Aristotle is embarking on a discussion of lack of control and self-control *ab ovo*’ (p. 107). As a result, it would be unplausible to think that book VII as we have it belongs to an *Eudemian* context, otherwise we would expect Aristotle to engage with the things he said about these phenomena before (i.e., in *EE* II). A response to this has been offered by Kenny himself in the third edition of his book. In rough lines, Kenny’s (1978/2016, p. 279) response relies on an observation about the first line of *EN* VII (i.e., *EE* VI), namely the fact that there we come across the phrase ‘*ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν*,’ which, as Kenny observes, is a type of phrase that does not occur elsewhere in the *EN*, but does occur in the *EE*. For instance, in *EE* II.1 1218^b31, Aristotle uses the phrase ‘*ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν*’ to introduce a discussion ‘of happiness (extensively discussed already in Book one) from a new viewpoint.’ Similarly, in *EN* VII.1 1145^a15, ‘*ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν*’ could be introducing ‘a fresh approach to incontinence—an approach which contrasts it with two other kinds of objectionable moral conditions, namely vice and brutishness. If the purpose of the phrase is to introduce a fresh treatment of a subject already addressed.’ *In sum*, Frede’s worries turn out to be ultimately unjustified, and the treatment of *ἀκρασία* in book

VII is compatible with the things Aristotle says about in *EE* II in that *EN* VII is introducing a new approach to this phenomenon.

Furthermore, not only are arguments for saying that the common books were revised inconclusive, but there are some theses explicitly held in the common books that are at odds with what we come across in the *EN*.¹⁹⁷ As a matter of fact, as we shall see in more detail below in discussing T 41, in the common books—most notably in book V—, Aristotle avails himself of a view according to which mixed actions are involuntary. This is clearly in tension with the treatment given to mixed actions in the *EN*, according to which mixed actions are clearly voluntary (cf. *EN* III.1 1110^a4–23). However, such a view is congenial to what Aristotle says about mixed actions in the *EE*, since, in *EE* II.8 1225^a2–19, Aristotle clearly concludes that people who act under constraint, despite not acting by force, act against nature and involuntarily. Accordingly, a pressing question for those who think that the common books were revised before being incorporated into the *EN* is why such clear incogruities between the common books and the *EN*, which are the first things one should have revised if one were adapting the common books to the *Nicomachean* context, have been left unrevised.

Now, a remaining worry about the common books is that there is evidence for thinking that an *EE* in eight books is the result of a late compilation, and thus that, *pace* Kenny, the common books were not transferred from the *EE* to *EN*, but rather from the *EN* to the *EE*, since the *EE* was missing some books.

Although, as Primavesi (2007, pp. 70–73) has shown, there is strong reason for thinking that an *Eudemian Ethics* in eight books is the result of a late compilation, and that an

¹⁹⁷ I am leaving aside here the fact that, read with the common books, the *EN* ends up having two treatises on pleasure which do not make reference to one another, an issue that led Schleiermacher (1817/2002) to think that *EN* could not be Aristotle's (his other main reason for thinking this concerns the relationship between *EN* I and X). I am leaving this aside because albeit we do indeed come across two different perspectives on pleasures in the discussion found in book VII and in the discussion found in book X, it may be argued that these two different accounts of pleasure are not really incompatible with one another—on this, see Harte (2014).

Eudemian Ethics having five books (i.e., not including the common books) is something quite early in the transmission of this text, I think this is still inconclusive as to whether the common books are originally *Eudemian* or not. As a matter of fact, it is still possible to argue that all that this proves is that the common books were transplanted into the *Nicomachean Ethics* quite early, perhaps when Aristotle's treatises were being divided into *πραγματεῖαι*, either by Aristotle himself or by someone (or by a group of people) in the Lyceum not much after his death.

In other words, I do not think that the fact that an *Eudemian Ethics* in eight books is the result of a late compilation that was meant to give to the *EE* books that it had originally lost is reason enough for thinking that books V-VII of the *EN* are not the books that were originally missing from the *EE*.

That being said, I have favoured Anthony Kenny's (1978/2016) hypothesis that the common books are originally *Eudemian*. Moreover, the fact that there are no conclusive arguments for saying that a revision of these books took place before their were transplanted into the *EN*, as I have argued, and that, on the contrary, there are things in the common books that conflict with doctrines that are characteristically *Nicomachean* is further grist to Kenny's mill.

CHAPTER I. THE COMMON BOOKS

In this first Chapter, I would like to focus on what Aristotle has to say in the common books about the division of labour between virtue and reason. The main passage I would like to analyse corresponds to a whole chapter of *EN VI* [= *EE V*]—Chapter 13 in the chapter division adopted in Bekker's and in Susemihl's editions, and Chapters 12 and 13 in the chapter division adopted in Bywater's edition. This Chapter can be divided into four parts.

The **first** part—lines 1143^b14–36—raises the three *aporiae* that Aristotle will discuss throughout the Chapter, two of which concern the usefulness of *φρόνησις* (more precisely, the first *aporia* asks about the usefulness of both *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, whereas the second *aporia* presents a further difficulty regarding the usefulness of *φρόνησις*). The **second** part—lines 1144^a1–11—presents part of the answer to the first *aporia*. The **third** part—lines 1144^a11–1145^a2—presents a long argument that complements, with respect to *φρόνησις*, the answer to the first *aporia* and appears to answer the second *aporia* to some extent. The **fourth** and final part—lines 1145^a2–11—first concludes, at 1145^a2–6, the arguments presented in the second and third parts, and takes the questions regarding the usefulness of *φρόνησις* to be answered. After that, at 1145^a6–11, it presents an argument that answers the third *aporia*, which concerns the relation between *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* (which might be viewed as one in which *φρόνησις* is more controlling than *σοφία* even though it is worse than it). The argument advanced by Aristotle in these final lines of the fourth part of the Chapter will not be relevant for the arguments I intend to marshal in this Chapter, for which reason it will not be discussed in depth.

In analysing these passages, I intend to show that Aristotle's divisions of labour in the common books should be read as saying that only full virtue makes the end right (so that we

should answer [III] by saying that virtue is necessary for having right ends, and [II] by saying that it is full virtue that makes the ends right) in that full virtue enables one to decide on, and to perform, virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account (thus making one's ends₂₋₁ right), which implies that only fully virtuous agents can aim for right ends₃ for their own sakes (so that we should answer [I] along the lines I proposed in the **Introduction** when it comes to Aristotle's position in the common books).

Moreover, in discussing the third part of *EN* VI.13—lines 1144^a11–1145^a2—, I would like to propose that, in the common books, Aristotle conceives of virtuous actions in such a way that they are morally valuable and virtuous irrespective of how they are performed (which will allow me to say something about Aristotle's position regarding [V] in the common books, although it will not be enough yet to articulate a full answer to this question). In so doing, I shall compare what Aristotle says in *EN* VI.13 and throughout *EN* V (another common book) about virtuous actions with his argument in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], which will also allow me to problematise the orthodox readings of this latter text, since in the common books performing a virtuous action having decided on it on its own account is sufficient for determining whether one is fully virtuous (or so I shall argue), which will throw some light into how moral habituation is to be conceived in the common books.

Moreover, going through Aristotle's arguments in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] will allow me to present a first argument to the effect that the virtues enable one to grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine things, a claim to which I intend to offer further support in **Chapters 2 and 3**.

1.1 The *aporiae* of *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12]—1143^b14-36

To begin, let me quote and translate *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1143^b14–36:

T 1 – *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1143^b14–36

1143b14

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ

15 || φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἐκατέρα τυγχάνει | οὐσα,
καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἐκάτερα, | εἴρηται. |

διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν. | ἡ μὲν

20 γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαιμόνων ἄνθρωπος
(οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο | μὲν ἔχει,

ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ
τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἂ τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, | οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ

25 εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις || αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, | ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ

τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· | οὐδὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν

28 τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐσμεν.

28

εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν

φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ | τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὐσι σπουδαίοις οὐ-

30 δὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, || ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
διοίσει αὐτοῖς ἔχειν | ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἰκανῶς τ' ἔχει

ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ | καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν

33 ὅμως οὐ | μανθάνομεν ἰατρικὴν.

33

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν

εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριώτερα αὐτῆς

35 ἔσται· || ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον.

35

περὶ

δὴ | τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.

|| **b14–15** ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ φρό-
νησις B^{95sup}. || **b15** τί K^bP^bC^cO^bV: τίνα LL^bB^{95sup}.V¹ | ἐκατέρα
τυγχάνει K^bP^bC^cL^bO^b: τυγχάνει ἐκατέρα LB^{95sup}.V¹ || **b19** θεωρήσει
K^bP^bC^cV: θεωρεῖ O^bLL^b || **b20** post οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως
add. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ πράξεως θεωρητικὴ P^bC^cM^b || **b22** ἡ om.
O^bL^b || **b23** ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς K^bLL^bO^b: ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν P^bC^cB^{95sup}.V ||
b27 καὶ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἡ B^{95sup}. || **b28** ῥητέον K^bP^bC^cVM^b: θε-
τέον LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V² || **b29** χρήσιμος P^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: χρήσιμον
K^bL^b || **b30** αὐτοῖς K^bP^bV: αὐτοῖς C^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.

It was said, then, what [15] practical and theoretical wisdom are, what each of them is concerned with, and that each of them is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

[18] But one might raise a difficulty about them [sc., practical and theoretical wisdom] <asking> what they are useful for. As a matter of fact, theoretical wisdom will not consider anything from which a human being comes to be happy [20] (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), whereas practical wisdom is indeed occupied with¹⁹⁸ that <from which a human being comes to be happy>, but <one might ask> what one would need it [sc., practical wisdom] for if (1) practical wisdom is the <virtue> concerned with things that are just, fine, and good for the human being, (2) these are the things up to the good person to do, and (3) we are no more doers of these things by knowing them, [25] since virtues are dispositions (just as neither <are we any more doers of> healthy and wholesome things that are <so> called not by

¹⁹⁸ For this meaning of ἔχω, see the Cambridge Greek Lexicon (henceforth CGL), s.v. ἔχω, 17.

being productive but by coming from our disposition <by knowing them>, for we are no more doers of these by having an expertise in medicine or gymnastics).

[28] But if it must be said [in response to this] that <one should be> practically wise not for the sake of these things [sc., that are up to the virtuous person to do], but for the sake of becoming <virtuous>, it [sc., practical wisdom] would be of no use to those who are virtuous <already>, [30] and besides not even to those who do not have <practical wisdom>, for having it or following others who have it would make no difference to them.

[33] In addition to that, it would appear to be absurd if in spite of being inferior to theoretical wisdom practical wisdom should be more controlling than it, [35] for the one that does something [i.e., practical wisdom] rules and issues orders in regard to each thing.

We must, then, discuss these things, because up to now we have only raised difficulties about them.

After concluding the examination of the virtues of each of the rational parts of the soul, whose results are summarised here at lines 14-17, Aristotle presents a question regarding the usefulness of practical and theoretical wisdom.¹⁹⁹ This is an obvious issue in regard to theoretical wisdom, since it is not even occupied with things from which happiness stems.²⁰⁰ Thus, contrary to what would be expected in view of theoretical wisdom being a virtue, it would be questionable whether it contributes somehow to happiness. But in order to raise a similar difficulty regarding practical wisdom, which clearly deals with things that produce happiness, Aristotle unfolds this *aporia* into two separate problems that will then be attended to later in the text—namely, in 1144^a1-11 and in 1144^a11-1145^a2—, thus showing that dealing with things that produce happiness is, for two reasons,²⁰¹ not sufficient for saying

¹⁹⁹ This is typical of the common books, since, in these books, after finishing the discussion of the main topic, Aristotle goes through problems and questions related to it. The same structure can be observed also in *EN* V, where after discussing justice and injustice in *EN* V.1-9 [=Bywater V.1-5], Aristotle solves some difficulties and remaining problems in *EN* V.10-15 [=Bywater V.6-11].

²⁰⁰ Similarly, see Natali (2014, p. 196)

²⁰¹ Eustratius (*CAG*. XX, 384.31-386.20) and Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L VI, 10 14-87) construe this *aporia* in a similar fashion: 1) σοφία is not useful for human matters because it does not deal with things through which one is happy; 2) even though φρόνησις deals with these things, it is useless, because a) it is concerned with just, fine, and good things which are up to the good person to do, and this person is not a more effective doer of these things if she has knowledge of them; and because b) even if someone answers to this argument saying that the φρόνησις would still be useful for acquiring virtue, the same conclusions would follow, because, first of all, it would still be useless for virtuous agents, and, moreover, it would be useless for non-virtuous agents who intend to become virtuous, since it will make no difference whether they are performing actions that will lead to virtue by means of φρόνησις or by following the lead of someone else who has φρόνησις.

that *φρόνησις* is useful.

The first problem regarding practical wisdom—presented at lines 1143^b20–28—questions its usefulness by pointing out that we do not become more effective doers of good things by knowing them (presumably at the very least that they are good). What motivates this objection is that it is not clear how practical wisdom would be useful for performing virtuous actions, since actions of this sort are performed by virtuous agents, and just as people do not display more health by knowing medicine, so too virtuous agents would not manifest their characters more by having knowledge about the good they already bring forth.²⁰² This problem, at least if construed in this way, appears to presuppose that there is no connection between being good and having a sort of knowledge about the good (namely, the sort of knowledge provided by *φρόνησις*).²⁰³

²⁰² Both in the *EE* and in the *EN* Aristotle has described virtue as something that enables people to perform virtuous actions (see *EE* II.4 1222^a6–8 and *EN* II.2 [=Bywater III.3] 1104^b27–28). It is reasonable, then, to ask about the contribution of *φρόνησις* to virtue, since what has been said before in both *Ethicae* is seemingly compatible with virtuous agents not having *φρόνησις* themselves, although they act as right reason commands, i.e., in accordance with reason (similarly, for the idea that the question raised about *φρόνησις* here is analogous to that about the ethical enquiry raised in *EN* II.2, see Gourinat [2015, p. 126]).

In *MM* A.V.2 1185^b8–12, we come across a similar conception of *φρόνησις*, since in this passage from the *MM* it is said that people are not praised due to excellences of the rational part of the soul, and one of the examples given is that no one is praised due to being *φρόνιμος*. Yet the author of the *MM* seems to safeguard the possibility of *φρόνησις* being essentially connected to virtue to the extent that lines 1185^b11–^b12 establish that the non-rational part of the soul is not praised except in so far as it is subservient to and subserve the rational part (οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἄλογον [sc., οὐδεὶς ἐπαινέεται], εἰ μὴ ἢ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστιν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖ τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντι μορίῳ). Thus, there is space for a connection between *φρόνησις* and moral virtue such that the moral virtues are praised *due to being subservient to φρόνησις*. Even so, this would only secure that *φρόνησις* itself is praiseworthy if one conceives of it in such a way that it is essentially connected to virtue, in which case it could be said that they are mutually dependent or that although *φρόνησις* requires virtue, it is hierarchically superior to virtue. To be sure, it is not clear whether this is the conception of *φρόνησις* one finds in *MM* A.V.2 1185^b8–12. In *MM* A.V.2 1185^b9–11, for instance, it is claimed that people are not praised due to being *φρόνιμοι*, whereas in *MM* A.XXXIV.12 1197^a17 it is claimed that the *φρόνιμοι* are praiseworthy. If these two passages are compatible, it seems that the view on *φρόνησις* presented in the *MM* is that the *φρόνιμοι* are not praised due to being *φρόνιμοι*, but due to being virtuous. At any rate, this could still be construed in such a way that the *φρόνιμοι* are praised due to being virtuous, whereas the virtuous persons are praised due to the non-rational part of their souls being subservient to *φρόνησις*. But the *MM* is not as clear in this regard as we would like it to be.

²⁰³ Similarly, see Meyer (2011, p.54), who claims that when Aristotle distinguishes between natural and full virtue he is ‘resisting an objection articulated in the previous chapter [sc., in Bywater’s VI.12, which corresponds to Bekker’s VI.13 1143^b18–1144^b1], to the effect that the excellent disposition of the nonrational part of the soul is sufficient to guarantee right action—that one need not have *phronêsis*, an excellence of deliberative reason, in order to act correctly.’ If this is correct, it is a further reason for taking Bywater’s

Moreover, note that this problem is not necessarily anticipated in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], in which Aristotle says that acting as a virtuous person requires the agent to be in a certain condition that includes, among other things, having some sort of knowledge (specifically, acting *εἰδώς*). I shall discuss this passage in more detail in **Chapter 3**. For now, it is worth noting that although it seems possible to construe this requirement as implying that in order to act as a virtuous person, one needs to have the sort of knowledge provided by *φρόνησις*, this is not only not necessary, but also involves a serious difficulty (on this, see Williams [1995, pp. 14–15]).²⁰⁴

The second problem—presented at lines 1143^b28–33 and which corresponds to the second *aporia* concerning *φρόνησις* I mentioned above—says that if practical wisdom is concerned not with doing good things (understood as manifestations of a good disposition), but instead with becoming able to do them (which might appear to be an answer to the first problem),²⁰⁵ virtuous agents would not have any use for it either, for they are already agents of the sort that perform these actions. But nor would non-virtuous agents find it really useful, since, for them, it would make no difference whether they are doing good things (understood now as things productive of a good disposition) on the basis of practical wisdom or by following the lead of other persons who are practically wise. Presumably, in either case they would

chapters 12 and 13 to constitute an argumentative unity, so that the arguments advanced in Bywater's VI.13 should be taken as part of the answer to the difficulties regarding the usefulness of *φρόνησις* raised in the previous chapter. Thus, it would be better to read these chapters as a single chapter, as is done in the division of chapters adopted in Bekker's and Susemihl–Apelt's editions.

²⁰⁴ For an overview of the different possible readings for this passage and their corresponding difficulties, see Zingano (2008, pp. 112–113). I shall present and discuss the different ways of construing this criterion below in **Chapter 3, section 3.1.1**.

²⁰⁵ In fact, someone might come up with this solution by pointing out that the ethical enquiry itself is for the sake of becoming good (otherwise it would be of no use, as Aristotle himself remarks in *EN* II.2 1103^b26–31), so that the same might be true about *φρόνησις* as well. Yet this would seem to assume that the common books either have been written after the *EN* or that they have been revised in light of the *EN*. Alternatively, one could say that the way out of to the *aporia* Aristotle entertains here anticipates to some extent the things he will say about ethical enquiry in the *EN*, in which case it will still be possible to say that the common books are originally *Eudemian* and that they have not been completely revised (or simply have not been revised) so as to incorporate views only presented in the *EN*.

become virtuous.

A difficulty quite similar to (but, as I take it, importantly different from) the one lying behind these two problems is raised in the *Protrepticus* (=Iamblichus' *De communi mathematica scientia*, ch. xxvi, lines 79.5-80.1). The second part of this argument (lines 79.15-80.1 [=Düring B52]) presents the parallel that interests us:

T 2 – *Protrepticus* 79.15–80.1 [=Düring B52]

79.15 δει δὴ μὴ λεληθέναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ
 20 | τούτων ἐξετάζειν, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἢ τὸν
 βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ | πράττειν
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον· | οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ
 γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς | ὑγείας, ἀλλὰ τῷ προσφέρεσθαι
 τοῖς σώμασιν· οὔτε | πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γινώσκειν πλοῦτον, ἀλλὰ
 25 τῷ κεκτηῖσθαι πολλὴν οὐσίαν· οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέγιστον εἶναι |
 ζῶμεν τῷ γινώσκειν ἅττα τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ·
 τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν. ὥστε | προσήκει καὶ
 τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, | ἥτοι πρᾶξις εἶναι τῶν
 30 ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρησίμων εἰς τὰς ἢ τοιαύτας πράξεις.

[15] It should not go unnoticed by someone intending to inspect these things that every good and everything that is beneficial to the life of human beings consists in using <something> and putting <it> into action, and not only in knowing <it>. Indeed, we do not try to be healthy by obtaining knowledge of the things that are productive [20] of health, but by administering <things productive of health> to our bodies. Nor are we rich by knowing about wealth, but by possessing a valuable property. And, most important of all, we do not live well by knowing certain beings, but by acting well, for being happy is truly this. As a result, [25] it is fitting for philosophy as well, if it is in fact beneficial, to be either a practice of good things or else useful for [80.1] such practices.

It is not clear whether the objection to knowledge presented in this passage (according to which good and beneficial things do not consist in knowledge alone) is the same as that at issue in lines 1143^b20-28 and 1143^b28-33 (see below). Indeed, at lines 1143^b20-28 Aristotle is not saying that knowledge alone does not make any difference (which would be compatible with it being beneficial when combined with something else—sc., use or practice), but that knowledge does not make us more doers of fine and good things (understood as things that stem from virtue) than without it. Likewise, at 1143^b28-33, Aristotle is not saying that

knowledge alone cannot contribute to the acquisition of virtue, but rather that knowledge is not necessary for that, for one can become virtuous by following the lead of someone who is practically wise without being practically wise oneself. Yet, at 79.15-80.1 [=Düring B52], we come across the idea that mere knowledge is not *sufficient* for bringing forth what is good or beneficial, which is compatible with knowledge either being itself practical or being useful for practice, as lines 79.25-80.1 say it must be the case if philosophy is to be beneficial. Moreover, the example given at 79.19-20 also does not correspond exactly to that of 1143^b25-26, since the latter concerns things that spring from a healthy disposition, whereas the first is about things that are productive of health.²⁰⁶

In *MM* A.I.26 1183^b11-18, we come across an argument against Socrates' identification of virtues with knowledge that may seem to be closer to the problem I discussed above:

T 3 – *MM* A.I.26 1183^b11-18

1183b11

ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν

ἐπι|στημῶν συμβαίνει ἅμα εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστὶ καὶ |
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμονα (εἰ γὰρ ἰατρικὴν τις οἶδεν τί ἐστίν, καὶ ἰατρὸς
 15 | οὗτος εὐθέως ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). ||
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τοῦτο συμβαίνει. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις οἶδεν
 | τὴν δικαιοσύνην τί ἐστίν, εὐθέως δίκαιος ἐστίν, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς |
 καὶ πὶ τῶν ἄλλων. συμβαίνει οὖν καὶ μάτην τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι |
 καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμας.

[Socrates was mistaken] because, in the case of the knowledges, it happens that one knows what the knowledge²⁰⁷ is and is knowledgeable at the same time (for if someone knows what medicine is, one is thereby a physician as well, and in a similar way also in the case of the other knowledges). [15] But this does not happen in the case of

²⁰⁶ I thank Evan Keeling for pointing this passage from the *Protepticus* out to me.

²⁰⁷ If Socrates claims here are to make sense, the point should not be that one becomes knowledgeable in a certain domain when one knows the definition of the knowledge that covers that domain (e.g., that medicine is knowledge of health), but rather when one knows the body of propositions that constitute knowledge in that domain (and *ἐπιστήμη* can sometimes capture precisely that: the body of propositions that constitute a field of knowledge rather than the mental state of knowing them). Alternatively, one could perhaps construe *τὴν ἐπιστήμην* as an accusative of respect rather than as a prolepsis (as I did in the translation), in which case the point would be saying that one becomes knowledgeable in a certain domain when one knows, regarding the corresponding knowledge, the what it is, i.e., when one knows the definition of the subject kind of that domain. Yet given that *τί ἐστὶ* is not substantivised in this clause (*τὸ τί ἐστὶ*), I take this reading to be less natural.

the virtues, for it is not the case that if one knows what justice is, one is thereby just, and in the same way also in the case of the other <virtues>. Thus, it happens that the virtues [if they are knowledges] are in vain and[, since this cannot be the case,] that they are not knowledges.

This passage is supposed to explain an argument advanced against Socrates' identification of virtues with knowledge. The argument this passage is meant to explain says that Socrates was mistaken in making the virtues *ἐπιστήμαι* because 1) he believed that nothing should be in vain (*ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐδὲν ᾔετο δεῖν μάτην εἶναι*) and because 2) from the fact that the virtues are *ἐπιστήμαι* it follows that the virtues are in vain (*ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶναι συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρετὰς μάτην εἶναι*). This context allows us to make better sense of the extremely compressed conclusion of **T 3**, which would then be a refutation of Socrates' thesis: on Socrates' assumption that the virtues are *ἐπιστήμαι* it results that the virtues are in vain, and, given Socrates' belief that nothing should be in vain, it also happens that the virtues are not *ἐπιστήμαι*.

Now, although the difficulty raised in this argument is closer to that at issue in lines 1143^b20-28, they are still different. As I take it, the main difference between these two arguments is that what is made closer to knowledge in 1143^b20-28 is *φρόνησις* rather than moral virtue, and it is precisely because moral virtue is not a knowledge that one can question whether *φρόνησις* is useful for someone who is already virtuous. Moreover, this change of perspective seems to be what leads Aristotle to analyse the relation between medicine and health, which is not mentioned in *MM* A.I.26 1183^b11-18, which was solely concerned with the difference between the knowledges and the virtues.

In the sequel to 1143^b28-33, in 1143^b33-35, Aristotle raises a further *aporia*, questioning the relationship between practical and theoretical wisdom (this is the third *aporia* I mentioned above): if practical wisdom is concerned with commanding and issuing orders

about everything, an absurd conclusion would follow, namely *φρόνησις* would be in control of theoretical wisdom, which is better than it.

The answer to the *aporia* concerning the usefulness of theoretical wisdom and of practical wisdom begins to be presented in the second part of the argument of *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] (lines 1144^a1-11—which will be discussed below in section 1.2), and its results with regard to practical wisdom are stated in the first lines of the fourth part of the argument (lines 1145^a2-4—which will be discussed below in section 1.4). As we shall see, it seems that the main part of Aristotle's answer to the question on the usefulness of practical wisdom is presented in the third part of the argument (lines 1144^a11–1145^a2—which will be discussed below in section 1.3), in which he argues for a connection between being virtuous and being *φρόνιμος*, thus giving a response to the part of the first *aporia* that concerns *φρόνησις* specifically (the one presented in lines 1143^b20-28). The matter is a bit more obscure in what concerns Aristotle's answer to the second difficulty about practical wisdom (presented in lines 1143^b28-33), since, in the subsequent arguments, he does not address explicitly the usefulness of practical wisdom in becoming virtuous. Despite these difficulties, I would like to suggest that some of the things Aristotle says in the third part of the argument (1144^a11–1145^a2) may allow us to reconstruct his answer to this problem as well.

1.2 Aristotle's first answer (1144^a1-11): practical and theoretical wisdom as parts of the whole of virtue, and the first division of labour between virtue and reason

Let us now proceed to Aristotle's first answer to the *aporiae*:

T 4 – *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a1–11

1144a1 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς |
αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ
| εἰ μὴ ποιούσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιούσι | μὲν,
5 οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως || ἡ σοφία

εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς | τῷ ἔχασθαι
ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον | ἀποτελεῖται
κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἢ | μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ
τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ | πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ
10 δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν || ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ
θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.

|| a1 μὲν οὖν K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: οὖν μὲν B^{95sup.} | λέγωμεν K^bP^bC^c:
λέγωμεν LL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V || a2 ἐκατέραν P^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἐκατέρας
K^bB^{95sup.} | om. τοῦ B^{95sup.} || a3 ποιούσι P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V:
ποιοῦσων K^b || a4 om. ἢ P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V || a6 τῷ ἐνεργεῖν
P^bC^cLL^bV: ἐνεργεῖα Busse (1883, pp. 141-142): ἐνεργεῖα K^b: ἐνεργεῖ
O^b | εὐδαιμονίαν LL^bO^b POxy 2402: εὐδαιμονία K^b: εὐδαιμονα
P^bC^cB^{95sup.}V: τὸν εὐδαίμονα M^b

[1144a1] Well, then, first we should say that they [sc., practical and theoretical wisdom] are necessarily choiceworthy in themselves in so far as each of them is the virtue of one part <of the rational soul>, even if neither of them is productive of something. After that, also <that> they in fact produce <something>, not as medical expertise <produces> health; <we say> rather <that> as health <produces health> thus [5] wisdom <produces> happiness, for it is a part of the whole virtue and it produces happiness by being had and by being exercised. Moreover, this function [sc., this happiness] is accomplished on the basis of practical wisdom and moral virtue, that is, virtue makes the end right, whereas practical wisdom makes the things contributing to the end right. And there is no such virtue of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, for nothing is up to it to do or not to do.

In this passage, two arguments are presented as answers to the first *aporia*. In the first one (1144^a1-3), Aristotle contends that the usefulness of *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* lies in the fact that they are virtues, which would secure their choiceworthiness even if they were not productive of anything. That is, they are good because they are choiceworthy on their own account, and not because they are of use for something else.

It is worth comparing this with *Top.* VI.12 149^b31-39, where Aristotle presents us with the following argument:

T 5 – *Top.* VI.12 149^b31-39

149b31 Πάλιν εἰ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὡς ποιητικὸν ἢ πρακτικὸν
ἢ ὅπως οὖν δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον τὴν δικαιοσύνην
νομῶν σωστικὴν εἰπὼν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν ποιητικὴν εὐδαιμονίας·
35 τὸ γὰρ ποιητικὸν ἢ σωστικὸν τῶν δι' ἄλλο αἰρετῶν. || Ἡ οὐδὲν
μὲν κωλύει τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλο εἶναι | αἰρετὸν,
οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἤττον ἡμάρτηκεν ὁ οὕτως ὀρισάμενος τὸ δι'
αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν· ἐκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ | μάλιστα,
βέλτιον δὲ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν εἶναι τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, | ὥστε τοῦτο

καὶ τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἔδει μᾶλλον σημαίνειν.

[31] Further, <one should verify> whether one has rendered what is choiceworthy on its own account as something that is productive, able to effect, or in some other way choiceworthy on account of something else, saying, for instance, that justice is able to preserve the laws or that wisdom is productive of happiness, for things that are productive or able to preserve are choiceworthy on account of something else. [35] If not this [sc., if one is not rendering what is choiceworthy on its own account as something that is productive], nothing hinders what is choiceworthy on its own account from being choiceworthy on account of something else as well. Notwithstanding this, the person who defines what is choiceworthy on its own account in such a fashion [i.e., as something that is choiceworthy on account of something else] is no less mistaken, for the best of each thing is above all in its substance, and what is choiceworthy on its own account is better than what is choiceworthy on account of something else. As a result, the definition would need to indicate rather this [sc., the fact that the thing is choiceworthy on its own account]

What this passage makes clear is that even though some things may be characterised as being choiceworthy both on their own account and on account of something else, their defining feature is their being choiceworthy on their own account. As a result, something that is choiceworthy in itself (or on its own account) would be no less choiceworthy if it were not useful for anything else. Moreover, this text mentions the very case under discussion in *EN* VI.13: the fact that *σοφία* is productive of *εὐδαιμονία*, in which case the idea would be that even though *σοφία* may indeed be productive of *εὐδαιμονία* (if, among other things, one disposes of the external resources necessary for being *εὐδαίμων*), its choiceworthiness is not due to that, for it seems that even if it were not productive of *εὐδαιμονία* it would still be choiceworthy on its own account.

That this is Aristotle's position there is no doubt, for he explicitly says that the virtues and some other goods are choiceworthy on their own account even when nothing results from them (*EN* I.5 [=Bywater I.7] 1097^b2-4: *τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν)*): that is, even when they are ineffective *qua* productive of something, they are still choiceworthy, in which case one may hold that *σοφία* is worthwhile even for people who are not able to be

happy due to some major misfortune (as in the case described in *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b22–33—see **T 65**, which is briefly discussed below in **Chapter 3, section 3.3**). Yet it remains to see why being a virtue makes *σοφία* choiceworthy and why exactly *σοφία* is a virtue, and how its being choiceworthy is related to *εὐδαιμονία*, for it may turn out that its being choiceworthy on its own account can be spelled out by its being constitutive of (instead of its being productive of) *εὐδαιμονία*.

In any case, the fact is that *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* do indeed produce something, and are therefore useful as well. As Aristotle goes on to say in his second argument (lines 3–11), *σοφία* is not related to happiness as medical knowledge is related to health (i.e., as an instrumental means), rather it is closer to health (as a part—e.g., the health of a part of the body) in its relation to health (as a whole—e.g., the health of the whole body), since, being a part of the whole of virtue, wisdom produces happiness by being had and being used, that is, it is a constitutive means to *εὐδαιμονία* which seems to be sufficient for it when conditions are favourable (i.e., when one disposes of the necessary external resources for leading a life of contemplation).

In construing the argument in this way, I am here favouring a view entertained by Greenwood (1909, p. 47). The traditional reading of the passage supplies *ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν* after *ἡ ὑγίεια*, and understands this as saying that health (as a *ἔξις*) produces health (as an activity).²⁰⁸ Greenwood objects that this ‘lays too much stress upon, and implies a difficult and unlikely antithesis between, *τῷ ἔχουσθαι* and *τῷ ἐνεργεῖν* [sc., 1141^a6],’ and that this ‘also destroys the point of *μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*.’ In view of these difficulties, Greenwood presents two alternatives, the first of which also supplies *ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν* after *ἡ ὑγίεια* but takes this as implying that *σοφία* is related to happiness as the health of any part of the body is related to

²⁰⁸ For this reading, see, for instance, Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L VI, 10 123–138).

the health of the whole body.

It is not clear how exactly this first alternative should be spelled out, though. No doubt this idea may be construed in line with *Met.* Z.7 1032^b21–29, a passage in which heat (which is something that, in some cases, produces health) is characterised as being either a part of health or something that is followed—directly or indirectly—by a part of health. In fact, as Thomas Aquinas suggests in his commentary (*Sententia Metaphysicae* Lib. 7, L. 6, §1411 [=Spiazzi pp. 345–346]), by ‘part of health’ Aristotle is, in this passage from the *Met.*, referring to those things that are sufficient for producing health—regardless of whether they are or are not the final step before attaining health.

Yet *σοφία* does not seem to be, by itself at least, sufficient for *εὐδαιμονία* in the same way as heat, for instance, is, in some cases, sufficient for putting into motion a chain of events that will lead to health. As a result, it seems better to think of the example of health not as talking of parts of health that are sufficient for producing health of the whole body, but of parts of health whose presence is required if the whole body is to be healthy, but which are nevertheless insufficient (by themselves at least) for eliciting the health of the whole body: one may have healthy knees, but lack health as whole in that one has the flu. In that case, the thought expressed here would be closer to what one comes across in *EE* VIII.3 1248^b11–16, where Aristotle grounds the fact that one who is truly *καλοκάγαθός* must have the particular virtues by pointing out that this cannot be otherwise in other cases as well, since ‘no one is healthy in their body as a whole, but not in any part <of it>. Rather, it is necessary for either all parts or for the majority and the most important ones to be in the same way as the whole’ (*οὐθὲς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει, μέρος δ’ οὐθέν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα τὸν αὐτόν ἔχειν τρόπον τῷ ὅλῳ*).

As a result, *σοφία* would contribute to *εὐδαιμονία* by being a part of the whole virtue

in the same way as the health of a part of the body contributes to the health of the whole body, since σοφία is not, by itself, enough for achieving εὐδαιμονία, just like the health of a part of the body is not enough for the whole body to be healthy if it is unaccompanied by the health of all other parts or of all the main parts of the body, and, moreover, by necessary conditions for health such as nourishment. This is the reading I am adopting.

Greenwood's second suggestion (which he prefers) consists in thinking that σοφία and ὑγίεια are both component means to εὐδαιμονία, in which case the point of the passage would be that wisdom produces εὐδαιμονία in the same way as health produces εὐδαιμονία, since both would be parts of it (this is a view anticipated by Eustratius in his commentary—see *CAG*. XX, 388.21–29]²⁰⁹).

Notwithstanding this, I think that Greenwood's second solution is not feasible, for health could hardly be conceived of as a part of εὐδαιμονία, since it is rather a necessary condition for it, and Aristotle distinguishes parts from necessary conditions.²¹⁰ As a result, health's contribution to εὐδαιμονία is not such that it is a constitutive means to εὐδαιμονία, if by constitutive means one has in mind means that are part of the end to which they contribute. In the face of these difficulties, Greenwood's first solution should be favoured.

²⁰⁹ 'Therefore, these both also produce happiness, but not as medicine produces health, but as they are constitutive parts of happiness. In fact, if bodily health in being a good produces happiness together with the remaining goods, since it is constitutive and is itself like a part of happiness, practical and theoretical wisdom <produce happiness> much more, since they are dispositions that give order and perfect the better parts of the soul, that is the theoretical and practical reason. In fact, medicine accomplishes health because it assists nature, whereas health fulfils happiness as a part of it because it is superior to the bodily goods' (ὥστε καὶ ποιούσιν αὐται ἄμφω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ὡς ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ὡς μέρη συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. εἰ γὰρ ὑγίεια σωματικὸν οὖσα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, συμπληροῦσα καὶ αὐτὴ ὡς μέρος οὖσα εὐδαιμονίας, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ σοφία καὶ ἢ φρόνησις, ἔξεις οὖσαι τῶν κρείττωνων μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς κοσμητικαὶ καὶ τελειωτικαί, τουτέστι τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ὡς ὑπουργοῦσα τῇ φύσει κατορθοῖ τὴν ὑγίειαν, ἢ δὲ ὑγίεια ὡς κρείττων οὖσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀναπληροῖ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς μέρος αὐτῆς).

²¹⁰ On this, see Teichmüller (1859, pp. 120-122), who resorts to *EN* I.10 [=Bywater I.9] 1099^b26ff and to *EE* I.2 1^ab–2^a–27 to make his point. That health is among the external goods (which are not parts of happiness, but conditions for it) is clear from *EN* VII.14 [=Bywater VII.13] 1153^b16–19 and X.9 [=Bywater X.8] 1178^b33–1179^a3 (on this broader usage of the concept of external goods, see Cooper [1985/1999a, pp. 176-178, 177n9]).

Now, one would expect, given how the first *aporia* was formulated, the same argument to hold in relation to *φρόνησις* as well, but Aristotle only explicitly gives an answer on behalf of *φρόνησις* later, in the fourth part of the argument (specifically, at 1145^a2-4). For now, he restricts himself to saying that τὸ ἔργον is accomplished on the basis of *φρόνησις* and moral virtue. I take it that τὸ ἔργον here refers to *εὐδαιμονία*, which can also be understood as an ἔργον of the human soul (see *Met.* Θ.8 1050^a36-b2, where *εὐδαιμονία* is said to be ἔργον of the soul on the grounds that (1) life is the ἔργον of the soul and (2) *εὐδαιμονία* is a sort of life), and, more specifically, to the type of *εὐδαιμονία* produced by *σοφία*. If this is so, Aristotle's answer says that both moral virtue and *φρόνησις* have a role to play in achieving happiness (seemingly alongside *σοφία*²¹¹): virtue contributes to happiness by making the end right, whilst *φρόνησις* contributes to happiness by making right what contributes to the end, i.e., by making the means right. This first division of labour between virtue and reason, as we shall see below, is quite different from the two others presented in the chapter, and in spite of showing how *φρόνησις* can contribute to happiness, it does not determine whether *φρόνησις* makes us more doers of good things. Indeed, it seems only to specify the claim (made at 1143^b20-21) that *φρόνησις* deals with things from which someone comes to be happy, which was compatible with the problem formulated by Aristotle. In fact, although I translated 'κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν' (line 7) above as 'on the basis of practical wisdom and moral virtue,' it seems that Aristotle has not yet offered arguments to secure this causal connection between happiness and *φρόνησις*, since this connection will only

²¹¹ It is telling that in this argument Aristotle describes *σοφία* as a part of the whole virtue (*μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*), for in *EE* II.1 1219^a35-39 he distinguishes between virtue as whole and virtue as a part (the first being complete virtue—*ἀρετὴ τελεία*) and then defines happiness as an activity on the basis of complete virtue (cf. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μέρειον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν*), which suggests that one cannot attain happiness on the basis of *σοφία* alone, which is merely a part of virtue, and thus that *φρόνησις* would also be required. In that case, it would seem that, in this argument, Aristotle talks of *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* as involved in attaining happiness on the basis of *σοφία* because he is operating with an *Eudemian* conception of happiness.

be secured later on when he presents his arguments showing that true moral virtue depends on *φρόνησις*, and *φρόνησις* depends on true moral virtue.²¹² Thus, Aristotle's answer about the usefulness of practical wisdom has not been offered yet.

In any case, what is clear so far is that in saying that virtue makes the end right, Aristotle seems to be talking about a virtue that is simultaneous with *φρόνησις*, which gives us good reasons for thinking that Aristotle has in mind what, in the continuation of the argument, he will call *full* or *authoritative virtue* (allowing us to answer [II] in the way I have proposed). However, we are still not close to having an answer about the sense in which virtue makes the end right (i.e., [I]), about whether virtue is necessary for having a right end (i.e., [III]), and about how specific the ends for whose sake we deliberate and for whose sake *φρόνησις* makes the means right are (i.e., [IV]).

1.3 Aristotle's second answer (1144^a11-1145^a2): performing virtuous actions as a virtuous person and the relation between *φρόνησις* and full virtue

In *EN* VI.13 1144^a11–1145^a2, Aristotle turns to answering the question of whether practical wisdom makes any practical difference. This passage can be divided into three parts: a first part (lines 1144^a11–20) in which Aristotle presents the differences between performing virtuous actions and performing virtuous actions in such a way that one is virtuous; a second part (lines 1144^a20–^b1) in which Aristotle discusses *δευότης* and its relation to *φρόνησις*, but whose precise argumentative role is disputed; and a third part (lines 1144^b1–1145^a2) in which Aristotle distinguishes natural and full virtue, which are different in a way that is analogous to that in which *φρόνησις* and *δευότης* are different. In this third part of the argument, Aristotle

²¹² I do not think, however, that I am over translating the passage here, for I do not think that Aristotle means something ambiguous. It is just that the way in which he formulates his thought here could be understood in terms of happiness being in accordance with moral virtue and *φρόνησις*, but, as I understand it, this is not what he means, and later on in the chapter he will make it clear that he has something stronger than that in mind.

secures a connection between being good and having *φρόνησις*, which seems to answer the first *aporia* in what it concerns *φρόνησις*, since, as I have observed above at section 1.1, this *aporia* seemingly relies on the idea that one can be good without being *φρόνιμος*.

To begin, let me quote and translate the first part of the passage, namely 1144^a11-20:

T 6 – *EN VI.13* [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11–20

1144a11 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτι-
κατέ|ρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν
ἄνω|θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
15 | δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἶον ||
τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας | ἢ δι'
ἄγνοίαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πρᾶτ|τουσί γε
ἂ δει καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς | ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ
πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγα|θόν, λέγω δ' οἶον
20 διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν || πραττομένων.

|| a14 λέγομεν om. L^bO^b | οἶον P^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.G^aV: ἢ K^bi.r. ||
a15 τοὺς om. C^c || a16 post αὐτά add. ταῦτα P^bC^c || a17 χρὴ
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: δει B^{95sup}. || a18–19 ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν
ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἶον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν om.
K^b

And concerning the <claim> that <we> are by no means more doers of fine and just things due to practical wisdom, we must begin a little farther back, assuming the following principle: just as we also say that some persons are not just in doing just things²¹³—namely, [15] those who do the things imposed by the laws either involuntarily, or by ignorance, or for some other reason, that is, not for their own sakes (though they really do what should be done and what the virtuous person ought to do)—, so too, as it seems, it is possible to do each of these things being in a condition such that one is good, and I mean, namely²¹⁴ due to a decision and for the sake of the things being [20] done themselves.

In this first part of the argument—1144^a11-20—, Aristotle gives some indication to

the effect that performing virtuous actions in a way that does not show that one is good (i.e.,

²¹³ I am construing the participial clause τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας as specifying the way in which some people are not called just: i.e., they are not called just in performing just actions, which is compatible with their being just. If τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας is read instead as qualifying the group of persons who are not just, then Aristotle would be saying something unpalatable: namely, that some agents who do just things (like those who do just things involuntarily) are not just. This is problematic in that it implies that just agents cannot act involuntarily if they are indeed just, for their acting involuntarily in some circumstances would imply that they are not just—which is absurd. But if τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας is read in the way I propose, the point would be rather that some people (like those who do just things involuntarily) are not just in respect to their performance of just things. In that case, 'τὰ δίκαια πράττοντάς <...> δικαίους εἶναι' is an expression parallel to 'τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα [sc. τὰ δίκαια] ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν' (from lines 18-19), as a matter of fact in denying that some agents are good in doing just things Aristotle seems to be denying precisely that they perform just actions in such a way that they are good.

²¹⁴ That οἶον here is not merely introducing an example is also the view of Stewart (1892, vol. 2, p. 100).

virtuous) is tantamount to performing them either involuntarily (which includes performing them due to ignorance) or not for their own sakes but for some other reason, whereas performing virtuous actions as a good person (i.e., in a way that reveals that one is virtuous) implies performing them for their own sakes and on the basis of decision.²¹⁵

Two clarifications are in order:

First, what does Aristotle mean by being good here? As I take it, in the context of this Chapter, being good *sans phrase* means the same as being fully virtuous (see 1144^a34, 36-^b1, and, especially, ^b31-32, where the claim to the effect that one cannot be *φρόνιμος* without being good is phrased as 'it is not possible to be *φρόνιμος* without moral virtue'). Someone might still object by saying that being good can be equivalent to being either naturally or fully virtuous, in which case being fully virtuous would be equivalent not simply to being good, but to being good *κυρίως*. In that case, in 1144^a18-19, 'being good' would encompass both kinds of goodness. Yet, as we shall see below (in **Chapter 2** and in **Chapter 3**), it seems that natural virtue, taken by itself, lacks *προαίρεσις* and the right end (see *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1117^a4-5 and *EE* III.1 1229^a27-29).²¹⁶ Hence, due to its mention of *προαίρεσις*, the

²¹⁵ I do not think that virtuous agents always perform virtuous actions in such a way that these actions are enough grounds for saying that they are virtuous. In fact, some of the virtuous actions virtuous agents perform voluntarily do not seem to be performed on the basis of decision, as is evident if we consider sudden actions. As a result, 1144^a17-20 would be describing not how virtuous agents act in general, but what is sufficient grounds for saying that they are virtuous. Yet, because the role of virtue in making the end right can also be spelled out by its making the end of decision right (as we shall see in more detail in **Chapter 2**) or even by its making decision right (as already said here in 1144^a20), I would like to contend that this criterion says something fundamental for understanding how virtue makes the end right, for, as I interpret it, it says that only virtuous agents perform virtuous actions due having decided on them for their own sakes.

²¹⁶ Similarly, for the idea that in defining virtue as a *ἔξις προαιρετική* Aristotle means to distinguish between natural and full virtue, see Aubenque (1963/1993, pp. 119-120). Now, someone could object that Aristotle's definition of virtue is ambiguous as to whether he has natural or full virtue in mind if we read text of the mss. (*καὶ ὡς*) instead of the text transmitted by Aspasius (*καὶ ᾧ*): the mss. say that virtue is a disposition that consists in a mean state relative to us, a disposition determined (*ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη*) by reason, i.e., in the way in which (*καὶ ὡς*) the prudent would determine it, whereas Aspasius says that it is a disposition consisting in a mean state relative to us determined (*ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη*) by reason, i.e. by the reason through which (*καὶ ᾧ*) the prudent would determine it. As Morel (2020, pp. 208-209) emphasises, if we read *ὡς* with the mss., Aristotle may mean that the way in which the virtues determine the mean is not

criterion from *EN* VI.13 1144^a18–20 would not pick out agents that are merely naturally virtuous. As a result, in talking of being just and being good, Aristotle would seem to be referring to someone who has justice as a full virtue and to someone who is fully virtuous. Moreover, natural virtue and full virtue are not species of the same genus, but are related in some other way, such that they merely resemble each other, and it seems that their resemblance is not enough for constituting a conceptual unity (as is most clear in the case of the courage due to *θυμός*, which Aristotle describes as the most natural courage, but which is merely similar to courage, and this similarity is spurious: it is not enough for saying that it is really courage).²¹⁷ Accordingly, the goodness due to natural virtue and the goodness due to full virtue are not related as species of the same genus, for, despite being similar, they do not seem to constitute a genuine conceptual unity. Thus, unless one wants to say that in 1144^a19-20 Aristotle is talking of goodness in a way that is open to two completely homonymous senses of the word at the same time (which is hardly plausible, besides not being charitable), one should take a decision as to whether he means the goodness due to natural virtue or the goodness due to full virtue.

A further difficulty that could be raised against my claim concerns continent agents, for continence is also said to be something virtuous (see *EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.IX] 1151^b28–29). As a matter of fact, although continence is differentiated from virtue both in the *EN* (at IV.15 [=Bywater IV.9] 1128^b33–34) and in the *EE* (at II.11 1227^b16), Aristotle still holds, at *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater IV.9] 1128^b33–34, that it is a virtue of sorts, which is

the same as the way in which the *φρόνιμος* determines the mean. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the virtue defined as a *ἔξις προαιρετική* is not yet full virtue. In any case, it seems that the definition of virtue found in *EN* II.6, taken by itself, is not enough to determine whether Aristotle has in mind full virtue or some other sort of virtue that falls short of being full virtue, but that settling this issue depends on supplementary arguments.

²¹⁷ That the five character states similar to courage are not genuine cases of courage and that calling them courage implies a completely homonymous use of the word, see Zingano (2020, pp. 150-152). For a more general argument to the effect that things that are called Fs merely because they resemble other Fs are spuriously F, see Irwin (1981, pp. 527ff).

mixed (*τις* [sc., *ἀρετή*] *μικτή*) (presumably with a bad character disposition, since continent agents have shameful appetites), so that one may still try to argue that being good can include being continent and that continent agents can also perform virtuous actions on the basis of decision and for their own sakes. Moreover, at *EE* II.7 1223^b11–12, Aristotle says that continence is a virtue, which is in flat contradiction with what he will say later in the *EE*, at II.11 1227^b16 (I shall discuss these passages in more detail below in section 3.3, in Chapter 3).

In any case, if the type of goodness at issue in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] were compatible with continence, this would make poor sense of the claim made in 1144^a34–^b1 that it is impossible to be *φρόνιμος* without being good, since it would make no sense to think of continence as being required by *φρόνησις*, for just as *φρόνιμοι* cannot be incontinent (cf. *EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.10] 1152^a6–8), it is reasonable that they cannot be continent as well.²¹⁸ Thus, unless there are good reasons to think that Aristotle talks of goodness *sans phrase* inconsistently in *EN* VI.13 [= Bywater VI.12-13], I think we should settle that performing a virtuous action in such a way that one is good means performing a virtuous action in such a way that one is fully virtuous. In that case, in distinguishing between two senses of goodness later on in *EN* VI.13 [= Bywater VI.12-13], Aristotle would not be admitting that earlier, in 1144^a11-20, he meant to talk of goodness in a way that is ambiguous, but would be rather clarifying what he meant earlier in 1144^a11-20,²¹⁹ which should be understood as talking of

²¹⁸ *Pace* Callard (2017). I shall come back to this issue below in Chapter 3, in section 3.3. A remaining worry is whether *φρόνησις* excludes any type of continence, or just continence in those domains of one's life in which one need to be virtuous if one is to be *φρόνιμος*. If being *φρόνιμος* requires one to have all the particular virtues, there is no relevant difference between these two claims, but if it turns out that one does not need to have all particular virtues to be *φρόνιμος*, but can be *φρόνιμος* without being, say, witty (*εὐτράπελος*) or magnificent (*μεγαλοπρεπής*), then *φρόνησις* would be compatible with continence in such domains in which one does not need to be virtuous to be *φρόνιμος*. Yet *φρόνησις* would not be compatible with continence *simpliciter* (which concerns bodily pleasures with which temperance is concerned) and with the types of continence related to the object of the other particular virtues required by *φρόνησις*.

²¹⁹ A place in the *Corpus* in which something similar has been taken to occur is *Cat* 7, where Aristotle gives two definitions of the relatives. According to Simplicius (*CAG*. XX, 199.17–35), Syrianus has taken Aristotle's second definition of the relatives not as an alternative definition, but as a definition that clarifies the first one by making it more explicit, in that Aristotle would be showing that the *ἅπερ* clause from the first definition (6^a36–37: 'all such things that are in themselves said to be precisely what they are of

a way of acting that implies that one is good *κυρίως*.

The second clarification concerns an alternative reading of 1144^a11-20 proposed by von Fragstein (1974, pp. 250-251), who thinks that Aristotle is talking here of a sort of formal goodness that agents can achieve when they perform virtuous actions deciding on them for their external results, rather than for the sake of the mean (i.e., for their own sakes). Now, as I take it, von Fragstein's reading overlooks two things: first, that, for Aristotle, virtue makes one act for the sake of the actions performed themselves, a view I think Aristotle holds both in the *EE* and in the *EN*, as I shall argue in **Chapter 2** and in **Chapter 3**. Second, that 'αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων' is clearly not making reference to the results achieved by one's actions, but to the actions being performed themselves. Indeed, it seems that Aristotle would describe the results achieved by an action as something different from the action itself. See, for instance, his remarks in *EN* I.5 1097^b2-4 on virtue and other goods as being choiceworthy on their own account even if nothing results from them (*μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν*), and his remarks in *Pol.* VII.3 on episodes of practical thought as occurring for the sake of the things that result from action, in contrast to theoretical thinking, which is its own end (*τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένης* [sc., *διανοίας*] *ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν*). In both cases, the results being referred to are differentiated from what they result from by being described as its *ἀποβαίνοντα*. Yet von Fragstein's reading is not completely unwarranted, since Aristotle also uses, in *EN* IV.13 [Bywater IV.7] 1127^a26-30, *ἔνεκα* + genitive to talk of acting with a purpose (i.e., aiming for the results of what one is doing) in contrast to acting without a purpose (i.e., acting for the sake of the very thing one is doing) (on that, see

something else or in relation to something else in some other way are said to be relatives' [*Πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον*]) should be cashed out in terms such that 'relatives are things whose being amounts to being related in some way to something' (8^a31-32: *ἔστι τὰ πρὸς τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν*). Whether this is indeed what is happening in the *Categories* is controversial, but Syrianus' interpretation of relationship between these two definitions captures something similar to what I take to be happening here in the *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] in regard to goodness *sans phrase* and goodness in the proper sense of the word.

footnote 564 below in **Chapter 3**). However, because in our passage what is aimed for are the very actions being performed, it would not make much sense to say that agents who perform virtuous actions *αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων* are aiming for something different from the actions they are performing in the first place. Thus, it seems that what Aristotle means in 1144^a11–20 is something that is either sufficient for virtue (if virtue turns out to be necessary for deciding on and performing virtuous actions for their own sakes) or else necessary for virtue (if virtue turns out not to be necessary for deciding on and performing virtuous actions for their own sakes), but in either case the type of goodness in question here would involve a right motivation in that one decides on and performs virtuous actions for the very reason that makes them virtuous: for the sake of the mean (to use von Fragstein's own expression).

Now, with talk of acting being in a certain condition (*τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν*), and in a condition such that one is fully virtuous, Aristotle seems to be distinguishing between different ways in which one can perform virtuous actions (or, more precisely, do things that happen to be virtuous), and, for that reason, he has been taken by some to be referencing back to a point made explicitly in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31–33.²²⁰ In this latter passage, as I have pointed out in the **Introduction**, he presents three criteria that must be satisfied for saying that a virtuous action was performed virtuously (which appears to be sufficient for saying that one is fully virtuous), among which is performing a virtuous action having decided on it for its own sake. In that case, in saying 'we must start a little farther back' (*μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον*) at 1144^a12-13, Aristotle could be drawing on a point made earlier in the treatise. Moreover, if this is correct, it might be argued that in saying 'λέγω δ' οἶον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων' to spell out what he means by acting being in a condition such that one is good Aristotle is not mentioning a criterion that is sufficient for being good,

²²⁰ Thus argues Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 627–p. 628). More recently, see Frede (2020, p. 706).

but would be picking one of the three criteria from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]—the second one—to exemplify something that is involved in performing virtuous actions in such a way that one is good (in which case *οἶον* from 1144^a19 should be translated rather as ‘for instance’), and something which is not sufficient for being good. In that case, one could perform virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes without thereby being fully virtuous.

Yet it is not necessary to read 1144^a11-20 in this way. As Natali (2017, p. 27) shows, *ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον* and such expressions are used by Aristotle not to make back references, but to indicate that the discussion should be conducted at a more fundamental level.²²¹ As Natali argues, this expression comes from the *APr* and the *APo*,²²² and its use in the latter suggests that it derives from the process of *διαίρεσις* (which is what is at discussion in the context of the passage from the *APo*), in which it is natural to name a term that comes first in the argument as the higher in that it is in a higher position in the division. The upshot is that 1144^a11-20 would not be making an explicit reference to a previous discussion, but would be taking the discussion to a more fundamental level.

Yet this is still compatible with there being some other place in the treatise in which the principle on which Aristotle relies to take the discussion to a more fundamental level is presented in more detail. Aristotle does not merely say here that the discussion should be led at a more fundamental level, but also specifies that one should do so assuming a certain

²²¹ It is telling that the only other place in the *Corpus* where Aristotle uses an expression of this sort is in *EN* VI.3 1139^b14 (*Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν κτλ.*), also in *EN* VI, and that, in this passage, there is no doubt that Aristotle is not making any back references. Besides, Iamblichus uses this expression once in his *Protrepticus* (Pistelli 49.1: *Ἄνωθεν δ' ἀρχόμενοι κτλ.*), where it also clearly indicates that one should take a step back in the discussion and begin from a more fundamental point.

²²² In particular, *APr* I.25 42^a35–40: ‘Thus, it is manifest that <if> the premises in the syllogistic argument through which the main conclusion comes about (for it is necessary for some higher conclusions to be premises) are not of an even number, this argument either has not been deduced or else has assumed more <premises> than the ones necessary for the thesis [i.e. the thing to be deduced]’ (*φανερὸν οὖν ὡς ἐν ᾧ λόγῳ συλλογιστικῶ μὴ ἄρτιαί εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις δι' ὧν γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ κύριον (ἕνα γὰρ τῶν ἄνωθεν συμπερασμάτων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτάσεις), οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ συλλελογίσται ἢ πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἠρώτηκε πρὸς τὴν θέσιν*); and *APo* II.13 97^a33–34: ‘For if the highest <term> is removed, the following <term> will be the first of the remaining <terms>’ (*ἀφαιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ἄνωθεν τὸ ἐχόμενον τῶν ἄλλων πρῶτον ἔσται*).

principle that he goes on to describe.²²³ There being some other place in which this principle is presented is not necessary, however. *EN* VI.3 1139^b14ff, the only other passage in which Aristotle uses a similar expression (see footnote 221), is clearly not making a point that was anticipated in some other part of the *Ethics*: it tells us that we should begin our discussion of the virtues of the intellectual parts of the soul at a more fundamental level, and then proceeds to say that the things through which the soul hits the truth are five in number. Aristotle does not specify here the principle he is assuming to proceed with the discussion at a more fundamental level. But perhaps even here Aristotle is referring to a procedure that he adopts elsewhere: a version of the method of exhaustion. He is listing all possible candidates for being intellectual virtues (since in order to be an intellectual virtue a disposition should hit the truth, since the truth is the *ἔργον* of all rational parts of the soul—cf. *EN* VI.2 1139^a29), and will then go through each of them to see which is the virtue of each of the two parts of the rational part of the soul that were distinguished in *EN* VI.2 [=Bywater VI.1-2].

In any case, it seems clear that *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] anticipates in a way the point made in 1144^a11-20 since both are concerned with conditions sufficient for saying that one is virtuous, so that it would be profitable to compare the two passages. But *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is not the only passage in which the idea of acting being in a certain condition (*τὸ*

²²³ Pace Di Basilio (2021, p. 552) who thinks that the fact that Aristotle is not making any back references here is sufficient for saying that this passage should not be understood in light of *EN* II.1-3 [=Bywater II.1-4], but on its own. A further reason di Basilio offers for this procedure is that the picture we come across in the common books in regard to moral habituation is significantly different from the one we find in *EN* II.1-3 [=Bywater II.1-4], since the picture found in the common books would be closer to the *Eudemian* one. Now, as I intend to show later on in **Chapter 2**, this conclusion of his rests on what I take to be two mistakes: first, the fact that di Basilio does not properly understand that the *Ethica Eudemia* operates with a different account of pleasure and pain, which leads to important differences in formulation of the claims regarding the role of pleasure and pain in the context of moral habituation (which is what leads him to the idea that that are fundamental differences between the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* accounts of moral habituation); and, second, the fact that di Basilio assumes that *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] should be read as it is usually read (on the orthodox interpretation), in which case I think he is right in observing that what we find in 1144^a11-20, properly understood, is indeed incompatible with the *Nicomachean* parallel, since when compared to what *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] says on the orthodox reading, 1144^a11-20 read in its own light is indeed saying something quite different.

πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν) is discussed, for the same language occurs in another common book, in *EN* V, where we also come across a similar discussion. As a matter of fact, both Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, p. 549) and Loening (1903, p. 115n18) see 1144^a11-20 as referring to the discussion from *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^b16–1136^a9,²²⁴ which pertains to a common book. Thus, although 1144^a11-20 is not making a back reference, I think it is undeniable that the point Aristotle is drawing on in 1144^a11-20 is also anticipated in *EN* V. If this is correct, it is possible to read what is introduced by *οἶον* in 1144^a19-20 as being sufficient for saying that one acted in such a way that one is fully virtuous (or so I shall argue).

1.3.1 The relationship of *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a 11-20 and *EN* V

EN V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^b16–1136^a9, the passage Gauthier and Loening think anticipates 1144^a11-20, builds on two distinctions made in an earlier passage from *EN* V: *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^a8–23.

The first distinction made in *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^a8–23 is the one between a wrong (*τὸ ἀδίκημα*) and something that is unjust (*τὸ ἄδικον*). The second is the one between a just act (*δικαιοπράγημα*) and something that is just (*τὸ δίκαιον*). One does wrong (*ἀδικεῖ*) when one voluntarily does something that happens to be unjust; similarly, one performs a just act (*δικαιοπραγεῖ*) when one voluntarily does something that happens to be just. By contrast, if one involuntarily does things that happen to be just or unjust, one has not performed a just act (*δικαιοπράγημα*) or a wrong (*ἀδίκημα*) except accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*).

Let me quote *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^a8-23 in full:

T 7 – *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^a8–23

²²⁴ One may also include *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1134^a16–18, as Gauthier does. Note that Maurus (1668, p. 179, §10) too says that 1144^a18-19 points to *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.8], but, as indicated in footnote 220, he also thinks that this is pointing to *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. Likewise, Casaubon (1590, vol. 2, p. 47) thinks that this passage points to *EN* V, but he does not specify to where in Book V.

1135a8

διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ

10 | ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ || ἐστι
τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῆ, | ἀδίκημά ἐστι,
πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕτω ἀλλ' ἄδικον· ὁμοίως | δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα
(καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ | κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ
τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος)· καθ' | ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν,
15 ποῖα τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα || τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον
ἐπισκεπτέον.

ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων | καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημέ-
νων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ | ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττη·
ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε | δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίους εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πρᾶτ-
20 τουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ || δικαιοπράγημα ὠρισταὶ τῷ ἐκούσιῳ
καὶ ἀκούσιῳ· ὅταν γὰρ | ἐκούσιον ἦ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδί-
κημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' | ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὕτω,
εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον | προσῆ.

|| a9 καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον om. K^b || a10 ante αὐτὸ add.
τὸ VB^{95sup}.M^b || a11 ἐστι om. K^bP^bC^cL^bM^b | πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι,
οὕτω ἀλλ' ἄδικον om. Arab. | post ἄδικον add. ὅτι (τι K^b) ὅταν πρα-
χθῆ, ἀδίκημα ἐστίν K^bP^bC^cs.1.L²L^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: om. L Arab. || a12-13
μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b: τὸ κοινὸν μᾶλλον δι-
καιοπράγημα B^{95sup}.VM^b || a19 εἶναι transp. LO^b post ἀδίκους: || a21
τότ' K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bVM^b: τὸ τέλος B^{95sup}. || a22 ἔσται transp. B^{95sup}.V
post ἄδικον: | τι ἄδικον K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἄδικον τι B^{95sup}. | οὕτω
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b: οὐδέπω B^{95sup}.V

A wrong and something unjust are different, and a right action and something just are different. That is, something is unjust [10] by nature or prescription, and this very thing, when done, is a wrong, but before being done, is not <a wrong> yet, but something unjust, which is a wrong when it is done, and it is in a similar way in the case of a right action (but what is common is rather called a just act, while the righting of a wrong <is called> a right action). Concerning each of these things, we must examine later what <their> species are, how many they are, and [15] what sort of things <each of them> is concerned with.

Since just and unjust are the things mentioned, one does wrong and has performed a just act when one does these things [sc., just and unjust things] voluntarily. When one does <these things> involuntarily, one neither does wrong nor has performed a just act except accidentally, for<, in these cases,> people are doing things that happen to be just or unjust. A wrong and [20] a just act are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary, for whenever <something unjust> is voluntary, it is blamed, and besides there is at that moment a wrong. As a result, if voluntariness is not added, there will be something unjust, but not yet a wrong.

Now, although Aristotle begins this passage talking about τὸ δικαίωμα as well, it becomes clear in the sequence that δικαίωμα is but a species of δικαιοπράγημα: right actions are just acts that involve the righting of a wrong. That problem aside, the distinction is quite straightforward, and the second paragraph (lines 15-23) makes clear that wrongs (ἀδικήματα)

and just acts (*δικαιοπραγήματα*) are defined in terms of the voluntary performance of unjust and just things (respectively).

A few lines later, in 1135^b11–1136^a9 (which includes the passage Gauthier and Loening have in mind—1135^b16–1136^a9), the distinction presented here in **T 7** is taken further: Aristotle presents the different ways in which one can do just or unjust things (i.e., things that happen to be just or unjust)—a discussion that was announced in **T 7**, in lines 13-15.

In rough lines, the idea is that if unjust things are done involuntarily, what has taken place is either a misfortune (*ἀτύχημα*) or a mistake (*ἀμάρτημα*), but if they are done voluntarily, it is not only a mistake, but a wrong (*ἀδίκημα*) as well. Yet people are not said to be unjust or base merely due to having committed wrongs, but only when they do that *ἐκ προαιρέσεως*: by choice. From this, Aristotle then concludes (at 1136^a1-5) that unjust is the person who commits wrongs by choice, and that just is the person who performs just acts by choice. Let me translate the whole passage:

T 8 – EN V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^b11–1136^a9

1135b11 τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς |
κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ’ ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν | μήτε
ὄν μήτε ὁ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε ταῦτα πράξει (ἢ | γὰρ
15 οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα ᾧήθη, ||
ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα ᾧήθη, οἶον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ’ | ἵνα
16 κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ὡς).
16 ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως | ἢ
βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἀνευ | δὲ κα-
κίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἢ ἀρχὴ | ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ
20 τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ’ ὅταν ἔξωθεν). ὅταν δὲ || εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προ-
βουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἶον ὅσα τε διὰ | θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη,
ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαί|νει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (ταῦτα γὰρ
βλάπτουντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματα
ἔστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδι|κοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ
25 **διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη**). || ὅταν δ’ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, **ἀδικος καὶ**
μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς | τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται·
28 οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ | ποιῶν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ὀργίσας.
28 ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ
τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ | ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ
φερομένη γὰρ | ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς

30 συναλλάγμασι || περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη
τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι | μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ'
ὁμολογοῦν|τες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον
ἀμφισβη|τοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν
1136a1 οἶεται ἀδι||κείσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ,
καὶ | κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικος, ὅταν παρὰ
| τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν
| προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ, δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκῶν
5 || πρᾶττη. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ'
| οὐ συγγνωμονικὰ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ
| καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικὰ, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' |
ἀγνοίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν | μῆτ'
ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικὰ.

|| **b11** δὴ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: οὖν M^b || **b12** μὲν om. B^{95sup}.
| ὅταν K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ὅτε L || **b13** μήτε ὁ om. P^bC^c
| ταῦτα om. K^b || **b15** ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα ᾤθηθι om.
P^bC^cB^{95sup}. || **b16** ὡς P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (327.8: ^{أَوْ لَيْسَ}
^{أَوْ لَيْسَ} ^{أَوْ لَيْسَ} [aw laysa kamā arāda]): ᾤ K^b || **b18-19** ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ
K^bP^bC^cL^b: ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀρχὴ LO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b || **b19** τῆς αἰτίας
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τῆς ἀγνοίας Arab. (327.9: ^{الْجَهْلَاتِ} [al-ǧahālātī])
|| **b22** ante ταῦτα add. διὰ LO^b || **b25** post διὸ add. καὶ L^b || **b26**
θυμῷ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b: θυμὸν B^{95sup}. || **b28** φερομένη K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV:
φαινομένη s.l.C^c B^{95sup}. || **b29** ἐν om. K^b || **b32** alterum περὶ
τοῦ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: περὶ δὲ τοῦ K^ba.c. || **a3** post καὶ add.
ὁ L^bB^{95sup}. || **a5** συγγνωμονικὰ K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: συγγνωμο-
νικὰ L || **a6** συγγνωμονικὰ K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: συγγνωμονι-
τικὰ L || **a8** δὲ om. K^b || **a9** ἀνθρώπινον K^ba.c.: ἀνθρώπικον
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b

Since the harms in the associations are three, the <harms> that involve ignorance are mistakes whenever it is not the case that one is acting towards whom one supposed, or doing what one supposed, or by the means one supposed, or for the sake of what one supposed (for one either did not believe one was hitting someone, or did not believe one <was hitting> with this, or did not believe <one was hitting> this person, or did not believe <one was hitting> for the sake of this, [15] but it happened not for the sake of what one believed: For instance, not to wound, but to prick, or not this person, or not in this way).

Now, whenever the harm occurs unexpectedly, it is a misfortune, but when it does not occur unexpectedly, but is without vice, it is a mistake (for one commits a mistake whenever the principle of causation²²⁵ is in oneself, but one is unfortunate whenever <the principle of causation> is outside <oneself>). But whenever [20] one <causes a harm> knowingly, but without having previously deliberated, it is a wrong. For instance, all those things <done> due to spirit or other necessary or natural affections that befall human beings (when people strike someone and commit mistakes in regard to these things, they commit injustice and <their mistakes> are wrongs, but they are not yet unjust due to these things, nor base, for the harm is not due to wretchedness). [25] But whenever <one causes harm> by decision, one is unjust and wretched. For that reason, the things <done> from spirit are not judged as being premeditated, for the person acting by spirit is not in command, but the person who provoked the anger <is in command>.

²²⁵ For a discussion of the meaning of this expression here, see van Braam (1912, pp. 269-270).

Moreover, there is no dispute about whether something took place or not, but rather about what is just, for anger depends on an apparent injustice. In fact, people do not disagree [30] about whether something took place, as in agreements, in which one of the parts is necessarily base unless they do it [sc., disagree about whether something took place] due to forgetfulness. Rather, while agreeing about the matter at issue, they disagree about which of the two is just (and the person who plotted does not ignore <who is just>). As a result, one part believes they have been wronged, [1136a1] while the other part does not. **But if one harms by decision, they commit wrongs, and on the basis of these wrongs the person wronging is already unjust when they are in violation of what is proportional or in violation of equality. And in a similar way one is just when they perform a just act having decided on it, and they perform a just act only if they act voluntarily.** [5] Among the involuntary <harms>, some are liable to pardon, and some are not. That is, all those <mistakes> people commit not only in ignorance but also due to ignorance are liable to pardon, but all those <mistakes> people commit not due to ignorance, but in ignorance and due to an emotion that is neither natural nor human are not liable to pardon.

What this passage makes clear is that it is possible to perform just actions without being *eo ipso* a just person, and to perform unjust actions without being *eo ipso* an unjust person.²²⁶ The first possibility seems to be grounded on the definition of justice as a disposition ‘on the basis of which the just person is said to perform just actions on the basis of a decision’ (*EN* V.9 [=Bywater V.5] 1134^a1–2: καθ’ ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου), whereas the second possibility, on the definition of injustice as a disposition on the basis of which an unjust man performs unjust actions on the basis of a decision (*EN* V.9 [=Bywater V.5] 1134^a6–7: ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τὸναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου). As a result, if one does not perform just or unjust actions on the basis of a decision, the performance of these actions would not be sufficient for saying that this person is just or unjust (see the two bits in bold in T 8).

What is not so clear here is whether any sort of decision will do, or if what Aristotle

²²⁶ Aristotle will make a similar point later in comparing incontinent and intemperate agents in book VII: after saying that it is manifest that incontinence is not a vice, since it is against one’s decision, whereas vice is on the basis of decision, he admits that it is nevertheless similar to vice in regard to its actions, just as the Milesians, according to Demodocus, are not stupid, but do just what stupid people do, so too incontinent agents are not unjust, but commit wrongs (*EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a5–11: ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ πῆ ἴσως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους “Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ’ οἰάπερ ἀξύνετοι,” καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ).

has in mind are rather decisions that are right in that the action is decided on for its own sake. If the parallel to 1144^a19-20 holds true, then there is good reason for thinking that the latter option is what Aristotle has in mind here, since in 1144^a19-20 he exemplifies the condition sufficient for being good as one in which one performs virtuous actions due to decision and for the sake of the very actions one is performing, which should perhaps be understood as a hendiadys for due to having decided on these actions one is performing for their own sakes.²²⁷

Later in *EN V*, in chapter 13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a4-26, Aristotle seems come back to a related issue when he claims that *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* are not the same as performing actions of a certain sort, but consist in performing these actions being in a certain condition (*τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν*), a claim whose language is strikingly reminiscent of that made in 1144^a18-19.

1.3.1.1 DOING THINGS BEING IN A CERTAIN CONDITION IN *EN V*

EN V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a4–26 is responding to three difficulties. The first (lines 1137^a4-9) concerns two related beliefs: i) the belief that committing wrongs is easy and up to people, and, accordingly, ii) the belief that it is easy to be just (which is said to be consequent upon the first belief)—I shall analyse these lines below in **section 1.3.1.1.1**.

The second (lines 1137^a9-17) concerns the belief that there is nothing wise in knowing just and unjust things because it is easy to understand the things that are prescribed and proscribed by the laws—I shall analyse these lines below in **section 1.3.1.1.2**.

²²⁷ Moreover, as we shall see in **Chapter 3**, there is reason for thinking that the second criterion of *EN II.3* [=Bywater II.4], according to which one must perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account, is, at least according the text of some of the mss. (V, E^a, G^a, and M^b), the Arabic translation, and Grosseteste's Latin translation (which is also the text printed by Bywater and Sussemihl solely on the basis of M^b and Grosseteste), introducing a normative sense of acting *προαιρούμενος*, since Aristotle says (with this text) not merely that a requirement for performing virtuous actions virtuously is performing such actions *προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*, but that a requirement for performing virtuous actions virtuously is performing such actions *προαιρούμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*, in which case *καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά* could be construed as specifying what Aristotle means by *προαιρούμενος* here. More on that below in **Chapter 3**, **section 3.1.3**.

The third difficulty (lines 17-26), in turn, concerns the belief that the just person is as capable of doing wrong as they are of performing just acts (which Aristotle indicates is a belief derived from the answer given to the second difficulty, which approximates to some extent the knowledge of just and unjust things to the knowledge possessed by the physician)—I shall analyse these lines below in **section 1.3.1.1.3**.

Talk of doing certain things being in a certain condition (*τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν/τὸ ὠδε ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν*) comes up twice in the argument, namely in Aristotle's response to the first and seemingly also in his response to the third difficulty.²²⁸

Moreover, Aristotle's response to the second difficulty seemingly concerns a sort of knowledge that is sufficient for being just (which would be analogous to the kind of knowledge of healthy things that is sufficient for being a physician).

But let me go through these three difficulties so that we can determine i) what Aristotle means by '*τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν*'/'*τὸ ὠδε ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν*' here, since it is unclear what '*ὠδί*'/'*ὠδε*' is referring to in these contexts; and ii) what the sort of knowledge in question in the second difficulty consists in.

1.3.1.1.1 *The first difficulty (1137^a4-9)*

Let me quote 1137^a4-5:

T 9 – *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a4-9

1137^a4 οἱ δ'
 5 ἀνθρώποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ |
 τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ | τὸ
 ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας | ταῦτα

²²⁸ It is not so clear, however, whether this is Aristotle's point in the two occurrences of this passage in the third difficulty, given the ambiguity of *τὸ ὠδί* (since, as we shall see, it is not clear what should be supplied with this expression). As I shall argue below in **section 1.3.1.1.3**, I think that Aristotle's talk of *τὸ ὠδί* in his response to the third difficulty should not be understood in terms of doing something being in a certain condition, but rather in terms of doing things in a certain way.

ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς.

|| a5 οἴονται εἶναι K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: εἶναι οἴονται L | διὸ καὶ τὸ
om. V: mg. V¹ || a6 τὸ K^bP^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}.V: τοῦτο LO^b || a7 post
γείτονος add. s.l. γυναικὶ C^{c2} || a8 ῥάδιον K^bP^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}.V: ῥᾶον
LO^b | ὠδὶ K^bLL^bO^bVM^b: ὡς δεῖ P^bC^cO^ba.r. B^{95sup}.Va.c.

And people believe that doing wrong is up to them, for which reason <they> also <believe> that it is easy to be just. But this is not the case, for sleeping with the neighbour's wife, beating one's neighbour, and handing over a bribe is easy and up to them, but doing these things being in a certain condition is neither easy nor up to them.

This first difficulty is introduced with the belief that committing wrongs is easy and up to people, from which those who hold this belief are also led to believe (διὸ καὶ) that it is easy to be just. Aristotle responds saying that this is not the case (τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστω). Yet it is unclear what the referent of 'τὸ δ'' in this response is: is Aristotle giving an answer to the second belief, saying that it is not the case that it is easy to be just? Or is he answering the first belief, saying that it is not the case that committing wrongs is up to us? In the latter case, Aristotle would also be answering the second belief, since he also says that it is motivated by the first (as is suggested by the 'διὸ καὶ' that introduces the second belief).

I think the reasons he gives us for his response do not clarify the issue as much as one would expect, for Aristotle explains his claim that 'this is not the case' by saying that it is easy and up to people to engage in actions such as sleeping with the neighbour's wife, hitting someone, or handing money to someone, but that it is neither easy nor up to us to do these things being in a certain condition.

In his commentary, Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 63.11–12) takes Aristotle to be talking here of wrongs such as adultery, assault, and bribery, in which case the thought would be that merely committing these wrongs does not imply that one is thereby unjust, since *προαίρεσις* would also be required for being unjust.²²⁹ In that case, in talking of doing these

²²⁹ Similarly, see Albert the Great's second commentary (*Ethic.* Lib. V, Trac. III, c. X, §74 [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 381]), and, more explicitly, Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 539[=Walker, p. 280]).

things being in a certain condition, Aristotle would be meaning a condition such that one is vicious, analogous to what we find in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a17–20. Accordingly, on this reading, Aristotle would be conceding the truth of the first belief while contesting the truth of the second belief: in saying that it is easy and is up to us to sleep with the neighbour's wife, to beat one's neighbour, and to hand over a bribe, Aristotle would be saying that people are right in thinking that doing wrong (*τὸ ἀδικεῖν*) is up to us but are nevertheless wrong to believe, on the basis of this first belief, also that it is easy to be just because it is not easy to be unjust as well (which suggests that Aristotle is here rejecting that virtue and vice are asymmetrical in this regard²³⁰).

One could resist this reading by pointing out that Aristotle's language here is neutral as to whether one is doing wrong or is merely doing something that happens to be unjust.²³¹ In that case, someone could, say, sleep with their neighbour's wife without thereby committing adultery and thence without doing wrong when they do that involuntarily (e.g., when one is not aware that the woman they are sleeping with is their neighbour's wife or someone else's wife), and the same is true for the two other actions mentioned by Aristotle here.²³²

²³⁰ As we shall see in **Chapter 3**, he will do something similar about the voluntariness of virtue and vice in *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25, where he rejects the so-called asymmetry thesis—i.e., the thesis according to which virtue is voluntary, whilst vice is not.

²³¹ What I have in mind here is slightly different from what has been proposed by Jackson (1879, p. 63), who, commenting on the expression *δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον*, says that '[t]he remark in which these words occur applies to virtuous actions as well as to vicious ones. A virtuous action does not necessarily imply a virtuous *ἔξις*, any more than a vicious action a vicious *ἔξις*. The example alleged is a liberal action which does not necessarily proceed from *ἐλευθερία*.' Jackson thinks that Aristotle's wording is neutral as to whether what is being done is something vicious or virtuous, but he still thinks that the point Aristotle is making here is about being able to commit wrongs without thereby being unjust or to perform just acts without thereby being just.

²³² Someone might resist this conclusion for the case of handing over money, taking *δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον* as an expression that is neutral as to whether one is doing something that happens to be unjust or something that happens to be just instead, as Jackson (1879, p. 63). Jackson claims that *δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον* is making reference to a generous actions here—see the previous footnote.

Now, *δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον* is very rare expression in Greek. According to a search in the TLG, this expression and its counterpart *ὑποδέχεσθαι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον* occur only in two other places. Gregory of Nyssa uses the latter expression in his *Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus* seemingly to describe merely the act of receiving pay (46.904.27–28: *ὁμοῦ γὰρ τῷ ὑποδέξασθαι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον*). A few lines before this (lines 18–20), a young man who was accused of denying pay to a courtesan asks

There are, however, two different ways of construing this. A first alternative is to say that Aristotle is contrasting the mere performance of things that happen to be unjust or just with the voluntary performance of these things (so that the condition Aristotle has in mind is one that implies merely that one is acting voluntarily), which amounts to doing wrong or to performing just acts (respectively). As a result, he would be denying the truth of the first belief (for he would be saying that what is up to us is rather doing things that merely happen to be unjust) and, consequently, also the truth of the second belief.

Yet, even if we concede that Aristotle's three examples concern things that merely happen to be unjust, it is not necessary to take him to be denying the truth of the first belief. It might be the case instead that in saying that it is easy and up to us to sleep with the neighbour's wife, to beat one's neighbour, and to hand over a bribe, Aristotle does not mean to imply that doing wrong (which requires one to do these things voluntarily) is not up to us, for his point would be merely that doing these things (irrespective of whether voluntarily or

someone to 'pay her [sc., the courtesan] the money, so that she may no longer disturb our present pursuit of reason annoying us' (46 904.18–20 : *διάλυσον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀργύριον, ὡς ἂν μὴ διὰ πλείον διοχλοῦσα, τὴν προκειμένην τοῦ λόγου σπουδῆν ἐπιταράσσουσι*), and just four lines before 'ἴσθι γὰρ τῷ ὑποδέξασθαι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον,' it is said that 'the payment was already in the dishonoured woman's hands' (46 904.24–25 : *καὶ ἦν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ ἤδη τῆς ἀτίμου τὸ κέρδος*). Thus, the context may suggest that Gregory of Nyssa is not using the expression 'ὑποδέχεσθαι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον' to describe the act of receiving a bribe, but merely the act of receiving a payment purportedly due. The only other place besides T 9 in which an expression such as 'δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον' is used, in turn, is in a oration written by Libanius, who uses such an expression in a context in which he is talking of someone's property as giving not amusement to the eyes, but money to one's hand (Declam. 32, 1.20.5: *τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ μὲν κτήματα οὐ τέρψιν δίδοντα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀργύριον τῇ χειρὶ*). Now, it is telling that in both these authors the expression has seemingly no negative connotations (this is most clear in Libanius), but is merely a way of saying that money was given or received, without implying bribery or something like that. However, this evidence comes from quite late Greek, so that, in the absence of more examples, nothing really hinders this expression from being an idiomatic expression for bribing someone as has been suggested by Stewart (1892, vol. 1, p. 522) following R. Williams (1876), who translates 'δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον' as 'to actually deliver a bribe.' In that case, we could claim that in saying 'δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον' Aristotle has in mind, at the very least, an action that happens to be unjust and not an action that can be either just or unjust depending on the circumstances.

Moreover, note that 'ἄργυρος' can, in some contexts, indicate not any money, but money paid to someone as a bribe or as payment for an unjust action: i.e., money whose payment amounts to doing something unjust. This is the meaning of the word in Sophocles *Oedipus Rex* vv. 124–125 (*πῶς οὖν ὁ ληστής, εἴ τι μὴ ξὺν ἀργύρῳ/[125] ἐπράσσει ἐνθένδ', ἐς τόδ' ἂν τόλμης ἔβη;*), for instance. In that case, even Gregory of Nyssa may be taken as using the word pejoratively, since he is talking of the money paid to someone to keep that person silent.

involuntarily) is easy and up to us, but doing them in a way that implies that one is vicious (which requires one to do them not only voluntarily, but also on the basis of decision) is neither easy nor up to us.

In sum: there seem to be three different ways of construing the argument from **T 9** depending on how we understand his three examples. If we follow Michael of Ephesus and take Aristotle's three examples to be about wrongs (i.e., unjust things done voluntarily), then it follows that (1) Aristotle would be acquiescing to the truth of the first belief while denying the truth second belief.

But if we take the three examples to be about things that happen to be unjust, then there are two more ways of construing **T 9**:

According to the second one, (2) Aristotle is denying that doing wrong is up to us (i.e., the first belief) in that he would be saying that it is easy and up to us to do things that happen to be unjust while denying that it is easy and up to us to do these things voluntarily (i.e., which implies denying that doing wrong is easy and up to us).

According to the third one, (3) Aristotle is merely saying that although doing things that happen to be unjust is easy and up to us, it is not easy nor is up to us to do these things in a way that imply that one is unjust, which is compatible with Aristotle accepting the truth of the first belief.

Now, a potential problem for these three readings is the referent of *ὡδί* in *ὡδί ἔχοντας*. In the sequence, Aristotle does not specify what condition he is talking about, which might indicate that *ὡδί* should perhaps be read anaphorically.²³³ But, in that case, the only thing *ὡδί*

²³³ For an example of anaphoric *ὡδί* in Aristotle, see *APo* II.13 96^a35–38. In this passage, after saying that odd and prime in the two senses of prime (i.e., both in the sense of not being measured by a number and in the sense of not being composed by numbers—which is true of triads because a monad is not a number, so that one cannot say that a triad is composed of the numbers 1 and 2) belong to all triads, Aristotle concludes that the triad is this: a number that is odd, prime, and prime in this sense (*τοῦτο τοίνυν ἤδη ἐστὶν ἡ τριάς, ἀριθμὸς περιττὸς πρῶτος καὶ ὡδί πρῶτος*). In saying that the triad is a number that is *πρῶτος καὶ ὡδί πρῶτος*, Aristotle is clearly picking up the two senses of being *πρῶτος* he just described.

could be picking up in the context is the condition of being just (*τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*) mentioned in 1137^a5-6. The same could be argued if we adopt a variant for this passage: P^b and C^c—and probably also O^b²³⁴ and V (both before correction)—write *ὡς δεῖ* instead of *ὡδί* at 1137^a8, which seems to be spelling out the condition Aristotle is talking about here as the condition one must be in: that of being virtuous.

This makes poor sense of reading (1). In fact, if *ὡδί* is picking up *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι* or if we read *ὡς δεῖ*, it simply does not make sense to think that Aristotle's three examples concern wrongs, since it does not seem to be possible to do wrong being in the condition one must be in, i.e., being virtuous. Rather, it seems that virtuous agents do not do things that happen to be unjust but involuntarily, and thus that they do not do wrong.

What about readings (2) and (3)?

If we read *ὡδί* picking up '*τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*' or if we read *ὡς δεῖ*, it seems that (2) is also out of the picture. As matter of fact, according to (2) not only Aristotle's examples concern things that merely happen to be unjust, but, more importantly, his conclusion is that doing these things is not tantamount to doing wrong. But if *ὡδί* is read as picking up '*τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*' or if we read *ὡς δεῖ*, Aristotle's conclusion must be construed as saying instead that doing the things he is talking about in his examples is not tantamount to doing things that, taken by themselves, happen to be unjust in a way that expresses a virtuous character.

(3), in turn, can be made sense of both if we read *ὡδί* picking up *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι* and if we read *ὡς δεῖ*. In fact, one could argue that in saying that it is easy and up to us to strike someone, to sleep with the neighbour's wife, and to hand over money, Aristotle is not necessarily denying that doing these things voluntarily is not easy and up to us. In that case,

In that case, *ὡδί πρῶτος* is most probably referring to the second sense of being *πρῶτος* Aristotle just described.

²³⁴ That O^b read '*ὡς δεῖ*' before the correction is also the view of Jackson (1879, p.1) in his apparatus.

the point would be that although it might be easy to do these things (even if voluntarily), it is not easy to do these things in a way that expresses virtue (which requires not only doing these things voluntarily, but also doing them on the basis of decision).

However, although reading *ὡδί* as picking up ‘τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι’ or reading ‘ὡς δεῖ’ might make good sense of examples such as giving money to someone or striking one’s neighbour (which, on this reading, would be actions that can be performed in ways that are just and that reveal that that one is a just person—so that it would make sense of talking of performing these things being in the right condition or in a condition such that one is just), it is harder to defend this in the case of sleeping with the neighbours’ wife. As a matter of fact, it is hard not to see ‘sleeping with the neighbours’ wife’ as a description of an action that, if performed voluntarily, is indeed a case of adultery and thus of a wrong, and adultery is among the actions that Aristotle says that do not have a mean, i.e., that cannot be performed in a way that hits the mean in action, but are always vicious regardless of the circumstances constitutive of their performance (*EN* II.6 1107^a8–17—in **T 13** below). So, it would not be possible to perform such an action in a way that reveals that one is virtuous, although it might be possible to perform an action like sleeping with someone else’s wife without thereby being unjust:

T 10 – EN V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1134^a17–23

1134a17 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα
ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοι-
20 χὸς ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ || ἂν συγγένοιτο
γυναικὶ εἰδῶς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως | ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ
πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, | οἷον οὐ κλέπτῃς,
ἔκλειψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· | ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων

|| **a17** μήπω K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: μηδέπω L | post ποῖα add. δὴ
B^{95sup}. || **a20** διὰ om. K^b || **a22** οὐ K^bP^bC^c: οὐδὲ C^{c2}LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V

And since it is possible for someone not to be unjust yet in doing wrong, by committing what sorts of wrongs is the person <who commits these wrongs> thereby unjust relatively to the respective injustice (e.g., <is> a thief, an adulterer, or a pirate)? Or is there no difference in this way of talking? For [20] if someone sleeps with <someone else’s> wife knowing with whom <they are sleeping>, but did not do that due the authority of decision, but due to emotion, they are doing wrong but are not unjust.

For instance, one is not a thief, but stole, and one is not an adulterer, but committed adultery, and similarly also in the remaining cases.

One of the examples Aristotle gives here in **T 10** concerns sleeping with someone else's wife, and the point is that merely sleeping with someone else's wife voluntarily, i.e., knowing that one is sleeping with someone else's wife, does not imply that one is an adulterer, although one is indeed doing wrong. Besides, it is reasonable that what is said in this passage—which opens *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] and begins the section of *EN* V concerned with responding to objections and solving some problems left open by the discussion of justice that took place in the preceding chapters of *EN* V—is being mobilised in the responses given by Aristotle to the three difficulties.

Someone could resist this objection pointing out that Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 50.2–5), in his discussion of *EN* II.6 1107^a8–17 (in **T 13** below), suggests that there might be cases in which sleeping with someone else's wife is not a case of adultery, and therefore is not a case of a vicious action, since one could, say, sleep with the tyrant's wife for the sake of coming close to the tyrant so as to be able to kill him, thus freeing one's country, in which case one will have performed a praiseworthy action instead. Perhaps, then, what we have here would be a mixed action, so that one is being constrained to commit adultery, and is thus not doing wrong except accidentally. Yet, even if we concede that acting in this way is not tantamount to committing adultery (and there is reason for not conceding this),²³⁵ reading *ὡς δεῖ* instead of *ὡδί* or *ὡδί* as picking up *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι* still faces a serious problem: it is unclear whether this is an action that a virtuous agent would perform, since it is unclear whether performing

²³⁵ Similarly, for an argument for rejecting Aspasius' reasoning in *CAG*. XIX.1, 50.2–9, see Zingano (2008, pp. 132–133). The same argument Aspasius raises in this section of his commentary by reference to *EN* II.6 1107^a8–17 can perhaps also be raised by reference to *EE* II.3 1221^b18–26 (**T 15** below), where Aristotle even mentions the fact that some people dispute that they have committed adultery saying that they have slept with someone, but have not committed adultery because they have done so in ignorance or being constrained.

such an action is something one could be constrained to do in the first place if one is indeed virtuous.²³⁶ Moreover, the example Aristotle gives here is quite different from the one offered by Aspasius. Even if we conceded that sleeping with the tyrant's wife for the sake of getting close to the tyrant so as to overthrow him is not a case of adultery, it is much harder to think this about an example such as sleeping with the neighbour's wife (which is the example from T 9). Thus, reading *ὡς δεῖ* instead of *ὡδί* or *ὡδί* as picking up *‘τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι’* not only makes Aristotle's argument far-fetched, but also puts him in difficulties he does not seem to be aware of in the context.

A deflationary way out of these difficulties would be to understand *ὡδί ἔχοντα* either as not saying that one is acting being in a condition about which Aristotle spoke or will speak, but as just emphasising that Aristotle has in mind here a particular condition (which is not specified in the context),²³⁷ or else as saying that one is acting being in a condition like one about which Aristotle talked or will talk (in which case, although Aristotle has only talked about a good condition, a bad condition could also be implied, since it is relevantly similar to the good condition in that it involves *προαίρεσις*).²³⁸

²³⁶ I mean, one could perhaps also object to Aspasius that this is a case in which it is not possible to be constrained to do something, but one should rather die suffering terrible things (cf. 1110^a26–27), in which case acting in this way would not be praiseworthy. Aristotle's own example concerns Alcmeon's killing his mother, for Aristotle says it would be ridicule to say that Alcmeon was constrained to kill his mother (which he did to avenge his father's death). Perhaps, as Zingano (2008, p. 133) suggests, Aristotle's point becomes clearer if we think of rape rather than adultery, since no one would admit that someone who rapes someone else for the sake of, say, overthrowing the tyrant was constrained to rape that person. Thus, the idea is that even in cases in which adultery is a means to something that is praiseworthy, committing adultery for the sake of that is not praiseworthy and cannot be described as something one was constrained to do given the circumstances.

²³⁷ This is how people usually translate *ὡδί ἔχοντα* in this passage: see, for instance, the translations by Jackson (1879, p. 2: in a given *ἔξις*), Dirlmeier (1959, p. 117: auf Grund einer ganz bestimmten, festen Grundhaltung), Rowe (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, p. 173: in a given state), Natali (1999, p. 213: sulla base di un certo stato abituale), Zingano (2017, p. 135: em uma dada condição), and Frede (2020, p. 96: aufgrund einer bestimmten Verfassung). Note, moreover, that I do not think that one should understand *ὡδί ἔχοντα* as making reference to a given *ἔξις*, but to a condition one is in while acting, which might even be due to one's *ἔξις*, but which is different from one's *ἔξις* nevertheless. I shall talk more about this below in **section 1.3.3**.

²³⁸ Similarly, see Bodéüs (2004, p. 276n3): '[c]et état (de l'âme) particulier est celui du *vice*, qui porte à décider délibérément l'injustice qu'on fait (cf. 1136 a 3-5); ce qui n'est pas l'état de la plupart des hommes qui font quelque

If Aristotle is talking of acting being in a condition like one about which he talked or will talk, only readings (1) and (3) would be tenable (since the condition Aristotle has in mind here could hardly be construed merely in terms of voluntariness).

But if he talking of acting being in a *particular condition* (which is not necessarily specified in the context), the three readings would still be an option. In my translation above, I have opted for this solution.²³⁹

Something that might be problematic for reading (2) is that it implies that doing wrong is not easy and is not up to us. The problem is that Aristotle thinks that even the things that we do involuntarily are up to us,²⁴⁰ and it is far from clear whether he would be willing to describe it as something hard in that it would be hard to perform unjust actions voluntarily.

Yet note that, on reading (2), Aristotle would not be denying that it is easy and up to us to perform unjust actions, but rather that it is easy and up to us to do wrong, and doing wrong is something that in its very definition already implies voluntariness, so it could hardly fit into the things one can do either voluntarily or involuntarily and whose doing and not

chose d'injuste, on l'a vu.' Moreover, this reading is also suggested by the use of 'tel' in the translations proposed by Jolif (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 151: avec telle disposition intérieure) and by Bodéüs (Bodéüs, 2004, p. 275: dans tel état particulier).

²³⁹ Moreover, even if in the immediate context there is no mention of the precise condition Aristotle has in mind with 'ὡδὲ ἔχοντα,' this could perhaps be taking up the discussion from *EN* V.4 [=Bywater V.2] 1130^a24ff, where Aristotle distinguished between cases in which voluntarily performing an action is expressive of intemperance and cases in which voluntarily performing that same action is expressive of injustice. Aristotle's example in this passage concerns adultery: someone who commits adultery for the sake of profit, is not thereby intemperate, but rather unjust, while someone who commits adultery due to appetite and actually loses money to commit adultery, is thereby intemperate (and not unjust). In these examples, the agential condition that allows one to say whether one's action is expressive of intemperance or of injustice is one's motivation.

²⁴⁰ Cf. *EE* II.9 1225^b8–10 (ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων), which can be reasonably construed as saying precisely that, since the clause ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄν μὴ πράττειν should be supplied with the second ὅσα clause (ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν κτλ.). As a result, Aristotle would be saying that 'those things which, being up to one not to do, one does' in ignorance in that one <does it> due to ignorance, <one does> involuntarily,' thus implying that the things we do involuntarily are up to us. I thank Dionatan Tissot for pointing this passage out to me.

doing are thereby up to us.

I do not think there is a regimented way of deciding between the three readings we have before us. But given that there are good indications that Aristotle's three examples are not always wrongs, but actions that can be wrongs if performed voluntarily, there is good reason to say that our decision should be between (2) and (3). Moreover, given the difficulty in determining whether Aristotle would say that doing wrong in the sense of doing something that happens to be unjust voluntarily is easy and up to us, perhaps we should favour (3), so that Aristotle is not necessarily acquiescing to the truth of the first belief, but is merely pronouncing himself against the truth of the second belief, since there is no doubt that it is neither easy nor up to us to be just.

At any rate, what I think should be clearly rejected here is an interpretation of the argument according to which the view Aristotle is dealing with here is not one in which the belief according to which it is up to us to do wrong leads to the belief it is easy to be just, but rather one in which the belief according to which it is up to us to perform just actions on the basis of justice leads to the belief that it is easy to be just. Let me call this (4).

This interpretation has been recently advanced by Fernandez (2021, pp. 390-393), and his argument in its favour depends on his analysis of the difficulties discussed in lines 1137^a9-17 (see T 11 below) and on lines 1137^a17-26 (see T 12 below). Its advantage is that Aristotle would without a doubt be denying the truth of the two related beliefs in question in the first difficulty, for there is no doubt that doing wrong on the basis of injustice is not up to us if we are not unjust already. In that case, Aristotle would be first denying that it is easy and up to us to do things expressive of injustice,²⁴¹ but would then be saying that performing the actions

²⁴¹ Fernandez (2021, p. 391) thinks that Aristotle has in mind a contrast between things that are *per se* just and things that are *accidentally* just/unjust in that they are *generically just/unjust* (although here, different from the two other difficulties dealt with in the sequence, there is no mention of the *per se/accidentally* contrast). In that case, Aristotle could be taken as implicitly conceding that it is easy and up to us to do

from his examples in a way that is expressive of a fully virtuous or vicious character disposition is neither easy nor up to us, for which reason the two beliefs people usually hold should be rejected. Yet if this is correct, it would mean that in this chapter from *EN V* Aristotle would be operating with a sense of *ἀδικεῖν* that is completely unexpected considering everything he said so far in *EN V*.²⁴²

Although in the previous chapter (*EN V.12*) he did indeed say that doing something is said in many ways (1136^b29-30: *ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται*), he neither distinguishes nor entertains the possibility of distinguishing doing just/unjust things generically and doing just/unjust things in a way expressive of justice/injustice. The only contrast Aristotle makes in *EN V.12* is the one he had already made in **T 7** in **T 8**, namely that between doing things that happen to be just/unjust without thereby performing just acts/doing wrong and performing just acts/doing wrong, which amounts to voluntarily doing things that happen to be just/unjust. Thus, unless there is overwhelming evidence that in *EN V.13* Aristotle means something different with *ἀδικεῖν*, such that, unless it is understood in terms of doing unjust things in a way that reveals one's character disposition, the argument advanced in the chapter cannot be made sense of, I think there is good reason for rejecting Fernandez's proposal (i.e., [4]).

things that are generically unjust, but as saying that doing things that are *per se* just is neither easy nor up to us, for it requires doing generically just things on the basis of injustice. Yet I think this completely misconceives what Aristotle thinks as generically just/unjust, as we shall see later below.

Generically just/unjust actions are those that despite being just/unjust due to corresponding in abstract to the things prescribed or proscribed by the laws (respectively) are accidentally just/unjust because they turn out to be or not to be just/unjust relatively to the particular circumstances in which are performed in a certain way. Thus, although some things are prescribed by the laws as being just, it may be the case that in some circumstances doing these things is not really just, but rather unjust. As a result, even if we concede that Aristotle's examples here concern generically unjust actions (since it might be conceivable to think of circumstances in which hitting someone who stands close to you hits the mean in action and thus turns out to be just), such actions are generally contrasted by Aristotle not with actions expressive of injustice, but with actions that actually fail to hit the mean in action: what appears to make an action that is generically just or unjust intrinsically just or unjust is not the fact that the person performing it is just or unjust, but the fact that they hit the mean or fail to hit the mean in action in the particular circumstances in which they are being faced with. Thus, the contrast proposed by Fernandez seems to be unwarranted.

²⁴² Similarly, in *Rh.* I.10, in 1368^b6-7, Aristotle defines τὸ ἀδικεῖν in terms of voluntarily causing harm against the law (*ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον*). I thank Harry Alanen for pointing this passage out to me.

Thus, conceding that reading (3) is to be favoured, Aristotle's point here should be that it is neither easy nor up to us to do things such as sleeping with the neighbour's wife or giving money to someone being in a condition that reveals the agent's character disposition (in which case Aristotle's response to the first difficulty would be to deny that it is easy to be just by denying that it is easy to be unjust), which is compatible either with denying that doing wrong is also not easy and not up to us, and with conceding that doing wrong is both easy and up to us.²⁴³

In any case, the upshot is that with talk of acting being in a certain condition here, Aristotle would be clearly talking of acting in such a way that implies that one has a certain character disposition.²⁴⁴ Moreover, there is reason for thinking that the agent's motivation is sufficient for saying whether his voluntary performance of a virtuous or vicious action is expressive of virtue or vice (cf. T 8, T 10, and footnote 239).

1.3.1.1.2 *The second difficulty (1137^a9-17)*

Let me now translate *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a9-17:

T 11 – *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a9–17

1137a9 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ
 10 || γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, |
 ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ |
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς |
 πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλεον ἔργον

²⁴³ We could of course distinguish between two versions of (3), one in which Aristotle acquiesces to the truth of the first belief (3a), and another one in which he implicitly denies the truth of the first belief (3b). (3b) would still be distinct from (2) in that it construes what is implied by acting in a certain condition differently: not merely in terms of doing something in a condition such that one does it voluntarily, but in terms of doing something in such a way that one is unjust. For my purposes, however, any of these—(3a) and (3b)—will do.

²⁴⁴ At any rate, (3) or a version thereof is not required to make the parallel I want to draw between *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a17–20 and *EN* V, although it would give us a verbal parallel that makes things much easier. In fact, even if we interpret 1137^a4–9 along the lines of (2), the parallel I have in mind can still be drawn, since, as we saw in T 8, Aristotle clearly holds in *EN* V that one is not just or unjust due to performing just acts or due to doing wrong, but is just or unjust due to doing these things on the basis of decision.

15 ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κακὴ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἢ ἐλλέβορον
καὶ καῦσι καὶ τομῆν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς | δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς
ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον | ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι.
|| a12 πῶς Jackson Susemihl: πῶς Bekker Bywater || a13 πῶς Jack-
son Susemihl: πῶς Bekker Bywater | νεμόμενα P^bC^cL^bV: γενό-
μενα K^bB^{95sup}.M^b: διανεμόμενα LO^b | δὲ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V:
δὴ Bywater | πλεόν K^bP^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup}.V: πλείον O^b || a14
κακὴ μέλι P^bC^cLL^bO^b: κακὴ μὲν K^b: κακὴ μὲν μέλι B^{95sup}.V ||
a15 ἐλλέβορον P^bC^c: ἐλέβορον K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b || a16 νεῖμαι
P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: εἶναι K^b || a17 ἰατρὸν P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἰα-
τροῦ K^b

Similarly, they also believe that knowing just and unjust things is not wise at all, because it is not hard to understand the things about which the laws are talking. However, these [sc., the things about which the laws are talking] are not just things except by accident, but are just when performed and distributed in a certain way, and <knowing> this [sc., how they should be performed and distributed to be just]²⁴⁵ is more difficult than knowing healthy things, since here too it is easy to know <that> honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, incision <are healthy>, but <knowing> how these things should be administered for the sake of health and to whom and when, that is a task enough for being a physician.

This second difficulty is introduced as being similar to the first one (cf. 1137^a9ff: *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κτλ.*). As I have indicated, it comes from the belief that there is nothing wise in knowing just and unjust things because it is easy to understand the things that are prescribed by the laws, which is a belief somehow related to the belief that it is easy to be just (since knowledge of just and unjust things is characteristic of the virtue of justice). Aristotle's answer to this second difficulty depends on two moves.

Aristotle's first move is to point out that the things prescribed by the laws are not just

²⁴⁵ As I take it, *τοῦτο* here is the object of the *εἰδέναι* that must be supplied as the subject of *πλεόν ἔργον* <ἔστι> (and supplying it is perfectly justifiable in such brachyological constructions, since the other member of the comparison is an *εἰδέναι* infinitive clause—similarly, see Jackson's note *ad locum* [1879, pp. 63-64]). In that case, *τοῦτο* would be referring to the way in which just actions must be performed to be just which was at issue in the previous clause. Alternatively, one could take *τοῦτο* to be picking up 'τὸ γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα' from lines 1137^a9-10, in which case nothing would need to be supplied. In either case, Bywater's correction is unnecessary. Bywater (1892, p. 42) corrects the text because he wants what is being said here to be parallel to 1137^a15-17, where Aristotle says that '<knowing> how these things should be administered for the sake of health and to whom and when is a task enough for being a physician' (*ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι*). Yet the parallel only makes sense if we read *πῶς* in the previous clause as Bywater and Bekker propose (note that the mss. have no authority when it comes to accentuation) and if we take *τοῦτο* as picking up the previous clause (which is not necessary), in which case Bywater's correction seems to be justified. Yet if we follow Jackson and Susemihl in reading '*πῶς*' instead, even if we read *τοῦτο* as picking up the previous clause, no change in the text is necessary to make good sense of it.

except by accident. As the anonymous paraphrasis makes clear (*CAG. XIX.2*, 107.31–33),²⁴⁶ the things prescribed by the laws are accidentally just in that an action is just relatively to the particular circumstances in which it is performed.²⁴⁷ Thus, in talking about certain types of action as prescribed or proscribed, the laws are talking of things that, if done in a certain way relatively to the particular circumstances, prove to be just or unjust, but which are not intrinsically just or unjust. If this is correct, then Aristotle would be seemingly qualifying a claim he made earlier in *T 7* (at 1135^a9–10), where he said that something is unjust by nature or **prescription** (τῆ φύσει ἢ τάξει), which could be taken as suggesting that the laws can also determine whether something is unjust or not.²⁴⁸ Read in light of *T 11*, 1135^a9–10 would be saying rather that the law can be an element in determining whether something is unjust, and not that the law is sufficient for determining whether something is unjust. This conclusion becomes even more compelling considering the discussion of ἐπιείκεια in the next chapter (i.e., in *EN V.14* [=Bywater V.10]). There, the justice involved in ἐπιείκεια is said to be better than a certain kind of justice (τινος δικαίου) in that it is better not than what is just simpliciter, but better than the error caused by speaking in a general way (1137^b24–25: διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἔστιν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος). The upshot is that the justice involved in ἐπιείκεια is better than legal justice, since the laws are characterised as committing mistakes precisely in speaking in a general way

²⁴⁶ *CAG. XIX.2* 107.31–33: ‘And people say that these things are just, but they are not, except accidentally. For, the law is just not because it is put into action in any way in each case and because it is applied as chance has it and by whomever, but <because it is put into action and applied> as it should, when it should, and by whom it should’ (ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι φασὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὔτω πραττόμενος ὁ νόμος δίκαιός ἐστιν ἐκάστοτε καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε τελούμενος καὶ παρ’ ὧν, ἀλλ’ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ παρ’ ὧν δεῖ).

²⁴⁷ Similarly see the Albert the Great’s second commentary (*Ethic. Lib. V, Trac. X, c. III, §75* [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 381]) and Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 540). A similar argument is advanced by Fernandez (2021, pp. 383ff). However, as I shall point out below, Fernandez’s takes this claim to imply much more than I do, for he defends a view closer to that advanced by Michael of Ephesus in his commentary (*CAG. XXII*, 64.1–5).

²⁴⁸ See, for instance, Albert the Great’s first commentary (*Super Ethica L. V, Lect. XI, 426.64–66*), who thinks that, with talk of things that are just τάξει, Aristotle means to talk of things that are just due to the legal order (*ordine legis*).

(cf. 1137^b19-22).

This is not, however, the only way of construing this first move of Aristotle's. Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 64.1-5)²⁴⁹ thinks that what Aristotle means to contrast with the things said by laws is what is done on the basis of justice, which he thinks consists in what is just due to being performed on the basis of justice. More recently, Fernandez (2021) has advanced a similar argument, defending that what is done on the basis of justice is prior to just acts (just things done voluntarily) and to things that happen to be just (i.e., just things regardless of whether they are done voluntarily or involuntarily) in that just acts and just things would be abstractions from what is done on the basis of justice: just things abstract from all agential conditions (for which reason one can even do something just in the sense of something that happens to be just involuntarily), whereas just acts abstract from some agential conditions, but still include those concerning the voluntariness of the action (for which reason performing a just act is not sufficient for being just, which also requires a certain kind of *προαίρεσις*—a further agential condition). One upshot of this is that Aristotle's claims here in **T 11** would be perfectly in line with **T 7** (at 1135^a9-10), since things would be just or unjust in the abstract sense regardless of how and of whether they are performed, but would be fully just only when performed on the basis of justice.

As I take it, deciding which of these alternatives is more fitting as an interpretation of what is going on in 1137^a9-17 will depend on how we understand Aristotle's second move, which, apparently,²⁵⁰ is to say that knowing the way in which things should be done if they

²⁴⁹ 'Just in itself is that which is performed on the basis of the disposition of justice, and that person who performs <what is just> on the basis of that disposition knows what is just in a full sense. But if knowing what is just in a full sense involves acting on the basis of the disposition, and <if> the dispositions are difficult to obtain, therefore knowing just things is also not easy, but difficult etc.' (*καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ πραττόμενον ἀπὸ ἕξεως τῆς δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶδε κυρίως τὸ δίκαιον ὁ πράττων ἀπο τῆς ἕξεως. εἰ δὲ τὸ κυρίως εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ ἀπὸ ἕξεως πράττειν, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ἐπικτᾶσθαι χαλεπὸν, οὐδὲ τὸ τὰ δίκαια ἄρα εἰδέναι ῥᾶδιον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν κτλ.*)

²⁵⁰ I say apparently because Aristotle could be interpreted as saying instead that 'knowing just and unjust things is more difficult than knowing healthy things'—see footnote 245 for this alternative construal of

are to be just is more difficult (*πλέον ἔργον*) than knowing healthy things.

What is fundamental for understanding this is determining where exactly the disanalogy between the two types of knowledge in question here lies. Aristotle explains what he has in mind here by seemingly pointing out that knowledge of healthy things has an easy part (which involves knowledge that some things are such as to promote health) and a difficult part (which involves knowledge about how these things that are such as to promote health should be administered: what should be administered to whom at what moment etc.—a sort of knowledge whose possession implies that one is a physician and thus has the medical craft).

Now, in saying that knowing just and unjust things is harder than knowing healthy things, is Aristotle contrasting the first kind of knowledge only with the easy part of the knowledge of healthy things (in which case knowledge of just and unjust things would be analogous to the difficult type of knowledge of healthy things)? Or does he think that even when it comes to knowing how, to whom, and at what moment healthy things should be administered the knowledge of just and unjust things is still more demanding than knowledge of healthy things?

As I understand it, answering affirmatively the first of these two question makes poor sense of the text,²⁵¹ for Aristotle has reason to think that merely knowing that something is

the passage. In any case, there is no relevant difference between these two different ways of construing this phrase.

²⁵¹ *Pace* Fernandez (2021, pp. 383-387), who seemingly takes 1137^a14-17 (*ἐπεὶ...εἶναι*) to be introducing a case that is analogous to that of the knowing just things, since in the case of knowledge about healthy things we can also distinguish between knowledge of things that are healthy in that they are potential medicines and treatments and knowledge of 'what actually cures a particular patient: i.e., some medicine and/or treatment applied at the right time to a patient in a specific condition, and in the right way so as to restore health' (p. 384). It is telling that Fernandez renders the *ἐπεὶ* from '*ἐπεὶ κακῆι μέλι καὶ οἶνον*' merely as '[a]nd' (p. 381), thus failing to see how 1137^a14-17 is meant to explain why knowing just and unjust things is harder than knowing healthy things. On Fernandez's reading, Aristotle would be instead making a further point, which could perhaps be taken as a correction on his part: knowing healthy things is only easier than knowing just and unjust things if we think of knowing that certain things are potential medicines or treatments, but it is not easier than knowing just and unjust things if we think of knowing how these things should be administered so as to promote health. But given the clear explanatory function that *ἐπεὶ* has in this passage, Fernandez's reading should be rejected.

healthy in that it generally promotes health is analogous to knowing the things prescribed and proscribed by the laws, and is thus only knowledge of things that are healthy *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.²⁵² As a result, it seems more reasonable that Aristotle's thought in the passage is that even when it comes to knowing how healthy things should be administered, knowledge of just and unjust things (i.e., knowledge of how things should be done if they are to be just or unjust) is more demanding than knowledge of healthy things.²⁵³

Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 64.3–7)²⁵⁴ and the anonymous scholiast (*CAG*. XX, 247.14–15)²⁵⁵ both make an assumption that makes good sense of this idea: knowing just and unjust things is more difficult than knowing healthy things because being just is harder than being a physician, so that, because the person who knows healthy things in the proper sense is the one who has the relevant craft—medicine—(and who is thus a physician in the full sense of the word²⁵⁶), and because the person who knows just things in the proper sense

²⁵² For this argument, see Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 64.7–14): 'For as in the case of those things, it is easy to know those things that the physician uses for the sake of health, for instance, wine, food, hellebore, cautery, and incision, but knowing these things is not knowing healthy things except by accident. Rather, knowing that these things are healthy consists in using them from the disposition of medicine, and this consists in administering <them> when <one should>, how <one should>, and up to the quantity <one should>, which is not easy, for which reason it is also not easy to acquire the craft of medicine. Therefore, knowing the adequate use of these things is <difficult and troublesome> to the extent in which it is difficult and troublesome to become a physician' (*ὡς γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν οἷς χρήται ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς ὑγίαν ῥάδιον εἰδέναι, οἶον οἶνον, σίτον, ἐλλέβορον, καῦσις, τομήν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τὰ ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἐστὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ὑγιεινά, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστιν ὑγιεινά ἐν τῷ χρησθῆναι ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ ἕξεως ἰατρικῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πόσου προσφέρειν, ὃ οὐ ῥάδιον, διότι μηδὲ τὴν ἰατρικὴν κτήσασθαι ῥάδιον. ὅσον δὴ ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ δύσκολον τὸ ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν εἰδέναι).*

²⁵³ Otherwise, the contrast would not concern knowledge of healthy things *sans phrase*, but rather knowledge of things that are healthy *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

²⁵⁴ *CAG*. XXII, 64.3–7: 'If knowing in the proper sense of the word what is just is acting on the basis of a disposition, and <if> it is harder to acquire the dispositions, therefore knowing just things will also not be easier, but harder, and, he says, knowledge of just things is a task bigger and a matter more difficult than knowledge of healthy things to the extent that being just is also more difficult than being a physician' (*εἰ δὲ τὸ κυρίως εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ ἀπὸ ἕξεως πράττειν, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ἐπικτᾶσθαι χαλεπόν, οὐδὲ τὸ τὰ δίκαια ἄρα εἰδέναι ῥάδιον ἀλλὰ χαλεπόν, καὶ πλέον, φησίν, ἔργον καὶ χαλεπώτερον πράγμα ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν δικαίων εἰδησις τῆς τῶν ὑγιεινῶν γνώσεως, ὅσω καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ ἰατρὸν εἶναι χαλεπώτερον).*

²⁵⁵ *CAG*. XX, 247.14–15: 'For knowledge of just things is harder than <knowledge> of healthy things to the extent that being just is also harder than being a physician' (*χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἢ τῶν δικαίων γνώσις τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ὅσω καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι ἰατρὸν χαλεπώτερον).*

²⁵⁶ That there are different reasons why someone could be called a physician is made clear by Aristotle in *Pol.* III.11 1282^a3–4, where he mentions the physician *qua* δημιουργός, the physician *qua* ἀρχιτεκτονικός,

is virtuous, the knowledge about just and unjust things would be harder to acquire than the knowledge about healthy things because it is easier to acquire a craft than to become virtuous.

As Michael of Ephesus puts it (see the passage from his commentary quoted in footnote 252), it is not the case that having knowledge of healthy things in the proper sense is easy: although acquiring the craft of medicine is hard, it is still easier than becoming just and acquiring *φρόνησις*.

But if this is correct, then we do not need to commit ourselves to thinking that Aristotle is also saying here that just things are only those done on the basis of justice (as both Fernandez and Michael of Ephesus want). No doubt Aristotle's thought here is that only someone who is just in the proper sense of the word and thus also *φρόνιμος* can properly know how things should be done so as to be just in that only such an agent knows just things *in so far as they are just*, as the anonymous scholiast puts it.²⁵⁷ Yet this does not imply that Aristotle is saying here that only those actions that are performed on the basis of justice are just in themselves.

It is true that someone could say that the criteria for saying whether an action is just or not are to be paradigmatically found in just actions performed on the basis of justice, since these actions hit the mean both in action and in emotion. But for Aristotle's purposes here it is not necessary to give this sort of priority to virtuous actions performed on the basis of virtue, for all he needs to do for the purposes of his argument is to contrast things that are potentially just, like the things prescribed by the laws, with things that are properly speaking just in that they are instances of actions that hit the mean in action in the domain of justice

and the physician *quia πεπαιδευμένος*. As it seems, only the second sort of physician actually has the relevant craft, although all three are good judges about the craft of medicine.

²⁵⁷ *CAG*. XX, 247.5–7: 'It is also possible to know just and unjust things, albeit by accident, for the person who knows these things in this way <knows> that these things are the same as the things that happen to be just or unjust, **but not in so far as they are just and unjust**' (ἔστι δὲ καὶ εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ὁ οὕτως αὐτὰ εἰδώς, οἷς συμβέβηκε δίκαιος ἢ ἀδίκος εἶναι τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, **οὐ μὴν καθό ἐστι δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα**).

(which is something that can be done also by actions that are not performed on the basis of justice, but that are just nevertheless in so far as they hit the mean in action).

In any case, the type of knowledge necessary for knowing things that are just in the proper sense of the word requires the virtue of justice, and thus its possession implies that one is virtuous and *φρόνιμος* (since Aristotle does not seem to be talking of a natural virtue here, but of justice as involving the right *προαίρεσις*).

If this is true, then there is reason for saying that agents who are not fully virtuous cannot perform virtuous actions on the basis of knowledge of these actions as virtuous. In fact, if one is not fully virtuous, there is reason for thinking that one's knowledge of what one should do is in some sense accidental. If so, this is further reason for thinking that fully virtuous agents are to be distinguished from agents who fail to be fully virtuous by reference to their motivation, since, to put it in Anscombian parlance, these agents would not act *under the same description*.

1.3.1.1.3 *The third difficulty* (1137^a 17-26)

To conclude, let me quote *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a17-26:

T 12 – *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a17–26

1137a17 δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται |
εἶναι οὐδὲν ἤττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἤττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ | καὶ
20 μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πράξει τούτων· καὶ γὰρ || συγγενέ-
σθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος τὴν | ἀσπίδα ἀφείναι
καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ | τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ
τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν | κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ὧδε ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσ|περ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῖεν καὶ
25 τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ || τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ
φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ | ὠδί.

|| **a17** αὐτὸ P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ταυτὸ K^b s.l.C^c || **a18** οὐχ K^bP^bC^c:
οὐδὲν LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || **a19** καὶ om. C^c || **a22** τὸ om. P^bC^c
|| **a23** ὧδε K^bP^bC^c: ὠδί LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V | post ποιεῖν add. ἔστιν
B^{95sup}.V || **a25** ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν K^bP^bC^cL²L^bV: om. LO^b || **a26**
ὠδί K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ὡς δεῖ B^{95sup}.

But for that very reason they also believe that doing wrong is no less a task of the

just person, because the just person is no less <capable>, but even more capable of doing each of these things, for <the just person is even more capable> of sleeping with <someone else's> wife and of beating <someone>, and the courageous person <is even more capable> of putting aside their shield and, turning back, running <away> in any direction. But doing something cowardly and doing wrong is not doing these things except by accident, but doing these things being in such a condition,²⁵⁸ just as practising medicine and curing are not cutting or not cutting or administering medicine or not administering medicine, but <doing these things> in a certain way.

Aristotle's solution to the second difficulty (in T 11 above) is said to motivate a further difficulty: because the type of knowledge required for knowing just things is to some extent analogous to the type of knowledge required for knowing healthy things it seems that one could argue that the just person is equally capable of performing just acts and of committing wrongs, just like someone who has the craft of medicine is equally capable of promoting health and disease. This is a difficulty that we find in several places in Plato's dialogues, and is a direct result of the craft analogy.²⁵⁹

Aristotle's response to this comes in lines 21-26. Yet it is unclear what τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν are referring to in lines 1137^a21-23. A first alternative is that they indicate, respectively, that one is a coward or unjust person in that one is performing cowardly actions on the basis of cowardice or unjust actions on the basis of injustice. A second alternative is that they indicate, respectively, that one merely has a cowardly or unjust behaviour, and not that one is a coward or an unjust person: i.e., they merely indicate that one is voluntarily performing cowardly actions or unjust actions, which is compatible with these actions not being performed on the basis of cowardice or injustice.

On the first alternative, the point made here would be analogous to that made in

²⁵⁸ I think that ὥδε here is picking up the condition one is in when one engages in δειλαίνειν and ἀδικεῖν which involves being aware of what one is doing and not being forced, so that one is acting voluntarily. In that case, reading ὥδε instead of ὥδι would be relevant if indeed ὥδι is ambiguous between making reference to something that was mentioned or that will be mentioned in the sequence and making reference to a condition that has not been specified in the context, for ὥδε would instead be referring to a condition that is at the very least implicit in the context.

²⁵⁹ This *aporia* comes up most notably in the *Hippias Minor*, see *Hp.Mi.*375b7-376b6.

1144^a18-19, the only difference between the two passages being that 1144^a18-19 refers to the condition one must be in when performing virtuous actions if one's actions are to be sufficient for determining whether one is virtuous, whereas 1137^a21-23 would refer to the condition one must be in when performing vicious actions if one's actions are to be sufficient for determining whether one is vicious. That is, 1137^a21-23 would be mentioning a condition that is sufficient for determining whether one is vicious.

On the second alternative, in turn, 1137^a21-23 is rather pointing out that one's behaviour can only be cowardly or unjust if, say, the things one does are done voluntarily. In that case, even though courageous and just persons might do things that happen to be cowardly or unjust, their behaviour cannot be said to be cowardly or unjust (i.e., they cannot be said to be engaging in *δειλαίνειν* or *ἀδικεῖν*), for they do not do these things voluntarily: the thought would be that when courageous and just persons perform actions that happen to be cowardly or unjust, they do not do these things voluntarily. That is, 1137^a21-23 would be presenting a necessary but non-sufficient condition for determining whether one is vicious: the voluntary performance of vicious actions (which is sufficient for being vicious if done *from decision*: *ἐκ προαιρέσεως*). Moreover, on this alternative, Aristotle would be subscribing to the thesis according to which virtuous agents do not perform vicious actions voluntarily.

The example discussed by Aristotle in the sequence (lines 1137^a23-26) should be crucial for deciding what is at issue here in **T 12**: Aristotle says that practising medicine and curing (*τὸ ἰατρεῦειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν*) do not consist in performing or not performing actions such as cutting and administering medicine, but in *τὸ ὠδί*.

Now, although Aristotle's mention of the practice of medicine (*τὸ ἰατρεῦειν*) tells in favour of the first alternative in that it suggests that he is thinking of someone exercising the craft of medicine, it is not so clear what exactly should be supplied with *τὸ ὠδί*, which is what

Aristotle is identifying the practice of medicine and the act of curing with.

One way of making sense of ‘τὸ ὥδι’ is to supply ‘ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιῆν,’ in parallel to line 23.²⁶⁰ Another way of making sense of τὸ ὥδι’ is to supply ‘τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν.’ In the latter case, the point would be that practising medicine and curing consist not in merely doing or not doing some things, but in doing these things in a certain way, in which case perhaps the καί from ‘καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν’ should be understood expegetically, so that Aristotle would not mean to talk about the exercise of the craft of medicine, but of activities related to this craft which can be performed even by persons who lack this craft. In other words, by ‘τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν’ he would mean something like ‘practising medicine in the sense of curing someone.’

In the first case, in turn, Aristotle would be saying that practising medicine and curing someone involve not only doing or not doing things such as cutting and administering medicine, but in doing these things while being in a certain condition (similar to 1137^a7-9—T 9 above). In the case of practising medicine, this condition involves exercising the craft of medicine, which is implied in acting *ιατρικῶς*, just like in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a23-26 acting *γραμματικῶς* involves acting on the basis of the grammatical craft in oneself. Yet this is an excessive requirement for merely saying that one is curing someone else, in which case perhaps τὸ ὥδι’ should be making a less demanding requirement: for instance, one about the voluntariness of the action. But if we do not construe τὸ ὥδι’ in the more demanding way, then satisfying this requirement would not be enough for saying that someone is practising medicine. Thus, supplying ‘ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιῆν’ with τὸ ὥδι’ puts us in a Procrustean bed: there is no way of making sense of both ‘τὸ ἰατρεύειν’ and ‘τὸ ὑγιάζειν’ if

²⁶⁰ Note, however, that I am not reading ὥδι’ in line 23 (which is the text transmitted by LL^b O^b B^{95sup} V, and which can thus be safely said to be the reading of the β family), but ὥδε (which is transmitted by K^b P^b C^c, and which can thus be safely said to be the reading of the α family). There are no crucial differences between the two readings, however.

we read the text in this way.

As I take it, this first way of making sense of Aristotle's example (according to which one should supply 'ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν' with τὸ ὠδῶ) is problematic for two other reasons as well: first, it implies that Aristotle is shifting the meaning of τὸ ἀδικεῖν between 1137^a18 and ^a22, since in 1137^a18 (and in several other passages from *EN* V) τὸ ἀδικεῖν clearly means doing wrong (i.e., voluntarily doing things that happen to be unjust)(or so I have argued above in **section 1.3.1.1.1**), whereas in ^a22 it would mean more than that: performing unjust actions on the basis of injustice.

Second, it does not account for a disanalogy between the actions that Aristotle says are not cases of τὸ ἰατρεύειν and τὸ ὑγιάζειν and the actions he says are not cases of τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν except accidentally. While 'συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι' (in the case of the just person) and 'τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφείναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεροῦν τρέχειν' (in the case of the courageous person) are clearly meant as examples of actions that are not morally neutral (since they are meant to exemplify the claim that the just person is no less capable of τὸ ἀδικεῖν—1137^a17-18), the same is not true of actions such as 'τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν,' for depending on the way and on the circumstances one cuts someone or refuses to cut someone, or administers medicine to someone or forbears from administering medicine to someone, these actions might be components both of acts of curing and of acts of harming someone.

Thus, there is good reason for thinking that the example of τὸ ἰατρεύειν and τὸ ὑγιάζειν should be understood in the second way I proposed, i.e., as saying that practising medicine in the sense of merely curing someone is not tantamount merely to doing things that are potentially healthy, but consists in doing these things in a way that actually promotes health to a particular patient in a particular condition.

If this is correct, then the *ὥσπερ* that introduces the comparison with the case of health is not introducing a case that is perfectly parallel to the one of *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν*. Rather it would be presenting a distinction between two ways of doing things that is in a relevant way analogous to the distinction that Aristotle makes in the case of *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν*:

On the reading of *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* I am defending—i.e., the second reading, according to which these infinitives indicate, respectively, that one has a cowardly or unjust behaviour in that one voluntarily performs cowardly or unjust actions, and not that one performs cowardly or unjust actions on the basis of cowardice or injustice—, the analogy would be that just like merely doing things that happen to be unjust or cowardly is not tantamount to having an unjust behaviour or having a cowardly behaviour but accidentally (since one can also engage in such behaviour involuntarily, in which case doing these things would not imply that one is behaving unjustly or cowardly), so too merely doing things that are potentially productive of health does not count as a case of curing someone except accidentally (for in some cases doing these things will cause harm instead), but they count as cases of curing someone when these things are done in a certain way.

In other words, Aristotle would be explaining the application of the *per se*/accidentally distinction to vicious actions and to vicious states-of-affairs by reference to its application to things that are potentially healthy and to actually healthy things. The argument would proceed *a fortiori*.

An upshot of this reading is that Aristotle would not be shifting the meaning of *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* between 1137^a18 and ^a22, and, moreover, would be using the pair *δειλαίνειν* and *ἀδικεῖν* in the same sense as in the only other place in the *corpus* in which he uses the verb *δειλαίνω*: 1107^a18ff.

There is no doubt that at 1137^a18 τὸ ἀδικεῖν must indicate voluntarily doing things that happen to be unjust (i.e., doing wrong), for otherwise (i.e., if it meant doing things that happen to be unjust in a way that is expressive of injustice) the belief that lies behind the third difficulty would be simply contradictory, and Aristotle would have no need to argue against it. So construed, this belief would be saying that it is equally up to the just person (who is the person who knows just things according to the previous argument) to perform actions expressive of justice and actions expressive of injustice, which is simply inconsistent. In fact, Aristotle's argument against the belief in question in the third difficulty (irrespective of how we construe it) suggest that the mistake that lies behind this belief is much more subtle.

That being said, let me quote *EN* I 1107^a18ff in its context:

T 13 – EN II.6 1107^a8–27

1107a8 οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις |
 10 οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ἀνόμασται ||
 συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχειρεκακία | ἀν-
 αισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπή | ἀν-
 δροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται²⁶¹ | τῷ
 αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἰ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν | οὐδ' αἰ ἐλ-
 15 λείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κα||τορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
 ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ | περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ
 ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, | ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν
 τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. | ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν | καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ
 20 ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλ-
 λείψεως με|σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλεί-
 ψεως. | ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ
 καὶ | ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ | ἐκεί-
 25 νων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀν || πράτ-
 τηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ | ἐλλείψεως
 μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ | ἔλλειψις.
 || a8–9 οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα
 K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: οὐ πᾶσα δ' πράξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσό-
 τητα ἐπιδέχεται B^{95sup}. || a12 λέγεται LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (175.1:
 تُوصَفُ [tūṣafu]): ψέγεται K^bP^bC^c || a14 οὐδ' αἰ K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V:
 || a15 ante μὴ add. τὸ B^{95sup}. || a19 εἶναι K^bP^bC^cL^bV: καὶ LO^bB^{95sup}.
 || a20 οὕτως K^bP^bC^c: οὕτω γε LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || a21 ἔλλειψις
 ἐλλείψεως K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἐλλείψεως ἔλλειψις B^{95sup}. | post ἐλλεί-
 ψεως add. ταῦτα K^b || a23–24 διὰ τὸ μέσον ... ἔλλειψις mg. C^c || a23
 ἄκρον K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἄκρων B^{95sup}. || a26 οὔτε K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV:
 οὐδὲ B^{95sup}.

Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean, for some are named straightway [10] in conjunction with baseness: for instance, spite, shamelessness, and envy, and, in the case of the actions, adultery, theft, and murder, for all these and <all> such things are called <by these names> due to being base, and there are no excesses of these, nor there are deficiencies <of these>. Thus, it is never possible to be right about these things, [15] but one <must> always be wrong. Nor does goodness and badness in regard to these things depends on committing adultery with whom one should, when <one should>, and in the way <one should>, but simply doing any of these amounts to erring. **Then, <this> is similar to considering that there is a mean state, an excess, and a deficiency also with regard to being unjust, coward, or intemperate, [20] for, on this assumption,**²⁶² **there will be a mean state of excess and of deficiency, and an excess of excess and a deficiency of deficiency.** But just like there is no excess or deficiency of temperance and courage due to the mean being, in a certain sense, an extreme, so too there is not a mean state of these things, nor is there an excess or a deficiency of these things, but however [25] one performs them, one errs, for, in general, there is neither a mean state of excess and deficiency, nor an excess and a deficiency of a mean state.

What is crucial for determining the meaning of ‘ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν’ in this passage is the comparison with temperance and courage that takes place in lines 22-25. At face value, this comparison seems to suggest that by ‘ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν’ Aristotle means, respectively, having the vice of injustice, having the vice of cowardice, and having the vice of intemperance (or, more precisely, performing unjust actions on the basis of injustice, cowardly actions on the basis of cowardice, and intemperate actions on the basis of intemperance).²⁶³ As a result, the argument would be that just like in the case of the virtues, which in being mean states are extremes, there is no excess or deficiency, so too in the case of the vices there would be no mean state, since vices are excesses or deficiencies and thus extremes as well, which would be similar to what happens in the case of vicious actions such

²⁶¹ The agreement between the Arabic translation and the β family makes a strong case for reading λέγεται instead of ψέγεται (which is the reading of K^bP^bC^c, which is printed by Susemihl). λέγεται is clearly the *lectio difficilior*, since to make sense of it one must supply something like ‘by these names’, and the argument works much more clearly with ψέγεται. Yet, because λέγεται can also make good sense of the argument without any harm to its sense, I have retained it.

²⁶² I take οὕτως here to be picking up ‘τὸ ἀξιοῦν ... ἔλλειψιν,’ so that it is making reference to the situation in which one considers that there is a mean state, an excess, and a deficiency in regard to ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, and ἀκολασταίνειν, which is why I have translated it as ‘on this assumption.’

²⁶³ This is the view of Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 50.10ff) in his commentary, who thinks that in these lines Aristotle is moving from vicious actions to vicious dispositions so as to confirm what he said about vicious actions in the lines before.

as murder, theft, and adultery that were discussed in the beginning of the passage.

However, the phrase with which Aristotle ends this comparison suggests that something might be slightly off in this way of construing it. He says ‘ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται,’ and the idea seems to be that whenever one engages in ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, or ἀκολασταίνειν one errs, irrespective of the way in which one is performing these actions.²⁶⁴ This suggests that ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, and ἀκολασταίνειν may be referring not to the having or expressing the corresponding vices, but to the voluntary performance of actions such as the ones performed on the basis of to these vices: unjust actions, cowardly actions, and intemperate actions, which are actions one can perform even if one does not have the corresponding vices (in which case one will not perform these actions due having decided on them for their own sakes).

In that case, Aristotle would be clarifying what happens in the case of these actions by reference to what happens in the case of virtuous character dispositions: just like there is no excess or deficiency in the case of a virtue, which is a character disposition that is a mean state, for a mean state is an extreme and thus does not admit of excess or deficiency, so too in the case of vicious actions there is no mean state, for vicious actions are excesses or deficiencies, which are extremes, and thus do not admit of mean states. If they admitted of mean states they would also admit of excesses and deficiencies, so that there would be an

²⁶⁴ Pace Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 51.1–4), who thinks that what the ἐκείνων from 1107^a24, and thus also this clause (i.e., ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται), is picking up are rather the actions mentioned in 1107^a11-12. Yet 1107^a22-25 can also be taken to be clarifying the explanation given in 1107^a20-21 according to which the reason why there is no excess or deficiency in the case of ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, and ἀκολασταίνειν is that this would imply that there is an excess of excess and a deficiency of deficiency, a claim that becomes clearer when we see the case of the virtues discussed in lines 1107^a22-25 (perhaps the δέ from ‘ὅσπερ δέ’ is being used in the sense of γάρ—but assuming this is not necessary for my point). In that case, ἐκείνων is referring either only to ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, and ἀκολασταίνειν, or both to these actions he just discussed and to the vicious actions he discussed at the beginning of T 13: adultery, theft, and murder. Saying that it refers only to adultery, theft, and murder, as Aspasius wants, seems to be unexpected in the context if it is not given from the beginning that ἀδικεῖν, δειλαίνειν, and ἀκολασταίνειν are making reference to the conditions of being unjust, coward, and intemperate—but this is precisely what is unclear.

excess of an excess and a deficiency of a deficiency, which is absurd. Then, what happens in the case of these actions would be said to be similar to what happens in the case of theft and in the case of adultery because there is no doubt that there is no right way of performing an unjust, coward, or intemperate action, for an action is unjust, coward, or intemperate precisely because it fails to hit the mean in action, something that, at first, may not be so clear in the case of adultery, theft, and murder, but which is made clear by Aristotle when he says that such actions are ‘named straightway in conjunction with baseness.’ In other words, just as there is no right way of murdering someone, there is no right way of wronging someone (i.e., it is not possible to wrong whom one should, when one should etc., so that wronging ceases to be a vicious action).

Besides, in one of the only two other passages from the *Corpus* in which Aristotle uses the verb ἀκολασταίνω,²⁶⁵ *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a9–21, he employs the verbs ἀδικέω and ἀκολασταίνω to talk about people who perform actions that promote intemperance and injustice, thus indicating that, in general, these verbs are not used by Aristotle to talk of actions that are expressions of their corresponding vices. This gives us further reason for thinking that in **T 13** Aristotle is using these verbs merely to talk of vicious actions irrespective of whether they are being performed on the basis of a vice. Let me quote and translate *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a9-21:

T 14 – *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a9–21

1114a9 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ
 10 || ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. |
 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ | τὸν
 ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ

²⁶⁵ The other passage is *Rh.* II.23 1397^a7–10, where Aristotle contrasts τὸ σωφρονεῖν and τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν saying that the first is good (ἀγαθόν) whereas the latter is harmful (βλαβερόν), and it is unclear in the context whether τὸ σωφρονεῖν and τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν refer to the being temperate and the being intemperate (or performing temperate actions on the basis of temperance and performing intemperate actions on the basis of intemperance) or merely to doing things that are temperate voluntarily and to doing things that are intemperate voluntarily, since either option would make sense in the context.

ὦν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε | βούλη-
 15 ται, ἄδικος ὦν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ || ὁ νοσῶν
 ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς | βιοτεύων
 καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ | μὴ νοσεῖν,
 προεμένω δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' | αὐτὸν δυνα-
 τὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν | καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ
 20 γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ || καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, | διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν·
 γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι.

|| a12 τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον K^bP^bC^cL^oB^{95sup}.V:
 ἀκόλαστον τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα L^b || a13 ἄδικος ἂν εἴη
 K^bP^bC^cL^oB^{95sup}.V: ἂν εἴη ἄδικος L || a14 παύσεται
 K^bP^bC^cL^oB^{95sup}.V: παύεται L || a16 ἐξῆν P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V:
 ἐξὸν K^b || a17 προεμένω K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: προελομένω
 Arab. (209.10: 'يَحْتَرُ' [yah^htar]—cf. Schmidt & Ullmann [2012, p.
 33]) | ἀφέντι K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἀφέντα B^{95sup}. || a20 μὲν ἐξῆν
 K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἐξῆν μὲν B^{95sup}. | τοιούτοις K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV:
 τοιούτους B^{95sup}. | γενέσθαι K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: γίνεσθαι L^b || a21
 γενομένοις K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: γινομένοις B^{95sup}.

Thus, ignoring that the dispositions arise from [10] being active in regard to each thing is proper to someone altogether insensible, and, moreover, it is irrational for the person performing unjust actions not to wish to be unjust or for the person who performs intemperate actions <not to wish to be> intemperate. In fact,²⁶⁶ if someone does the things from which they will become unjust not being in ignorance, they will become unjust voluntarily. Yet one will not cease from being unjust and will become just <only> if they wish <so>, for nor does [15] the sick person <ceases to be sick and becomes> healthy <just if they wish to do so>. And if things are so, one will become sick voluntarily when they live incontinently and are disobedient to their doctors. Thus, at some moment it was possible for the agent not to be sick, but is not possible anymore when they have been deserted <by health>, just like it is not possible anymore for the person who threw a stone to recover it, but nevertheless it was up to them to hurl <it> and throw <it>, for the principle was up to them. In this way, [20] it was possible, at the beginning, both for the unjust and for the intemperate person not to become such, for which reason they are <such> voluntarily; but when they have become <such>, it is no more possible for them not to be <such>.

In this passage, τὸν ἀδικοῦντα and τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα appear to be agents who perform unjust and intemperate actions, i.e., actions from which one will become unjust or intemperate, and not agents who are already unjust or intemperate and who are performing unjust and intemperate actions on the basis of these character dispositions. This is suggested

²⁶⁶ I am taking 'εἰ δὲ μὴ κτλ.' in the sense of 'εἰ γὰρ μὴ κτλ.', as has been suggested by Rassow (1874, p. 28) as way of making sense of the text in the order it has been transmitted. Alternatively, Rassow suggests that 'εἰ δὲ μὴ ... ἂν εἴη' should be transposed before 'ἔτι δ' ἄλογον.' But I think this is unnecessary, given not only that it is possible to make sense of the transmitted order, but also that it is quite common for δέ to be used for γάρ—see Denniston (1954, s.v. δέ C.(1).(i), p. 169).

by three things: first, by the fact that what is introduced by ‘ἔτι δ’ in line 11 is responding to ‘τὸ μὲν οὖν ... ἀναισθήτου’ from lines 9-10 (which clearly concerns the performance of actions that lead to the corresponding dispositions); second, by the fact that ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ κτλ.’ can be taken as an explanation of ‘ἔτι δ’ ... ἀκόλαστον’ (see footnote 266), so that Aristotle would be explaining the claim that it is irrational for the person performing unjust actions not to wish to be unjust or for the person who performs intemperate actions not to wish to be intemperate with a claim about how, in voluntarily performing actions that are productive of injustice, one voluntarily becomes unjust; and, finally, by the context of the passage, since T 14 appears to be a corollary of the claim that ‘the activities regarding each thing make us of a certain quality’ (1114a7: αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν), in which case ‘ἔτι δ’ ... ἀκόλαστον’ would seem to be describing agents who perform actions that lead to a certain disposition rather than agents who already have a fully formed character disposition and perform actions expressive of this disposition.

As a result, the thought of the whole passage would be that if one performs vicious actions voluntarily, one will voluntarily acquire the corresponding character disposition. Moreover, it seems that even if one does not really wish to acquire these character dispositions, one will acquire them voluntarily if they perform the corresponding vicious actions voluntarily: the example of incontinent behaviour from lines 15-16 suggests that just like in the case of sickness the incontinent agent despite not wishing to become sick nevertheless voluntarily becomes sick in not following their doctors’ advice and in doing things that promote sickness, so too in the case of, say, intemperance it would seem that despite not wishing to become intemperate, the incontinent agent will nevertheless become intemperate if they consistently perform intemperate actions voluntarily (and when they experience episodes of ἀκρασία they do indeed perform intemperate actions voluntarily). This may be taken as strongly suggesting

that intermediate agents are to be characterised by transient character dispositions, which are on the way either to virtue or to vice.²⁶⁷ But let me put this issue aside, for it will not matter for my purposes, and emphasise instead that in T 14 too the verbs *ἀδικέω* and *ἀκολασταίνω* are referring merely to the voluntary performance of unjust actions and of intemperate actions (respectively)—irrespective of whether one has the corresponding unjust or intemperate character disposition—, *ἀδικέω* being the contrary of *δικαιοπραγέω*, as in T 7 and T 8 above.

With these observations on T 13 and T 14 in mind, let me go back to T 12, for I think that T 13 and T 14 tell strongly in favour of the interpretation of 1137^a21-23 according to which the pair *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* refer to performing vicious actions of a certain type (cowardly actions and unjust actions respectively) rather than to performing vicious actions in a way that expresses a vicious character dispositions (cowardice and injustice respectively). Thus, I think we should favour the second alternative I presented above (according to which *τὸ δειλαίνειν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* should be understood in this way precisely). If I am correct, Aristotle would be then explaining the idea that performing cowardly and unjust actions does not consist merely in doing things such as abandoning one's shield and running away from battle (in the case of cowardice) or sleeping with the neighbour's wife or hitting someone (in the case of injustice) by saying that merely doing these things does not imply that one is voluntarily performing a cowardly action or an unjust action, for one may just be doing things that happen to be cowardly or unjust, which is compatible with involuntariness. For instance, if one ignores that the woman one is sleeping with is someone else's wife, one would not be

²⁶⁷ For an argument to the effect that continence and incontinence are transient character dispositions, see Charles (1984). The same might be argued about resistance and softness. For an argument against thinking that continence and incontinence are necessarily transient character dispositions, see Lawrence (1985). I cannot settle this issue in this Dissertation, and the argument I intend to advance does not depend on doing so. In any case, I think that consistency is important for one's actions to transform one's character disposition, in which case it would be possible to say that although intermediate character dispositions are not fully formed character dispositions and thus, in a sense, can be transformed easily, it would be possible for some intermediate agents to retain their character dispositions throughout their lives if they never become consistent in performing either virtuous or vicious actions.

voluntarily committing adultery; and if one abandoned one's shield and ran away from battle under constraint (say, because one's family was threatened and would be killed if one did not do so), one is performing a mixed action, which, at the very least, implies that abandoning one's shield and running away from battle is not something that one is doing voluntarily, although it might be argued that, in the context of the *EN* at least, one is voluntarily doing that-for-the-sake-of-avoiding-a-greater-evil.²⁶⁸

Now, on the first alternative—according to which τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν refer to the performance of vicious actions in a way that reveals the corresponding vicious character disposition—, not only Aristotle would be using the pair τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν in 1137^a22 in a way different from T 13, but he would also be using the expression τὸ ἀδικεῖν in a sense different from the one he used the same expression only four lines above (in 1137^a18) and throughout *EN* V. In any case, I think that this reading can also make good sense of the comparison with health read in the way I suggested above. The thought would go as follows: merely performing actions such as sleeping with someone else's wife or hitting someone or actions such as abandoning one's shield and running away from battle is not expressive of character dispositions such as injustice or cowardice (respectively) in a similar way to how merely doing things that are potentially productive of health does not count as curing someone except accidentally (for in some cases doing these things will cause harm instead—hence,

²⁶⁸ Depending on whether we read *EN* V in light of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* theory of voluntariness the analysis of this particular case will vary, since there are indications to the effect that in the *EE* mixed actions are involuntary, whereas in the *EN* there is a description of what the agent does in which they do it involuntarily, but there is another description of what the agent does in which he acts voluntarily: it could be said that one abandons one's shield and runs away from battle involuntarily, but that one voluntarily performs that-action-for-the-sake-of-saving-one's-family. As we shall see below in **Chapter 2** in the discussion of T 41, in *EN* V Aristotle appears to talk indifferently between acting involuntarily and acting under constraint (*ἀναγκαζόμενος*), which is an indication that in *EN* V Aristotle adopts a theory of responsibility closer to the *EE* (which is a strong sign that the common books are indeed originally *Eudemian*, and that although they might have undergone some revision so as to become part of the *EN*, purely *Eudemian* elements remain in many places—on that issue see the discussion of the common books in **section 0.3.2.1** of the **Introduction**).

these things are accidentally cases of curing just like the things prescribed and proscribed by the laws are accidentally just or unjust).

Yet due the inconsistency of this alternative with **T 13** and **T 14** and with the use of τὸ ἀδικεῖν in 1137^a18 and in several other passages from *EN* V, I shall give preference to the more deflationary reading of Aristotle's response to the third difficulty. In that case, Aristotle's point would be that the fact that just persons are equally able of doing things like sleeping with someone else's wife or hitting someone does not imply that they are equally able of doing wrong, for merely doing these things is not tantamount to doing wrong (ἀδικεῖν), which also requires one to do these things voluntarily.²⁶⁹ In other words, although sleeping with someone else's wife and striking someone are cases of things that happen to be unjust, doing these things does not always imply doing wrong, since one can involuntarily do things that happen to be unjust thereby not doing wrong except accidentally.

I think the plausibility of this picture is greatly increased by a parallel with *EE* II.3 1221^b18-26:

T 15 – *EE* II.3 1221^b18–26

1221b18 οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ |
 20 πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἄν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον πάσχειν, || οἷον
 μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλη|σιάζειν· οὐκ
 ἔστι γὰρ, ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὕτη <ἧ>δη ἔστι, | συνειλημμένον
 γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε | εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ
 ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγ|γενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες, ἀλλ'
 25 οὐ μοιχεύσαι· ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ || ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, καὶ πατάξαι
 μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕβρισαι. | ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
 || **b21** οὐκ ἔστι γάρ CB: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν PL | <ἧ>δη Rackham Rowe:
 δη PCBL

One must not ignore that it is not possible for some of the things mentioned to be taken as depending on a question of how, if how is taken as experiencing in excess. [20] For instance, <one is> an adulterer not due to consorting with married women more than one should, for <this> [sc. consorting with married women more than one should] is not possible, but this²⁷⁰ is already a sort of vice, for this affection and being

²⁶⁹ Pace Fernandez (2021, p. 388).

²⁷⁰ I take it that αὕτη here, which is the subject of the clause and refers back to 'τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησιάζειν,' has been attracted to the feminine due to 'μοχθηρία τις' which is its predicate in the

such are said in conjunction. And assault too is similar. For that reason, people also dispute <accusations> by saying that they have slept <with a married woman>, but did not commit adultery [25] or that they have struck <someone>, but have not assaulted, for they did so due to ignorance or being constrained. And it is similar also in the case of other such things.

This passage gives us the *Eudemian* version of *EN* II.6 1107^a8-27 (T 13), but besides briefly discussing actions that do not admit of a mean, it ends saying something quite relevant to the interpretation of the examples given in T 12. The two examples given by Aristotle here in T 15, striking someone and sleeping with a married woman, recur in T 9 and partially in T 12 (which only talks about striking someone). Moreover, T 15 makes clear that these things happen to be unjust, since it seems that if one voluntarily consorts with a married woman one is committing adultery, and if one voluntarily strikes someone, they are assaulting that person.

Besides, the final lines of the T 15 (lines 23-25) report that some people would defend themselves from accusations of adultery or of assault by claiming that although they have slept with a married woman or struck someone, they have not committed adultery or assault because they did that due to ignorance or due to being constrained. I think this is the very case at issue in Aristotle's response to the third difficulty in T 12: although just persons are equally able of performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) and of doing things such as sleeping with a married woman or striking someone, this does not imply that they are equally able of performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) and of doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*), for doing things such as sleeping with a married woman or striking someone only counts as doing wrong if one does them voluntarily (as was already made clear in T 10 above, whose results I argued Aristotle might be putting to use in his response to the difficulties he deals with in T 9, T 11, and T 12).

In any case, it is important to emphasise that Aristotle's answer to the third diffi-

clause. For this phenomenon, see Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 1.Bd., §369, 1a, p. 74.

culty would also not commit him to the idea that virtuous actions performed on the basis of virtue enjoy some sort of definitional priority relatively to virtuous actions performed in other ways.²⁷¹ Even if we conceded that τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν indicate performing vicious actions in a way that reveals the corresponding vice, Aristotle would be saying that people who perform actions such as sleeping with someone else's wife or striking someone or such as abandoning one's shield and running away from battle are not performing the actions expressed by τὸ ἀδικεῖν and τὸ δειλαίνειν but κατὰ συμβεβηκός. On that assumption, this would be the case not because these actions are not, in themselves, cases of cowardly or unjust actions²⁷² (since, if done voluntarily, these things are indeed cases of cowardly or unjust actions), but rather because in performing these actions, one is not performing cowardly or unjust actions in a way that expresses the corresponding vices (which, according to the framework we find in *EN* V, requires προαίρεσις). In other words, the point would be that the performance of things that happen to be cowardly or unjust by virtuous agents (even if we conceded that they can do that voluntarily) does not count as performing these actions

²⁷¹ Pace Fernandez (2021, p. 387), who thinks that there is “a single mistake underlying the falsity of all three beliefs, namely a failure to appreciate the priority of acting from a character disposition,” in which case Aristotle would be here applying the ‘*per se*/coincidental contrast within the category of voluntary action.’ Moreover, even if Fernandez is right in thinking that what Aristotle has in mind in responding to this third difficulty is a contrast between just actions voluntarily performed in a way that does not imply that one is just and just actions performed in a way that implies that one is just, it is still the case that Aristotle, in saying that the doing the first only amounts to accidentally doing the latter, has in mind what could be called an accident₄, which does not seem to imply the kind of definitional priority that is necessary for Fernandez’s claims. Otherwise, in saying that ‘it lightened when one was walking’ (βαδίζοντος ἤστραψε)—which is Aristotle’s example of the accident corresponding to the *per se*₄ in *APo* I.4 73^b12—, Aristotle would mean that lightning and walking are somehow definitionally related, which is false. Thus, if there is any definitional relation between just actions performed voluntarily and just actions performed in a way that implies that one is just, this relation does not stem from the fact that both could be related in terms of an accident₄, but from the fact that just actions performed in a way that implies that one is just are also just actions performed voluntarily, with the difference that while the first, as such, only hits the mean in action, the latter also hits the mean in emotion (thus satisfying further agential conditions). But if this is so, the definitional priority is the opposite of that held by Fernandez: just actions performed on the basis of justice would have just actions performed voluntarily as their *per se*₁, since just actions performed on the basis of justice would be but just actions performed voluntarily due to having been decided on for their own sakes.

²⁷² So that these actions would be so only in a derivative sense that is dependent upon cowardly or unjust actions performed on the basis of cowardice or injustice.

on the basis of the corresponding vices *despite the fact that people who perform these actions on the basis of the corresponding vices are also performing cowardly and unjust actions*, and the fact that, under this description, their actions *coincide*: they have the same behaviour but satisfy different agential conditions.²⁷³

Similarly, if τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν indicate the voluntary performance of vicious actions regardless of whether one has or has not the corresponding vices (which I think is how the text should be understood, as I argued), Aristotle would be saying that people who merely perform actions such as sleeping with someone else's wife or striking someone or such as abandoning one's shield and running away from battle are not performing the actions expressed by τὸ ἀδικεῖν and τὸ δειλαίνειν but κατὰ συμβεβηγός because these are only cases of the actions expressed by τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν if one does these things voluntarily: the things these agents do coincide with the things people who perform the actions expressed by τὸ δειλαίνειν and τὸ ἀδικεῖν do (i.e., they bring about the same state-of-affairs), but what they do does not count, in itself, as δειλαίνειν and ἀδικεῖν because they are not acting voluntarily.

That being said, the argument from 1137^a21-26 would be importantly different from the one advanced in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11-20, since it would be talking of a necessary but non-sufficient condition for one's action to reveal that one is vicious (i.e., a necessary but non-sufficient condition for the moral unworthiness of one's action): the voluntary performance of vicious actions. *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11-20, in turn, is talking about sufficient conditions for one's action to reveal that one is virtuous (i.e., a necessary and sufficient condition for the moral worth of one's action).

²⁷³ Of course this is compatible with just actions performed on the basis of justice enjoying some sort of priority relatively to just actions performed by agents who are not just, but this would not be in question in this passage. Moreover, I think there is reason for saying that this priority is not definitional (see footnote 271).

1.3.1.1.4 *Preliminary conclusions*

Even if, as I have argued, 1137^a21-26 (in **T 10**—discussed in **section 1.3.1.1.3**) is saying something fundamentally different from *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11-20 despite the linguistic parallel, the other arguments advanced in **T 9** and in **T 11**—i.e., i) the one against the belief that it is easy to be just (**T 9**—see **section 1.3.1.1.1**); and ii) the one against the belief that there is nothing wise in knowing just and unjust things (**T 11**—see **section 1.3.1.1.2**)—would be sufficient for my purposes.

In the first of these arguments (the one from 1137^a4-9—**T 9**), Aristotle is talking of acting being in a condition that implies that one has a fully developed (or corrupted) character disposition, which would be a clear anticipation of the principle at work in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11-20. Moreover, in the second argument (the one from 1137^a9-17—**T 11**), Aristotle talks of a kind of knowledge that is fundamentally connected to having a virtuous character disposition, such that having this sort of knowledge implies that one has such character disposition (and thus also *φρόνησις*) just like having a certain kind of knowledge about healthy things implies that one has the relevant craft: medicine.

Furthermore, 1135^b16–1136^a5 (in **T 8**), despite not explicitly anticipating the language of performing an action being in a certain condition, would also suffice for my purposes, for it clearly distinguishes between the mere performance of virtuous actions and the performance of virtuous actions in such a way that one can be said to be virtuous due to it. And the same is true of **T 10**, a passage in which Aristotle clearly claims that in doing wrong one is not *eo ipso* unjust.

So, given that *EN* VI is a common book and that there is no discussion of this sort in the books that are exclusively *Eudemian* that come before the common books, and given that

there is good reason for thinking that the common books are originally *Eudemian* (although they could have undergone some degree of revision so as to become part of the *EN*), 1144^a11-20 was probably first written having the discussion of *EN V* in mind, as would be suggested by the example given by Aristotle in 1144^a13ff, which concerns just actions.

Note, moreover, that Aristotle's example in 1144^a13ff is not only thematically fitting to *EN V* (since it concerns just actions), but that it talks more precisely of doing 'τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα,' and says that people who perform these things are not just yet 'even though they really do the things they must do and the things the virtuous person ought to do' (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), a qualification that makes sense only if we presuppose the discussion of the things said by the law as being only accidentally just that was conducted at 1137^a9-17 (in **T 11**).

Of course we can also think about what 1144^a11-20 has to say in the *Nicomachean* context, and thus in light of *EN II.3* [=Bywater *II.4*]. Depending on how we interpret this latter text, there might even be two different ways of understanding 1144^a11-20: in light of *EN V* alone (which would perhaps represent the *Eudemian* version of the argument), and in light of *EN II.3* [=Bywater *II.4*] (which would perhaps represent the *Nicomachean* version of the argument). Yet, as I intend to argue below in **Chapter 3**, I think that the *Nicomachean* version of 1144^a11-20 is fundamentally in line with its *Eudemian* version, so that they are not relevantly different. But for now, I shall only discuss what is implied by 1144^a11-20 read in light only of what is said in the common books.

1.3.2 Back to *EN VI.13* [=Bywater *VI.12*] 1144^a 11-20

Considering what is said in 1144^a11-20, we can raise some important questions about the division of labour between virtue and reason. As we shall see in **Chapter 2** and in **Chapter 3**,

Aristotle also seems to claim—both in the *Ethica Eudemia* and in the *Ethica Nicomachea* when dealing with the particular virtues—that the virtues make one act for the sake of the very actions one performs. He claims that the virtues make one act for the sake of the fine, and then seemingly suggests in his analysis that they do so in so far as they make one act in a particular way because so acting is fine. This suggests that in making one act in such and such a way because it is fine to do so, the virtues are making one perform fine actions for their own sakes.²⁷⁴ In this connection, two other questions I raised in the **Introduction** of this Dissertation are specially relevant: (I) in which sense virtue makes the end(s) right; and (III) whether virtue is necessary for making the end(s) right.

As we saw, if we answer question (I) by saying that (full) virtue makes the end(s) right by making one decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes,²⁷⁵ there seems to be two alternatives regarding question (III): one according to which we can distinguish fully virtuous agents from agents who are not fully virtuous such as intermediate agents by reference to the way in which only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions and in which other agents cannot; and one according to which we can make that distinction only by reference to how consistent these agents are in performing virtuous actions.

Accordingly, a first possibility is to answer (III) by saying that (full) virtue is necessary

²⁷⁴ See, for instance, *EE* III.1 1230^a26–34 and *EN* III.12 [=Bywater III.9] 1117^b7–9. I shall analyse these and other passages in which Aristotle makes similar claims in **Chapter 2** and in **Chapter 3**. See Burnet (1900, p. 87), Gauthier (1958, pp. 76–77), Kraut (1976, p. 235n23), Taylor (2006, pp. 86–87), Moss (2012, pp. 207, 217–218), Hitz (2012, p. 277), and Meyer (2016, pp. 52–53) for claims to the effect that by ‘deciding to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes’ Aristotle means ‘deciding to perform them because they are fine’ or ‘deciding on them for the sake of the fine.’ However, as I have indicated in the **Introduction** (see footnote 183), I think that these two clauses are used in different contexts: i.e., the for the sake of the fine clause is used when Aristotle is talking of actions that are, in themselves, morally neutral, whereas the for their own sake clause is used when Aristotle is talking of actions that are, in themselves, morally good. I shall come back to this below in **Chapter 3**.

²⁷⁵ This is how Moss (2012, p. 167), for instance, answers this question in arguing that habituation is non-rational: ‘I will argue below that habituation is non-rational; if it can ensure that we decide on virtuous actions for themselves, this can only mean that it ensures that our decisions have the right ends.’ Similarly, see her page 176: ‘[c]ertainly he [sc., Aristotle] must think that virtue makes right one’s particular goals in particular situations, for it is a mark of doing particular actions virtuously that one decides on them “for themselves” (*EN* II.4 1105^a32).’

for deciding on virtuous actions for their own sakes, such that (A) intermediate agents would not be able decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes. In that case, such agents would not satisfy at least one of the three criteria presented in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31–33,²⁷⁶ namely the second criterion, and, as a result, the ‘λέγω δ’ οἶον κτλ.’ clause from 1144^a19 would be introducing a sufficient condition for being fully virtuous, and should be thus rendered as ‘and, I mean, namely etc.’

A second possibility is to answer (III) by saying that although virtue makes the end(s) right (and is sufficient for doing so), it is not necessary for that, so that (B) intermediate agents can in fact decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, but because they are not fully virtuous, they, as Price (2021, p. 246) puts it, ‘cannot be fully trusted either to identify what is right or to perform it’: they would be unreliable both in judgment and in practice, since, because they lack an appropriate appreciation of what is good (which shows up in how they read their circumstances), they would be prone to err on some occasions.²⁷⁷ In that case,

²⁷⁶ This idea becomes even more compelling if one reads our passage in light of *EN* V.9 [=Bywater V.5] 1134^a1–2, 1134^a6–7, V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^a16–1136^a9, and V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1134^a17–23, so that performing a virtuous action both for its own sake and on the basis of a decision would be without a doubt sufficient for virtue. This same claim can also be held in view of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31–33 if one takes the third requirement presented by Aristotle (performing a virtuous actions being stable and unchanging) not as implying that one must perform a virtuous action on the basis of virtue (as this criterion is understood, for instance, by Gauthier [in Gauthier and Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 130]—which would suggest that having knowledge and deciding to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes is not enough for virtue, and is thus possible for intermediate agents), but as implying that one must perform a virtuous action without hesitation (for this argument, see Zingano [2008, p. 117])—more on this below in **Chapter 3**. In that case, the third requirement can either be satisfied by agents who do not satisfy the second requirement (performing virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account) or else can only be satisfied together with the second requirement.

²⁷⁷ This view goes back to Michael Woods (1986, p. 152). Burnyeat (1980/2012a, pp. 87–88) advances a similar line, recognising that choosing a virtuous action for its own sake is compatible with continence and incontinence. Burnyeat locates the problem with agents who fail to be fully virtuous such as continent and incontinent people in the fact that their decision is not such that it stems from a conception of the good and includes a desire for virtuous actions ‘as goods in themselves as well as noble and pleasant,’ and in the fact that their decisions do not proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. Yet it is not clear if Burnyeat thinks that this later claim has or not some consequence for the consistency with which incontinent and continent agents would be able to perform virtuous actions. Broadie (1991, pp. 91–92, 93), in turn, seems to waver between (A) and (B), for she recognises that those who live as if happiness were something other than acting well ‘cannot value acting well entirely for its own sake, since at times they value it only because it leads to what they do value for its own sake,’ but still thinks that ‘it is important for Aristotle’s theory of moral education that subjects not yet established in their prohairetic attitudes can act for the sake of the

the ‘λέγω δ’ οἶον κτλ.’ clause from 1144^a19 would be just introducing a necessary condition for being fully virtuous, a condition that would not be sufficient for being fully virtuous, however. Accordingly, on this reading, we should render ‘λέγω δ’ οἶον κτλ.’ as ‘and, I mean, for example etc.’

(B) is especially compelling if 1144^a11-20 is taken as a referring back to *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] and if *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is understood along the lines of its traditional interpretation. For, in that case, performing a virtuous action on the basis of decision and for its own sake would not be sufficient for saying that a virtuous action has been performed virtuously, which would require one to perform it on the basis of virtue, a stable and unchanging character disposition. On the traditional interpretation of the third criterion from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], in saying that, in order to perform a virtuous action virtuously, the agent must be stable and unchanging, Aristotle would be meaning to say that only agents who possess virtue (which would be a stable and unchanging state) or some other stable and unchanging disposition²⁷⁸ can satisfy this criterion.²⁷⁹

Yet (as I have mentioned in footnote 276) this is not the only way of understanding Aristotle’s third criterion. As Zingano (2008, p. 117) points out, 1105^a32-33 does not make any explicit mention of the *ἔξις* of the agent,²⁸⁰ as if the point here were that performing vir-

noble.’ One could perhaps make sense of this by saying that Broadie defends a middle ground between (A) and (B), according to which, although intermediate agents are agents for whom happiness is something other than acting well, continent and incontinent agents could on some occasions be motivated to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, but they would not do that consistently, for on some other occasions they would shift to acting for the sake some goal different from the virtuous actions they perform or intend to perform.

²⁷⁸ As Gibson (2019, pp. 144-145, 145n92) argues is the case with continence as well. For a similar view on continence and incontinence as non-transient dispositions, see Lawrence (1985, pp. 75-81).

²⁷⁹ For the view that the third criterion requires the agent to act on the basis of a stable and unchanging state or disposition, see, for instance, Ramsauer (1878, p. 34), Burnet (1900, p. 87), Gauthier and Jolif (1970, vol. 3, p. 130), Ackrill (1978, p. 596), Burnyeat (1980/2012a, p. 73), London (2001, p. 566), Taylor (2006, p. 93), Vasiliou (2007, p. 53), and Frede (2020, p. 420). This reading depends on the force one attributes to lines 1105^b2-5, and, as I would like to contend, appears to be somehow derivative (although significantly different) from a reading found in some of the medieval Latin commentaries to the *EN*. I shall discuss this in more detail below in **Chapter 3, sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4.**

²⁸⁰ In that sense, *pace* Natali (1999, p. 463n123), this passage would be quite different from Chrysippus’

tuous actions on the basis of a stable and unchanging *ἕξις* is necessary for acting virtuously.²⁸¹

In fact, the three conditions Aristotle introduces in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a30–33 are agential conditions, i.e., they spell out the condition the agent is in when they perform a virtuous action (their *πῶς ἔχων πράττει*), and the first and second conditions are clearly not

fr. *SVF* III.510 [=Long & Sedley 59 I]—at least in how Natali appears to understand it—, according to which eudaimonia comes to the life of the person who performs all their duties (*τὰ καθήκοντα*) and neglects none of them ‘when these intermediate actions [i.e., these duties] obtain in addition what is stable and habitual, that is, <when> they acquire their particular fixity’ (*ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὐται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἐκτικόν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσιν*), which, for Natali, suggests that virtuous actions only produce happiness when their performance becomes consistent due to a stable and habitual property, so that, in order to be happy, one would need not only to perform virtuous actions, but also to have a stable character disposition.

In that case, it would seem that there is no relevant difference between virtuous actions performed by agents who can achieve happiness and virtuous actions performed by other agents who can also perform them for their own sakes, except that the first would perform such actions consistently.

I am not denying that, for Aristotle, only virtuous actions performed on the basis of virtue (i.e., virtuous activities) can promote happiness by being constitutive of one’s eudaimonia. In fact, I am only saying that the third criterion from II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is not saying (at least not explicitly) that one must perform virtuous actions on the basis of virtue or, more generally, on the basis of a stable and unchanging character disposition (assuming that this distinction between *ἕξεις* and *διαθέσεις* made in the *Categories* is operating in the the *EN*—and I am not sure it is). Moreover, note that there are other ways of interpreting Chrysippus’ fr. Inwood (1985, pp. 207-214), for instance, defends a reading that makes the parallel with Aristotle congenial to the interpretation of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] I shall defend, since he takes the stability and habituality Chrysippus is talking about in this fragment as something that is ultimately consequent upon one’s action being not only an appropriate selection (*ἐκλογή*)—which is what makes it a duty (*τὸ καθήκον*)—, but also a choice (*αἵρεσις*), and thus an expression of virtue—which is what makes it a right action (*κατόρθωμα*). In other words, the difference in consistency between the actions of the sage and of the learner is ultimately explained by their difference in motivation. More on this below in **Chapter 3**.

²⁸¹ Which is not to deny that virtue can be described as stable and unchanging. As a matter of fact, in *MM* B.XI.21 1209^b12–15, it is said that the friendship between virtuous persons (which is the friendship on the basis of virtue that is also a good) is the most stable (*βεβαιοτάτη*) and permanent (*μονιμωτάτη*) because the virtue through which this friendship is established is unchanging (*ἀμετάπτωτον*), the upshot being that it would be reasonable to say that such a friendship is unchanging (*ἀμετάπτωτον*) as well. Similarly, in *EN* VIII.4 [=Bywater VIII.3] 1156^b9–12, Aristotle argues that those who want good to their friends for their friends’ own sakes are most of all friends, for they are so related (i.e., are friends) on their own account, and not *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Thus, their friendship remains as long as they are virtuous, and virtue is something permanent (*μόνιμον*). The implicit conclusion of this argument—namely, that the friendship based on virtue is something permanent as well—is then used in VIII.8 [=Bywater VIII.6] 1158^b8–11 to distinguish this friendship from the other two friendships, which change quickly.

Even more explicitly for our current purposes, after saying in *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b1–2 that happiness is something stable (*μόνιμόν τι*) and in no way easy to change (*μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον*), Aristotle says in 1100^b12–14 that there is no *ἔργον* of the human being that has as much stability (*βεβαιότης*) as the activities on the basis of virtue, for these seem to be more permanent than those of the *ἐπιστήμαι*. And it seems that the activities on the basis of virtue are stable precisely because Aristotle is also assuming that the virtues are stable.

These arguments make clear that Aristotle would not deny that virtue is a stable disposition and that, in performing virtuous actions, virtuous agents are acting on the basis of a stable disposition. However, it is not so clear why this would be Aristotle’s point in the passage. In fact, if only virtue is stable and unchanging, why is acting on the basis of a stable and unchanging disposition one of three conditions for

ἔξεις, despite counting as components of the agent's πῶς ἔχων: this is most clear in the case of the second condition, since acting προαιρούμενος is acting on the basis of προαίρεσις, and this is not a description of a ἔξις (although it could be construed as a description of the exercise of a given ἔξις). Thus, in the context, there is no reason for thinking that because the third condition talks of one performing virtuous actions βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων Aristotle must mean to talk about the ἔξις on the basis of which one is acting, which would need to be stable and unchanging if one is to be virtuous. As I intend to show in **Chapter 3** there are good reasons for thinking that Aristotle means to emphasise something else with this expression, which despite being a consequence of having a virtuous ἔξις, is not a direct description of that ἔξις. But let me bracket this discussion for now.

At any rate, it seems reasonable to think that all that Aristotle means to say at 1105^a32-33 is that, in order to act virtuously, the agent must perform a virtuous action without hesitation, as Zingano proposes (similarly, for the idea that Aristotle is not concerned here with the stability and unchangeability of one's disposition, see the anonymous paraphrasis [*CAG*. XIX.2, 32.10-11], the anonymous scholia [*CAG*. XX, 129.17-21], and Piero Vettori's commentary [1584, pp. 86-87]).²⁸²

Now, there is no doubt that the third criterion from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] can be construed in ways that are compatible with intermediate agents deciding on virtuous actions

determining whether someone is performing virtuous actions virtuously and thus has virtue? In fact, if by the third criterion Aristotle means to make reference to a stable and unchanging disposition, it seems that determining whether someone performs virtuous actions satisfying this criterion would be sufficient for securing that that person is acting virtuously, in which case the two other conditions would be unnecessary. I shall come back to this below in **Chapter 3**.

²⁸² Nevertheless (as I have observed in footnote 279) this lack of hesitation appears to be acquired by means of some process of habituation. In any case, this would not preclude continent agents, for instance, from performing virtuous actions without hesitation depending on how one construes this requirement (more on that in **Chapter 3**). For a more demanding way of construing this requirement, which would exclude continent agents, see Angioni (2009b, p. 200n30), whose view is closer to the one I shall defend in **Chapter 3**. I shall discuss the different ways of construing this requirement in detail in **sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4**.

for their own sakes, even if we understand this requirement as being about a sort of lack of hesitation (as we shall see below in **Chapter 3**). Yet it would be surprising if Aristotle were saying in 1144^a11-20 that performing a virtuous action on the basis of decision and for its own sake is sufficient for virtue (in so far as this implies acting in such a way that one is good), but would still admit that agents who are not fully virtuous such as intermediate agents can do that without being fully virtuous on the grounds that, when they end up performing virtuous actions on the basis of a decision to perform them for their own sakes, they do not do it consistently.

It is true, as I have indicated above, that 1144^a11-20 can also be read in light of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] in its traditional interpretation, so that it is not saying that performing a virtuous action on the basis of decision and for its own sake is sufficient for virtue, but only that this is an example of the type of thing that is involved in performing a virtuous action in such a way that one is good. In that case, more could be required for performing virtuous actions in this way.

Yet the passages from *EN* V that I analysed above in **section 1.3.1** could hardly be understood as saying something along these lines, for they clearly imply that performing just actions on the basis of decision (which, as I have indicated, should be understood as a decision to perform these actions for their own sakes) is sufficient for virtue, which suggests that either the traditional interpretation of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is to be abandoned or else that *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is not compatible with what we come across in the common books read in their own light. For that reason, let me put (B) aside for now,²⁸³ since I only want to

²⁸³ In rejecting (B), I think we should side with what Annas (1993, p. 67) says in regard to what differentiates virtuous agents from non-virtuous agents such as intermediate agents: 'The virtuous person is not just the person who does in fact do the morally right thing, or even does it stably and reliably. She is the person who understands the principles on which she acts, and thus can explain and defend her actions.' Now, it may turn out that this sort of understanding implies that the agent acts in the right way constantly and reliably. Yet I shall argue that this constancy and reliability in the performance of virtuous actions *is not*, for Aristotle, what distinguishes virtuous agents from other agents, although it may turn out

explore what could I called the *Eudemian* version of 1144^a11-20.²⁸⁴

There are, however, other alternatives along the lines of (A). First of all, question (I) can be answered in a slightly different way, to the effect that virtue would make the end(s) right not merely by enabling one to decide on virtuous actions on their own account (which can be construed as a claim concerning ends₂), but instead by also making one perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account (which is a claim about ends₁): that is, by securing that the morally good end that one endorses is also motivationally sufficient to lead one to perform virtuous actions.

Accordingly, one could think that only virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account, in which case one could say that (A') despite being able to decide on virtuous actions on their own account,²⁸⁵ intermediate agents would not be sufficiently motivated by their decisions to perform the virtuous actions they decide on.²⁸⁶ In that case, they would need some kind of aid whereby their decisions can

to be a difference between virtuous agents and most non-virtuous agents. In that case, (B) will bear some truth, even though it will not represent the grounds on which Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous and intermediate agents.

²⁸⁴ As we shall see below in **Chapter 3**, this reading poses some problems when we try to make it compatible with what we come across in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31-33, for it would be necessary to construe the criterion presented by 1144^a11-20 as being as strict as the three criteria from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31-33 combined, even though it appears to correspond to the second criterion from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31-33. My way out to this difficulty will be to say that the second and third criterion from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] cannot be satisfied apart from one another, and that the third criterion is complexifying rather than revising his account of the agential conditions for the virtuous performance of virtuous actions in that it is bringing to light something that was behind the scenes in the *EE*. My hypothesis is that this change of perspective is due to the different account of pleasure that operates in the *EE* and in the *EN*: in the *EE*, I think that Aristotle is operating with the account of pleasure that we find in *EN* VII.11-15 [=Bywater VII.11-14], whereas in the *EN*, he is operating with the account of pleasure that we find in *EN* X.1-5.

²⁸⁵ Similarly, for the idea that 'only the virtuous, and those striving to be virtuous, choose virtuous actions for themselves,' see Kraut (1976, p. 236). Yet Kraut views these decisions as the motives behind those agents' actions, which does not fit (A') in regard to agents striving to be virtuous such as intermediate agents, as we shall see. For that reason, perhaps Kraut's view fits better (B).

²⁸⁶ Note that this is compatible with only continent agents being able to decide on virtuous actions on their own account. I mean, if it turns out that incontinent, soft, and resistant agents do not make decisions in episodes of incontinence, softness, and *καρτερία*, respectively, but can only make decisions when they are not experiencing the psychic conflicts by which they are characterised, then it seems that only continent agents may make decisions while experiencing the type of psychic conflict by which they are characterised.

lead to the performance of actions of this sort, the upshot being that non-virtuous agents ‘fail to be motivated by their practical understanding alone.’²⁸⁷ On this reading, virtue would be necessary for having a right end₁, but would not be necessary for having right ends₃₋₂.

A fundamental idea that I think can underpin (A′) is to view the requirements presented in 1144^a11-20 and *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] as motivational instead of psychological (which is clearly how *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1134^a17-23—T 12—, for instance, should be understood, since, in this passage, the *προαίρεσις* being *the* principle of action is what allows one to determine that someone performing an unjust action is also unjust).

Similarly, in 1144^a11-20 Aristotle seems to be saying not that one must decide on and aim for the very actions being performed, but rather that one must *act* on the basis of decision and for the sake of the very actions being performed, which seems to be better construed as a motivational claim. I mean, if one’s actions are to be sufficient grounds for determining whether one is virtuous, they must not only have been decided on for their own sakes, but that decision must also be sufficient motivation for the performance of these actions as well (which would not preclude other things from also motivating virtuous agents to perform virtuous

²⁸⁷ This is, in general lines, the interpretation advanced by Gibson (2019). There are different ways of construing this view though. Gibson himself thinks that non-virtuous agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, have the required knowledge to perform these actions as virtuous agents would perform them, and (if they are continent) perform these actions on the basis of a stable character disposition, so that they would differ from virtuous agents not because they do not satisfy one or other criterion listed in II.3 [=Bywater II.4], but because they do not satisfy the criteria listed in II.3 in the same way as virtuous agents, that is, they would be able to satisfy the three criteria of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31–33 in a second best way (Gibson, 2019, pp. 142–148). Moreover, there seems to be at least two ways of construing the issue with non-virtuous agents’ decisions, and Gibson prefers the one according to which the problem is that their decisions require some explanatorily otiose premise in order to be effective. There are, however, different ways of construing (A′). On the version defended by Gibson (2019, pp. 135–141), the non-virtuous agent’s reasoning requires an extra premise, which would be superfluous for fully virtuous agents, and this extra premise would at the same time render decision effective and its reasoning imperfect, since it would deploy an explanatorily otiose premise (on the grounds of *Top.* VIII.11 161^b28–30, 162^a24–34, and some passages of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary of the *Topics*—*CAG*. II.2, 13.25–14.2, 432.2–3, and 568.18–23, see Barnes [1980, pp. 168–169] for a brief discussion of that idea), which is nevertheless psychologically required for issuing in action. Another alternative, would be saying the decision made by non-virtuous agents requires the aid of something different from it in order to be effective: for instance, shame.

actions. For now, the idea would be just that only fully virtuous agents can be sufficiently motivated to perform virtuous actions due to the moral value of these actions,²⁸⁸ although they can perform virtuous actions due to other reasons or even without having decided on them. Yet, in that latter case, these actions would not be sufficient grounds for determining whether they are virtuous or not).

Accordingly, it is reasonable to think that *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31-33 implies that one must perform virtuous actions not only while deciding on them on their own account, but also *because* one has decided on them on their own account.²⁸⁹ That is, being in a prohairetic state (being *προαιρούμενος*) would not be just a psychological condition that must be simultaneous to the performance of a virtuous action if it is to be performed virtuously, but would be sufficient motivation for that action, which, as I take it, makes better sense of the idea that being *προαιρούμενος* describes the way in which one performs virtuous actions.²⁹⁰

Yet (A') is not the only way of making sense of the claim that the agential criteria Aristotle is talking about in 1144^a11-20 and in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] are motivational. In fact, it is also possible to make sense of this claim without conceding that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes.

A first alternative, then, would be to claim that (A'') when intermediate agents perform virtuous actions voluntarily, they are not even motivated by the moral value of the actions

²⁸⁸ This is compatible with non-rational desires also contributing in favour of performing virtuous actions, as Cooper (1996/1999b, p. 279; 1988/1999c, p. 247) argues is the case with virtuous agents.

²⁸⁹ *Pace* Gibson (2019), who thinks that the criteria from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a31-33 can be satisfied in different ways, and that the way in which continent agents satisfy them is such that the moral value of the actions they intend to perform is not sufficient motivation for performing them, whereas the way in which practically wise agents satisfy them is such that the moral value of these actions is sufficient motivation for their acting in the way they do. At any rate, it seems that Gibson's view can be made compatible with the reading of 1144^a11-20 I am proposing.

²⁹⁰ In fact, if we consider the *εἰδώς* criterion, it is clear that it does not imply merely that one just has knowledge while acting, which is compatible with one not relying on that knowledge to perform the action in question. Rather, it seems to imply that one performs a virtuous action *on the basis of some sort of knowledge*, and not by sheer luck or by following someone else's instructions without realising what one is doing.

they perform, but at most by a fine end different from the fineness of the actions they perform and may have decided on, *but a fine end they aim at for its own sake*. In that case, they will not perform these actions for their own sakes, but for some further fine reason whose intrinsic fineness they grasp and value. As I take it, this implies that intermediate agents are motivated to perform virtuous actions for the sake of an end such as being virtuous, in which case they would value virtuous actions only as productive means to something they take to be fine and is really so (like virtue), and not as things that they take to be fine on their own account. Thus, different from what happens in (A'), in (A'') the moral value of virtuous actions would not motivate intermediate agents at all, who will be motivated only by other fine features of the actions they decide on as, for instance, their being productive of virtue, in which case intermediate agents will not decide on virtuous actions on their own account to begin with. Moreover, it seems that this could still not be enough for leading them to action either (at least not when they are experiencing those psychic conflicts by which they are characterised). As a result, the performance of virtuous actions in episodes of continence, for instance, could still depend on things different from the moral value of the fine ends they aim for: continent agents would be able to perform virtuous actions because these actions are productive of virtue and, say, acting otherwise would be shameful.

I think this alternative is ultimately to be rejected. As I have pointed out in the **Introduction** (pages 102 to 105), there is something deeply implausible in the idea that intermediate agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes, for instance the end of being virtuous, if fine things are not fine for them (as I intend to show is the case). As a result, it remains that the only consistent way of denying that intermediate agents can decide on virtuous actions on their own account amounts to denying also that they can aim for fine ends for their own sakes.

Accordingly, another motivational version of (A) that denies that intermediate agents can decide on virtuous actions on their own account would be to claim that (A''') when intermediate agents perform virtuous actions voluntarily, they are not motivated by the moral value of the actions they perform, *but by a fine end that they do not aim at for its own sake*. In that case, virtue would be necessary for having ends₁₋₃ right in the sense these ends are right in the case of fully virtuous agents, since virtue would be necessary for 1) performing virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account, 2) deciding on virtuous actions on their own account, and 3) aiming for fine ends for their own sakes.

It is not easy to decide between (A') and (A''').²⁹¹ Ultimately, I shall argue that (A''') is to be preferred. But, in any case, intermediate agents would typically either not perform virtuous actions voluntarily (as it is in the case of incontinent and soft agents, at least in episodes of incontinence and softness), or else, if they do indeed voluntarily perform virtuous actions (as continent agents and resistant agents generally do), they will either do this for some reason that is different from the fineness of these actions (on [A'''])²⁹² or due to some complex reason that includes, but that is to be distinguished from, the fineness of the virtuous actions performed (on [A'] or [A'']) (for example, if one performs such actions because 'it is fine to act in this way and one should not follow base appetites'²⁹³ or because 'doing such and such will lead one to virtue and it is shameful to act otherwise').

In sum: even if virtue is responsible for establishing, either psychologically or moti-

²⁹¹ I shall come back to this in **Chapter 3** and in the **Conclusion** of this Dissertation, as well as to the question of whether (B) bears some truth, even if it is not adequate as an explanation of the criteria for performing virtuous actions virtuously.

²⁹² As for now, I am not concerned with determining what exactly are the fine ends for whose sake intermediate agents can perform virtuous actions, which is a question I shall attempt to tackle later in this Dissertation.

²⁹³ This is close to how Gibson construes the continent reason for acting. Yet I am not sure whether there would be any issue with virtuous agents having such a motivation provided they do not have base appetites. In that case, it would be better, perhaps, to construe the continent's motivation as including some sort of hedonic calculus (perhaps of the sort foreshadowed in *DA* III.10 433^b5-10) or the avoidance of shame.

tionally,²⁹⁴ a goal that is exclusive to it (as on [A], [A'], [A''], or [A''']), this would not be equivalent to saying that only (fully) virtuous agents can aim for the fine ends₃ (in which case the truth of C2—the claim that intermediate agents can aim for fine ends—remains preserved). In fact, all that would be implied by this is that only (fully) virtuous agents either have the fineness of fine actions themselves as their ends₁₋₂ and aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes (as on [A] and [A''']), or have the fineness of fine actions themselves as their ends₁₋₂ (as on [A'']), or else perform virtuous actions for the sole reason that they are fine (which is the sense in which they would have right ends₁)(as on [A']).²⁹⁵

A further reason for thinking that motivational readings are to be preferred as an interpretation of 1144^a11-20 is that such readings make good sense of cases in which one is not performing a virtuous action in a way that reveals that one is virtuous. At 1144^a14–16, Aristotle talks of people who are not just in respect to their performance of just things (see footnote 213 for a discussion of how to construe this phrase), those who do just things involuntarily, due to ignorance, or due to some other things, i.e., not on their account (*ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά*). The last case Aristotle mentions here, the one in which one does just things *'δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά,'* would encompass precisely the case of people who voluntarily perform just actions but whose performance of just actions is not sufficient for saying that they are virtuous because they do not do it on the basis of decision and for the sake of the very actions they perform. Thus, if Aristotle's examples here

²⁹⁴ I mean, non-virtuous agents cannot perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account either if they cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account (psychological reading) or if they are motivated by some reason different from the fineness of this action regardless of whether they can or cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account (motivational reading). As the distinction between ends₁₋₃ suggest, the motivational and the psychological readings are not really incompatible, for the latter concerns the role of virtue in making ends₂ right, whereas the first, the role of virtue in making ends₁ right. The question is what of these things is at issue in the passages we are analysing, and what, say, claims regarding the role of virtue in making ends₁ right imply about the role of virtue in making ones ends₃₋₂ right.

²⁹⁵ I shall come back to these and other possibilities later in this Dissertation.

are exhaustive (and the ‘ η ... η ... η ’ coordination suggest that they might be—despite the fact that acting $\delta\iota'$ $\alpha\gamma\nu\omicron\iota\alpha\nu$ is a case of acting involuntarily— $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$), if an agent who fails to be fully virtuous is performing a virtuous action, they are doing that either involuntarily, or, more specifically, due to ignorance, or else for the sake of something else (i.e., not for their own sakes)—otherwise their performance of that virtuous action would be sufficient for saying that they are virtuous, although they are not virtuous. This strongly suggest that agents who fail to be fully virtuous like intermediate agents, who are agents who can perform virtuous actions voluntarily, are agents who can only perform virtuous actions due to some reason that should be distinguished from the intrinsic moral value of these actions (be it because it is a complex reason that includes the moral value of these actions, be it because it a reason distinct from the intrinsic moral value of these actions).

What I would like to show now is that Aristotle favours (A''') at least in the *Eudemian* version of 1144^a11-20, but since this will depend on a decision for which the elements are still lacking (some of which will be introduced in **Chapter 2**), let me now get into what Aristotle says in the sequence, since I think that the different interpretative options regarding 1144^a11-20 have been mapped satisfactorily.

1.3.3 The final part of Aristotle's second answer: EN VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a20-^b1 and 1144^b1-1145^a2

The next argument in Aristotle's second answer, 1144^a20-^b1, begins with what seems to be another division of labour between virtue and reason. Let me quote and translate these lines:

1144a20 τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἢ ἀρετῇ,
 τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς | ἀρε-
 τῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σα|φέστερον
 περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει|νότητα· αὕτη δ'
 25 ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα || σκοπὸν συντεί-
 νοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχά|ναι αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν
 οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἦ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν, | ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουρ-
 γία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς | καὶ <τοὺς> πανούργους
 φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύ|ναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ
 30 τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἔξις τῶ || ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς
 ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς | εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ
 συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρα|κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσι, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε
 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ | ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν· ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν
 τὸ τυχόν. | τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῶ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει
 35 γὰρ ἡ || μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδουσιν ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς
 1144b1 ἀρ|χάς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ||
 ἀγαθόν.

|| a21 τὸ K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τὰ P^bC^c | πέφυκε πράττεσθαι K^bP^bC^cL
 O^bB^{95sup}.V: πράττεσθαι πέφυκεν L^b || a23 δὴ τις LL^bO^bV: δέ τις
 B^{95sup}.: δὴ K^bM^b: om. P^bC^c || a26 αὐτῶν K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V:
 αὐτοῦ Bywater || a28 <τοὺς> add. Klein (1875, pp. 15n^{***}): οὐ s.l.P^bV²:
 om. K^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || a31 τε om. K^b || b36 ἀδύνατον K^bP^bC^c
 s.l.L L^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: om. L

Then, virtue makes decision right, but to do the things that are naturally for the sake of that is the task not of virtue, but of another capacity. But we must, when dealing with these things, talk more clearly about them. Now, there is a capacity that people call cleverness, and it is such that it is able to do and to attain those things that [25] contribute to a goal that has been assumed. Well, then, if its goal is fine, <this capacity> is praiseworthy, but if it is base, it is unscrupulousness. For that reason, we say that both the practically wise and the unscrupulous are clever.²⁹⁶ Yet practical wisdom is not this²⁹⁷ capacity [sc., cleverness], but it does not exist without this capacity. And this disposition [sc., practical wisdom] [30] does not come to this eye of the soul [sc., cleverness]²⁹⁸ without virtue, as was said and is evident, for the reasonings about

²⁹⁶ Against this, for an argument in favour preserving the text of the mss., according to which Aristotle would be making a point about the common language, see Rasso (1874, pp. 124-125) and Frede (2020, vol. 2, p. 707). There is, however, reason to doubt that this could be the case here. Alexander (*CAG*. II.2, 157.29-158.6), for instance, in describing the phenomenon in which people substitute a word for a more expressive one (τὰ ἐμφαντικώτερα [sc., ὀνόματα]) in his commentary to Aristotle's *Topics*, mentions just the case in which people put the word φρόνιμος in place of the word πανούργος (which is just what seems to occur in some passages from Plato's dialogues in which being φρόνιμος is something described in terms of being able to commit injustice voluntarily—see *Resp.* I 348d3-d9 and *Prot.* 333d5-d8). Yet this is not quite the case here in 1144^a27-28, for Aristotle (in the text of the mss.) is actually talking of people calling πανούργοι those who are φρόνιμοι (and not φρόνιμοι those who are πανούργοι). In that case, it seems better to emend the text following either the proposal made by Klein or the suggestion written above the line in mss. P^b and V (see the *apparatus* above), unless there is evidence (of which I am unaware) of a linguistic practice according to which φρόνιμοι are referred to as πανούργοι.

²⁹⁷ The article here is picking up the τις δύναμις introduced in 1144^a23 and discussed in the previous line, which is now clearly identifiable (the copyist of G^a even writes δεινότης instead of δύναμις here), for which reason I translated it as a demonstrative.

²⁹⁸ Aristotle here seems to be alluding to *Resp.* VII 518d9-519a5, a passage in which Plato describes,

objects of action have a principle, since the best end²⁹⁹ is such and such, whatever it is: for the sake of the argument, let it be any chance thing. But this [sc., the best end] does not show itself but to the good person, for vice [35] corrupts, that is, it makes one err about practical principles. Therefore, it is manifest that it is impossible to be practically wise without being [1144^b1] good.

Different from the division of labour presented in 1144^a6-9 (discussed in **section 1.2** above), this division of labour is not presented as a division of between virtue and *φρόνησις*, but between virtue and another capacity (i.e., a capacity different from virtue). This second division of labour also says that virtue makes the end right (though in a roundabout way, saying that virtue makes the *προαίρεσις* right), but it does not say that the other capacity mentioned makes right the things for the sake of the goal. Instead, it says that this capacity is responsible for doing something.

There are several difficulties here. In particular, it is unclear (i) what is up to another capacity (it is concerned with doing things that are naturally for the sake of what? Virtue³⁰⁰ or *προαίρεσις*? And if *προαίρεσις*, what does Aristotle mean by *προαίρεσις* in this passage?); (ii) which capacity is that (*φρόνησις*³⁰¹ or *δευότης*?); and (iii) which virtue is responsible for making decision right (moral virtue or *φρόνησις*?). Depending on how we answer these questions, the second division of labour will not be one between moral virtue and a rational capacity, but rather a division of labour between two different rational capacities. But irrespective of the meaning this passage is assumed to convey, one might claim that it is by somehow presupposing or consisting in a capacity responsible for leading to action as that

under the name of *σοφία*, a capacity that functions just like what Aristotle calls *δευότης*, by which means the soul of their possessors sees sharply the things to which it is directed.

²⁹⁹ I take *τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον* to be a hendiadys for *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἄριστον*.

³⁰⁰ The passage is understood in this way in Magirus' translation (Magirus, 1601, p. 623) and by Lorenz (2009, pp. 203-205).

³⁰¹ That this capacity is *φρόνησις* is the position of Stewart (1892, vol. 2, p. 101), Natali (1989/2001, pp. 51, 203n38), and Frede (2020, vol. 2, p. 706). Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire (1856, p. 232, §8), in turn, only says that this other capacity is, for instance, *φρόνησις*, which seems to be compatible with this other capacity being rather *δευότης* (provided *φρόνησις* is a species of *δευότης*). The copyist of B^{95sup} (f.134v) seems to have interpreted the text also taking the capacity in question here to be *φρόνησις*, since he adds *τῆς φρονήσεως* above the line over *δυνάμεως* at 1144^a22.

described in this passage that *φρόνησις* can be said, at lines 1145^a4-6 (the fourth part of the argument—see section 1.4 below), to make one achieve the things towards the end. As a result, we could perhaps conceive of the division of labour that will be presented at 1145^a4-6 as resulting from the combination of the two previous ones (at 1144^a6-9 and 1144^a20-22).³⁰² With that in mind, I shall put questions (i)-(iii) aside, for they will not be relevant for my current purposes.

There is something to be said, though, about lines 1144^a31-^b34. In these lines, a thesis more problematic for my current purposes is advanced by Aristotle, for it is said that ‘the best end’ (literally, ‘the end and the best’—*τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον*³⁰³) does not manifest itself but to the good person. What exactly is meant by that is not clear. Thus, it seems necessary to explain what is implied by ‘the best end’ not manifesting itself but to the good person and whether this hinders agents who are not fully virtuous from aiming for fine ends (if indeed, as I have argued, by good *sans phrase* Aristotle means fully virtuous here in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13]). But before discussing this, let me say a few words about 1144^b1-1145^a2, which comes in the sequence of T 16:

T 17 – *EN* VI.13 1144^b1-1145^a2

1144b1 σκεπτόν δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ
 | ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα
 | (οὐ ταῦτόν μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
 5 | τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσιν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν ||
 φύσει πως (καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι | καὶ
 τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς)· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ζητοῦμεν | ἕτε-
 ρόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον
 | ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρ|χουσι
 10 | ἕξεις, ἀλλ’ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὐσαι. || πλὴν τοσοῦτον
 εἰσὶν ὁμοίωσιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ σῶματι ἰσχυρῶ | ἄνευ ὀψίως κινου-
 μένω συμβαίνει σφάλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ | τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὀψιν,
 οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, | ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει,
 ἡ δ’ ἕξις ὁμοία οὐσα τότε ἔσται | κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ

³⁰² Similarly, see Irwin (2019, p. 142): ‘we might suppose that D3 [= 1145a4-6] is a full statement of the contrast of which D1 [= 1144a6-9] and D2 [= 1144a20-22] give an abbreviated statement.’

³⁰³ See footnote 299

15 ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν || εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὐ-
 τως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο | ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ
 κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ | κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ
 τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης
 τῇ μὲν | ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις
 20 ᾤετο || εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ
 φρο|νήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημείον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, |
 ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες |
 καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ | κατὰ
 25 τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκάσι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες || ὅτι ἡ
 τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ | δὲ μι-
 κρὸν μεταβῆναι· ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,
 ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. ὀρθὸς | δὲ λό-
 γος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν. Σωκράτης | μὲν οὖν
 30 λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι || πάσας),
 ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων | ὅτι οὐχ
 οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ | φρόνιμον
 ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος | ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἂν, ᾧ
 διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ
 35 ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ'
 οὐπω εἰληφῶς ἔσται· τοῦτο | γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς
 1145b1 ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς || δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται·
 ἅμα γὰρ τῇ | φρονήσει μιᾶ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν.
 || **b1** περὶ K^bP^bC^cL s.l. L^b O^bB^{95sup}.V: om. L^b || **b1-2** καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ
 παραπλησίως K^bP^bC^cLB^{95sup}.V: παραπλησίως γὰρ L^bO^b || **b6** post
 εὐθύς add. καὶ P^bC^c || **b7** εἶναι P^bC^cB^{95sup}.: om. K^bLL^bO^bV || **b10**
 ante σώματι add. ἐν B^{95sup}. || **b12** δὲ om. K^b || **b13** post οὐσα add. τῇ
 δεινότητι P^bC^cs.l. V²: τῇ φυσικῇ s.l. L^{b2} || **b14** post καθάπερ add. καὶ
 P^bC^c || **b15** καὶ om. K^b || **b16** φυσικὴ P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἠθικὴ K^b
 || **b17** τινές φασι K^bL^bO^b: φασὶ τινες P^bC^c: φασὶ LB^{95sup}.V || **b20** εἰ-
 ναι om. O^b || **b21** καὶ γὰρ νῦν K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: νῦν γὰρ L^b || **b24**
 τὴν om. B^{95sup}. || **b24-25** εἰκάσι ... φρόνησιν K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b mg.V:
 om. B^{95sup}.V || **b26** ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ K^bP^bC^cO^bM^b: οὐ γὰρ LL^bB^{95sup}.V
 || **b30** ante πάσας add. ᾤετο O^b | οὖν K^bP^bC^cL^bO^b: τοίνυν LB^{95sup}.V
 || **b31** κυρίως K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b mg. V: om. VB^{95sup}. || **b2** ὑπαρχούσῃ
 K^bP^bC^cM^b: οὐση LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V | πᾶσαι K^bP^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup}.V: ἅπα-
 σαι O^b | ὑπάρξουσιν K^bP^bC^cLVB^{95sup}.: ὑπάρχουσι L^bO^b

We must, then, investigate virtue once more, for virtue too is in a similar condition: as practical wisdom is related to cleverness—<cleverness> is not the same <as practical wisdom>, but similar <to it>—, so too natural virtue is related to full virtue [sc., it is not the same as it, but only similar to it].³⁰⁴ In fact, everyone judges that each of the moral characters is present [5] by nature in some way,³⁰⁵ for we are just, moderate,

³⁰⁴ For this construal of the passage, see (Rassow, 1862, pp. 25–26; Rassow, 1874, pp. 125–126). Similarly, see Natali (1989/2001, p. 52) and Moss (2012, pp. 195–196).

³⁰⁵ Alternatively, one could follow Irwin's translation (1999, p. 98) and construe πᾶσι with ὑπάρχειν rather than with δοκεῖ, in which case the passage could be rendered as 'each of the moral characters seems to belong to everyone by nature in some way.' White (1992, p. 157n29) argues that this translation is to be preferred since if πᾶσι is construed with δοκεῖ, Aristotle would be suggesting that 'no one doubted the existence of natural virtue,' which is perhaps false.

There is a caveat, however. If the claim that everyone has 'ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν' is to make sense, it

courageous, and all other things right from the moment we are born; but we nevertheless want what is good in the full sense to be something different, and such things to be present in some other way, for the natural dispositions pertain to both children and animals, but are clearly harmful without reason. [10] But³⁰⁶ this much seems to be observed: that just like a powerful body that is moving without vision happens to fall vigorously due to not having sight, so too here; but if one obtains reason, there is a difference in practical matters. And the disposition that is similar will then be full virtue. Therefore, just as in the case of the part that forms opinions there are two kinds [15] of thing, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the case of the moral part there are two <kinds of thing>, one is natural virtue, the other, full virtue, and of these, full virtue does not come into being without practical wisdom. For that reason, some people say that every virtue is a *φρόνησις*,³⁰⁷ and Socrates, in one way, investigated this rightly, but, in another way, was mistaken. That is, because he believed [20] that every virtue was a *φρόνησις*, he was mistaken, but he spoke rightly that <they> cannot exist without *φρόνησις*. And a sign of this is that now everyone, when defining virtue, adds, when talking about the disposition and the things it is concerned with, that it is <the disposition> in accordance with the right reason, and right is the reason in accordance with practical wisdom. Everyone, then, seems to divine somehow [25] that virtue is such a disposition in accordance with practical wisdom. But it is necessary to change <this> a little, for virtue is not only the <disposition> in accordance with the right reason, but it is the <disposition> that involves right reason. And practical wisdom is the right reason about such matters. Well, then, Socrates believed that virtues were reasons (for <he believed> each one of them to be sciences), [30] but we <believe> they involve reason. Thus, it is evident from the things said that it is not possible to be good in the full sense without practical wisdom, nor is it possible to be

cannot be saying that everyone has all natural virtues, which is clearly false. An alternative to cope with this difficulty, which is the one favoured by Irwin (1999, p. 254), is to say that what everyone has are rather the natural aptitudes for the virtues. This is certainly true, but Aristotle does not seem to be here talking of the mere aptitude to become virtuous, but of a certain character state that is similar to full virtue but still falls short of full virtue. Thus, with talk of people who are *σωφρονικοί* (an expression that also comes up in *Top.* II.11 115^b15–16), Aristotle would not mean to talk merely of the natural aptitude to temperance that everyone has, but, more specifically, of a certain aptitude to temperance that is had by people who, by nature (or habit), are such as to perform temperate actions. Another alternative would be to say that ‘*ἐκάστα τῶν ἡθῶν*’ is not referring to the virtues, which would then be described as also being present by nature somehow (i.e., as natural virtues), but rather to any character traits be they virtuous or vicious, in which case the point would be that everyone has the character traits they have somehow by nature. Yet this would make poor sense of the explanation that comes in the immediate sequence, in which Aristotle only talks of virtuous character traits.

In the face of these problems, I have favoured the translation that suggests that everyone really admitted the existence something like natural virtues. But perhaps there may be a way of making sense of Irwin's alternative depending on how we construe the explanation in the sequence: if one thinks an *εἶναι* is being left understood with *ἔχομεν*, then Aristotle would be saying rather that we are able to be just, moderate, courageous, and all other things right from the moment we are born. But because the way we understand this passage does not affect my overall point, I shall not explore this option further.

³⁰⁶ *πλὴν* is being used adversatively here.

³⁰⁷ From this point onwards, Aristotle appears to be using the word *φρόνησις* in a slightly different way: not to talk about practical wisdom, but to talk of knowledge more generally, as is common in Plato. For that reason, I have left this word untranslated in this part of the argument in which Aristotle is reporting the Socratic view, since it would be inaccurate to say that Socrates thought that the virtues were forms of practical wisdom.

practically wise without moral virtue. Further,³⁰⁸ in this way it is possible to solve the argument by which one can argue dialectally that the virtues are separate from one another, for the same person is not naturally gifted in relation to every virtue, [35] so that they would have attained one virtue now, but another one, not yet. In fact, this is possible in regard to the natural virtues, [1145a1] but it is not possible <in regard to the virtues> on the basis of which one is said to be good *simpliciter*, for the other virtues will be present at the same time as practical wisdom, which is present as a single thing.

In this passage, Aristotle presents the famous distinction between natural and full virtue. I shall not discuss the details of this distinction here, since not only will they not matter for my current purposes, but also because discussing them presupposes a decision about how exactly *δεινότης* and *φρόνησις* are related to one another (as a matter of fact, Aristotle appears to say in lines 1144^b1-4 that natural virtue is related to full virtue in the way *δεινότης* is related to *φρόνησις*), and I cannot delve into this issue here.

Irrespective of these details, though, it is possible to say that, in this passage, Aristotle establishes a strong connexion between being good and being *φρόνιμος*, such that one cannot be fully virtuous without being *φρόνιμος*, nor *φρόνιμος* without being good, i.e., fully virtuous, which implies that *φρόνησις* does after all make us more doers of good things (in fact, Aristotle explicitly concludes, in lines 1144^b12-13, that reason makes a practical difference—‘ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει’).³⁰⁹ This allows him to then establish that virtues are not merely conditions that are in accordance with right reason (*κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*), but conditions that involve reason in a more fundamental way, that is, are accompanied by right reason (*μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου*). The upshot is that performing a virtuous action as a virtuous person not only requires the action being performed to satisfy the criteria set by reason, but also that this action is performed in this way due to the correct reason of the

³⁰⁸ For this use of *ἀλλὰ* (which sometimes, like in this instance, is reinforced by *καί*) see Denniston (1954, s.v. *ἀλλά*, II.(9), p. 21).

³⁰⁹ That Aristotle is using *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* interchangeably in this passage (like Plato does in *Men.* 88b1–c3) is also the view of Gourinat (2015, pp. 124–125).

agent who performs it. Therefore, Aristotle can finally answer the concerns raised previously, since performing virtuous actions as a virtuous person is now unavoidably connected to being *φρόνιμος*. Moreover, it appears that one cannot really have *φρόνησις* before becoming a fully virtuous person, so that it can be of no help in doing that (though one may perhaps argue that *δεινότης* can be of help in that regard³¹⁰). Yet *φρόνησις* is nevertheless what an agent who is not fully virtuous, if they intend to become virtuous, should try to attain, for without *φρόνησις* they will never become fully virtuous.³¹¹ In fact, it seems possible to think of an agent who has all natural virtues³¹² but is not fully virtuous due to not being *φρόνιμος*, for such an agent would lack the rational virtue that unifies their virtues making them into full virtue.³¹³ Therefore, someone may only become fully virtuous by also becoming *φρόνιμος* at the same time, which requires them to acquire *δεινότης*, and not only natural virtue.

Moreover, given that *φρόνησις* is involved in full virtue, the virtue that makes the ends right is virtue involving *φρόνησις*. Similarly, the rational capacity that makes the means right—*φρόνησις*—is always accompanied by full virtue. As Irwin (2019) argues it, this suggests that Aristotle's divisions of labour are merely functional, the upshot being that although it is virtue that makes the end(s) right, *φρόνησις* is nevertheless required for having ends that are right in the sense these ends are right for fully virtuous agents. Similarly, in saying that *φρόνησις* makes the means right Aristotle would also hold that full virtue is required for having means that are right in the way they are right for fully virtuous agents. In other words, '[t]he functions of virtue and prudence cannot be independent of each other, nor can one be a prerequisite for the other' (Irwin, 2019, p. 156). As I have suggested in the **Introduction**

³¹⁰ See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas commentary (*Sententia Ethic.* L VI, X 201–207).

³¹¹ Similarly, see Gourinat (2015, p. 127).

³¹² It remains to see if having *all natural virtues* is really required for *φρόνησις* or if it rather requires the majority of and the most important of the virtues, in which case it would seem that it might be compatible with continence in some domains of one's life. Settling this issue lies outside the scope of this Dissertation.

³¹³ On the idea that in becoming *φρόνιμος* the independent and separate natural virtues one had are replaced by 'a superior virtue which encompasses them and binds them together', see Viano (2008, p. 28).

(pages 57 to 60), the type of rightness that the ends of fully virtuous agents enjoy should be understood as being similar to the type of rightness characteristic of *εὐβουλία*: the rightness involved in *εὐβουλία* is such that for a piece of deliberation to be a case of *εὐβουλία*, one must reason in a way that not only is efficient in achieving the end one aims at and that arrives at a good a conclusion (i.e., leads to the performance of a virtuous action), but that also arrives at this good conclusion through no false or apparent syllogism (see also footnote 64).

I have suggested that the rightness achieved by fully virtuous agents in their ends is such that they not only aim for ends that are fine and decide on and perform virtuous actions for the sake of fine ends, but also aim for these fine ends for their own sakes: grasping their intrinsic fineness. In terms of ends₃₋₁, we can say that they i) have right ends₃ in that they aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes, ii) decide on virtuous actions for the sake of ends₂ that correspond to the intrinsic fineness of the virtuous actions they decide on, and iii) perform virtuous actions motivated by ends₁ that amount to their fine ends₂ put in action: i.e., they perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account. Note, moreover, that one's ends₃ cannot be really right in this way if one does not perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (i.e., a fully right ends₃ must issue in fine actions), and that one cannot have ends₂₋₁ that are right in this way if one does not aim for fine ends₃ for their own sakes. In other words, fully right ends₂₋₁ require one to grasp the intrinsic fineness of the ends₃ that triggered the episode of deliberation that led one to decide and to act accordingly. It seems clear, then, that having ends that are right in this way also requires *εὐβουλία* and thus *φρόνησις*, since one could not arrive at right ends₂₋₁ if one were not able to deliberate well. Conversely, if one could not arrive at right ends₂₋₁, one could doubt whether one really aims for fine ends₃ for their own sakes.

Accordingly, we could say that having means that are right in the sense means are

right for fully virtuous agents requires not only performing virtuous actions (i.e., doing things that not only are effective for achieving a given fine end₃ but that are also done in a way that hits the mean in action), but also selecting these means due to seeing that they contribute to ends₃ that are right in the sense I have sketched above. As a result, it is only if one is fully virtuous and thus has ends that are right in the sense I presented that one can also have means that are right in this sense.

Again, despite fulfilling different functions, full virtue and *φρόνησις* would be intimately associated in making the ends and the means right, respectively.

In any case, I would resist the thought that this would also imply that, for Aristotle, virtue makes the means right (as Irwin ends up saying) and *φρόνησις* makes the ends right (as Loening [1903, p. 266n22] would say).³¹⁴ My contention is only that in making the end right (full) virtue requires *φρόνησις*, and that in making the means right *φρόνησις* requires (full) virtue.³¹⁵

³¹⁴ The formulation of the conclusion advanced by Irwin (2019, p. 156) is a bit misleading, he says: 'If full virtue requires prudence, which makes the means correct, full virtue makes the means as well as the end correct. And if prudence is necessary for virtue, which makes the end correct, it is necessary for making the end correct.' I think there is no issue in the second part of his claim. It is true that given that *φρόνησις* is necessary for virtue, it is thus necessary for making the end right, for this does not imply that *φρόνησις* makes the end right as well. Yet the first part of Irwin's claim is a bit more problematic, since he draws this conclusion in the case of full virtue, i.e., he says that full virtue would make both the ends and the means right in so far as it requires *φρόνησις*. It is not so clear, however, whether he would draw a similar conclusion in the case of *φρόνησις*, or if his drawing this conclusion in the case of full virtue is just an infelicity of formulation. Loening, in turn, as we shall see below in pages 262 to 263, seems comfortable in saying that because the virtue that makes the ends right is full virtue and virtue requires *φρόνησις*, then *φρόνησις* makes the ends right.

³¹⁵ This would be significantly parallel to what happens in the scientific domain. For, as Bronstein (2016, p. 79) puts it, '[i]n the order of inquiry, we first acquire non-noetic knowledge of what S is, and then non-scientific knowledge of why S is P. We then acquire nous of what S is, and thus scientific knowledge of why S is P. [...] The result is that we finally acquire demonstrative and non-demonstrative (noetic) scientific knowledge, we acquire them at the same time and by the same activity.' Similarly, in the order of habituation we would first aim for fine ends and perform virtuous actions on the basis of decisions that correctly identify adequate means for achieving these ends, and then we would be able to aim for fine ends for their own sakes and at the same time perform virtuous actions that are adequate means for achieving these ends on the basis of decisions to perform such actions for the very reason that they are fine. In that case, *φρόνησις* and moral virtue would be acquired at the same time and would manifest themselves in the same activities, for their roles in making the means and the ends right would be fundamentally coordinated if not inextricable. The same parallel can also be formulated if one favours an account of definitional enquiry in which it is interdependent with explanatory practices, such that 'the priority and

That being said, let me now focus on 1144^a31-^b1 and on claim that the best end does not manifest itself but to the good person.

1.3.3.1 ‘<THE BEST END> DOES NOT MANIFEST ITSELF BUT TO THE GOOD PERSON’ AND THE ROLE OF REASON IN ESTABLISHING THE ENDS OF ACTION—A DIGRESSION

Let me quote 1144^a31-^b1 again:

T 18 – EN VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a31-^b1

1144a31 οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν
 ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον,
 ὅτιδήποτε ὄν· ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. | τοῦτο δ’ εἰ
 35 μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ || μοχθηρία καὶ
 διαψεύδουσα ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερόν
 1144b1 ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα || ἀγαθόν.
 || b36 ἀδύνατον K^bP^bC^c s.1.L L^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: om. L

For the reasonings about objects of action have a principle, since the best end³¹⁶ is such and such, whatever it is: for the sake of the argument, let it be any chance thing. But this [sc., the best end] does not show itself but to the good person, for wretchedness [35] corrupts, that is, it makes one err about practical principles. Therefore, it is manifest that it is impossible to be practically wise without being [1144b1] good.

What is striking about this passage is how strong the claim Aristotle makes here is: ‘τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον,’ that is, the best end, only manifests itself (*φαίνεται*) to someone who is good, which strongly suggests that agents who are not good in the sense Aristotle has in mind here do not aim for the best end.

In other words, if, as I have suggested above (in section 1.3), by good Aristotle means in this Chapter fully virtuous, the idea here will be that agents who fail to be fully virtuous fail to grasp the best end, and, accordingly, to aim for it. But perhaps this is too strong, and,

unity of the definiens cannot be captured without recourse to our causal explanatory practices, as these are revealed in demonstration’ (Charles, 2000, p. 245), which suggests that there is no such thing as a non-noetic grasp of essences *qua* essences, for grasping essences involves having a noetic grasp of them such that one sees them as fulfilling an explanatory role in demonstrations. In fact, in that case it would be even clearer why the grasp of fine ends by agents who are not fully virtuous is defective, for they would not grasp these ends as motivationally prior (what I take to be the practical analogue of being explanatorily prior), for which reason they would not aim for such ends for their own sakes.

³¹⁶ See footnote 299.

for that reason, objectionable: as we have seen in the **Introduction**, there is good reason for thinking that at least some agents who fail to be fully virtuous are able aim for fine ends (even if not for their own sakes). As a result, whatever Aristotle means with talk of the best end manifesting itself (*φαίνεται*) or not manifesting itself (*οὐ φαίνεται*) to someone, this should be understood in such a way that agents who are not fully virtuous are able to aim for ends that are fine.

The explanation Aristotle offers in lines 34ff to the claim that the best end does not manifest itself but to the good person (made in lines 33-34) might suggest that he has a much less demanding sense of goodness in mind here, so that his claim would be even weaker than I have suggested. If the reason why the end does not manifest itself except to someone who is good is that wretchedness corrupts and makes one err about practical principles, perhaps in saying that the end does not manifest itself except to someone who is good Aristotle has in mind any agent who is not wretched.

Yet I would like to resist this interpretation, for I think it is too deflationary. No doubt '*διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ κτλ.*' is introducing an argument that supports the claim that the end does not manifest itself except to someone who is good, but this does not entail that this is the reason why Aristotle thinks this claim is true, although this is indeed the most clear case in which the end does not manifest itself to someone because they are not good.³¹⁷ I would like to argue instead that lines 33-34 should be read as saying something that applies only to fully virtuous agents, and that Aristotle's claim here does not preclude agents who are not fully virtuous from aiming for fine ends.

³¹⁷ I mean, '*διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ κτλ.*' would be introducing something that gives us reason for believing that the claim that the end does not manifest itself except to someone who is good is true, but which does exhaust the reasons for believing the truth of this claim. On my reading, the claim that the end does not manifest itself except to someone who is good is true not only because it does not manifest itself to wretched agents, but also because it does not manifest itself to other agents who are not fully virtuous who are not wretched.

Earlier in *EN VI*, in *EN VI.5* 1140^b4–21, when *φρόνησις* was being defined, Aristotle made a claim very similar to the one we come across in 1144^a33–34 (in **T 18**). Let me quote and give a provisional translation for it (I shall discuss below other alternatives for the part in bold and shall favour a different translation):

T 19 – *EN VI.6* 1140^b4–21

1140b4

λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι

- 5 || ἔξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ
| καὶ κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ |
| πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ |
| τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, |
10 ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν·
εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς | πολι-
| τικοὺς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ
| ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν | τοιαύτην
| ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει | οὐδὲ διαστρέ-
15 φει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας
| ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ | πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
| τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα | τὰ πρακτά· **τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι'**
ἡδονῆν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς | οὐ φαίνεται ἢ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου
| ἔνεκα οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο | αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν. ἔστι γὰρ
20 ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ || ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν εἶναι
| μετὰ λόγου | ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῆν.

|| **b5** ἀληθῆ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἀληθοῦς Alexander on *Met.* A.1
981^b25 (*CAG.* I, 7.21–24) | ἀνθρώπων K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἀν-
| θρώπινα M^b || **b11** ἔνθεν K^bP^bB^{95sup}.V: ἔνθα C^c: ἔθεν LL^bO^b || **b12**
| ὀνόματι K^bP^b s.l.C^c LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: om. C^c | ὡς om. K^bM^b |
| σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τὴν φρόνησιν σώζου-
| σαν L | post δὲ add. οὐ P^bC^c || **b13** ἅπασαν K^bP^bC^c: πᾶσαν
| LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || **b14** ante λυπηρόν add. τὸ LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || **b15**
| δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας K^{b2}P^bC^cLO^b: δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας B^{95sup}.V: δύο ὀρθὰς
| ἴσας K^b: δύο ὀρθὰς Bywater || **b18** ἔνεκα K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἔνεκεν
| L^b || **b21** ἀληθῆ K^bP^bC^cL^bV: ἀληθοῦς LO^bB^{95sup}.M^b

Therefore, it remains for it [sc., practical wisdom] to be [5] a true disposition with an account<, a disposition> that is practical in regard to the things that are good and bad for the human being. Indeed, the end of production is different <from the production itself>, whereas that of action is not <different from the action itself>, for acting well itself is an end. For that reason, we believe that Pericles and such persons are practically wise, because they are able to consider the things that are good for themselves and for the human beings, [10] and we consider such persons to be household managers and statesmen. Thence we also call temperance by this name, believing it preserves practical wisdom. And it preserves a belief of this sort, for not every belief is corrupted or distorted by what is pleasant or painful—for instance, <the belief> that the triangle [15] has or does not have <internal angles> equal to two right angles—but those connected to an object of action. That is, the principles of the objects of action

are that for the sake of which these objects are, **but to those naturally³¹⁸ corrupted by pleasure or pain this principle [sc., the end] does not manifest itself**, nor <does it seem to them> that everything must be chosen and done for the sake of that [sc., the end] and for that reason [sc., due to the end], for vice is corruptive [20] of a principle. Hence, practical wisdom is necessarily a true disposition with an account<, a disposition> which is practical in regard to the human goods.

Although it is tempting to read the claim made in 1144a35-b1 (in **T 18**) as being equivalent to that made here in **T 19**,³¹⁹ this is misleading, although both claims can be made compatible (as we shall see).

Moreover, what is said here in **T 19** is seemingly compatible with the end³²⁰ manifesting itself to agents who are neither fully virtuous nor fully vicious, and, depending on how one construes *εὖθύς*, it could even be made compatible with vicious agents being able to see the end, though not directly or immediately.³²¹ In that case, it would not even be compatible with 1144^a35-b1 (in **T 18**) in the way I have construed it, for there we come across an unambiguously stricter restriction, according to which the best end does not manifest itself *but to the good person* (*εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ*).

Now, the exact relationship between 1144^a35-b1 (in **T 18**) and **T 19** depends on deciding two things regarding the latter: first, the scope and meaning and *εὖθύς* in 1140^b17-19; and second, what agents Aristotle has in mind with talk of people corrupted by pleasure or pain.

Two passages from *EN VII* shed some light on this second question at the same time

³¹⁸ Bonitz (1870, s.v. *εὖθύς*, p.296^a13-21) mentions this passage as one of his examples of the causal sense of *εὖθύς*, which indicates that something is related to something else due to its own nature, without the intermission of other causes. On how *εὖθύς* should be construed in this passage, see the discussion below. Ultimately, I shall construe it as merely emphasising the negative (different from what I have done here).

³¹⁹ In his commentary to 1140^b16ff, Stewart (1892, vol. 2, pp. 47-48) merely quotes 1144^a35-b1, thus suggesting that he takes Aristotle to be saying the same thing in both passages. Similarly, Barney (2018, p. 297) understands talk of the end not appearing to someone both in **T 18** and in **T 19** in terms of the bad person not grasping the correct first-principle of action in particular deliberative contexts.

³²⁰ In this context, 'end' must be understood normatively, picking out a fine end.

³²¹ Against the possibility of agents who are completely vicious being able to see the value of a certain fine action (or end), see Vasiliou (1996, pp. 791-793). Yet although this might be true of completely vicious agents, it may be possible for vicious agents who are not completely vicious (and hence who are prone to feel regret) to see the value of performing virtuous actions in some way (though not due to seeing the intrinsic fineness of such actions).

as they raise further questions about what Aristotle means when he says that temperance preserves the belief about practical principles. The first is *EN* VII.7 [=Bywater VI.6] 1150^a1–3, a passage in which Aristotle explains the claim that bestiality is less of a vice than intemperance (despite being more frightening than temperance) by saying that, in the case of bestiality, 'the best element is not corrupted, like in the human case, but is not present' (*οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει*). And by 'the best element' (*τὸ βέλτιστον*), Aristotle seems to mean here not one's end, but the natural ruling principle of our actions³²² (i.e., the deliberative part of our rational soul), so that with talk of its being corrupted he has in mind those cases in which one is convinced that something bad is good and, accordingly, is also corrupted in regard to one's ends. The same is true of our second passage, *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a25, which aims at explaining the claim that the incontinent agent is better than the intemperate and that the incontinent is not base without qualification by saying that, in the case of the incontinent agent, 'the best element, namely the principle, is preserved' (*σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή*). Right before this Aristotle characterised the incontinent as someone who 'departs from right reason due to emotion, over whom emotion prevails in such a way that one does not act in accordance with right reason, but over whom emotion does not prevail in such a way that one is such as to be convinced that they should pursue such pleasures [i.e., bodily pleasures] without restraint' (1151^a20–24: *ἔστιν δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτο οἶον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής*). As a result, in saying that the principle is preserved in the incontinent agent, Aristotle means that they do not think that performing a

³²² See Barney (2018, p. 297) on the meaning of *ἀρχή* here and in our second passage, i.e., *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a25. For the idea that reason is by nature more ruling in that it is a higher element in comparison to desire, see *DA* III.11 434^a14–15.

vicious action is good for them, which strongly suggests that they are actually committed to fine ends (i.e., it is not only the case that their reason is preserved in that they are not convinced that bad things are good, but also that their principle *qua* end is preserved), whereas agents who are corrupted would be agents who aim for base ends as if they were fine ends (i.e., are agents whose principle *qua* end too is corrupted, but whose reason is nevertheless still a ruling principle different from what happens in cases of bestiality, although the reason of agents whose principle is corrupted like the intemperate is, in a way, subservient to their non-rational appetites).

But if this is what Aristotle has in mind in **T 19** when he talks of agents who are corrupted by pleasure or pain, then it is not so clear why temperance is said to preserve beliefs concerning practical principles, for it would clearly not be necessary for that if the principle is indeed preserved when we are dealing with incontinent agents.

A way out of this difficulty is to say that although the principle is indeed preserved in the case of incontinent agents, they are not safe from having their principle corrupted, for they lack temperance. In that case, these passages from *EN VII* would be compatible with **T 19**, since virtue would secure that one's ends are not corrupted, which is compatible with the ends of agents who are not fully virtuous being preserved, since the ends of such agents would be liable to corruption nevertheless in that they lack temperance.

That being said, what exactly is the meaning of *εὐθύς* in **T 19**?

I have translated **T 19** above taking *εὐθύς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην,' so that Aristotle would be saying that the end does not manifest itself to an agent who is naturally (see footnote 318) corrupted by pleasure or pain. There are, however, two other alternative syntactical readings, both of which take *εὐθύς* with 'οὐ φαίνεται,' which is perhaps more natural given the word order.

The first alternative reading is to take *εὐθύς* as merely strengthening the negative, so that Aristotle's point here would be that the end simply does not manifest itself to an agent who is corrupted by pleasure or pain.³²³ This is the alternative I shall end up favouring. The other alternative is to take *εὐθύς* as qualifying *φαίνεται*, so that the point would be either that the end does not manifest itself immediately (temporal) to an agent who is corrupted by pleasure or pain (in which case it would seem that it can manifest itself afterwards, say, after some reflection takes place) or that the end does not manifest itself immediately (logical/causal) to an agent who is corrupted by pleasure or pain (in which case the thought would be that the end can only manifest itself to agents who are corrupted by pleasure or pain *mediately*, e.g., through something else).

Although some translators have taken *εὐθύς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην'³²⁴—which would seem to imply that Aristotle does not have in mind here any old agent who is corrupted by pleasure or pain, but, more specifically, agents who are, due to their own nature, corrupted by pleasure or pain—, it seems that the only way of making sense of this qualification is to distinguish between intemperate agents, who are agents whose very nature consists in their being corrupted by pleasure and pain, and other vicious agents, who despite also being corrupted by pleasure and pain, should still be differentiated from intemperate agents in that they are not corrupted by pleasure and pain *directly* (due to their very nature),

³²³ This might be how Dirlmeier (1959, p. 127) is understanding the text, but his translation is ambiguous as to whether this is indeed how he is understanding it. He translates the passage as '[e]inem Menschen aber, der durch Lust und Unlust innerlich zerstört ist, zeigt sich schon gleich kein Ansatzpunkt des Handelns mehr und auch kein Antrieb.' Now, although the way in which he translates the negative suggest that he is taking it to be emphasised by *εὐθύς*, the fact that he says that the agents corrupted by pleasure and pain are internally (innerlich) corrupted by pleasure and pain, might be a sign that he is actually construing *εὐθύς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην' instead.

³²⁴ See the translations for this passage proposed by Greenwood (1909, p. 99), Jolif (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 167), and Rowe (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, p. 180). Similarly, Tuozzo (2019, p. 165) also construes *εὐθύς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην,' but the way he translates the passage makes poor sense of the attributive position of *διεφθαρμένῳ*, which he seemingly takes as a circumstantial participle: 'and once someone is corrupted through pleasure or pain the first principle does not appear to him,' but perhaps one could justify this construal of *διεφθαρμένῳ* if one changed the article τῷ into an indefinite τῷ.

since not all vices are about bodily pleasures and pains, although pleasures and pains are involved in all vices.

Yet the position of *εὐθύς* makes it more natural to take it with what comes after it, rather than with what comes before it.³²⁵ That being said, I would like to suggest that we should only read *εὐθύς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονῆν ἢ λύπην' if we cannot make good philosophical sense of text reading *εὐθύς* with 'οὐ φαίνεται.'

Now, although restricting the claim made here to intemperate agents makes good sense in the context (since this passage is meant to clarify the explanation Aristotle gave to the claim that temperance does not preserve any *ὑπόληψις*, but *φρόνησις*), it is not necessary to take it in this way. Aristotle could be clarifying the explanation he gave to a claim concerning temperance by appealing to a more general principle according to which vicious agents in general are not agents to whom fine ends manifest themselves due to the fact that these agents are all corrupted by pleasure or pain in some way. As a result, because temperance is a virtue that concerns pleasures and pains (although it concerns only bodily pleasures and pains related to the sense of touch), it would have a central place in preserving the *ὑπόληψις* that consists in *φρόνησις*.

Moreover, in the context, Aristotle may not have his technical sense of temperance in mind (according to which it concerns bodily pleasures and pains that have to do with the sense of touch), since the etymological claim that *σωφροσύνη* got its name due to its preserving *φρόνησις* is a clear reference to Plato's *Cratylus*,³²⁶ in which case one could say that by *σωφροσύνη* Aristotle does not mean here a virtue that concerns bodily pleasures and pains related to the sense of touch, but a virtue that concerns pleasures and pains in general.³²⁷

³²⁵ It is telling that the mss. usually place a comma right before *εὐθύς* and that most translators since Grosseteste have taken *εὐθύς* with 'οὐ φαίνεται.'

³²⁶ *Cra.* 411e4–412a1: 'And "temperance" is the preservation of that which we just now examined [i.e., in lines 411d5–7]: prudence' ("σωφροσύνη" δὲ σωτηρία οὐ νυνδὲ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως).

³²⁷ No doubt Plato usually talks of temperance as concerning appetites and pleasures without any quali-

In any case, if *εὐθὺς* should be read with 'οὐ φαίνεται,' it is unclear whether it should be taken as merely emphasising the negative, although this makes perfect sense of the text (which would then be perfectly compatible with 1144a31-b1, since T 19 would be simply denying that the end can show itself to vicious agents). In fact, although the position of *εὐθὺς* suggests either that it is merely strengthening the negative, or else, less plausibly, that it is to be read with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην' (the option I just rejected for philosophical reasons), if we look at the other passages in which Aristotle writes *εὐθὺς* immediately before a negative, we see that it is not usually employed to emphasise the negative:

In *EE* II.5 1222^a36–37, to explain why in some cases the excess and the deficiency are not both described by people as being contrary to the mean (but one of them is privileged), Aristotle says that this happens 'because, right away, our nature is not distant from the mean in the same way in regard to everything' (διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου). Similarly, in *Pol.* V.10 1313^a14–15, Aristotle explains the fact that the end of kingship comes about easily by saying: 'for if <one's subjects> do not want <one to be a king anymore> one immediately ceases from being a king' (μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς). A more controversial case is *Pol.* VII.13 1332^a2–3, where he says that 'other persons do not pursue happiness correctly from the outset despite being able to attain it' (οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης), and here it seems that

fiction (e.g., *Phd.* 68c8–c12 and *Smp.* 196c4–c8), but in talking of appetite perhaps he may be already thinking of a desire for pleasures that involve a perceived lack, and thus of a desire for bodily pleasures, in which case the Platonic conception of temperance as being concerned with pleasures and appetites will not be much different from the Aristotelian. Yet it is telling that in the *EE* Aristotle has to argue that temperance is concerned not with any appetite or pleasure (οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας [sc. ἐπιθυμίας] οὐδὲ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων), but with appetites for bodily pleasures related to the sense of touch (see *EE* III.1 1230^b22ff). My hypothesis is that Aristotle may be responding here to the conception of temperance we can find in the *Gorgias*: in *Gorg.* 507a5ff, for instance, Plato identifies being temperate with being good, and then, in *Gorg.* 517b5ff appears to conceive of the act of redirecting one's appetites by means of persuasion as a way of making citizens better. In any case, my argument does not depend on taking a position on this matter or on claiming Aristotle does not have his technical sense of temperance here, although this would give further support to it.

nothing hinders us from taking *εὐθύς* as emphasising the negative, since what Aristotle wants to do in the context is, in rough lines, to contrast i) people who are able to attain happiness, ii) people who are not able to attain happiness due to lacking external resources, and iii) people who despite being able to attain happiness do not pursue it correctly. But perhaps the qualification introduced by *εὐθύς* makes good sense in the context if it is pointing out that these persons do not attain *εὐδαιμονία* not due to some cause different from *εὐδαιμονία* (as the second group of persons, who are said not to be able to attain happiness *διὰ τινα τύχην ἢ φύσιν*), but due to not pursuing *εὐδαιμονία* correctly right from the beginning: they err in, right from the start, not pursuing *εὐδαιμονία* correctly despite being able to attain it.

This does not mean, however, that *εὐθύς* cannot emphasise a negative. A very clear example of that can be found in a passage from Plutarch's *Galba* (5.2 [=Ziegler 353.18–24]), where, talking about the fact that people began to call Galba emperor (*αὐτοκράτωρ*), Plutarch says that 'he [sc., Galba] did not accept this denomination at all, but, after denouncing Nero and lamenting the most notable among the men that were killed by him [sc., by Nero], he agreed to devote his own care to the country, being called neither Caesar nor emperor, but general of the Senate and of the Roman people' (*ὁ δὲ ταύτην μὲν εὐθύς οὐ προσεδέξατο τὴν προσηγορίαν, κατηγορήσας δὲ τοῦ Νέρωνος, καὶ τῶν ἀνηρημένων ἀνδρῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους ὀλοφυράμενος, ὡμολόγησεν ἐπιδώσειν τῇ πατρίδι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρόνοιαν, οὔτε Καῖσαρ οὔτε αὐτοκράτωρ, στρατηγὸς δὲ συγκλήτου καὶ δήμου Ῥωμαίων ὀνομαζόμενος*). In this passage, *εὐθύς* is clearly emphasising the negative, since, as the *δέ* clause that responds to the *μέν* clause makes clear, Galba never accepted being called emperor, so the passage cannot be taken as saying that he did not accept being called emperor right away, but accepted it later.

In any case, what the passages from Aristotle's *corpus* make clear is that, despite its

position, *εὐθὺς* *can* be modifying the action of the main verb and not the negative that follows it immediately. So, to decide what makes better sense of the text, let me explore this possibility further.

A first way of construing *εὐθὺς* as modifying the action of the main verb would be to take it as having a temporal meaning. This is what Eustratius does in his commentary. He says that the person whose reason has been corrupted by pleasure or pain 'does not see the principle (namely, the final cause) *εὐθὺς*, but requires attention, so that they can recover from the emotion and look keenly at the good without error' (*CAG. XX, 311.36–312.1: οὐχ ὀρᾶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς, ἤτοι τὸ τελικὸν αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτῷ μελέτης, ἵνα ἀνανήψῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀπλανῶς ἐντρανίσῃ τῷ ἀγαθῷ*), and it is clear that the point is that the person corrupted by pleasure or pain does not see the principle right away, but must take some effort to see the principle (which takes time). Yet this would mean that the principle can indeed manifest itself to who are not fully virtuous, except that it does not manifest itself *right away*, which would contradict 1144^a31-^b1, giving us good reason to reject this interpretation.

The only other way of making sense of *εὐθὺς* as modifying the action of the main verb is to follow Bonitz (1870, s.v. *εὐθὺς*, p. 296^a13-21), who, as I have indicated in footnote 318, mentions 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἢ ἀρχή' as one of his examples of the causal sense of *εὐθὺς*, which indicates that something is related to something else due to its own nature, without the intermission of other causes. In that case, and if *εὐθὺς* is indeed to be taken with *φαίνεται*, the idea would be that a fine end (for end is being used normatively here) does not manifest itself directly to agents who are corrupted by pleasure or pain. Accordingly, the thought here could be that vicious agents cannot see a fine end *due to what it is*, i.e., in so far as it is *intrinsically fine*, but can only see it as an end to be pursued (and thus as being fine in some sense) in so far as they see it as a means to some other end they

take to be fine (however mistaken they might be in doing so).

If this is to make sense, however, Aristotle must have situation-specific ends₃ in mind here, so that he would be admitting that even vicious agents might think that fine situation-specific goals are fine, but that these ends do not manifest themselves as fine to them because they are fine, but because such agents see these ends as means to further ends that they take to be intrinsically fine (even if, in the case of vicious agents, these ends are rather base). For instance, someone may think that withstanding fearful things in such and such a way in these circumstances is what one must do for the sake of saving one's country (and saving one's country in this way is something fine to do in these circumstances), but they might be aiming for this end₃ (sc. saving one's country) not because they see the intrinsic fineness of achieving that in this way in the circumstances they are faced with, but because they aim at the honour that will be conferred to someone who achieves that in battle, and honour, in turn, may contribute to, say, their becoming a tyrant. In that case, a fine end (saving one's country in such and such a way in these circumstances) is manifesting itself to an agent who is corrupted by pleasure or pain, but it is not manifesting itself *directly*.

As a result, instead of contradicting 1144^a31-b¹, **T 19** would be making a different claim: it would be saying that fine ends cannot manifest themselves directly to vicious agents because these agents cannot see these ends as intrinsically fine, which is compatible with the claim that the best end only shows itself to agents who are fully virtuous, for in saying that fine ends do not show themselves directly to vicious agents, Aristotle would be at the same time denying that these ends are really showing themselves to such agents, for these agents are not seeing these ends as what they are, but *qua* something else.

No doubt this can also make good philosophical sense of what is at issue here in **T 19**, but I think it makes Aristotle's point a bit far-fetched, since nowhere in the context he seems

to suggest something that goes in this direction. For that reason, I shall assume instead that *εὐθὺς* is merely emphasising the negative, which, despite not being usual in Aristotle, is not only possible in Greek (as we saw in the passage from Plutarch) and makes good sense of the position of *εὐθὺς* (different from taking *εὐθὺς* with 'τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονῆν ἢ λύπην'), but makes the text philosophically more straightforward, since Aristotle would be simply denying that the end can manifest itself to vicious agents, which is perfectly compatible with holding that it manifests itself only to fully virtuous agents. In any case, as will become clear later in this Dissertation, I also think that Aristotle holds a view according to which agents who fail to be fully virtuous can only aim for fine ends *mediately* in that they do not aim for fine ends for their own sakes, but only in so far as these fine ends are for the sake of something different from their intrinsic fineness. Thus, although this reading is *not* what is at issue at T 19 and should thus be rejected as an interpretation of this text, this reading captures something I shall argue Aristotle ultimately endorses.

Now, to talk about what Aristotle means by an end *manifesting* itself to someone—which is fundamental for fully understanding what is being said by Aristotle both in T 18 and in T 19—,³²⁸ I would like to begin analysing another passage from the common

³²⁸ As I shall suggest below, I think that talk of the end manifesting itself or not manifesting itself has something to do with the epistemological position one is in in regard to the end aimed for. As a result, only virtuous persons would be in a position to attain a full understanding of their end (since the end is only manifest to someone who is good), just like people with experience in a scientific domain are in a privileged position to attain *ἐπιστήμη* or *τέχνη* in that domain, but are not *εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστήμονες* or *τεχνῖται*. This is somewhat different from the position held by Angioni (2011, p. 312), who claims that, in 1140^b18ff, *φαίνεται* does not have the purely cognitive sense of being manifest or clear, but the stronger sense of being evident in a way that is relevant for imposing itself for moral assent (and the same would be true of other passages such as *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a30–31 and III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^b14 and 17), in which case, as Angioni argues, Aristotle would not be saying that vicious agents are not aware of the moral principles in question, or have some cognitive flaw that impedes them from understanding these moral precepts (as if they were acting due to some sort of ignorance), but rather that they do not give their moral assent to these principles. By contrast, my contention is that, in saying that the good end does not manifest itself to vicious agents, Aristotle is indeed pointing to a cognitive flaw of vicious agents, who, according to Aristotle, are really ignorant of the universal, although not of the circumstances of action (see, for instance, *EN* III.1 [=Bywater III.2] 1110^b28–1111^a2). Thus, it is perhaps due to the best end not being manifest to vicious agents that they are ignorant of it.

books that I think gives us reason for saying not only that vice prevents one from seeing the best end, but also that virtue helps one to conceive of it correctly in that it enables one to see it *as something fine*, which is further reason for thinking that 1144^a31-^b1 should be read in the way I am reading these lines: as saying that the end manifests itself only to fully virtuous agents. The passage I have in mind is *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a14-20:

T 20 – *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^a14–20

1151a14

15 || γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ | δὲ
σῶζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν | τοῖς
μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὐτε δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς
τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ | ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ
20 ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σῶφρον μὲν οὖν ὁ || τοιοῦτος, ἀκό-
λαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. κτλ.

|| a15 ἢ LL^bO^b: om. K^bP^bC^cB^{95sup}.VM^b || a15–16 ἢ δὲ
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}. mg.V: om. V || a17 ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖ B^{95sup}. | ὁ om. L^bO^b || a19
ἐθιστὴ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐθιστικὴ M^b

In fact, [15] virtue and vice, respectively, preserve and corrupt the principle, and in practical matters the for the sake of which is a principle, just like hypotheses are principles in mathematics. Then, neither here [sc., in mathematics] is reason instructive about the principles, nor <is reason instructive about the principles> there [sc., in practical matters], **but rather<, in practical matters,> a virtue, either natural or habituated, is <instructive> about attaining a correct opinion in regard to the principle.** Thus, temperate is [20] such an agent, and intemperate is the contrary agent. Etc.

This passage (which offers an explanation to a contrast between incontinent and unjust agents according to which the first are easy to dissuade [*εὐμετάπειστος*] but the latter are not)³²⁹ appears to attribute to virtue a quasi-intellectual role in the apprehension of the ends of action. For that reason, Richard Loening (1903, pp. 42n4, 266n22), for instance, tried to weaken the point made here. At a first moment (p. 42n4), he claims that the virtue meant here is *φρόνησις* rather than moral virtue (which would not make much sense, since, properly speaking, there is no natural *φρόνησις*³³⁰). Later (p. 266n22), he explains better his point by

³²⁹ Which is Aristotle's response to a problem raised earlier, according to which the incontinent is harder to cure than the vicious—see *EN* VII.3 [=Bywater VII.2] 1146^a31-^b2.

³³⁰ Cf. *Top.* II.11 115^b16-17: 'for no one is practically wise by nature' (*οὐδεὶς γὰρ φύσει φρόνιμος*).

claiming that this passage is asking whether the virtue responsible for conceiving of the end correctly is natural or habituated, a question he takes to be equivalent to asking whether it is natural or full virtue that is responsible for conceiving of the end correctly.³³¹ As a result, in the second case (i.e., if full virtue is responsible for conceiving of the end correctly), it is *φρόνησις* that would be the virtue responsible for conceiving of the end correctly, since *φρόνησις* is implied by full virtue. In any case, Loening thinks that this passage leaves this question unanswered.³³²

There are two issues with Loening's view, though: First, habituated virtue does not need to be identified with full virtue (see below the mention of *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b21–31 and footnote 344); and second, 'ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή' can be construed both as 'either natural or habituated virtue' (as Loening construes it) or as 'a virtue—either natural or habituated.' In the latter case, Aristotle might not be ruling out the possibility of both natural and habituated virtue being able to perform the same role, but would be only emphasising that the virtue that performs this role can be either natural or habituated.³³³

Similarly, see, for instance, Lawrence (2011, p. 255n42), who emphasises that although Aristotle sometimes talks of *φρόνησις* in a wide sense, according to which even animals can be said to be *φρόνιμοι* (which seems to be due a sort of natural *φρόνησις*), strictly speaking there is no natural *φρόνησις*.

³³¹ Similarly, the anonymous scholiast (*CAG*. XX, 440.1–2) writes 'but a virtue, either natural or habituated (i.e., moral) has the right opinion (i.e., discovers correctly the principle—i.e., the end) and is not led astray' (ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἥτοι ἡ φυσικὴ ἢ ἡ ἐθιστή, ἥτοι ἡ ἠθικὴ ὀρθοδοξεῖ, ἥτοι ὀρθῶς ἐφευρίσκει τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἥτοι τὸ τέλος καὶ οὐ πλανᾶται), which also seems to suggest that habituated virtue is to be identified with full virtue.

³³² 'Ähnlich wie hier [sc., III.7 1114b16ff] wird es auch in VII 9, 1151 18 dahingestellt gelassen, ob die ἀρετὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν (d.h. περὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα) ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή sei' (p. 266n22).

³³³ However, as Moss (2012, p. 170) observes, '[t]here are two ways to read this qualification: either Aristotle is explaining more fully than he does in the other Goal passages what he means by "virtue" – all virtue is either natural or habituated, and either type can make the goal right – or he is restricting the work of making the goal right to two species of virtue among several.' Now, I do not think that this passage is about making ends right to begin with (for which I take full virtue to be required), but rather about necessary conditions for conceiving of the end correctly, and thus for having a right end. In any case, a decision about whether Aristotle is here assuming that all virtue is natural or habituated or else is talking of two types of virtue among others depends on a decision about what habituated virtue refers to. If habituated virtue is the same as full virtue, then we should prefer the first reading; but if habituated virtue is rather a non-innate analogue of natural virtue, then the second reading is to be preferred (since full virtue would be out of the picture, for which reason Aristotle could not be making a division of the types of virtue that is meant to be exhaustive).

Moreover, the word order appears to suggest that this second rendering is to be reading is to be preferred. Thus, a case as good as Loening's³³⁴ can be made for thinking that the role of being instructive regarding the correct conception of the end can be performed by both natural and habituated virtue, and, as I would like to suggest, for thinking that habituated virtue is a disposition analogous to natural virtue, which should not be conflated with full virtue.

If this is true, it is striking that even natural virtue can perform that role.³³⁵ In the face of this, some simply deny that T 20 is attributing to virtue the role of being instructive (*διδασκαλική*) about correctly opining about the principles, for although supplying *διδασκαλική ἐστὶ* is grammatically required, it might be the case that 'nothing more is really meant than *κυρία ἐστὶ*' (Burnet, 1900, p. 235).³³⁶ As Burnet goes on to say that '[t]here is nothing unusual in a zeugma like this, and the sentence does not force us to believe that *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ* is able to *διδάσκειν*' (p. 325). This reading goes back to Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 136.32–137.1), who paraphrases what is being said in here in terms of natural and habituated virtue being 'causes of the correct opining about the principle for the sake of which' (*αὐται γὰρ αἰτίαι τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς οὐ ἔνεκα*). As I understand it, Aspasius' reading (which is also shared by Grant—see footnote 336) can be construed as being even weaker than Burnet's, since something can be cause of something else without being in control of it (i.e., without being *κύριον* of it).

More recently, Jessica Moss (2012, pp. 170-174) also weakened the sense of *διδασκαλική*, taking Aristotle to mean that the dispositions of our non-rational characters merely

³³⁴ I shall come back to Loening's reading when discussing *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^b16ff (T 50) in Chapter 3.

³³⁵ Broadie (2009, p. 161n12) reports that it was pointed out in the discussion during the Symposium Aristotelicum that this is a 'deliberate oxymoron.'

³³⁶ Burnet is here followed by Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 4, p. 648). Similarly, Grant (1885, vol. 2, p. 226) says that '[o]ne would have expected *αἰτία*.'

determine the content of what appears to be good to us, since seeing something as pleasurable would be a way of seeing it as a good even when reason does not take part in this process. Accordingly, virtue would teach us how to conceive of the end correctly by providing us with the contents of what is good, and the role of reason would be restricted to giving assent to these *φαντασίαι* (see Moss, 2012, pp. 163, 223–233). Yet Moss does not think that agents who do not share the *φαντασίαι* of the good had by fully virtuous agents cannot aim for fine ends, it is just that because the fully virtuous grasp of the good is grounded on their *φαντασίαι* of the good, their grasp of the good should count as a sort of knowledge (in contrast to that of continent and incontinent agents) (Moss, 2012, p. 225n44).

David Charles (2015, pp. 91–92), in turn, thinks that it is important that Aristotle says *διδασκαλική* here, which suggests that virtue, in some sense, gives us reason for taking something as a goal of action. In that case, it could be said that the point of this passage is that practical reason essentially involves a conative aspect, so that if one does not display adequate motivational responses to what one takes to be good, then one would not have conceived of it correctly, so that even natural virtue, in so far as it makes one display adequate motivational responses to what is really good, would contribute to the correct conception of the good, and it is this conative response towards the good secured by virtue that gives us reason for adopting it as a goal.³³⁷

Yet both Moss' and Charles' readings depend on some assumptions that may be objected to. In particular, Moss' reading depends on a controversial interpretation of Aristotle's talk of '*φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*,' which she understands in terms of *φαντασίαι* one has of the

³³⁷ This is how Charles understands what is being said in 1144^a34. In any case, he thinks that the claim made 1151^a18 is considerably stronger than that, since here virtue is said to teach about the correct thinking about the goals, and '[t]eaching, unlike indoctrinating, involves giving reasons' (p.91). Charles' explanation of what is going on here consists rather in saying that 'the experience of acting finely, and satisfying their desires in doing so, gives the practically wise a reason to take so acting as their goal. The doing of fine actions, as experienced by the naturally or trained virtuous, can be correctly described as the "teacher" of correct thinking about the goal' (p.92).

good, which retain the perceptive data of perceptions of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain being, in turn, the perceptual manifestations of the good.³³⁸ Charles' reading, in turn, depends on a controversial thesis about how the relationship between reason and desire should be construed.³³⁹

I do not wish to reject the conclusion drawn by Charles that Aristotle views 'the virtuous' distinctive grasp of their goals as consisting in their experiencing, and therein being attracted to, the fineness of acting virtuously' (2015, p. 91), my only contention is that perhaps the virtuous' distinctive grasp of their goals may not, properly speaking, consist in, but rather depend on, 'their experiencing, and therein being attracted to, the fineness of acting virtuously,' in which case this conclusion can also be secured in a quite refined intellectualist framework, without requiring one to subscribe to inextricabilism, although my position is compatible with inextricabilism as formulated by Charles. In that case, my way of answering the End Question will have some rhetorical advantages over Charles', since it neither depends on accepting inextricabilism in order to work, nor does it directly support inextricabilist interpretations of Aristotle's views on the relationship between form and matter, in which case it could be objected to if inextricabilism turns out not to be successful in capturing with precision Aristotle's views.

³³⁸ This view advanced by Moss depends heavily on her interpretation of the 'definition' of pleasure found in *DA* III.7 431^a8–14, according to which experiencing pleasure and pain amounts to being active with the perceptual mean in relation to what is good and bad as such. Her view of this passage is far from uncontroversial, however. For some issues in Moss' defence of an intensional reading of this passage, see Vasiliou (2014, pp. 363–365). For an alternative reading of this passage, see Corcilius (2008, pp. 67ff; 2011; 2020, pp. 199–201), who not only defends an extensional reading of this passage, but also claims quite convincingly that it is not even concerned with pleasure and pain in general, but with bodily pleasures and bodily pains that have to do with the reestablishment of one's natural condition and the being out of one's natural condition (respectively), which are sorts of pleasure and pain that also are discussed in both treatises of pleasure in the *EN*.

³³⁹ Although in his recent presentation of inextricabilism Charles (2021) responds to the objections raised by Caston (2008) against an earlier formulation of his thesis, there are some remaining issues raised by Corcilius (2021) which still makes his views objectionable to some degree. Thus, if there is a way of defending my answer to the End Question without assuming inextricabilism, it is preferable.

Moss' view, in turn, faces more serious issues,³⁴⁰ although it is indeed true that pleasure can *indicate* somehow what one should take as good for oneself (even though it is not always to be trusted in that regard),³⁴¹ and that it can be described as being, in some sense, a way of experiencing things as good, but perhaps not as good *qua* object of βούλησις.³⁴²

In any case, for now I would only like to suggest a more deflationary way of reading of T 20, according to which all that is being said by it is that, in so far as virtue makes one appreciate somehow what is fine (by making one take pleasure in things that are fine), it both gives some indication of what the agent should take as good, and, more importantly, it is a step towards one becoming able to experience these fine things as fine for them.³⁴³

On this reading of the passage, one also does not need to commit oneself to thinking that

³⁴⁰ Since there is good reason for thinking that pleasure and pain are not objects of perception (see footnote 338), although they are something connected to the activity of perception, so that one cannot say that there are φαντασίαι that have pleasure and pain as their objects as well. In that case, Moss' proposal would not get off the ground.

³⁴¹ In fact, as Broadie (1991, p. 317) rightly observes, our love for the pleasures we are educated to take in fine things 'can be taken to excess; for our love of them, in every case, is not limited to just those times and places where we can pursue them without detriment to a more important end.'

³⁴² I mean, if we distinguish between two senses of good in Aristotle, as Pearson (2012, pp. 9-10, 68ff) proposes, one which encompasses all objects of desire, and one which refers specifically to the object of βούλησις, whose grasp depends on reason, then pleasure would be a way of grasping the good in the first sense, but not in the second sense, in which case it would be possible, for instance, for something to be appear good (*sub specie* pleasure), but also be thought bad (*sub specie* the narrow notion of bad that corresponds to the narrow notion of good that is the object of βούλησις) (Pearson, 2012, p. 76n13). In rough lines, the idea is that seeing something as pleasurable is a way of seeing something as good in that it amounts to seeing something as contributing to the attainment of pleasure, and thus as something that is a good in the sense of a means to an end, which is a type of goodness that Aristotle says applies κατ' ἀναλογίαν to all domains.

³⁴³ The view I am arguing for here is to some extent similar to that of Engberg-Pedersen (1983, pp. 184-186), according to whom the point here is not only that (a) the sort of grasp of the good required by φρόνησις requires a certain corresponding state of desire and that (b) this desiderative state must be present independently of this grasp of the good, but also that (c) this grasp 'arises in some way, e.g. by induction, from the desiderative state.' Thus, Aristotle's point here would not merely be that a certain condition of one's non-rational soul is required if one is to have in the full sense a grasp of the end, but that their grasp of the end 'is acquired not by rational argument but directly from the person's moral state.' That is, natural and habituated virtue would teach us a correct conception (or opinion) of the end not only in so far as it is an enabling condition for a full grasp of the end, but also in so far as it makes the right end salient to us in a case by case basis, thus indicating what we should take as good. Yet Engberg-Pedersen also appears to suggest that only virtuous agents are properly convinced of their views about the end, in which case it would seem that only virtuous agents really endorse the views they entertain about the good. Thus, if intermediate agents, for instance, are to be able to aim for morally good ends, it seems that a *desideratum* would be that they too are properly convinced of views about the end that are right to some limited extent, although they would not grasp it in the same way as practically wise agents. More on this below.

'habituated virtue' picks out full virtue. It could be referring, for instance, to some disposition like natural virtue but which is acquired through habituation (cf. *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b21–31),³⁴⁴ so that the point here may be that by having a disposition to take pleasure in things that are really fine (irrespective of whether this propensity has been acquired by habit or is inborn), one is in a privileged position for conceiving of the good, because one knows in a pre-theoretical sense what is good for oneself.³⁴⁵ As a result, these agents are in a condition that is necessary (but still non-sufficient) for being able to appreciate the fine *qua* fine.

Thus, we can make good sense of the claim that virtue is *διδασκαλική* without weakening or modifying this claim: Charles would be right in saying that this means that virtue give

³⁴⁴ Along the same lines, see Aufderheide (2020, pp. 233–236, 235n168), Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 648–649), and Moss (2012, pp. 172–174). Similarly, Bostock (2000, p. 86) attempts to make sense of Aristotle's claims on natural virtue by making a distinction between three levels of virtue: the first would correspond to natural virtue; the second, to habituated virtue; whereas the third and final level would correspond to full virtue. Yet Bostock appears to think that habituated virtue is the sort of virtue Aristotle is discussing in *EN* II, a claim I do not think we should so readily accept. First, it seems perfectly feasible to think that, in some instances at least, habituated virtue is not much different from natural virtue, in which case the idea would be that some people 'are simply ready to receive virtue [i.e. full virtue](by nature), whereas others need habituation to get to that point' (Aufderheide, 2020, p. 235n167). For a similar argument, see Tuozzo (2019, p. 169). However, this does not preclude habituated virtue from also being the adequate label for imperfect forms of virtue such as forms of civic virtue, which seem to require more than a mere tendency towards virtue, since civically virtuous agents are committed to performing virtuous actions in so far as they are committed to securing external goods for themselves by means of virtuous activities. I shall discuss civic virtue in more detail in **Chapter 2** and in **Chapter 3**.

³⁴⁵ The idea that 'something's being pleasant is a prereflective way of its seeming to be good' comes from Broadie (1991, pp. 329–330). In a similar vein, Price (2021, pp. 235n55) claims there is a sort of embedding between habituated desire and *φρόνησις* that explains why the latter is not subject to forgetfulness. Now, if virtue is said to support one's grasp of the good in such a way, it would be possible to conclude that, when one does not have *φρόνησις* yet, natural virtue would in some way prompt one to take as good the things it makes one appreciate as pleasant. It must be noted, however, that such a view does not necessarily commits one to thinking that experiencing something as pleasant is a way of cognising the good as such, nor that moral cognition essentially involves non-rational conative responses to what one takes to be good. In fact, it would be sufficient to suppose i) that what is pleasant, and above all, what seems to be pleasant simpliciter suggests itself as a good, since what is good simpliciter is also pleasant simpliciter, as Aristotle insistently remarks in the *EE*, and ii) that if practical reason is to be effective in eliciting action, the agent must take pleasure in some aspect of the things they decide on (be it their fineness or not). In fact, what I have in mind here by saying that by taking pleasure in the fine one knows in a pre-theoretical sense what is good for oneself is closer to the idea advanced by Vasiliou (1996, p. 778) when he says that '[w]hat makes ethics a special discipline is that one must already take pleasure in what is pleasant by nature and know what is knowable by nature before one even starts.' That is, taking pleasure in what is pleasant by nature (which is something that habituation enables one to do consistently) would be a requirement for having an adequate understanding of the principles one must assume in the Ethical enquiry, and, I shall contend, of the principles one must assume for acting virtuously as well.

us reason for adopting something as a goal. For, in making us take pleasure in certain things, the virtues do indeed give us reason for also thinking that these things are good, since pleasure is a sign of goodness (though it is a defeasible sign). Besides, *pace* Moss (see footnote 333), T 20 would be saying something quite different from the goal passages from the common books, since it would not be talking of making ends right in the sense these ends are right for fully virtuous agents, but about how other sorts of virtue (natural or habituated) contribute to the aiming for ends that are in some sense right in that they contribute to correctly *opining* about these ends. In that case, it will be relevant that Aristotle says *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* here,³⁴⁶ since the point is merely that natural and habituated virtue help one truly see good things as good (since the rightness of *δόξα* is truth—see *EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b11), thus making them aim for fine ends. Note that this is perfectly compatible with these fine ends not being manifest to them, since although they would be able to aim for right ends in that they aim for ends that are intrinsically fine, it may be argued that they do not aim for these ends for their own sakes (which would explain why these ends are not manifest to them—I shall come

³⁴⁶ This appears to be emphasised in the anonymous paraphrasis (*CAG*. XIX.2, 151.8–18), where *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* is paraphrased in terms of having a correct *δόξα*, and the incontinent, in contrast to the temperate person, is said not to know the good, but simply to assume a right end and to believe that they should organise their actions for its sake: 'but a certain virtue, natural or habituated, is capable of having the right opinion about the end. In fact, such cognition comes to us as a result either of nature or of a good character. Now, the person who knows the good which must be established as the end of actions, and who does the things that are conducive to it is temperate, while the person who assumes evil as an end and organises the pleasures towards it is intemperate. But the person who assumes a good end and believes they should organise their actions towards it, but who departs from the right reason due to emotion, not in such a way as to believe that they must pursue such pleasures, but in such a way that they only err in regard to their actions, such a person is neither temperate nor intemperate, but is worse than the temperate due to their actions, and better than the intemperate due to their reason' (*ἀλλὰ ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή, τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχειν περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ἢ γὰρ φύσει ἢ ἀπὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἔθους ἢ τοιαύτη ἡμῖν περιγίνεται γνῶσις. ὁ μὲν οὖν εἰδὼς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὁ δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τέλος τῶν πράξεων, καὶ πράττων ἂ πρὸς αὐτὸ φέρει, σώφρων· ὁ δὲ τὸ κακὸν ὑποτιθέμενος τέλος καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο τάττων τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀκόλαστος. ὃς δὲ ὑποτίθεται μὲν ἀγαθὸν τέλος καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο τάττει τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πράξεις οἶεται δεῖν, ἐξίσταται δὲ διὰ πάθους τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, οὐχ ὥστε νομίσει δεόν ἐῖναι διώκειν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς, ἀλλ' ὥστε μόνον περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐξαμαρτάνειν, ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε σώφρων ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν σώφρονος χείρων διὰ τὰς πράξεις, τοῦ δὲ ἀκόλαστου βελτίων διὰ τὸν λόγον). The anonymous scholiast (*CAG*. XX, 440.2–3), in turn, glosses the claim that virtue is instructive of the *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* saying that it 'correctly discovers the principle' (*ἵτοι ὀρθῶς ἐφευρίσκει τὴν ἀρχήν*), which may seem to be a bit stronger than merely having a right opinion depending on how the *ὀρθῶς* is understood.*

back to this below).

There is, however, an objection to such a view that has been raised by Tuozzo (2019, p. 169), who thinks that in this passage *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* is not denoting 'a way of grasping moral first principles that falls short of the grasp that the truly virtuous have' due to the fact that Aristotle would conclude the passage drawing the conclusion that the temperate agent has precisely this grasp Aristotle described in terms of *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* (or so Tuozzo argues).³⁴⁷ No doubt Aristotle concludes the argument by saying that 'such a person is temperate' (*σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος*). Yet this does not need to imply that the temperate should be described as someone who *ὀρθοδοξεῖ* (for, given the context, an equally feasible alternative would be describing him as an agent in whom the principle is preserved).³⁴⁸ Besides, this does not even need to be seen as the beginning of a conclusion of this particular argument advanced in T 20, for it can also be interpreted as the conclusion of the whole argument that begun in EN VII.8, in which case it would briefly summarise some results of the whole discussion.³⁴⁹

In the latter case, in saying that the temperate is such an agent, Aristotle would not

³⁴⁷ This is also the view of Pierro Vettori in his commentary (1584, p. 407): 'Therefore, temperate is this person and anyone of this sort who has in the soul true opinions and propositions, whereas intemperate is the one who is contrary' (*temperans igitur hic erit, huiusmodique omnis, qui veras opiniones, sententiaque in animo habebit; intemperans autem, qui huic contrarius est*). Note, however, that Ramsauer (1878, pp. 470-471), who also seems to think that this passage is describing the temperate in terms of *ὀρθοδοξεῖν*, observes that, in itself, *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* is not sufficient for virtue, and suggests that perhaps Aristotle mentions a virtue here because he was talking of its opposite (*[a]t τὸ ὀρθοδοξεῖν per se non sufficient ut propter id certo quis sit. Dixeris virtutis, quae quidem ad hanc demonstrationem omitti poterat, mentionem tantum antitheseos causa factam esse*). In that case, saying that the temperate is such as to *ὀρθοδοξεῖν* would be an imprecision of Aristotle that could be justified in the context.

³⁴⁸ This idea seems to underlie the response Stewart (1892, vol. 2, p. 205) gives to Cook Wilson (1879, p. 36), who thinks that 'ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ... σώζει' was written by an inferior thinker in that it would imply that incontinent agents have virtue. Stewart, in turn, thinks that the ἀρετὴ in question here is the one of the *σώφρων* (who will be mentioned in the sequence, in lines 19-20), so that the point would be that 'the ἀκρατής has not yet lost the ἀρχή which ἀρετὴ (in the *σώφρων*) keeps permanently safe,' which seems to imply that the incontinent is someone for whom the principle is preserved, in contrast to the intemperate, who would be someone for whom the principle is corrupted.

³⁴⁹ This is the view of Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 688), who describes what is introduced with *σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος* as a *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*, 'i.e., a brief repetition, of the things that were said, which shows, summarily and briefly, who is properly called temperate and intemperate, and continent and incontinent' (*[h]aec est brevis repetitio eorum, quae dicta sunt, quae summam et breviter ostendit, quis proprie temperans vel intemperans, continens vel incontinens sit nominandus*).

mean an agent such as one who *ὀρθοδοξεῖ* about their end, but one such as described in *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^a22–23 as being intermediate when compared to the intemperate (who errs in pursuing excessive pleasures) and to the agent who errs in being deficient in this domain (whom Aristotle does not name here, but is called elsewhere insensible—*ἀναίσθητος*).

In the first case, in turn, in saying that the temperate is such an agent Aristotle would merely mean that the temperate too is an agent in whom the principle is preserved.

In either case, the reading of T 20 I advanced above militates in favour of thinking that a claim such as 'the best end does not manifest itself but to the good person' does not imply that only fully virtuous agents can aim for fine ends (as would be the case if this required some apprehension of the end that is enabled by full virtue), but only emphasises the epistemologically privileged position fully virtuous agents are in with regard to the end due to their moral disposition, which enables them to aim for fine end for their own sakes, for, as I intend to show later, it is only for fully virtuous agents that fine ends are also fine (see **Chapter 2**, esp. **section 2.3.3**, and **Chapter 3**, esp. **section 3.2**). Thus, whatever Aristotle means by the best end manifesting itself only to the good person, a *desideratum* is that this is stronger than the best end merely showing itself as a good and thus becoming something the agent can aim at.

Moreover, the view I am arguing for will not depend (for now at least) on the sense we attribute to the verb *φαίνεσθαι*, forcing us to decide whether it conveys a *quasi*-perceptual appearance or a rational appearance. In either case it is possible to argue for the same reading:³⁵⁰ if by *φαίνεσθαι* what is meant is a *quasi*-perceptual manifestation of the end, the idea

³⁵⁰ *Pace* Fink and Moss (2019, p. 5), who think that an answer to this question has 'significant consequences for our interpretation of Aristotle's moral psychology,' for they think that deciding the meaning of *φαίνεσθαι* in the *Ethics* amounts to deciding whether Aristotle thinks 'judgements of moral principles are the province of reason, with emotions playing merely a supporting conative or affective role' or 'that the emotions play a crucial role in moral cognition even of our ends.' I think both positions can be pursued in either reading of *φαίνεσθαι*. Moreover, note that this passage, in the way I read it, would not directly depend on how we understand Aristotle's talk of '*φαινώμενον ἀγαθόν*' either.

would be that fully virtuous agents, because they take pleasure *in the fineness* of fine things, already see the end they should pursue as something worth pursuing for its own sake, with the proviso that perhaps they do not see it as something good or as an end, but only as something pleasant;³⁵¹ but if what is meant is a rational appearance of the end, Aristotle would then be saying that representations of something as pleasant can be taken as signs of the goodness of that object, so that because fully virtuous agents love what is really fine, and, moreover, take pleasure in the fineness of fine things, these objects appear to be not only good to their reason, but also as worth pursuing for their own sakes—an inference that may be due to similarities between pleasantness and goodness,³⁵² but which may be grounded on the fact that what is good *simpliciter* is also pleasant *simpliciter*.

That being said, I would like to suggest that there is a fruitful parallel with the principles of theoretical sciences and of practical philosophy to be drawn that may perhaps shed some light into this issue. With this, I purport to show that the view I am arguing for (according to which the pleasure one takes in what is really good due to having been properly habituated is a condition for properly *understanding* what is good for oneself, since it is required if fine things are to be fine for the agent, which additionally requires one to take pleasure in the fineness of fine things) is in line not only with some things Aristotle says about the role of perception, experience, and, in general, induction as conditions for the correct apprehension of the principles of the theoretical sciences, but also, more importantly, with what he says, in the *EN*, about the role of habituation in the correct apprehension of the principles of practical philosophy.³⁵³ This parallel is an advantage of this reading in comparison to Loening's,

³⁵¹ And this would provide some grounds for taking it as a good, though, on this interpretation, what is conveyed by the end 'manifesting itself' is not yet its being taken as a good.

³⁵² On the role of similarity in the free associations made by thought, see Caston's analysis of the role of similarity in the errors described in *Insom.* 2 (1992, pp. 363–371).

³⁵³ There is no novelty in drawing such a parallel. In fact, one already comes across similar arguments in Burnet (1900, pp. 66–67), in Moss (2012, pp. 200–233), and in Charles (2015, pp. 88, 91–92). Burnet limits himself to drawing a parallel between the process by which one's *ἦθος* is formed and the process by which

since it suggests that Aristotle's claims on the need of habituation for a correct conception of the ends should be understood in a more general epistemological framework, which operates both in theoretical sciences and in practical philosophy, albeit in ways that are considerably different.

1.3.3.1.1 *Being manifest in the theoretical domain: an analogy*

To begin with—before I turn to the passages in which Aristotle talks about the role of perception, experience, and, in general, induction as conditions for the correct apprehension of the principles of the theoretical sciences—, perhaps it would be worth to take a look into a passage of the second book of Aristoxenus' *Elementa Harmonica* (Aristoxenus was a student of Aristotle's), in which an idea analogous (at least in its formulation) to that of 1144^a35-^b1 is discussed with regard to the science of harmonics, which will allow us to further clarify what is implied by the end manifesting itself to someone:

T 21 – Aristoxenus *Harm.* II 42,5-7 [=Meibom 32.31-33.1]

2.42 ἡμεῖς δ' ἀρχάς τε πειρώμεθα λαβεῖν φαινο|μένας
42 ἀπάσας τοῖς ἐμπείροις μουσικῆς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων || συμβαί-
νοντα ἀποδεικνύναι.

But we are trying to grasp principles that are—all of them—manifest to those experienced in music and to demonstrate what results from them.

In this passage,³⁵⁴ Aristoxenus suggests that the principles of harmonics that he in-

one acquires experience, the upshot being that acquiring a tendency to desire or wish fine things in so far as one takes them to be pleasant (which is what ἡθος is all about) is not full human goodness any more than mere experience is science or art. I fully take Burnet's point. Charles takes this analogy further, claiming both that the virtues offer 'emotionally convincing reasons for taking acting finely as one's goal' and that they ground the virtuous' distinctive grasp of their goals, which, for him, consists 'in their experiencing and therein being attracted to, the fineness of acting virtuously.' As already mentioned, I think this is correct, but different from Charles, I do not think this is reason for us to reject an intellectualist account, for if it is only for virtuous agents that fine things are fine, then it is clear that only virtuous agents can really see their fine ends as fine. Thus, even though agents who are not fully virtuous may endorse, and be committed to, fine ends, they would not really pursue them for their own sakes because these ends are not fine for them (I shall come back to this below in **Chapter 2**). Moss, in turn, presents a complex and interesting account of how habituation would function as a sort of practical induction. Yet because her account depends on how she interprets *DA* III.7 431^a8–14, I take her view to be misleading in some respects (see footnote 338).

³⁵⁴ There is also a further passage in which Aristoxenus comes back to a related issue, namely:

tends to grasp in the treatise are all manifest, in some unspecified way, to those experienced in music. The similarities in the language used by Aristoxenus to that used by Aristotle in 1144^a35-^b1 are striking (in none of the other passages of Aristotle I shall analyse below he uses the language of a principle being manifest to someone as he has done in the *Ethics*). If this parallel is not only linguistic, and holds true to what Aristotle says about the best end not manifesting itself but to the good person, the idea could be that moral habituation makes the principles of action manifest to the good person in a way analogous to that in which experience makes the principles of harmonics manifest to those who are experienced in music.³⁵⁵

Note, however, that there are some clear limits for this analogy, irrespective of how we construe it: since the principles of action are not principles of a science, it is clear that saying that a principle of a science is manifest to a specialist in that field may amount to something entirely different from saying that a principle of action, i.e., the end of action, is manifest to a good person. Moreover, as I shall suggest below, in **T 21** Aristoxenus seems to be saying that he intends to attain a grasp of the principles of harmonics that goes beyond the grasp of

54,19 δύο τοῖσδε· πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως | ἀληθές τε κἀφαινόμενον ἕκαστον ἔσται
20 τῶν ἀρχοειδῶν || προβλημάτων, ἔπειθ' ὅπως τοιοῦτον οἶον ἐν πρώτοις ὑπὸ
| τῆς αἰσθήσεως συνορᾶσθαι τῶν τῆς ἀρμονικῆς πραγματείας | μερῶν· τὸ
γὰρ πως ἀπαιτοῦν ἀπόδειξιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχοειδές.

Since of every science which is composed of several propositions it is fitting to attain principles from which what comes after them will be demonstrated, it would be necessary to attain <them> paying attention to these two things: First, that each fundamental proposition is true and manifest; after that, that <each fundamental proposition> is such that they are observed by perception as being among the first parts of the discipline of harmonics, for the <proposition> that somehow demands demonstration is not a fundamental one.

This passage is interesting because it assigns to perception the role of recognising some propositions as having the function of principles, and perhaps the principles of harmonics are manifest to those experienced in music because only they have a trained perception that can recognise adequate propositions as principles. These and other details, however, will not be relevant for our purposes.

I am indebted to Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro for calling my attention to these passages and discussing them with me. My translation and understanding of these passages are informed by her Portuguese translation of these passages along with her commentary on them (in Cruzeiro, 2021).

³⁵⁵ As I shall observe below, it turns out that what Aristoxenus is saying here is a bit weaker than what Aristotle may be meaning in saying that the end does not show itself but to the good person, but even so there is an analogy to be drawn here as I intend to show.

these principles had by those experienced in music, but a grasp for which being experienced is a necessary condition. As a result, if we want an exact parallel in the practical domain, we will need to look not to the fully virtuous agent, but to some agent who has a minimal grasp of the right principles of action that allows them to aim for fine ends, but which is perhaps not yet enough for aiming for fine ends for their own sakes. Yet both the *ἐπιστήμαι* and *φρόνησις* are mental states that depend on a correct apprehension of their principles, and, to this extent, given that the principles of an *ἐπιστήμη* must be manifest to a person if they are to be an *ἐπιστήμων*, and must be manifest in a way different from the way in which it is manifest to the merely experienced, a *desideratum* would be that the ends of action must not only be manifest to a person if they are to be *φρόνιμος*, but must also be manifest in a way different from, and more demanding than, the way in which it is manifest to someone who has merely natural or habituated virtue.

However far-fetched this parallel with Aristoxenus may sound at first glance, in the *Posterior Analytics* there is a passage quite similar to Aristoxenus', which makes the analogy I am proposing more plausible in so far as it gives us reason for thinking that Aristotle's view on the principles of theoretical sciences corresponds to something along these lines:

Τ 22 – *APo* II.9 93^b21–28

93b21

ὥστε

| δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα καὶ ἀρχαί εἰσι, ³⁵⁶ | ἃ
καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον | φανερά
25 ποιῆσαι (ὅπερ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ποιεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τί || ἐστὶ τὴν μο-
νάδα ὑποτίθεται, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν)· τῶν δ' ἐχόντων μέσον, καὶ ὧν
ἐστὶ τι ἕτερον αἴτιον τῆς οὐσίας, ἐστὶ δι' | ἀποδείξεως, ὥσπερ
εἴπομεν, δηλῶσαι, μὴ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύοντας.

³⁵⁶ I retain the comma before the relative *ἃ* here in line 22 that is printed by Ross, so that this relative clause is explanatory or digressive rather than restrictive. The deletion of this comma has been proposed by Zuppolini (2017, p. 133n229), and it has the upshot of securing the possibility of definitions of things whose cause of the being is something else being principles as well. The alternative to this, which is the reading I am favouring here, would be to understand the text as Detel (1993, vol. 2, p. 665) does, who thinks that both types of *τί ἐστὶν* can be premises in demonstrations, but not all demonstrations have fundamental principles of sciences as their premises, but only the most basic demonstrations of a science have principles as their premises (likewise, see Themistius paraphrasis [*CAG*. V.1, 50.25]). According to Zuppolini's view,

Therefore, it is evident that among the ‘what is’ some are immediate <propositions> and principles, in regard to which it is necessary to hypothesise or to make it manifest in some other way both that they are the case and what they are (which is precisely what the arithmetician does, for he hypothesises what the unity is and that it is the case); whereas in the case of what has a middle term, that is, in the case of that of which something different is a cause of the being,³⁵⁷ it is possible—as we have said—to reveal the what it is by means of demonstration without demonstrating it.

Similar to Aristoxenus, who in T 21 talks of principles that are manifest to those experienced in music, Aristotle here talks of making certain principles manifest in regard to their ‘existence’ (εἶναι) and their ‘what it is’ (τί ἐστίν) in some other way (presumably other than demonstration).³⁵⁸ Yet at least two things are unclear in the contrast made in this passage between essences (τὰ τί ἐστίν) that are immediate and cannot be revealed through demonstration (i.e., those of primary subject-kinds of sciences and perhaps also of subordinate subject-kinds of sciences,³⁵⁹ henceforth causally simple essences)³⁶⁰ and essences that

both types of τί ἐστίν can be principles as far as both of them can be premises in demonstrations; according to Detel’s view, both types of τί ἐστίν can figure as premises in demonstrations, but only one type of τί ἐστίν consists of principles, namely those that are immediate.

³⁵⁷ It is unclear what οὐσία refers to here. Charles (2000, p. 275n444) thinks it refers to the substance the thing in question is rather than its essence. Accordingly, Aristotle point would be that there are some substances that are to be identified with their causes, whereas some other substances are different from their causes.

If οὐσία here is picking up the things’ essences instead, Aristotle would be admitting that there are things whose causes are different from their essences, which is perhaps a bit hard to understand if the essence of the things in this group includes their cause. For instance, the essence of thunder should include the cause of thunder: assuming that thunder is noise in the clouds caused by fire being quenched (which is the example given by Aristotle, but which is something whose truth he will deny in the *Meteorologica* II.9), it is clear that the cause of thunder (fire being quenched in the clouds) can only be said to be different from its essence in that although its essence includes the cause of thunder, it is not reducible to the cause of thunder, but has other elements.

I have translated οὐσία as ‘being’ so as to remain neutral on this issue, since it will not matter for my purposes. In any case, thinking about where composite substances are to be located in the division presented here in *APo* II.9 will be relevant for an objection that I shall raise below against Bronstein’s view that causally simple essences encompass substances and *quasi*-substances such as unity and number, since it would seem that only some substances have causally simple essences, namely primary substances: forms.

³⁵⁸ As we shall see, what other ways of making clear Aristotle has in mind here and their exact relationship with hypothesising the ‘what it is’ and the existence of some things is far from clear. At any rate, given the contrast between essences that are immediate *and* principles (causally simple essences) and essences that admit of an intermediate (causally complex essences), it seems clear that the other ways of making causally simple essences manifest should not include demonstration.

³⁵⁹ For the claim that Aristotle distinguishes between primary subject-kinds, whose existence is indemonstrable and whose essences are discovered by induction, and subordinate subject-kinds, whose existence is demonstrable and whose essences are discovered by division, see Bronstein (2016, esp. pp. 170ff). But, as we shall see, it is not so clear whether subordinate subject-kinds are causally simple essences, for it

can be revealed through demonstration (e.g., those of demonstrable attributes of primary or subordinate subject-kinds, henceforth causally complex essences)³⁶¹ First of all, it is unclear what are the other ways of making essences manifest that Aristotle has in mind when he says that with regard to causally simple essences it is necessary either to hypothesise both that they are the case (their *εἶναι*) and what they are or to make these things manifest about them in some other way. Second, it is unclear whether Aristotle is contrasting assuming things as hypotheses and making things manifest in some other way, and, if so, how exactly this contrast is to be spelled out.

A first alternative, entertained by Barnes in his commentary, is to say that hypothesising ‘is not a way of “making clear” but is compatible with various ways of making clear’ (1993, p. 221). This may suggest that hypotheses can be held in either of two cases: when the what it is and the existence of a causally simple essence is in no way manifest; and when the what it is and the existence of a causally simple essence is manifest in some way to the person who holds the hypothesis. The first case could perhaps describe the condition of someone being taught by a specialist, whereas the second case could describe the condition of an inquirer or of someone who is a specialist already. However, this makes poor sense of the *ἢ*, which suggests that hypothesising and the other ways of making clear are real alternatives.

But perhaps what Barnes means is actually closer to what is suggested by Zabarella in his commentary, according to whom immediate principles ‘either are assumed as hypotheses, or, if they should be made known, one must make them manifest in some other way’ (*In Post. An.*, p. 134r : *vel supponuntur, vel, si notificandae sint, aliqua alia methodo eas declarare oportet*).

may be objected that some subordinate subject-kinds have essences that can be displayed in the form of a demonstration.

³⁶⁰ I take this expression and the one it is being contrasted with (causally complex essences), from Bronstein (2016).

³⁶¹ As we shall see, it is not so clear whether causally complex essences include only essences of attributes of primary and subordinate subject-kinds, for there is a good case to be made to the effect that sensible substances too (which are compounds of matter and form) have causally complex essences.

The thought here seems to be that immediate principles are either already manifest (so that one simply assumes their what it is and existence as a hypothesis), or else not manifest yet (so that one should make them manifest in some other way). In that case, hypothesising would not be a way of making manifest, but would presuppose that what one is hypothesising has been made manifest already in some way.

Yet a difficulty that could be raised against this reading is that earlier in the *APo*, in I.10 76^b16–19, Aristotle talks of some sciences that do not hypothesise their subject-kind if it is manifest that it is the case, which suggests that hypothesising is something one does not when what one hypothesises has already been made manifest, but when it is not manifest. But perhaps these two passages are talking of hypothesis in two different senses, which is perhaps not surprising, since talk of hypothesising the what it is is already a novelty in light of the conception of hypothesis operating in *APo* I.2, where definitions are said to be theses but not hypotheses (cf. *APo* 72^a14–24). In fact, one could argue that in *APo* I.10 76^b16–19, Aristotle is talking of hypotheses involved in learning, whereas in **T 22** he has a more general sense of hypothesis in mind, which covers any proposition assumed as true, including principles that have been made manifest previously.

Another alternative is proposed by Bronstein (2016, pp. 137–143), who suggests that **T 22** is distinguishing hypotheses and other ways of making causally simple essences manifest, and that in doing so, Aristotle means to contrast primary subject-kinds (whose essences are made clear through induction and are assumed by the sciences as hypotheses) with subordinate subject-kinds (whose existence is demonstrable on the basis of primary subject-kinds and whose essences are made clear through the method of division). Some support for this view can be gathered from Aristotle's example, since he says that the arithmetician assumes the monad as a hypothesis, and the monad is indeed the primary subject-kind of arithmetic, for

it is that on the basis of which numbers (which are pluralities of monads) are defined. In that case, there would be two different ways of making causally simple essences clear: by induction and by division, and induction would be required for hypothesising. However, if subordinate subject-kinds are things whose existence is demonstrable (as Bronstein thinks), then it would seem that the other ways of making clear Aristotle has in mind here do not really exclude demonstration, for their ‘existence’ (εἶναι) would indeed be made clear by demonstration.³⁶²

Moreover, it is not so clear that the simple essences Aristotle has in mind here in the first part of **T 22** are those of substantial items and of *quasi*-substantial items (most notably, the monad and the numbers). For, as we know from the *Metaphysica*, sensible substances, *qua* compounds, can be analysed in terms of form and matter in such a way that the cause of their being is something different (ἕτερον τι) from the compound (cf. *Met.* Z.11 1037^a28–29—where the essence of human being is said to be its soul, which is a part of the compound that is to be distinguished from the compound—, and esp. *Met.* Z.17), and which thus allows of being organised in the form of a demonstration of type presented in *APo* II.8.³⁶³ As a result, although it is true that some substances do not have a cause of being and of being one (i.e., a proper unity) different from themselves (cf. *Met.* H.6 1045^b4–5), namely those that are essences (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), this will not be true of all substances. For, the cause of the being and of the unity of some substances, i.e., of sensible substances (compounds), is to be

³⁶² That the existence of subordinate subject-kinds is demonstrable is most clear in the case of geometry, since the existence of subordinate subject-kinds such as the triangle can be demonstrated through construction. On the role of construction as a proof of existence in ancient geometry, see Knorr (2004).

³⁶³ On this, see, for instance, Charles (2000, pp. 274–309; 2010a, pp. 309–319). Of course one could say that Aristotle either did not dispose yet of the hylomorphic tools of analysis he employs in the *Met.* when he wrote the *APo* or that he is avoiding getting into these issues in the *APo*. Yet a *desideratum* is that the views expressed in the *APo* are at least to some extent compatible with what we find in the *Met.* in that *Met.* Z.17–H can be read as extending the model of definition presented in the *Analytics* to hylomorphic substances. In any case, it is telling that Aristotle’s only example in **T 22** of something with a causally simple essence is the monad, which is the first principle of arithmetic, and not a number (which is subordinate subject-kind) or a sensible substance. If this objection turns out to be correct, it would seem that, *pace* Bronstein, the division between causally simple essences and causally complex essences will not correspond to the division between substances (and *quasi*-substances) and their necessary demonstrable attributes.

identified with their forms instead, and their definition will be causally complex in such a way that it can also be made clear by demonstration in that the causal-explanatory role of their forms can be made explicit by means of a demonstration. But if this is so, to what the other ways of making clear Aristotle is talking about are being opposed if not to demonstration?

Further difficulties for both these alternatives can be raised if we compare what Aristotle is saying here in **T 22** to what he says in *Met.* E.1 1025^b11–12, since if we read what Aristotle says about causally simple essences in **T 22** in light of that passage,³⁶⁴ it would seem that in talking of hypotheses and other ways of making subject-kinds clear, Aristotle would be meaning to contrast rather the procedure adopted to establish primary subject-kinds *in some sciences*, i.e., those that rely on perception to make their primary subject-kind clear, with the procedure to establish primary subject-kinds *in other sciences*, i.e., those that simply assume their primary subject-kind as a hypothesis.

In that case, we would have a third way of making sense of **T 22**: Aristotle would not be contrasting the procedures adopted in a same science at different stages (i.e., when defining primary subject-kinds and when defining subordinate subject-kinds—as Bronstein wants—, or when hypothesising an essence that has been made clear already and when making clear an essence that is not clear yet so that it can be hypothesised when it becomes clear—as Barnes and Zabarella want), but procedures adopted by different sciences at the same stage (i.e., when defining primary subject-kinds). In that case, it would seem that the sense of being manifest at issue in **T 22** would not describe the type of grasp that specialists in a given field have of their principles (i.e., a grasp of these principles as first immediate principles), for the idea would be that, in some domains, one begins by simply assuming certain principles and then, by using these principles to demonstrate other propositions in that domain, one

³⁶⁴ Which is what Leszl (1981, pp. 311ff) does to connect *APo* II.9 with I.10 76^b16–22.

attains a fuller grasp of these principles (this would be the case of mathematical sciences, for instance); whereas in other domains, the principles are first made manifest in some other way (i.e., other than demonstration) in that one first attains a preliminary grasp of the principles by means of induction (widely conceived), and then, by using these principles to demonstrate other propositions in that domain, one attains a fuller grasp of these principles (as would be the case in natural sciences, for instance).³⁶⁵

But before discussing this in more detail, let me quote *Met.* E.1 1025^b11–12 in its context, so that we can discuss what is at issue in this passage more clearly:

T 23 – *Met.* E.1 1025^b7–18

1025b7

ἀλλὰ |

πάσαι αὐται περὶ ἓν τι καὶ γένος τι περιγραφιζόμεναι περὶ | τού-
 10 του πραγματεύονται, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ ὄντος ἀπλῶς οὐδὲ ἦ || ὄν,
 οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν οὐθένα λόγον ποιοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου, | αἱ
 μὲν αἰσθήσει ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον αἱ δ' ὑπόθεσιν λαβούσαι τὸ
 τί ἐστὶν, οὕτω τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει | περὶ ὃ εἰσιν
 ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον* | διόπερ φα-
 15 νερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν || ἐκ τῆς
 τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς | δηλώσεως.
 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι τὸ γένος περὶ ὃ | πραγματεύ-
 ονται οὐδὲν λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δια|νοίας τό τε τί
 ἐστὶν δῆλον ποιεῖν καὶ εἰ ἔστιν.

|| b8 ἔν EJ: ὄν A^b γρ. E Al. Asc.

But all these <sciences>, being circumscribed to a single thing, i.e., to a certain subject-kind, occupy themselves with it and not with being *simpliciter* or with being *qua* [10] being, nor do they offer any explanation of ‘what it is,’ but from it [sc., their ‘what it is’], some <sciences> making it clear through perception, others assuming what it is as a hypothesis, in this way demonstrate (either more strictly or more loosely) the *per se* attributes that pertain to the subject-kind about which they are. For that very reason it is manifest from such an induction that there is no demonstration of the substance nor of the what it is, [15] but <there is> some other kind of showing <it>. Similarly, nor do they say anything about whether the subject-kind with which they occupy themselves is or is not due to the fact that making clear the what it is and <the> if it is is the task of the same thought.

What is most puzzling about this passage is what the contrast between sciences that make their primary subject-kind clear through perception and sciences that assume their

³⁶⁵ I thank Joe Karbowski for pressing me on this point.

primary subject-kind as a hypothesis means. In his commentary to this passage, Pseudo-Alexander (*CAG*. I, 441.15–31) suggests that Aristotle means to contrast empirical sciences like medicine with mathematical sciences in that the first rely on perception to make their subject-kind clear, whereas the latter rely neither on perception nor on argument.³⁶⁶ Yet this might be problematic if we remember that mathematical objects are made clear by abstraction (cf. *EN* VI.9 [=Bywater VI.8] 1142^a18–20) and that Aristotle ultimately reduces abstraction to induction in the *APo* (cf. *APo* I.18 81^b2–5), which, in turn, ultimately depends on perception (cf. *APo* I.18 81^b5–6).

Another alternative would be to follow Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Metaphysicae* Lib. VI, L. 1, §1149 [=Spiazzi pp. 295–296]), who thinks that that this passage is rather contrasting sciences that make their subject-kinds clear by themselves, and sciences that outsource this task to a higher science from which they assume their subject-kind: geometry, for instance, would assume its subject-kind from first philosophy. In that case, Aristotle would not be merely contrasting empirical sciences with mathematical sciences, but sciences that take their subject-kind from first philosophy (as would be the case of geometry, arithmetic and physics) with subordinate sciences (like biology) that make their primary subject-kind clear through perception.

Yet, despite its influence, this latter view is fraught with problems, as has been shown by Gómez-Lobo (1978). The main issue it faces lies in the idea that First Philosophy can somehow prove either the what it is or the existence of the primary subject-kinds of particular disciplines, which are both immediate (it is less plausible to think, however, that the same applies to weaker versions of this view, according to which First Philosophy is merely

³⁶⁶ Similarly, see Bonitz (1848, p. 280), and, more recently, Leszl (1981, p. 313)—who thinks Aristotle is here contrasting mathematical and physical sciences—, and Berti (2015, p. 87)—who thinks Aristotle is contrasting pure mathematics with applied mathematics and physical sciences.

responsible for examining the common principles—the axioms—,³⁶⁷ although Gómez-Lobo thinks it also applies in these cases). Thus, if T 23 is to be consistent with what is expounded in the *Analytics*, a *desideratum* is that geometry, arithmetic, and physics do not rely on First Philosophy either to make the essence of their respective subject-kinds clear or to establish that their respective subject-kinds are the case.³⁶⁸

That being said, let me go back to the first alternative: perhaps there is a way out of the difficulty I mentioned if in contrasting sciences that make their subject-kind clear through perception and sciences that assume their subject-kind as a hypothesis, Aristotle is not saying that perception is not required by the second group of sciences, but only that perception is not what makes the essences of subject-kinds of the second group of sciences clear, which would make perfect sense of the status of mathematical objects as things said in abstraction. As a matter of fact, their being things said in abstraction at the very least implies that although perception is necessary for grasping these objects (since they are things that inhere in things that can be perceived, and since one cannot think without *φαντάσματα*, and thus without perception), they are things assumed without their perceptible features.³⁶⁹ As Thomas Aquinas puts it (*Sententia Metaphysicae* Lib. VI, L. 1, §1157 [=Spiazzi p. 297]), some *definienda* are defined like snub (i.e., including sensible matter) whereas others like concave (i.e., abstracting sensible matter). But perhaps even if it turns out that no *definienda* includes sensible matter (i.e., if

³⁶⁷ For such a weaker view, see Kirwan (1993, pp. 183-184), who thinks that First Philosophy is responsible for *proving* the axioms. More recently, Peramatzis (2013, pp. 309-310) has entertained an even weaker version of this claim, according to which there is an interdependence between metaphysics and the special sciences in that although only metaphysics can thematise and theorise about common axioms, one can only fully grasp them seeing them at work underlying certain *explananda*. As result, a full grasp of the common axioms would depend both on metaphysics and on the particular sciences.

³⁶⁸ Similarly, see Ross (1949, p. 537), who responding to Zabarella's version of the claim that metaphysics can prove the principles of the sciences, says that 'it is impossible to reconcile this interpretation with what A. [i.e, Aristotle] says [sc. in 76a16ff].'

³⁶⁹ Similarly, see the contrast made by Leszl (1981, p. 307) between mathematics and physical sciences, according to which 'what is given through sense-perception is for such sciences not merely a medium, as it is for mathematics.'

even forms of sensible substances admit of purely formal definitions), it is nevertheless true that some *definienda* can only be properly grasped by reference to the sensible matter in that they can only be grasped as *definienda* if one sees them as explaining why matter organised in such and such a way produces a unity: the compound.

But should we read T 22 in light of T 23? Is it really the case that T 22 is contrasting subject-kinds of mathematical sciences, and subject-kinds of empirical sciences?

Matters are far from clear in this regard. In any case, what is important for my purposes is that T 22 talks of making the what it is and existence of principles of sciences manifest (*φανερὰ*) and that T 23 says that at least some sciences make their subject-kind clear (*δηλον*), which appears to be not much different from making it manifest (*φανερὸν*).

Thus, when Aristoxenus says in T 21 that he wants to grasp (*λαβεῖν*) principles that are all of them manifest to those who are experienced in music, he seems to be thinking of a type of grasp of these principles that goes beyond the grasp of these principles had by those merely experienced in music. Otherwise, granted that both Aristoxenus himself and his intended audience are experienced in music,³⁷⁰ these principles' being manifest would suffice for their being grasped: the fact that Aristoxenus talks of a grasp of principles that are already manifest suggests that they should be made clear in a way they still are not for those merely experienced in music.

³⁷⁰ This is the view expressed by Gaudentius in his handbook to Aristoxenus *Elementa Harmonica* (his *ἀρμονικὴ εἰσαγωγή*), where he says that 'it is necessary for the person who intends to hear about these arguments [sc., those that concern notes, intervals, scales, tonalities, modulation, melodic composition in all genres of harmony] to have trained the hearing beforehand by means of experience' (327.8–9: τὸν δὲ ἀκουσόμενον τῶν περὶ ταῦτα λόγων ἀναγκαῖον ἐμπειρία τὴν ἀκοὴν προγεγυμνάσθαι). I owe this point to Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro.

Similarly, see Aristotle's *Protrepticus* 54.12–18: 'For just like all the refined doctors and most refined gymnastic trainers pretty much agree that those who intend to be good doctors and gymnastic trainers must be experienced about nature, so too those <who intend to be> good lawgivers must be experienced about nature, and certainly much more than the former' (*ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομφοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γυμναστικὴν οἱ πλείστοι σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἰατροὺς ἔσεσθαι καὶ γυμναστὰς περὶ φύσεως ἐμπείρους εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς νομοθέτας ἐμπείρους εἶναι δεῖ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἐκείνων*).

One way of making sense of this would be to say that the fact that these principles are the case is manifest to those experienced in music, but that their ‘what it is’ is not yet manifest, since they do not grasp the correct definitions of these principles yet. Another alternative would be to say that even if we concede that those experienced in music can arrive at the correct definition of the principles of harmonics, they would still not have *νοῦς* of these principles,³⁷¹ since to have that they would need to be able to use these definitions to explain the demonstrable attributes of these subject-kinds,³⁷² which would perhaps make these principles manifest to them in an even more demanding way: as first principles.

In either case, experience is at the very least necessary for grasping these principles correctly, either because it makes their being the case (*εἶναι*) manifest and provides one with preliminary accounts³⁷³ that help one to define them correctly, or else because it is simply a necessary step for grasping these principles noetically irrespective of whether experience is sufficient or not for defining these principles correctly. If something along these lines is

³⁷¹ Whether the type of grasp I have in mind here should be called *νοῦς* is a contentious matter. What matters is that there is a more demanding type of grasp of principles that involves seeing them as having an explanatory role, and of some principles as first principles, which involves seeing them as having an explanatory role and as being immediate.

³⁷² For the idea that our definitional practices are interdependent with our explanatory practices, in that the latter reveal the priority and unity necessary for grasping essences *qua* essences and in that essences and *per se* causes are codetermined, see Charles (2000, pp. 245, 260ff, 349–353; 2010a, pp. 301–302, 324). A clear example of such a view could be found in the methodological remark Aristotle makes in *DA* I.1 402^b22–25, where he says that ‘whenever we are able to demonstrate, in accordance with *phantasia*, either all or most of the properties <of a substance>, then we shall also be able to talk most finely about that substance’ (*ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἔξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα*). For the more specific claim that a noetic grasp of a principle (i.e., *νοῦς*) is acquired by using that principle (e.g., the essence of a subject-kind) to explain that subject-kind’s demonstrable attributes, see Bronstein (2016). For a similar, but slightly more demanding view, see Morison (2019b), who claims that having *νοῦς* of a proposition involves knowing not only how to derive theorems from that proposition and the different ways (possibly all) to use that proposition in such derivations, but also knowing that nothing explains that proposition (i.e., that it is immediate). Similarly, for the idea that ‘we cannot identify the principles as such independently of any demonstrative practice,’ and that, given that essences are ultimate causes, ‘the missing step between the grasp of universal truths and noetic knowledge is the very practice of demonstrating, that is to say, the act of organizing a given body of truths based on their explanatory connections,’ see Zuppolini (2020, pp. 38ff).

³⁷³ I remain neutral here as to whether these count as definitions in some sense, so that Aristotle would admit of nominal definitions as real types of definition (as is defended by Charles [2000, Part I, *passim*]).

correct, it seems that experience is either something involved in some cases in which one posits the existence and the ‘what it is’ of subject-kinds or else is one of the other ways of making clear that Aristotle has in mind in **T 22**.

As I would like to argue, Aristotle thinks of induction quite widely in the *APo*, so that even if we concede to Bronstein that in **T 22** Aristotle wants to contrast primary subject-kinds (which are made manifest by induction) and subordinate subject-kinds (which are made manifest by division), induction would also cover things like abstraction, perception, and experience.³⁷⁴ Not only **T 21** suggests that experience can fulfil this role, but in **T 23** explicit mention is made of sciences that make principles clear through perception, which appears to be covering several different types of cognition that involve perception not merely as a necessary condition (at the very least, experience and induction in the strict sense would be implied here, in opposition to abstraction, which, as I have suggested, depends on perception, but does not makes things clear *through perception*). In this connection, I would like to argue that Aristotle is much more generous about the ways by which principles can be made manifest, and is willing to recognise other means by which they can be rendered manifest besides these, which concern theoretical sciences in particular.

1.3.3.1.2 *The case of practical philosophy: habituation as a way of making principles manifest*

That Aristotle is willing to recognise ways of making principles manifest beside those that concern theoretical sciences (e.g., induction, abstraction, experience, and perception) is made clear by what he says in *EN* I.7 1098^b3-6:

T 24 – EN I.7 1098^b3–8

³⁷⁴ Similarly, see Eustratius’ commentary (*CAG*. XXI.1, 127.22–24) and Themistius’ paraphrasis (*CAG*. V.1, 50.25–27). As I have mentioned above, there are some indications that induction is conceived of quite broadly in the *APo*, for in *APo* I.18 81^b2–5, for instance, even things that are said on the basis of abstraction are described as being made *γνώριμα* by induction. In that case, it would seem that nothing would hinder perception, experience, and abstraction from being all counted under induction in the *APo*.

1098b3 τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, |
 5 αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρα||τέον
 ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι | κα-
 λῶς. μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ | γὰρ
 πλείον ἢ ἡμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ | συμφανῇ
 γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

|| **b5** ἐκάστας P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐκάστης K^b | διορισθῶσι K^bP^bC^c:
 ὀρισθῶσι LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b || **b7** γὰρ K^bP^bC^c: οὖν LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V |
 τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι K^bP^bC^cB^{95sup}.V: εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς LO^b: τοῦ παντὸς L^b
 || **b8** δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τῶν ζητουμένων
 δι' αὐτῆς L

Some principles are considered by means of induction, some by means of perception, some by means of some sort of habituation, and others by other means. And we must try to pursue [5] each of them in the way which it natural <for each of them>, and we must take care to define them correctly, for <they> have a great influence on the things that follow upon them, since the principle seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things being inquired <seem> to become completely manifest by means of it.

The point made in this passage is congenial to that made in the first part of T 22 (lines 21-25). Besides recognising induction as a means by which principles are considered (*θεωροῦνται*), this passage claims that this role can also be performed by perception (as expected considering *Met.* E.1 1025^b11-12 [in T 23] and *APo* II.7 92^a37-^b3) or by some kind of habituation, and then generalises the claim by saying that other principles will be considered by other means. This seems to square well with the claim made by Aristoxenus, for nothing would hinder experience from being a means by which at least some principles of harmonics, for instance, are considered (and since even perception is said to be able to fulfil such a role in regard to some principles, experience would with much more reason be able to perform such a role in regard to some other principles³⁷⁵). In addition to that, this passage from the *EN* mentions two things involved in the actual acquisition of principles: (i) one must pursue the principles by the means that are natural for each of them (i.e., in some cases through induction, in others through perception, etc.); and (ii) one must strive to define them correctly. It is

³⁷⁵ Note what Aristoxenus says on the role of perception in *Harm.* II, p. 44,4-14 [=Da Rios p. 54,19-55,16] (quoted in footnote 354), which is said to be responsible for recognising some propositions as having the role of principles, a function that it is perhaps able to perform in virtue of experience.

not clear whether these are two different steps, or whether, taking the *καί* epexegetically, trying to pursue the principles on the basis of induction, perception, or something else amounts to defining them correctly.

This issue is fundamentally connected to another one I have left undiscussed so far: is induction (in the wide sense) sufficient for arriving at the correct definitions of primary subject kinds?

This question can be approached in a plethora of ways. I cannot cover all interpretations here, but will nevertheless attempt to present in rough lines what I take to be some of the most important positions in the debate.

A first alternative is to say that induction is not sufficient for arriving at the correct definitions of primary subject kinds because, for leading to knowledge of principles, it requires the work of *νοῦς*, which, on this reading, would be a sort of intuitive capacity.³⁷⁶ Things may change slightly, though, if one distinguishes, following Maier (1896-1900, vol. 2, pp. 387-430), two types of induction, one that merely grounds empirically universal propositions (which Maier names ‘dialectic-justifying induction’) which would not be sufficient for grasping principles through *νοῦς*, and one that involves the work of *νοῦς* and is sufficient for leading to knowledge of scientific principles (which Maier calls ‘scientific induction’).

Another alternative is to say that induction is sufficient for obtaining knowledge of principles, and that *νοῦς* is just the state of knowing these principles that results from induction,³⁷⁷ in which case there would be no gap between induction and knowledge of principles to be filled by an intuitive capacity responsible for enabling one to grasp their priority.

Yet, as we saw, it might be the case that *νοῦς* is not any old grasp of the correct definition of principles, but a grasp of these *as first principles*, which at the very least involves

³⁷⁶ See, for instance, Irwin (1988a, Ch. 7, *passim*).

³⁷⁷ See, for instance, Barnes (1993, pp. 267-271).

being able to use these principles in demonstrations (see footnote 372 for different ways of formulating this). In that case, it is possible to claim that induction is sufficient for grasping the starting points of demonstration, but perhaps not yet as starting points.³⁷⁸ The standard version of this reading is committed to an explanationist view of the order of enquiry, to the effect that one can only grasp essences *qua* essences (and accordingly adequately define and understand subject kinds) when one arrives at an understanding of the essences as explanatory principles by using them in demonstrations (see footnote 372). Another version of the view on induction as not sufficient for having *νοῦς* of the principles is defended by Bronstein (2016). Two things set Bronstein's view apart of the standard picture: first, he thinks that induction fulfils a double role. It is first responsible for providing one with preliminary accounts that enable one to engage in definitional enquiry, and then it is the means through which one who disposes of these preliminary accounts can arrive at the correct definitions of primary subject kinds. On Bronstein's account, induction is presented as fulfilling the first role in *APo* II.19, and the second role in *APo* II.13.³⁷⁹ Second, on Bronstein's view, on its

³⁷⁸ See, for instance, Charles (2000, pp. 265–272).

³⁷⁹ This would be most clear in *APo* II.13 97^b7–25. However, it should be noted that, when it comes to subordinate subject kinds, the procedure described in *APo* II.13 seems to stop short of arriving at the correct definitions of these subject kinds, for someone like Charles (2000, pp. 237–238) may say that in organising sub-kinds of a genus intelligibly by means of *differentiae* one is not yet defining the sub-kinds, but merely picking out those features of the sub-kinds that differentiate it from its genus and for its coordinate sub-kinds and that are explained by its essence. Even if it turns out that the explanatory account of definition is compatible with definition by means of genus and *differentia* (as Charles thinks it is), it is still the case that even if one arrives at a correct definition of subordinate subject kinds, one may not be aware yet of the fact that one of the *differentiae* is explanatory of the presence of the others. For instance, the fact that the number five is odd, prime₁, and non-prime₂—prime₁ being the property of not being measured by other numbers, and prime₂ being the property of not being compounded by other numbers—could be explained by what could be taken to be a further *differentia* of five: its being a certain concatenation of two and three—two non-prime₂ numbers—, which is what explains why it is odd, prime₁, and non-prime₂ and what distinguishes five from seven, which is also odd, prime₁, and non-prime₂, but which involves a different sort of concatenation of non-prime₂ numbers. A further problem for this model concerns the sort of unity assumed for the method of division. Definition by means of genus and *differentia* appears to assume the existence of a generic unity. However, number, for instance, is not a genus, but is a concept unified τῷ ἐφεξῆς. Thus, how can one divide number by means of *differentiae*? A similar difficulty comes up in the *διαίρεσις* we find in *EE* VIII.3 if τὸ ἀγαθόν is not univocal (as Aristotle believes) and division requires a univocal genus. For a discussion of some of these problems in the *διαίρεσις* from *EE* VIII.3 see Bobonich (2023, pp. 189–191). I shall discuss *EE* VIII.3 in detail below in **Chapter 2, sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.3.**

second role, induction is sufficient for arriving at correct definitions of primary subject kinds, even if one may still lack noetic knowledge of them, which one can then acquire by using them as principles in demonstrations.

Arguing in favour of one of these alternatives lies outside the scope of this Dissertation, although my sympathies lie with views according to which *νοῦς* describes a grasp of principles *qua* first principles along explanationist lines, in which case induction would neither be enough for having *νοῦς* of principles, nor for grasping essences *qua* essences. In any case, what is important for the current purposes is that in all these accounts induction is at the very least necessary both for arriving at the correct definitions of the primary subject kinds of a science and for grasping these noetically. In that case, if the role of induction is analogous to that of habituation, it would seem that mere habituation too may not be enough for having a grasp of the principles of the ethical enquiry that is analogous to *νοῦς*, although it would be certainly necessary for attaining such a grasp.

Moreover, there is a further complication, since according to some mss. (whose reading I have followed above in translating **T 24**) Aristotle uses the verb *διορίζω* rather the verb *ὀρίζω* (which is attested in the mss. of the β family—see the *apparatus*), and *διορίζω* may not be pointing to the act of giving a definition (although in many contexts it points to the act of giving definitions precisely—see *DA* II.1 412^a5), but to the act of determining something in such a way that it can be distinguished from other things (see Bonitz, 1870, s.v. *διορίζειν*, p. 199^b58ff), which in many cases does not imply giving the proper definition of the object, but something like a nominal definition or a preliminary account instead.

That being said, when Aristotle says in *EN* I.7 1098^b3-8 (**T 24**) that (i) one must pursue the principles by the means that are natural for each of them (i.e., in some cases by induction, in others by perception, etc.), and that (ii) one must strive to *determine* them cor-

rectly, he could be merely saying that pursuing these principles by the means that are natural for each of them is *necessary* (but not yet sufficient) for defining them correctly. But, as should be clear, Aristotle may mean more than that depending on how we construe the role of induction in the *APo* and on how we understand the kind of induction he has in mind here in T 24.

In any case, what I think is novel in T 24 is that Aristotle seems to have practical sciences in mind as well,³⁸⁰ which explains why a certain kind of habituation is mentioned alongside with induction and perception. It is not that habituation can be conceived as sort of induction here, as has been suggested by Michelakis (1961, pp. 19–21), who thinks that Aristotle thinks of induction as coming in degrees: from mere perception to habituation (in which case the latter would involve being in a condition such that one can perform inductions).³⁸¹ Rather habituation would be a way of grasping principles different from induction and which is the appropriate way of grasping principles when we are dealing with practical disciplines such as *Ethics* and *Politics*.

Aristotle expresses a concern with the audience of his ethical enquiry in several passages in the *EN*, and the basic idea of these passages is that in order to correctly comprehend what is being said in the *EN* so that one can benefit from it, one must have been properly

³⁸⁰ Similarly, see Leszl (1981, p. 314).

³⁸¹ In support of this claim, Michelakis makes two moves:

First, he makes mention of *Tob.* I.14 105^b27–^b28, where Aristotle says that we must try to grasp each *πρότασις* (i.e., ethical, natural, and logical *πρότάσεις*) τῆ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνηθεία (*Tob.* I.14 105^b27–28: τῆ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνηθεία πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἐκάστην αὐτῶν). No doubt this passage can be rendered as saying that we must try to grasp each of the propositions in question in the previous lines through the habituation by means of induction, which could suggest that repeated inductions lead to a habit to make inductions. However, it is perhaps more natural to take ‘*συνηθεία*’ to mean ‘acquaintance,’ in which case the passage would be conveying the much more deflationary idea that we must attempt to grasp each proposition through the acquaintance by induction.

Second, Michelakis quotes Maier (1896–1900, vol. 2, pp. 398n3, 407n1) in his support, but this idea that induction comes in degrees is not explicit in Maier. It is interesting to note that Maier’s suggestion that habituation also plays a role in the theoretical domain depends on a very unlikely interpretation of our T 20, whose second part (lines 1151^a18–19) Maier thinks is dealing chiefly, but not exclusively, with *πρακτικά*, in which case it would be possible to think of habituation as also playing a role in the grasp of principles of theoretical sciences, which is clearly far-fetched as a reading of this passage in its context.

habituated. See, for instance, *EN* I.2 [=Bywater I.4] 1095^b4-8:

T 25 – *EN* I.2 [=Bywater I.4] 1095^b2-8

1095b2 ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ |
μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ | τῶν
ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.

5 διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἠχθαι καλῶς τὸν || περὶ
καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε|νον ἰκα-
νῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ|κούντως, οὐδὲν
προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ | λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς
ῥαδίως.

|| b2 μὲν γὰρ K^bP^bC^cO^bV: μὲν οὖν LL^bB^{95sup}. || b2-4 ταῦτα
... γνωρίμων om. O^b || b4 ἔθεσιν K^bP^bC^cO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἠθεσιν
LL^bO^bcorrV²M^b || b6 ἀρχὴ γὰρ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: γὰρ ἀρχὴ
K^ba.c. | ἀρχὴ K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἀρκεῖ mg.K^{b3}L^b | τοῦτο mg.K^{b3}
P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐν τούτοις K^b || b7 ἔχει K^bP^bC^cO^bV: ἢ ἔχει
L^bB^{95sup}.M^b

[2] One must begin from the things that are familiar, and these are <said> in two ways: those that are familiar to us, and those that are familiar *simpliciter*. Thus, we should begin from those things that are familiar to us.

[4] For that reason, the person who intends to hear adequately about fine and just things and, in general, about political matters must have been well educated by means of habits, for the ‘that’ is a principle, and if it is sufficiently manifest, there will be no need of the ‘why.’ And such a person [sc., who has been well educated in their habits] has or can easily grasp the principles.

Putting lines 1095^b6-7 aside (whose precise meaning is not of much consequence for the current argument), Aristotle’s point in this passage is clear: the adequate audience for the arguments marshalled in the *EN* consists of people who have been subject to adequate moral habituation, for which reason they either already grasp the principles relevant for the ethical enquiry, or else can easily attain them. As a result, it is quite reasonable to say that habituation has a role in the ethical enquiry that is, to some degree at least, analogous to that performed by induction and experience in the theoretical sciences, for just as these allow the learner to attain a proper grasp of the principles in these sciences (which is a necessary condition for one to become an ἐπιστημῶν in a given domain), so too habituation would allow the learner to attain a proper grasp of the principles relevant to practical philosophy.³⁸²

³⁸² With talk of allowing here, I want in both cases to remain neutral as to whether induction and habitu-

As I have suggested above, habituation might do this by making one take pleasure in some objects rather than others. In that case, the idea would be that one can only adequately understand claims about the good if one already takes pleasure in what is really good, a point that would be analogous to the one made in *APo* I.18 81^b6–9, according to which one will lack *ἐπιστήμη* if some perception is missing, since *ἐπιστήμη* depends on induction and induction ultimately rests upon perception. As a result, one cannot attain *ἐπιστήμη* of things one has no perception of. Similarly, one cannot engage in practical philosophy to begin with if one does not take pleasure in what is really good. Otherwise, one would not be really grasping these propositions as being *practical*.

This is crucial for my purposes, for here lies an important disanalogy between induction (widely conceived) and habituation. Although some sciences may require one to have a trained perception so as to be able to adequately grasp their principles,³⁸³ it seems that this training only refines what one is already able to perceive: in acquiring experience in a domain, one's perception becomes more fine-grained.

Moral habituation, in turn, seems to be able to transform what one experiences much more radically: it enables one to take pleasure in things one did not take pleasure in before and displeasure at things one did not feel displeasure at before. More than that, in many cases, going through habituation makes one take pleasure in and feel displeasure at things contrary to those they took pleasure in and felt displeasure at before undergoing habituation.

ation are merely necessary or are indeed sufficient for attaining this proper grasp of the principles in their respective domains. For an argument to the effect that in saying, in the *EN*, that habituation is a way of making principles manifest, Aristotle does not mean to say that it provides one with the first principles of *Ethics*, but only of starting-points of the Ethical enquiry, see Karbowski (2019, pp. 164ff).

³⁸³ Good examples of these would be harmonics, carpentry, and lathe turning, all of which are contrasted by Aristoxenus (Aristoxenus *Harm.* II 42,10–21 [=Meibom 33.4–20]) with geometry on the grounds that their practitioners rely on a trained perception so as to judge each thing with precision, whereas geometers are said not to employ the faculty of perception, 'for they do not train their vision to judge poorly or well the straightness, nor the circularity, nor any other such thing' (ὁ μὲν γὰρ γεωμέτρης οὐδὲν χρήται τῆ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυνάμει, οὐ γὰρ ἐθίζει τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὸ εὐθὺ οὔτε τὸ περιφερὲς οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε φάυλως οὔτε εὖ κρίνειν). I thank Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro for this point.

A change in one's moral habits can radically change one's experiences of pleasure and pain and thus one's moral outlook.³⁸⁴ No doubt that when one is naturally virtuous already, moral habituation would merely refine and enhance a natural sensitivity to things that happen to be fine one already has, but it seems that when one is not naturally virtuous, habituation is doing much more than that, since it enables one to take pleasure in things one did not take pleasure in before.³⁸⁵ Moreover, it seems that fully virtuous agents have a pleasure that is proper to them, pleasure in the fineness of fine things,³⁸⁶ and that moral habituation, when complete, is at the basis of that pleasure only such agents are able to experience.

But does this allow us to conclude that the same is true for the principles of action?

If we take these passages by themselves, the answer is no. But irrespective of how we construe the relationship between the ethical enquiry and the sort of knowledge had by the *φρόνιμος*, I think that Aristotle holds a similar view when it comes to practical knowledge.

Although claims on the proper audience for the ethical enquiry are absent from the *EE*,³⁸⁷ we still come across (even in its special books) with the claim that *φρόνησις* is somehow coordinated with moral virtue: 'at the same time one is *φρόνιμος* and those dispositions of the other <part of the soul> [sc., the irrational part of the soul]³⁸⁸ are good' (*EE* VIII.1 1246^b33:

³⁸⁴ Similarly, see, *en passant*, Leunissen (2017, pp. 135ff).

³⁸⁵ Pace Tuozzo (2019, p. 167) who thinks that 'moral habituation works by encouraging an already existing natural sensitivity to values other than that of pleasure—in particular, a natural sensitivity, in a rudimentary form, to the fine' and that 'natural virtue is just the condition of those in whom this natural sensitivity is particularly strong,' in which case moral habituation would seem to work in the same way in all cases.

³⁸⁶ See, for instance, *EN* X.2 [=Bywater X.3] 1173^b28–31 and *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a31–32.

³⁸⁷ And as Devereux (2015, pp. 145–147) suggests, this difference seems to be connected to the different methodological attitude that Aristotle has in these two treatises, a topic I cannot venture to discuss in this Dissertation.

³⁸⁸ Rowe (2023a, p. 199) doubts 'whether *ἄλλου* by itself can stand for *τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους (τῆς ψυχῆς)*, as *ἀλόγου* can, in its own way, in the present context.' Yet Aristotle has been contrasting the rational and the irrational parts of the soul since 1246^b11, where he begins talking about the virtue of the ruling part using the virtue of the ruled part. In the sequence, he repeatedly contrasts virtues and vices of the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Thus, in the context it is clear that *φρόνησις* is a virtue of the rational part of the soul, and with talk of '*αἱ ἄλλου ἕξεις*' he can only mean the dispositions that pertain to a part of the soul different from that to which *φρόνησις* pertains, and that this part is the irrational part of the soul to which the other virtues pertain (since these are the two only parts of the soul in discussion in the context). Thus, pace Rowe, I have retained the text of the mss.

ἄμα φρόνιμοι³⁸⁹ καὶ ἀγαθαὶ³⁹⁰ ἐκεῖναι³⁹¹ αἱ ἄλλου³⁹² ἕξεις).³⁹³

Yet this indicates that there is an important difference between what Aristotle says about the condition necessary for engaging in the ethical enquiry, and the condition of the φρόνιμος. As a matter of fact, while it seems that one can engage in ethical enquiry without being fully virtuous and still profit from it, provided one has been well educated in some domains of one's life,³⁹⁴ being φρόνιμος is much more demanding, for it implies that one is fully virtuous (it remains to see if it implies that one is fully virtuous in *all* domains of one's life).³⁹⁵ Accordingly, the way in which the principles of action are manifest to someone who is φρόνιμος should differ from the way in which the principles of ethical enquiry are manifest to those who have been subject to adequate moral habituation, but should nevertheless be similar to the way in which principles of ethical enquiry are manifest to someone who has full grasp of practical philosophy *and* who is already fully virtuous.

This conception of practical philosophy, I think, is to be contrasted with the conception that Kant advances in his *Groundwork*. As a matter of fact, practical philosophy as Aristotle conceives of it is not merely a matter of reaching the principle that common hu-

³⁸⁹ φρόνιμοι L: φρόνιμαι PCB

³⁹⁰ ἀγαθαὶ PCBL: ἀγαθοὶ Jackson

³⁹¹ ἐκεῖναι PCBL: ἐκεῖνων Moraux Walzer&Mingay

³⁹² αἱ ἄλλου PCBL: αἱ ἀλόγου Rowe: αἱ <τοῦ> ἀλόγου Susemihl Walzer&Mingay: δ' ἄλλου Jackson: αἱ ἄλλαι Moraux

³⁹³ Similarly, see T 35 below, which suggests that each of the virtues include some kind of right judgement, which appears to be due to φρόνησις. Moss (see footnote 447) reads this passage as making an even stronger claim, namely that φρόνησις either implies or is implied by all moral virtues. I shall come back to this below in Chapter 2.

³⁹⁴ In fact, if this were not so, it would be hardly clear how ethical enquiry could be something by means of which some people can become good (unless Aristotle's thoughts here were hopelessly circular). I owe this point to Professor Marco Zingano.

³⁹⁵ There is, however, a possibility I cannot address here: perhaps at the level of the ethical enquiry there might be something analogous to φρόνησις when we think of someone who has full domain of practical philosophy, for it is not so clear if at the end of the ethical enquiry one who has the type of goodness required to engage in it will have become fully virtuous as well, in which case it would seem that, in the practical domain, the analogue of the person who is ἐπιστημῶν *simpliciter* is someone who is not merely well educated and thus takes pleasure in what is really good for them, but someone who is also fully virtuous and φρόνιμος.

man reason already employs in judging, and making one aware of one's own principle without teaching one anything new (cf. *GMS*, Ak. IV, pp. 403.34-404.36), nor does it aim to merely protect common human reason from the corruption to which it is easily susceptible due to a natural dialectic that forces it to seek help in philosophy (in many cases leading it to rationalise against the laws of duty)(cf. *GMS*, Ak. IV, pp. 404.37-405.35). Instead, not only one may engage in practical philosophy without being fully virtuous, but also, if one does that, one does indeed ends up learning something new, for one who has been well brought up can become fully virtuous through this sort of learning. Accordingly, although it is indeed true that for agents who are already fully virtuous practical philosophy would be merely allowing these individuals to understand the principles they make use of in acting from the perspective of practical theorists without teaching anything new about how they should lead their private lives (although it does indeed teach them something about how they should lead their political lives in that it is part of the process through which one may become a political scientist and a good legislator—i.e., the process through which one may acquire a universal sort of *φρόνησις*), this is not necessary to protect them from corruption, for in being fully virtuous one is already safe from corruption.

In *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b21–31, Aristotle says that if one is to become a good person by means of teaching, 'their character must be present beforehand somehow in a condition akin³⁹⁶ to virtue, <i.e.,> loving what is fine and hating what is base' (*δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν*), a claim that besides showing the Platonic provenance of Aristotle's views on moral education,³⁹⁷ suggests that habituation is necessary for understanding claims about what is good

³⁹⁶ I translate *οἰκείον* in this way here because I take it to be a predicate of *τὸ ἦθος*, describing the condition in which *τὸ ἦθος* must be when it is present beforehand.

³⁹⁷ As a matter of fact, this claim expands something already expressed earlier in *EN* II.2 [=Bywater II.3] 1104^b11–12 in explicit reference to Plato, according to whom 'one must be habituated in some way as

for oneself in that it is necessary not only for being able to engage in ethical enquiry, but also to become fully virtuous (which seemingly requires some learning).³⁹⁸ As a result, it would seem that only agents who are to some extent virtuous (albeit not yet fully virtuous) are in a position to understand the views about the good they endorse, in which case the intermediate agents' grasp of the good would be to some extent defective due to them not being fully virtuous, even if they might be able share the same views about what is good as a fully virtuous person.³⁹⁹

What is perhaps merely gestured at in these passages is confirmed by a parallel Aristotle from *Met.* Z.3 1029^b3–12:

Τ 26 – *Met.* Z.3 1029^b3–12

1029b3 πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμωτερον. ἢ γὰρ
 | μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἡττον γνωρίμων φύσει
 5 || εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν |
 | ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως |
 | ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθὰ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ |
 | τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῶ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνώριμα | καὶ
 10 πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ || οὐθὲν ἔχει
 | τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνω|στῶν αὐτῶ δὲ
 | γνωστῶν τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, | μεταβαίνοντας,

soon as one is young, so that one takes pleasure and pain in the things one must <take pleasure and pain in, respectively>' (διὸ δεῖ ἡχθῆαι πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ). Moreover, moral education (which is education separated from, and that precedes, teaching) is understood by Plato in the *Laws* precisely as the correct direction of pleasure and pain that makes one hate the things one should hate and love the things one should love (*Lg.* II 653b6–c3: τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ προσαγορεύων).

³⁹⁸ Yet, as Moss (2012, p. 173) observes, 'given that the purpose of the whole discussion [...] is to argue that logoi are not sufficient for instilling virtue (see 1179b4 ff.), and given that this discussion nowhere says that they are necessary, Aristotle's view might be that they are simply an optional aid.' In any case, habituation (conceived as a sort of non-rational education in the way Plato conceives of it in *Lg.* II 653b6–c3—see the previous footnote) enables one to properly understand λόγοι about the good, irrespective of whether these λόγοι are part of the process through which one becomes virtuous. Moreover, it may turn out (*contra* Moss) that teaching is a part of the process by which one becomes fully virtuous, in which case one would need to have natural or habituated virtue in order to be able to learn the things one must learn to become fully virtuous, or that being φρόνιμος amounts to being someone who is potentially an ethical theorist, that is, who is in a condition such that they are able to become ethical theorists if they want to and make the effort (see Broadie, 1991, p. 262n51), in which case the knowledge of the good they attain on a case by case basis about the good will be grounded in their moral character.

³⁹⁹ I am here leaving open the sense which they might be said to share the knowledge of the good had by the fully virtuous. But, as I have suggested in the **Introduction** (in **section 0.1.2.2**), I think that they can do that only to a limited extent.

ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.

In fact, it is useful to proceed towards what is more intelligible. For, learning occurs for everyone in this way: from what less intelligible by nature towards what is more intelligible <by nature>, and this is the task: just like in the case of actions making what is completely good good to each person starting from what is good to each one, so too making things that are intelligible by nature familiar to one starting from the things that are familiar to one. And the things familiar and first to each person are frequently slightly intelligible, and have little or nothing of being. But nevertheless one must attempt to know the things completely intelligible starting from things that are slightly intelligible but which are familiar to one, going through, as was said, these very things.

What is relevant for my purposes in this passage—which is one of many versions of Aristotle’s contrast between things that are *γνώριμα* to us and things that are *γνώριμα* by nature or *simpliciter*—is that Aristotle compares the task one has in the theoretical domain (which amounts to making familiar to one things that are intelligible by nature beginning with things that are only slightly intelligible) with what goes on in the practical domain, presumably by means of habituation. Aristotle talks of making good what is *ὅλως* good to oneself beginning with what is good to each person (a class of goods presumably different from the things that are good *ὅλως*).

If this is correct, then it would seem reasonable to think that by saying that the principles of action do not manifest themselves but to good agents, and if by good agents there Aristotle means fully virtuous agents, what Aristotle means is not only that the moral habituation that leads to virtue is the means by which the end is made manifest to the good person, and that this is a necessary step for grasping⁴⁰⁰ this kind of principle correctly, that is, for attaining a correct conception of the end, but also that having full virtue makes principles of

⁴⁰⁰ Yet it is not necessary to take the analogy as far as to claim that one must provide some sort of definition of end aimed for. At any rate, I would like to think that there is in fact a problem in how agents who are not fully virtuous conceive of the end they pursue, which would imply that they do not pursue this end just as what it is, just like people who have *δόξα* about an object which corresponds extensionally to the one about which one can also have *ἐπιστήμη* do not conceive of the (extensional) object of their belief just as what it is (see *APo* I.33 89^a33–37), even though they can believe in the same proposition about this object as the person who has *ἐπιστήμη* of it.

action manifest in a way they are not yet manifest to persons who are not fully virtuous (even if they are virtuous *in some sense*).

Mere natural and habituated virtue would be necessary if one is to be able to aim for fine ends, in which case it would seem that if intermediate agents do indeed aim for fine ends (and there is good reason for thinking so, as we saw in the **Introduction**), they must have natural and/or habituated virtues in domains of their lives in which they are not liable to experience the psychic conflicts by which they are characterised. For instance, it is because a person who is *simpliciter* incontinent (and thus is liable to be led to perform intemperate actions due to bodily pleasure connected to the sense of touch) is, say, naturally courageous and generous that they can have reason not to act in the way they act when they experience episodes of incontinence.⁴⁰¹ Thus, it would seem that having a good character that still falls

⁴⁰¹ How many natural or habituated virtues they must have to be able to aim for fine ends, and in which combination, is a different question. Moreover, although having a character state that is minimally virtuous is enough for agents who are incontinent to have reason not to act the way they act, it is still not enough for saving them from *ἀκρασία*. A potential problem in this connection is that one could argue that the incontinent are included by Aristotle among agents who live on the basis of *πάθος* (cf. *EN* I.1 [=Bywater I.3] 1095^a7–9), and agents who are disposed to follow what is pleasant to them and what is immediately pleasant (like agents who live *κατὰ πάθος* certainly are—see *EN* VIII.3 1156^a31–33) are agents for whom the ethical enquiry will be in vain and unprofitable (cf. *EN* I.1 [=Bywater I.3] 1095^a4–6). Thus, if I am correct that their endorsing right views about what is good for themselves is something that depends on their being minimally virtuous, it seems that the grasp that incontinent agents have of propositions of the domain of practical philosophy would be even more lacking than that of the usual learner, for although they can see that something is good for them, because they are such as to live on the basis of *πάθος* (i.e., what immediately affects them), they tend to pursue in action something different from what they are convinced (even if only universally) they should pursue. Yet this is somewhat problematic in face of Aristotle's description of agents who live *κατὰ πάθος* as agents who neither listen to nor understand dissuasive arguments (cf. *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b26–28: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειεν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνέη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν), since a *desideratum* is that although incontinent agents do not follow moral injunctions to the effect that they should act in a certain way (e.g., that they should not eat this sweet thing), they nevertheless understand that they should act in that way. Moreover, in domains of their lives in which they are not such as to experience the psychic conflicts by which they are characterised, it seems that they have no issue in understanding moral injunctions. An alternative is saying that incontinent agents are similar to people who live *κατὰ πάθος*, but are still different from them, for they are rather people who are under the control of their *πάθη* when they are experiencing episodes of incontinence (cf. *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1147^a14ff). At any rate, it seems that their grasp of practical propositions in many cases fails to be practical (for they do not act accordingly), which indicates that it is perhaps even more flawed than that of continent agents, who in contrast to incontinent, soft, and resistant agents are not under the control of their *πάθη*. In *EE* II.10 1225^b29–30 Aristotle appears to suggest that *καρτερικοί* count as agents who are under the control of their *πάθη*, while two important things are said about continence in contrast to *καρτερία*: (i) *καρτερία* is characterised, in *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^a33–^b1, as a disposition to resist to one's emotions in contrast to *ἐγκράτεια*, which consists in a disposition to master one's emotions,

short of full virtue is necessary for being able to grasp what one should do in a particular situation and for being able to aim for ends that are right in being fine (see also 1179^b4-16, a passage I shall discuss in more detail below in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.3**—see **T 55**)

Yet Aristotle seems to have something more demanding in mind in 1144^a31-^b1 (specially lines 33-34), since he says that the best end only manifests itself to fully virtuous agents. Thus, with talk of the end manifesting itself in 1144^a33-34 Aristotle may mean not merely that it manifests itself as something good (which would be the practical analogue of its being the case in the theoretical domain) but also that it manifests itself as a particular sort a good: something intrinsically fine. As a result, if indeed it is only for fully virtuous agents that fine things are fine (as I intend to argue in the two next Chapters), it seems that fine ends would only be manifest in what they are for fully virtuous agents, since it is only for such agents that these ends manifest themselves as intrinsically fine.

Views along these lines have been recently objected by Tuozzo (2019), however, who holds that Aristotle does not think that ‘the fully virtuous person grasps or endorses or sees her principles differently from how she did earlier in her development, nor from the way in which some other, non-fully virtuous agents do so’ (p. 160), but rather that ‘what is different, and especially admirable about her, is her ability to figure out how to put those general principles into practice’ (p. 160). Tuozzo begins by proposing that what happens in *Ethics* is analogous to what happens in theoretical sciences, where we may attain correct definitions of primary subject kinds at an early stage of the scientific investigation (on Bronstein’s view, which Tuozzo assumes). Similarly, in *Ethics*, it would be possible to attain an adequate grasp of the ends at an early stage of moral development, and what would differentiate fully virtuous agents and

and (ii) Aristotle says, in *EN* VII.10 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b8-10, that the continent agent is not altered by *πάθος* and appetite, whereas nothing of this sort is said of the resistant agent. Discussing this issue in detail lies outside the scope of this Dissertation, however.

agents who are not fully virtuous yet in this regard would not be their ends or their grasp of their ends, but the fact that fully virtuous agents are able to ‘see their implications [sc., of their ends] in all the different circumstances of life’ (p. 175).

Now, what I find most misleading in Tuozzo’s objection is his assumption that ‘given the right background and upbringing, people will generally acquire these principles, **and indeed endorse them as first principles**’ (p. 165, emphasis mine). I fully concede that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can acquire right principles of action in that they are able to aim for fine ends. Yet I do not think that we should concede that they do indeed endorse them *as first principles*, for it is possible to think that they cannot aim for these ends for their own sakes, in which case they would only be committed to these ends due to some further reason. This does not necessarily imply that they are heteronomous in the sense that an agent who is not fully virtuous can only grasp these principles ‘without having in some way truly recognized for herself their truth and so in that sense made them her own’ (p. 173)—which Tuozzo thinks would be problematic—, for nothing hinders them from having recognised the truth of these principles (i.e., from coming to the conclusion that ϕ is fine) for themselves. It is just that they would not think of these ends as fine due to having recognised their intrinsic fineness. In this sense, then, they are still heteronomous if we attain the technical Kantian sense of the word, since they would not be really motivated to pursue these ends due to their intrinsic moral value.

Besides, something similar may also hold in the case of theoretical sciences. As I have pointed out above (in footnote 372), Morison (2019b) describes having *νοῦς* of a proposition as involving knowing both that nothing explains it (i.e., that it is first and immediate) and how to derive theorems from it and the different ways (possibly all) to use that proposition

in such derivations⁴⁰² (similarly, see Zuppolini's view of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ [2020], which allows of being construed in a way that comes quite close to this). As I take it, such descriptions of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ have some advantages over Bronstein's, since they allow us to differentiate clearly the grasp that someone at an earlier stage of the enquiry has of the principles of the sciences from the grasp of someone who has acquired $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ of the principles, since having $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ would not be merely a matter of endorsing the correct definitions of fundamental propositions of a science (conceding that one can arrive at those at earlier stages of the scientific investigation), nor would involve merely being able to put these propositions to use demonstrating theorems, but would also require one to see these propositions as immediate—as not admitting further explanation. As a result, someone who does not see certain propositions as immediate will not have $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ of them, and thus will not grasp these principles *as first principles* and thus precisely as what they are, similar to how agents who are not fully virtuous would not aim for fine ends as 'primary' motives of action (on this, see pages 40 to 44 above in the **Introduction**), since they would not be committed to such ends due to the intrinsic fineness of these ends.

It should be noted that the end not being manifest (in this more demanding sense I have described) to agents who are not fully virtuous does not need to imply that these agents make false assumptions about their end or that they do not believe that fine ends they aim

⁴⁰² In other words, attaining noetic grasp of a proposition involves knowing not only the relational properties that it is better known than, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion (the three last of the six conditions that scientific principles must satisfy according to *APo* I.2 71^b19–23 to be appropriate to what is explained), but also that that proposition is true, primary, and immediate. These latter three seem to be absolute conditions, that do not hold only relatively to the conclusion. This is crucial, because some theorems may be true, better known than, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion demonstrated on their basis, without thereby being first principles, for they would not be first (since there are things that are prior to them as well) or immediate (since they would not be indemonstrable). Similarly, even when we are dealing with principles that satisfy the six requirements from *APo* I.2 71^b19–23, it is still possible that one does not grasp these principles as satisfying these six requirements, but is committed to the truth of these principles as something derived from other propositions to which they are also committed (thus implying that one does not grasp these principles as being first and immediate). For the idea that the six requirements from *APo* I.2 are to be divided into two groups of three, the first one concerning Absolute requirements, the second one concerning relative requirements, see, for instance, Ross (1949, p. 509), McKirahan (1992, p. 24), and Barnes (1993, p. 93).

for are good for them.⁴⁰³ Presumably, their mistake is much more subtle, and their condition may be described as being analogous to that of someone who assumes the principles of a certain *ἐπιστήμη* and uses them to explain certain propositions in that domain without being properly familiarised with its subject matter or with the principles one is assuming, which does not mean positing an incorrect definition for the principles, but rather not having a full understanding⁴⁰⁴ of the propositions assumed, which would not be known just as what they are (see footnote 400), i.e., as immediate propositions, but would be seen as being ultimately explained by some further principles.

Therefore, 1144^a31-34 would not hinder agents who are not fully virtuous from posit-

⁴⁰³ In fact, if they were not convinced that the fine ends they aim for are good for them they would not be able to have *βουλήσεις* of these ends (and, as we saw in the **Introduction**, Aristotle describes intermediate agents like the incontinent as acting against their *βουλήσεις*). Thus, the condition of intermediate agents would be relevantly different from that of young persons who, according to *EN* VI.9 [=Bywater VI.8] 1142^a11-19, cannot be wise nor natural scientists, although they can become mathematicians, for Aristotle's argument in *EN* VI.9 [=Bywater VI.8] actually proceeds further: At 1142^a19-20, he entertains the possibility of some principles being enunciated but not believed in by young people (presumably those that come from experience), and of 'the what it is' of other principles (*τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστίν*) being manifest (*οὐκ ἄδηλον*) to them (presumably those principles that come from abstraction). This claim is reminiscent of that made in *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1147^a18-24 about first learners, to whom Aristotle is comparing persons under the control of their emotions like the incontinent. In fact, in this latter passage Aristotle says that merely enunciating something is not a sign of knowledge, for both persons under the control of their emotions and first learners can repeat deductions and Empedocles' verses, although they are not knowers, for knowledge must be ingrained (*δεῖ γὰρ συμψυγῆναι*), which demands time. Thus, even though first learners can really entertain the same propositions as people who really have knowledge (including the principles), this is not enough for saying that they have knowledge, for this would require their grasp of these propositions to be grounded in some other fashion, be it in induction, perception, abstraction, or experience. Similarly, I would like to hold that although intermediate agents like the incontinent can endorse right ends of action, their grasp of it is in some way defective in so far as it is not grounded in habituation. Yet, different from young people, it is not the case that they enunciate without believing or cease from believing while experiencing incontinence or softness, for they do not really lack habituation (the practical analogue of experience), since I am assuming that intermediate agents, despite lacking the proper habituation in the domain of their lives in which they are liable to experience the psychic conflicts that characterise them as intermediate agents, are well habituated in other domains of their lives, and that this habituation is sufficient for allowing them to endorse fine ends as good ends (thus triggering *βουλήσεις* for these ends), although it would not be enough for making them aim for fine ends for their own sakes and for making their ends effective in leading them to action. What they are merely enunciating and cannot believe in while experiencing the psychic conflicts that characterise them as intermediate agents is rather the conclusion saying that they should not act in such and such a way, which is either something they arrived at through deliberation (as in the case of weak incontinent agents), or something they would have arrived at if they had deliberated, but which is somehow implicit in the ends they are committed to (as in the case of impetuous incontinent agents).

⁴⁰⁴ Which would depend on the principles that are more knowable by nature having also become more knowable to the agent.

ing an end without it being manifest to them (both on my reading and on Loening's reading). And, if I am right, this passage would be compatible with their being able to posit an end without understanding it fully. Thus, when an intermediate agent aims for, say, giving money to someone (an end₃ that may be something generous in the circumstances the agent is being faced with), they would not really understand what achieving this in the circumstances they are being faced with is all about, since this could be something they aim at not because of its intrinsic moral value, but because it contributes to some further end (say, their being recognised as a generous person). As a result, they would not assume fine ends as their goal in the circumstances they are being faced with *qua* something intrinsically fine, but *qua* something else,⁴⁰⁵ in which case they would not aim for fine ends *for their own sakes*.⁴⁰⁶

1.4 Aristotle's conclusion (1145^a2-11): the usefulness of practical wisdom, and his answer about the relationship between practical and theoretical wisdom

To conclude, let me now quote *EN* VI.13 1145^a2-11:

T 27 – *EN* VI.13 1145^a2–11

1145a2 δῆλον δέ, κὰν εἶ |
 μὴ πρακτικὴ ᾗν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τό του μορίου | ἀρετὴν
 5 εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ || φρονήσεως
 οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ | τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 ποιεῖ πράττειν.
 6 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία | γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ
 τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ | τῆς ὑγείας ἢ ἰατρικῆ· οὐ
 γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ | ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα
 10 ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη. || ἔτι ὅμοιον κὰν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτι-
 κὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, | ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ

⁴⁰⁵ Note that assuming an end *qua* something not intrinsically fine is compatible with assuming it as something fine, since, as we shall see, Aristotle also talks of fine things that are not intrinsically fine, but whose fineness is to be explained by fine things for whose sake they are pursued. Thus, one who has a mistaken conception of fineness might think that an intrinsically fine action is fine because it is honourable (which it is because it hits the mean in action) rather than because it hits the mean in action (which is why such actions are honourable), thus failing to think of fine actions as intrinsically fine in that they fail to be motivated by what makes them fine.

⁴⁰⁶ As my remarks here make clear, I think reading (A''') is to be preferred if the reading I proposed turns out to be right.

πόλει.

|| a2 κἄν K^bP^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup}.V: πρακτικὴν O^b || a3 πρακτικὴ ἦν
P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: πρακτικὴν K^b | ἄν om. K^b | του C^c von Frag-
stein (1974, p. 254n1): τοῦ K^bP^bLB^{95sup}.V: om. L^b Eustratius (CAG.
XX, 404.23–30) Dirlmeier (1959, p. 473): νοῦ Susemihl: τοῦ ἑτέρου (cf.
MM A.XXXIV.17 1197^b5-6) aut τοῦ βελτίονος conj. Spengel (1852,
p. 454) || a8 ἦ om. K^b || a9 ἐκείνης P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐκείνη
| οὖν ... ἐκείνη om. P^bC^c | οὖν LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: οὐ K^b | ἐκείνη
LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐκείνη K^b: ἐκείνης Va.c.

And it is evident, even if it [sc., practical wisdom] were not a doer <of some-thing>, that one would need it because it is virtue of a part <of the soul>, and that decision would not be correct without practical wisdom, nor without virtue. That is, one of them makes one achieve the end, whereas the other, the things towards to end.

But neither is it [sc., practical wisdom] really in control of wisdom or of the better part, but it [sc., practical wisdom] sees that it [sc., wisdom] comes into being. Thus, it gives orders for its sake, but not to it. Besides, <this third *aporia*> is just as if someone said that statesmanship rules the gods because it issues orders about everything in the city

In this passage not only Aristotle's answers to the *aporiae* raised in 1143^b14-36 (T 1) come to an end, but *EN* VI as well. I have divided T 27 into two bits of text. In the first one—lines 1145^a2-6—, Aristotle concludes his answer to the *aporiae* about the usefulness of practical wisdom. In the second bit—lines 1145^a6-11—, Aristotle turns to the third *aporia*, answering it.

As I have announced before, I shall not attempt to make sense of Aristotle's problematic but very interesting answer to the third *aporia*, which seems to somehow subordinate practical wisdom to theoretical wisdom, thus raising a series of questions for Aristotle's discussion of *εὐδαιμονία* in *EN* X.6-10 [=Bywater X.6-9] if we read this claim in the *Nicomachean* context.⁴⁰⁷

Now, the conclusion drawn in lines 1145^a2-6 begins with the claim that we would need practical wisdom even if it were not productive of anything on the grounds that it is a virtue (an argument quite similar to the one about *σοφία* that was presented at 1144^a5-6), which appears to confirm that what Aristotle said about *φρόνησις* above in T 4 was not meant

⁴⁰⁷ Yet, as I have already indicated in footnote 211, there is reason for thinking that the conception of *εὐδαιμονία* operating in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13] is *Eudemian*.

as an answer to the first *aporia*, which concerned the usefulness of both *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, in what concerns *φρόνησις*, but only in what concerns *σοφία* (as I have suggested above in **section 1.2**).

In addition to that, albeit the division of labour presented in lines 1145^a4-6 is reminiscent of the division of labour from lines 1144^a6-11 (in **T 4**, discussed above in **section 1.2**), it is substantially different (or so I shall argue). Whilst the division of labour presented at 1144^a6-11 was compatible with practical wisdom not making us any more doers of good things, the argument now is to the effect that *φρόνησις* and moral virtue make us do something, namely moral virtue makes us achieve the end, whereas *φρόνησις* makes us do the things that contribute to the end, a claim that can only be made after Aristotle secured two things: first, that *δευότης*, a capacity responsible for achieving things that are for the sake of an established goal, is required by *φρόνησις*, so that *φρόνησις*, because it presupposes *δευότης*, also shares in the capacity of achieving things that are for the sake of an end. And second, that being virtuous and being *φρόνιμος* are inextricably intertwined, so that the contribution given by *φρόνησις* is not superfluous or redundant.⁴⁰⁸ Indeed, virtuous agents are only fully virtuous because of *φρόνησις*, for it seems that having only natural virtue is not enough for consistently performing virtuous actions voluntarily (in fact, natural virtue, as Aristotle contends, can be harmful), so that *φρόνησις* does make a practical difference after all.

There are, however, different ways of construing this division of labour.

A first alternative is to claim that it is saying that virtue makes the end right by motivating us to achieve the right end,⁴⁰⁹ and not by merely securing that the end we pursue is

⁴⁰⁸ In that case, this division of labour would not be a mere restatement of the previous two, but also incorporates the results of the argument advanced throughout the chapter in regard to *φρόνησις* and moral virtue (see also footnote 302 for Irwin's view on the relationship between the three divisions of labour in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12-13]).

⁴⁰⁹ This is the view held by Angioni (2011, p. 345).

morally good, i.e., is fine. As I would like to suggest, virtue motivates us to achieve the right end precisely in that it enables us to value its intrinsic fineness, thus enabling us to aim for fine ends for their own sakes.

A second alternative to this is to suppose that one should not read *ποιεῖν πράττειν* as governing the two parts of the sentence, but only the second. In that case, to make sense of the first part, one should supply *ὀρθόν* with *ποιεῖν*, so that Aristotle would be saying that whilst virtue makes the end right, prudence makes one achieve the things that lead to the end.⁴¹⁰

A third alternative is to say that although *ποιεῖν πράττειν* governs both parts of the sentence, it indicates something quite different, namely that virtue posits the end, i.e., that it makes us desire it in the first place.⁴¹¹

⁴¹⁰ This was suggested as a correction by Ramsauer (1878, p. 423). If we read the text in this way (irrespective of whether we add *ὀρθόν* into the text), it implies that this passage is not saying something much different from the previous divisions of labour. This is how Barnes (2015, p. 92) understands the passage, since he holds that Aristotle intends to say here just what he said in 1144^a7-9, to wit, that virtue makes the goal right, whereas *φρόνησις* the things that contribute to the goal.

⁴¹¹ This is how Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, p. 560) and Natali (1989/2001, p. 44) interpret this passage. As Gauthier observes, Alexander of Aphrodisias quotes this passage in his 22th Ethical Problem (*Supplementum Aristotelicum* X.2, 142.31) without supplying *ὀρθόν*, which suggests that no correction is needed after all. Thus, Gauthier argues that by saying that virtue *ποιεῖ πράττειν* the end, Aristotle means that virtue makes us desire the end. Similarly, Natali takes this as indicating that virtue *posits* the end. Yet if virtue were a condition for merely desiring or positing an end, and if, as I have argued, Aristotle is thinking of full virtue here, then it would seem that intermediate agents cannot really aim for morally good ends, that is, although they would be able to assert a morally good end, they would not actually desire it.

As Natali (1989/2001, p. 201n22) rightly observes, this idea seems to be suggested by Loening (1903, pp. 18ff), who explicitly claims that reason can only posit an end of action when what it recognises as an end is *effectively* desired (i.e., is desired by an *ὄρεξις ἢ ἐνέργεια*), in which case one would only have a *βούλησις* for what one takes to be good if one's *βούλησις* is active in pursuing that end.

But what does that mean? Loening appears to think that actively desiring something amounts to being led to action on the basis of that desire (since in *DA* III.10 433^b17–18 Aristotle appears to say that desire is a sort of movement in so far as it is active: *ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις τίς ἐστὶν ἢ* [VX: ἢ CH^aLU: ἢ E] *ἐνέργεια* [codd.: *ἐνεργεία* coni. Torstrik, 1862, p. 103]), in which case the activity of desire would correspond to actual bodily movement towards the object that is desired. As a result, virtue would make the end right by securing that what one knows to be good is also the end of one's action, i.e., the motive behind one's actions.

There are two problems, though: first, this would imply either that virtue is not necessary for making the ends right, since Loening also seems to think that continent agents are motivated by what they take to be good, since they are distinguished from incontinent agents by the fact that their *λόγος* prevails (p. 25n17), or, if virtue is indeed necessary for making the end right, that in making the end right, it determines not just what we aim for by means of *βούλησις* (since continent agents would also be able to aim for morally good ends), but also what our *ἐπιθυμῖαι* and *θυμοί* aim for, as Loening indeed claims

All these readings are feasible (though the third one is to some extent objectionable, see footnote 411). But I think that first one, besides making better sense of the text as we have it, captures a thesis that, as I shall argue in next Chapters, is unmistakably Aristotelian.

later in his book (1903, p. 90), in which case the role of virtue in making the end right would be purely conative.

Second, there is a good case for thinking that desire is a movement or activity (following mss. CH^aLU: *ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια*) or is a movement in so far as it is active (following mss. VX: *ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια*) not because it implies that one is acting on its basis, but rather because desiring something involves alterations around the heart like heating and cooling, which are not always sufficient for actually moving the body thus leading one to action, for some other desire that is stronger can impede it from doing that (see Corcilius, 2008; Corcilius & Gregoric, 2013; Primavesi & Corcilius, 2018). As a result, it would be possible to have an active *βούλησις* for a morally good end without it being what leads one to action, i.e., without it being the case that the end that is the object of this desire is the end that explains one's action, for incontinent agents, for instance, would be able to have a *βούλησις* for a morally good end, but, in episodes of incontinence at least, they are led, by their *ἐπιθυμίαι* and *θυμοί* (depending on which kind of incontinence they suffer), to act against their *βούλησις*. Alternatively, one could argue, drawing on a distinction made by Inwood (1985, p. 11), that this passage is not saying that virtue makes one have desiderative states for the right end, but that virtue makes one have activated desires for the right ends, and that activated desires are those desires that figure in the explanation of action. Yet, although this would make good sense (since it would be compatible with intermediate agents having *βουλήσεις* against which they act), it leads us to an issue I already mentioned in the **Introduction** (see footnote 23): if virtue makes the ends right in that it makes the ends we desire effective in leading us to action (thus securing that they are also or lead to ends₁ that are right), it would seem either that virtue is not necessary for having right ends (since continence, for instance, would also be sufficient for that), or else that if virtue is necessary for having right ends, its contribution is purely conative, since it would make the end right not by making one have ends₁ that are right, but by securing that one is not conflicted while acting as reason prescribes.

CHAPTER 2. THE *ETHICA EUDEMIA*

In this Chapter, I intend to discuss the passages on the division of labour between virtue and reason that can be found in the *Ethica Eudemia* and Aristotle's views expressed in the *EE* on how fully virtuous agents should be distinguished from agents who are not fully virtuous.

In the *Ethica Eudemia*, there are several passages on the division of labour between virtue and reason that should be relevant for our purposes. The first and most important passage is *EE* II.11; the other relevant passages come from *EE* III. In the passages from *EE* III I shall be interested in, Aristotle talks about the end aimed by virtuous agents and distinguishes the virtues from dispositions to perform virtuous actions on the basis of non-rational desires. *EE* II.11, in turn, besides explicitly presenting us with divisions of labour between virtue and reason according to which virtue is responsible for making the end of decision right, also introduces an argument according to which agents are qualified by reference to the ends for whose sake they act.

Moreover, in the passages from *EE* III I shall discuss, Aristotle seems to identify the end aimed by the virtues with the fine ($\tau\acute{o}$ καλόν), which appears to make the claim that virtue makes the end right more specific in that it suggests that virtue makes the end right in that it makes one act for the sake of the fine. For that reason, in the second part of this Chapter (i.e., section 2.3), I shall also say something on Aristotle's account of $\tau\acute{o}$ καλόν giving special attention to what he says in *EE* VIII.3 and in some other passages of the *EE*, whose account of fineness I shall argue is consistent with Aristotle's use of this notion in the passages from *EE* III I analyse in the first part of this Chapter. Besides, the argument from *EE* VIII.3 will allow me to provide further grounds for the claim that fully virtuous agents are distinguished from agents who are not fully virtuous by reference to their motives, for they

can also be distinguished by reference to the fact that they are agents for whom fine things are fine, which, as I shall argue, seems to be what enables them to perform fine actions for their own sakes, a possibility that does not seem to be open to agents who are not fully virtuous.

As a result, the views on these matters expressed by Aristotle in the *EE* seem to be perfectly in line with what he said in the common books read in the way I proposed above in Chapter 1.

2.1 The divisions of labour from *EE* II.11 and Aristotle's argument to the effect that agents are qualified by the ends for whose sake they act

Even though much has been written about *EE* II.11, it is nonetheless a difficult and controversial text. To discuss it, I have below divided it into four parts (1227^b12-22, 1227^b22-33, 1227^b34-1228^a2, and 1228^a2-19).

2.1.1 *EE* II.11 1227^b 12-22

Let me begin with 1227^b12-22:

T 28 – *EE* II.11 1227^b12-22

1227^b12 τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἀνα|μάρτητον ποιῆι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως | ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισὶ τὸν 15 λό|γον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια, αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν | λόγον, ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὅσπερ|ρον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέ|χειν ἢ ἀρετὴ τοῦτο αἴτιον. ἢ μὲν ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν | ἐπαυε- 20 τῶν δ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια. λέγωμεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι || γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν | διαμαρτάνειν, ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ | πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον.

Since these things have been determined, we should say whether virtue makes decision unerring in that⁴¹² <it makes> the end right in such a way that one decides for the sake of what one should, or, as some people judge, <it makes> reason <right>. [15] However, this [sc., what makes reason right] is continence, for it does not corrupt

⁴¹² I read this *καί* as expegetical. Similarly, see Lorenz (2019, p. 202n10).

reason. But virtue and continence are different. We must talk about these things later, since for those who think that virtue provides right reason, the cause is this: continence is such a thing and it is praiseworthy. Now, let us continue our discussion⁴¹³ after first raising some difficulties: It is possible [20] for the goal to be right, but for one to be mistaken about the things that contribute to it; it is possible to be mistaken about the goal, but right concerning what contributes to it; and <it is possible> for neither of them <to be right>.

In this passage, Aristotle appears to be asking whether virtue makes decision unerring by making one decide for the sake of a right end,⁴¹⁴ or makes reason right. The second alternative, as the sequence makes clear, is to be rejected. Yet matters are not so clear in what concerns the first alternative.⁴¹⁵

The second alternative should be rejected on the grounds that if virtue were responsible for making reason right, it would be possible to say that it is no more than continence, as

⁴¹³ I have translated λέγωμεν in this way because it seems to be continuative rather than immediate—on this distinction van Emde Boas et al. (2019, pp. 483–484)—, especially given the λέγωμεν from 1227^b12. This will be relevant for the discussion of *EE* II.11 1227^b22–33 (T 28 below), which comes immediately after Aristotle finishes raising difficulties (which is what he does in lines 19–22).

⁴¹⁴ Pace von Fragstein (1974, p. 118), who thinks that this alternative consists in thinking of virtue as responsible for making both the means and the ends right. Similarly, Maurus (1668, p. 439, §1) thinks the question being asked here is ‘whether virtue not only makes sure that we do not err about our decision of the means, and that we aim for a right end, and therefore <that> we choose the means on account of a right end, but also, as some people think, causes reason itself to be right’ (*utrum virtus non solum faciat, ut non peccemus circa electionem mediorum, & ut intendamus finem rectum, ac media eligamus propter finem rectum, sed etiam, ut quidam arbitrantur, efficiat, ut ipsa ratio sit recta?*). Alternatively, von der Mühl (1909, pp. 11–12), who says that he cannot understand the text in its current form (*mihi quidem haec omnino sensu carere videntur neque intellego, quomodo continentia rationem rectam reddere atque dirigere dici possit*), proposes changing τὸν λόγον from lines 14–15 into ὁ λόγος (an error that, according to von der Mühl, would be due to Eudemus having misheard what Aristotle would have said). As a result, Aristotle would be asking whether it is virtue or reason that makes the end right. Yet this still makes poor sense of the mention of continence. In the face of this, von der Mühl (1909, p. 12) says that this argument on continence was added by Eudemus with the intention of explaining the things written (i.e., τὸν λόγον) and showing why Socrates and the Socratics committed an error. Kapp (1912, pp. 12–14), in turn, criticises von der Mühl’s solution, and tries to make sense of the transmitted text. Kapp’s solution consists in thinking that the question being asked here is whether virtue makes decision unerring or reason right, and that those who side with the latter alternative do so because they are talking of ἐγκράτεια rather than virtue, since they think of virtue as making the reason right in terms of reason not being corrupted, which is also compatible with ἐγκράτεια (pp. 14–17). My reading is close to Kapp’s, but I think one should describe in more detail what precisely is implied by making reason right if this is meant to be sufficient only for ἐγκράτεια and not for virtue. In saying that the rightness in discussion here implies only that reason is not corrupted, Kapp’s reading faces some issues, for Aristotle thinks that reason not being corrupted holds in the case of ἀκρασία as well (e.g., *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a24–25), as I shall point out below.

⁴¹⁵ Lorenz (2019, p. 202), for instance, thinks Aristotle ends up favouring the first alternative. Yet, as I shall argue below, making the end right in the sense of securing that one decides for the sake of what one should is not enough for making decision unerring, for which reason it may seem that this alternative should be rejected as well.

is suggested at lines 15-19. This implies that Aristotle is not envisaging here any sort of correctness of reasoning, since even incontinent and intemperate agents can be described as right in their reasonings about what contributes to their ends (see *EN* VI.10 [=Bywater VI.9] 1142^b17–20). Moreover, I do not think that not corrupting λόγος should be understood merely in terms of its remaining preserved in the sense presented in *EN* VII.9 [= Bywater VII.8] 1151^a25 (I have briefly discussed this passage above in section 1.3.3), otherwise reason not being corrupted would be sufficient for incontinence as well.

In order to be a sufficient condition for continence, but not for virtue or incontinence, ‘not corrupting reason’ should imply that continence not only secures that one does not have something base as one’s end, but also that one is such as to act as reason commands. No doubt incontinence also does not corrupt reason in that it does not make the agent perform vicious actions due to thinking that the base end to which these actions contribute is fine, but there is a sense in which it corrupts reason in that it makes one act against one’s deliberative conclusions (as in the case of weak incontinence) or against fine ends one might be committed to and that may allow the agent to see that they are not acting as they should (as in the case of impetuous incontinence). Besides, if continence were responsible merely for securing that one’s reason is effective in achieving the ends one has βουλήσεις for, it seems that vice would be a sort of continence, for fully vicious agents are in general described by Aristotle as effective in achieving the ends they have βουλήσεις for, since, different from intermediate agents, fully vicious agents do not experience psychic conflicts. Thus, it seems that continence makes reason right in that it secures that one is consistently effective in acting for the sake of an end that is right in some sense.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁶ Woods (1992, pp. 153-154) also argues that, in this passage, ‘right reason’ implies the reference to a right end. However, this may not be sufficient to distinguish continence from incontinence depending on how we conceive of these two conditions. A criterion that can uncontroversially distinguish between continence and incontinence is, as I have argued, that continence secures that one can perform virtuous actions

In that case, by not corrupting *λόγος*, continence would seem to secure rather that one's reasonings are effective in eliciting virtuous action for the sake of fine ends. Perhaps then 'αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον' (lines 15-16) could rather mean that continence does not *disrupt* reason, for the point here would be not that continence merely secures that reason is not morally corrupted (for incontinence is sufficient for that as well), but also that continence secures that reason can perform its causal role in eliciting action, i.e., it does not *disrupt* reason. Yet it would perhaps be misleading to describe it as merely not disrupting reason, for vice does not disrupt reason as well, although it certainly corrupts reason, as I have pointed out above. In any case, why should this prompt us to reject the idea that virtue makes reason right? As a matter of fact, virtue also seems not to corrupt and disrupt reason.

A way out of this difficulty is offered by Woods (1992, p. 154), who argues that even though virtue can be described as rendering reason right in the same way as continence, this would not be sufficient for virtue. So, the question posed by Aristotle would not be one about what virtue is sufficient for (whether making decision unerring or reason right), but instead about what is sufficient for virtue. In other words, Aristotle wants something that is proper to virtue (i.e., an *ἴδιον* of virtue). As a result, making reason right in the sense of making it effective in leading one to perform virtuous actions for the sake of a right end would not be a task proper to and characteristic of virtue, for it is shared by both virtue and continence.

Regarding the first alternative—according to which virtue makes decision unerring by making one decide for the sake of a right end—, it may be argued that it is to be rejected

or forbear from vicious actions despite the psychic conflicts that characterise one as continent. A further problem is whether, despite putting incontinence and softness aside, securing that one is consistently effective in acting for the sake of a right end is sufficient for distinguishing between resistance and continence. But perhaps Aristotle is talking of continence in this passage as including resistance (*καρτερία*), which is not surprising if the target here is a Socratic account of virtue, since Socrates seemed to conflate *ἐγκράτεια* and *καρτερία* in that the latter is implied by the former (as is most clear in Xenophon's representation of Socrates—e.g. *Memorabilia* IV.v.9,11-13, a passage in which *ἐγκράτεια* is described as entailing *καρτερία* over certain desires).

because rendering the end of decision right is not sufficient for it to be unerring. In fact, as Aristotle argues at lines 19-22, it is possible to be right about one's end without being right about what contributes to it, that is, it would be possible to decide for the sake of a right end without being right about what contributes to it. In that case, deciding for the sake of what one should would not be sufficient for a decision to be free from error.⁴¹⁷ Yet the sequence of the chapter clearly suggests that virtue is responsible for making the end of decision right, so that although making the end of decision right is not tantamount to making decision unerring, it seems that virtue is nevertheless responsible for making the end of decision right and that it contributes to making decision unerring in making its end right. But is this sufficient for virtue? If it turns out that only fully virtuous agents can decide for the sake of right ends in that only such agents can decide for the sake of fine ends aimed at for their own sakes (as I have proposed in the **Introduction** and in **Chapter 1**), then it seems that this is sufficient for virtue (provided that Aristotle has full virtue in mind here). But how could that be compatible with one erring about what contributes to the end, while being right about the end? In fact, if the sort of rightness of the end secured by virtue is compatible with one erring about what contributes to it, then it would seem that naturally virtuous agents and even intermediate agents can decide for the sake of what they should. Yet, in that case, making the end right would not be sufficient for virtue as well, and it would not be clear why Aristotle will later conclude (in lines 1228^a1-2) that virtue is the cause of the end of decision being right.

In the face of this difficulty, I would like to suggest that in saying that one can be right about the end, but mistaken about what contributes to it, Aristotle does not intend to suggest that the way in which virtue makes the end right is compatible with one being mistaken about what contributes to it, but rather that making decision unerring is not a task performed by

⁴¹⁷ Aristotle presents a similar argument about the different ways in which one can be mistaken about ends and means in *Pol.* VII.13 1331^b29-38.

virtue alone, which is compatible with virtue always being associated with whatever other capacity is also needed if decision is to be unerring. As a result, even though making decision unerring is sufficient for virtue, it is not quite what virtue is, by itself, responsible for.

That being so, Aristotle is led to formulate the question differently, asking whether virtue is responsible for making the end right, or what contributes to it. This is the issue he is dealing with in 1227^b34ff (cf. T 31). It is not clear, however, if this question was not already posed before 1227^b34ff, namely at 1227^b22-23 (in my T 29).

2.1.2 *EE* II.11 1227^b 22-33

Let me now translate 1227^b22-23:

T 29 – *EE* II.11 1227^b22-33

1227b22 *πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα | δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω· οὔτε γὰρ 25 ἰατρὸς || σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μὴ, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μὴ, οὔτε | ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μὴ, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ | μὴ. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ὥσπερ γὰρ | ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ 30 τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τὸδε ὑγιαίνειν, || ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ εἰ ἔστι | τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή.*

|| **b29** *ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τὸδε ὑγιαίνειν* PCL: *ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τό γε ὑγιαίνειν* B: *ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τὸ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν* B²: *ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τοδὶ ὑγιαίνειν* Spengel (1865, p. 609): *ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόνδε ὑγιαίνειν* Rackham (1935, p. 302) Walzer & Mingay: *ἐπειδὴ εἰ τὸδε ὑγιαίνειν* Kenny (1979, p. 132n1) Rowe

But virtue makes <right> the goal, or the things towards it? We hold that it <makes> the goal <right>, because there is no reasoning of it, nor explanation. [25] Now,⁴¹⁸ let this be assumed as a principle, for the doctor does not consider whether one should be healthy or not, but instead whether one should walk or not, nor does the expert in gymnastics consider whether one should be in good shape or not, but instead whether one should wrestle or not. Similarly, nor is any other <science> about the end, for just as in theoretical sciences hypotheses are principles, so too in productive sciences [30] the end is a principle and a hypothesis: since being healthy must be this, it is necessary that this thing here occurs if that [sc., being healthy] will be the case, just as there [sc.,

⁴¹⁸ I taking *ἀλλὰ δὴ* here as progressive rather than adversative—on the progressive sense of *ἀλλὰ δὴ*, see Denniston (1954, s.v. *ἀλλὰ δὴ*, (3), p. 240). But I think that the text can also be made good sense of if one reads it as adversative.

in theoretical sciences], if it is the case that the triangle <has the sum of internal angles equal to> two right angles, it is necessary for this thing here to be the case. So, the end is a principle of reasoning, and the final step of thought is <a principle> of action.

On one reading of lines 22-23, which I have favoured in my translation, Aristotle is asking whether virtue makes the end right, or what contributes to it,⁴¹⁹ but this reading requires one to supply ‘ὁρθόν,’⁴²⁰ which is absent from the text transmitted by the mss. On another reading, the absence of ‘ὁρθόν’ is meaningful, and implies that these lines are rather asking whether virtue is responsible for setting the ends or the means.⁴²¹

In order to decide between these two readings, I think we should ask what exactly is being assumed as a principle at line 25: that is, what is the referent of *τοῦτο* in ‘ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω.’ A first alternative is to say that Aristotle is assuming as a principle at line 25 that virtue makes the end right.⁴²² In that case, it could be argued that lines 25-32 support this claim in that they imply that reason does not deal with the end, which allows one to conclude that virtue is the only candidate for making the end right, for which reason one should assume that it is virtue that makes the end right.

A second alternative is to say that what is assumed as a principle at line 25 is that virtue establishes the end. In that case, Aristotle’s argument would have two steps: he would first show that virtue is responsible for establishing the ends and not the means here in **T 29**, and then, in 1227^b34ff (in **T 31** below), he would conclude that virtue is responsible for making the ends right rather than the means, since reason cannot be responsible for making the ends

⁴¹⁹ This reading is adopted by the translations of Woods (1992, p. 33), Inwood and Woolf (2013, p. 39), Simpson (2013, p. 46), and by Maurus (1668, p. 439, §4), von Fragstein (1974, p. 119), and Natali (1989/2001, pp. 40, 199n9).

⁴²⁰ A possibility that is first mentioned by Rackham (1935, pp. 302n1, 303na). But perhaps we do not need to insert *ὁρθόν* into the text (as Rackham wants) to secure this reading—similarly, see von Fragstein (1974, p. 119) and Kenny (1979, p. 84).

⁴²¹ As was defended by Dirlmeier (1963, p. 303) in light of the parallel discussion in *MM* A.XVIII 1190^a9ff (see **T 30** below), where Aristotle talks of virtue as something that sets (*προτίθησι*) the end, in which case ‘ποιεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν’ could perhaps mean ‘to establish the goal’.

⁴²² As was thought by Maurus (1668, pp. 339-340, §4).

right, for it does not establish the ends to begin with.

Technically, the arguments advanced at lines 25–32 never deal with the idea of ‘positing ends.’ All they say is that no practitioner of arts examines (*σκοπεῖ*) whether they should pursue an end or not, and that, in general, no science is about the end.⁴²³ This claim is then supported by the fact that the ends occupy a position that is analogous to that occupied by hypotheses in the theoretical sciences. The implicit point appears to be that just as no theoretical science is concerned with explaining its own principle, since it is presupposed by them, so too no productive or practical science is concerned with explaining its principle, its end. The argument advanced in this passage concludes by saying that the end is a principle of reasoning, which implies that there is no reasoning that leads to the end, but that reasoning starts from the end.

In any case, when Aristotle says in 1227^b23–24 that we hold that virtue makes right/establishes the goal (*τιθέμεθα δὲ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν*), he explained this assumption by saying that that there is neither reasoning nor explanation of the end. Similarly, in lines 25–32, Aristotle would be explaining the fact that we should assume as a principle that virtue makes right/establishes the end by saying that no technical science examines whether they should or should not pursue an end, but simply assumes it (i.e., they give no explanation as to why one should pursue the end characteristic of that craft), just like hypotheses are principles in the theoretical sciences.⁴²⁴

Now, the second reading—according to which in **T 29** Aristotle is talking of virtue

⁴²³ Which claim appears to be a clear denial of the thesis advanced by Plato in the *Laches*, where he talks of sciences as examining their ends (see *La.* 185b9–d5).

⁴²⁴ This parallel gains force if we pay attention to Aristotle’s language here, since, as has been pointed out to me by Paulo Ferreira, ‘ἀλλὰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω’ seems to be a pun on the part of Aristotle, especially given the comparison between ends and hypotheses we come across in the sequence, since after asking whether virtue makes right/establishes the end (which is like a hypothesis) or the means, and saying that we hold (*τιθέμεθα*) that it makes right/establishes the end, he would be saying that we should assume (*ὑποκείσθω*) as a principle that it makes right/establishes the end, which claim will be the principle (the hypothesis) of Aristotle’s reasoning in the sequence of *EE* II.11.

establishing the end—faces some difficulties. As I have indicated in footnote 421, Dirlmeier's main argument for this reading is the parallel with *MM* A.XVIII.3-6 1190^a8ff. Yet in this passage from the *MM* it is not said that virtue simply establishes the end, for in the context the author of the treatise does not have any end in mind, but the end characteristic of virtue: the fine. Let me quote *MM* A.XVIII.3-6 1190^a8-28:

T 30 – *MM* A.XVIII.3-6 1090^a8-28

1090a8 ἐπεὶ οὖν διήρηται ἐν τίνι ἢ ἀμαρτία καὶ πῶς, λοιπὸν ἐστι
 | τίνος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ στοχαστική, πότερον τοῦ τέλους ἢ τῶν
 10 πρὸς τὸ || τέλος, οἷον πότερον τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ καλόν.
 πῶς οὖν ἢ | ἐπιστήμη; πότερον τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστή-
 μης τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἰδεῖν; ἂν
 γὰρ τοῦτο καλῶς | προθῆται, οἷον καλὴν οἰκίαν ποιῆσαι, καὶ
 τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ | ἄλλος τις εὐρήσει καὶ ποιεῖ ἢ οἰκοδόμος.
 15 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ || ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπασῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ὡσαύτως
 ἄρα δόξειεν | ἂν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς, μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτῆς τὸν
 σκοπὸν | {πρὸς} τὸ τέλος, ὃ δεῖ ὀρθῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος· καὶ ἐξ ὧν τοῦτ' ἔσται οὐθεὶς ἄλλος ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐρήσει
 20 ἂ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο. καὶ εὐλογον δὲ τούτου εἶναι προ||θετικὴν τὴν
 ἀρετὴν· ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, | ἕκαστον καὶ
 προθετικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν. οὐθὲν οὖν βέλτιον | τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν·
 ταύτης γὰρ ἔνεκα καὶ τᾶλλα ἐστίν, καὶ | πρὸς ταύτην ἐστίν,
 καὶ τούτου ἔνεκεν μᾶλλον | τὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ τέλος
 25 ἀρχῆ τι ἐοικεν, καὶ || τούτου ἔνεκέν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 τρόπον τοῦτο | ἔσται. ὥστε δῆλον ὡς καπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐπειδὴ
 βελτίστη | ἐστὶν αἰτία, ὅτι τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ στοχαστικὴ μᾶλλον
 ἢ | τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
 || a16 τὸν σκοπὸν codd.: σκοπεῖν Rieckher (1859, p. 938) || a17 prius
 πρὸς secl. Rieckher (1859, p. 938) Spengel (1865, p. 627) Susemihl

Thus, since it has been determined where and how error takes place, it remains <to ask> at what virtue aims, whether at the end or at the things that contribute to [10] the end, namely whether at the fine or at the things for the sake of the fine. Now, how it is in the case of science?⁴²⁵ Is it up to the science of housebuilding to establish the end finely or to consider what contributes to the end? As a matter of fact, if this has been established finely, <if>, for instance, <it has been established that the end is> making a fine house, no other person but the housebuilder will find out and provide the things that contribute to this. Similarly also [15] in the case of all other sciences. Therefore, it would seem that it is in the same way also in the case of virtue: that its aim is the end that must be established correctly rather than the things for the sake of this end. And no one else <but the virtuous> will provide the things from which this will be the case and will find out the things that must <be done> for the sake of this.

⁴²⁵ Literally, it seems that one should supply *στοχαστική*, so that Aristotle would be asking how science is *στοχαστική*, which would be tantamount to asking what it is *στοχαστική* of, i.e., what it aims at: the end or the means.

And it is reasonable that virtue [20] establishes this, for in those cases in which there is a principle of the best thing, something both establishes <the end> and achieves it. Thus, there is nothing better than virtue, for all the other things are for its sake and contribute to it and the things for the sake of this [sc., virtue] are rather sake of that [sc., the end], and the end appears to be like a principle, and [25] each thing is for its sake. And this is reasonable. As a result, it is evident, also in the case of virtue (since it is the best cause), that it aims at the end rather than at the things that contribute to the end.

Leaving aside the fact that this passage suggests that virtue is responsible both for establishing the end correctly and for achieving the end (lines 19-21), it should be noted that although it begins questioning what virtue is *στοχαστική* of—i.e., the end or the things for the sake of the end (*τίνος ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ στοχαστική, πότερον τοῦ τέλους ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος*)—, this question is immediately spelled out as a question as to whether virtue is *στοχαστική* of the fine or of the things for the sake of the fine (*οἷον πότερον τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ καλόν*). Similarly, in discussing what happens in the case of the sciences, it does not merely ask whether the sciences establish their own ends, but whether they are responsible for establishing their ends correctly (e.g., 1190^a12-14: *πότερον τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἰδεῖν*);). Besides, albeit it concludes saying that virtue is *στοχαστική* of the end rather than of the things that contribute to the end, this conclusion is grounded on an argument to the effect that virtue establishes an end that must be established correctly, and not merely that it establishes the end. In any case, if virtue is responsible for correctly establishing the ends, this implies that it is responsible for establishing the ends rather than the means.

That being said, *MM* A.XVIII 1190^a9ff would seem to support the idea that, in **T 29**, Aristotle is asking not merely whether virtue establishes the end, but whether virtue establishes the right end (in other words: makes right the end), which is compatible with ends that are not right in the sense secured by virtue being established by other means.

Thus, there is good reason for thinking that we should read the *πρόβλημα* of lines 1227^b22-23 as inquiring whether virtue makes right the end or what contributes to it, so that in saying that virtue makes the end right, Aristotle would appear to be saying that virtue makes right those ends that are starting-points of deliberation, for they are the correct starting-points for the reasoning that is the starting-point of action, which reasoning establishes the things that contribute to the end one assumed. Besides, in comparing the ends of action with hypotheses in the theoretical sciences such as the hypothesis that the triangle has the sum of internal angles equal to two right angles, Aristotle not only gives us some further information about how principles in the practical domain should be formulated (i.e., what we assume as an end are propositions to the effect that a certain ϕ is good/fine), but also suggests that what is assumed as ends of action are ends whose being good/fine can be ultimately explained by reference to something else. Yet this is hardly plausible in the context, since Aristotle is arguing that there is no explanation or reasoning of the ends. No doubt that the mathematical hypothesis that Aristotle gives as an example here is not quite an immediate proposition, since it is possible to demonstrate that triangles have the sum of internal angles equal to two right angles. Yet this is far from conclusive, since earlier in *EE* II, in *EE* II.6 1222^b29-42 Aristotle gave the same example without worrying about whether it is something that admits proof or not, since there he was only concerned with the role of this principle in determining things such as the sum of the internal angles of the quadrangle. Accordingly, in comparing the hypothesis (made in medicine) that being healthy consists in such and such a thing, and the hypothesis (made in mathematics) that the triangle has the sum of internal angles equal to two right angles, Aristotle could be concerned merely with the role played by hypotheses as principles that explain other things in a given domain: just like a mathematical hypothesis about the sum of internal angles of the triangle determines several other things

in mathematics like the sum of internal angles of more complex figures, so too assuming a certain end determines what one must do in order to achieve it.

Read in such a way, **T 29** not only provides us with a clear continuation of the argument interrupted in 1227^b19-22 by the *aporia* raised by Aristotle (as would be expected given that he said in 1227^b19 that ‘we should continue our discussion after raising some difficulties’ [λέγωμεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες]—see footnote 413 for my reasons for translating the present hortative subjunctive λέγωμεν in such a fashion), but also flows smoothly into the next section of the argument.

2.1.3 *EE* II.11 1227^b34-1228^a2

Let me now move on to *EE* II.11 1227^b34–1228^a2:

T 31 – *EE* II.11 1227^b34–1228^a2

1227b34 εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ
 35 || λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ |
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα |
 προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἔνεκα τινός. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον
 | ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ. ἔστι
 μέντοι | ἢ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἔνεκα. τὸ μὲν
 40 οὖν τυγῖ||χάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἔνεκα τοῦ τέλους
 1228a1 δεῖ || πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως
 οὐ ἢ | ἀρετὴ αἰτία.

|| **b38** τῷ corr. Fritzsche (1851, p. 60): τὸ PCBL: τοῦ corr. Kenny (1979, p. 86) | οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ PCBL: οὐ ἔνεκα Susemihl Walzer & Mingay: οὐ ἔνεκα secludenda ci. Richards (1915, p. 56) (δεῖ non habet) || **b39** τῶν PB: τῆς CL || **a2** αἰτία om. PCB

[34] Thus, if either reason or virtue is the cause of all rightness, if reason is not [35] <the cause>, the end would be <right> due to virtue, but the things for the sake of the end would not <be right due to virtue>. And the end is that for the sake of which, since all decision is of something and for the sake of something. Now, the mean is that for the sake of which of which virtue is a cause by deciding <for the sake of that> for sake of which one should, but decision is not of this [sc., of that for the sake of which], but of things for sake of that. Therefore, to attain [40] that which must be done for the sake of the end is up to another capacity, [1228a1] whereas the end of decision being right is that of which virtue is a cause.

This passage is fraught with interpretative and textual problems. To begin with, al-

though it would make sense to say that virtue, and not reason, is responsible for making the end right if it had been established that reason does not set the end in that there is no explanation of the end or reasoning that leads to a grasp of the end (i.e., a reasoning that has the end one should aim at as its conclusion, and which thus explains why we should aim at it), this makes poor sense of the conclusive force ‘*ὄνν*’ seems to have in this passage. This is further reason for reading 1227^b25 (in **T 29**) in the way I proposed above, i.e., in such a way that Aristotle is assuming as a principle that virtue makes the ends right.

Now, if what is being said here in **T 31** is indeed a conclusion drawn from the argument advanced in **T 29**, and if, as I have argued, in 1227^b25 Aristotle is assuming as principle that virtue makes the ends right (and not merely that virtue establishes the end), it is more natural to say i) that, in the first conditional (lines 1227^b34), Aristotle is introducing a new premise (which was absent in his argument in *EE* II.11 so far: namely, that all correction is due either to reason or to virtue); ii) that, in the second conditional (1227^b34-35), he is introducing a second premise that is a corollary of the previous passage (since in **T 29** Aristotle asked whether virtue or reason makes the end right and then showed that there is no explanation or reasoning concerning the end, which implies that reason cannot be responsible for making the end right); and iii) that, from these two premises, he then draws the conclusion that virtue is responsible for making the end right (which would confirm the reading of **T 29** I defended above). This is not a mere restatement of what was assumed as a principle in **T 29**, for now Aristotle makes clear that virtue *and only virtue* makes the end right, since rightness is caused either by reason or by virtue and since reason does not make the end right.

Now, as to the role of virtue in establishing the ends of action, although lines 34-35 deny reason any role in the correctness of the ends, which is said to be due to virtue, they do not say anything to the effect that reason cannot play any role in establishing the ends

of action. No doubt Aristotle said in **T 29** that there is neither reasoning nor λόγος of the ends, and that there is no science about the ends either, that is, that no science grounds the end. But the ends are principles in the productive sciences just as hypotheses are principles in theoretical sciences. One may then suspect that some intellectual activity may after all be involved in grasping the ends of action, just as νοῦς is involved in fully grasping principles of theoretical sciences (and of τέχναι as well—see *APo* II.19 100^a3–9) and other operations of reason may be involved in attaining a grasp of the principles of theoretical sciences that still falls short of being νοῦς (depending on how we understand Aristotle’s views on theoretical νοῦς—for the brief discussion of these matters, see **section 1.3.3.1** above). In that case, the denial of reasoning and λόγος of the ends should be understood as denying just the existence of rational explanations of the ends of action, which would be, just like some hypotheses of theoretical sciences, immediate propositions. This implies that attaining a correct grasp of these propositions is not something that we do through λόγος in the sense that there is no demonstration that leads to such a proposition as a conclusion (thus securing its correctness) or no explanation that allows us to grasp these propositions correctly (say, when we have propositions that are made clear by demonstration without being demonstrated, as is the case of causally complex essences). But let us set this idea aside for now, since *EE* II.11 is silent in that regard and is thus inconclusive.

At any rate, as I have indicated in the **Introduction**, I think that reason plays a fundamental role in establishing the ends of action in that having a βούλησις for an end requires an activity of reason (irrespective of how we construe the relationship between βούλησις and reason—more on this below in the **Conclusion**). Something can be said, nevertheless, about how exactly virtue is said to be make the ends right:

After establishing that (1) virtue is that because of which the end is right, and not that

because of which the means are right (lines 35-36), Aristotle deploys the following premises:

- (2) the for the sake of which is an end (line 36);
- (3) decision is *of something* and *for the sake of something* (lines 36-37);
- (4) the mean is that for the sake of which of which virtue is the cause by deciding for the sake of what one should decide (lines 37-38); but
- (5) decision is not *of the for the sake of which*, but of the things for its sake (lines 38-39).

If these premises are construed in this way, Aristotle's argument seems to be quite straightforward, and it explains without difficulties the conclusions drawn in the following lines of the text (at 1227^b39-1228^a1 and at 1228^a1-2):

- (6) obtaining what must be done for the sake of the end is up to a different capacity (presumably different from virtue)(from [1], [4] and [5]); and
- (7) virtue is the cause of the end of decision being right (from [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]).

If this is correct, a corollary of this argument is that virtue makes the end(s) right by making one decide for the sake of the right end.

Yet the text of (4) (lines 37-38) and of (7) (lines 1228^a1-2) have been subject to severe emendation, for which reason I need to say something about how I am reading the text of these premises here.

Above, I have read (4) accepting an emendation proposed by Fritzsche (1851, p. 60), which corrects the $\tau\delta$ transmitted by all mss. changing it into a $\tau\hat{\omega}$.

If we keep the text of the manuscripts instead, the idea might be (if ' $\tau\delta$ προαιρέσθαι οὐ ἐνεκα δεῖ' is an appositive clause to ' η ἀρετή') that virtue, which is a cause of the mean, consists in deciding for the sake of that for the sake of which one should⁴²⁶ or in being able

⁴²⁶ This is how Dirlmeier (1963, p. 306) reads the text.

to do that.⁴²⁷ On this reading, deciding for the sake of a right end may be taken as something essential to virtue, and, for that reason, exclusive to it.

Yet it is not clear how this reading can secure (6)—the conclusion that obtaining what must be done for the sake of the end is up to a different capacity. In fact, if virtue is conflated with a capacity for deciding (which is much more plausible than saying that virtue, which is a *ἔξις*, consists in *deciding*, an activity), and if decision is of the things for the sake of the end, it is not clear how virtue is to be distinguished from this capacity responsible for obtaining what must be done for the sake of the end. Perhaps the idea is that this capacity is responsible for obtaining things that are for the sake of any end, whereas decision as something that springs from virtue necessarily aims at a right end, in which case virtue would consist in an ability to decide for the sake of the right end in so far as it is responsible only for this aspect of decision: the end it aims at. No doubt this may explain why Aristotle immediately reminds us that decision is *not* of the for the sake of which, but of the things that are for its sake (at lines 1227^b38-39). Yet, as I have indicated, it is quite odd to describe virtue as consisting in ‘making decisions’ as Dirlmeier (1963, p. 306) suggests, in which he is followed by von Fragstein (1974, p. 120).⁴²⁸ But the other alternative—supposing that an *εἶναι* is left understood in ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι’ (see footnote 427), so that Aristotle would be saying that virtue consists in it being possible to decide for the sake of what one should—, despite being bit more plausible philosophically, is not very plausible way of making sense of the Greek text as we have it.

Alternatively, one could perhaps read the texts transmitted by the mss. in a way similar to how Simpson (2013, p. 46) does in his translation.⁴²⁹ Although Simpson does not give

⁴²⁷ This would be the reading if one supposes an *εἶναι* is left understood in ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι’ (as is suggested by Kenny [1979, p. 86n1]).

⁴²⁸ More recently, this construal of the text has been endorsed by Natali (1989/2001, p. 200n16).

⁴²⁹ Simpson translates the text as: ‘What it [sc., decision] is for the sake of, then, is the mean (what virtue

us any explanation about how he is understanding the text, one could explain his translation by supposing that there is an asyndeton between ‘οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον’ and ‘οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετή κτλ.’ which either signals an opposition between the mean being an end and virtue causing one to decide for the sake of a right end (Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §546, 5d, p. 346) or marks a transition from the first to the second idea (Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §546, 5e, p. 346). In that case, the μὲν οὖν introducing [4] would be responded by οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετή κτλ., and not by the μέντοι introducing [5] (which is how I have understood the text in my translation).

This way of reading the text makes perfect sense of the argument, but at the cost of making Aristotle’s Greek much harsher than usual (even for the standards of the *EE*). Fritzsche’s correction, in turn, is perfectly reasonable (since subscript iotas stopped being pronounced quite early in the development of the language,⁴³⁰ in which case someone could have easily misheard ΤΩ, copying ΤΟ quite early in the transmission of the *EE*—which would explain why we have τό in all extant mss.) besides also making good sense of the argument.

An alternative emendation was proposed by Kenny (1979, pp. 86-87), who changes ‘τὸ’ into τοῦ.⁴³¹ Yet not only this also makes Aristotle’s Greek quite unnatural (as is made clear by the translation suggested by Kenny—see footnote 431), but it is also less plausible as a correction, since it is not as easy to explain how an original ‘τοῦ’ was miscopied as ‘τὸ’ as it is to explain how ‘τῷ’ was corrupted into ‘τὸ’.

Thus, Fritzsche’s correction not only makes good sense of the argument while not making Aristotle’s Greek harsher than usual in the *EE*, but is also a quite plausible correction.

is cause of is choosing [sc., deciding] for the sake of which).’ Alternatively, one could translate it as ‘Now, the mean is the for the sake of which, <whereas> that of which virtue is a cause is deciding <for the sake of that> for sake of which one should.’

⁴³⁰ Cf. Allen (1987, pp. 86-87).

⁴³¹ In which case, we would have, slightly modifying Kenny’s translation, something like: ‘The mean is the wherefore which virtue is a cause of the decision’s being for the sake of’ (οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετή τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα).

The only thing objectionable about is that it seems to suggest that what makes decisions is virtue, since virtue would be seemingly the subject of the infinitive τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι. Yet this is not as strange as saying that virtue consists in making decisions, for it is perfectly expected given that virtue was characterised in *EE* II.10 1227^b8 as a ἔξις προαιρετική: i.e., a disposition *that issues in decision*.⁴³²

A remaining problem for the interpretation of (4) is the meaning of τὸ μέσον in this premise. There is a dispute about whether, in this passage, τὸ μέσον is the end aimed at (i.e., what one takes to be the right end), or rather something that is for the sake of the right end. The latter position was first defended by Maurus (1668, p. 440, §6), and, more recently, by Rackham (1935, p. 305na), and implies that, in ‘οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν,’ τὸ μέσον’ is neither the antecedent of ‘οὐ ἔνεκα,’ nor the subject of the main clause, but is part of the relative. In that case, to make sense of 1227^b37-38, one should either supply τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα or τέλος in the main clause (which could be supplied from the previous line) (as Rackham does in his translation), or else take ‘οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετῆ’ as the antecedent of ‘οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον.’ On the first alternative, Aristotle would be saying that ‘the end is that for whose sake the mean is’ (and depending on how we read ‘οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετῆ κτλ.,’ there are different ways in which we could construe [4]). On the second alternative, Aristotle would be saying that ‘that for whose sake the mean is is what virtue is a cause of.’⁴³³ The first position—according

⁴³² As I take it, adjectives ending in -ικός are ambiguous between a passive and active sense in Aristotle. The passive sense is clearly expressed by Aristotle in characterising προαίρεσις as a ὄρεξις βουλευτική in *EE* II.10 1226^b15ff, where he explains what he means by it by saying that he means ‘that <desire> whose principle and cause is deliberation’ (1226^b19–20: λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἧς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις ἐστίν). A clear example of the active sense of a -ικός adjective is διάνοια πρακτική (practical thinking), which is a kind of thinking that leads to action. For a defence of translating Aristotle’s uses of πρακτική in *EN* VI in this fashion, see Angioni (2011, pp. 312-313).

⁴³³ But unless one takes ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ’ to be an appositive clause to the antecedent of ‘οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετῆ’ (in which case Aristotle would be saying that ‘that for whose sake the mean is is what virtue is a cause of, namely deciding for the sake of that for the sake of which one should’), one would need to adopt Fritzsche’s emendation to make sense of ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ,’ so that Aristotle would be saying that ‘that for whose sake the mean is is what virtue is a cause of by deciding for the sake of that for the sake of which one should.’

to which τὸ μέσον is the end aimed for—, in turn, was defended by Kenny (1979, pp. 85–86), and is motivated by the fact that taking τὸ μέσον as something that is for the sake of the end amounts to conflating it with τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. As Kenny argues, τὸ μέσον (the golden mean) ‘is not the means, but the end, of an Aristotelian virtuous choice: the choice is made in order to realise in action the mean which is the best relative to us (1220^b28).’ I have favoured this reading of τὸ μέσον in my translation.

There are some issues, though. First of all, in the *EE*, τὸ μέσον is the mean between excess and deficiency that is determined by the right reason (see *EE* II.3 1220^b27–28, and especially II.5 1222^a6–12), and, in its connection to virtue, it appears to refer to the way in which one should experience emotions in doing something. At face value, this picture seems much more restricted than the one we find in the *EN*, where virtue is explicitly said to be about the mean (τὸ μέσον) both in emotion and in action (see *EN* II.8 1109^a22–23). As a result, although it might be argued that performing an action for the sake of the fine amounts to performing it *because* it is a mean⁴³⁴, if the mean consists in performing an action as one should, I can hardly see how performing an action for its own sake could be conflated with performing it merely *aiming for hitting the mean between excess and deficiency in the emotions one feels in performing that action*. In the face of this difficulty, I would like to suggest that, in the *EE*, τὸ μέσον does not refer only to the mean between excess and deficiency regarding the emotions, but also to the mean *in action*.⁴³⁵ In fact, given that (i) virtue is about those means in pleasures and pains and in pleasant and painful things (*EE* II.5 1222^a11–12: *περὶ μέσ’ ἅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς*), and that (ii) actions appear to be among pleasant and painful things (as far as they may be unimpeded activities—see the

⁴³⁴ As is done by M. Heinze (1909, pp. 21–22) and by Gauthier (1958, p. 87).

⁴³⁵ Similarly, see Lorenz (2019, pp. 203–204), who adds that, in the *EE*, the mean may also be a character-state, and that neither the mean as a character-state nor the mean in emotion are likely to be goals of action or goals that orientate one’s deliberation.

account of pleasure in *EN* VII.12-15 [=Bywater VII.11-15]), it can be argued that, in the *EE*, the virtues are about means in action as well. In that case, it would be possible to explain why, for instance, Aristotle i) talks of virtue as being a disposition on the basis of which we are doers of what is best and are best disposed regarding what is best (1222^a6-8), which appears to connect virtue both to the best actions and to the emotions one experiences in performing such actions; ii) defines the best as what is determined by right reason (1222^a8-9), which is the mean between excess and deficiency relative to us (1222^a9-10); but then iii) defines virtue as being about those means in pleasure and pain and in pleasant and painful things (1222^a10-12). In fact, if actions are pleasant or painful in that they count among the things that cause pleasure or pain (i.e., pleasant and painful things), and virtue is about the mean in things of this sort, there would be no difficulty in saying that, in the *EE*, virtue concerns the mean in action as well.

A second difficulty for this reading is to explain how τὸ μέσον is something on the basis of right reason or that is determined by right reason if, as Aristotle says in **T 29**, there is no λόγος of the end. As I shall suggest below, there is a sense in which reason may be necessary for establishing the right end which is compatible with there being no λόγος of the ends. Moreover, even if it turns out that reason plays no role in establishing the right end, this is still different from saying that the mean is as right reason says it is, which is compatible with reason not being enough (nor necessary) for establishing the mean as an end. As a matter of fact, the claim that the mean is as right reason says or determines is much more naturally read as being about what one takes the mean to be in the situation one is faced with, in which case λόγος would determine the mean by determining what one should do to attain the mean (similarly, see Moss [2012, pp. 192-195]), and not by establishing the mean as an end to be pursued.

That being said, let me briefly discuss how I am construing (7) (lines 1228^a1-2). What is problematic about (7) is not so much its meaning, but whether it is possible to make sense of the text transmitted by the extant mss. or an emendation is ultimately necessary. All mss. have ‘*τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως οὗ ἢ ἀρετῆ αἰτία,*’ and Fritzsche (1851, p. 60) has proposed the deletion of *οὗ* (in which case Aristotle would be saying that ‘virtue is cause of the end of decision being right’).⁴³⁶ An alternative to this was suggested by Kenny (1979, p. 87n1) and by Woods (1992, p. 195), who ultimately follow Fritzsche’s emendation in their translation but entertain another alternative in their commentaries. This alternative consists in changing ‘*τοῦ*’ into ‘*τὸ*’ (in which case Aristotle would be saying that ‘the end of decision being right is what virtue is cause of’). In his recent edition, Rowe, who adopts Fritzsche’s solution, argues against the alternative suggested by Kenny and by Woods by saying that what is conveyed by this proposal is ‘a rather bizarre way of putting what is being said more straightforwardly by the sentence as printed. There are bizarreries in *EE*, but that is not a reason for adding to their number’ (Rowe, 2023a, p. 69). It is true that writing ‘*τὸ δὲ τὸ κτλ.*’ (which is what the texts looks like if we follow Kenny and Woods) is indeed bizarre.⁴³⁷ But perhaps the same meaning conveyed by Kenny’s and Woods’ suggestion can be secured with the text transmitted by the mss. (and thus without writing ‘*τὸ δὲ τὸ κτλ.*’) if we explain the genitive from ‘*τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος κτλ.*’ as being required by the antecedent of ‘*οὗ ἢ ἀρετῆ αἰτία,*’ which would have been attracted by the relative (a case of inverse attraction). In that case, we should read the text as if Aristotle had written ‘*τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως <τούτου> οὗ ἢ ἀρετῆ αἰτία.*’ Yet because the antecedent of ‘*οὗ ἢ ἀρετῆ αἰτία*’ would ultimately stand in the same case as the relative, it was omitted (as is typical).

⁴³⁶ In that case, it would seem that *οὗ* ultimately got into the text due to the parallel with 1227^b38: *οὗ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετῆ κτλ.*

⁴³⁷ In fact, writing articles of the same form in sequence is something to be avoided, see Smyth §1162. Yet see *Met.* N.2 1089^a14–14.

Although unusual (and this case would be especially unusual due to being combined with the omission of the antecedent of the relative), inverse attraction is by no means bizarre.

In any case, the conclusion of the argument (which says that virtue is the cause of the end of decision being right, whereas obtaining the things that should be done for the sake of the end is the task of another capacity) suggests that virtue makes the end right by determining the end of decision⁴³⁸ and that it does so by making one decide on a virtuous action for the sake of the mean (which refers to what is morally good relatively to the circumstances one is being faced with).⁴³⁹ But if by making the end of decision right virtue is just securing that it is morally good, then we have problem. For, in that case, unless virtue is not necessary for making the end right, it may seem that only fully virtuous agents would be able to deliberate and to decide for the sake of morally good ends (which would imply denying **C2**).

At any rate, the fact that Aristotle also describes the end for whose sake one should decide as the mean suggests a way of making sense of the role of virtue in making the end of decision right according to which virtue is necessary if one is to decide on a virtuous action due to the fact that it hits the mean, while not being necessary merely for deciding on a virtuous action for the sake of some fine end. In that case, depending on how we understand Aristotle's theory of decision, **T 31** would be concerned with the role of virtue in making right either one's ends₂ (if *προαίρεσις* turns out not to be necessarily connected to acting *προαιρούμενος*, such that one can arrive at a *προαίρεσις* while not acting on its basis) or one's ends₁ (if *προαίρεσις* is necessarily connected to acting *προαιρούμενος*, in which case the conclusion of one's deliberation only counts as a *προαίρεσις* if one acts on its basis). In either case, virtue would be necessary if one is to be able to decide on virtuous actions on their

⁴³⁸ Cf. Lorenz (2019, p. 191).

⁴³⁹ Similarly, for the idea that the 'mean relative to us' should be construed as relative to the circumstances of action one is being faced with, see Rapp (2006, p. 110).

own account (i.e., because they hit the mean in action).

As I would like to argue, this interpretation is confirmed by the sequence of the argument in *EE* II.11 1228^a2-19.

2.1.4 *EE* II.11 1228^a2-19

That being said, let me quote and translate *EE* II.11 1228^a2-19:

T 32 – *EE* II.11 1228^a2–19

1228a2 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν | ποιός τις· τοῦτο
 δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί | πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ
 5 καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἔνεκα ποιεῖ || τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὲ
 τις ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν πράττει μὲν τὰ | καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προ-
 αιρέσεως κρίνομεν | καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τοῦναντίον
 ποιεῖ, δηλὸν ὅτι | οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ'
 ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οὐδε-
 10 μία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ || μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν
 ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ | ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν, τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ
 11 κακὰ οὐ ψέ|γεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια.
 11 ἔτι πάν|τας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαί-
 ρεσιν βλέποντες | μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα (καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ
 15 ἐνέργεια τῆς || ἀρετῆς), ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκα-
 ζόμενοι, | προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδεῖς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν
 τὴν | προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγ-
 καζόμεθα κρίνειν ποιός τις· αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια,
 ἐπαι|νετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμ-
 20 βαίνει || ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.
 || a14–15 καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς post οὐδεῖς (a15)
 trai. Rowe

[2] And, for that reason, we judge what someone is like from their decision, i.e., <we judge> that for the sake of which they act, and not what they do.⁴⁴⁰ Likewise, vice

⁴⁴⁰ For a similar reading of this phrase, see Inwood and Woolf (2013, p. 39). Alternatively, 'τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει' is translated by Woods (1992, p. 34) as 'that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does' and by Simpson (2013, p. 47) as 'and this is the "what does he do it for the sake of?" but not "what is he doing?"', both taking *τοῦτο* to be referring to *προαίρεσις*. As I understand it, there are no substantial philosophical differences between these renderings of the text. On the first reading, the idea would be that judging what someone is like on the basis of their *προαίρεσις* is just a particular case of judging that for the sake of which they act, and not merely what they do. On the second reading, this same idea is implicit, since Aristotle's point would be that we judge what someone is like on the basis of their *προαίρεσις*, which is that for the sake of which one acts, and not merely what one does, a claim that is compatible with some agents not being qualified on the basis of their *προαίρεσις*, namely those agents for whom their *προαίρεσις* is not that for the sake of which they act (e.g., incontinent agents)—yet because this second reading forces us to assume that the conclusion of one's deliberation can be a *προαίρεσις* even when one does not act on its basis, I have given preference to the other reading, which leaves things open in this regard.

makes decision <be> for the sake of things contrary <to virtue>. [5] Then, if it is in one's power to do fine things and to forbear from doing base things, but one does the opposite [sc., one does base things and forbear from doing fine things], it is evident that this person is not virtuous. Hence, it is necessary for vice and virtue to be voluntary, since it is not necessary to bring about wicked actions. For these reasons, vice is blameworthy, and [10] virtue is praiseworthy, for involuntary base and vicious actions are not [11] blamed, nor are <involuntary> good actions praised, but instead the voluntary ones <are praised and blamed respectively>.

[11] Furthermore, we praise and blame everyone looking into their decision more than into their deeds (although activity is more choiceworthy than virtue),⁴⁴¹ because people do base things under constraint as well, [15] but no one decides <under constraint>. Besides, because it is not easy to see what one's decision is like, for that reason, we are constrained to judging how someone is from their deeds. So, activity is more choiceworthy, but decision is more praiseworthy. Thus, these things result from what has been established, and, moreover, they agree with the phenomena.

In this passage, Aristotle pursues an argument to the effect that a person is morally qualified on the basis of their *προαίρεσις*. This may imply that the end aimed at by the *προαιρέσεις* of virtuous agents is exclusive to them, since they can be identified as virtuous agents on its basis. This is a promising argument, but it should be noted that Aristotle does not simply say at lines 2-4 that we judge what a person is like by reference to the end aimed at by their decision, but instead that we do that by reference to the end for the sake of which they act, which suggests that what is relevant for judging what someone is like is not merely the end that figures in the conclusion of their deliberation (if indeed we can describe it in terms of a *προαίρεσις*), but rather the end that motivates them to act, in which case it would

⁴⁴¹ As indicated in *apparatus*, Rowe proposes transposing 'καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς' after 'ὅτι πράττουσι [...] προαιρείται δ' οὐδείς' on the grounds that even if 'καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς' were a parenthesis, this would make poor sense of the ὅτι in the sequence, since it would separate what comes before from its explanation, a difficulty that is usually blurred in modern translations. As Rowe argues, while an expression like 'This is because' (which is Kenny's rendering of ὅτι here) 'can easily refer back over the intervening "even though ...", the Greek it translates, a bare ὅτι, cannot.' With that in mind, Rowe suggests that 'καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς' either originates from a gloss or should be transposed, and he prefers the latter alternative in view of 1228^a17-18, where Aristotle talks of activity being more choiceworthy, while decision is more praiseworthy. Notwithstanding this, transposing 'καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς' after 'ὅτι πράττουσι [...] προαιρείται δ' οὐδείς' makes poor sense of it, since it is clearly not introducing something that is in opposition to that explanation, but to what Aristotle gave this explanation. I mean, the claim that the activity of virtue is more choiceworthy seems to be opposed to the claim that we should look at the *προαίρεσις* rather than at the deeds, and not to the claim that people perform base things under constraint but no one decides under constraint. As a result, I have kept 'καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς' in the position it was transmitted in the mss., despite the difficulties raised by Rowe.

seem that, at the very least,⁴⁴² virtue makes one's ends₁ right in that it makes one act for the sake of the mean.

At any rate, this seems to be unaccounted for in (B) (the view according to which the problem with agents who are not fully virtuous is that they are not consistent in their judgments and actions, although they can decide to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes), which reading I did set aside in the previous Chapter as inadequate for explaining what is going on in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a11-20 (T 6).

On (B), even if, on some occasions, there may be a difference in the end for whose sake intermediate agents and fully virtuous agents act (i.e., when the former voluntarily perform vicious actions), this would not be so in all cases (for instance, it would not hold when intermediate agents voluntarily perform virtuous actions), for if both fully virtuous agents and intermediate agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, then making reference to this end would not be a reliable criterion for distinguishing fully virtuous agents from intermediate agents in general when the latter voluntarily perform virtuous actions. Thus, it seems that (B) is simply untenable in the context of the *EE*, which is further reason for thinking that the view on how fully virtuous agents perform virtuous actions described in T 6 above is indeed congenial to (if not originated from) the *EE*.

Yet (A') and (A''') would still be viable options. As a matter of fact, if we judge what someone is like by reference to the end for whose sake they act (which in some cases will coincide with the end of their decision), then there might still be a way of distinguishing between virtuous and intermediate agents even if we concede that both can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes (as is assumed on reading [A']): by claiming that intermediate

⁴⁴² As I have suggested above when discussing T 31, it is unclear whether in making the end of *προαίρεσις* right by making the end of one's decision be the mean virtue is being described as making right one's end₁ or one's end₂.

agents are not (or are not sufficiently) motivated to perform virtuous actions by the intrinsic fineness of these actions. In that case, the end that motivates them to perform virtuous actions will be different from the one that motivates fully virtuous agents, who are led to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, i.e., in so far as they are constitutive of the fine ends they aim for. I would like to ultimately reject that Aristotle holds this view (i.e., [A']) in the *EE*, and shall present my arguments below when discussing *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17. In any case, a first indication that this is the way to proceed can be gathered from the fact that above in T 29 Aristotle described virtue as making the end right in that virtue makes right an end that is a starting point of reasoning. In other words, in T 29 virtue is described as making right one's ends₃. Thus, if virtue is indeed necessary for making the ends right in this way as well (and not merely in making right one's ends₂ or one's end₁), a *desideratum* is that there is also a difference in how fully virtuous agents aim for their ends₃ and how agents who are not fully virtuous such as intermediate agents aim for their ends₃.

For now, I shall confine myself to discussing Aristotle's treatment of the particular virtues in some passages from *EE* III in which he also appears to hold the view that virtue makes the end right by making one decide for the sake of the very virtuous actions one performs on its basis.

2.2 Making the ends right in the *Eudemian* discussion of the particular virtues

Let me begin analysing two passages from Aristotle's discussion of courage in the *EE*:

T 33 – *EE* III.1 1229^a1–4

1229a1 ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολουθήσις τῷ λόγῳ |
 ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει· διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ | διὰ
 τοῦτον ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἦτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς, ὁ | δὲ
 διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείος μόνος.

[1] In fact, courage consists in obedience to reason, and reason urges <one> to choose what is fine. Also for that reason, the person who does not withstand these things

[sc., fearful things] on that account [sc., on account of the fine] is either out of their mind or is rash. The person who is fearless on account of the fine, in turn, is, alone, also courageous.

T 34 – *EE* III.1 1230^a26–34

1230a26 ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική, τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν,
εἴρη|ται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ
τοῦτο | ἐστὶ,⁴⁴³ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία
ἀρετὴ | τις οὐσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ'
30 οὔτε || δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν)⁴⁴⁴ οὔτ' δι'
ἡδονῆν, | ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, |
οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ.

[26] But since every virtue issues in decisions, and <since> it was said earlier in which sense we mean that, namely that <every virtue> makes <one> choose everything for the sake of something, and this—that for the sake of which <virtue makes one choose>—is the fine, it is clear that courage too, since [30] it is a virtue, makes one withstand fearful things for the sake of something. Therefore, <one does not withstand fearful things> due to ignorance (for <courage> rather makes one judge correctly), or due to pleasure, but instead because it is fine, since, if <withstanding> is not something fine but mad, one does not withstand, for it would be base <to do so>.

Both these passages are part of Aristotle's account of courage in the *EE*. The first one (T 33) sticks to saying that reason urges people to choose what is fine, and that someone who withstands fearful things on account of the fine is the only one who is also courageous. Despite suggesting that reason may after all play a role in establishing the end in that it orders one to choose (*αἰρεῖσθαι*) the fine, a claim that could perhaps be interpreted as saying that reason orders one to establish the fine as an end,⁴⁴⁵ this can also be understood in a slightly different way, to the effect that reason leads one to do things that are fine rather than to adopt the fine as an end, that is, it determines what one should do and not that for whose sake one must do that.

⁴⁴³ I retain here the comma printed by Walzer & Mingay, *contra* Rowe.

⁴⁴⁴ I retain here the parentheses printed by Walzer & Mingay, *contra* Rowe.

⁴⁴⁵ On the same line, Maurus (1668, p. 444, §6) appears to suggest that reason makes one choose the fine in so far as it says, in the case of courage, that not fearing something is fine, so that the person who does not fear because it is fine not to fear is courageous (*Qui non metuit, quia honestum est, non metuit, is est fortis*). On this reading, reason as a faculty seems to provide the *reason why* the courageous person acts as they do, in which case it would determine the end that motivates courageous actions.

T 34, in turn, not only goes into detail about what is meant by withstanding fearful things for the sake of the fine, but also makes a generalisation, allowing us to draw two conclusions: first, that virtue is *προαιρετική* because it makes one choose everything for the sake of the fine; and second, that acting for the sake of the fine means performing an action *because it is fine*, and hence that virtue makes people act for the sake of the fine in so far as it makes them act because the very actions they intend to perform are fine or because refraining from performing these actions would be base.

However, these two passages do not say anything about whether deciding to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes or performing virtuous actions because they are fine is something exclusive to virtue. My hypothesis is that only fully virtuous agents can do that, for, as will become clear in the next subsection of this Chapter (section 2.3), it is only for fully virtuous agents that fine things are fine. Thus, it would seem that virtue makes the end right by making it fine for the agent as well, which, in the case of ends₁, is tantamount to saying that virtue makes the end of action right in that it makes it correspond to the fineness of the fine actions one voluntarily performs. As a result, only virtuous agents would perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, for only virtuous agents would pursue the fineness of virtuous actions for its own sake.

For now, what I would like to emphasise is that, in saying (in lines 28-29) that what he means by saying that virtue issues in decision is that ‘<every virtue> makes <one> choose everything for the sake of something, and this—that for the sake of which <virtue makes one choose>—is the fine,’ Aristotle seems to be referring back to *EE* II.11, specifically to T 31, where virtue, which was defined in *EE* II.10 as a *ἕξις προαιρετική* (at 1227^b8), is first described as attaining the mean (literally as being a cause of the mean) by issuing in decisions for the sake of the right end (cf. 1227^b37–38: οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ

ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ) and then as being the cause of the end of decision being right (cf. 1228^a1–2: τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐ ἢ ἀρετὴ αἰτία), which seems to indicate that virtue issues in decision by making us decide for the sake of the right end: the fine. In that case, T 34 would be confirming at least part of the interpretation of *EE* II.11 I proposed above.

Now, what about reason and the role attributed to it in T 33? T 34 is also inconclusive in that regard, although it tells us that the courageous person does not act due to ignorance because courage makes them judge correctly. This suggests the presence of some rational capacity inextricably associated with courage. In fact, Aristotle seems to make a similar point when dealing with magnanimity later, in *EE* III.5:

T 35 – *EE* III.5 1232^a32–^b4

1232a32 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν
 | ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν, δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ἃ διώκει | ὁ
 τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἔξω περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' {εἶναι} ἡδέα. ἢ δὲ
 35 || μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη. κρίνει δ' ἢ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ |
 μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε
 καὶ ἢ ἀρετῆ, ὥστε ἔπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ | αὐτῇ
 38 ἔπεσθαι πάσαις.

1232b1 ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχον εἶναι τὸ | καταφρο-
 νητικὸν εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικούς ποιεῖ || τῶν
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρία κινδύνων (μέγα | γὰρ
 οἶεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν),⁴⁴⁶ | καὶ
 σῶφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος | χρη-
 μάτων.

|| a34 περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' {εἶναι} ἡδέα Richards (1915, p. 57): περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι {ἡδέα} Spengel (1865, p. 19): περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα {εἶναι ἡδέα} Walzer & Mingay Rowe: περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶ καὶ Simpson (2013, p. 61n1): περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ἡδέα PCL: περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἡδέα B

[32] In fact, judging right what is great and small among the goods is praiseworthy. And great seem to be those <goods> that the person possessing the greatest disposition regarding such pleasant things pursues; [35] magnanimity is the greatest <disposition>; and the virtue relative to each thing judges right the great and the small (which is precisely what the practically wise person and their virtue would command), so that all virtues will follow it [sc., magnanimity], or [38] it will follow all virtues.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁶ I retain here the parentheses printed by Walzer & Mingay, *contra* Rowe.

⁴⁴⁷ This is not the only way of reading these lines. Moss (2012, p. 161) translates them quite differently: ‘The virtue concerned with each thing discerns (κρίνει) rightly the greater and the lesser – just the things

[38] Moreover, being disdainful appears to be proper to the magnanimous person. And each virtue makes people disdainful [1232b1] of great things that are against reason. Courage, for instance, <makes people disdainful> of <great> dangers (for it is thought that they are great among the base things, and not every fearful thing is great in magnitude), and the temperate <is disdainful> of great and intense pleasures, and the generous person <is disdainful> of money.

There are two things I would like to emphasise in this passage. First, that magnanimity, because it involves right judgement about what is great and small among the goods, is either something that is consequent upon the remaining virtues (as if this rightness of judgment were something that is possible because the other virtues are present) or something that implies that the other virtues are present (as if this rightness of judgment were something that is required by the other virtues and that is sufficient for them to be present) (see footnote 447). Second, that every virtue makes people disdainful of great things that are against reason, and since Aristotle conceives of disdain as involving a belief that something is of no value (as is clear from *Rh.* II.2 1378^b10–17),⁴⁴⁸ it appears that every virtue requires some sort of belief about the value of things, which is perhaps dependent upon a capacity to judge correctly.

Although still inconclusive about the role of reason in establishing the ends of action, this passage is relevant in another regard: it suggests that Aristotle does not think that mere habituation or natural giftedness in regard to one's desires is sufficient for making the end

which the *phronimos* would command virtue also [performs? commands?], so that all the virtues follow *phronesis*, or it follows all of them' (the brackets are Moss'). In that case, the *αὐτῆ* and the *αὐτῆν* from lines 37–38 would be referring to *φρόνησις*, which would be understood in the passage as the *ἀρετή* of the *φρόνιμος*. I think the point of the passage is not much different if one reads it as Moss does, since in both cases the virtues would be connected to a rational capacity, namely *φρόνησις*. Yet the context of the passage makes it more natural to expect the conclusion drawn from the premises deployed in lines 1232^a32–38 to be about magnanimity rather than *φρόνησις*. As a matter of fact, what the argument in this passage appears to ground is the claim made in 1232^a31–32 that magnanimity 'appears to be consequent upon all the virtues' (*καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται*).

⁴⁴⁸ Aristotle not only says that disdain is a sort of belittling (*Rh.* II.2 1378^b13–14: *τρία δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη ὀλιγωρίας, καταφρόνησις τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις*)—and belittling is defined as the actualisation (*ἐνέργεια*) of an opinion about something that is taken to be of no value (*Rh.* II.2 1378^b10–11: *ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον*)—, but he also explains the fact that the person who disdains belittles by saying that the things we disdain are all those we believe are of no value, and that we belittle what is of no value (*Rh.* II.2 1378^b15–17: *ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἄξιων ὀλιγοροῦσιν*).

right (which is not to say that these things give no contribution to making the end right). It is rather virtue that makes the end right, and virtue involves, in some still unspecified way, a rational capacity. By the end of book III of the *EE* (III.7 1234^a23–30), when contrasting those *μεσότητες* that are *πάθη* of sorts⁴⁴⁹ with actual virtues, Aristotle adds that virtues can exist either naturally, or in some other way, namely associated with *φρόνησις*.

The extent to which natural virtues involve reason is disputed. At any rate, the virtues Aristotle is dealing with in the passages we have analysed above seem to involve some rational capacity, be it *φρόνησις* or some other praiseworthy, but non-virtuous rational disposition. Moreover, reciprocity among the virtues seems to be implied by T 35 as well, and, as we saw in the previous Chapter, while one natural virtue can exist without the others, this is not true of full virtues (see the brief discussion of 1144^b1–1145^a2 above in section 1.3.3). So, T 35 would appear to be talking of a full virtue instead of a natural virtue. Besides, in *EE* III.1 1229^a27–29, a passage I have not analysed above, Aristotle calls the courage of spirit (*ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ*) the most natural sort of courage, which is shared even by children and which is to be distinguished from the courage that is the object of III.1, and it can be reasonably argued that this is a reference to courage as a natural virtue.⁴⁵⁰ Therefore, reason seems to be somehow associated to the virtues when they make the end right.

As a result, it seems that, in the *EE* at least, it is full virtue rather than natural virtue which is responsible for making the end right in making one decide on and perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.⁴⁵¹ Quite what role reason plays in this process, however, is

⁴⁴⁹ One should note that what Aristotle calls *πάθη* in this passage cannot be *πάθη* in the technical sense of the word, since *πάθη* are not praiseworthy (see von Fragstein, 1974, p. 157). Perhaps, in calling each of these mean states a *πάθος τι* (cf. *EE* III.7 1234^a26–27: *ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστίν*) Aristotle means rather that they are affections of sorts (*τις alienans*), implying that he is not using the term in the technical sense.

⁴⁵⁰ For an argument along these lines, see von Fragstein (1974, pp. 157–159). The same is suggested passingly by Moss (2012, p. 170).

⁴⁵¹ *Contra* the idea that Aristotle is talking of full virtue when he talks of virtue in the *Ethicae*, see the suggestion made by Curzer (2012, p. 23n7). I am not denying that Aristotle presents the virtues in *EE*

not clear yet. As I have already suggested in the **Introduction** (at **section 0.1.2.3**) and shall argue in more detail in the **Conclusion** of this Dissertation, the point seems to be that reason is required in so far as to aim for an end by means of *βούλησις* (whose object is that which is made right by virtue) one needs to conceive of it as a good for oneself by means of reason. At any rate, it seems clear that the arguments on the division of labour between virtue and reason in the *EE* are compatible with intermediate agents aiming for morally good ends, although they also suggest that intermediate agents cannot aim for fine ends for their own sakes in that they cannot perform virtuous actions for the sake of the mean, i.e., for the sake of the fine or for their own sakes (or so I have argued).

In the final section of this Chapter, I intend to substantiate this claim further, showing that, in the *EE*, only fully virtuous agents are able to i) aim for fine ends for their own sakes, ii) conclude through deliberation that they should perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, and iii) perform virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes. As I shall argue, this is the case because only fully virtuous agents are in a position to experience fine things *as* fine.

2.3 Τὸ καλόν in the *EE* and an analysis of VIII.3 1248^b16-1249^a17

What does ‘τὸ καλόν’ indicate in the *EE*? In the passages I have analysed above, there is no clear indication of what Aristotle means by it, nor is it clear if it consists in a sort of value that is distinct from goodness.

A sign that there might be some difference between the fine and the good may be found at the first lines of the *EE*, in which Aristotle argues against those who divide the

II-III and at *EN* II-IV in a way that is in many junctures unclear as to whether he is talking about full or natural virtue. Yet I think that some of the things he says about the virtues in the discussion of the particular virtues both in the *EE* and in the *EN* suggest that he meant to be talking of full virtue only, and not of natural virtue.

good, the fine, and the pleasant, like the person who made the inscription at Delos (*EE* I.1 1214^a1–6). Aristotle seems to think that these values do not pick distinct things in the case of happiness, which is at the same time the finest, the best, and the most pleasant of all things (1214^a7–8: ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἀπάντων οὐσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν).⁴⁵² This suggests that the same might not be true when we are not dealing with εὐδαιμονία, so that there may be good things, for instance, that are not also fine. As we shall see, this is indeed Aristotle's view: not every good thing is fine.⁴⁵³ Notwithstanding this, it is not clear how the good and the fine are related to one another.

Aside from the discussion of courage in **T 33** and in **T 34**, there are five other texts in which the notion of fineness is mentioned in connection to action or in connection to values other than fineness in a manner that is also inconclusive in regard to how it is related to goodness.⁴⁵⁴ In *EE* I.8, however, Aristotle appears to suggest that the fine is not to be simply identified with the good, but rather with a feature that distinguishes a class of good things:

T 36 – *EE* I.8 1218^b4–7

⁴⁵² This point is, to some extent, anticipated by Plato in *Lg.* II 662d1–663c5.

⁴⁵³ Moreover, all truly pleasant things seem to be fine, whereas those things that are not fine are not pleasant ἀπλῶς, but only *τινι*.

⁴⁵⁴ In *EE* I.4 1215^b3–4, Aristotle says that fine actions (which are those that stem from the virtues) are connected to the political life, and, similarly, in I.5 1216^a24–26, he says that the statesman is προαιρετικός of fine actions for their own sakes. At 1215^b24–26, Aristotle talks of non-fine pleasures, showing that pleasant things are not always fine; and later, in VII.2 1236^a5–7, he talks of those pleasant things that are fine, namely those that are pleasant to the fair and practically wise person, for whom fine and good things are pleasant. Finally, in *EE* VII.10 1243^a38 Aristotle says that the many pursue what is fine superfluously, that is, only when they have what is necessary at their disposal (for the opposition between τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας and τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, see *Top.* III.2 118^a6–15, and for a reading of 1243^a38 in light of this passage from the *Topics*, see Dirlmeier's commentary [1963, p. 448]). Although this last passage may be taken as suggesting that the fine can figure as an end for the many, it does not specify the precise relationship between the fine and virtuous actions, nor does it make clear how the fine as an end is related to virtue. As a matter of fact, it appears to say rather that the many perform fine actions only when they have already satisfied their basic necessities, a claim that is indifferent to the role of the fine as an end of action, for which reason I shall put it aside along with the four other passages I mentioned.

1218b4

ἀλλὰ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 5 || καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλόν.⁴⁵⁵ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρακτὸν τὸ δ' οὐ
 πρακ|τόν· πρακτὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀγαθόν, τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, οὐκ ἔστι
 | δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.

|| b4 πολλαχῶς P: ποσαχῶς CBL

But the good is <said> in many ways, [5] and a part of it is fine. And a part of it [sc. of the fine]⁴⁵⁶ is doable, and another <part> is not doable. And doable is a good of this sort: that for the sake of which; but the <fine> in changeless things is not <such>.

Irrespective of the difficulties in reading this passage and understanding its role in the context of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic conception of the good, and in understanding it in light of Aristotle's own claims in the *EE* to the effect that there is no single science of the good (just like there is no single science of being)—which would imply that good is fundamentally homonymous and not a single genus that could be divided as it is here—,⁴⁵⁷ this passage clearly identifies the fine as something that distinguishes a class of good things from other goods (which at the very least suggests that he is already thinking of a specific kind of good that is properly unified as a genus—or in some other way—among the different kinds of good that cannot be so unified), to the effect that there is a distinction to be made

⁴⁵⁵ I follow Fritzsche (1851, p. 22) in placing a point above the line here instead of a comma.

⁴⁵⁶ I am construing the referent of 'τὸ μὲν' as 'καλόν' rather than 'τὸ ἀγαθόν.' Accordingly, Aristotle is saying that there is a type of 'καλόν' that is achievable in action and a type of 'καλόν' that is not (which is perfectly reasonable—see, for instance, *MA* 6 700^b23–26), and then, in lines 6–7, he is saying either that what is fine in changeless things is not doable or else that what is fine in changeless things is not a good such as that for the sake of which (which implies that it is not doable). I do not think that the differences of construing the argument in this way are relevant for my purposes here, but it should be noted that, in the parallel in *MA*, when Aristotle turns to talk of changeless things he does talk indifferently of 'what is eternally fine and what is truly and primarily good' (*MA* 6 700^b32–33: τὸ δὲ αἰδιον καλὸν καὶ τὸ [καὶ τὸ mss.: καὶ Primavesi] ἀληθῶς καὶ [ἀληθῶς καὶ α: ἀληθές καὶ τὸ β] πρῶτως ἀγαθόν). Yet the fact that Aristotle explains what he means by being doable by reference to a good such as that for the sake of which suggests that he does not have any old good in mind here, but goods that fulfil the function of ends, for not all goods are doable due to being ends. In fact, ends are just doable because there are things that are doable through which they can be put into action (see *EE* I.7 1217^a35–39).

The alternative to this reading would be construing the referent of 'τὸ μὲν' as 'τὸ ἀγαθόν' instead. It is interesting to note that Susemihl (1880, p. 477) thinks that 'καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλόν' is disturbing the sequence of the argument (probably because he thinks that 'τὸ ἀγαθόν' is the referent of 'τὸ μὲν'), so that it should either be placed in a parenthesis or else be marked in the text as inauthentic. Similarly, Allan (1971, p. 66) thinks that 'τὸ μὲν' and 'τὸ δὲ' are contrasting the good and the fine, to the effect that the fine would be that aspect or part of the good that is 'outside the range of action.' Yet I take this restriction of fineness to the non-practical domain to be unwarranted in the *EE*, even if one is thinking of the *συστοιχία* from *Met.* Λ.7 1072^a34–35 (as Allan is). I thank Jennifer Whiting for pressing me on these issues.

⁴⁵⁷ For a brief discussion of some of these issues, see Bobonich (2023, pp. 188–191).

between the good and the fine in so far as the latter picks out a subclass of good things.⁴⁵⁸

But what does the fine amount to? That is, what distinguishes the fine from the merely good?

As we saw above at 1229^a2 (in T 33), Aristotle connected the fine with that which is determined by reason, and this might lead one to wonder whether what, according to the *EE*, makes a good something fine is it being recommended by reason.⁴⁵⁹ Moreover, at 1227^b37–38 (in T 31), the mean is said to be an end of action, and, besides, in *EE* II.3 1220^b27–28 and in 3 1222^a6–12 it is also said to be determined by reason (or right reason). Yet, although this might be enough for distinguishing the fine and the good (as indicated in footnote 459), I would like to resist the conclusion that it is all there is to say about acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα in the *EE*. In fact, in *EE* VIII.3—at 1248^b16–1249^a17—, we are faced with an argument that distinguishes fine things from merely good things that suggest that acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα requires more than merely acting as right reason prescribes, for it requires not only doing things that are fine, but also that these things are fine to the agent, i.e., are recognised as being intrinsically fine.

EE VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 is an extremely difficult and controversial bit of text, though. Not only are its arguments quite obscure, but there are many textual problems that make matters even worse, and this passage has been subject to severe emendation.

My aim in this section is threefold:

First, I would like to argue that *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 can throw some light

⁴⁵⁸ Similarly, for the idea that not all goods are ἐπαινετά, but that rather some goods are above praise (being only honoured), whereas others are below praise (as it is the case of external goods taken in themselves), and that the ἐπαινετά consists of a subdivision of the ἀγαθά, see M. Heinze (1909, p. 30).

⁴⁵⁹ This possibility is entertained *en passant* by Zingano (2020, p. 32n19), and is related to Aspasius interpretation of the fine in the *EN*, according to which acting for the sake of the fine is tantamount acting as one should and when one should (see *CAG*. XIX.1, 82.17–18), i.e., as (right) reason prescribes. As we shall see, although being prescribed by the right reason seems to capture what makes an action fine (i.e., it is fine because it hits the mean), it does not seem to be an adequate description of what is required for one to act for the sake of the fine. In any case, we should note that being recommended by right reason is not quite what makes something fine (i.e., the *ground* of its fineness), but is, if anything, a sign that something is fine: reason recommends something *because it is (or seems to be) fine*.

not only into what Aristotle means by τὸ καλόν in the *EE*, but also into what is implied by acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα.

Second, I would like to defend a reading of *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 according to which only fully virtuous agents—i.e., agents who are καλοὶ κάγαθοί—can perform fine (virtuous) actions for the sake of the fine (τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα),⁴⁶⁰ so that when agents who are not fully virtuous (such as intermediate agents) perform fine actions, they do it for some motive different from the fineness of these actions.

Third, I would like to suggest that in *EE* VIII.3 Aristotle presents us with a view of virtuous actions according to which virtuous actions are virtuous and fine irrespective of the motives that lead to their performance: agents who fail to be fully virtuous (i.e., who, in the context of *EE* VIII.3, fail to be καλοὶ κάγαθοί) can do fine things, but they do not do these things in the same way as agents who are καλοὶ κάγαθοί, for they cannot perform such actions for their own sakes or for the sake of the fine. For that reason, Aristotle says that agents who fail to be καλοὶ κάγαθοί only do fine things κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which appears to indicate that they do not perform fine actions because they are fine, but for some other reason, and not that the actions they perform are not really fine or intrinsically fine (i.e., are only so accidentally).

Now, all these claims are controversial. The first one, in so far as it might be argued that Aristotle does not really intend *EE* VIII.3 to provide clarifications on what τὸ καλόν and acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα mean, but is rather preoccupied with salvaging the notion of καλοκάγαθία, which is a popular designation of disposition of the fully virtuous agent. In that case, *EE* VIII.3 would be showing what καλοκάγαθία looks like within an Aristotelian framework

⁴⁶⁰ As we saw above in the **Introduction**, even though Aristotle never uses the expression τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα in the *EE*, he comes quite close to that in *EE* VIII.3 1249^a5–6 (see **T 39** below). Moreover, acting ὅτι καλόν or διὰ τὸ καλόν (which are the preferred expressions in the *EE*) seems to be equivalent to acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ὅτι καλόν, or διὰ τὸ καλόν (which are the preferred expressions in the *EN*). What is uncontroversial is that with such expressions seem ‘to mean that the intrinsic fineness of the act is the sole purpose which prompts the agent to do it’ (cf. Allan, 1971, p. 68).

and would be distinguishing between the good and the fine and giving some indication as to what is implied by acting for the sake of the fine only in so far as this contributes to these enterprises, in a similar fashion to how *EE* VIII.2 is preoccupied with giving a proper place within the Aristotelian framework to εὐτυχία, which is commonly conflated with εὐδαιμονία.⁴⁶¹

The second claim, in turn, is controversial in so far as it must address alternative readings of *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 according to which fine and good agents and merely good agents are not being distinguished by their motives, but rather by their different reflective attitudes towards the fine: merely good agents would fail neither in their particular responses to situations nor in their motives (in fact, according to this reading, they would act for the sake of the fine just like agents who are *καλοὶ κάγαθοί*), but in their general views about the value of virtue. This reading was advanced by Broadie (1991, pp. 373–383; 2010, pp. 6–16), in which she was followed by Pakaluk (1992). A slightly different version of this view is advanced by Kenny (1996, pp. 9–15), who despite also holding that agents who are not *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* differ from *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* in that the way they answer ‘the second-order question “What is the point of being virtuous”’ (p. 12)—to which someone who is *καλὸς κάγαθός* would perhaps answer ‘because virtue is splendid, fine, and noble,’ whereas someone who is not (like the Spartan) would perhaps answer ‘because virtue pays’—, thinks that there is a motivational difference between agents who are *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* and agents who are not: *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* perform virtuous actions because they are fine (i.e., for the sake of the fine), whereas agents who are not *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* perform virtuous actions merely for their own sakes, but not for the sake of the fine (since they treat intrinsically fine things like the virtues as useful for non-noble ends, thus failing to grasp the intrinsic fineness of these fine things).

⁴⁶¹ I thank professor Marco Zingano for pressing me on this issue.

The third claim, finally, is controversial specially in that it depends on a particular interpretation of *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 according to which merely good agents are not really virtuous. To use the vocabulary from *EN* VI.13: they are not good in the proper sense of the word (*κυρίως*), for they do not have full virtue (*ἀρετὴ κυρία*). Moreover, as we shall see below in **section 2.3.3**, the *Eudemian* account of moral habituation and virtuous action is full of obscurities, which makes it hard to decide how it should be understood.

I shall defend my second claim and respond to the alternative readings of *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 I mentioned above below in **section 2.3.2**,⁴⁶² and shall then defend my third claim below in **section 2.3.3**. But for now, I would like to say a few words in defence of my first claim.

There is no doubt that in discussing *καλοκάγαθία* Aristotle is conceiving of it in a way that differs in important respects from how it is popularly conceived, as is made clear when he distinguishes *καλοκάγαθία* from the disposition like that had by the Spartans,⁴⁶³ which strongly suggests that what we come across in the first part of *EE* VIII.3 is an Aristotelian reappropriation of the notion of *καλοκάγαθία*. Moreover, if either the common books pertain to the *EE* (or originally came from the *EE*) or if we originally had in the *EE* something like the common books, it seems that in discussing *καλοκάγαθία* Aristotle can be taken as just getting into more detail about what is involved in full virtue, since *καλοκάγαθία* is nothing but the condition that characterises the person who possess all particular virtues. Besides, that Aristotle intends to discuss something like full virtue in the *EE* is strongly suggested by III.7 1234^a28–30, where Aristotle announces that he will talk later about the fact that each

⁴⁶² In doing so, I shall also argue against a reading that has been recently proposed by Irwin (2022), which in spite of being congenial to my reading in that it offers a neat way of responding to the alternatives defended by Broadie and Kenny, depends on what I take to be a unpalatable construal of the Greek from 1249^a1–2.

⁴⁶³ As I shall point out below in footnote 524, it is noteworthy that Xenophon describes the Spartan constitution as promoting *καλοκάγαθία*.

virtue is present in some way by nature and in another way, namely accompanied by *φρόνησις*, which is a clear anticipation of the type of discussion we find in *EN* VI.13.

In that case, *EE* VIII.3 would indeed not be centrally concerned with getting clear on what τὸ καλόν is and on what is implied by acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, but would rather be resorting to these notions with a view to explaining *καλοκάγαθία* as the condition that comprises all particular virtues (and perhaps also *σοφία*—see footnote 211). However, if we put the common books aside, we are far from having a clear view on τὸ καλόν and on acting for the sake of the fine as a distinctive feature of virtue in the *EE*. As we saw above, although Aristotle gives some indication to the effect that τὸ καλόν picks up a particular sort of good, and to the effect that performing a virtuous action because it is fine is characteristic of virtue, he is far from being clear about what τὸ καλόν means in the *EE*.

If this is correct, then we also have an answer to another objection I have not raised above: namely, that in contrasting agents who have *καλοκάγαθία* with agents who have a disposition like that had by the Spartans, Aristotle is not characterising fine-and-good agents in terms of properties that are exclusive to them, but in terms of properties that they may share with other agents (like learners, and continent and incontinent agents), but which are ἴδια to them in relative terms, i.e., in contrast to agents who have the civic disposition like the disposition had by the Spartans. This objection is based on a distinction that Aristotle makes in *Top.* I.5 102^b20–26, according to which nothing hinders a property something has from being an ἴδιον relatively to something (πρὸς τι) or at some particular moment (i.e., temporarily), without being a ἴδιον without qualification (ἀπλῶς). As Aristotle's example goes, being seated, despite being an accident, may be an ἴδιον of someone whenever that person is the only person seated, and even if that person is not the only one seated, this may still be their ἴδιον relatively to those who are not seated. This objection will also be

relevant for the analysis of some other passages in the next Chapter. At any rate, given that *EE* VIII.3 is concerned not only with distinguishing *καλοκάγαθία* from some other character dispositions that are commonly conflated with it, like the civic disposition like that had by the Spartans, but also with presenting *καλοκάγαθία* as a disposition that comprises *all the virtues*, this gives us strong reason for thinking that Aristotle is characterising it in terms that allow us to distinguish it not only from that civic disposition with which it may be conflated, but also from any other disposition that does not comprise all the virtues (including the disposition of learners of virtue and of intermediate agents in general). Accordingly, if it is true that Aristotle contrasts *καλοκάγαθία* and that civic disposition by saying that only agents who have *καλοκάγαθία* do fine things motivated their intrinsic fineness, we have reason for saying that this is not an ἴδιον these agents have only relatively to civically virtuous agents, but relatively to any agent who does not have all the virtues is thereby not fine-and-good.

Furthermore, in so far as fineness has a central place in the argument advanced in *EE* VIII.3 in that agents who are fine-and-good are distinguished from merely good agents precisely by reference to the fact that they perform fine actions *because these actions are fine*, it seems that *EE* VIII.3 is clearly a good place to look for some clarity about what fineness consists in.⁴⁶⁴ The reading of *EE* VIII.3 I intend to advance in this section is by no means completely novel.⁴⁶⁵ Yet I shall here defend my reading while at the same time trying, as far as possible, to make sense of the text transmitted by the main Greek manuscripts or by the Latin translation of *EE* VIII.3 (Harlfinger's *La*; Rowe's *FL*) and of the argument of *EE* VIII.3 1248^b16–1249^a17 as a whole. No doubt, as we shall see, some corrections appear to be unavoidable. But in spite of the textual difficulties, I think there are some uncontroversial

⁴⁶⁴ That the discussion of fineness in *EE* VIII.3 'casts great light' on the doctrine of fineness is also the view of Kenny (1978/2016, p. 291).

⁴⁶⁵ Some of my claims have strong affinities with views expressed in the works of von Fragstein (1974), Whiting (1996), Buddensiek (1999), Barney (2005), and esp. Bobonich (2023).

philosophical points that can be gathered from this text, which, I contend, shed great light into Aristotle's conception of τὸ καλὸν in the *EE* and are consistent with what he says in other parts of the treatise. I shall discuss 1248^b16–1249^a17 dividing it into three parts—namely, 1248^b16–26, 1248^b26–37, and 1248^b37–1249^a17.

2.3.1 *EE VIII.3 1248^b16-26*

Let me begin with the first part, 1248^b16–26:

T 37 – *EE VIII.3 1248^b16–26*

1248b16 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ
καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ⁴⁶⁶
| ἔχοντα διαφορὰν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ
20 | αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δι' ἢ
αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστίν ἐφ' ὧν | αἶ
τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά.⁴⁶⁷ δικαιοσύνη
καὶ αὐτή, καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις· καὶ αἱ σώφρονες· ἐπαινετὴ | γὰρ
καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ | γὰρ τὸ
25 ἔργον. οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς. ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθὰ μὲν,
ἐπαινετὰ δ' οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ | τῶν ἄλλων διὰ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

|| **b17** ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ Rowe: *sed secundum se ipsa FL* (cod. Sa): ἀλλὰ
κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ L: ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ Spengel (1843, p. 550n^{***}): *sed et
secundum se ipsa FL* (cod. Co): *sed et secundum ipsa FL* (cod. Pa): ἀλλὰ
κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ P: ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ C: ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταῦτα B || **b20**
ὄντα PCBL: secl. Verdenius (1971, p. 285n1) | πάντα PCBL: πάντα
aut ante ὅσα transponendum aut in αἰρετὰ mutandum esse conj. Spengel
(1843, p. 550n^{***}): πάντως Brandis (1857, p. 522): πάντη von Fragstein
(1974, p. 380): om. *FL* | ἐφ' PCBL: ἀφ' Sylburg (1854, p. 294): *a
quibus FL* || **b22** καὶ αὐτή, καὶ γὰρ Rowe: καὶ αὐτή καὶ γὰρ PCBL: *et
enim ipsa et enim FL*: καὶ αὐτή καὶ Bekker Susemihl Walzer & Mingay |
αἱ σώφρονες Richards (1915, p. 68): οἱ σώφρονες PCBL: *temperati FL*

[16] Then, being good and being fine are different not only in their names, but also *per*

⁴⁶⁶ Walzer & Mingay and Susemihl report the καί present in Spengel's correction as coming from Bussemaker et al. (1850, p. 241), in which case it would seem that Spengel would have suggested merely 'ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ.' Yet not only Bussemaker's edition is later than Spengel's text, but Bussemaker also says in his preface (p. I-IV) that he depends on Bekker (1831), Spengel (1841; 1843), and Bonitz (1844), and then presents his own solutions for the remaining obscure and corrupt passages. This emendation is absent from Bussemaker's own solutions listed in his preface, and was in fact first suggested by Spengel (1843, p. 550n^{***}). Moreover, note that Bussemaker prints 'ἀλλ' [καὶ] καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα κτλ.', that is, he follows Spengel not only in adding the καί, but also in changing κατ' αὐτὰ to καθ' αὐτὰ and in deleting the article before ἔχοντα. This error of attribution has been duly avoided in Rowe's new edition, who correctly attributes 'ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ' to Spengel.

⁴⁶⁷ P and L have a ὑποστιγμῆ (.) here, which corresponds to a point above the line (·) as we currently use it.

se. Indeed, among all the goods, those that are choiceworthy for their own sakes are ends. And among these [sc. the ends], all those that [20] are praiseworthy while being <choiceworthy> on their own account are fine. In fact, these are <the ends> (1) in respect of which actions are praiseworthy and (2) which are praiseworthy themselves. <Now,>⁴⁶⁸ justice itself is <praiseworthy> because⁴⁶⁹ its actions are <so> as well; and temperate actions <are praiseworthy> because temperance too is praiseworthy. But health is not <itself> praiseworthy, for neither is its work; nor is <acting> strongly, for neither is strength. <These things> [25] are rather goods, but are not praiseworthy <themselves>. And this is evident in a similar way by induction in the remaining cases as well.

At lines 1248^b16–20, Aristotle first announces that being fine and being good are different *in themselves*, and then establishes that ‘the fine’ identifies a class of good things—namely, fine things are the goods that are choiceworthy on their own account (i.e., are genuine ends) and that are also praiseworthy. There is no novelty either in distinguishing between things that are praiseworthy on their own account (or due to some intrinsic feature) and things that are not praiseworthy on their own account or in distinguishing between things that are choiceworthy for their own sakes and things that are not choiceworthy for their own sakes, but due to something else.⁴⁷⁰ But, together, these two distinctions allow Aristotle to present here a technical sense of *καλόν*, on which basis fine things are to be distinguished from merely good things (even though they are also good themselves).

Yet the text of 1248^b16–20 has been subject to severe emendation: there is seemingly no issue in accepting Spengel’s proposal for line 17 (*ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰ*), which would appear to be warranted by *FL*, the *translatio vetusta* (which, according to Harlfinger [1971, pp. 25–26, 30], pertains to a branch of the *stemma codicum* that is independent from that of *PCL*, and thus from *B* as well).⁴⁷¹ In fact, there are some difficulties in accepting the text from *P*, since it would be unnatural to read *κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἔχοντα διαφορὰν* not as one syntagma, but as

⁴⁶⁸ I am taking this as an asyndeton.

⁴⁶⁹ For a discussion of the meaning of *καὶ γὰρ* here, see pages 366 to 368 below.

⁴⁷⁰ E.g. *Top.* III.1 116^a29–39 and IV.12 149^b31–39.

⁴⁷¹ For the place of *B* in the stemma see Harlfinger’s stemma as modified by Rowe (2021, p. 149; 2023b, p. vii).

two separate ones: *κατὰ ταῦτα*, and *τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν* (which would be the predicate of *τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι* and *τὸ καλὸν κάγαθόν <εἶναι>*). The text of C, in turn, does not make much sense either due to the *ταῦτά*, but this can be easily changed into *ταῦτα*. Then, if it were not unnatural to read *ταῦτα* not connected with *τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν*, Aristotle would be saying (with the text of P and with the text of C with corrections) that ‘being good and being fine are things that differ not only in their names, but <also> on the basis of these things’ (*ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν κάγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ταῦτα τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν*), in which case *ταῦτα* could be read as making reference to the differences that are discussed in the subsequent lines.

A more plausible alternative can be found in B (which reads *ἀλλ’ κατὰ ταῦτα* and does not have the article with *ἔχοντα διαφοράν*). With this text, Aristotle would be saying that ‘being good and being fine differ not only in their names, but <also> on the basis of these things’ (*ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν κάγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα διαφοράν*). In that case, *κατὰ ταῦτα* would also be referring to the differences between fineness and goodness discussed in the immediate sequence.

Another plausible alternative is transmitted by L (*ἀλλὰ κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ*). To make good sense of it, one would need to change *κατ’ αὐτά* into *καθ’ αὐτά* (which is a minor correction that is perfectly justifiable), in which case Aristotle would be saying that ‘being good and being fine are things that differ not only in their names, but <also> in themselves.’ In contrast to what is transmitted by P and C, it would not be unnatural to read *καθ’ αὐτά* *τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν* not as single syntagma (i.e., taking *καθ’ αὐτά* separated from *τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν*), since *καθ’ αὐτά* is a more crystallised expression (similarly, cf. *APo* I.4 76^a13, and *HA* IX.40 624^b18–19 and 638^a7–8). Besides, despite being strange at first, making abstract reference to things that differ somehow as *τὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν* is not completely unheard

of, for in Asclepius' commentary to the *Metaphysics* we come across just such expression: in commenting *Met.* Δ.10 1018^b7–8 (a passage in which Aristotle says that things that are identical in species are said in ways that are opposed to those in which things are said to be different in species), Asclepius says that things that are the same in species are 'those that are not different' (*CAG.* VI.2, 323.12–13: τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα διαφορὰν), which is expected given that Aristotle just described (in *Met.* Δ.10 1018^b2) things differing in species as things that belong to the same genus but that have a difference (ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ὄντα διαφορὰν ἔχει), in which case things identical in species would be those that have no difference.

Now, in order to decide between the reading of B, the reading of L (with a correction), and Spengel's proposal I think we should take a closer look into what is transmitted by the *translatio vetusta*. In his edition, Dieter Wagner prints '*sunt itaque agathon esse et kalon kagathon non solum per nomina, sed et [om. Sa] secundum se [om. Pa] ipsa habentia differentiam.*' Now, although the text as printed by Wagner supports Spengel's correction (since ms. Co reads '*sed et secundum se ipsa*'), in another manuscript (Sa), the text reads '*sed secundum se ipsa*' which suggests rather something like '*ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ,*' which is perfectly justifiable since '*οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ*' can occur without *καὶ* when the second clause either includes the first clause or is strongly contrasted with it (Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §525, 2.A1, p. 257; Smyth §2764). Thus, Aristotle would be saying that the fine and the good are different things not only in their names, but both in their names and in themselves (similarly, see *Met.* Z.9 1034^b7–10 and *Pol.* II.9 1270^a11–15, two passages in which '*οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ*' is used without *καὶ*). Now, although 'before *καθ'*, *καὶ* might easily have fallen out' (Rowe, 2023a, p. 218), it is plausible that the *et* we find in Co and Pa was inserted by someone who thought *et* (or *etiam*) was missing or that '*οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ*' was missing a *καὶ* (as Rowe [2023a, p. 218] thinks perhaps

is the case), and this correction ended up in the text of Co and Pa.⁴⁷² As a result, the most plausible alternative is that the original Greek source of the *translatio vetusta* had something like ‘οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλά’ without καί, which agrees with the extant Greek mss.

As to the article ‘τὰ,’ one cannot know for certain from the Latin translation whether the text it translates had the article or not. In fact, ‘sunt ... habentia differentiam’ can be interpreted either as a periphrastic construction equivalent to ‘ἔστι ... ἔχοντα διαφορὰν’ (on such constructions in Medieval Latin, see Pinkster [2015-2021, vol. 1, pp. 544-545]) or as something equivalent to ‘ἔστι ... τὰ ἔχοντα διαφορὰν.’ But given that reading ‘sunt ... habentia differentiam’ as a periphrastic construction is much more natural in medieval Latin, it would seem that the article ‘τὰ’ ended up in the text due to dittography (in which case an original ΑΥΤΑ or ΤΑΥΤΑ was copied as ΑΥΤΑΤΑ or ΤΑΥΤΑΤΑ), and that the original Greek source of the *translatio vetusta* had something like ‘ἔστι ... ἔχοντα διαφορὰν,’ without the article τὰ, which agrees with the text transmitted by B.⁴⁷³

The following lines present bigger issues. The text transmitted by the mss. for the ὅσα clause that begins at line 19 reads ‘ὅσα δι’ αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν’ (there is no word translating πάντα in *FL*), and two difficulties have been raised about it.

The first is about the πάντα in line 20, whose position Spengel takes to be unacceptable, suggesting that it should be either transposed before ὅσα or changed into αἰρετὰ (so that we would have ‘καλὰ πάντα ὅσα δι’ αὐτὰ ὄντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν’ or ‘καλὰ ὅσα δι’ αὐτὰ ὄντα αἰρετὰ ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν,’ respectively); Brandis (1857, p. 1560n522), in turn, suggests it should be changed into πάντως, which was also proposed by von Fragstein (1974, p. 308) as

⁴⁷² Note that Pa also omits the *se* from ‘secundum se ipsa,’ which is probably due to an error of copy.

⁴⁷³ Yet this is not conclusive, since because L has the article, the absence of the article in B could be due to haplography, in which case the dittography that led the article to creep into the text would go back to archetype ω. Alternatively, one could say that the archetype ω did not have the article yet and that it got into the text at two different places in the *stemma*, first in the probable intermediary between ω and L or in L itself, and second in sub-hyperarchetype α, which would explain why PCL have the article, while B does not.

an equivalent alternative to his own *πάντη*.⁴⁷⁴

The second difficulty concerns the meaning of *δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα*, and has led Verdenius (1971, p. 285n1) to propose the deletion of *ὄντα*, since otherwise Aristotle would be seemingly talking of goods that exist on their own account.⁴⁷⁵

The proposals made by Spengel, Brandis, and von Fragstein are all motivated by the apparently unacceptable position of *πάντα*. Yet the position of *πάντα* can be easily explained if it is taken to be incorporated into the relative clause, so that it would be actually the antecedent of *ὅσα*.⁴⁷⁶ This would not be redundant or unusual in such phrases, as Cooper (1985/1999a, p. 272n28) thinks.⁴⁷⁷ In fact, although there is no other example of a *πᾶς* incorporated into a *ὅσος* clause in the *corpus*, there are several passages in which *πάντα* is the antecedent of *ὅσα*,⁴⁷⁸ and this is by no means redundant.

Even though such expressions are most commonly found in the biological works (especially in the *Historia Animalium*),⁴⁷⁹ the *ὅσα* in such expressions, as Gotthelf (1987, pp. 110-111) puts it, 'typically picks out a subclass of some wider class and *suggests*—though by no means entails—that *only* this subclass has, or is known to have, the feature' and, at least

⁴⁷⁴ Both Brandis and von Fragstein proposals attempt to correct this passage in view of *MM* A.II.5 1183^b38–1184^a4, where Aristotle talks of goods that are *πάντη καὶ πάντως αἰρετά*. More recently, Buddensiek (1999, pp. 201–204) has followed Brandis adopting a quite similar reading. Note that although Buddensiek sees how something like *δι' αὐτὰ <αἰρετὰ> ὄντα* could do the job of distinguishing fine things from merely good things, he shares Cooper worries about the use of *πάντα* with *ὅσα* (see below), which leads him both to adopt *πάντως* and to insert *αἰρετά* into the text.

⁴⁷⁵ Which is what the text says if we understand it as Rackham (1935) does (who translates this clause as: 'all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes') or as Décarie (2007, p. 270) does (who translates this clause as: 'qui, existant pour elles-mêmes, sont dignes de louanges').

⁴⁷⁶ This reading also seems to be conveyed by Dirlmeier's translation (1963, p. 103.22). Yet one cannot know whether Dirlmeier translated the text as he did because he thought *πάντα* was incorporated in the relative clause or because he followed Spengel's first solution and transposed *πάντα* before *ὅσα* (and he is not clear on that when he comments the passage in pages 494–495). At any rate, reading *πάντα* incorporated in the *ὅσα* clause achieves the same results as Spengel's first solution without introducing any unwarranted change into the text.

⁴⁷⁷ In which he is followed by Buddensiek (1999, p. 201).

⁴⁷⁸ Just to name a few: *EE* II.6 1223^a18, *EN* V.4 [=Bywater V.2] 1130^b4–5, *GC* II.8 334^b31, *HA* I.1 487^a30, 488^a30, 12 504^a8–9, *Met.* Z.5 1030^b22, and *Rh.* I.10 1369^a5–7.

⁴⁷⁹ As has already been observed by Gotthelf (1987, p. 110).

in the *HA*, such doubly quantified expressions ‘*are* often convertible, and if not are ripe to serve as premises for the so-called perfect induction to the desired level.’⁴⁸⁰ If this is correct, then at least some passages in which Aristotle uses such double quantifications would be concerned with convertible universal propositions whose subject is a member of a wider class whose other members do not share the predicate attributed to that subject in this universal proposition. For instance, in *HA* II.15 506^a1–3, Aristotle says that, ‘in general, all animals which, taking air in, inhale and exhale have a lung, a windpipe and an oesophagus’ (ὅλως δὲ πάντα ὅσα τὸν ἀέρα δεχόμενα ἀναπνεῖ καὶ ἐκπνεῖ, πάντ’ πνεύμονα καὶ ἀρτηρίαν καὶ στομάχον), which implies not only that an animal displays the combination of lung, windpipe, and oesophagus *if and only if* it inhales and exhales taking air in, but also that animals that inhale and exhale taking air in are members of a wider class whose members do not universally display the combination of lungs, windpipes and oesophagus—namely, the class of animals. Now, this seems to be just the case we are faced with here in the *EE*. As a matter of fact, not only Aristotle’s point appears to be that an end is καλόν *if and only if* it is praiseworthy while being choiceworthy on its own account (or however else we understand the ὅσα clause at line 19), but also that things that are praiseworthy while being choiceworthy on their own account are members of a wider class whose members do not universally share the property of being καλόν—namely, the class of ends.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁸⁰ In which he is followed by Lennox (1991, p. 285n30), who glosses Gotthelf’s position as one according to which such doubly quantified expressions ‘may signal Aristotle’s concern in *Hist. an.* to identify primitively universal predications.’

⁴⁸¹ This is not the only way of construing πάντα that makes good sense of its position, though. Rowe (2023a, p. 218), for instance, thinks that Solomon’s construal of ‘ὅσα δι’ αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν’ seems ‘enough to justify πάντα (and the preceding ὄντα).’ Solomon (1915) translates this clause as ‘which, existing all of them for their own sake, are praised,’ which no doubt makes good sense of the position of πάντα. However, I disagree with Rowe as to whether it is enough to justify the ὄντα, since this rendering of the ὅσα clause still falls prey to Verdenius’ objection. But if we supply αἰρετὰ with ὄντα, then it is easier to make sense of this, since, in that case, the ὅσα clause could then be translated as ‘which, all of them being <choiceworthy> on their own account, are praised.’ In any case, this way of construing πάντα is certainly more deflationary than the one I defended, but I think that the parallel with the biological works I have made clarify what Aristotle is saying here in such a way that it makes it quite tempting (and justifiable) to read πάντα as the antecedent of ὅσα. Moreover, the reading I am defending would vindicate Allan’s

Notwithstanding this, Spengel's second alternative (i.e., changing πάντα into αἰρετά) would still be relevant in light of the problem raised by Verdenius. The latter is right in thinking that it would not make much sense to say that 'fine are those things that, *existing on their own account*, are praiseworthy,'⁴⁸² so that virtues such as courage would be things that are fine *because* they exist on their own account.⁴⁸³ If one follows Verdenius' own solution, the text would be saying instead that 'fine are all those things that are praiseworthy on their own account' (καλά, ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ {ὄντα} πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν). Cooper (1985/1999a, p. 272n28) objects to this solution on the grounds that talk of things that are 'praised [or praiseworthy] in themselves [or on their own account]' would produce 'a non-Aristotelian, maybe nonsensical, idea' in light of *EN* I.12 1101^b12–18. Someone advocating for Verdenius' proposal could respond that 1101^b12–18 only says that what is praiseworthy *appears* to be praised (φαίνεται + ἐπαινεῖσθαι) due to being relative to something else, which would not rule out the idea of things that are praiseworthy for their own sakes. But I think that a more promising response is to say that in *EN* I.12 1101^b12–18 Aristotle is thinking only of the praise given to actions and persons, which would be compatible with the idea of ends being intrinsically praiseworthy, since in the context of *EN* I.12 it is presumably not adequate to say that ends are praiseworthy, for they are rather objects of honour.

(1971) suggestion that Aristotle's argument here proceeds by means of a διαίρεσις. Similarly, for a recent defence of the claim that Aristotle is here making use of a διαίρεσις (which would also explain why he is not concerned with providing us with definitions, but with characterisations that sufficiently distinguish the items divided), see Bobonich (2023). For the idea that Aristotelian divisions, like those found in the *historiai*, have as an aim 'to distinct genera and (where required) species and to determine which properties belong *per se* to them,' and that at least in the *Analytics*, 'differentiae are demarcated (in part) by their role as *explananda* in the relevant causal theory'—two ideas that, combined, would strongly suggest that Aristotle is here in *EE* VIII.3 demarcating the fine as a sub-kind of final goods that is to be distinguished from other final goods by reference to *per se* properties that are exclusive to them and which are not essential to fine things, but, on the contrary, are to be explained by whatever turns out to define fine things—, see Charles (2000, pp. 329, 247, respectively).

⁴⁸² *Pace* Hitz (2012, p. 277), who interprets 1248^b20 as talking of 'kalon actions as existing for their own sake.' At any rate, she does not discuss this passage in detail and just observes that its text is corrupt (p. 277n33). See also the translations by Rackham and Décaire in footnote 475.

⁴⁸³ On the same line, see Buddensiek (1999, pp. 201–202). Note, however, that Buddensiek does not adopt Verdenius' solution (see footnote 474)

EN I.12 1101^b12-18 is then compatible with *Top.* III.1 116^b37-117^a4, where Aristotle distinguishes between things that are praiseworthy for their own sakes and things that are praiseworthy due to something else. Yet even if it is reasonable to think of ends that are praiseworthy in themselves, one should only accept Verdenius' solution if there is no other way of making sense of the transmitted text.

An alternative to this consists in reading the *ὅσα* clause in light of the first characterisation of the fine found in the *Rhetorica* (I.9 1366^a33-34: *καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἦ κτλ.*),⁴⁸⁴ which could be done either by accepting Spengel's second proposal (so that we would have 'fine are those things that are praiseworthy while being choiceworthy in themselves' [*καλά, ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα αἰρετὰ ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν*]), or by keeping *πάντα* and inserting *αἰρετὰ* into the text (so that we would have 'fine are *all* those things that are praiseworthy while being choiceworthy in themselves' [*καλά, ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ <αἰρετὰ> ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν*]). All these proposals make good sense of the text as well. Yet none of them is really necessary, as I take it. It is perfectly reasonable to supply *αἰρετὰ* without altering the text, since this word was just mentioned in the previous line.⁴⁸⁵

Read in this way, 1248^b16-20 seems to provide us with a criterion for identifying fine things that is identical to the first criterion from *Rh.* I.9 1366^a33-34, so that fine would be those goods that are praiseworthy while being choiceworthy on their own account (a de-

⁴⁸⁴ Similarly, see Cooper (1985/1999a, pp. 271-272).

⁴⁸⁵ This possibility is entertained by Dirlmeier (1963, pp. 494-495), who mentions two other passages in the *EE* in which he takes something similar to occur: *EE* VII.2 1236^b29-30 and 1237^a11237a2. Dirlmeier is probably mistaken about the first passage (since nothing needs to be supplied here to make good sense of it), but the second passage does indeed present us with a case in which the adjective *αἰρετόν* must be supplied from a previous clause: Aristotle writes 'ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν,' and there is no doubt that *αἰρετόν* must be supplied with *αὐτῷ δὲ* (and the 'μὲν ... δέ' makes this clear). Yet Dirlmeier himself he ends up rejecting this alternative in the case of 1248^b19-20 in favour of one of his own, according to which *δι' αὐτὰ* is short for *δι' αὐτὰ καλά*, so that fine would be those things that are praiseworthy while being *simpliciter* fine. Dirlmeier (1963, p. 103.22) translates the text as if it were saying that 'Sittlich-schön unter diesen sind alle jene, die als schlechthinig-schön auch noch des Lobes würdig sind.' Yet I do not think that this gives makes good sense of the circumstantial participle in 'δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα.'

scription that might be equivalent to that according to which fine are those goods that are praiseworthy on their own account). Yet this does not seem to say much about the sort of value that fineness is meant to convey, since praiseworthiness appears to be consequent upon something being fine rather than what makes a good that is choiceworthy in itself into something fine. Someone could point out that Aristotle actually gives us the reason why they are praiseworthy, for the text may be interpreted as saying that they are praiseworthy *because they are choiceworthy on their own account* (i.e., taking the circumstantial participle as having a causal force). Yet many things are choiceworthy on their own account and are not *eo ipso* praiseworthy, but are only praiseworthy on account of something else (e.g., health—see *Top.* III.1 116^a30–31). There should be, then, some feature of fine things that is non-reducible to their choiceworthiness and that explains why they deserve praise *on their own account*, that is, that makes their endlike character worthy of praise.⁴⁸⁶ I shall bracket this question. For I am only interested here in what one might call the schematic sense of *καλόν* as a moral end,⁴⁸⁷ regardless of what something being fine really means from a moral standpoint.

The next lines (1248^b20-26) are controversial as well. As I understand them, the

⁴⁸⁶ Pace Allan (1971, pp. 70-71), who despite rightly seeing an issue here regarding whether the goods in question in this passage are fine because people commend them or are commended because they are fine and acknowledging that the safe answer for Aristotle would be to say that an action is praised as fine due to qualities such as those described in *Met.* M.3 1078^a36–^b1, ends up entertaining the possibility that here in *EE* VIII.3 fine ‘describes no property of the action, and that the use of such a word is a verbal gesture indicating an emotional and subjective approval.’ Perhaps it would be illuminating to distinguish between two different uses of the word fine in *EE* VIII.3, the adjectival and the relative. To say that something counts as being fine is to say that it is a thing of a given sort, whereas to say that something is fine *to someone* amounts to capturing the subjective approval that someone gives to something as a result of that thing appearing to them as being something of that sort (even if one may turn out to be mistaken in that regard). This will be relevant below in **Chapter 3** for the discussion of some passages in which Aristotle talks of fine things that are proper (*ἴδια*) to each of the character dispositions. I thank Jennifer Whiting for pressing me on this issue.

⁴⁸⁷ For a description of the purely schematic and formal role of the *καλόν* and its limitations in explaining what makes something *καλόν*, see Irwin (2011, pp. 247-248). Irwin’s account of the formal role of the *καλόν*, however, depends on a further step—namely, taking τὸ *καλόν* as an expression of the correct rational order, which would grant it some conceptual unity when one talks of ‘the fine’ about other things such as numbers and the natural world. Yet I do not think this step is necessary to understand the merely formal role played by the *καλόν* in the practical domain.

argument runs as follows:

- (1) Fine are those <ends> (a) in respect of which actions are praiseworthy and that (b) are themselves praiseworthy (1248^b20-21);
- (2) Virtues, like justice, are themselves praiseworthy because the actions that stem from them are praiseworthy (1248^b21-22);
- (3) Similarly, actions performed on the basis of virtue are praiseworthy because the virtues by which they are qualified are praiseworthy (1248^b22-23);
- (4) Health, by contrast, is not praiseworthy, for its *ἔργον* is not praiseworthy as well (1248^b23-24);
- (5) Nor is acting strongly praiseworthy, for strength is also not praiseworthy (1248^b24);
- (6) Then, goods like health and strength are good, but are not praiseworthy (from [4] and [5]) (1248^b24-26).

Let me begin by commenting on (1). The text I am reading is ‘*ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά.*’ The *τε* in this phrase is postponed, so that it is coordinating the whole relative ‘*ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ*’ with ‘*καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά,*’ which stands for a second relative clause that should have the same antecedent as *ἐφ’ ὧν*. Yet because the relative pronoun of this clause would stand in a different case than the *ὧν* from *ἐφ’ ὧν*, its place has been taken by *αὐτὰ* (see Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §561, 1, p. 431, Smyth §2517).

What is meant by ‘*ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ*’ is not clear, however. This is perhaps why the editors prefer to print ‘*ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ,*’ which comes from a conjecture made by Sylburg that can be justified on the basis of the *translatio vetusta*,

which gives ‘*a quibus*’ here (see the *apparatus* of **T 37** above). Now, some translators have understood ‘ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ’ as if Aristotle were talking of things from which praiseworthy actions stem, so that Aristotle would be talking of the virtues here (which would suggest that ‘καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά’ are, for instance, virtuous actions).⁴⁸⁸ But this interpretation overlooks the predicative position of ἐπαινεταί.⁴⁸⁹ It seems better then to take the antecedent of ἀφ’ ὧν as identifying *that because of which* (ἀφ’ ὧν) actions are praiseworthy.

Notwithstanding this, ‘ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά’ is not the text transmitted by the extant Greek manuscripts, for the text transmitted by PCLB is rather ‘ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά,’ which, as I have translated above, could be rendered by something like ‘these are the things *in respect of which* actions are praiseworthy, and which are themselves praiseworthy.’ The thought here could be construed as being quite similar to that expressed in *EN* I.12 1101^b12-18: things are praised not only in virtue of their qualities, but by standing in a relation to something as well. In that case, actions would be praiseworthy not only due to being actions of such and such a sort (say, withstanding fearful things in such and such a way or

⁴⁸⁸ This is how the text is understood by White (1992, pp. 161-162), Kenny (2011), and Bloch and Leandri (2011, p. 174) in their translations. Similarly, Bobonich (2023, p. 179n27) thinks that 1248^b21-22 has a chiasmic structure. In that case, Aristotle would be first saying that fine are those things because of which actions are praiseworthy and which are themselves praiseworthy, and then would then talk of the things that are themselves praiseworthy and of the actions that are praiseworthy because of these things. Thus, the virtues would be the things because of which or in respect of which actions are praiseworthy, in which case the καὶ γάρ clause that seemingly explains why justice is praiseworthy should be read not as giving the reason why justice is praiseworthy, but merely as supporting the claim that justice is praiseworthy without explaining it. I shall present my reasons for rejecting this interpretation below in discussing a possible objection to my construal of 1248^b21-22 (cf. pages 366 to 368 below).

⁴⁸⁹ I am not denying that noun phrases may be discontinuous, as is the case in hyperbata. On that, see van Emde Boas et al. (2019, §60.18-19, p. 709). For instance, in *APr* I.16 34^b30-31, Aristotle writes the following: ‘ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμὸς τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἐστὶν φάσεως [φάσεως A²C²nΓP^c: ἀντιφάσεως ABCd],’ which can only be rendered taking ‘τῆς ἀντικειμένης ... φάσεως’ as a syntagma, in which case ἀντικειμένης would be an attribute of φάσεως in spite of the position of the verb ‘ἐστίν.’ Yet this is not the case of ‘ἀφ’ [ἐφ’ codd.] ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταί,’ given the position of the article. As I take it, had Aristotle written something like ‘ἀφ’ ὧν πράξεις τε εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταί,’ ‘ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε ἐπαινεταὶ εἰσὶν πράξεις,’ ‘ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε ἐπαινεταὶ εἰσὶν αἱ πράξεις,’ or ‘ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπαινεταί’ instead, then he could be read as talking of those things from which praiseworthy actions stem. But the text as we have it can hardly be understood in such a fashion.

giving money in such and such a quantity to such and such a person), but also by contributing to a fine end. I mean, what makes withstanding fearful things in such in such a way in the circumstances one is being faced with something fine is that doing that in this way amounts to achieving a certain end that happens to be fine to achieve in these circumstances, but that may not be fine to achieve in this way in other circumstances. That is, what makes that action fine and praiseworthy is not the fact that one is performing it in a given way, but the fact that its being performed in that way in these circumstances achieves something fine in these circumstances. If this reading is feasible, the difference between reading ‘ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ’ and reading ‘ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ’ would be that the latter text is explicit in saying that fine ends are the cause of actions being praiseworthy, whereas with the first text all that is said is that actions are, *in respect of their fine ends*, praiseworthy. In the latter case, Aristotle would not be explicit in saying that the end is the reason why an action is praiseworthy, but would nevertheless be suggesting that the praiseworthy element in actions is their end. As a result, one may infer that actions are praiseworthy in virtue of their ends.

That being said, I think it is more plausible to think that ‘*a quibus*’ is either an interpretative translation of ‘ἐφ’ ὧν,’ or else that ‘ἀφ’ ὧν’ is correction made by a copyist bothered by ‘ἐφ’ ὧν.’ As a matter of fact, it is much less plausible to think that ‘ἀφ’ ὧν’ was corrupted into ‘ἐφ’ ὧν’ in archetype ω if the common source of archetypes ω and Ψ had ‘ἀφ’ ὧν’ like the *vetusta*, than to think that an original ‘ἐφ’ ὧν’ was corrupted into ‘ἀφ’ ὧν’ (so that we would have ‘ἀφ’ ὧν’ in Ψ only, but not in the text that gave origin to both ω and Ψ) or that the translator of the *vetusta* made an interpretative translation of ‘ἐφ’ ὧν’ in translating it as ‘*a quibus*’ (in which case both Ψ and ω would have ‘ἐφ’ ὧν’).

As a result, in talking of ends *in respect of which* actions are praiseworthy Aristotle

seems to have in mind ends that characterise these actions as actions of a certain kind. In fact, Aristotle seems to conceive of actions as always consisting of two things: *οὐδ' ἔνεκα* and *τὸ τοῦτο ἔνεκα* (see *Cael.* II.12 292^b6–7). Thus, it would be possible to argue that actions are praiseworthy due to one of their aspects (their end) being praiseworthy. It is not clear, though, whether this end that is a component of action is to be conflated with the end that motivates one to perform that action.

At any rate, if agents who are not fully virtuous such as intermediate agents can perform virtuous actions, and if indeed they are not motivated to perform these actions in the same way as fully virtuous agents (as has been suggested earlier in this Chapter in the discussion of **T 32** and also in **Chapter 1**), it seems that the end that motivates them to perform these actions should not be conflated with the end that characterises these actions as virtuous and fine. Otherwise, it would either be the case that the actions performed by intermediate agents are not fine (at least not in the same sense as the actions performed by fully virtuous agents—and Aristotle, as we shall see below in **section 2.3.2** and in **section 2.3.3**, thinks that agents who are not *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* can perform fine actions, although they do not perform them because they are fine) or else that motivation will not be enough to distinguish intermediate agents from fully virtuous agents (different from what Aristotle seemed to suggest above in **T 32**).

Moreover, if the end that motivates an action should be fine if that action is to be fine as well, it would not even be possible to do fine things involuntarily, and Aristotle seems to countenance this possibility (as has been made clear already in the discussion of *EN* V above in **section 1.3.1** in recognising the possibility of involuntarily doing things that happen to be virtuous).

But a problem remains: if the ends that make actions virtuous are not the psychological

goals of action that one adopts as one's purpose, which ends are they? A promising candidate is the mean ($\tau\acute{o}$ μέσον), which was said to be an end in 1227^b37-38 (in **T 31**), and may even be identified with the end one should aim for when deciding to perform an action. Therefore, if what makes an action fine is it hitting the mean, then an action would be fine because it is such as to hit the mean (i.e., it is what should be done in the circumstances at hand).

Furthermore, it seems that one can perform an action that hits the mean in action even though its hitting the mean is not what motivates one to perform it, and even without knowing that it hits the mean in this way. As result, virtuous actions performed for their own sakes would be actions that hit the mean in action that are performed *because they hit the mean in action*. There are, however, different ways of describing this, and perhaps in order to perform such an action for its own sake, one need not necessarily think of it as hitting the mean, but rather only that it is fine or the right thing to do. I shall come back to this issue below in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.3**.

At any rate, this seems to make clear how virtuous actions' praiseworthiness is explained by their ends and why virtuous actions should be decided on on their own account ($\delta\iota'$ αὐτά), for with talk of virtuous actions Aristotle is already thinking of something that consists in $\omicron\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$ and $\tau\acute{o}$ τοῦτο ἔνεκα, so that the end that makes an action praiseworthy is not something over and above it, but a component of it.

Accordingly, with talk of deciding on a virtuous action for its own sake, Aristotle is saying that one should perform that action motivated by the very end that makes it virtuous. Acting in such and such a way is praiseworthy because so acting is tantamount to doing certain things in a certain way such that a fine end is achieved in the circumstances one is being faced with. For instance, a courageous action is something praiseworthy because it is tantamount to withstanding fearful things in a particular way in the circumstances one is being faced with

such that something fine is attained, i.e., the mean in action.⁴⁹⁰

At any rate, this suggests that in *EE* VIII.3, and thus perhaps in the *EE* in general, Aristotle would answer question (V) by saying that virtuous actions are virtuous due to hitting the mean in action, which is something that they can do irrespective of whether one is motivated to perform them for their own sakes. And since what makes an action praiseworthy and fine is the fact that it hits the mean in action, it seems that being fine turns out to be a *per se* of actions of this sort, for actions that hit the mean in action would be fine precisely because they hit the mean in action (as I have suggested above in footnote 35).⁴⁹¹ Accordingly, being fine would be something that belongs to actions irrespective of the motive that leads to their performance by an agent. Besides, if being fine is something that is said *per se* of actions that hit the mean in action, it becomes clear why performing fine actions due to their hitting the mean or because they are fine amounts to performing fine actions for their own sakes, for it amounts to performing such actions due to recognising an intrinsic feature of these actions: their fineness.

Now, if I am right in construing the text and the argument of (1) in such a way, then the function of (2) and (3) is to introduce things that are, so to say, secondarily fine. In particular, (2) the virtues would be praiseworthy because the actions they elicit are intrinsically

⁴⁹⁰ Similarly, see Broadie's (1991, p. 88) and Ackrill's (1978, p. 596) reading of the second criterion from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], according to which one must perform virtuous actions *having decided on them for themselves* (*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*). On Ackrill's and Broadie's interpretations, this should be understood as implying that one must decide on performing an action, say standing one's ground in battle, because doing so has a certain property ϕ (for instance, it is fine to do so). As Broadie rightly observes, the upshot of this construal is that it eschews any inconsistencies with Aristotle's account of deliberation and decision, since it implies that deciding on some action ψ for the sake of ϕ can be understood as deciding on ψ for itself in so far as one decides on ψ under the description ϕ , which is not necessarily the same deciding on ψ with no further end in view. Therefore, it seems that the thought here can be best conveyed by the idea that choosing an action for its own sake is tantamount to choosing it as a constitutive means to its end. However, depending on whether we admit that intermediate agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, on their own account, or for themselves, choosing an action as a constitutive means to its end may not be enough for acting virtuously, which will additionally require one to be sufficiently motivated to act on the basis of that decision.

⁴⁹¹ I thank Professor Paulo Ferreira for pressing me on this issue.

praiseworthy (likewise, see *EE* II.1 1219^b8–9: *οἱ ἔπαινοι* [sc. *εἰσι*] *τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα*),⁴⁹² and (3) actions performed on the basis of virtue would be praiseworthy due to the virtue on which basis it is performed being itself praiseworthy (which it is due to the actions it elicits). (4) and (5), in turn, would be presenting things that are not praiseworthy, although they are goods (as becomes clear in [6]): health and strength.

There are several problems here, though. To begin with, my reading of (2) may be objected to. I am taking the ‘*καὶ γάρ*’ here as introducing an explanation of why justice is praiseworthy, but there is an alternative to this: one could think that ‘*καὶ γάρ*’ is not introducing something that explains why the claim that justice is praiseworthy is true, but merely something that supports the truth of this claim without giving us the reason why it is true.⁴⁹³ In that case, ‘*αἱ πράξεις*’ could be actions whose praiseworthiness does not explain the praiseworthiness of justice, but whose praiseworthiness is to be explained by justice instead. Hence, given that justice issues in such actions, and that there is no doubt that these actions are praiseworthy, one should accept that justice is praiseworthy, since it would be what explains the praiseworthiness of these actions.

The problem with this reading is that it implies that Aristotle would not give us here in *EE* VIII.3 any explanation of why the virtues are praiseworthy and thus fine, an explanation that is to some extent expected, given that he will later say that the virtues and the deeds that come from virtue are fine (in 1248^b36-37—in **T 38**). Moreover, as we saw, 1248^b20-21 (my [1]) describes fine ends as those ends which explain why actions are praiseworthy (either because they are ends because of which actions are praiseworthy or ends in respect to which

⁴⁹² See also *MM* A.I.2 1183^b27-28: ‘And other <goods> are praiseworthy, for instance, the virtues. In fact, praise is a product of the actions done on the basis of these [sc. the virtues]’ (*τὰ δ’* [sc. *τῶν ἀγαθῶν*] at 1183^b20] *ἐπαινετά, οἷον ἀρεταί· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος γίνεταί*).

⁴⁹³ I thank Professor Paulo Ferreira for calling my attention to the other ways of understanding ‘*καὶ γάρ*’ here and pressing me on this issue.

actions are praiseworthy) and which are themselves praiseworthy.

So, if the just actions at issue in (2) do not explain the praiseworthiness of justice (but merely support the claim that justice is praiseworthy without explaining it), and if the just actions in question here are the same praiseworthy actions Aristotle was talking about in 1248^b20-21, it would be odd to shift to talk of the virtues as praiseworthy because the actions whose praiseworthiness they explain are also praiseworthy.⁴⁹⁴

Thus, unless the ends from 1248^b19-20 are to be identified with the virtues (which is hardly plausible, since it would imply that actions are praiseworthy due to being for the sake of virtue, a claim that only makes sense if they are seen as productive of virtue, and hence not as choiceworthy on their own account—which would contradict the fact that they are fine⁴⁹⁵) or else the praiseworthiness of the ends in question in 1248^b19-20 is ultimately due to virtue (which would make it really hard to explain how agents who are not *καλοὶ κάγαθοι* can perform actions that are really praiseworthy if these agents are not virtuous—cf. 1249^a14-16, in **T 39** below), there is good reason for thinking that ‘καὶ γάρ’ is indeed introducing something that gives us the reason why the virtues are praiseworthy. In that case, there will be no relevant difference between the explanation introduced by ‘καὶ γάρ’ in 1248^b20 (*καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις*) and the explanation introduced by ‘γάρ’ in 1248^b20-21 (*ἐπαινετὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη*)—perhaps ‘καὶ γάρ’ is not even a particle cluster here, but the particles retain

⁴⁹⁴ One could perhaps try to resist this objection by denying that the praiseworthy actions from 1248^b20-21 are the same praiseworthy actions whose praiseworthiness is explained by virtue. Yet this would make the argument even more convoluted. In fact, not only Aristotle would be using the expression ‘αἱ πράξεις’ in senses that are importantly different in the span of two lines (for in 1248^b20 he would be talking of actions that are praiseworthy due to their ends being praiseworthy, and in 1248^b21 he would be talking of actions that are praiseworthy due to virtue)—which would spoil the chiasmic structure that gave further plausibility to the claim that what makes the actions praiseworthy are the virtues (see footnote 488)—, but one would also need to assume that a claim such as that from *EE* II.1 1219^b8-9 is implicit here, so that the virtues would be praiseworthy due to issuing in virtuous actions of the sort described in 1248^b20-21, but would then be described in 1248^b21-22 as being praiseworthy due to issuing in actions whose praiseworthiness they explain (i.e., [2]) and then as explaining the praiseworthiness of these actions they issue in (i.e., [3]).

⁴⁹⁵ I shall come back to the relationship between being praiseworthy for its own sake and being productive of virtue below in **pages 413 to 414**.

their independent meaning in 1248^b20 (like the ‘*γὰρ καὶ*’ in 1248^b20-21), in which case the difference between the two passages would be just one of word order.

The second issue concerns the way I am reading (3). I am accepting here a correction proposed by Richards (1915, p. 68), who suggests that one should read ‘*αἱ σώφρονες*’ instead of ‘*οἱ σώφρονες*’. There is nothing wrong *per se* with reading ‘*οἱ σώφρονες*’.⁴⁹⁶ In that case, Aristotle would be saying that temperate agents are praiseworthy because the virtue on which basis they are qualified is praiseworthy. Although this is a perfectly reasonable claim, it is somewhat puzzling why Aristotle would be making this point here, especially given that this claim has no parallel in the case of merely good things.

If we accept Richards correction, in turn, there would be a perfect parallel in (5), as I shall argue below. As a matter of fact, with ‘*αἱ σώφρονες*’ Aristotle might not be referring merely to temperate actions in the sense of actions in the domain of temperance that hit the mean in action. If he were doing that, he would be suggesting that the end that makes a temperate action praiseworthy is ultimately determined by virtue or else is to be identified with virtue. In the first case, as I have already suggested, it would seem that agents who do not have the corresponding virtue cannot perform praiseworthy actions, which is clearly false given that later in the argument (in 1249^a14-16—in **T 39**) Aristotle will claim that merely good agents can perform fine actions *κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός*.⁴⁹⁷ In the latter case (i.e., if the end that makes a temperate action praiseworthy is to be identified with virtue), matters are even worse, since, as I have also indicated, it would seem that what makes virtuous actions virtuous is their contributing to virtue, so that they would not be fine, for they would not even

⁴⁹⁶ The objection made by Bobonich (2023, p. 179n27) that reading ‘*οἱ σώφρονες*’ here would spoil the chiasmic structure from 1248^b21-22 depends on one first accepting that the virtues explain the praiseworthiness of the actions at issue in 1248^b20-21 (my [1]), an alternative I have argued should be rejected for philosophical reasons.

⁴⁹⁷ As we shall see, Irwin objects to the idea that Aristotle is here talking of good agents. See the discussion below in section 2.3.3.

be choiceworthy for their own sakes.⁴⁹⁸

To avoid these difficulties, it is better to take *αἱ σώφρονες* as referring to actions that are expressive of a temperate character disposition, which is precisely what happens in *EN* X.8 1078^b10–16. In this passage, Aristotle is rejecting the claim that we can say that the gods are happy due to performing virtuous actions, and in rejecting this claim he is ultimately giving support to the idea that the perfect happiness is a sort of contemplative activity. Throughout this argument, which proceeds by means of a series of rhetorical questions, Aristotle rejects that the gods could engage in the performance of just actions (*πότερα τὰς δικαίας; κτλ.*), courageous actions (*ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους κτλ.*), generous actions (*ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; κτλ.*), and finally temperate actions (*αἱ [αἱ P^bC^cL^b: εἰ K^bO^bB^{95sup}.M^b] δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν*).⁴⁹⁹ Since Aristotle is talking here of actions on the basis of which one could be described as happy, he clearly means actions performed on the basis of virtue (i.e., virtuous activities), and not merely virtuous actions (i.e., actions that hit the mean in action), which are usually referred by him in the neuter: *τὰ δίκαια, τὰ σώφρονα*, etc.⁵⁰⁰ Moreover, ‘the two termination adjective *σώφρων* virtually invites the corruption to the masculine,⁵⁰¹ in which case it would very easy to explain why someone could have copied an original *αἱ σώφρονες* as *οἱ σώφρονες*.

As a result, in saying that *αἱ σώφρονες* are praiseworthy because *σωφροσύνη* is praiseworthy, Aristotle would be merely recognising that the type of praise we give to actions that are expressions of virtue (i.e., virtuous activities) is ultimately due to the virtue of which these actions are expressive, and that this virtue, in turn, is praiseworthy because it makes one perform fine actions (i.e., actions that hit the mean in action). Thus, the actions at issue in (1),

⁴⁹⁸ I shall come back to the relationship between being praiseworthy for its own sake and being productive of virtue below in pages 413 to 414.

⁴⁹⁹ See my de Sousa (2024b) for a detailed discussion of the textual issues of this passage.

⁵⁰⁰ See the discussion of question (V) above in the **Introduction**, and the discussion of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] (T 48) below in **Chapter 3**.

⁵⁰¹ As Christopher Rowe has suggested to me (personal communication).

which are the same actions Aristotle was describing in the ἐφ' ὧν (or ἀφ' ὧν) clause from lines 1248^b20-21, are not the same actions he is describing in (2), which is perfectly justifiable given the compressed structure of the argument in *EE* VIII.3.

Furthermore, if I am right so far, (2) would be perfectly parallel to (5), since actions performed on the basis of virtue are nothing but actions performed virtuously (as Aristotle will make clear in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]), and in (5) Aristotle describes a parallel case in the domain of merely good things: acting strongly is not praiseworthy because the strength on which basis one acts in such a way is not praiseworthy as well. But before getting into this argument, let me respond to an objection to what I have said so far.

The objection to which I would like to respond consists in pointing out that health and strength can in fact be praiseworthy under certain conditions. They can indeed be praiseworthy on account of something else, although they are not in themselves praiseworthy (see *Top.* III.1 116^b37–117^a4). This is not an issue just for my construal of the argument advanced in (4) and (5), but for Aristotle's argument in 1248^b21-26 as a whole.⁵⁰² Then, charity seems to require us to understand the claim made by Aristotle in such way that he is saying rather that health and strength are not *in themselves* praiseworthy or are not praiseworthy *sans phrase*, but are so only by a reference to something else which is accidentally connected to them (in contrast to justice and to the temperate actions, since justice is non-accidentally connected to just actions⁵⁰³ and temperate actions are non-accidentally connected to their being performed

⁵⁰² And this worry is seemingly avoided if one accepts Brandis' and von Fragstein's emendations of the πάντα from 1248^b20 (πάντως and πάντη, respectively), since the text read with their emendations would not be talking about all sorts of fineness and praiseworthiness, but about the intrinsic sort of fineness which is attributed to things that are completely or in all respects praiseworthy. In that case, Aristotle could be taken not as denying praiseworthiness *sans phrase* to things such as health and strength, but only the kind of praiseworthiness by reference to which fine things are identified. Similarly, see Buddensiek's (1999) defence of πάντως.

⁵⁰³ In the manner of a *per se*₂, since just actions (i.e., things that happen to be just) are part of the definition of justice (see *EN* V.9 [=Bywater V.5] 1134^a1–2: ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου).

on the basis of temperance⁵⁰⁴).

A remaining worry concerns the meaning of ‘τὸ ἰσχυρῶς’ in (5), for if ‘τὸ ἰσχυρῶς’ is not praiseworthy because strength is not praiseworthy, whereas health, on the contrary, is not praiseworthy because its ἔργον is not praiseworthy (just like justice is praiseworthy because its actions are praiseworthy), there would be an asymmetry that must be explained somehow.⁵⁰⁵ ‘τὸ ἰσχυρῶς’ seems to be short for ‘τὸ ἰσχυρῶς πράττειν’ (Dirlmeier, 1963, p. 495). If this is correct, I think there is good reasons for thinking that this expression points to a discussion found in Plato’s *Protagoras* (332a6–c3), in which acting in a certain manner is explained by reference to a corresponding quality of the agent. In fact, one of the examples given by Plato is precisely about acting ἰσχυρῶς (332b6–b7), and it connects the strength with which one does something (τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται) with the way in which one acts when one acts strongly (ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται).⁵⁰⁶ This argument introduces a sense in which acting strongly is dependent upon strength, but if we extend this connection too far, it may seem that praiseworthy actions are not adequate explanations for the praiseworthiness of their correspondent virtues anymore. There are, however, two alternatives by which one can avoid this difficulty:

⁵⁰⁴ In the manner of a *per se*₁, since temperate actions *qua* activities performed on the basis of temperance (and not merely in the sense of things that happen to be temperate) would seem to be defined by reference to virtue (see footnotes 101 and 108 for some expressions Aristotle use to refer to virtuous activities that strongly suggest that their definitions make reference to virtue). Similarly, if (2) were instead talking about temperate agents, it could be argued that being temperate is non-accidentally related to temperance in the manner of a *per se*₂, since someone who has temperance in their soul is said to be temperate precisely because temperance is in their soul (since qualities are those things on which basis people are said to be qualified in a certain way [cf. *Cat.* 8 8^b25], so that it is because someone has a quality that they are qualified in a correspondent fashion [e.g., *Cat.* 8 10^b7–8: τῷ γὰρ ἀρετῆν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται]).

⁵⁰⁵ In his commentary Maurus (1668, p. 508a, §4) appears to avoid this problem by making the example of strength parallel to that of health, so that bodily strength would not be praiseworthy because strong actions are not praiseworthy (Ἐξ ἐαδὲμ ῥατῖονε κορπορῖσ ροβυρ, Ἐξ ἀλῖα ηυῖσμοδῖ νον συντ λαυδαβῖλῖα, quia actiones robustae non sunt laudabiles). However, this is in direct conflict with what one reads in the text. In fact, when Maurus translates ‘ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον. οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς. ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὰ μὲν, ἐπαινετὰ δ’ οὐ’ he does not translate ‘οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς’ nor ‘ἐπαινετὰ δ’ οὐ,’ and has instead ‘non etiam sanitas laudabilis, nam nec opus eius, quando nec quod fortiter sit laudabile est, tametsi bona haec confiteamur’ (1668, p. 507b, §4).

⁵⁰⁶ For a critical discussion of this argument from the *Protagoras*, see Burnyeat (1971/2012b, pp. 216–221).

According to the first one, all Aristotle needs is to be committed to a thesis according to which actions are prior to dispositions regarding their praiseworthiness to explain the praiseworthiness of these dispositions (see *EE* II.1 1219^b8–9), but for denying the praiseworthiness of something, no such priority must be observed. Instead, to point out that the condition from which an action stems is not praiseworthy itself would be sufficient grounds for claiming that that action is not praiseworthy either.

According to the second one, which I prefer, doing something does not need to be tantamount to doing it in a certain way, for performing a virtuous action, for instance, may be distinguished from performing it virtuously. In that case, there will be no asymmetry at all, but Aristotle would be making a different claim, namely that doing something in a certain manner is (or is not) praiseworthy depending on whether the condition on which basis someone does it is (or is not) praiseworthy. Thus, even if acting *ἰσχυρῶς* could be thought as being undistinguishable from performing a strong action (such that every strong action is performed *ἰσχυρῶς*), the same may not be true of some other things, such as virtuous actions. Accordingly, performing virtuous actions could be detached from performing them with strength or even virtuously (just as Aristotle will explicitly say in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]—see **Chapter 3** below—and Plato appears to do in 332a6–c3), and only in the latter case virtue would be what accounts for the praiseworthiness of what one is doing, for it will account for the moral worth of the way in which one performs an action (though not the moral worth of the action one is performing). Whether this is Aristotle's view on virtuous actions in the *EE*, though, may not be so clear at first, but if, as I have already suggested above, 'αἱ σῶφρονες' is referring precisely to virtuous activities, then it would seem that Aristotle is indeed anticipating the point he will make in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] here in the *EE*, for the claim made (2) will be parallel to the claim made in (5): just like acting strongly is not praise-

worthy (in itself) because strength (i.e., that on the basis of which one acts strongly) is not praiseworthy (in itself), so too temperate activities (i.e., acting temperately) are praiseworthy (in themselves) because temperance (i.e., that on the basis of which one performs temperate activities) is praiseworthy (in itself).

These issues being addressed, let us proceed into the next part of the text.

2.3.2 EE VIII.3 1248^b26-37

I now quote and translate 1248^b26-37:

T 38 – EE VIII.3 1248^b26-37

1248b26

ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ᾧ τὰ |
 φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ. τὰ γὰρ περιμάχητα καὶ μέγιστα
 εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθὰ, τιμὴ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ σῶμα|τος ἀρεταὶ
 30 καὶ εὐτυχία καὶ δυνάμεις, ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει || ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δ'
 εἶναι βλαβερὰ τισὶ διὰ τὰς ἕξεις. οὔτε | γὰρ ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄδικος
 ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὧν οὐδ' ὀνήσεται χρώ|μενος αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ
 κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροφῇ | χρώμενος οὐδ' ὁ ἀσθενῆς
 καὶ ἀνάπηρος τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιoῦς καὶ | τοῖς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις.
 35 καλὸς δὲ καγαθὸς τῶ τῶν || ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶ δι'
 αὐτά,⁵⁰⁷ καὶ τῶ πρα|κτικὸς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα.
 καλὰ δ' ἐστὶν | αἶ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

|| **b30** δ' LB: *autem FL*: om. PC || **b31** οὐδ' ὀνήσεται Langerbeck (cf. Walzer and Mingay, 1991, pp. xi, xviii): *non proficiet FL* (mss. Sa and Co): οὐδ' ὀνήσειε PCBL: *non proficiet FL* (ms. Pa): οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται Rowe: οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε Spengel (1843, p. 511n**): οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνηθείη Richards (1915, p. 68) || **b33-34** τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιoῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις Susemihl: *valentis et integri ornamentis FL*: τῆς τοῦ ὑγιoῦς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις PC: τῆς τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου B: τῆς τοῦ ὑγιoῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις L: τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου B²: τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιoῦς καὶ {τοῖς} τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις Rowe || **b34-36** L: *cum existant agathorum kala ipsi propter ipsa et cum operativis fiunt kalorum ipsorum gratia FL*: τῶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα PCB || **b35** δι' αὐτά Bekker: *propter ipsa FL*: *per se ipsa* Λ¹: δ' αὐτά L: om. PCB: δι' αὐτά Ald. Rowe || **b36** καὶ PCBL: om. *FL*

[26] Well, then, good is the person for whom the natural goods are good. In fact, the things that are disputed and seem to be the greatest goods—honour, wealth, bodily virtues, successes, and capacities—are good by nature, [30] but can be harmful to some people due to their dispositions. For neither someone who is foolish nor someone who is unjust or intemperate will have any benefit from using these things, just as neither the sick <would have any benefit> from using the food of the healthy, nor the sickly or maimed person <would have any benefit from using> the adornments of the healthy

⁵⁰⁷ I retain here the comma printed by Walzer & Mingay, *pace* Rowe.

or the <adornments> of the whole person.⁵⁰⁸ But one is fine-and-good because the [35] fine things among the goods pertain on their own account to them, i.e., because one is a doer of fine things for their own sakes.⁵⁰⁹ Then, the virtues and the deeds that spring from virtue are fine.

In these lines, good persons are distinguished from fine-and-good persons on the grounds that a good person is someone for whom the natural goods are good, whereas a fine-and-good person is someone to whom fine things pertain *δι' αὐτά*. Aristotle thinks it is relevant to say that being good amounts to being someone for whom natural goods are good because natural goods can be harmful to some people, even though they really are good. As Aristotle says, a vicious person would have no benefit from using natural goods (presumably, because they would do something bad with them), just as a sick person would not benefit from having the same diet as a healthy person. Up to this point, the argument is clear and uncontroversial (despite the textual problems). The same is not true about its final lines (34-37). In fact, what does Aristotle mean by talking of something pertaining *δι' αὐτό* to someone?

In comparing the definition of *καλοκάγαθία* found here to that given in the *MM*, von Arnim (1927, pp. 130-134) construes the phrase *καλὸς δὲ κάγαθὸς τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δι' αὐτά* in a slightly different manner.⁵¹⁰ He suggests that *δι' αὐτά* should be read with *τὰ καλά*, to the effect that Aristotle would be saying that 'someone is fine-and-good due to what is fine in itself pertaining to them.' As a result, Aristotle would

⁵⁰⁸ Pace Rowe (2023a, p. 219).

⁵⁰⁹ I take that the *καί* in this clause should be read emphatically (see Denniston, 1954, s.v. *καί*, II.C.(5), p. 320), for which reason I have left it untranslated. We come across a similar construction in the text of *EN* III.5 [=Bywater III.8] 1114^b27-28 that is transmitted by Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 80.7-8) and is printed in Bywater's edition.

⁵¹⁰ In making that comparison, von Arnim purports to argue that in the *EE* Aristotle conceives of *καλοκάγαθία* as a more demanding condition than in the *MM*, for which reason he reads *καλὸς δὲ κάγαθὸς τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δι' αὐτά* as parallel to the criterion for being *καλὸς κάγαθός* given in *MM* B.IX.3 1207^b31-33, according to which *καλὸς κάγαθός* is the person for whom things that are good *simpliciter* are good and the things that are fine *simpliciter* are fine. As a result, in the *EE*, it would seem that one needs to satisfy two criteria to be *καλὸς κάγαθός*.

be implicitly admitting, beside things that are *καλὰ δι' αὐτά*, also things that are *καλὰ δι' ἕτερα*, which von Arnim equates to things that are *καλά τινι* (in contrast to those that are *καλὰ ἀπλῶς*). There is no talk of things that are only *καλά τινι* in the *MM*, but since the *MM* defines the fine-and-good person as the one for whom both what is good simpliciter is good and what is fine simpliciter is fine (*MM* B.IX.3 1207^b31-33), and qualifies the virtues and virtuous actions as things that are fine and good in every case and for everyone (*MM* A.II.5 1183^b38-1184^a2—provided one corrects the text on the basis of Arius Didymus' Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics, as von Arnim proposes⁵¹¹), it would seem to presuppose that there are also things that are *καλά τινι*. The upshot would be that some goods are fine only for people who are not fully virtuous yet. For instance, for people who are on the way to virtue there would be some things that are fine that would not be so anymore when they become virtuous.⁵¹² I think von Arnim's argument is quite reasonable from a philosophical standpoint, even though in the *EE* (outside the common books)⁵¹³ there is no hint at a contrast between things that

⁵¹¹ The text of *MM* A.II.5 1183^b38-1184^a2 as transmitted by the mss. reads: 'ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ ἄλλην ἔχει τὰγαθὰ διαίρεσιν· οἷόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἰρετά, τὰ δ' οὐ. οἷον ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἰ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἰρεταί, ἰσχὺς δὲ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ δύναμις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε πάντῃ οὔτε πάντως.' But von Arnim (1927, p. 131) thinks one should read *πάντι* instead of *πάντῃ* by reference to Arius Didymus. Indeed, at lines 135.18-136.3 of his Epitome we find a *διαίρεσις* of the good that reads as follows: 'Ἄλλη διαίρεσις· τῶν τελῶν τὰ μὲν παντὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὐ παντί. Τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ φρόνησιν παντὶ ἀγαθὰ, ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν παραγένηται ὠφελείν· πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυνάμεις οὐ παντὶ ὅπως οὖν ἀγαθὰ, καθ' ὅσον ἀφώρισται τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς χρήσει· φαίνεσθαι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ χρωμένους ὠφελείν.' Although Arius Didymus' *διαίρεσις* really appears to be dependent upon that from the *MM*, this is not decisive for justifying the correction proposed by von Arnim, since *παντί* could be due to an iotacism (just like *πάντῃ*), and *πάντῃ* also makes good sense of the text from the *MM*, rendering the correction proposed by von Arnim unnecessary.

⁵¹² von Arnim (1927, p. 132) gives as examples the natural virtues and things like shame (*αἰδώς*), which is not a virtue for Aristotle, but is nevertheless praiseworthy, because it contributes to the acquisition of virtue (see *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater IV.9]). The same point could be made about the mean states (*μεσότητες*) that the *EE* classes as *πάθη τινά*, and not as virtues, although they contribute to the virtues (see *EE* III.7 1234^a23-34), a class of things that includes among its members not only shame (*αἰδώς*), but also some mean states that are virtues within the framework of the *EN*.

⁵¹³ In fact, at *EN* V.12 [=Bywater V.9] 1136^b20-22 Aristotle talks of reputation (*δόξα*) in contrast to what is 'fine simpliciter' (*τὸ ἀπλῶς καλόν*), which suggests that there are things that are not *simpliciter* fine, but only fine *τινι*, and that honour is one such thing. But perhaps this is not quite the point there as well, since he might be actually contrasting things that are *simpliciter* fine in that they are fine by nature with things that are not fine by nature and thus are not *simpliciter* fine, although they can be fine when they are pursued for the sake of a fine end or are necessary means to attain a fine end.

are fine for someone and fine *simpliciter*.⁵¹⁴ Yet I find it unnatural to read ‘δι’ αὐτά’ with ‘τὰ καλὰ.’ It is true that at 1249^a2-3 (see below) Aristotle writes ‘οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι’ αὐτά,’ which could be more easily read in the way von Arnim proposes, but I do not think this is sufficient to justify von Arnim’s interpretation.

Now, von Arnim interprets the text in the way he does because he thinks that reading ‘δι’ αὐτά’ with ὑπάρχειν does not make any sense (1927, p. 133: Oder ist δι’ αὐτά zu ὑπάρχειν zu beziehen? Aber das gibt keinen Sinn). He thinks that if δι’ αὐτά is read with ὑπάρχειν, Aristotle would be saying that the fine things pertain to someone *for their own sakes*, which indeed does not make much sense, as opposed to saying that they are choiceworthy *for their own sakes* or *on their own account*.

Von Arnim’s worries are reasonable, but I think that they are not ultimately justified. In fact, δι’ αὐτά may be understood as meaning something quite different, to the effect that ‘καλὸς δὲ κάγαθὸς τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δι’ αὐτά’ could be rendered as ‘fine-and-good is the person to whom the fine things among the goods pertain *on their own account*,’ in which case Aristotle would be saying that these things have a place in these agents’ lives in virtue of the sort of thing these things are, i.e., because they are intrinsically fine, and not for some further reason. In support of that, I would like to suggest that the next clause—namely, ‘καὶ τῷ πρακτικῶς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα’—can and perhaps should be read as explaining the claim that fine things pertain on their own account to the fine-and-good person. In fact, if we understand the καί at 1248^b35 epexegetically, Aristotle would be saying that being a doer of fine things for their own sakes is tantamount to being someone to whom fine things pertain δι’ αὐτά.⁵¹⁵ As a result, this latter claim should be

⁵¹⁴ Dirlmeier (1963, p. 495) follows von Arnim’s reconstruction, but admits that there is no such contrast being made in the *EE*, which is the very reason why von Fragstein (1974, p. 383n1) rejects von Arnim’s solution.

⁵¹⁵ Similarly, Barney (2005, p. 121) says that the fact that the Spartans do not possess fine things δι’ αὐτά

understood as implying that fine things are valued by the fine-and-good person for something they are intrinsically, just as I have proposed.

If this is correct, then Aristotle would not be distinguishing between fine-and-good persons and merely good persons by reference to the fact that merely good agents are non-reflective, but virtuous nevertheless, whereas fine-and-good agents are not only virtuous, but also reflective, as Broadie suggests. As a matter of fact, these two sorts of agent would be distinguished rather by reference to their motives.

Yet what makes Broadie's view compelling is that it provides us with a neat explanation of how natural goods can be good to merely good agents. If they lack full virtue and the right motivation, how can they 'reliably stay out of moral trouble'? In fact, if natural good things are good to them, the implication is that they have a character disposition such that these things cannot be harmful to them (which is quite demanding).

I cannot address this argument now, for my response will depend on some elements that will be introduced in the sequence (in *EE* VIII.3 1248^b37–1249^a17—T 39). But something can already be said, though, against Kenny's claim that merely good agents can perform virtuous actions for their own sakes but not for the sake of the fine. As a matter of fact, unless there is a relevant distinction to be drawn between fine things and virtuous actions (and it does not seem that there is any, since virtuous actions are actions that hit the mean in action and that are thus fine), there seems to be no relevant difference between performing virtuous actions for their own sakes and doing fine things for the sake of the fine, except that, as I have

(1249^a2-3) 'seems to mean that they do not act for the sake of the fine (1249^a5-6).' Broadie (2010, p.9), in turn, favours a more deflationary reading, such that 'ὑπάρχειν ... αὐτῷ' may mean merely that fine things are in the life of the fine-and-good person, whether as attributes of these agents or as objects to which they stand in some different logical relation, such that by saying that fine things pertain to a fine-and-good person because of themselves 'what is emphasized is not that noble things are his [sc., of the fine-and-good person] attributes, but that they are realized in him on account of themselves.' However, this is still perfectly compatible with Aristotle specifying the exact relation in which fine things stand to fine-and-good persons as one in which fine-and-good persons are doers of fine things for their own sakes.

already suggested in the **Introduction**, Aristotle usually reserves the ‘for the sake of the fine’ expression for when he is talking of actions that taken by themselves are not intrinsically fine (see the discussion above in **pages 80 to 85**). But I shall come back to this below in **Chapter 3**.

In any case, the idea that fine-and-good agents and merely good agents are distinguished by reference to their motives is in line with the interpretation of the passage defended by von Fragstein (1974, p. 383), according to whom the claim that fine things pertain in themselves to fine-and-good persons should be understood in contrast to that made in the following lines about people who have a character disposition like that of the Spartans, people who, according to Aristotle, believe they should have the virtues for the sake of the natural goods (we shall see below what is implied by this). On this interpretation, the thought would be that fine-and-good agents are persons who do what is fine for its own sake, so that if someone does fine things for some other reason, they will not be fine-and-good. With that in mind, let us look into the final part of the text.

2.3.3 *EE VIII.3 1248^b37-1249^a17*

To conclude, let me quote and translate 1248^b37–1249^a17:

T 39 – *EE VIII.3 1248^b37–1249^a17*

1248b37 ἔστι δέ τις |
 ἕξις πολιτική, οἷαν⁵¹⁶ οἱ Λάκωνες ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι |
 40 ἔχοιεν ἄν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ οἷονται || τὴν
 1249a1 ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἔνε||κεν. διό
 ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσὶ, τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ | αὐτοῖς ἐστίν,
 καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρ||χει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ
 δι' αὐτά<, ὅσοις δὲ ὑπάρχει δι' αὐτά> καὶ προαιροῦνται, κα-
 λοι κα|γαθοί, καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν
 5 || φύσει ὄντα ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα τούτοις καλά. καλὰ | γὰρ
 ἐστὶν ὅταν οὐ ἔνεκα πράττωσι καὶ αἰροῦνται καλά ἦ, | διὸ τῶ
 καλῶ κα|γαθῶ καλά ἐστὶ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ. κα|λὸν γὰρ τὸ δί-
 καιον, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἀξίος δ' οὗτος | τούτων. καὶ τὸ
 10 πρέπον καλόν. πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ,⁵¹⁷ πλοῦ||τος εὐγένεια
 δύναμις. ὥστε τῶ καλῶ κα|γαθῶ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ | συμφέροντα
 καὶ καλά ἐστὶν, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ | τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ τὰ

ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κακείνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, τῷ | δ' ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθὰ. τῷ
 δὲ <καλῷ κ>ἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά· πολλὰς γὰρ | καὶ καλὰς πράξεις
 15 δι' αὐτὰ ἔπραξεν. ὁ δ' οἰόμενος τὰς || ἀρετὰς ἔχει δεῖν ἔνεκα
 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὸ συμ|βεβηκὸς καλὰ πράττει. ἔστιν
 οὖν καλοκάγαθία ἀρετὴ τέ|λειος.

|| **b38** οἶαν L: *qualem* Λ¹: *quem* FL: οἶον PCB || **a1** ἀγαθοὶ Ald. Walzer & Mingay Rowe: ἄγριοι PCBL: *silvestres* FL || **a2** δὲ Vettori (in the margin of his copy of the Aldine edition, p. 315v): *autem* Λ¹FL: γὰρ PCBL || **a3** ὅσοις δὲ ὑπάρχει δι' αὐτὰ Allan (1966, p. 149) (likewise, see Zeller [1879, p. 878n1]: 'Bei wem diess dagegen der Fall ist (vor den Worten καὶ προαιροῦνται 1249, a, 3 scheint mir eine kleine Lücke zu sein)'): *quibuscumque autem existent propter ipsa* FL: om. PCBL || **a3-4** καλοὶ καγαθοὶ PCBL: *boni honestique* Λ¹: *kalokagathon* FL: καλὰ καγαθὰ Ross (Walzer & Mingay, 1991, pp. xin3, 123) || **a6** καλά PCBL: καλὸν Allan (Walzer & Mingay, 1991, pp. xin3, 123) Rowe || **a7** διὸ Solomon (1915, *EE* VII.15 1249a5ff, n. 5): *propter quod* FL: διότι PCL: δι' ὅ τι B: *vel quod* Λ¹ || **a9** τούτῳ Ambr.: πλούτῳ PCBL: om. FL: *illum* Λ¹ || **a10** καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ PB: καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ C: καὶ αὐτὰ L: ταῦτα Dirlmeier (1963, p. 497): *hec* FL: *ea* Λ¹: τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ Ross (Walzer & Mingay, 1991, pp. xin3, 123): αὐτὰ καὶ Spengel (1843, p. 551n**) || **a13** τῷ ... καλὰ om. FL | τῷ δὲ <καλῷ κ>ἀγαθῷ Spengel (1843, p. 551n**): τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ B: τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ PCL: om. Λ¹ || **a14** δι' αὐτὰ PCBL: *propter ipsa* FL: δι' αὐτὰς Spengel (1843, p. 551n**): δι' αὐτῶν Rieckher (1858, p. 896n8)

[37] But there is a civic disposition of the sort the Spartans have or that other people of this sort might have. And this is a disposition of this sort:⁵¹⁸ there are some people

⁵¹⁶ Note that the fact that *FL* has 'est autem quidem habitus politicus, quem etc.' is inconclusive as to whether the text *FL* is translating has οἶαν or οἶον. In fact, 'habitus ... quem' can be reasonably construed as a translation of 'ἔξις ... οἶαν.' As a result, *FL* can be taken as confirming the text transmitted by L (*contra* Wagner, 1970, p. 193).

⁵¹⁷ Dieter Wagner's edition of the vetusta has 'decenter autem hec habent' (with 'autem hec habet' in ms. Sa and 'habet autem hec' in ms. Pa) for this passage, which Buddensiek (1999, p. 214n67) takes to correspond to something like 'πρεπόντως δὲ ταῦτα ἔχει' or 'πρεπόντως δὲ ἔχει ταῦτα.' Although this is also ambiguous in Greek, it would be much more naturally read if ταῦτα were the subject of ἔχει, in which case one would expect the Latin version to have something like 'decenter autem hec se habent' (or *se habet*) (though this is not necessary). In fact, 'decenter autem hec habet' can mean, besides this, also that 'someone uses these things in an appropriate manner' (similarly, see Buddensiek [1999, p. 214n67: 'auf geziemende Weise aber hat er diese')—see Lewis & Short, s.v. *habeo*, II.C.5, and the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, s.v. *habeo* pp. 2440b15ff. In that case, it would not be reasonable to suppose that 'decenter autem hec habet' is translating something like 'πρεπόντως δὲ ταῦτα ἔχει.' Rather, it would seem to be an interpretative translation of a text like 'πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ' that understands 'something being fitting to someone' as implying that 'someone uses something in an appropriate manner,' which is perfectly adequate since Aristotle is talking of goods whose moral value depend on the use (see above the argument in lines 1248^b27-34).

⁵¹⁸ White (1992, p. 163n37) construes this phrase in a slightly different way, taking *τοιαύτη* as referring back to the sort of disposition had by the merely good persons discussed above in 1248^b26-27, in which case the γὰρ clause that comes in the immediate sequence (εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ κτλ.) would not be describing the civic disposition that is like that had by the Spartans and other people like them (as in my translation), but would be showing why the Spartans and people like them also count as having the disposition had by the merely good persons discussed in 1248^b26-27. There are no relevant philosophical differences in reading the text as White wants to read it, since I also do not think that the disposition described by *τοιαύτη* is the one had by the Spartans, but is a disposition that is said to be similar to the one had by the Spartans. Yet I think that taking *τοιαύτη* as referring back is much less plausible in the context than taking it as forward

who believe [40] they must have virtue, but for the sake of natural goods. [1249a1] For that reason, <these> are good men indeed, for the natural goods are <good> for these persons, but they do not have fineness-and-goodness. For the things that are fine [3] do not pertain on their own account to these persons, but those to whom these things pertain on their own account and who decide on <these things on their own account> are fine-and-good persons [4], and not only these things are fine for them, but also those that are not fine [5] by nature but are good by nature. In fact, <these things>[sc., those that are not fine by nature] are fine <for them> whenever that for the sake of which they are done and are chosen is fine. For that reason, the natural goods are fine for the fine-and-good person. In fact, the just is fine, and what is worthy is just, and such a person is worthy of these things. And the fitting is fine, and these things—wealth, [10] good birth, and power—are fitting for this person. Therefore, even things that are in themselves useful are also fine for the fine-and-good person. But for the many this [sc., what is in itself useful and what is fine for them] is in dissonance.⁵¹⁹ For the things that are merely good⁵²⁰ are not good for them, but they

looking (in which case the *γάρ* clause is showing us what the disposition like the one had by the Spartans and other people like them looks like). Perhaps White's reading is motivated by the fact that he thinks that the civic disposition mentioned in 1248^b37–38 is to be identified with the disposition had by the Spartans, which may indeed lead to some problems (as Bobonich [2023] has recently pointed out). But if we read 1248^b37–38 more carefully, it becomes clear that Aristotle is not saying that the civic disposition he is talking about is the one had by the Spartans, but that it is similar (*οἶαν*) to the one had by the Spartans. No doubt this is compatible with the Spartans having the very same disposition (if their disposition is similar to that civic disposition in all respects—on this sort of similarity, see *Met.* Δ.9 1018^a15–16), but this is also compatible with the disposition had by the Spartans only sharing most features with the civic disposition Aristotle is interested in here, but not all features of that disposition (for this sort of similarity, see *Met.* Δ.9 1018^a16–17).

⁵¹⁹ I am not construing *διαφωνεῖ* with the dative 'τοῖς δ' πολλοῖς,' which I take to be a dative of interest. Alternatively, Bobonich (2023, p. 184) argues that *τοῦτο* here, due to being singular, is making reference to the 'the state of affairs of natural goods being both good for and fine for someone,' in which case one would need to construe *τοῖς δ' πολλοῖς* with *διαφωνεῖ*, meaning that this [i.e., the state of affairs of natural goods being both good for and fine for the many] is in discord with the many, meaning that this claim is not true of them. There are two issues with this reading proposed by Bobonich, however. First, there is no claim to the effect that the natural goods are both fine and good to someone in the nearby context. In fact, Aristotle just concluded that the natural goods are fine to the many, and about 9 lines above, in 1248^a1–2, said that the things good by nature are good for the good persons (that if we accept the correction printed in the Aldine). Thus, it is much more plausible to say that Aristotle is here just denying that the conclusion he just drew in the case of the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* holds of the many, since things good by nature can only be fine to someone if they are also good to that person, and, as Aristotle explains in the immediate sequence, things good by nature are not good for the many. Second, I think it is harsher to take *διαφωνεῖ* to indicate something like 'is false in the case of someone (dative)' than to take 'τοῖς δ' πολλοῖς' as a dative of interest (and not as an argument of *διαφωνεῖ*) and to take the singular *τοῦτο* as referring to two things just mentioned (which would be justifiable if the singular has a collective meaning: the two things just mentioned—what is in itself useful and what is fine to someone—are now taken as single group of things in which there is disagreement).

⁵²⁰ As I take it, by 'τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ' Aristotle is referring to what is simply or merely good, in contrast to those things that are both good and fine. In fact, later in VIII.3, namely in *EE* VIII.3 1249^b24, Aristotle concludes the book positing that it was said what the goal of the merely good things is (*τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν*), and in so saying he seems to be talking about the *ὄρος* of the external goods by reference to which their excess or deficiency and thus also the right amount of external goods is determined. Yet even if by 'τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ' Aristotle means merely good things in contrast to fine things, it is not clear if this class of things includes only external goods, or also some psychic goods. For an argument to the effect that some psychic goods should also be included here, see Bobonich (2023, p. 9n27): '[s]ome characterizations

are good for the good person. And for the fine-and-good person <they> are also fine, for <the fine-and-good person> brings forth⁵²¹ many fine actions⁵²² by means of these things.⁵²³ But the person who thinks that [15] one must have the virtues for the sake of the external goods does fine things accidentally. Thus, fineness-and-goodness is the complete virtue.

At 1248^b37–1249^a2, the distinction between good and fine-and-good persons is put to use to analyse a disposition that might be conflated with fineness-and-goodness, but which does not really fulfil its requirements.⁵²⁴ This is a civic disposition similar to the one had by the

of τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ (*Eth. Eud.* 2.10 1227a18–22, 7.2 1236b26–1237a5, a26–27) and τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ (*Eth. Eud.* 7.2 1237a4–5) seem to hold of psychic goods. Also, some psychic goods seem to be good for the fine and good person, bad for the unjust, and good for the good person so they should be discussed. Perhaps Aristotle thinks that the most prominent non-virtue goods are external to the soul, but still holds that non-virtue psychic goods' benefit depends on their possessor.'

⁵²¹ I take ἔπραξεν to be a gnomic aorist.

⁵²² 'πολλὰς ... καὶ καλὰς πράξεις' seems to be a hendiadys for 'πολλὰς καλὰς πράξεις.'

⁵²³ The transmitted text here has been widely contested, since it would seem that with δι' αὐτὰ Aristotle would be saying that fine-and-good agents perform many fine actions due to external goods (which is how text is translated by Woods and also by Bobonich [2023, p. 173]), a claim that is clearly problematic. In the face of this, Spengel (see the *apparatus* above) proposed that we should read 'δι' αὐτὰς' instead, in which case Aristotle would be saying that the fine-and-good person performs many fine actions on their own account (which is the reading adopted by Woolf and Inwood in their translation). Yet it is not so clear how this could explain why external goods are fine for fine-and-good agents. Rieckher proposal makes better sense of the argument, since, if we read δι' αὐτῶν instead, then Aristotle's point would be rather that fine-and-good agents perform many fine actions by means of the external goods, which would explain why external goods are fine for fine-and-good agents by pointing to the use these agents make of these goods (see also Simpson, 2013, p. 319). Yet I do not think that emending the text is necessary to interpret it in such a fashion. In fact, Aristotle uses both διά + acc. and διά + gen. in the sense of by means of, as has been shown by Eucken (1868, p. 39), who gives several examples of it.

See, for instance, *Pol.* II.2 1263^b36: 'ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν [sc., πόλις] ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν,' which can be rendered as 'but since <the city> consists of a multitude, as was said previously, it must be made common and one *by means of education* [διὰ τὴν παιδείαν].' In this passage, the participle ὄν seems to be in the neuter due to having been attracted to the neuter by the predicate πλῆθος, but, given the context of the passage, its logical subject is clearly πόλις, which was described earlier in book II as being, in regard to its nature, a multitude [*Pol.* II.2 1261^a18: πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις] (see Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 1.Bd., §359, I.3.a, p. 53 for a description of this phenomenon in the case of attributive participles).

⁵²⁴ As has been suggested by Hitz (2012, p. 285n50), this passage appears to be connected to some views expressed by Xenophon in his *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* (*Lac.*). As a matter of fact, Xenophon not only says that 'Sparta, as expected, surpasses all other *poleis* in virtue, since it alone makes fineness-and-goodness an official matter' (*Lac.* X 4,7-8: ἡ Σπάρτη εἰκότως πασῶν τῶν πόλεων ἀρετῇ διαφέρει, μόνη δημοσία ἐπιτηδεύουσα τὴν καλοκάγαθίαν), but also claims that Lycurgus 'imposed the practice of the whole civic virtue as an irresistible necessity' (*Lac.* X 7,1-3: ἐπέθηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκην ἀσκεῖν ἅπασαν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν), which suggests that the public duty of καλοκάγαθία amounts to the practice of the whole civic virtue, in which case Xenophon would identify the civic disposition had by the Spartans with καλοκάγαθία. If this is so, in discussing the civic disposition like that of the Spartans, Aristotle could be answering to views like Xenophon's. But perhaps Aristotle's point here is a bit more general, since he indicates that this disposition is *like* that that is had by the Spartans and that can be had other peoples like the Spartans. Moreover, talk of *civic virtue* and its shortcomings when compared to real virtue, as Barney

Spartans and that might also be had by other peoples like them. It is such that its possessors believe they must have virtue for the sake of natural goods. A similar mistake is mentioned in connection to the Spartans in two passages in the *Politica*. In II.9 1271^b7–10, Aristotle reckons that the Spartans are right in thinking that the disputed goods should be acquired through virtue rather than through vice, but are mistaken in thinking that these goods are better than virtue itself (νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς); likewise, in VII.15 [=Newman IV.15] 1334^b3–4 Aristotle claims that Spartans appreciate the greatest goods (i.e., the disputed goods) more than the virtues, and think these goods are greater than the virtues (ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα [sc., μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν at 1334^b1–2] καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῆν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν †).

However, despite the similarities, there is reason for thinking that there are important differences between the civic disposition Aristotle intends to talk about and the disposition had by the Spartans. What I take to give most clear indications in this direction is the fact that the Spartans are described as producing brutishlike children by means of exertions as if this contributed to courage (*Pol.* VIII.4 1338^b12–14: θηριώδεις [sc. παῖδες] δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον), after which Aristotle immediately warns that one should not concern oneself with children looking to a single virtue or to courage most of all (καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν [sc. τῶν παιδῶν, cf. 1338^b9–10]). This strongly suggests that the failure of the Spartan educational model lies either in the fact that it promotes courage only or in the fact that it promotes courage mostly (but is perhaps also concerned with promoting other virtues to a lesser degree). A bit earlier in the *Politica* (in

(2005, p. 120) observes, hearkens back to Plato.

Pol. VII.14 [=Newman IV.14]), Aristotle says the legislators that established the constitutions of the Greeks who were currently held to be the best governed did not organise ‘their laws and education aiming at all the virtues, but were vulgarly inclined towards the <virtues> that are held to be useful and more profitable’ (*Pol.* VII.14 [=Newman IV.14] 1333^b8–10: οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας), and Aristotle’s example of this in the sequence are the Spartans, whose constitution is described as being praised precisely due to promoting war and conquest (which suggests that the virtues it promotes are only those that are useful in this enterprise).⁵²⁵

That being said, it seems, at the very least, that the disposition had by the Spartans can be distinguished from the civic disposition Aristotle is talking about here in that the Spartans believe they must have either a single virtue for the sake of the external goods, or else must have *some virtues* for the sake of the external goods (namely, those that are useful in acquiring these goods). The possessors of the civic disposition introduced here in *EE* VIII.3, however, are first described as believing that they should have the virtue for the sake of the external goods (in 1249^b39–^a1), and then as believing that they should have the virtues for the sake of the external goods (in 1249^a14-15). Accordingly, the disposition had by the Spartans seems to be merely similar to the civic disposition Aristotle is talking about here.⁵²⁶

In the face of this, one would expect Aristotle to say that this disposition is merely goodness, but not fineness-and-goodness. Yet the text transmitted by the mss. and by the *translatio vetusta* makes him say that the possessors of this disposition are ἄγριοι instead, savage or uncultivated, and then justifies this with the fact that the natural goods are good

⁵²⁵ Similarly, see Plato’s *Lg.* IV 705d3–e1 on the laws of the Cretans and the Spartans as looking only to a part of virtue, and not to virtue as a whole.

⁵²⁶ My argument here is indebted to Bobonich’s (2023, pp. 175-176) analysis of the differences between the disposition had by the Spartans and the civic disposition to which it is similar.

for them, but they do not have fineness-and-goodness. Yet it is unclear how these two claims explain why these agents are *ἄγριοι*. In fact, although agents who are *ἄγριοι* do not have *καλοκάγαθία*, being *ἄγριοι* is compatible with being someone to whom natural goods are not good. Besides, as Bobonich (2023, p. 181) points out, not all agents for whom natural goods are good and who do not have *καλοκάγαθία* are *ἄγριοι*: as Bobonich (2023, p. 181) argues, possessors of the *δημοτική* virtue described in *Phd.* 82a10–b3 could hardly be described as *ἄγριοι* (although of course they lack *νοῦς* and *φιλοσοφία*).

This is not the only way of construing the text on this reading, for one may also take the *δέ* from ‘*καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ κτλ.*’ as responding not to the *μέν* from *τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ... ἐστίν*, but to the *μέν* from ‘*διὸ ἀγαθοί μὲν ... εἰσὶ*’. Yet the same issues persist, as Bobonich (2023, p. 181) stresses.

The Aldine edition prints *ἀγαθοί* instead of *ἄγριοι*, as would be expected given that these are persons to whom the natural goods are good but who do not have fineness-and-goodness.

Despite not being supported by any of the extant manuscripts or by the *translatio vetusta*, the correction printed in the Aldine edition would make the argument much more straightforward. Besides, as Rowe (2023a, p. 220) argues, ‘the orthographic distance between *ἀγαθοί*, surely the only possible emendation, and *ἄγριοι* is small,’ and ‘[t]his is one of those very many places where the argument “preferable because in all the manuscripts” surely carries little weight; we should not forget that all the extant manuscripts descend from a single archetype, and their many shared corruptions, which as will be more than evident by now are on a considerable scale, are inherited from that single document (and its predecessors).’ Thus, unless there is a good philosophical reason for retaining *ἄγριοι*, *ἀγαθοί* would seem to be preferable.

Now, calling the Spartans and other such peoples ἄγριοι is not far from some other things Aristotle says about them in the *Politica* when he criticises their educational model. In *Pol.* VIII.4 [=Newman V.4] 1338^b24–38, for instance, Aristotle accuses Sparta’s educational model of placing brutishlikeness (τὸ θηριῶδες) in the place of fineness (τὸ καλόν), and of ending up producing people who are truly vulgar (βάνουσοι). Aristotle thinks fineness, and not brutality, should play the leading role in education because no wild animal faces danger, for instance, because it is fine to do so, but only a good person. The thought could be construed as being that although the Spartans may end up doing the right thing, they do not do it because it is fine.⁵²⁷ Moreover, a few lines before this, in *Pol.* VIII.4 [=Newman V.4] 1338^b16–19, Aristotle justifies the claim that the Spartans do not succeed in producing courage in their citizens by saying that, among the other animals and peoples, we do not find courage in the most savage characters (τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις <ἤθεσιν>), but rather in those characters that are calmer and more leonine (οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀρώμεν τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς

⁵²⁷ Simpson (2013, pp. 390–391) also thinks that ἄγριοι makes good sense of the text. However, he sustains that claim arguing that the Spartans would be typical examples of people who pursue the secondarily happy life described in *EN* X.8. This does not seem reasonable, though. If one must attribute some sort of virtue to the Spartans, it would be seemingly more reasonable to say that they have a civic virtue, which would be like the civic courage described by Aristotle in *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1116^a15–29, which is not to be identified with courage although it is quite similar to it, since its possessors perform courageous actions due to a virtue, that is, due to shame. People who have civic courage are not courageous because they perform courageous actions either seeking honour or intending to avoid reproach. I mean, they do not perform such actions because acting in this way is something fine, but for some other reason, a claim that can be construed as saying that civic courage is for the sake of external goods such as honour. Yet this proposal is also fraught with difficulties, as we shall see below in **section 3.3**, since (1) civic courage is said to be due to a virtue, and (2) Aristotle says that the person who has civic courage seeks honour so that he (Aristotle) can explain the sense in which they act desiring something fine. One can perhaps avoid the difficulties involved in (1) by saying that civic courageous actions are due to shame, which is praiseworthy and held to be a virtue by some, but which is not properly speaking a virtue (alternatively, for the idea that the virtue that explains civic courage is like the civic courage attributed to the Spartans, see Hitz [2012, p. 289]), it seems harder, though, to explain (2), since honour is not something fine by nature, but seems to be fine only for fully virtuous agents, so that it would be strange if honour could be fine for someone who only possesses natural or habitual virtue. I shall come back to this issue below in **section 3.3**. For a discussion of the similarities between civic courage and the civic virtue had by the Spartans, see Hitz (2012, pp. 283–292).

ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν), which appears to include the Spartans among those who have savage characters.

Thus, at face value, it would appear to be possible to make sense of the text along the lines I have proposed so far if we read ἄγριοι. In that case, Aristotle would be emphasising that people who have a civic disposition like that of the Spartans and other such peoples, in performing virtuous actions for a reason distinct from their fineness, are acting like wild animals, and do not attain true virtue, just like he does in the *Politica* talking about the Spartans. This would not be much different from saying that they are only good, for they would be good persons to whom what is fine does not pertain by itself, but *for some other reason*, specifically, due to the external goods. The εἶξις discussed in these lines, then, would consist in a sort of goodness that is not yet fineness-and-goodness, although the possessors of this εἶξις are persons to whom fine things may pertain in some way (i.e., not on their own account)(I shall come back to this issue below).

Yet the question we should ask is why Aristotle would refer to the fact that people who have a civic disposition like that had by the Spartans and other such peoples are ἄγριοι in this context if all he needs for the argument is to say that they fail to be fine-and-good, and are rather merely good? Is this the right context?⁵²⁸

I am not sure it is. Moreover, it is not immediately clear how the claim that things good by nature are good to these agents but they do not have fineness-and-goodness would explain the claim that they are ἄγριοι, unless of course one has the passages from the *Politica* I mentioned in mind (which would make Aristotle's argument here quite far-fetched) and, in addition to that, assumes that an agent being ἄγριοι implies also that external goods are good to that agent (and there is no indication to this effect in the *corpus*). For that reason, I have

⁵²⁸ I owe this point to Christopher Rowe.

accepted the correction printed in the Aldine edition.

Yet Irwin (2022) has recently offered an ingenious defence of ἄγριοι on different grounds, which should be relevant to us not only for the sake of deciding how we should understand Aristotle's description of the possessors of the civic disposition under discussion here, but also to thematise Broadie's argument to the effect that agents who are not really virtuous cannot be agents to whom the external goods are beneficial, which implies that merely good agents should be virtuous agents who merely lack the reflective aspect of virtue (i.e., are not ethical theorists), but which are virtuous nevertheless, and, accordingly, can perform fine actions motivated by their fineness.

Irwin's argument consists in saying that in distinguishing between being fine and being good in *EE* VIII.3 Aristotle is not distinguishing between two different agents, but between two different aspects of one and the same agent. His argument seems to ultimately hang on how he interprets 1249^a1-2: he takes Aristotle to be saying here that these agents are savage men indeed (διό ἄγριοι μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσὶ) *because they have things that are good by nature, but do not have fineness-and-goodness* (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν). Irwin's crucial move here is understanding the dative 'αὐτοῖς' from 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν' as a dative of possession and taking 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ' as a single syntagma.

What I take to be the main philosophical advantage of Irwin's reading is that it does not make Aristotle say that the external goods are good to agents who are not fully virtuous.⁵²⁹ On this reading, being an agent to whom the natural goods are good (i.e., being a good person) is an inextricable aspect of being a fine-and-good person, i.e., a person who has all virtues and

⁵²⁹ Irwin also thinks that there are philological advantages in construing the text in the way he does, since he rejects the correction coming from the Aldine edition, and also does not need Spengel's supplement in 1249^a13 (see the *apparatus* of T 39 above) to make sense of the argument.

is thus fully virtuous. Besides, because Aristotle never says explicitly that agents who are good do not do fine things for their own sakes, but only that those who believe that they should have the virtues for the sake of the natural goods do fine things *κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς* (which strongly suggests that such agents do not do fine things for their own sakes), there would be no issue in saying that fine-and-good agents are also good, since, because, on this reading, Aristotle does not call possessors of the civic disposition under discussion in this argument good, we would not be able to say that good agents are distinct from fine-and-good agents in their motivation.

Despite this philosophical advantage, it may be argued that Irwin's construal of 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν' is a bit harsh. Not only is it quite natural to supply *ἀγαθὰ* with 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ' (in light of 1248^b25-26: *ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ᾧ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ*), but also one could argue that the word order here makes it less plausible to take 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ' as a syntagma. On this assumption, had the text been 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει ἀγαθὰ μὲν' or 'τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει' instead (both alternatives suggested by Richards) or even 'τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ἀγαθὰ,' then Irwin's interpretation would be much easier to defend. Yet I think there is nothing wrong with the word order here, since it is perfectly natural to take 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ' as a syntagma (and writing in this way would avoid a hiatus).⁵³⁰ Moreover, I do not think that, for pursuing an alternative to Irwin's reading, *ἀγαθὰ* should be inserted into the text⁵³¹ (in which case its absence would simply be a consequence of haplography) so that we would have 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν <ἀγαθὰ> ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν,' for I think the word order would be a bit strange (I would rather expect the text to be 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν <ἀγαθὰ>,' which can hardly be justified as the result of haplography). As a matter of fact, it is perfectly natural to supply *ἀγαθὰ* as the predicate in 'τὰ γὰρ φύσει

⁵³⁰ I owe this point to Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro.

⁵³¹ This correction is proposed by Solomon (1915, *EE* VII.15 1249a1-2, n. 1).

μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν,’ so that no emendation is necessary.⁵³²

This is not conclusive, however. According to Bobonich (2023, p. 182), if one reads the text as Irwin, ‘there is only a weak contrast between having natural goods and lacking καλοκάγαθία’ despite the fact that ‘the previous μὲν/δέ pairings in 8.3 have been adversative including the preceding one at 1248b26 and 1248b34 and the succeeding one at 1249a5.’ Now, in Plato’s *Critias*, we come across a use of ‘μὲν ... δέ’ that is illuminating in this regard. In *Criti.* 121a8–b1, close to the end of the dialogue, Critias says the following: ‘But when the divine portion became faded in them in being frequently mixed with much mortality, and when their human character prevailed, at that moment, being already unable to bear the present circumstances, they began to behave unseemly’ (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν μοῖρα ἐξίτηλος ἐγίνετο ἐν αὐτοῖς πολλῶ τῶ θνητῶ καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεραυνυμένη, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον ἦθος ἐπεκράτει, τότε ἤδη τὰ παρόντα φέρειν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἡσχημόνου). The ‘μὲν’ in the first clause (ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν κτλ.) is interrupting the syntagma just like in ‘τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν,’ but there is no doubt that ‘ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν μοῖρα’ is a syntagma. The stylistic effect of this is an emphasis on the fact that the portion that became faded in the Atlanteans is divine, and it is this divine portion that stands in contrast with their human character, which is introduced by the ‘δέ’ in the second part of the protasis. Similarly, one could say that what is being emphasised by ‘τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν’ is that these goods are natural, which would then contrast with καλοκάγαθία (in ‘καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν’), which would then presumably be a non-natural good. Thus, in denying that καλοκάγαθία is a natural good one may perhaps avoid Bobonich’s objection to reading ‘τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν’ as Irwin wants it. In fact, read in the way I suggested (in light of the passage

⁵³² Similarly, in *EN* IX.9 1170^a21–22, Aristotle writes ‘τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶ ἐπιεικεῖ’ and it is fairly uncontroversial that he means that ‘what is good by nature is <good> to the decent person as well.’ In a footnote in an earlier paper, Irwin (2019, p. 148n13), seems to think that the statement that the natural goods are to these persons is the result of conjecture (and he probably has in mind Solomon’s suggestion).

from Plato's *Critias*), the contrast would not be one between having the natural goods (if we concede to Irwin) and having *καλοκάγαθία*, but between having goods *that are natural* and having *καλοκάγαθία* which is presumably a good that is not natural.⁵³³

Thus, if we are to conclusively reject Irwin's proposal, we should give philosophical reasons for this.

One such reason has already been mentioned above: there are indications that the disposition had by the Spartans is different from the civic disposition Aristotle has in mind in this passage,⁵³⁴ for although the Spartans do indeed believe that they should have a virtue or some virtues for the sake of the external goods, they do not think that they should have *the virtues* (i.e., all the virtues) for the sake of the external goods (as the agent described in 1249^a14–15). As a matter of fact, their laws and their education are not established to promote all virtues, but those that are useful and profitable (cf. *Pol.* VII.14 [=Newman IV.14] 1333^b5–10). Accordingly, the reasons we have for rejecting the claim that the Spartans are good would not apply to possessors of the civic disposition Aristotle is talking about in this passage as well, since the latter would not be agents who are concerned only with one or with a few virtues at the expense of becoming vicious in other areas of their lives, but would be agents who believe they should have *all the virtues* for the sake of the external goods.⁵³⁵

⁵³³ A pressing issue here is what would it mean to say that *καλοκάγαθία* is not a natural good. In the only other passage from the *EE* in which Aristotle talks of things as good by nature, *EE* VII.2 1237^a4–5, he describes things that are good *ἀπλῶς* as being good by nature to a human being (*φύσει γὰρ ἀντῶ [sc. <τις> ἄνθρωπος ὢν] ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά*), a claim that is false unless being good by nature to someone is not yet being good to someone, but is a normative claim: things that are good *ἀπλῶς* are good by nature to any human being because in being human they can become good so that these things become to be good for them. Accordingly, things that are good by nature could be conceived as things that are only good to persons with certain character dispositions, and which are thus called goods by nature by reference to this normative case—for a similar argument, see Tuozzo (1995). *καλοκάγαθία*, in turn, would not be a good whose benefit is dependent upon one's character disposition, and would thus fail to be a good *ἀπλῶς* (in the sense of something *simply* or *merely* good) and a good by nature (in the sense of something that is only good to someone who has a character disposition such that they will not misuse and hence be harmed by these goods).

⁵³⁴ Pace Wolt (2022, p. 12), who thinks that the this civic disposition is indeed exhibited by the Spartans.


⁵³⁵ And as Bobonich (2023, p. 176) observes, '1248b39–40's and 1249a14–15's phrasings overlap so much that Aristotle must be discussing the same group.' Besides, it is telling that here in *EE* VIII.3 the belief

Another reason is offered by Bobonich (2023, p. 179), who compellingly argues that ‘1248b18’s claim that there is a *διαφορά* between being good and being fine and good entails that there is a difference in intrinsic properties between the good and the fine and good and not merely that they can be described differently,’ which, if true, would give us very strong reasons for rejecting Irwin’s claim that the being good and being fine and good are coextensive.

Bobonich’s argument is quite intricate and detailed, but in rough lines the problem he sees is that ‘if he [sc. Aristotle] intended to argue that being *ἀγαθός* and being *καλὸς καγαθός* are interentailing, it is extremely odd to begin by showing that *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ καλὸν καγαθόν* are necessarily non-coextensive. But if Aristotle were to consider them interentailing, we would certainly expect him to argue very explicitly for this given the necessary non-coextensiveness of *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ καλὸν καγαθόν*’ (p. 179). As a matter of fact, in 1248^b18ff we not only find an argument to the effect that fine things (which are also good) consist in a class of good ends (i.e., of good things that are choiceworthy on their own account),⁵³⁶ but the successive divisions of goods that we find in these lines are introduced by a *γάρ*, and are thus meant to support somehow the claim that being good and being fine-and-

of the possessors of civic virtue is one in which they believe they should have the virtue (*τὴν ἀρετὴν*) or the virtues (*τὰς ἀρετὰς*), whereas the belief of the Spartans is one according to which the external goods should be acquired through virtue (*δι’ ἀρετῆς*) rather than through vice, which is compatible with them thinking that they do not need to have all the virtues for the sake of the external goods, but either only a single one (as Bobonich [2023, p. 175] thinks) or only those that they hold to be useful for acquiring the external goods they aim for (as suggested by *Pol.* VII.14 [=Newman IV.14] 1333^b8–10).

⁵³⁶ Implicit in this division would be the fact that the final goods that are not also fine constitute a class of goods that is probably to be identified with the merely or simply good things that Aristotle deals with later in the text. Thus, the division in 1248^b18ff should look as follows if we complete the missing branches (these are between parentheses):



good differ. Irrespective of whether the *διαφορά* being good and being fine-and-good are said to have is a *differentia* in the technical Aristotelian sense or merely a difference, it is hardly plausible that Aristotle would support the claim that being good and being fine-and-good are coextensive but differ nevertheless with an argument according to which good things and fine things are different in that fine things belong to a class of final goods (namely, of those good things that are ends in that they are choiceworthy on their own account) that is to be distinguished from *merely* good things (which are those ends that are not also fine). Accordingly, the very core of Irwin's proposal—i.e., taking being good and being fine-and-good as coextensive—makes poor sense of the argument Aristotle advances in 1248^b18ff to explain the difference between being good and being fine-and-good.

But if we cannot resort to the coextensiveness of being good and being fine-and-good to deny that natural goods are good to agents who are not fully virtuous, how could we secure that good things are truly good to good agents if they do indeed lack full virtue and the right motivation for action and if, as I have argued, there is reason for rejecting Broadie's reading of *EE* VIII.3?

A promising alternative is offered by White (1992), who conceives of merely good agents as agents who are naturally virtuous and who can thus be described as having the kind of good luck described in *EE* VIII.2 1247^b18-27, which Aristotle later says is the more continuous kind of good luck (cf. 1248^b3-7). In that case, the fact that merely good agents ultimately misconceive fine things (taking them to be merely useful to attain external goods) would not necessarily imply that they will commit mistakes on the basis of that misconception, for their good characters may secure that they will, with a good degree of consistency, act well even in those cases in which their reason would lead them astray. Let me then discuss *EE* VIII.2 1247^b18-38.

2.3.3.1 LUCKY AGENTS AND THE GOOD CHARACTER DISPOSITION OF THE CIVICALLY VIRTU-

OUS AGENTS FROM *EE* VIII.3 1248^b37-1249^a17

To begin discussing White's solution, let me quote and translate *EE* VIII.2 1247^b18-38:

T 40 – *EE* VIII.2 1247^b18-38

1247b18 ἀρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὀρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν | ἀπὸ
20 λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου, καὶ πρότεραι || αὐται;
εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἠδέος καὶ ἢ ὄρεξις, φύσει
γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζοι ἂν πᾶν. εἰ δὲ τινές | εἰσιν εὐφυεῖς
ὥσπερ οἱ ᾠδικοὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν οὕτως | εὖ πεφύκασι,
καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὀρμῶσιν <ῆ> ἢ φύσις πέφυκε, καὶ | ἐπιθυμοῦσι
25 καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ || ὅτε.
οὔτοι κατορθώσουσι κἂν τύχῳσιν ἀφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλογοι
ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἄσονται οὐ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες. οἱ δὲ γε | τοιοῦτοι
εὐτυχεῖς, ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ | πολὺ. φύσει
28 ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἄν.

28 ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ εὐτυχία; τὰ
30 μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς || καὶ προελομένων πράξαι,
τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον, καὶ ἐν | ἐκείνοις <ἐν οἷς> κακῶς
λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦντες, καὶ εὐτυχεῖσιν φαμέν, καὶ
πάλιν ἐν τούτοις εἰ ἐβούλοντο ἄλλο ἢ | ἔλαττον <ῆ> ἔλαβον
τὰγαθόν. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ | φύσιν ἐνδέχεται, ἢ
35 γὰρ ὀρμῆ καὶ ὄρεξις οὐσα οὐ δεῖ || κατάρθωσεν, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς
ἦν ἠλίθιος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν
ὀρθὸς εἶναι τύχη δ' | αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὐσα <ἐπιθυμία>, αὕτη ὀρθὴ
οὐσα ἔσωσεν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε δι' | ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω
καὶ ἠτύχησεν

|| **b20** καὶ ἡ PCBL Kenny (1996, p. 153): del. Spengel Walzer & Mingay || **b21** πᾶν PCBL Kenny (1996, p. 153): πᾶσα Allan || **b23** <ῆ> ἢ Jackson: *secundum quod BF*: <ἀλλ' ὅτι> ἢ vel <ὡς> ἢ Fritzsche: lacunam ante ἢ pos. Susemihl || **b30-31** ἐν ἐκείνοις <ἐν οἷς> Fritzsche (1851, p. 252): *in illis in quibus BF*: <εἰ> ἐν ἐκείνοις Spengel (1843, p. 547n*) Kenny (1996, p. 155): <ῆ> ἐν ἐκείνοις ci. Susemihl || **b31** κατορθοῦντες Casaubon (1590, p. 172): κατορθοῦνται PCB Kenny (1996, p. 155): κατορθοῦν τὲ L: *dirigunt BF*: κατορθοῦντας Ambr. || **b31-32** καὶ εὐτυχεῖσιν PCBL: κατευτυχεῖσιν ci. Bussemaker (in Bussemaker et al., 1850, p. 111) || **b31** καὶ secl. Bussemaker (in Bussemaker et al., 1850, p. 111) Rowe || **b33** <ῆ> suppl. Jackson || **b36** τύχη PCBL Kenny (1996, p. 155) Rowe: τύχη Walzer & Mingay: *fortuna BF* || **b37** οὐσα secl. Walzer & Mingay | <ἐπιθυμία> suppl. Dirlmeier (1963, p. 488) Kenny (1996, p. 155) | αὕτη Spengel: αὐτὴ PC: αὐτὴ δ' BL: *ipsa BF*

Are there not impulses in the soul, some coming from reasoning and others coming from irrational desire, and the latter are not prior? [20] For if the impulse due to an appetite for pleasure, i.e., a desire, is natural, everything would proceed at any rate naturally to its good. Thus, if some persons are naturally gifted just like those who are able to sing not knowing to sing are naturally gifted in this way, they also have

impulses without reason in the way their nature developed, and they have appetite for what they should, when they should, and as they should. [25] These persons succeed even if they happen to be fools and irrational just like those who sing well despite not having been taught. Then, such persons who succeed for the most part without reason are lucky. [28] Therefore, there would be lucky persons by nature.

Or is good luck said in many ways? In fact, some things are done from impulse [30] in that people have decided to act, whereas others are not, but are <done> in the opposite way. And we say that <people> have been lucky indeed⁵³⁷ in those cases in which they seem to have reasoned badly despite succeeding, and again in these cases: if they wished <a good> different from or lesser than the good they obtained. Then, it is possible for these persons to be lucky by nature, for their impulse and desire, which is for what it should, [35] prospered, while their reasoning was in vain. And, when these persons, despite their reasoning not seeming to be right, succeed because <appetite> is the cause of it [sc., of their succeeding], this [sc., appetite] saves them in this case because it is right, except that sometimes people reason again in this way due to appetite and are unfortunate.

The agents described in the first part of this passage (lines 18-28) are such that they have non-rational desires (in particular, appetites) for what they should have by nature: i.e., without the help of reason. As a result, these agents seem to succeed even when they are foolish or irrational (lines 25-26). Now, this is not quite the case of the people who have the civic disposition like that of the Spartans that Aristotle is concerned with in **T 39**. These agents are not foolish or irrational, but are simply agents who misconceive the value of virtue. Moreover, they are not agents who think that external goods should be obtained by whatever means possible, but agents who have a regimented attitude towards these goods: they think they should be obtained through virtue. No doubt they may in many occasions be mistaken about what is the virtuous thing to do in order to secure external goods, but their beliefs seem to be reliable to some extent.

Now, as I have already pointed out, the issue we are faced with is that their beliefs about the value of virtue can ultimately lead them astray. Yet if they do indeed have natural virtues (which in them is combined with their false belief about the value of virtue), it would seem that their moral characters could ultimately save them from error in those cases in which

⁵³⁷ I am taking the *καί* from *‘καὶ ἐντυχῆσαι φασμέν’* as having an intensive meaning.

their reasoning would lead them astray.

In the second part of **T 40** (lines 28-38), Aristotle presents us with the very case that should interest us: the case of people who succeed despite having reasoned badly: such agents, Aristotle says, are saved by their right appetites, which makes them act correctly despite their reasoning indicating that they should act in a different way.

It is tempting to think here of cases of inverse *akrasia*, in which the agent's fine desires and emotions make them act in contrariety to what their reason prescribes saving them from mistake. Thus, it seems that if the civically virtuous agents at issue in **T 39** are indeed agents whose non-rational desires are for what they should be, these agents will tend to act well even in those cases in which their mistaken beliefs about the value of virtue would have led them astray if they had acted on their basis.

As a result, even if we concede (*pace* Irwin) that those who believe that they should have the virtues for the sake of the external goods are good, it is still possible to hold (against Broadie) that the natural goods are good to them, for their moral character is such as to save them from error for the most part. Accordingly, there is no issue in claiming that merely good agents that have a civic disposition like that of the Spartans are not fully virtuous (but rather merely naturally or civically virtuous), and hence that they are not motivated to perform fine actions because they are fine (which I take to be tantamount to performing fine actions for their own sakes).

At 1249^a2-6, Aristotle explains this contrast further, first confirming that fine things do not pertain on their own account to those who believe they should have the virtues for the sake of the external goods, and then contrasting such agents with those to whom fine things pertain on their own account and who decide on fine things on their own account, i.e., the fine-and-good persons. Moreover, Aristotle adds, not only fine things are fine for the fine-

and-good person, but also those things that are not fine by nature (like the natural goods) are fine to these agents, for these things are fine whenever they are done or are chosen for the sake of a fine end.

2.3.3.1.1 *Virtuous actions and moral habituation in the EE*

Now, Aristotle stated above at the end of T 38 (at 1248^b36-37) that both the virtues and the *ἔργα* of the virtues are fine (*τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς*), a claim that seems to class as fine by nature only the virtues and those actions that spring from virtue (i.e., actions performed on the basis of virtue). Likewise, at 1248^b22, the praiseworthiness of justice was seemingly explained by reference to the actions that pertain to justice (i.e., that hit the mean in the domain of justice), which are praiseworthy. This makes a strong case for thinking that up to now Aristotle had only virtuous actions performed by virtuous agents in mind, which raises questions about the virtuous actions that intermediate agents (and learners of virtue in general) can perform: how distinct are they from the virtuous actions performed by virtuous agents?

Yet I have already suggested above that 1248^b22 is not quite talking about actions performed on the basis of justice, but rather about just actions that can be performed irrespective of whether one is just and whose connection to justice (which is defined as disposition to perform just things on the basis of decision) explains the praiseworthiness of justice. But are the praiseworthy actions at issue in 1248^b20-21 and, accordingly, the just actions mentioned in 1248^b22 fine in the same sense as the actions expressive of temperance (*αἱ σώφρονες*) also mentioned in 1248^b22 (which are clearly actions performed on the basis of virtue)?

In *Rh.* I.9, after defining what he means by *τὸ καλόν* and showing that virtue as a whole as well as the particular virtues are fine, Aristotle says that ‘it is manifest that it is

necessary for the things that are productive of virtue to be fine (for they contribute to virtue) and for the things that spring from virtue to be fine' (1366^b24–26: *φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλὰ (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γιγνόμενα*),⁵³⁸ which suggests not only that actions that spring from virtue are to be distinguished from actions that are productive of virtue, but also that both of them are fine (though on different grounds).

Yet we are far from having a clear answer to these questions in the *EE*. In fact, *EE* II.2 1220^b1–3 describes as being subject to habituation (*ἐθίζεται*) that '<which is habituated> by a non-innate direction through being moved several times in a given way, eventually <becoming> that which is capable of activating' (*ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πως, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν*)⁵³⁹ (Ferreira's translation [2017, p. 124]), which is quite obscure as to the things one must do repeatedly in order to acquire a moral disposition and as to whether the things that one becomes able to do on the basis of that disposition are the same as those that lead to it. Likewise, *EE* II.1 1220^a29–31 describes virtue as a disposition 'that is brought about by the best movements in the soul and from which the best works and πάθη of the soul are done' (*ἡ γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχῆν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη*), which is just as unclear regarding what

⁵³⁸ A similar argument is also found at the opening lines of the *de Virtutibus et Vitiis* (at *VV* 1 1249^a26–30). The arguments advanced in *Rb*. I.9 in that regard, however, present several difficulties. Just to name a few: (1) they seemingly do not represent Aristotle's own positions at some instances (it seems, for instance, that *Rb*. I.9 favours a position according to which virtuous actions are praiseworthy because the virtues from which they are generated are praiseworthy, a thesis that is in conflict with what is found in *EE* II.1 1219^b8–9 and in 1248^b20–23, passages in which, on the contrary, virtue is said to be praiseworthy because its ἔργα are praiseworthy); and (2) it is not easy to determine what Aristotle means by actions that are productive of virtue, since he has stated earlier in the *Rb*. (I.6 1362^a31–34) that things are said to be productive of something (*ποιητικά*) in three different ways: (i) as being healthy is productive of health; (ii) as food is productive of health; or (iii) as practicing gymnastics, which for the most part produces health, is productive of health. As I take it, if by actions productive of virtue, Aristotle means those actions that non-virtuous people perform in order to become virtuous, he must mean that they are productive in sense (iii), since these actions are neither an expression of virtue nor something virtuous agents must do to preserve their virtue, but something that, for the most part, will lead them to virtue.

⁵³⁹ For a detailed commentary on these lines, see Ferreira (2017, pp. 126–129).

the things that lead to virtue are and whether they are the same as the ones one does on the basis of virtue.

Despite the obscurities of these two passages, I would like contend that, in the *EE*, virtuous actions that spring from virtue are not completely distinct from virtuous actions that lead to virtue, in that both of them are fine by being things that contribute to a fine end (as expected given 1248^b20-21—otherwise the praiseworthiness of the virtues, which are things fine by nature, would be explained by the praiseworthiness of things that are not fine).⁵⁴⁰ If this is true, in performing virtuous actions for their own sakes, fine-and-good agents would perform them because they are fine. Intermediate agents, in turn, would not seem to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, since fine things (among which are virtuous actions) would not be fine for them (since fine things do not belong on their own account to them). If this turns out to be right, there would be a strong case for saying that virtue makes the end right by making it fine for the agent, i.e., virtue would enable the agent to aim at ends that are fine for them for their own sakes in that it makes fine things belong on their own account to these agents, even though virtue would not be necessary for merely aiming at fine ends.

That being said, let me come back to Aristotle's account of moral habituation in the *EE*. In *EE* II.1 1220^a22–24, Aristotle assumes that 'the best disposition is produced by the best things, and that the best things in each case are done from the virtue of each thing' (*ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἢ βελτίστη διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς*), a claim that can be read as implying that the things that lead to the best disposition in a certain domain are precisely those that are done

⁵⁴⁰ I mean, if actions that are praiseworthy due to hitting the mean in action are not fine in themselves, and if I was right in saying that there is a distinction to be drawn between the actions that explain the praiseworthiness of justice and the actions whose praiseworthiness is explained by temperance, then it is not so clear how could these actions explain the praiseworthiness of virtue. So, a *desideratum* is that the actions that explain the praiseworthiness of justice (which seem to be actions whose praiseworthiness is explained by a fine end) are fine despite the fact that the fine end that explains their praiseworthiness is not the end that leads to their performance.

on the basis of this disposition. The example given by Aristotle in the immediate sequence (at lines 24–26) makes this clear: ‘the best toils and diets are what good physical condition comes from, and people toil best due to their good physical condition’ (οἶον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφή ἀφ’ ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα). If this example is to be taken as a perfect instance of what Aristotle described in *EE* II.1 1220^a22–24, there should be no difference between at least some⁵⁴¹ of the things that produce the best disposition in a certain domain and the things one can do on basis of that disposition, except that one does these things best on the basis of that disposition.⁵⁴²

Now, it seems that when Aristotle describes virtue as ‘the disposition of this sort, which is brought about by the best movements in the soul and by which the best works and πάθη of the soul are done’ (*EE* II.1 1220^a29–31: καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστίν, ἣ γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχῆν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ’ ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη), he intends to describe it as a disposition of the sort (τοιαύτη) described at lines 1220^a22–29, so that *EE* II.1 1220^a29–31 should be understood in light of *EE* II.1 1220^a22–26.⁵⁴³ As a result, the virtuous actions that produce virtue would be different from

⁵⁴¹ No doubt there may be certain things that, in some cases, one must do in order to become virtuous that are not virtuous and should not be done once one has become virtuous. A sign of that is the advice given by Aristotle in *EN* II.9 1109^b4–7, according to which one should drag oneself off in a direction contrary to that of one’s errors, for by pulling far away from error we shall reach the intermediate condition, like people do in straightening wood.

⁵⁴² Note that not all activities that lead to the best disposition in the example given by Aristotle are also done best on the basis of the best disposition or seem to be the same as those that are done by someone that has the best disposition. In fact, no one would say that the diets adequate for someone in a good physical disposition are the same as those that lead to the good physical disposition, they are rather different diets. In fact, no one would think of these two diets as indicating one and the same diet that is had in different ways. Therefore, as suggested in the previous note, it would seem that in order to become virtuous, people may also do some things that are not virtuous actions, although performing virtuous actions would still be a fundamental and central part of the process of becoming virtuous.

⁵⁴³ A further sign that this is how we should think of the relation between these two passages is the fact that 1220^a22–29 is introduced by ὑποκείσθω, which suggests that Aristotle intends the claims he assumes in these lines to function as a principle (similarly, Maurus [1668, p. 415, §4] thinks Aristotle is making assumptions here for the sake of arriving at a description of moral virtue). In that case, the ἄρα in line 29 would be drawing the conclusion that virtue too (καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ), since it is also the best disposition in a certain domain (as can be inferred from *EE* II.1 1218^b37–1219^a6), is a disposition of the sort described at 1220^a22–29. For a sensible account of the uses of ὑποκείσθω and other third person imperatives and

virtuous actions done on the basis of virtue only in the way they are done: virtuous actions are done best on the basis of virtue. Notwithstanding this, it is not immediately clear how one should accommodate virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous in *EE* VIII.3 and in the *EE* in general.

A first alternative would be to distinguish between virtuous actions productive of virtue and virtuous actions that spring from virtue in the same way as *Rb.* I.9, in which case the former would be fine because they contribute to virtue (which is something fine), but not in so far as they are constitutive of a fine end. This is somewhat reminiscent of an idea expressed by Plato in *Resp.* IV 444c1–d1, according to which just actions are defined as those that produce justice and unjust actions as those that produce injustice, and are thus things that are clearly known on the condition that justice and injustice are clearly known. Yet this is not quite the framework operating in *EE* VIII.3, since we saw that actions are said to be fine due to contributing to a fine end, and when they are performed for their own sakes by fully virtuous agents, they are performed precisely due to contributing to the fine ends that make them fine. Accordingly, in *EE* VIII.3, actions that lead to virtue and actions that are expressive of virtue appear to be fine on the same grounds, and the latter are clearly not virtuous merely because in performing them one will become virtuous (for one is virtuous already when one performs virtuous actions for their own sakes). It remains, then, that both are virtuous due to contributing to a fine end different from virtue. Otherwise, we would have a vicious circle, since Aristotle would have said that virtuous actions (praiseworthy actions) explain the praiseworthiness of virtue, but would ultimately think that the virtuousness and praiseworthiness of these actions is due to virtue.

their argumentative function in the *EE*, see Gazoni (2017). For a similar reading of the relationship of the two passages, in which, at *EE* II.1 1220^a29–31, Aristotle is applying the general remarks on the best disposition made in 1220^a22–29 to the specific case of virtue (which is the best disposition of the soul), see Woods (1992, pp. 97–98), London (2001, p. 562), and Simpson (2013, pp. 243–244).

What I take to be a more promising alternative is to categorise these actions along with ‘τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς’ (mentioned in lines 36-37). Although at face value this expression appears to refer to actions performed on the basis of virtue (given the parallel with *Rb.* I.9 1366^b25–27), Aristotle also uses expressions with ἀπό + genitive differently. As I have indicated above in the **Introduction** (pages 80 to 85), in *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1147^a18–19 Aristotle countenances that saying the things that come from ἐπιστήμη is no sign of ἐπιστήμη (τὸ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημείον). If this is how Aristotle is using ‘ἀπό’ in *EE* VIII.3 1248^b36–37, then we could say that merely performing the actions that come from virtue (τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς) is not a sign of virtue as well. Thus, with talk of actions that come from virtue, Aristotle may have in mind actions whose normative standards are paradigmatically found in actions performed on the basis virtue (which is compatible with virtue not being a standard that defines what the mean is, but something that is defined by reference to the mean, which it is said to hit), but which can be performed irrespective of whether one is fully virtuous.

As a result, it would seem that the actions mentioned in 1248^b20-21 (those that are praised in respect of [ἐφ’ ὧν] or due to [ἀφ’ ὧν] their fine ends) can indeed include actions that contribute to a fine end but are not performed for the sake of a fine end (as I have already suggested above), and, accordingly, that τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς comprise not only actions that spring from virtue in the sense that they are performed by virtuous agents, but also actions that a virtuous agent would perform faced with the same circumstances.⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴⁴ Similarly, as we shall see below in **Chapter 3**, Aristotle says, in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^b5–7, that states-of-affairs ‘are said to be just and temperate whenever they are such as the things the just or the temperate agent would perform’ (τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν). Yet nothing close to that is found in the *EE*.

2.3.3.2 BACK TO *EE* VIII.3 1248^B37-1249^A17 AND PERFORMING FINE ACTIONS ACCIDENTALLY

Despite the philosophically interesting points that 1249^a2-6 allow us to raise, the only conclusion that Aristotle explicitly draws from this text is that the natural goods are fine for the fine-and-good person (different from what would be expected if he had intended give us here an explanation of the fineness of actions productive of virtue that resorts to a fine end of which these actions are productive).⁵⁴⁵ To this conclusion Aristotle offers a further argument at 1249^a7-11,⁵⁴⁶ which allows him to claim that the natural goods (i.e., things that are in themselves useful) are also fine for the fine-and-good person, and to contrast fine-and-good agents both with the many and with the person who thinks that one should be virtuous for the sake of the external goods. For the many, what is *simpliciter* good (i.e., the natural goods) is not good. However, these things are good for the good person, and, for that reason, they can

⁵⁴⁵ In fact, I think Aristotle had no intention of addressing in detail actions productive of virtue in the *EE*, and that this problem is only thematised in the *EN*. Nevertheless, the things Aristotle says in *EE* II.1-2 appear to suggest that if he had dealt with these actions in the *EE*, he would have arrived at a view similar to that advanced in the *EN*, to the extent that actions that lead to virtue would not differ from actions that are done on the basis of virtue except in the way they are performed. More on that below.

⁵⁴⁶ Which is not fully formulated in this passage but can be reconstructed in its full version (as Buddensiek [1999, p. 219n78] does) by reference to *EE* III.6 1233^b7ff.

In 1249^a7-11 we encounter the following argument:

do fine things.⁵⁴⁷ Yet when they do fine things, they do it accidentally, since these things are not fine for them (for these things do not belong *on their own account* to them).⁵⁴⁸ Therefore, it seems that only fine-and-good persons perform fine actions because they are fine, for it is only for such agents that fine things are fine, and hence only they would be able to grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine actions and to be thereby motivated to perform these actions.

What is striking in this argument is that agents who are not fine-and-good are able to perform fine actions, and that these actions are fine in spite of being performed for the sake of natural goods (i.e., accidentally). This seems to confirm the claim that, in the *EE*, actions

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- (1) The just is fine (1249^a7-8);
 - (2) What is worthy is just (1249^a8);
 - (3) The fine-and-good person is worthy of the natural goods (1249^a8-9);
 - (4) The fitting is fine (1249^a9);
 - (5) The natural goods are fitting to the fine and good person (1249^a9-10);
 - (6) Therefore, the natural goods are useful and fine for the fine and good person (1249^a10-11).

Now, something seems to be missing between (3) and (4) if the argument is to make sense as a whole, like a premise connecting what is worthy with the fitting. Such a premise is just what one finds in 1233^b7: ‘the fitting is worthy’ (τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐστίν). If we supply this premise, then he could reconstrue Aristotle’s argument as follows:

- (1) The just is fine (1249^a7-8);
- (2) What is worthy is just (1249^a8);
- (3) The fine-and-good person is worthy of the natural goods (1249^a8-9);
- <(3’) The fitting is worthy (supplied from 1233^b7);>
- (4) The fitting is fine (1249^a9) [from (1), (2), and (3’)];
- (5) The natural goods are fitting to the fine and good person (1249^a9-10) [from (1), (2), (3), and (3’)];
- (6) Therefore, the natural goods are useful and fine for the fine and good person (1249^a10-11) [from (1), (2), (3), (3’), (4), and (5)].

⁵⁴⁷ For the natural goods are things through which we can perform fine actions, for many fine actions require external resources to be performed.

⁵⁴⁸ Pace Bobonich (2023, p. 183n37), who thinks that ‘Since in 8.3, Aristotle only asserts claims of the form “x is καλὸν τῶ y” when x are natural goods and y is the καλὸς κάγαθὸς, we cannot tell whether the fine goods are fine for the many.’

that lead to virtue are fine on the same grounds as actions that spring from virtue. Thus, the end that makes these actions fine is indeed not to be identified with the end that motivates their performance.

The way in which Aristotle allows agents who are not completely virtuous to perform virtuous actions in this argument bears a strong resemblance to a point made by him in **T 7** and in **T 12**. As I have pointed out above (in **section 1.3.1**), in **T 7**, after distinguishing first between doing things that happen to be unjust (*τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν*) and doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*) and then between doing things that happen to be just (*τὰ δίκαια πράττειν*) and performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*), Aristotle says, at 1135^a16-19, that the persons who do just or unjust things involuntarily (and hence are not doing wrong or performing just acts) can be said to do wrong or to perform just acts *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Similarly, in **T 12** (lines 1137^a21-26) he argued that merely doing things such as sleeping with someone else's wife or abandoning one's shield and running away from battle are not cases of doing wrong or of performing cowardly actions (i.e., voluntarily doing things that happen to be unjust and voluntarily doing things that happen to be cowardly, respectively) except *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

The same thought also comes up in 1135^b2-8, a passage I have not discussed above in **section 1.3.1** but which comes a couple of lines before my **T 8**:

T 41 – EN V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^b2-8

1135b2 ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως |
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· |
 5 καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ ||
 φόβον, οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον, | ἀλλ'
 ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ
 ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ | συμβεβη-
 κός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν.
 || **b2** post ὁμοίως add. καὶ P^bC^c || **b3** καὶ om. B^{95sup}.V || **b4** al-
 terum καὶ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (327.1: وَلَمْ يَكُنْ الْفَرَعُ [wa-lam-kana
 l-faza'a]): ἢ M^b || **b5** post φόβον add. ὃν K^b

The 'accidentally' <clause> holds in a similar way in the case of unjust and just things as well, for if someone returns a deposit involuntarily and due to fear, we should say that they are neither doing just things nor performing a just act. Similarly, we should

say that someone who does not return the deposit being constrained and involuntarily does wrong and do unjust things accidentally.

There are two main issues in this passage. The first one concerns what Aristotle means in his first example when he talks of someone who returns a deposit involuntarily and due to fear. Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 52.24–25) and Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L V, 13 87–91) think that, in this passage, acting due to fear is tantamount to acting involuntarily. This view has been criticised by Broadie (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, p. 350), since it would conflict with 1135^b20–21, where things done due to *θυμός* or due to other emotions are listed as examples of wrongs, i.e., unjust things voluntarily performed. Broadie (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, p. 350) entertains the possibility that *ἄκων* could be understood loosely here, indicating what is done reluctantly, in which case returning a deposit due to fear would not be a good example of performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*), which would require not only voluntariness, but also some positive attitude towards it. Yet she recognises that this possibility is at odds with 1135^a16–17, which clearly equates doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*) and performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) with voluntarily doing things that are unjust or just respectively (that *ἐκῶν* here in 1135^a16–17 is meant in the technical sense becomes clear in 1135^a23–25).

Zingano (2017, pp. 251–252), in turn, entertains two feasible solutions: the first one is to take fear as evidence or as a sign that one is being constrained and is thus acting involuntarily, which is something that is made explicit by Aristotle's second example, since it concerns a person who is being constrained and who involuntarily does not return a deposit. The second one is to understand this passage as representing the different stance towards mixed actions taken by Aristotle in the *EE*, in which case the point here would not be saying that any just action performed due to fear is performed involuntarily, but rather that those just actions performed due to a fear that exceeds the agent's nature would be involuntary (as is

suggested in *EE* II.8 1225^a19–21). In this latter case, the two examples given by Aristotle are perfectly parallel, their only difference being that the first concerns a person who returns the deposit, whereas the second is about a person who does not return a deposit. Now, because it is more plausible that with talk of being constrained (*ἀναγκαζόμενον*) Aristotle means to talk of mixed actions, which in the *EE* are indeed involuntary actions, I think Zingano's second solution is to be preferred.

The second issue concerns how exactly the *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* clause applies in the case of unjust and just things. To begin with, the anonymous scholiast (*CAG*. XX, 237.6–20) and Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XXII, 52.20–28) treat the passage as if Aristotle were merely talking of performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) and doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*), although Aristotle clearly thinks that *δίκαια πράττειν* and *τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν* are also at issue, which is indeed puzzling. Similarly, the anonymous paraphrast (*CAG*. XIX.2, 103.18–22) appears to interpret this passage as if, with talk of returning the deposit involuntarily and due to fear, Aristotle were thinking of cases in which we should not say that the agent is just (*δίκαιος*) and is performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) except by accident.

All these interpretations seem to be inadequate, for Aristotle is clearly talking not merely of performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) and of doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*), but also of doing just things (*δίκαια πράττειν*) and of doing unjust things (*τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν*). But what does he mean with talk of doing just things and doing unjust things accidentally?

A first answer to this was offered by Stewart (1892, vol. 1, p. 500), who in his commentary suggests that the distinction drawn here in **T 41** should be understood in light of what Plato says in *Lg.* IX 862b1–b6.⁵⁴⁹ In this passage, Plato talks of cases in which what

⁵⁴⁹ 'For perhaps, my friends, neither if someone gives something that exists to someone nor if, conversely, they subtract <something from someone> should we simply call such a thing just or unjust without qualification, but <we should call such a thing just or unjust> **if someone benefits or harms someone in any degree while having a just character and manner.** This is what the legislator should look at, and, therefore,

has been done should not be described as being just or unjust *simpliciter* unless the person who does it does it on the basis of a just or unjust character (see footnote 549 for whole passage translated). If the parallel with **T 41** holds true, then the thought could be that merely returning a deposit is not a case of doing something just except by accident because doing something just in itself requires one to have a just character disposition. This is reminiscent of the interpretation of just and unjust actions defended by Michael of Ephesus and Patricio Fernandez I have discussed above in **section 1.3.1**, according to which Aristotle distinguishes between things that are just and unjust *per se*, which are those done on the basis of justice and injustice respectively, and just and unjust things *by accident*, which includes not only just and unjust things done involuntarily, but also just and unjust things performed by agents who are not just or unjust. I have rejected this reading for the passages I discussed in **section 1.3.1**, and I think it should also be rejected here. As a matter of fact, **T 41** begins a couple of lines after **T 7**, where, as we saw above in **section 1.3.1**, Aristotle distinguished between just and unjust things (which are determined by nature or by law) and performing just acts (*δικαιοπραγεῖν*) and doing wrong (*ἀδικεῖν*) which amount to voluntarily doing just or unjust things. Thus, it would be highly unlikely that immediately after stipulating that just and unjust things are those things that can be done even involuntarily, in which case what one does happens to be just or unjust, Aristotle would shift to talking of just and unjust things in a different sense, such that just and unjust are those things performed by persons who are just or unjust. In fact, in saying that ‘the “accidentally” <clause> similarly holds in the case of unjust and just things as well’ (*ἔστι δ’ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) Aristotle does not seem to be introducing a new sense of unjust and just things to which the accidentally

they must look at two things: injustice and harm’ (*σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὐτ’ εἴ τις τῶν δίδωσίν τι τῶν ὄντων οὐτ’ εἰ τοῦναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἀπλῶς ἢ ἀδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἦθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῆ τινά τι καὶ βλάβητι, τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶ νομοθέτη θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλέπτεον, πρὸς τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην*).

clause applies, but expanding the use of the ‘accidentally’ clause,⁵⁵⁰ which he employed at 1135^a17-19 to distinguish, on the one hand, between involuntarily doing things that happen to be just and performing a just act and, on the other hand, between doing things that happen to be unjust and doing wrong.

Another alternative interpretation was offered by Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 399), who thinks that Aristotle’s example here is taken from Plato in *Resp.* I 332a11–b3.⁵⁵¹ In this passage, Socrates describes a case in which one does what the law prescribes, i.e., one returns the deposit to the depositor, but, in doing so, they are not described as having done what they are obliged to do if i) returning the deposit proves to be harmful either to the person returning the deposit or to the person who receives the deposit back and ii) the depositor and the depositary are friends (and, as Polemarchus said in 332a9–a10, friends owe something good to their friends, and nothing bad). As a result, because in some cases returning a deposit turns out to be harmful to one of the parts, it is not something one owes to one’s friend.

No doubt there is no mention of friendship in **T 41**, but it is telling that both are talking about returning or not returning a deposit. Besides, the fact that friendship is not taken into account in **T 41** to determine what each person should do in order to do something just is perhaps not that problematic for the parallel, for it is probable that *Resp.* I 332a11–b3 makes

⁵⁵⁰ That Aristotle is here expanding the use of the ‘accidentally’ clause is also the view of Frede (2020, p. 632), but in her analysis of what is going on in this passage she appears to fall into the same difficulty faced by the readings defended by the ancient commentators, since she thinks that Aristotle’s point here is to talk of actions that are indeed just or unjust and have been performed voluntarily but whose assessment should take into consideration the particular circumstances, such that if one returns a deposit merely due to fear they would not have performed a just actions but accidentally, despite the fact that what they do is indeed just and that they have done it voluntarily.

⁵⁵¹ ‘I understand <what you mean>, I said, because people are not giving the things they are obliged to if they return gold to someone who has made a deposit if indeed returning or receiving <the money> proves to be harmful and <if> the depositary and the depositor are friends. Don’t you say that Simonides means this?’ (Μανθάνω, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσις ὅς ἂν τῷ χρυσίῳ ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, εἴανπερ ἢ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἢ λήψις βλαβερά γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ᾧσι ὅ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;).

mention of friendship just because Polemarchus understood Simonides' dictum (presented in *Resp.* I 331d2ff.) as implying not merely that there are some circumstances in which one should not give back to someone whatever one owes them, but, more specifically, that friends owe something good to their friends (cf. *Resp.* I 331e5–332a10). Perhaps, then, the point Aristotle wants to make is that, in some cases at least,⁵⁵² something can only be truly just or unjust if it is indeed beneficial or harmful (respectively) irrespective of whether one is acting in relation to someone with whom they are friends. In other words, in some cases (see footnote 552 for an exception), even if something is indeed prescribed or proscribed by the laws, it is only intrinsically just or unjust if it is indeed beneficial or harmful (respectively). In that case, Aristotle would be here implicitly anticipating the distinction he will draw later, in *EN* V.13 [=Bywater V.9] 1137^a11-13 (cf. **T 11**), between the things prescribed or proscribed by the laws (which are said to be just or unjust only accidentally) and what is just or unjust due to being performed in a certain way in the particular circumstances in question. Accordingly, the examples given in **T 41** would be really compressed, but perfectly intelligible in light of *Resp.* I 332a11-b3. Aristotle's first example would be saying that someone who returns a deposit being constrained to do so in circumstances in which returning a deposit is not actually beneficial to the depositor are not really doing something just or performing a just act: they are not performing a just act because they are not acting voluntarily to begin with, and they are not doing something just but accidentally because although returning the deposit is indeed what is prescribed by the law, it would not turn out to be beneficial to the depositor in the particular circumstances: something does not count as just if doing so turns out to be something that happens to be vicious.

Aristotle's second example would be more straightforward, the idea would be that

⁵⁵² I say in some cases because there is a notable exception: punishments can be truly just despite being in some sense harmful to the person being punished.

someone who does not return a deposit due to being constrained not to return it is neither doing wrong nor doing something unjust: they are not doing wrong because they are not acting voluntarily to begin with, and they are not doing something unjust because returning a deposit would ultimately be harmful to the depository (since the deposit was not returned so as to avoid a greater evil) although not returning it is indeed against what is prescribed by the laws (for which reason it is something unjust by accident).

In sum: Aristotle's first example concerns a case in which receiving the deposit back is harmful in such a way that it cannot be called just but accidentally (in that it corresponds to what the law prescribes), whereas Aristotle's second example concerns a case in which giving the deposit back is harmful in such a way that not returning it cannot be called unjust but accidentally (in that it corresponds to what the law proscribes), just like in the two cases at issue in *Resp.* I 332a11-b3.

If this is correct (and in the absence of more plausible alternatives I am assuming it is), then **T 41** is further evidence of how productive the 'accidentally' clause is in Aristotle's philosophy of action. My hypothesis is that its use in *EE* VIII.13 1249^a14-16 expands the use of this clause beyond what we have seen in *EN* V.⁵⁵³ In fact, in saying that merely good agents perform fine things accidentally, Aristotle's point in *EE* VIII.3 seems to be that the things these agents do are fine because they coincide with what fine-and-good agents do. However, because fine things do not belong, *qua* fine, to agents who are not fine-and-good (for which reason they cannot perform fine actions because they are fine), their *actions* are fine only accidentally, i.e., they end up doing something fine by accident because they do not do it because it is fine, but as a means to attain something else: external goods. To put it in a

⁵⁵³ I would have an easier time here if I accepted Fernandez (2021) interpretation of the *per se*/accidentally contrast in *EN* V above in **section 1.3.1**. Yet, as I have argued, I do not think that the passages from *EN* V discussed by Fernandez support his thesis. In *EE* VIII.3, in turn, we come across a *per se*/accidentally distinction that comes close to the one Fernandez wanted to find in *EN* V.

non-Aristotelian vocabulary, they only perform fine actions accidentally because they cannot perform fine actions *under the description that makes these actions fine* unless they become fully virtuous.

With that in mind, it becomes easier to understand how agents who fail to be fully virtuous and, in particular, intermediate agents can perform fine actions. It is not that fine actions as performed by such agents are among the actions that spring from virtue, it is rather that when τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς are done by persons who are not fully virtuous, they are done accidentally in that these agents do not perform these actions *from virtue* and thus *for their own sakes*, a view that seems to be different from defining virtuous actions as those actions similar to those (τοιαῦτα οἶα) a virtuous person would perform faced with the same circumstances, even though it seems to lead to the same results: As a matter of fact, in saying that agents who are not fully virtuous perform fine actions accidentally, Aristotle may be just emphasising that although actions may be fine irrespective of what motivates their performance, in so far as fine actions are described as being ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς they are, in themselves, to be performed as virtuous agents perform them, in which case agents who are not fully virtuous would only do fine things accidentally in so far as they do not do it in the same way as the virtuous, i.e., from virtue and for their own sakes. Whereas in saying that virtuous actions are those that are *similar* to those a virtuous person would perform faced with the same circumstances, Aristotle is rather talking of *virtuous states-of-affairs* (πράγματα), which, when brought to bear virtuously, can be identified with the activities of a virtuous person, but which can nevertheless be done in a different way, such that they do not count as virtuous activities. Thus, different from what we see here in the *EE*, Aristotle does not need to say in the *EN* that when agents who are not fully virtuous perform virtuous actions they are doing so accidentally, for when he says that they can perform virtuous actions, he is rather thinking of

virtuous states-of-affairs that not only are fine irrespective of being done from virtue or not but also can be identified without making any reference to virtue. In the *EE*, in turn, although the ἀπό + genitive is compatible with one doing what comes from virtue (τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς) without being virtuous (as I have suggested above by reference to the parallel with *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1147^a18-19), this is a way of describing virtuous actions that makes reference to virtue, so that when one is described as doing what comes from virtue without being virtuous, one is said to do that accidentally so as to distinguish one's doing such things from how a virtuous person may do such things.

Now, given that for those who have the civic disposition that is similar to that possessed by the Spartans and other such people what is fine is not fine (since fine things do not belong on their own account to them, i.e., *qua* fine), the same might be argued regarding intermediate agents (and this is, as I take it, the main philosophical point—for my purposes—to be gathered from this discussion).

This would mean that only agents who are completely virtuous or fine-and-good really appreciate what is fine as fine, which requires doing fine things for their own sakes. Thus, if intermediate agents perform virtuous actions for a reason distinct from the fineness of these actions, they would only perform such actions accidentally, the upshot being that virtuous actions are not fine for intermediate agents, in which case it would seem that such agents are in an important sense heteronomous.⁵⁵⁴ Therefore, virtue would make the end right by securing not only that it is something fine, but also that it is fine for the agent, which, as I indicated in the **Introduction**, entails that that only fully virtuous agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes. As a result, virtue would make the ends right (our question [1]) by 1) making one perform fine actions having decided on them for their own sakes, by 2) making

⁵⁵⁴ Similarly, for the idea that the merely good agent, in contrast to the fine-and-good agent, is heteronomous, see Whiting (1996, p. 192).

one conclude through deliberation that they should perform fine actions for their own sakes, and by 3) making one aim for fine ends for their own sakes. And 3) is an enabling condition for 2) and 1).

Someone might try to resist this conclusion by pointing out that performing actions that lead to virtue could be viewed as strongly connected to virtue, in which case when someone performs such an action because doing so contributes to virtue, they would still be performing it for its own sake. Yet, even though being productive of virtue may be taken as a necessary feature of virtuous actions, it seems that if virtuous actions that lead to virtue were choiceworthy because they are productive of virtue they would not be choiceworthy on their own account, and hence could not be fine for those who perform them in such a fashion, since what is productive of something is among the things choiceworthy due to something else (cf. *Top.* VI.12 149^b31-39—T 5).⁵⁵⁵ Therefore, albeit virtuous actions are productive of virtue, it would seem that doing them because they are productive of virtue would be just as mistaken as conceiving of virtuous actions as actions choiceworthy for the sake of virtue (I mean, this would be mistaken in light 1248^b19-20, where fine things are said to be among things that are choiceworthy on their own account).

Accordingly, when Aristotle claimed at 1248^b34-36 that ‘fine-and-good is the person to whom the fine things among the goods pertain on their own account,’ he was talking only of things that are fine by nature (such as the virtues and virtuous actions), and not of things that are only fine when they are done for the sake of a fine end (natural goods). Hence, although natural goods can be pursued both for their own sakes and for the sake of something else,

⁵⁵⁵ In this passage, which I have translated above in **section 1.2**, Aristotle discusses instances in which someone takes something that is choiceworthy for its own sake as choiceworthy due to something else (as in the case in which it is taken as something productive of something else). As he argues, nothing hinders something that is choiceworthy for its own sake also being choiceworthy due to something else, but it would be wrong to define it in this way.

they can only be fine if they are pursued for the sake of a fine end (and not for their own sakes).⁵⁵⁶ Virtuous actions, in turn, can be performed both for their own sakes and for the sake of something else (an end that can still be fine, though not necessarily for the agent), but in both cases they are fine, and only in the first case they would be performed because they are fine, that is, being valued as what they are.

Given this, it seems that Aristotle's position in the *EE* (and in the common books read in its light) is indeed better represented by (*A'''*), for on this reading intermediate agents are distinguished from fully virtuous agents not in so far as they aim for ends that are not fine, but in so far as they are not doers of fine things for their own sakes, cannot decide on fine things on their own account, and do not aim for fine ends for their own sakes.

Besides, as I have mentioned earlier, praiseworthiness is not sufficient for determining what makes something fine, but neither does adding that this praiseworthiness is attributed to a good thing due to its being choiceworthy by itself constitutes sufficient grounds for doing that. Yet this provides us with a schematic criterion for identifying what is fine and differentiating it from what is merely good, although it does not say much about what does τὸ καλόν actually means. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it seems clear from Aristotle's arguments that fineness is a feature that makes things morally good,⁵⁵⁷ and that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions because they are fine. Thus, the notion of fineness plays a central role in establishing the boundaries of the moral realm, for it is by being, in some

⁵⁵⁶ This seems to be compatible, though, with pursuing natural goods being something fine in itself in some occasions, although the natural goods are not fine in themselves. Such an accommodation may be necessary, in light of the claim that the virtues are for the sake of the fine, to account for the fact that the unnamed virtue concerned with small honours involves aiming for honour in the right way. In fact, if no such thing were possible, the person who aims for honour in the right way would seem do that because honour is fine, and would do it for its own sake, although honour is not something fine on its own account. But if we distinguish honour from pursuing or aiming for honour, there is no issue in thinking of someone who aims for honour in a certain way because doing so is fine. For the idea that in saying that external goods can be fine, Aristotle means merely that the fine-and-good agent's *possession* of these goods is fine, see Whiting (1996, p. 189).

⁵⁵⁷ So too M. Heinze (1909, pp. 7, 21–22).

sense, fine (*καλός*) or base (*αἰσχρός*) that something is introduced into the moral realm and is hence subject to moral evaluation, which will also take into account other factors such as voluntariness and motivation.

CHAPTER 3. THE *ETHICA NICOMACHEA*

In this chapter, I would like to focus on what Aristotle has to say in the *EN* about the division of labour between virtue and reason. Outside the common books, there is no passage in the *EN* in which Aristotle explicitly claims that virtue makes the end right, although, as we shall see, he appears to present a division of labour between moral virtue and *φρόνησις* at *EN* X.8 1178^a16-19 (see **T 49** below). Nonetheless, a thesis quite similar to that advanced in the *EE* can be gathered not only from the treatment given to the particular virtues in the *EN* but also from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. In addition to that, an even stronger thesis can be gathered from the answer given in III.7 [=Bywater III.5] to a possible objection against the claim that both virtue and vice are voluntary (at 1114^a31–^b25—**T 50**) and from *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20-21 (in **T 56**), a passage in which Aristotle appears to suggest that the end of every activity (including virtuous activities) is relative to the character disposition on which basis that activity is brought off (i.e., the character disposition that activity is an actualisation of). As we shall see, this idea gains even more plausibility in light of the fact that, when discussing the object of *βούλησις* in III.5 [=Bywater III.4], Aristotle claims that there are fine and pleasant things that are particular (*ἴδια*) to each character disposition (*καθ' ἐκάστην ἕξιω*)(1113^a36—in **T 53**) (a claim that is invoked with slight variations in two other passages: IX.9 1170^a14-16 and X.6 1176^b23-27),⁵⁵⁸ which appears to suggest that the different character dispositions can be identified by means of the things that are fine only to their possessors (in a similar fashion to *EE* VIII.3).⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁸ A further related claim can be found in *EN* IX.4 1166^a12-13 (translated below in page 489), but in this passage, Aristotle is not quite recalling the claim that there are pleasant and fine things that are proper to each character disposition, but the related claim also made in III.5 [=Bywater III.4] that the virtuous is the person that excels in seeing what is true in each case, being like a ruler and measure.

⁵⁵⁹ However, as we shall see, it is arguable whether this is how *EN* III.5 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a31 should be understood, for one could also argue that the argument advanced in 1113^a31 is restricted to virtuous dispositions. In any case, *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20-21 would still seem to secure the idea that

I shall analyse the evidence found in these passages in the second part of this Chapter (section 3.2). In doing so, I intend show that Aristotle's views in the *EN* are compatible with the views expressed in the common books and in the *EE*, to the effect that virtue makes the ends right in that it enables one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, conclude through deliberation that they should perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. Therefore, the answer Aristotle would give in the *EN* to questions (I)-(III) would be perfectly in line with the answers to these questions I have argued he gave in the common books and in the *EE*.

As should be clear by now, all this implies reading *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] in a way that departs radically from orthodox readings of this passage, to the effect that only fully virtuous agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes and perform virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes. For that reason, below I shall first say some things about what Aristotle says on the 'for the sake of the fine' clause in his discussion of the particular virtues in the *EN*, and then, in the first part of this Chapter (section 3.1), I shall propose a reading of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] according to which virtue is necessary for making the ends right in that it enables one to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes.

To conclude, after arguing in the second part of the Chapter (section 3.2) that virtue not merely enables one to perform virtuous actions in this way, but also enables one to grasp the intrinsic fineness of the virtuous actions, I shall move into the third part of the Chapter (section 3.3), where I intend to discuss in more detail the conception of fineness at work in the *EN*. To do so, I shall analyse the things Aristotle says of character dispositions that fail to be virtues such as the non-genuine sorts of courage like civic courage and the vices opposite

activities can be distinguished by the dispositions on which basis they are brought forth, since their end corresponds to these dispositions. Moreover, the other passages in the *EN* that reiterate the thesis advanced in III.5 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a31 that I mentioned (IX.9 1170^a14-16 and X.6 1176^b23-27) should add more grist to the mill for the claim that Aristotle means this thesis to hold in general.

to generosity and to some other particular virtues, all of which will throw further light in what he means by acting *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα* (or so I shall argue).

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When dealing with the particular virtues, Aristotle does not repeat for each of them that they make one act for the sake of the fine,⁵⁶⁰ but such a thesis can nevertheless be secured. Indeed, he says that (1) the for the sake of the fine is an end that pertains to virtue; that (2) actions that spring from virtue are fine and for the sake of the fine; and that (3) the for the sake of fine is a *κοινόν*, that is, a common feature of the virtues.

The first claim is made in a passage about courage in book III chapter 10 [=Bywater III.7]:

T 42 – *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b10–13

1115b10 ὁ δὲ |
ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ |
τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ |
ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.
 || b13 τῆς ἀρετῆς P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (217.3: *الْفَضِيلَةَ* [*al-*
faḍīlati]): ταῖς ἀρεταῖς K^b

The courageous person is intrepid as a human being <can be>. They fear such things, but withstand <them> for the sake of the fine, as they should and as reason <commands>, **for this end belongs to virtue.**

The second claim, in a passage on generosity in book IV, Chapter 2 [=Bywater IV.1]:

T 43 – *EN* IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a23–24

1120a23 *αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ*
 | *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα.*

⁵⁶⁰ This claim is explicitly made in regard to courage (*EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b10–13, 20–24, 11 [=Bywater III.7] 1116^a10–12, 11 [=Bywater III.8] 1116^b2–3, 30–31, 1117^a16–17), temperance (III.15 [=Bywater III.12] 1119^b15–18), generosity (IV.1 1120^a23–29), magnificence (IV.4 [=Bywater IV.2] 1122^b6–7), and friendliness (IV.12 [=Bywater IV.6] 1126^b28–35, 1127^a2–6, 7–12). Moreover, this appears to be claimed indirectly in regard to truthfulness (IV.13 [=Bywater IV.7] 1127^a26–32, 1127^b11–13, 17–20).

This claim is not made explicitly, though, in the treatment of magnanimity, the unnamed virtue of small honours, mildness, and wit. A hypothesis as to why this occurs is that these virtues are all discussed after Aristotle claimed, in *EN* IV.4 [=Bywater IV.2] 1122^b7 (in T 44), that the ‘for the sake of the fine’ is a *κοινόν* of the virtues.

The actions on the basis of virtue⁵⁶¹ are fine and for the sake of the fine.

The third claim, in a passage on magnificence in book IV, chapter 4 [=Bywater IV.2]:

T 44 – *EN* IV.4 [=Bywater IV.2] 1122^b6–7

1122b6 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ |
 ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
 || b6 τὰ om. P^bC^c

The magnificent person will spend such things for the sake of the fine, **for this [sc. the for-the-sake-of-the-fine] is a common feature of the virtues.**

These passages make a strong case for thinking that the virtues make one act for the sake of the fine, so that it would seem that virtue makes one's ends₁ right in that it makes them correspond to the fineness of the actions one performs. And just as in the *EE*, it seems reasonable to argue that in the *EN* too these claims should be taken as saying that virtue makes one act for the sake of the very virtuous actions one performs, which would mean that acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα implies that one performs a virtuous action because it is fine. What is still unclear, however, is whether, in the *EN*, virtue is necessary for that.

Note, at any rate, that the actions Aristotle is talking about here, withstanding fearful things (in T 42), giving money (in T 43), and spending money (in T 44), are not virtuous in themselves. So, saying that the agent performs them for their own sakes would not make the point Aristotle wants to make (quite the contrary). The missing step that connects the 'for the sake of the fine' clause with performing actions of this sort because performing them in a certain way is fine is explicitly taken by Aristotle in his treatment of courage in the *EN*:

T 45 – *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.7] 1116^a10–12

⁵⁶¹ By 'the actions on the basis of virtue' (αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις), Aristotle appears to be referring to those virtuous actions performed by virtuous agents, for, as it seems, only such actions are not only fine, but also performed for the sake of the fine. As already indicated above in footnote 108, there seem to be other instances in which *κατα* + accusative phrases such as this make reference to the regulative role of virtue instead, such that agents can do things that are *κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς* or *κατ' ἀρετὴν* without thereby being virtuous. I shall talk about this in more detail below in discussing T 57. At any rate, it is telling that here in T 43 Aristotle talks of actions (*πράξεις*) that are on the basis of virtue, and not simply of things or states-of-affairs that are *κατ' ἀρετὴν* or *κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς*.

1116a10 καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶν περὶ |
 θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερὰ, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται
 καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ.

|| a10 ἀνδρεία K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: ἀνδρία V || a12 ἢ s.l.C^{c2}
 L^bO^bB^{95sup.}V: om. K^bP^bC^c: καὶ L Arab.? (219.11: ‘وَيَرَىٰ أَنَّ خِلَافَ ذَلِكَ’
 ‘فَيُبْحِنُ’ [wa-ḡarā anna ḫilāfa dāllika qabīḥun])

Thus, as was said, courage is a mean state concerned with what inspires confidence and what is fearful in the circumstances mentioned, and <the courageous person> chooses and withstands these things because it is fine, or because it is base not to <choose and withstand these things>.

T 46 – EN III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1117^a16–17

1117a16 ἀνδρείου δ’ ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ |
 φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ.

|| a16 καὶ LL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V Arab. (225.9: وَتُظْهِرُ لَهُمْ كَذَلِكَ [wa-taẓharu li-
 bim ka-dāllika]): καὶ μὴ K^bP^bC^c || a17 ἢ P^bC^c Arab. (225.10: أَوْ [aw]):
 καὶ K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V

And it is up to the courageous person to withstand the things that are fearful and that appear to be⁵⁶² fearful to human beings, and because it is fine <to withstand these things> or base not to <withstand them>.

In both these passages, Aristotle claims that the courageous person withstands fearful things because it is fine to do so or because it is base not to do so, which strongly suggests that, at least in the case of courage, acting for the sake of the fine amounts to acting in a certain way because so acting is fine,⁵⁶³ so that acting for the sake of the fine would be equivalent to acting for the sake of the very actions one performs if one describes the action one is performing differently: not in terms of actions that in themselves are morally indifferent such as withstanding fearful things, but in terms of withstanding fearful things in a way such

⁵⁶² As I take it, the μὴ transmitted by K^bP^bC^c (see the *apparatus*) probably crept into the text due to gloss made by someone thinking that Aristotle was here opposing what is really fearful to what merely appears to be fearful, in which case he should have said instead that the task of the courageous person is to withstand what is (really) fearful and not what is merely apparently fearful. Yet this is not necessary, for with talk of φαινόμενα Aristotle may also be referring to the fact that these things are also recognised as fearful (see, for instance, the use of this language in the discussion of the object of βούλησις in EN III.6 [=Bywater III.4]—for a detailed discussion of what is implied by φαινόμενον there see the commentary by Zingano [2008, pp. 194–197]). Moreover, the fact that the Arabic translation seems to translate a text that has merely καί (rather than ‘καὶ μὴ’) indicates that καί is to be preferred on stemmatic grounds as well, since it would represent an agreement between the *α* and *β* families (and the Arabic translation probably stems from a less corrupted testimony from the *α* family as I have indicated above in section 0.3.2).

⁵⁶³ Similarly, see Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 226, 229, 233, 254, 265).

that it hits the mean or in terms of doing things that happen to be courageous. As a result, if we can extend this conclusion to all moral virtues, it would seem that, in the *EN*, virtue makes the end right by making one perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, which would be equivalent to saying that virtue makes the end right by making one perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. As I take it, this claim is equivalent to saying that virtue makes the end right by securing that it is fine for the agent, for, as we saw, it is only if fine things are fine for the agent that they can do these things for their own sakes. In that case, to secure this thesis, I need to show that in the *EN* too Aristotle thinks that only fully virtuous agents can value fine things due to their intrinsic fineness.

I shall offer further reasons for thinking that this conclusion should be extended to all virtues below in section 3.3, in discussing the things Aristotle says about the non-genuine sorts of courage, such as civic courage, as well as about the vices opposite to generosity and to some other particular virtues. For now, I would like only to point out that Aristotle appears to make the same claim about truthfulness as well, although not as explicitly as in the case of courage:

T 47 – *EN* IV.13 [=Bywater IV.7] 1127^a26–30

1127a26 ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἔνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ |
μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷος ἔστιν, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει |
καὶ οὕτω ζῆ, ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἔνεκα πράττη. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ | μὲν
30 ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἔπαινετόν.

|| a26 ἕκαστα P^bC^eL^bB^{95sup}.V: ἕκαστος K^b: ἕκαστον LO^b || a27 λέγει
καὶ πράττει K^bP^bC^eLO^bB^{95sup}.: πράττει καὶ λέγει L^bV(καὶ λέγει mg.)

It is possible to do each of these things [sc. to be truthful, to boast, and to self-deprecate] both with a purpose⁵⁶⁴ and without a purpose. And as each person is, so are the things they say and do, and so they live, unless they are acting with a purpose. And, by itself, falsehood is base and blameworthy, whereas truth is fine and praiseworthy.

⁵⁶⁴ I take it that, in this context, *ἔνεκά τινος* implies that one is acting with a purpose, and not only for the sake of an end, i.e. it implies that one aims for something to be achieved or effected as a result of what one is doing (for this definition of purpose, see Austin [1966, p. 439]). In that case, acting without a purpose would not be tantamount to acting without an end, but would imply that one is not acting aiming for something that one expects to achieve or effect as a result of what one is doing, and hence is performing an action for its own sake.

What this passage suggests to us is that when one tells the truth without a purpose (see footnote 564), one does that for its own sake, and since truth is fine and praiseworthy in itself (1127^a28-30), it may be argued that telling the truth without a purpose implies telling the truth because doing so is fine.⁵⁶⁵

But can we extend these claims to all virtues? I would like to contend that we can, and if the particular virtues are seen in light of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a17–^b9 (read in the way I shall defend below), there is a strong case to be made to the effect that the fine things for which sake the virtues make one act should be taken as the very virtuous actions (or better, as features of these actions) one performs on the basis of virtue. That being said, let us discuss *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a17–^b9.

3.1 Performing virtuous actions virtuously: a discussion of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]

Let me first quote and translate *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a17–^b9:

Τ 48 – *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a17–^b9

1105a17 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ
 μὲν | δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
 20 σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἢ ἤδη
 εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικά | καὶ τὰ
 μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ | τῶν τεχνῶν
 οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι | ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ
 τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν | ἔσται γραμματικός,
 25 ἔὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσῃ καὶ || γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ'
 26 ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν.
 26 ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν
 ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τε-
 χνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει | ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτα πῶς
 ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ | κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἔὰν
 30 αὐτὰ πῶς ἔχῃ, δι|καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔὰν
 ὁ πράττων | πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἔὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ'
 ἔὰν προαι|ρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον
 ἔὰν καὶ | βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ
 1105b1 πρὸς || μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχει οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν

⁵⁶⁵ Such is the view defended by Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 309) and by Joachim (1955, p. 118).

| αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν
| ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν | δύνα-
5 ται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ || σώφρονα
περιγίνεται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σὴφρονα λέ-
γεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σὴφρων πράξειεν·
δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σὴφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα | πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σὴφρόνες πράττουσιν.

|| a17 ante πῶς add. ὅτι L | ὅτι K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ὡς L ||
a20 εἰ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: οἱ B^{95sup}. || a21 τὰ om. LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V
| γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοὶ K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: μουσικοὶ καὶ γραμ-
ματικοὶ P^bC^c || a24 καὶ γραμματικόν τι K^bP^bC^cV: τι καὶ γραμ-
ματικόν LL^bO^bB^{95sup}. || a26 ἔτι K^bLL^bO^b: ἔτι δ P^bC^c | τε
om. LL^bO^bB^{95sup}. || a27 γινόμενα K^bP^bC^cV: γενόμενα LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.
|| a28 οὖν P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τῶι K^b | ταῦτά K^bP^bC^cV: αὐτὰ
LL^bO^bB^{95sup}. || a31–32 ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι'
αὐτά V(προαιρούμενος, καὶ in mg.) E^aG^aM^b Arab. (165.18–19: إِذَا كَانَ
إِخْتِيَارُهُ لِأَنفْسِهِ وَكَانَ إِخْتِيَارُهُ لَهَا مُخْتَارًا لَهُ [idā kāna muhtāran labu wa-kāna ihtiyārabū
iyyābu li-nafsihī]): *deinde se eligens, et eligens propter hec* TrL: ἐὰν προαι-
ρούμενος δι' αὐτά LL^bO^bB^{95sup}: *deinde si volens propter hec* Burg.: καὶ
προαιρούμενος διὰ ταῦτα K^bP^bC^c || a31 ante ἐὰν add. καὶ P^bC^c ||
a32 ἐὰν καὶ K^bP^bC^c: καὶ ἐὰν L^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐὰν L || b1 μὲν om. L |
τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: τὰς ἄλλας ἔχειν τέχνας
L || b2 τὸ om. K^bP^bC^c p.r.V || b2–3 οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν K^bP^bC^c: μικρὸν
ἢ οὐδὲν LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || b4 [post] ἅπερ add. καὶ LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: εἴ-
περ Bywater || b6 ἢ K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: εἴη L^b | ὁ om. P^bC^c || b8
ὁ om. P^bC^c | καὶ K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἢ L^b | οἱ om. LO^bB^{95sup}.

[17] But someone might question in which sense we mean that it is necessary to per-
form just actions to become just, and to perform temperate actions to become tem-
perate,⁵⁶⁶ for if people perform just and temperate actions, [20] they are thereby⁵⁶⁷
just and temperate, just like if people do grammatical and musical things, they <are
thereby> grammarians and musicians. Or not even in the case of the arts is this so?
In fact, it is possible to do something grammatical also by accident or under someone
else's instruction. Thus, if one not only makes something grammatical but also in a
grammatical way, one will then be a grammarian. [25] And this [sc. what is grammat-

⁵⁶⁶ In these two sentences the participle appears to convey the leading thought, whereas the finite verb the subordinate thought (cf. Smyth §2147 and Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §490, 2, p. 98) (For this reading, see Zingano's translation [2008, p. 46]). Although Aristotle said previously, at *EN* II.1 1103^a34–^b2, that 'we become just by performing just actions, temperate by performing temperate actions, and courageous by performing courageous actions' (τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σὴφρονα σὴφρόνες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρείοι), the presence of δεῖ seems to change matters a bit here in T 48, since the claim that one must become virtuous by performing virtuous actions is seemingly compatible with one being able to become virtuous by some other means. In order to avoid this issue, it would be better to think of the claim made here is that to become virtuous one must perform virtuous actions, in which case the problem raised in the *aporia* would be asking for some specification of the sense in which this is meant. I shall come back to this below in discussing the objection raised by Hampson (2021) against the traditional reading of the *aporia*.

⁵⁶⁷ I am taking ἢδη here to have logical/causal sense. That Aristotle can use ἢδη in this way, is something first recognised by Bonitz (1870, s.v. ἢδη, 314^a10–19), but whose recognition became widespread after the work of Anscombe (1956, p. 8). That this is the sense of ἢδη here in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] is assumed by Irwin's translation (1999, p. 22). Similarly, see Hampson (2021, p. 14n18).

ical and is done in a grammatical way] is what is done on the basis of the grammatical knowledge in oneself.

Moreover, things are not similar in the case of the arts and <in the case of> the virtues. That is, regarding the things created by the arts, the 'well' is in them, so these things' having been produced as being of a certain sort suffices.⁵⁶⁸ But the things that occur on the basis of the virtues are not performed with justice or temperance if they are themselves [30] of a certain sort,⁵⁶⁹ but if the agent performs them being in a certain condition as well: First, if they do these things with knowledge; second, if they do them having decided on them in that they have decided on them on their own account; and third, if they do them being firm and unmovable as well. Yet in respect to [1105b1] having the other things, i.e., the arts, these <conditions> are not taken into account, with the exception of knowledge itself. But in respect to having the virtues knowing has no influence or <just> little influence, whereas the other <conditions>, the very ones that result from performing just and temperate [5] actions many times, mean no small thing, but everything.

Thus, states-of-affairs are said to be just and temperate whenever they are such as <states-of-affairs> the just or the temperate agent would bring about. And just and temperate is not the person who brings about these things, but the person who brings them about in the same way the just and the temperate bring them about.

This passage presents several issues that should interest us (some of which were already mentioned previously). For that reason, before getting into how exactly it can support the claim that all virtues, in making one perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, make one act for the sake of the very virtuous actions one performs, I shall analyse it in some detail:

It begins by posing a problem regarding the claim that one must perform virtuous actions to become virtuous, which could be objected to to the extent that if one performs virtuous actions one would thereby be virtuous. Accordingly, it would not be correct to say that virtue must be acquired by means of the performance of virtuous actions.

If there is no difference between the actions that lead to virtue and the actions one performs on the basis of virtue, it seems that performing virtuous actions would imply that one is thereby virtuous. As I have remarked above in **Chapter 2** (in **section 2.3.3**), although *EE* II.1 does not explicitly draw a difference between actions that lead to virtue and actions that spring from virtue, there is a hint at some difference between what leads to the best disposition

⁵⁶⁸ See footnote 572 for my reasons for translating $\pi\omega\varsigma$ ἔχοντα in this way here.

⁵⁶⁹ See footnote 572 for my reasons for translating $\pi\omega\varsigma$ ἔχῃ in this way here.

and what is done on the basis of the best disposition, since someone who possesses the best disposition does these things best: these actions are different *in the way they are performed*.⁵⁷⁰

In *EN* II.1, by contrast, there is no hint at such a difference, which opens the way for the problem raised in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4].

Given the analogy between virtues and arts (from lines 20–21), on which basis the objection is raised, it seems that denying (as Aristotle does at lines 1105^a21–27) that bringing forth the product of an art is sufficient for saying that the person who produced it has the art would be enough for answering the objection.⁵⁷¹ Nevertheless, Aristotle proceeds to offer us a second answer (introduced by $\epsilon\tau\iota$ in line 26), which relies on a disanalogy between virtues and arts.

⁵⁷⁰ In that case, Aristotle would not be completely liable, in the *EE*, to this objection raised in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], in spite of this problem not being formulated in the *EE*. *Contra* London (2001, p. 566), who thinks that the way Aristotle puts forwards his claims in the *EE* is unclear to the extent that his claims are open to an objection. For ‘if the activities necessary to acquire virtue are the very activities that are produced by the exercise of the virtues, then it becomes unclear how one can acquire virtue if one is not already virtuous.’ Whereas in the *EN* this objection is explicitly addressed in II.3. In any case, even if we concede London’s point, if the common books are read as part of the *EE*, it seems that this objection is somehow addressed in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12–13].

⁵⁷¹ So argues Broadie (1991, p. 119n17), according to whom the argument posing the problem assumes that (1) virtues are analogous to crafts, and (2) doing something grammatical is a sufficient condition for being proficient in grammar. Now, Broadie goes on, Aristotle answer in 1105^a21–27 consists in denying (2), ‘which is all that he needs for his main point; but then as if to be on the safe side he takes this opportunity to argue against (1).’ Similarly, for the idea that Aristotle gives two different answers to the problem raised in this chapter, see Albert the Great (*Ethic.* Lib. II, Trac. I, c. X, §10 [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 164]), Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L II, 4 19–23), Vettori (1584, p. 85), Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 137), Maurus (1668, p. 41, §2 and §3), Ramsauer (1878, p. 96), Grant (1885, vol. 1, pp. 493–494), Stewart (1892, vol. 1, p. 183), and Irwin (1999, p. 195).

Taylor (2006, p. 82), by contrast, thinks that the answer presented in lines 1105^a21–27 does not address the problem that would arise from the formulation in II.1, since, according to him, saying that one can do the things prescribed by an art without possessing it would have no bearing on the problem that arises from the idea that, for instance, ‘we become builders by building,’ which Taylor takes to suggest that one can acquire a skill by exercising it.

However, I think this issue pointed out by Taylor is unfounded. The problem being discussed in the passage does not come from Aristotle having said earlier that one must acquire an art by means of exercising it (a claim that was not made by Aristotle), but from the claim that one must, for instance, build houses in order to become a house builder, which would only seem to imply that one must engage in housebuilding to build a house, and not that one’s housebuilding is expressive of the housebuilding craft. Then, by showing that people who are not housebuilders are able to build houses (which Aristotle does by distinguishing between doing the things prescribed by an art without possessing it and doing these things on the basis of one’s own technical skill), Aristotle’s answer proves to be coherent with how his claims were formulated in II.1.

In showing how arts and virtues differ, Aristotle contends that the good condition ($\tauὸ \epsilonὖ$) of the products of the arts lies in these very products, whereas actions are performed virtuously if not only they are of a certain sort ($\epsilonἰς αὐτὰ πως ἔχῃ$) (say, just or temperate),⁵⁷² but if the person who performed them is in a certain condition as well. This implies that in the *EN* too there is an important sense in which the actions that lead to virtue differ from those that are done on the basis of virtue, such that only virtuous actions done on the basis of virtue would also be done virtuously.

As I have already indicated in the previous chapter (in **section 2.3.3**), it is telling that what I am calling virtuous actions here are things like $\tauὰ δίκαια$ and $\tauὰ σώφρονα$, which Aristotle will describe in 1105^b5ff as $\piράγματα$, i.e., states-of-affairs. This suggests quite strongly that what Aristotle has in mind here are things that turn out to be just and things that turn out to be temperate, which is congenial to how he dealt with the notions of $\tauὸ ἄδικον$ and $\tauὸ δίκαιον$ in *EN* V (see the discussion above in **section 1.3.1**). In that case, $\tauὰ δίκαια$ and $\tauὰ σώφρονα$ are not quite descriptions of one's actions, but of the states-of-affairs effected by one's actions. One can involuntarily bring about things that turn out to be just and temperate, but can also do that voluntarily.

What Aristotle is doing in the second answer to the *aporia*, then, is to describe a further way in which one can do things that turn out to be just or temperate, namely justly or temperately. This seems to describe what is required in order for the performance of things that turn out to be just or temperate to count as virtuous activities, i.e., expressions of the virtue of justice and of the virtue of temperance. For instance, withstanding fearful things is something that in certain circumstances amounts to something courageous (i.e., in circum-

⁵⁷² As we saw in **Chapter 1**, in **section 1.3.1.1.3**, this same language of $\epsilonἰς +$ adverb is used in 1137^a23 and in 1137^a25-26 (both in **T 12**) to qualify the way in which something is done (i.e., the particular circumstances of action ignorance of which makes the performance of an action so described involuntary) and not to qualify the way in which the agent performs it (i.e., an agential condition)—or so I have argued.

stances in which doing that in a particular way hits the mean in action), but withstanding fearful things in a way that happens to hit the mean in action is something that may be done either voluntarily or involuntarily, and if it is done voluntarily it may also be done satisfying the agential conditions Aristotle describes in 1105^a31-33, in which case one's withstanding fearful things in that particular way will also count as an activity of courage, i.e., an expression of one's virtuous character disposition.

There are different ways of making sense of this. One of them is to say that what distinguishes virtuous activities from virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous is the way in which they are done. This is the adverbial account of virtuous actions (see footnote 113), according to which virtuous activities *qua actions* differ from virtuous actions only in the way in which they are performed. Yet depending on how we conceive of action description,⁵⁷³ it may turn out that the agential conditions from 1105^a31-33 are constitutive of one's action in such a way that although what is done in virtuous activities to a large extent coincides with what is done by agents who perform virtuous actions that do not count as virtuous activities (in that they amount merely to the voluntary doing of things that turn out to be virtuous), virtuous activities are actions to be described in a way different from virtuous actions that do not count as expressions of virtue.

Moreover, it should be noticed that virtuous activities are virtuous not only in that they hit the mean in action, but also in that they hit the mean in emotion, whereas virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous do not hit the mean in emotion. Accordingly,

⁵⁷³ I have in mind here the framework proposed by Rescher (1970), according to which considerations about the rationale of action (which includes considerations of causality, finality, and intentionality) are part of the description of an action. In that case, even if two actions coincide with respect to act-type (e.g., both involve withstanding fearful things), modality (i.e., manner and means), and setting (circumstances), they can still be distinguished from one another on the basis of the motives that led the agent to perform them. My contention is that, for Aristotle, the fact that voluntarily doing things that happen to be virtuous and voluntarily doing that on the basis of virtue differ in the motivation behind these actions is sufficient for saying that these two actions are relevantly different.

there is a case to be made to the effect that virtuous activities are virtuous to a higher degree than other virtuous actions. This is congenial to the proposal made by Fernandez (2021) in regard to *EN* V I have rejected above (in section 1.3.1) as an interpretation of what Aristotle says in the passages from *EN* V Fernandez analyses. Although I think that Fernandez is fundamentally mistaken in thinking that virtuous activities enjoy a *conceptual* priority over virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous (see, for instance, my footnote 271), I nevertheless think that there are reasons for conceding that virtuous activities can be described as being prior to virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous without thereby conceding that they are definitionally/conceptually prior: in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], different from *EN* V, it seems that Aristotle may indeed be making the point that virtuous activities are virtuous to a higher degree than virtuous actions in that the latter only hit the mean in action whereas the former hit the mean both in action and in emotion, similar to how the friendship based on virtue is friendship to a higher degree than the friendship based on usefulness and than the friendship based on pleasure in that the friendship based on virtue is also useful and pleasant.⁵⁷⁴ Thus, Aristotle would have a very clear answer to question (V) in the *EN*, an answer to the effect that i) agents who are not fully virtuous (such

⁵⁷⁴ I owe the comparison of what is going on in the relationship between virtuous activities and other virtuous actions to the relationship between complete friendship (i.e., friendship based on virtue) and the other sorts of friendship to Fernandez (2021, pp. 349ff). My reasons for accepting this, however, differ from his, since I do not think that Aristotle accepts (in the *EN*) that there is a conceptual priority among the three different sorts of friendship, to the effect that friendship due to virtue is conceptually prior to the other sorts of friendship. As a matter of fact, although Aristotle ends up showing that friendship on the basis of virtue is the first friendship, this is not done on the basis of the arguments by means of which he establishes the conceptual unity of friendship: in the *EN*, friendship seems to be a unified concept due to similarity (*καθ' ὁμοιότητα*), and this establishes no hierarchy and thus no conceptual priority among the different kinds of friendship. To show that virtue friendship is first relatively to the other friendships, Aristotle advances an independent argument that despite establishing a hierarchy among the different sorts of friendship, does not establish conceptual priority among them. Accordingly, this is to be contrasted with the reductionist program that can be found in the *Eudemian* discussion of friendship, in which the three types of friendship are related to one another *πρὸς ἕν*—seemingly conceived in a way different from how it is conceived in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Γ (I owe this point to Professor Marco Zingano). For a discussion of the type of conceptual unity that friendship has in the *EE* and in the *EN* and the relationship between the different sorts of friendship in the argument advanced in the *EN*, see Zingano (2015a).

as intermediate agents or learners) can voluntarily perform actions that are really virtuous in that they can voluntarily do things that hit the mean in action, ii) actions that hit the mean in action are the sorts of action one must perform to become virtuous, and iii) virtuous activities are virtuous actions that may be described as being virtuous to a higher degree than other virtuous actions in that they hit the mean both in action and in emotion. As a result, his second answer to the *aporia* presents us with a much clearer position about how virtuous actions should be conceived than the views expressed by Aristotle in the common books and in the *EE*. Moreover, in making reference to the mean in action and the mean in emotion, and in defining virtue as *στοχαστική* of both these means (cf. *EN* II.5 [=Bywater II.6] 1106^b14–16 and 27–28), Aristotle seems to advance a view on virtuous activities that is slightly different from the one advanced in the *EE*. As we saw, there is reason for thinking that, in the *EE*, although the virtues are praiseworthy due to issuing in actions that hit the mean in action, the particular praiseworthiness of virtuous activities is due to the virtues on which basis they are accomplished. In the *EN*, in turn, the mean in emotion, which is what captures the agential condition constitutive of virtuous activities, is something by reference to which the virtues are defined, and not something whose specific praiseworthiness is explained by virtue.

But why exactly does Aristotle introduce this second answer to the *aporia*?

A first alternative is to say that this second answer is somewhat redundant: as Broadie puts it (see footnote 571), although denying the premise of the *aporia* that says that doing something grammatical (for instance) is a sufficient condition for being proficient in grammar would be enough for answering the *aporia*, Aristotle ‘as if to be on the safe side,’ argues against the other premise on which the *aporia* depends, namely the premise that virtues are analogous to crafts.⁵⁷⁵ Yet this seems to be an *ad hoc* solution, which should only be favoured if we cannot

⁵⁷⁵ This is somewhat similar to, but still different from the position held by Vettori (1584, p. 85), who thinks this second argument advanced by Aristotle proceeds *κατ’ ἀντιπαράστασιν* (on the notion of *ἀν-*

find a clear argumentative role for Aristotle's second answer.

A second alternative is to say that in distinguishing between the good condition in the case of the products of the arts and in the case of actions, Aristotle is describing further requirements that must be satisfied by our actions if they are to lead to virtue: e.g., they must be performed with motives that are to some extent virtuous if one is to become virtuous by performing them. Accordingly, it would seem that virtuous actions only lead to virtue if they are performed for the sake of the fine, since only such a motivation can secure the reliability required for the performance of virtuous actions to lead one to virtue.⁵⁷⁶ I have briefly spoken about this second alternative, whose main proponent is Marta Jimenez, above in footnote 111, but let me present her position more clearly now. Jimenez's argument depends on how she reads four claims made by Aristotle:

First, the idea expressed in *EN* II.1 1103^b6ff according to which every virtue comes into being and is destroyed by the same things to the effect that we become (e.g.) good housebuilders by building houses well, and bad housebuilders by building houses badly (*ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί*). This may be taken as suggesting that only virtuous actions that are to some extent performed well (*εὖ*) in the sense in question in 1105^a26ff contribute to the acquisition virtue.

Second, the claim made in *Met.* Θ.8 1049^b29–1050^a2 that the learner must possess something of the science they are learning, in which case it would seem that, in order to

τιπαράστασις, see, for instance, Ammonius' commentary on *Cat.* 4^a21ff), in which case this argument would not really accept the premises of the *aporia*, which I think is not quite the case here. At any rate, Vettori will be right in thinking that this argument works irrespective of whether one solves the problem regarding the arts, since even if we concede that a person who builds a house already has the art of house-building, this would be irrelevant for the virtues, since performing virtuous actions is not sufficient for virtue, which requires these actions to be performed virtuously. In this sense, this argument would be like an *ἀντιπαράστασις* in so far as it works even if one were to make a concession to the argument to be rejected (although Aristotle does not entertain any concession in this passage, different from what he does in *Cat.* 5 4^a28–29).

⁵⁷⁶ This is the view defended by Jimenez (2016, pp. 18ff; 2020, pp. 23, 43, 49, 85).

become virtuous, one must exercise a condition that has something of virtue already.

Third, Aristotle's description of the civic courage due to shame as being due to a desire for the fine (for, as Aristotle says, it is a desire for honour) or due to an aversion to blame (which Aristotle says is base), which suggests that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can, like civically courageous agents, be motivated by the fineness of the actions they perform.

Fourth, Aristotle's claim in *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b15–16 that people who live on the basis of *πάθος* 'do not even have a notion of the fine and of the truly pleasant in that they did not have a taste of it' (*τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες*). This suggests that agents who do not live on the basis of *πάθος* (e.g., those comprised by the adequate audience for Aristotle's Ethics) have some notion of the fine and of the truly pleasant and taste both what is truly pleasant and what is fine, a claim that may be taken as implying that fine things are indeed fine to, and experienced as in themselves pleasant by, agents who fail to be fully virtuous.

Accordingly, it may seem that there is good reason indeed for thinking that agents who fail to be fully virtuous can decide on, and perform, virtuous actions for their own sakes, except that, because they lack full virtue, they would not be able to do that on the basis of a stable and unchanging disposition. And, moreover, that in giving his second answer to the *aporia* Aristotle means to say that voluntarily doing things that count as virtuous such as *τὰ σώφρονα* and *τὰ δίκαια* does not suffice for becoming virtuous, for if these things are to contribute to virtue, they must also be done well to some extent: e.g., due to virtuous motives.

But because my main concern for now is to show that only fully virtuous agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, and because it is not necessary to concede to Jimenez's claims about moral habituation in order to claim that agents who are not fully

virtuous can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes⁵⁷⁷ (which claim is my present target), I shall address Jimenez arguments for holding that Aristotle's second answer to the *aporia* is introducing further requirements that must be satisfied by virtuous actions if they are to be effective in changing one's habits below in section section 3.3, and shall focus now on the interpretation of the three criteria for performing virtuous actions virtuously introduced by Aristotle in lines 1105^a31-33.

But before doing that, let me introduce a third way of understanding why Aristotle gives his second answer to the *aporia*: this third alternative consists in saying that Aristotle's second answer is necessary if he is to show that habituation is indeed necessary for becoming virtuous. This reading has been recently advanced by Hampson (2021, pp. 14ff), and depends fundamentally on the observation that the *aporia* Aristotle is responding to is not one about the sense in which we mean that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions, which would be motivated by the fact that one must be virtuous already to perform such actions, but one about the sense in which we *must* ($\delta\epsilon\iota$) perform virtuous actions to become virtuous, which would be motivated by the fact that if people perform virtuous actions they are thereby virtuous (see above my footnote 566).

There are, however, different ways of construing Aristotle's argument on this alternative. Hampson herself thinks that in introducing a disanalogy between the crafts and the virtues, Aristotle is stressing that 'the truth conditions for virtuously and skilfully performed actions are different,' so that while habituation does not contribute to knowledge (which is all that is required for doing something skilfully), it is required for the agential conditions char-

⁵⁷⁷ Hampson (2019; 2021; 2022), for instance, holds a view according to which any action that hits the mean contributes to the acquisition of virtue at initial stages of moral habituation. On her view, it is only in later stages, when one is already quite close to becoming fully virtuous, that performing virtuous actions for their own sakes comes into play, since, on her account, it is by adopting the agential perspective of the fully virtuous that the learner ultimately internalises it and can become fully virtuous, so that from inconsistently being able to perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine they become able to do that consistently, which is a mark of the fully virtuous.

acteristic of doing something virtuously (as Aristotle will make clear in lines 1105^a33–^b5). I think the third way of understanding why Aristotle introduces his second answer to the *aporia* is correct, but there is an important issue in how Hampson construes the argument that should be relevant for our purposes: Hampson thinks that in saying that the good of products of the arts lies in their being of a certain quality, whilst the good of actions depend on the agent who performs them being in a certain condition as well, Aristotle means to contrast the requirements of doing something skilfully and of doing something virtuously. Yet in discussing the case of the crafts, Aristotle has just pointed out that doing something skilfully also depends on the agent being in a certain condition, namely on the agent bringing about the product on the basis of knowledge. As a result, in saying that the good of the products of the crafts depend merely on these products being of a certain quality, Aristotle *cannot* be talking of doing these things skilfully. As I take it, the contrast is slightly different: Aristotle is rather saying that there is no relevant difference between a good product done on the basis of the craft knowledge in the agent and a good product done by accident or under someone else's instruction. What characterises the product of a craft as a good product of that craft is merely the fact that it fulfils its *ἔργον* well. In the case of the actions, in turn, their being excellent actions depends not merely on objective qualities they have, but also on the agent performing them being in a certain condition. Accordingly, it is not only the case that two of the three agential condition required for performing virtuous actions virtuously can only be achieved through habituation (as Hampson rightly argues), but also that there is a substantial difference between virtuous actions performed virtuously and virtuous actions, since only the former also count as accomplishing the good in action (as I take it, this is because only virtuous actions performed virtuously count as contributing to practical/political *εὐδαιμονία*).⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁸ An open question that I cannot address here is whether performing virtuous actions virtuously is also required for achieving contemplative *εὐδαιμονία* or not. In *EN* X.8 1178^b5–6, all Aristotle says is that in

That being said, let me now focus on the three criteria for performing virtuous actions virtuously. As I have already indicated above in **section 0.1** (in the **Introduction**), the precise meaning of the three requirements from 1105^a31–33 is object of dispute. A first (and much overlooked) difficulty is connected to how these three criteria are related to the criterion from *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a18–20 (in **T 6** above),⁵⁷⁹ according to which acting in such a way that one is virtuous is tantamount to acting ‘on the basis of decision and for the sake of the very actions being performed’ (*διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων*).

As we saw in **section 1.3** and in **section 1.3.3**, there are basically two ways to proceed here if my interpretation of *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a18–20 turns out to be correct. A first alternative is to say that the view expressed in the common books (and, as I have argued in **Chapter 2**, in the *EE* as well) was modified in the *EN*, to the effect that in the common books and in the *EE* performing virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes or on their own account is sufficient for full virtue, whereas in the *EN* it is not. This is what can be defended on the orthodox readings of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], according to which an agent who is not fully virtuous cannot perform virtuous actions virtuously in that they cannot perform such actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*, despite the fact that they can perform such actions *εἰδώς* and *προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά*.⁵⁸⁰

so far as one is a human being and lives with other people, they must chose (*αἰρέεται*) to do *τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν*, which is seemingly compatible with people being able to achieve contemplative *εὐδαιμονία* without being fully virtuous from a moral standpoint, provided that they do not voluntarily perform vicious actions, something that would destroy their *εὐδαιμονία* (as is suggested by the argument from *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b33–1101^a13).

⁵⁷⁹ And, by the same token, *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1136^a3–5 (in **T 8**), a passage in which one is said to be just whenever one voluntarily performs a just action (*δικαιοπραγῆ*) having decided on it (*προελόμενος*), to which Aristotle adds that one only performs a just action (*δικαιοπραγῆ*) if one acts voluntarily; and *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1134^a17–23 (**T 10**), a passage in which, conversely, Aristotle says that the person who does wrong (i.e., who voluntarily does things that happen to be unjust) is not *eo ipso* unjust since they may not have done it ‘due to the authority of decision’ (*διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν*).

⁵⁸⁰ As far as I am aware, this view was first explicitly articulated quite recently and seemingly independently by Hardie (1980, p. 403) (only in the second edition of his book) and by Burnyeat (1980/2012a, pp. 87–88)—see footnote 70 for other people who expressed commitment to this view afterwards. Yet this reading is compatible with views expressed in the work of previous scholars who also hold that the *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* criterion concerns one’s character disposition and that it can only be satisfied by fully

A second alternative, which is the one I am going to defend, is to abandon the orthodox reading of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] and to argue that *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a18-20 read in light of what Aristotle says elsewhere in the common books and in the *EE*,⁵⁸¹ is consistent with what Aristotle says in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. In that case, it seems that the criterion from *EN* VI.13 1144^a18-20 should be understood as equivalent (extensionally) to the three criteria from *EN* II.3 1105^a31-33 combined, since performing virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes would be sufficient for performing virtuous actions virtuously. So, the second criterion from *EN* II.3 1105^a31-33 would also be sufficient for performing virtuous actions virtuously as well, in which case it would seem that it is not possible to satisfy the second criterion without also satisfying the first and the third criteria.

There are, however, two different ways of construing the relationship between the three criteria from *EN* II.3 1105^a31-33 on this reading:

On the first one, an agent who is not fully virtuous can perform virtuous actions *εἰδώς* and *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*, but they cannot perform virtuous actions *προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*.

On the second one, an agent who is not fully virtuous can perform virtuous actions *εἰδώς*, but they cannot perform such actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* and/or *προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*, for these two conditions cannot be satisfied by agents who are not fully virtuous.

virtuous agents, which opens the way for the second criterion to be satisfiable by agents who are not fully virtuous.

⁵⁸¹ As I have indicated (in section 1.3), although it is possible to read *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a18-20 not as presenting a condition that is sufficient for determining whether one is fully virtuous, but as merely giving an example of the type of condition that is required for determining whether one is fully virtuous (which is compatible with performing virtuous actions having decided on them for their own sakes not being sufficient for being fully virtuous), this makes poor sense of the passages from *EN* V I discussed in section 1.3.1.

Now, to think about whether we should go back to the orthodox reading of *EN* II.3 1105^a31-33, and if not, about how we should construe the relationship between its three criteria, I propose that we should take into account a second major difficulty regarding this text: the meaning of each of the three criteria in discussion in these lines.

3.1.1 Aristotle's first criterion: performing virtuous actions εἰδώς

It seems that the εἰδώς criterion can be understood in at least four different ways.⁵⁸² The first of them, according to which the knowledge in question is that provided by φρόνησις, should be rejected. As a matter of fact, the sort of knowledge involved in φρόνησις cannot be of little or no use for having the virtues as Aristotle will say (in lines 1105^b2-3) about the knowledge required for performing virtuous actions virtuously (for an argument along the same lines, see Williams [1995, pp. 14-15]): as we saw above, in *EN* VI.13 1144^b12-13 (in T 17), φρόνησις does indeed make a practical difference (see also footnote 309 for the idea that this, in this passage, Aristotle, in talking of νοῦς, means to talk of φρόνησις). This implies that the knowledge involved in φρόνησις cannot be the sort of knowledge Aristotle is referring to with the first criterion.

The second way of understanding the εἰδώς criterion is to take the knowledge in question in this criterion to amount to some sort of awareness of what one is doing, which may or may not be construed as the sort of knowledge required for performing an action voluntarily.⁵⁸³ However, as Vasiliou, 2007, p. 55 rightly notices, awareness of what one is doing

⁵⁸² There is a fifth way of understanding this criterion that I am rejecting straightaway, namely Walter Burleigh's (*Expositio*, L 2 Tract. 1 Cap. 4, f. 31ra) suggestion, made in his *notandae* to this passage, that Aristotle will end up saying that the sort of knowledge he has in mind here does not contribute to virtue because he has theoretical knowledge in mind rather than practical knowledge.

⁵⁸³ This awareness of what one is doing is construed as the sort of knowledge required for acting voluntarily by Dirlmeier (1959, p. 307) and by Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, p. 130), but making this connection is not necessary. For a reading of the εἰδώς criterion according to which it implies a sort of awareness of what one is doing, but this is not conflated with the knowledge requirement of voluntary action, see B. Williams (1995, pp. 14-15). Similarly, see Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L II, 4 59-61).

appears to be equally important (or unimportant) for both the arts and the virtues, while Aristotle says that the sort of knowledge he is concerned with in the first criterion is all that is important for the arts, but is unimportant for the virtues.

The third way of understanding the εἰδώς criterion, which was first defended by Richard Loening (1903, pp. 177-178), consists in thinking that acting εἰδώς implies some sort of knowledge about the moral principles that can be had not only by practically wise agents, but also by continent and incontinent agents, which would have knowledge both of the moral principles (in fact, both of them seem to have some sort of knowledge of what is good) and of whether these principles are in harmony or in conflict with the action they are performing (since for both of them there is a conflict between these principles and their sensibility, and in the case of incontinent agents they end up doing voluntarily something different from what is prescribed by the moral principles they know).⁵⁸⁴

The fourth way of understanding the εἰδώς criterion is quite similar to the third, but is more deflationary. It takes εἰδώς to imply a sort of knowledge analogous to the sort of knowledge that plays a central role in the arts, so that the idea would be that the agent must act on the basis of some knowledge that secures the success of their actions, so that their success in action is not haphazardly achieved, but is due to a knowledge of a sort that has not been specified yet. This is the view defended by Zingano (2008, pp. 114-115) in his commentary.⁵⁸⁵

Both these two last readings are tenable, but I would like to contend that the latter is more reasonable due to the fact of it being more deflationary. Loening's reading, according to

⁵⁸⁴ This reading is quite similar to the one proposed by Vasiliou (2007, p. 55), who is seemingly unaware of Loening's view. On Vasiliou's formulation, Aristotle is talking of the kind of knowledge shared by practically wise, incontinent, and continent agents

⁵⁸⁵ Perhaps the same reading is behind what the anonymous scholiast says about this passage (cf. *CAG*. XX, 129.14-15: *πρώτον μὲν εἰ εἰδότηως ποιεῖ καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τύχης*), but this is not certain given that the only other thing it says about it is that acting with knowledge excludes not only acting by chance, but also acting under someone else's direction (*CAG*. XX, 129.20-21: *μὴ ἀπὸ τύχης ἢ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου*).

which acting *εἰδώς* implies some sort of knowledge about the moral principles that can be had not only by practically wise agents, but also by continent and incontinent agents, requires us to make a series of assumptions that are not warranted by the present passage, but depend not only on arguments Aristotle will only develop in later books, but also on a very particular way of understanding these arguments. By contrast, Zingano's reading supposes only that there is a sort of knowledge in the moral realm that would be analogous to that which plays a central role in the arts. At any rate, Zingano's reading is compatible with the point made by Loening, since (1) having this sort of knowledge would be insufficient for action, so that incontinent agents, for instance, could have it, but would not even perform virtuous actions on its basis; and (2) the sort of knowledge required for performing virtuous actions virtuously may turn out to be some sort of knowledge about moral principles, despite the fact that all this passage establishes is that there is a sort of knowledge in the moral realm that is similar to that found in the arts. Yet Zingano's reading is also compatible with construing the knowledge shared by practically wise agents and intermediate agents in ways considerably different from Loening.

That being said, let me now say something about the Aristotle's third criterion.

3.1.2 Aristotle's third criterion: performing virtuous actions βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων

The meaning of the third criterion (according to which to perform virtuous actions virtuously one must perform them *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*) is also disputed. I have pointed out in the **Introduction** that there are reasons for thinking that this should not be understood as saying that one must perform virtuous actions on the basis of a stable and unchanging disposition. Instead, it seems that it should be understood as saying that one must perform

virtuous actions *without hesitation*.⁵⁸⁶ But even if this is correct, it is not so clear how this lack of hesitation should be conceived of. A first alternative is to think of it as requiring the agent not to waver between ϕ ing and $\neg\phi$ ing at different moments (as suggested by Zingano [2008, p. 117]).⁵⁸⁷ This would not only rule out cases in which after ϕ ing on some occasion the agent later regrets having done so due to having changed their mind (as suggested by the anonymous scholiast [*CAG*. XX, 127.17–129.21], which construes the third criterion in terms of lack of regret),⁵⁸⁸ but would also capture the more general idea that acting *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* requires consistency in the way one acts (as suggested by Averroes' [Ibn Rushd's] middle commentary [p. 22r I]).⁵⁸⁹ In any case, performing virtuous actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* would be necessary for performing virtuous actions virtuously, but in performing virtuous actions in this way one will not thereby be fully virtuous. As a matter of fact, it may be argued that continent agents may be consistent in performing virtuous actions, but they are not thereby fully virtuous.

A second alternative (which can be gathered from the commentaries of Albert the Great [*Super Ethica* L. II, Lect. IV, 105.5–6, 105.5–6, 110.81–84, 111.10–11; *Ethic.* Lib. II, Trac. I, c. IV, §12 [=Borgnet, 1891, p. 473]],⁵⁹⁰ Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L II, 4

⁵⁸⁶ As is suggested by Zingano (2008, p. 117).

⁵⁸⁷ Zingano (2008, p. 117) spells out the lack of hesitation precisely with the idea that one should not sometimes be committed to ϕ ing and sometimes committed to $\neg\phi$ ing: 'Talvez Aristóteles queira enfatizar somente que o agente não pode estar em um estado de hesitação, ora adotando a, ora adotando $\sim a$, sem por isso comprometer-se a já lhe atribuir uma disposição moral bem estabelecida.'

⁵⁸⁸ See also *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1150^b29–30 and the anonymous scholia to this passage (*CAG*. XX, 438.8–18), which conceives of the lack of regret attributed to intemperate agents as being due to the unintermittent character of vice. Accordingly, the virtuous agent, like the vicious, will not regret the actions they voluntarily perform. Agents who fail to be fully virtuous, in turn, will experience regret even when they perform the virtuous actions they think they should perform, since in performing such actions they are sacrificing (e.g.) pleasures that they also value, for which reason they may experience displeasure in performing virtuous actions.

⁵⁸⁹ 'Third, that they are firm and immovable, such that they perpetuate actions' (*tertio ut sint firmæ habentes se non mutabiliter, i. ut perpetuent actiones*). Similarly, see Magirus (*Corona Virtutum moralium* p. 139): 'At last, consistency in action is also required, so that the agent always desires to act from virtue, whenever the opportunity is offered to him' (*Denique, requiritur etiam constantia in agendo, nimirum ut agens semper cupiat ex virtute agere, quotiescunque ei oblata fuerit occasio*).

⁵⁹⁰ In his first commentary, Albert paraphrases the third criterion in the following way: 'and the third

71–76],⁵⁹¹ and Piero Vettori [1584, pp. 86–87]⁵⁹²) is to take this lack of hesitation as being about one's motivation.⁵⁹³ Accordingly, someone would be *βεβαίως* and *ἀμετακίνητος* if, for instance, they abide by their decision and are not altered by emotion or appetite, that is, if they are firm and unchanging in their motivation to perform virtuous actions. Thus, due to

<criterion> is that <the agent> acts firmly as if they were made stable by habit' (*et tertium est, quod firmiter operetur quasi stabilitus per habitum*); later, in answering some difficulties, Albert gives another description of what is involved in satisfying the third criterion: he says that 'firmness in acting is on the behalf of the inclination to the action' (*firmitas vero in operer est ex parte inclinationis ad actum*). While the first description of third criterion is somewhat obscure, the second one suggests more clearly that Albert thinks that this is a consequence of habit (as he also makes clear in his first description) *that has to do with one's motivation for action*.

In his second commentary, however, we come across a slightly different picture. He says the following: 'Besides, if one is not firm and unchanging in the disposition of temperance and justice while acting, then the capacity that is acting wavers due to its strength not being sufficiently established by habituation. Again, the acting would be imperfect. Moreover, if one is not unchanging in accordance with habit, one is moved by the power of passions, and would act with difficulty, and the deed would once more be imperfect' (*Adhuc si non firme haberet et immobiliter operans in habitu castitatis et justitiae: tunc tremet potentia operans, in virtute suae potestatis non sufficienter posita per habitum: iterum imperfecta esset operatio. Adhuc si non immobiliter se haberet operans secundum habitum, vi passionis moveretur, et cum difficultate fieret, et esset opus iterum imperfectum*). Now, as I shall point out below, Albert's interpretation of the third criterion in his second commentary points in the direction that it should be understood as being about the stability of one's moral disposition, given that the first formulation he gives for the third criterion is in terms of the stability and strength of one's moral disposition. Nevertheless, Albert mentions two consequences of not having a stable disposition that are connected to the point I purport to make in regard to the third criterion: first, that if one is not unchanging in one's disposition, then one's capacity to act wavers in so far as it lacks strength, which seems to imply that one's motivation is not sufficient to see through what one decides to do. Albert's second formulation is clearer in that regard: due to not being unchanging in one's habit, one is then moved by passions. Lack of stability in one's disposition implies that one's motivation is easily defeasible. As will be clear in the sequence, the view I purport to defend is quite different from the one Albert advances in his second commentary, for I do not think it is necessary to commit ourselves to thinking that *this passage* grounds the stability of one's motivation in the stability of one's character disposition (although this might turn out to be Aristotle's position on the matter).

⁵⁹¹ 'Moreover, the third <condition> is acquired in virtue of habit, so that someone has a virtuous decision and acts on its basis firmly (that is, constantly) in regard to oneself, and unchangingly (that is not driven away from this by nothing exterior)' (*Tertium autem accipitur secundum rationem habitus, ut scilicet aliquis firme, id est constanter, quantum ad se ipsum, et immobiliter, id est a nullo exterior ab hoc removeatur quin habeat electionem virtuosam et operetur secundum eam*). Aquinas' view is closer to the reading of the passage I shall argue in favour of, for he takes the third criterion to imply two things: consistency in the way one acts, and stability in one's motivation. In saying that the third criterion points to a condition such that one has a decision and acts on its basis without being driven away by other things, what Aquinas seems to be pointing to is a condition that secures firmness in one's motivation to perform virtuous actions.

⁵⁹² 'And the third <condition> was that the person who is not changed and altered by some accident or event, but who is constant in her good deliberation does these things with a firm spirit. For how could someone who has not stationed oneself, always resisting to all pleasures and portentous delights, and who <does not> abide to one's own resolution, be called temperate?' (*tertium autem erit, ut illa gerat firmo animo, & qui non varietur, immuteturque casu aliquo atque euentu, sed constans sit in illa optima deliberatione; quomodo enim temperans dici posset, qui non secum statuisset, semper sibi ab omni libidine, & obscena voluptate temperare, atque in eo proposito maneret?*). Like Aquinas, Vettori also construes the third criterion as being about one's motivation, as his commentary makes clear.

⁵⁹³ On this reading, what is relevant is whether the agent is firm in unchanging in their motivation to

being *βέβαιος* and *ἀμετακίνητος*, one would consistently act in the way one decides to and would not hesitate in acting in such a fashion (due to not being altered by emotions or desires that would oppose one's decisions).

It is not so clear, however, how demanding this condition is. More recently, a quite demanding version of this reading has been entertained *en passant* by Angioni (2009b, p. 200n30), according to whom doing something *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* would amount to doing something without internal conflict and hesitation about its correction, a condition which he suggests is demanding to the extent that it cannot be satisfied by virtuous actions performed by continent agents (as mentioned in footnote 593). But, as we shall see below, it is also possible to construe the motivational reading of the third criterion in such a way that both continent and fully virtuous agents can satisfy it in that both are not altered by emotion.

But before going into more detail about these two different ways of construing this second alternative (according to which the third criterion concerns one's motivation), let me say a bit more about its differences in regard to the first way of thinking about lack of hesitation:

The first alternative (the one defended by Zingano) construes lack of hesitation diachronically. The upshot of this would be requiring a condition that is not intermittent and that secures one's commitment to virtuous actions throughout time.

On the second alternative, by contrast, lack of hesitation is thought of synchronically, since what is important is whether the agent does not waver between what they have decided on and something else that may appear good or pleasant to them at the same time. In other words, so construed the third criterion may be understood as a requirement about the *whole-*

perform a virtuous action. More recently, something along these lines has been suggested by Angioni (2009b, p. 200n30), although, as we shall see, he explicitly conceives of the third criterion as being satisfiable only by fully virtuous agents.

heartedness of one's decisions.⁵⁹⁴ Besides, this second alternative has diachronic consequences as well, since being such as not to be affected by emotions and appetites also appears to secure some consistency in the performance of virtuous actions throughout time.

Lack of hesitation construed diachronically seems to require nothing more than consistency in the performance of virtuous actions. No doubt this is compatible with (B)—see the discussion above in **section 1.3.3**—, since it could be argued that this sort of consistency is only achievable by fully virtuous agents, and that this would be what distinguishes them from intermediate agents. Intermediate agents could then perform virtuous actions on the basis of decision (to be more precise, having decided on them on their own account) and for their own sakes, but would still be different from fully virtuous agents on the grounds that they cannot do that on a regular basis.

Yet even if it is true that only fully virtuous agents are truly safe from error, this is nevertheless compatible with the existence of a few fortunate agents in the course of whose lives their proneness to err remains an unfulfilled possibility. This would mean that what, on this reading, would ultimately distinguish between agents who are fully virtuous and agents who are not fully virtuous that happen to be consistent in performing virtuous actions as well is merely the counterfactual that the latter could have erred (i.e., could have performed a vicious action voluntarily) given their character disposition, despite not having erred in the course of their lives.

I think this would make Aristotle's argument a bit far-fetched given his silence about

⁵⁹⁴ For a discussion of the notion of *wholeheartedness*, see Frankfurt (1988). Note however that the case I have in mind here is not one in which there is a conflict between what one really wants and the desire by which the agent is most powerfully moved (one of the two types of incoherence of one's volitional aspects distinguished by Frankfurt—cf. p. 164). In fact, in cases of *ἐγκράτεια*, the desire that ends up moving one is precisely one's higher order volition, so that one does indeed end up doing what one really wants. However, because one is pained in doing what one really wants in such cases (i.e., what one has decided on), there is still a sense in which one is acting on a desire on which one would prefer not to act, since from the appetitive point of view the agent would prefer rather to pursue the pleasure for which they have an appetitive desire. I thank Jennifer Whiting for pressing me on this issue.

what is implied in acting *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* and given that, in the *EN* (different from the *EE*), he does not describe as lucky those agents who act well despite their foolishness (like those from **T 40** above).

Thus, if it is plausible to construe the third criterion as a criterion about lack of hesitation, fully virtuous agents should be distinguished from agents who fail to be fully virtuous by reference to more than the latter's actual (or counterfactual) lack of consistency,⁵⁹⁵ in which case (B) should be rejected as way of making sense of what distinguishes fully virtuous agents and agents who fail to be fully virtuous like intermediate agents. In that case, it remains that they are to be distinguished by reference to the fact that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account (as in [A'], in [A''], and [A''']—see the discussion above in **section 1.3.3**).⁵⁹⁶

But what about the orthodox way of construing the third criterion?

As I have indicated in footnote 590, parsing *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* in terms of the stability and unchangeability of one's character disposition goes back to something

⁵⁹⁵ In the context of the discussion of the notion of moral worth, Markovits (2010, p. 213) raises further worries about what bearing one's behaviour in counterfactual scenarios has on the moral worth of one's action in one's actual circumstances: 'even if my psychological profile provides an answer to the question of how I would have been motivated to act in other circumstances, that answer does not help determine the moral worth of my action in my actual circumstances. We do not think a relatively low-cost right action is made worthier by the fact that the agent who performs it (for the right-making reasons) would have done so even had the cost to him been higher. So we should not think it less worthy because the agent who performs it (still for the same right-making reasons) might not have done so had the cost been higher.' Similarly, see Sliwa (2016, pp. 400-401), who thinks that counterfactual robustness is not to be given up completely in matters of moral worth, but that the relevant type of counterfactual stability required for the moral worth of actions is the one that is consequent upon moral knowledge.

⁵⁹⁶ As I have indicated above in **section 1.3.3**, according to (A') agents who are not fully virtuous can decide on virtuous actions on their own account, but their performance of such actions cannot be due to their having decided on such actions on their own account, since they are not sufficiently motivated by the moral value of virtuous actions alone. According to (A''), agents who are not fully virtuous cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account because they see virtuous actions as merely instrumental to a further fine end they aim at for its own sake (a position I have argued is ultimately inconsistent if it turns out that fine things are only fine for fully virtuous agents). According to (A'''), in turn, agents who are not fully virtuous cannot perform virtuous actions for their own sakes because they do not grasp the moral value of the virtuous actions they perform. Rather, they decide on these actions due to their contributing to a fine end that they do not aim at for its own sake (i.e., that they do not aim at due to its intrinsic fineness).

Albert the Great says in his second commentary to the *EN* (but which is absent from his first commentary). But as I have indicated in footnote 70, it nevertheless became widespread throughout the 20th century. The plausibility of this reading comes mainly from the fact that Aristotle without a doubt thinks that virtue is stable and unchanging, and accordingly that things on the basis of virtue like the friendship based on virtue and virtuous actions performed on the basis of virtue are stable and unchanging (see footnote 281 for an exhaustive listing of the relevant passages).

The point about the activities brought off on the basis of virtue is made in *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] in the context of the discussion of Solon's view of judgments of happiness as being only appropriate when the agent is beyond the reach of base things and misfortunes, namely when he is already dead. The point that matters for our purposes is that the assumption that happiness is something stable and in no way easy to change (*τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον*), which figures in the argument from *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^a31–^b4 as something that causes (*διὰ* + acc.) an *aporia*, appears to be recast in Aristotle's answer. Aristotle first establishes (in 1100^b9–10) that activities on the basis of virtue (i.e., virtuous activities) are in control of happiness (*κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*), and then contends that 'in no human work stability occurs as in the case of activities on the basis of virtue, for these seem to be more stable than the sciences even, and the most honourable among these [sc. the sciences] are most stable due to the blessed persons spending most of their lives continuously on them' (1100^b12–16: *περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐταὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι*). Thus, it seems that whatever stability and unchangeability happiness has is due to the stability and unchangeability had by the virtuous activities that are in control of (i.e., are *κύριαι* of)

happiness.

In that case, it would be quite plausible for Aristotle to say that for virtuous actions to count as virtuous activities⁵⁹⁷ they must be stable and unchanging, which requires them to be performed on the basis of a stable and unchanging disposition: virtue.

This is very compelling, but, as I take it, not decisive. Aristotle could admit all that and still think that the third criterion concerns not the stability of the disposition on which basis one acts, but one of the effects of having such a disposition: a stable and unchanging motivation. In that case, one could say that the three criteria of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], when combined, describes the effects of having a stable and unchanging character disposition, and hence that none of them describes directly the stability and unchangeability of one's character disposition.

Before presenting my philosophical argument to this effect, however, let me point out what I take to be a difficulty for the orthodox reading of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. As mentioned above in **section 1.3.3**, Zingano (2008, p. 117) emphasises that *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* makes no explicit mention of the *ἔξις* of the agent, which would be expected if the point here were that performing virtuous actions on the basis of a stable and unchanging *ἔξις* is necessary for acting virtuously. This means that, if a *ἔξις* is in question here, it is being referred to obliquely by the use of *ἔχω* + adverb in the expression *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*.

Yet—repeating what I have said above in **section 1.3.3**—the three criteria Aristotle introduces in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] 1105^a30-33 spell out the condition the agent is in when they perform a virtuous action (their *πῶς ἔχων πράττει*), and the first and second conditions are clearly not *ἔξεις*, despite counting as components of the agent's *πῶς ἔχων*:

⁵⁹⁷ And perhaps this what distinguishes virtuous activities from successful activities in the domain of the crafts, where it suffices if the product has the required characteristics, irrespective of how it has been made.

this is most clear in the case of the second condition, since acting *προαιρούμενος* is acting on the basis of *προαίρεσις*, and this is clearly not a description of a *ἔξις*—albeit of course this can be described as an effect of virtue, which is a *ἔξις προαιρετική*. Similarly, acting *εἰδώς* is not a matter of acting while having some knowledge (which will certainly be a *ἔξις* of the agent), but of acting by exercising some knowledge one has about what one is doing.

Besides, not only the context of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] gives us no particular reason for thinking that in using *ἔχω* + adverb he means to describe the agent's *ἔξις*, but we also saw that in the common books—most notably in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] and in *EN* V—he also uses expressions with *ἔχω* + adverb to talk of agential conditions, and not to describe the agent's *ἔξις*.

In light of this, I would like to argue that interpreting *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* as describing not the agent's *ἔξις*, but an agential condition (either one related to the agent's motivation for performing the present action, or, less plausibly, one related to the agent's consistency throughout time—and thus that extends beyond his present action) not only makes better sense of other uses Aristotle makes of *ἔχω* + adverb to qualify the way in which one is performing an action, but also makes better sense of what may be involved in calling someone *βέβαιος* and *ἀμετακίνητος*.

I mean, the author of the *MM* uses quite similar language in *MM* B.VI.12 1201^b5-6, where an opinion is described as vehement (*σφοδρὰ*) 'due to it being stable and inexorable' (*τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον*), in which case it would not differ (in regard to *ἀκρασία*) from *ἐπιστήμη* (*οὐθὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης*). This passage is parallel to *EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1146^b24-30, where Aristotle also equates a sort *δόξα* to *ἐπιστήμη* in so far as some persons holding an opinion do not hesitate (*οὐ διστάζουσιν*) but believe to know with precision (*ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι*), and are no less convinced of the things they have an

opinion about than other persons are convinced of things of which they have an *ἐπιστήμη*.

In the face of this, I would like to contend that *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* criterion is a motivational counterpart of being *βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπειστον*, and should hence imply that one must be stable and unalterable in their motivation just like someone who has *ἐπιστήμη* may be described as being stable and inexorable in their convictions (as a matter of fact, Aristotle actually describes the *ἐπιστήμων* as *ἀμετάπειστος* in *APo* I.3 72^a37–b4) (I shall come back to this point below in **section 3.1.4**).

Furthermore, this would be in line with the uses of the expression '*βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετακίνητος*' made by later authors. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for instance, reports a praise to Appius in his *Roman Antiquities* that uses this expression in a way that suggests that being '*βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετακίνητος*' is tantamount to not being swayed in one's judgments by fear or pleasure (*Antiquitates Romanae*, VIII.74.1). He says that Aulus Sempronius Atratinus praises Appius as someone who is, among other things, 'firm and unshaken in his judgements and who does not yield to fear or gives in to favours' (pp. 24–2: *βέβαιον τε καὶ ἀμετακίνητον ἐν τοῖς κριθέϊσι καὶ οὔτε φόβῳ εἶκοντα καὶ χάρισιν ὑποκατακλινόμενον*), to which Aulus Sempronius adds 'I shall always continue to praise and to admire him both for his prudence and for the nobility he has in the face of dangers' (pp. 2–4: *ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐπαιῶν αὐτὸν καὶ θαυμάζων διατελῶ τοῦ τε φρονίμου καὶ τῆς γενναιότητος ἣν παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχει*).

Now, in the *EE* Aristotle uses an expression somewhat close to *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* in a way that seems to qualify the agent's liability to be motivated in a certain way, and this does not seem to be a description of the agent's *ἕξις*, for Aristotle explicitly says that it is due to the agent's having a certain character disposition: Aristotle classes as insensible (*ἀναίσθητοι*) those agents who are unmoved (*τοὺς ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας*) in regard to certain pleasures (sc. those pleasures the temperate and intemperate persons are connected

with) *because of their insensibility* (*EE* III.2 1230^b13–14: *τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναίσθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς*). Thus, being *unmoved in regard to certain pleasures* is not a description of the agent's insensible character disposition, but something that is explained by the agent's insensible character disposition.

Accordingly, in talking of an agent who is *ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* (in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]) Aristotle may not be referring to the unchangeability of someone's disposition, but rather to the fact that this person is not prone to changes in their motivation (whether this characteristic is due to the fact that this person has a stable and unchanging character disposition like virtue would not be the point of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4], but is nevertheless compatible with what he says here).

It remains to see, then, if in the *EN* too Aristotle thinks that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account. For, if this is not the case (i.e., if it turns out that agents who are not fully virtuous can perform virtuous actions for their own sakes), the task of distinguishing between agents who are virtuous in that they perform virtuous actions virtuously and agents who are not virtuous in this sense would fall to the third criterion, which, in that case, would necessarily have to be read as implying that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*.⁵⁹⁸

I do not think that there is sufficient material in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] to settle this issue, for which reason I shall ultimately resort to some things Aristotle says in his response to an objection raised against the claim that both the virtues and the vices are voluntary (in *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5]—see **T 50** below), in his discussion of the object of *βούλησις* (in *EN*

⁵⁹⁸ *Pace* Gibson (2019), who thinks that the three criteria from *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] can be satisfied both by fully virtuous agents and by agents who are not fully virtuous like the continent, except that the latter would not satisfy these criteria in the same way as the fully virtuous, but in a second best way.

However, this seems to be in direct conflict with how Aristotle introduces the three criteria in 1105^a28ff, since Aristotle claims that if one does (e.g.) temperate things (*τὰ σώφρονα*) *εἰδώς, προαιρουμένος δι' αὐτά*, and *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* one has done temperate things temperately, which appears to be sufficient grounds for saying that the agent is temperate (cf. 1105^b7-9).

III.6 [=Bywater III.4]—see T 53 below) and in two passages in which he appears to restate points made there (namely, *EN* IX.9 1170^a14-16—T 54—and *EN* X.6 1176^b23-27—T 55), and in his treatment of the particular virtues (once again of courage—see T 56 below). In analysing these texts, I intend to show that, in the *EN* too, Aristotle thinks that fine things are fine only for agents who are fully virtuous, to the effect that only fully virtuous agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes. But before delving into that, I need first to talk about Aristotle's second criterion, which will then allow me to express myself more clearly (in section 3.1.4) about what hangs on the interpretation of the third criterion.

3.1.3 Aristotle's second criterion: performing virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account

In Chapter 1, in section 1.3.3, I argued that the agential conditions discussed by Aristotle in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12], in several passages from *EN* V, and in *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] should be understood as being about the way in which one performs a given action. In that case, with talk of acting *προαιρούμενος* Aristotle would be thinking of *προαίρεσις* as the principle of one's action, i.e., as something that explains the action the agent is currently performing. Accordingly, with talk of performing virtuous actions *προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά* he may be taken as saying not merely that to perform virtuous actions virtuously one must perform them on the basis of decision, but also that not any old decision will do, for one must perform virtuous actions *due to having decided on them on their own account*. In that case, it would seem that the 'καὶ' from 'προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά' should be exegetical, and is specifying the way in which one should act *προαιρούμενος*: one must perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them in the sense of having decided on them on their own account.

This is central for the argument as I want to construe it, since a bit later in the *EN*, in book III, Aristotle will describe continent agents as acting *προαιρούμενοι*, in contrast to incontinent agents, who do not act *προαιρούμενοι*, but *ἐπιθυμούντες* (cf. *EN* III.4 [=Bywater III.2] 1111^b13–15: *καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ*). Thus, if one intends to show that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions having decided on them on their own account, a *desideratum* is that the continent agents (and whoever else who is not fully virtuous but can also perform virtuous actions *προαιρούμενος*) are not *προαιρούμενοι* in the same way as fully virtuous agents.

No doubt Aristotle may in some instances talk of *προαίρεσις* normatively, thinking not of any old *προαίρεσις*, but of a *προαίρεσις* to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. As I have suggested above in section 1.3.1, this appears to be the case in *EN* V, where he repeatedly says that voluntarily doing just things (i.e., performing just acts—*δικαιοπραγήματα*) due to *προαίρεσις* is sufficient for being just, which can only be compatibilised with what he will later say in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a19–20 (and thus also in a common book) if Aristotle did not have any old *προαίρεσις* in mind, but a decision to perform just acts for their own sakes. Yet there is no reason for thinking that this is always the case, since, as we saw, in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144^a19–20 he once again seems to feel the need to specify that he is not talking of any *προαίρεσις*, but of a *προαίρεσις* to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes.

Now, *‘προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά’* is not, however, the text transmitted by the majority of the extant mss. In fact, of the main Greek mss. for establishing the text of the *EN* (see the discussion in section 0.3.2, in the **Introduction**), only V (the Vind. Phil. 315) reads *‘προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά.’* Yet not only is this the text being

translated by the Arabic translation, but also what is transmitted by the other extant Greek mss. can be explained as the result of errors of copy.

In fact, the Greek mss. of the α family ($K^b P^b C^c$) read 'καὶ προαιρούμενος διὰ ταῦτα' and it is not hard to imagine one's eye skipping 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος' and copying only 'καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,' and it is also perfectly possible that further down the road or even before that 'δι' αὐτά' was corrupted into 'διὰ ταῦτα,' thus explaining why $K^b P^b C^c$ have 'καὶ προαιρούμενος διὰ ταῦτα,' whereas the other representant of the α family—the Arabic translation—probably translates a text that had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.'

Similarly, most mss. of the β family ($LL^b P^b B^{95sup.}$) read 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,' which can be without any difficulty explained away as the result of a homeoteleuton.⁵⁹⁹

What is most interesting stemmatically (see Loungi's *stemma* above in section 0.3.2) is that both V and the *recensio pura* of Grosseteste's translation (TrL) have something that corresponds to 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.' In the case of V , this suggests three scenarios:

- (1) both sub-hyperarchetype $\alpha 1$ and sub-hyperarchetype $\beta 1$ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,' in which case both K^b (which goes back to $\alpha 1$) and L^b (which goes back to $\beta 1$) would have a text that results from an error of copy;
- (2) sub-hyperarchetype $\alpha 1$ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,' while sub-hyperarchetype $\beta 1$ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,' in which case K^b would have a text that results from an error of copy, while V has 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ

⁵⁹⁹ A remaining problem I am leaving aside here concerns E^a , which also reads 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.' This reading is unexpected given E^a 's position in Loungi's *stemma*, since neither P^b nor L (i.e., E^a 's exemplars) read 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.' Accordingly, the text of E^a would seem to be either a conflation of the text of P^b (i.e., 'καὶ προαιρούμενος διὰ ταῦτα') and the text of L (i.e., 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά') or else the result of contamination from F or V , both of which read 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.' In the latter case, it seems that Loungi's *stemma* should also be revised in this regard.

προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά' due to being contaminated by *α1*.

- (3) sub-hyperarchetype *β1* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά,*' while sub-hyperarchetype *α1* had '*καὶ προαιρούμενος διὰ ταῦτα,*' in which case *K^b* would be reproducing a mistake that is already present in its exemplar, whereas *L^b* would have '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά'* due to an error of copy of which *V* is safe.

This picture is complicated by the *recensio pura* of Grosseteste's translation. As a matter of fact, Grosseteste's translation (which has '*deinde se eligens, et eligens propter hec*') departs from the translation by Burgundio of Pisa that it was revising (which has '*deinde si volens propter hec*'), and there seems to be two scenarios in which this could be explained within Loungi's *stemma*:

- (A) *β2* (on which Grosseteste's translation depends for this revision) had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';
- (B) *γ* (on which the *gemelli* depend and which also contaminates Grosseteste's translation) had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*'

Accordingly, since (A) and (B) are not really incompatible with one another, there are nine possible scenarios:

- (1AB) *α1, β1, β2,* and *γ* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';
- (1A) *α1, β1,* and *β2* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';
- (1B) *α1, β1,* and *γ* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';
- (2AB) *α1, β2,* and *γ* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';
- (2A) *α1* and *β2* had '*ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*';

(2B) $\alpha 1$ and γ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά';

(3AB) $\beta 1$, $\beta 2$, and γ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά';

(3A) $\beta 1$, and $\beta 2$ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά';

(3B) $\beta 1$, and γ had 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά';

Now, (1AB), (1A), (1B), (2AB), and (3AB) can be put aside in so far as they are not economical explanations. Thus, it seems that the dispute should be between (2A), (2B), (3A), and (3B). What matters for my purposes, is that in either of these cases we have good explanations as to why both V and the *recensio pura* of Grosseteste's translation have 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά'. The only alternative to these would be to assume that Grosseteste's revision of Burgundio of Pisa's translation is also contaminated by V or by F (a copy of V that also reads 'ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά' here), and so that Loungi's *stemma* should be revised so as to include this. Ultimately, a decision in this regard depends on further study of Grosseteste's translation that lies outside the scope of this Dissertation, for which reason I shall leave it aside.

In any case, to come back to my philosophical point regarding the second criterion, if am right that it is possible to take this criterion as being satisfiable only by fully virtuous agents (and below I intend to offer further reason for pursuing this alternative), it seems that we have two alternatives regarding the third criterion: it is either something that can only be satisfied by fully virtuous agents as well, or else something that can be satisfied even by agents who cannot satisfy the second criterion. That being said, let me go back to Aristotle's third criterion.

3.1.4 Back to Aristotle's third criterion and the difference between fully virtuous agents and agents who fail to be fully virtuous

If I was right in arguing that taking the third criterion as describing one's *ἔξις* is not the best way of making sense of what Aristotle means by *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*, it remains that *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* is either a consistency requirement or else a motivational requirement, and both alternatives can be make good sense of the argument and would suffice for the claim that interests me, namely that only fully virtuous agents can perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account. Yet I would like to argue that understanding the *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* criterion motivationally has some further philosophical advantages.

First of all, as I have already suggested above, this allow us to see this criterion as being a motivational counterpart of an idea that goes back to Plato's *Timaeus*, but which has traces in things Aristotle says in describing the person who has *ἐπιστήμη ἀπλῶς*, and in things that can be found in the discussion of *ἀκρασία* in the *MM* (which allow us to bring into the fore things Aristotle says in the parallel passage in the *EN*).

In 51e1ff, in listing differences between *δόξα* and *νοῦς*, Plato says that 'one of them [sc., *νοῦς*] is unmovable by persuasion, whereas the other [sc., *δόξα*] is open to dissuasion' (51e4: *καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν*). This contrast recurs in the *Definitiones*, in which *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* are contrasted in that the first is defined as *a belief of the soul unchangeable by argument* (414b10: *Ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου*), whereas the latter is defined as 'a belief that can be dissuaded by argument' (414c3: *Δόξα ὑπόληψις μεταπειστός ὑπὸ λόγου*). This description of *ἐπιστήμη* is given as an example in several passages from the *Topics* (cf. V.2 130^b15–18, 4 133^b29–31, 133^b36–134^a4, 5

134^a34–^b1, 134^b16–18, VI.8 146^b1–2). Besides, in the *APo* Aristotle contends that ‘the person who intends to have the *ἐπιστήμη* that comes through demonstration must not only get to know the principles more and be more convinced of them than of what is demonstrated, but neither <must> something else be more convincing to them nor more familiar <to them> than what contradicts the principles from which the syllogism of the contrary error arises, *if indeed the person who is a ἐπιστήμων simpliciter must be inexorable*’ (*APo* I.4 72^a37–^b4: τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα δείξεως οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς μᾶλλον γνωρίζειν καὶ μᾶλλον αὐταῖς πιστεύειν ἢ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἄλλο αὐτῷ πιστότερον εἶναι μηδὲ γνωριμώτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐξ ὧν ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὁ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἀπλῶς ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι).

As I have indicated above, this idea comes up again in the *MM*, where a δόξα is said to be vehement (σφοδρὰ) due to being stable and inexorable (τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον), and in the parallel passage from the *EN* (*EN* VII.5 [=Bywater VII.3] 1146^b24–30), although this language does not recur, but talks of a type of δόξα had by people who do not hesitate but believe they know with precision.

Still in *EN* VII, Aristotle talks of incontinent agents as being easy to dissuade (εὐμετάπειστοι), in contrast to vicious agents, who are not so (cf. *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a11–14: ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὐ). Given the context, it seems reasonable to assume that vicious agents are rather ἀμετάπειστοι (a qualification whose exact force depends on how we understand their being described as ἀνίατοι).

Continent agents, in turn, are compared to obstinate agents, who are δύσπειστοι and οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι, but their similarity is compared to that which holds between the profligate

person (ὁ ἄσωτος) and the generous person (ὁ ἐλευθερίος) and that which holds between the rash person (ὁ θρασύς) and the confident person (ὁ θαρραλέος), and, for that reason, despite their similarity, continent and obstinate agents are said to differ in many respects (cf. 1151^b4–8), perhaps similar to how profligate persons differ from generous persons. These differences (described in 1151^b8–12) should not matter for our purposes. What matters is the fact that this passage seems to suggest that continent agents are οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι and this is a respect in regard to which they are similar to obstinate agents (they differ, among other things, in that continent agents are εὐπειστοι).⁶⁰⁰

What I am proposing regarding the *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* is that it may be describing the motivational counterpart of being *βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετάπειστος* in regard to one's convictions about the good. It seems that both the *φρόνιμος* and the vicious are *βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετάπειστος* in regard to their convictions about the good, and accordingly may perform the actions they believe are right *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*, except that the *φρόνιμος* will perform in this way actions that are virtuous, whereas vicious agents will perform in this way actions that are vicious instead.⁶⁰¹ Incontinent agents, in turn, because they are not *ἀμε-*

⁶⁰⁰ The traditional way of construing the idea that continent agents differ from obstinate agents in that continent agents are *εὐπειστοι* is to say continent agents are *easy to persuade* (presumably about the right thing to do), in contrast to obstinate agents who are *δύσπειστοι* in that they are *hard to persuade* (presumably about the right thing to do). However, although interpreting *εὐπειστοι* in these terms is something that goes back to Estienne (*Thesaurus graecae linguae* s.v. *πείθω* vol. 3, pp. 131–133), it seems plausible to understand the adjective *εὐπειστος* in a different sense, as describing not the ease of being convinced about something that characterises a given person, but rather the quality of their conviction. In that case, in saying that continent agents differ from obstinate agents in that continent agents are *εὐπειστοι*, Aristotle would be saying that they differ in that continent agents have a good conviction, i.e., are right about what they should do. Despite not being attested in the dictionaries, this would be a possible meaning of *εὐπειστοι* given how the prefix 'εὐ-' is usually employed, and which would make perfect sense of the parallel between the case of the profligate person and the generous person on the one hand, and of the rash person and the confident person on the other. As a matter of fact, virtuous and vicious agents are also distinguished by the fact that virtuous agents are right about what they should do (and thus could be described as having a good conviction), whereas vicious agents are mistaken about what they should do (and thus could be described as having a bad conviction).

⁶⁰¹ This does not imply that vicious agents cannot perform virtuous actions. However, when they perform virtuous actions this is something they are not doing having decided on it on its own account (say, because it is something they do only as a means to secure some further end—e.g., pleasure or honour) to begin with.

τάπειστοι in their convictions about the good (for, as we saw, they are rather εὐμετάπειστοι), will clearly not be able to perform virtuous actions βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων, but nor will they perform vicious actions in this way, for they do not believe that they should act in the way they end up acting in episodes of incontinence⁶⁰² (cf. 1151^a20-24—quoted above in section 1.3.3.1—, and *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a5-11—quoted in footnote 226).

Things are not so clear in the case of continence, though. At any rate, even if it turns out that being ἀμετάπειστος does not imply that one is really incapable of being dissuaded, but only that one is really hard to dissuade,⁶⁰³ a *desideratum* is that being ἀμετάπειστος in this sense is still different from being merely οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι, for one who is ἀμετάπειστος would be rather πάνν δυσμετάπειστος⁶⁰⁴ (to use language similar to *Cat.* 8 9^a1-4—see footnote 603). If this is so, it would seem that, accordingly, continent agents also do not perform virtuous actions βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων, because they are not as hard to dissuade as fully virtuous agents.

But if being ἀμετάπειστος does really imply that one cannot be dissuaded, then there is

⁶⁰² Considerations on action description are relevant here, for there is a sense in which neither do vicious agents think they should act in the way they are acting, namely if one describes what vicious agents do in terms of vicious actions. As a matter of fact, in performing vicious actions vicious agents are convinced that so acting is good, be it because they think that this is something fine for them to do given the circumstances, be it because it is something they deem good as a means to some further end they pursue.

⁶⁰³ This is suggested by *Cat.* 8 9^a1-4, where Aristotle describes a *ἕξις* as being a *διάθεσις* that, after a long time, has already become natural and incurable or really hard to change (*ἀνίατος ἢ πάνν δυσκίνητος*), and one could think that Aristotle is not saying that these are alternatives, but is rather spelling out what he means by incurable as really hard to change (in which case ἢ would be introducing some sort of correction on the part of Aristotle).

⁶⁰⁴ Although Aristotle never uses the expression *δυσμετάπειστος*, because it is unclear whether *δύσπειστος* (an expression he uses to characterise obstinate agents) indicates that one is hard to persuade or that one has a bad conviction (see footnote 600), I have used this language here to characterise someone who is οὐκ εὐμετάπειστος but is not thereby ἀμετάπειστος, since, given the parallel from *Cat.* 8 9^a1-4 (see footnote 603), someone who is ἀμετάπειστος would not be merely *δυσμετάπειστος*, but πάνν *δυσμετάπειστος*. Moreover, note that I am assuming here that both obstinate agents and continent agents are to be characterised as οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι, something that only makes sense if, in *EN* VII.10 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b4-12, Aristotle is not taking being *δύσπειστοι* and being οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι as synonymous (in which case the *καὶ* connecting these two expressions would be exegetical). In that case, continent agents are to be contrasted with incontinent agents in that the first are εὐμετάπειστοι, whereas the latter are not. This issue certainly requires further discussion to be settled, but doing this lies outside the scope of this Dissertation.

no doubt that continent agents cannot perform virtuous actions *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*. As a matter of fact, on this reading, fully virtuous agents cannot be dissuaded, and thus their motivation is not liable to change, whereas continent agents, despite being hard to dissuade, are still liable to dissuasion (as evinced by the fact that they are in some sense conflicted about what they are doing), in which case their motivation would not be really stable and unchanging.

Moreover, although there is a sense in which continent agents *are not altered by emotion* (cf. *EN* VII.10 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b8–10 and 27–28), and although Aristotle says that both the continent and the temperate agents are such as not to do anything against reason due to bodily appetites (cf. *EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b34–1152^a1), it is nevertheless true that there is a sense in which the continent person's base appetites mar the stability of their motivation, preventing us from saying that it is really *unchanging*, even though it remains *unchanged* when continent agents perform virtuous actions. In the sequence to *EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b34–1152^a1, at 1152^a1–3, Aristotle continues his argument saying that continent and temperate agents differ in so far as the continent has base appetites, whereas the temperate does not—that is, in so far as the temperate person is such as not to take pleasure against reason, whereas the continent is such as to take pleasure against reason, but not such as to be led to act against reason. This strongly suggests that there is indeed a sense in which the continent's commitment to act in the way they do in episodes of continence is not really unchangeable, but is always threatened by their appetites.

No doubt there are different ways of construing this. A first alternative is to adopt (A')—the view according to which intermediate agents can decide on virtuous actions for their own sakes, but cannot perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account, since the moral value of these actions is not sufficient motivation to lead them

to action (see the discussion above in **section 1.3.3**).

In that case, the idea could be that because continent agents need to overcome base appetites in order to perform virtuous actions, and, because (according to [A']) the fineness of the actions they have decided on is insufficient motivation for the performance of these actions, they can only secure the performance of virtuous actions by appealing to things extraneous to the moral value of these actions, which are not reliable sources of motivation for the performance of virtuous actions.

Another alternative, which I prefer, is to adopt (A''')—the view according to which intermediate agents cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account in that they do not properly grasp the moral value of the virtuous actions they perform, but are motivated by a fine end that they do not aim at for its own sake, but for some further reason.

In that case, their motivation would not be unchanging for the simple fact that, because they not even grasp the intrinsic fineness of the actions they perform to begin with, they have no safe incentives (to use Kant's expression) for leading them to action, but need to rely on incentives whose relation to the virtuous actions they perform is to some extent contingent.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰⁵ This would be close to what Kant says about non-moral grounds of action, which are contingent and precarious, since although they can issue in action in accordance with the moral law, they may lead, in many cases, to actions that are contrary to it, for which reason, according to Kant, something is morally good not only if it conforms with the moral law, but is also done for its own sake:

'For in the case of that which should be morally good, it is not enough that it is *in conformity with* the moral law, but it must also *be done for its own sake*; otherwise, that conformity is only coincidental and contingent, since the non-moral ground will certainly bring about, now and then, actions in conformity <with the moral law>, but will bring about actions that are against the <moral> law as well' (*GMS*, Ak. IV, p. 390.4-8: Denn bei dem, was moralisch gut seyn soll, ist es nicht genug, daß es dem sittlichen Gesetze *gemäß* sey, sondern es muß auch *um desselben willen geschehen*; widrigenfalls ist jene Gemäßheit nur sehr zufällig und mißlich, weil der unsittliche Grund zwar dann und wann gesetzmäßige, mehrmalen aber gesetzwidrige Handlungen hervorbringen wird)

Now, although continent agents would be prone to err due to relying on, so to say, non-moral grounds of action, it seems that they nevertheless are not as inconsistent as this at first sight suggests, for it might be the case (as I assumed) that continent agents are to some extent virtuous in the domains of their

In favour of this second alternative, I shall argue that, in the *EN*, Aristotle not only also thinks that fine things are fine only for fully virtuous agents, but is also explicitly committed to the idea that the end of every activity (including activities on the basis of fully virtuous dispositions and on the basis of dispositions that fall short of being fully virtuous) is relative to the disposition on the basis of which these activities are brought off.

Accordingly, the end of virtuous activities would be exclusive to fully virtuous agents, since when agents who are not fully virtuous perform virtuous actions, they are not engaging in virtuous activities since they are not acting on the basis of virtue to begin with. In that case, the activity they are engaged in will have an end relative to their non-fully virtuous character disposition, and which is thus different from the end of virtuous activities.

3.2 The relationship between one's ends and one's character disposition

Let me now turn to the other passages I have mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter. In *EN* X.8 1178^a16-19, later in the treatise, we come across, as I said, what seems like a division of labour between virtue and reason:

T 49 – *EN* X.8 1178^a16-19

1178a16 συνέλευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ
| ἠθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἶπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς
φρο|νήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν |
τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
 || a16-17 συνέλευκται ... ἀρετῇ om. Arab. (cf. Akasoy&Fidora [p.562n171] and Ullmann [2011-2012, vol. 2, p. 266]) || a17 αὕτη
 P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b: αὕτη Arab. (563.10: بِعَيْنِهَا [bi-'aynibā]): αὕτη
 K^b | τῇ φρονήσει K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b: ἡ σώφροσύνη Arab.

lives in which they are not continent or incontinent, and, in that case, they are in many respects similar to the civically virtuous agents from *EE* VIII.3. For, it would seem that despite the fact that their character disposition in the domain of their lives in which they are liable to continent behaviour is close to vice, in the other areas of their lives they are rather naturally or habitually virtuous, and thus are agents who are in a sense lucky (as I have suggested above in section 2.3.3.1 in discussing T 40).

As we shall see below in section 3.3, something similar would appear to occur with agents who are motivated by shame, since shame may in some instances lead agents to error, since it is not the case that disrepute should always be avoided, nor that honour should always be pursued (on that issue, see Raymond [2017, p. 142]).

(563.10: 'العفة' [*al-iffatu*]⁶⁰⁶—cf. Akasoy&Fidora [p.562n172]) | ante εἰ-
περ add. καὶ L || a18–19 τὰς ἠθικὰς ... κατὰ om. Arab. (cf. Aka-
soy&Fidora [p.562n173])

And practical wisdom is yoked with moral virtue, and moral virtue with practical wisdom, if indeed the principles of practical wisdom are on the basis of the moral virtues, and the rightness of the moral virtues is on the basis of practical wisdom.

If this passage is to be taken as a division of labour of the same sort we encountered in the common books and in the *EE*, it must be read in light the divisions of labour found in the common books. In that case, in saying that the principles of *φρόνησις* are on the basis of the moral virtues, Aristotle would be making virtue responsible for the correctness of the principles of *φρόνησις*, i.e., they would be morally good and fine for the agent due to moral virtue.

Even though this seems to be true, I am not so sure whether this suffices as an accurate description of what this passage is talking about.

Both Michael of Ephesus (*CAG*. XX, 594.34–595.8) and the anonymous paraphrast (*CAG*. XIX.2, 224.12–14) connect the claim from *EN* X.8 1178^a16–19—that the principles of *φρόνησις* are κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς—with the claim that virtue contributes to the attainment of a correct conception of the ends, which was made in *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a14–20 (T 20 above). In doing so, they seem to mean not only that the moral virtues establish the ends aimed by *φρόνησις*, but also that they are required for the agent to attain a correct conception of these ends.⁶⁰⁶

If this or something along these lines (as the alternative from footnote 606) is correct, what we have in T 49 is not quite a division of labour as those found in the common books and in the *EE*, but is nevertheless equivalent to such divisions of labour. Read in such a way,

⁶⁰⁶ Alternatively, Lefebvre (2014, pp. 161–162) interprets the sense in which the principles of *φρόνησις* are κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς by making reference to the claim made in 1144^a31–^b1 (see T 18 above, and its discussion in section 1.3.3.1) to the effect that the best end, which is the principle of the reasoning in practical matters, does not manifest itself but to a virtuous person. In that case, the idea would seem to be that virtue is *required* by *φρόνησις* not only because it establishes a good end, but also because it makes it manifest to the agent.

T 49 suggests that the role of virtue in making the end right is far from being only conative, since it may turn out that it is only if fine things are really fine for the agent that they can really conceive of these things correctly.

As I take it, this seems to commit Aristotle to a view according to which full virtue is necessary if one is to have an adequate grasp (i.e., *φρόνησις*) of what is morally good for oneself, but is not necessary for merely being convinced that morally good things are good for oneself, and thus for merely aiming for morally good ends.

To put it differently, full virtue would be necessary if one is to aim for fine ends for their own sakes (i.e., *qua* intrinsically fine ends), but would not be necessary for merely aiming for fine ends. Accordingly, full virtue is not necessary if one's ends₃ are to be correct in some sense, but it is necessary if one's ends are to be correct in the way they are correct for fully virtuous agents.

Yet not only does this also depend on showing that in the *EN* too Aristotle thinks that it is only for fully virtuous agents that fine things are fine, but there are some difficulties for this claim in the face of *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31-^b25, a passage that is generally overlooked in the discussion of the role of reason in establishing the ends of action.

3.2.1 Establishing ends in correspondence to how one is (EN III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a 31-^b 25)

In *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31-^b25, a passage that is responding to an objection that leads to the conclusion that we are not responsible for our character dispositions, Aristotle is led to a conclusion according to which it is by being of a certain quality that we establish our ends as being of a corresponding quality. This conclusion, despite being in some respects congenial to the idea that only fully virtuous agents really appreciate fineness and thus aim for fine ends for their own sakes, also brings with it a series of interpretative issues in what

concerns the ends aimed at by intermediate agents.

Let me quote this passage in full before discussing it:

T 50 – EN III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25

1114a31 εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ |
 φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός
 1114b1 || ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ
 | μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τῆς ἕξεως ἐστὶ πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς |
 φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ | αἴτιος
 5 τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοίαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα || πράττει,
 διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἢ | δὲ τοῦ τέλους
 ἕφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ | ὄψιν ἔχοντα,
 ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ
 ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν | (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ
 10 κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἶόν || τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν,
 ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ τοιοῦτο ἕξει, καὶ | τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο
 πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ | ἂν εἶη εὐφυῖα), εἰ δὲ ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ | ἀρετῇ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον;
 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ | ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει
 15 ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαί||νεται καὶ κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ'
 ἀναφέροντες | πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος μὴ
 φύσει ἐκάστω | φαίνεται οἰονδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν
 ἐστίν, εἴτε | τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν
 ἐκούσιως | τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἐκούσιόν ἐστίν, οὐθὲν ἦπτον καὶ ἢ
 20 κα||κία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἶη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει | τὸ
 δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει.

εἰ | οὖν, ὥσ-
 περ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν | ἕξεων
 συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοῖ τινες εἶναι | τὸ τέ-
 25 λος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· || ὁμοίως
 γάρ.

|| a31 λέγει P^bC^cLL^bO^b: λέγοι K^bB^{95sup}.V || b1 ποθ' om. B^{95sup}. ||
 b2–3 πως ... ἔσται om. P^bC^c || b3 αὐτὸς K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: αὐτῷ
 B^{95sup}. | εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς L^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (211.5: وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَحَدٌ مِنَ النَّاسِ [wa-
 in lam yakun ahadun min al-nāsi]) Alexander (*Supplementum Aristotelicum*
 X.2, 158.10): si autem nullus Burg.: εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς K^bP^bC^cO^b: si au-
 tem non, non erit aliquis homini Aver.: εἰ δὲ οὐδεὶς L s.l.B^{95sup}. || b4
 κακοποιεῖν K^bP^bC^cL^b: κακὰ ποιεῖν LO^bB^{95sup}.V || b9 καὶ ὁ C^ci.r.
 LL^bO^b(καὶ s.l.) B^{95sup}.(καὶ s.l.) V Arab. (211.9: وَالشَّيْءُ الْأَعْظَمُ الَّذِي [wa-
 l-šay'u l-a'zamu alladī]): εἰ K^bP^bC^ca.r. || b10–11 καὶ | τὸ K^bP^bC^cLV:
 καὶ τῷ B^{95sup}.2i.r.: τὸ δ' L^bM^b: τὸ Vermehren (1864, p. 17n2) || b11
 τὸ om. B^{95sup}. || b13 ἐκούσιον K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἀκούσιον L^b
 || b15 τοῦτ' B^{95sup}.V Asp. (CAG. XIX.1, 79.17): ταῦτα K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^b
 || b16 μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: ἐκάστω μὴ φύσει L ||
 b17 αὐτόν K^bP^bC^cB^{95sup}.2 Arab. (Akasoy & Fidora, 2005, p. 210n96):
 αὐτῷ LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.: αὐτό V || b18 τῷ K^bP^bC^cO^bB^{95sup}.V: τὸ LL^b
 s.l.B^{95sup}.2 || b19 ἢ om. B^{95sup}. | ante ἢ add. εἰ LL^bO^b || b21 εἰ μὴ
 ἐν L^bV: om. K^bP^bC^cLO^b: εἰ μὴ s.l.C^c: ἐν B^{95sup}. Arab. (Akasoy & Fi-
 dora, 2005, p. 210n97) | τέλει P^bC^cL L^bi.r. B^{95sup}.: τελείω K^b || b22

post τῶν add. αἰτίων K^b || **b23** ἔξεων K^bP^bC^c s.l.LL^bO^b: πράξεων L
 | ante συναίτιοι add. αὐτοῖς B^{95sup}. || **b24** ἐκούσιοι L^bB^{95sup}: ἐκούσια
 K^bP^bC^cLO^b

[31] But if someone says⁶⁰⁷ that everyone strives for what appears to be good, but is not in control of that appearance <of the good>, but however each person [b1] is, so the end also appears to them; then, if each person is in some sense cause of his own disposition, they will also be in some sense cause of the appearance <of the good>; but if no one is responsible for their own wrongdoing, but one does these things due to ignorance of the end, [5] believing that through these things what is best for them shall come into being; and <if> the aiming for the end is not self-chosen [or independent], but one must be born having, as it were, an eyesight through which one may judge correctly and shall choose what is really good, and <if> naturally gifted is the person who is of such a nature as to <do> that finely (for the greatest and finest thing is also something which is not possible [10] to obtain or learn from another person, but rather as one was born, in such a way one shall have this, and to be of such a nature as to <have> this well and finely would be the perfect and true natural giftedness). Therefore, if these things are true, how will virtue be more voluntary than vice? For the end, either by nature or in some other way, [15] appears to and is fixed for both the good and the bad person in a similar way, but by making reference to this [sc. the end] they do the remaining things [sc. the things different from the end] in some other way [i.e., not by nature]. Then, whether the end appears to each person to be of such and such a sort not by nature, but there is something that depends on each person as well, or the end is something natural, virtue is voluntary because the virtuous person does the remaining things voluntarily, and vice too would be no less [20] voluntary, for similarly the ‘on his own account’ pertains to the vicious person in regard to their actions even if not in regard to their end.

Now, if, as it is said, the virtues are voluntary (for we are in some way auxiliary causes of our dispositions and by being of a certain quality we establish the end in such a way), the vices too would be voluntary, [25] since they come about in a similar manner.

This is a long, difficult, and controversial passage. What is most striking for my current purposes is the that its conclusion (lines ^b16-25), which appears to be neutral as to whether one assumes that the ends manifest themselves (*φαίνεται*) by nature or in some other way, states that we establish our ends as being of a certain sort due to ourselves being of a certain

⁶⁰⁷ In think there are some advantages to reading λέγει instead of λέγοι here. First of all, it should be noted that corruption could have gone in either direction, since, due to iotacism, both λέγει and λέγοι were pronounced in the same way. Now, if one reads λέγοι, it seems that what we have here is a mixed conditional with a potential protasis (it is unclear what the tense of the apodosis is, since the two coordinated apodoses of this protasis are two other conditional clauses, namely ‘εἰ μὲν οὖν ... αὐτὸς αἴτιος’ and—depending on how we read the text—‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς ... ἔσται ἐκούσιον’ or ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ ... οὐκ ἀθαιρέτος’). In that case, it seems that Aristotle is not responding to any objection that was actually made against his view, but is anticipating his response to an objection that is possible given the things he himself said earlier. If we read λέγει, in turn, we have a neutral protasis, which does not give us any indication about the likelihood of its realisation, which is compatible both with the objection Aristotle is dealing with here being a merely possible objection and with it being a real objection internal to the Lyceum.

quality.⁶⁰⁸

But before getting into the exact meaning of this conclusion, I must say something about the argument that leads to it, namely the argument from lines *EN* III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b16.

This passage aims at responding to a difficulty that is expected given some claims Aristotle made earlier in Book III. As we shall see below in **T 53**, Aristotle claimed in *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a29–33 that the things that are fine for each character disposition are ἕδαια to each of these character dispositions. The meaning of this claim is controversial, as we shall see below. Notwithstanding this, it seems reasonable to assume, as Kamtekar (2019, pp. 80) and Natali (2023, p. 46) do, that the objection raised in 1114^a31–^b16 picks up this idea from *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a29–33. For, in this passage, Aristotle can be reasonably interpreted as claiming precisely that the way in which things appear fine to one depends on one's character disposition (more on this below in the discussion of **T 53**), and is thus determined by what one is like, which is the very idea by means of which the objector from 1114^a31–^b16 denies that we are in control of the how things appear to us (cf. 1114^a32–^b1: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ).

This may suggest that this is an objection internal to Aristotle's school (a possibility that has been entertained by Frede [2020, vol. 2, p. 491]). But even so, as is shown by Kamtekar (2019, pp. 80–82) and by Natali (2023, p. 46), there are undeniable platonic undertones in how this objection unfolds after the initial lines.

⁶⁰⁸ Someone might object to this construal of the argument and to the problems I shall raise in the sequence by pointing out that by καὶ τῷ ποιοῖ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα Aristotle does not mean that we posit our ends as being such as what we are like, but rather that we suppose the end to be such as we are like, in which case he would perhaps be thinking here of how one conceives of one's end (well or badly) rather than of what the ends one aims for are like. I shall address this objection below.

Before answering this objection, Aristotle spells it out in two different scenarios, which are clearly marked in the text by the contrast between ‘*εἰ μὲν οὖν κτλ.*’ (in 1114^b1-3) and ‘*εἰ δὲ κτλ.*’ (1114^b3-13).

The first part of the argument (lines 1114^b1-3) is quite straightforward: if we are, in some sense (*πως*), cause of our character disposition, we are also in some sense cause of how the good appears to us. Since Alexander (*Supplementum Aristotelicum* X.2, 158.19ff), this has been taken as a first answer given by Aristotle by which he denies the claim that we are not in control of the appearance of the good. However, as is stressed by Zingano (2007b; 2008), if this is part of Aristotle’s answer, then it would begin with a *petitio principii*, for what the objector denies is precisely that we are in control of the appearance of the good.

In the face of this, Zingano proposes that the point of 1114^b1-3 is not making the Aristotelian claim that being, in some sense, cause of our character disposition is a necessary (and sufficient) condition for being, in some sense, cause of appearance of the good, but rather pointing out that, according to the objector, being in some sense cause of the appearance of the good is a necessary condition for being in some sense cause of our disposition.

Now, there is no doubt that Aristotle sometimes uses conditionals to express relationships of this sort, as when he is talking about hypothetical necessity.⁶⁰⁹ However, the way in which the objection is formulated in lines 1114^a32–^b1 seems to suggest that the objector is actually committed to the claim that how things appear to us depend upon our character disposition, for he says that the end appears to one in a way that corresponds to what one is like (*ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ*)

That being said, the question is: can we save Aristotle from committing a *petitio principii* while conceding that the objector thinks that our character disposition conditions how

⁶⁰⁹ See, for instance, *GC* II.11 337^b14ff.

things appear to us (and not the other way around)?

A way out of this difficulty would be to say that 1114^b1-3 is presenting a way of understanding the objection according to which it may turn out to be innocuous (provided we can show that we are in some sense cause of our character disposition): conceding to the objector that we are not *κύριοι* of how things appear to us in regard to goodness and badness, it is still possible to argue that if we turn out to be, in some sense, cause of our character disposition, we will also turn out to be also, in some sense, cause of how things appear to us in regard to goodness and badness.

In other words, in qualifying (by means of *πως*) the sense in which one is said to be oneself cause of the appearance of goodness, Aristotle may be making a concession to the objector, since being, in some sense, cause of something can be construed as being compatible with not being *in control* (i.e., not being *κύριος*) of that thing.⁶¹⁰ In fact, later on in *EN* III, in III.8 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^b30–1115^a1 Aristotle will draw a subtle distinction between the way in which our actions and our character dispositions are voluntary by saying that we are in control of our actions from their beginning to their end, but are in control only of the beginning of our character dispositions (*τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἔσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς*), which may be taken as suggesting that we are not, *sans phrase*, *in control* of our character disposition, and thus that we are only *in some sense* cause of our character disposition.

So understood, the pair 'εἰ μὲν οὖν κτλ.' (in 1114^b1-3) and 'εἰ δὲ κτλ.' (1114^b3-13) would be taking up two different versions of the objection introduced in 1114^a31–^b1: the

⁶¹⁰ *Pace* Donini (2014, pp. 130-131), who thinks that the '*πως*' is not qualifying the personal responsibility one has for one's character disposition, but is merely leaving the exact sense in which one is responsible for one's character disposition indeterminate: all Aristotle needs in the context is that an objector concedes that there is some personal responsibility for one's character disposition, however one construes this personal responsibility. The problem, however, is that this would imply that Aristotle is indeed committing a *petitio principii*, for this is precisely what the objector denied in saying that we are not *κύριοι* of our character disposition (as Zingano points out).

argument from lines 1114^b1–3 would be showing that, on a first reading of the objection, it is possible to answer it if one can show that we are *in some sense* cause of our character disposition (although we are indeed not *κύριοι* of it); the argument from lines 1114^b3–13, in turn, would be showing that a stronger version of the objection (if true) leads to the conclusion that both the virtues and the vices are involuntary, which is something that the objector has reason to deny.

There are, however, different ways of construing this second part of the argument (lines 1114^b3–13) depending on the text we read:

If we read the text transmitted by K^bP^bC^c and by O^b—namely, ‘εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδὲς κτλ.’—, ^b3ff would seem to be further developing the objection made at 1114^a31–^b1 in the scenario in which we are in no sense cause of our character disposition: if it is not the case that we are in some sense cause of our character disposition, then all things Aristotle says in the sequence (some of which are clearly theses held by Plato) would seem to follow. However, as Aristotle concludes in 1114^b12–13, if these things are true, it would seem that both virtue and vice will turn out to be involuntary, which is something the objector has reason to reject (Plato, for instance, holds that only vices are involuntary).

But if we read the text transmitted by L^bB^{95sup}.V and which is supposed by the Arabic translation and by Alexander’s commentary—namely, ‘εἰ δὲ μῆδὲς κτλ.’—, Aristotle’s argument will have a more specific target: not merely people who think that we are in no sense cause of our character disposition, but people who defend the so-called asymmetry thesis (as Plato himself did). In other words, the target of the objection would not be people who deny that we are in some sense cause of our character disposition, but, more specifically, people who deny that we are responsible for our own wrong doing and thus for our vices.

The asymmetry thesis is the view according to which virtue and the doing of virtuous

actions are voluntary, whereas vice and wrongdoing are involuntary. This is a central tenet of Socratic intellectualism which Plato continues to hold even in his late works.⁶¹¹ However, as I have observed above, it is probable that Aristotle's objector here is not Plato himself. A sign of this is the fact that the objection relies on a view that Aristotle himself expressed earlier in his discussion of *βούλησις* and which constitutes a sort of middle ground between Plato's and Protagoras' views on *βούλησις*. Accordingly, there is reason for thinking that the objector Aristotle is dealing with here is not someone who, like Plato and the author of the *Definitiones*, thinks that everyone wishes for what is really good for them,⁶¹² but someone who conceives of *βούλησις* in such a way that people can be mistaken about what they wish for.

There is, however, some disagreement about where the apodosis of the argument initiated in 1114^b3 is to be located if one reads 'εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς κτλ.'

Vermehren (1864, pp. 18, 20–23) argues that if we read 'εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς κτλ.,' we would have a series of assumptions being made in ^b3–12, which are then picked up by 'εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ' at line 12, after which we finally come across the apodosis: the rhetorical question 'τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον;'

Alternatively, one could argue that the apodosis of the protasis that starts in ^b3 is to be found in 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεις κτλ.' (1114^b5ff.)⁶¹³ or in 'καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυνῆς ᾧ τοῦτο κτλ.' (1114^b8ff.).⁶¹⁴ Yet both these two latter alternatives are objectionable:

The second one is problematic in two regards: first, because it supposes an apodotic

⁶¹¹ See, for instance, *Ti.* 86d5–e3 and *Lg.* 860d1ff.

⁶¹² This view on *βούλησις* is famously expressed by Plato in the *Gorgias* and in the *Laos*. Similarly, in the *Definitiones*, *βούλησις* is defined 'an aiming that involves right reason, a reasonable desire, a rational desire in accordance with nature' (*Βούλησις ἔφεις μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ· ὄρεξις εὐλογος· ὄρεξις μετὰ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν*), which strongly suggests that the author of the *Definitiones* conceives of *βούλησις* as being for what is really good for oneself.

⁶¹³ As is assumed by Irwin (1999) and by Rowe (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002) in their translations. See also Zingano (2007b, p. 322n9).

⁶¹⁴ As is entertained by Zingano (2008, p. 207) in his commentary.

καί to be made sense of (in fact, if this were the apodosis, it does not make much sense to think of the *καί* that opens the sentence as emphatic), which is quite rare in prose;⁶¹⁵ second, because the argument becomes unclear if ‘*καὶ ἔστιν εὐφύης ᾧ τοῦτο κτλ.*’ is taken as the apodosis.

The first one, in turn, is problematic because it supposes that the ‘*δέ*’ from ‘*ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεις κτλ.*’ is apodotic. No doubt apodotic *δέ* is much more common than apodotic *καί*, but, as has been shown by Eucken (1866, pp. 26-27) with a series of examples, when Aristotle employs *δέ* in this way in the apodosis of conditional clauses, it seems establish some sort of opposition between the protasis and the apodosis.⁶¹⁶ Yet there is no clear opposition between ‘*ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεις κτλ.*’ and the protasis this is allegedly an apodosis of, unless of course there were some reason for denying that the objector holds that the aiming at the end is not *ἀθάρτος*.

Two things should be said here: first, that I am assuming that with talk of ‘*ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεις*,’ Aristotle has in mind the *βουλήσεις* one may have for the end;⁶¹⁷ and second, that there is no reason for saying that someone who thinks that the end appears to one as being of a quality that corresponds to how one is would countenance that desiring an end is *ἀθάρτος*. The fact that Aristotle says *ἀθάρτος* is important. Although this word is not common in the philosophical discourse in the classical period, its attested uses in the Greek *corpus* strongly suggest that it qualifies something as being caused by someone or as being able to be caused by someone in a way that implies responsibility.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁵ See Denniston (1954, s.v. *καί*, II.(9).(iii), p. 309).

⁶¹⁶ See, for instance, *Phys.* V.1 225^a31–32 and *Pol.* III.16 1287^b12–13.

⁶¹⁷ Similarly, see Donini, 2014, pp. 130-131. *Pace* Natali (2023, p. 49n66), who thinks that Aristotle has in mind here not the choice of the ends, but the choice of the pursuit of the end, that is, of the means to the end. As I take it, the fact that in the *Definitiones βούλησις* is defined as a *ἔφεις* tells strongly in favour of thinking that Aristotle also has *βούλησις* in mind here (see footnote 612), since, as is shown by Souilhé (1930, pp. 156, 156n4), Aristotle certainly knew the *Definitiones* and discusses several definitions found in this text in the *Topics*.

⁶¹⁸ In Bacchylides fr. 24, for instance, bliss, war, and faction are said not to be *ἀθάρτοι* for those who

As a result, there is no reason for assuming that ‘ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις κτλ.’ is to be contrasted with the protasis it is allegedly an apodosis of, which makes it very unpalatable to think that the ‘δέ’ here is apodotic and hence that this is the apodosis of this horn of Aristotle’s argument.

This leaves us with Vermehren’s reading, which is the one I adopted in my translation above. But what are the reasons in favour of reading ‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς κτλ.’ instead of ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς κτλ.’ to begin with?

Although there is no big philosophical differences between these two readings, one may nevertheless argue that reading ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς κτλ.’ makes Aristotle’s argument better in that it makes it more far reaching. With ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς κτλ.’ the argument is not targeting only people who explicitly hold the asymmetry thesis, but anyone who thinks that we are in no sense cause of our character disposition.

This is specially compelling if we concede that a view expressed by Gorgias in his *Encomium* is in the background here,⁶¹⁹ namely the idea that we have no control over external stimuli, and thus over the things we do in reaction to them (cf. *Hel.* §15 [=lines 100ff.]).

are mortal, which claim is contrasted with the idea that Destiny, giver of all things, (ἡ πάνδωρος Αἴσα) sometimes brings a ‘cloud’ (presumably a cloud of death or sorrow) against one land and sometimes against another (θνατοῖσι δ’ οὐκ ἀυθαίρετοι / οὐτ’ ὄλβος οὐτ’ ἄκναμπος Ἄρης / οὐτε πάμφθερσις στάσις. / ἀλλ’ ἐπιχρίμπτει νέφος ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλαν / γαῖαν ἡ πάνδωρος Αἴσα). Similarly, in Euripides fr. 286b (292N), some illnesses of the mortals are said to be ἀυθαίρετοι, while others are described as coming from the gods (νόσοι δὲ θνητῶν αἰ μὲν εἰς ἀυθαίρετοι / αἰ δ’ ἐκ θεῶν πάρεισιν). This expression is also used in contexts where human agency is not being explicitly contrasted with what is done by the gods. For instance: in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* (vv. 1228–1231), Sophocles, after talking of the not involuntary but voluntary evils that the house of Labdacus keeps concealed and then brings to light, adds that the most distressing among the pains are those that are manifestly ἀυθαίρετοι (τῶν δὲ πημονῶν μάλιστα λυποῦσ’ αἰ φανῶσ’ ἀυθαίρετοι). Similarly, in the first book of his *Historiae* (I.78.3-4 [=Alberti p. 94.9-14]), Thucydides reports a speech by Athenians envoys to Sparta in which the fact that both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians did not commit the mistake i) of going to war engaging first in action and then in the things that must be done and ii) of engaging in a discussion only when they are already in distress is described in terms of εὐβουλία still being ἀυθαίρετος for both of them (ἔως ἔτι ἀυθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἢ εὐβουλία). Finally, Xenophon, in his *Hellenica* (6.2.36), says that Crinippus killed himself by saying that Crinippus died an ἀυθαίρετος death due to distress (κακείνος μὲν ὑπὸ λύπης ἀυθαίρετω θανάτῳ ἀποθνήσκει). All this strongly suggests that ἀυθαίρετος refers to things that are, or can be, voluntarily caused by oneself, something that is to be contrasted with things that are caused by external forces like the gods, or that we are hindered from doing due to the circumstances.

⁶¹⁹ As has been suggested by Inwood (1985, p. 54).

However, not only ‘*εἰ δὲ μηδεῖς κτλ.*’ is the text transmitted by Alexander’s and by important witnesses of both the *α* family (namely, the Arabic translation) and the *β* family (namely, L^bB^{95sup.}V), but also the variants for this passage (see the *apparatus* of T 50 above) may be taken as suggesting that ‘*εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδεῖς κτλ.*’ is actually a corruption of the ‘*εἰ δὲ μηδεῖς κτλ.*’⁶²⁰ In fact, two mss. (L and, above the line, B^{95sup.}) have rather ‘*εἰ δὲ οὐδεῖς κτλ.*’

My hypothesis is that *μηδεῖς* was first miscopied as *οὐδεῖς* (perhaps from an exemplar in majuscule cursive script)⁶²¹ which then led copyists to add *μῆ* before *οὐδεῖς* to make sense of the conditional (since there would be clearly something wrong with ‘*εἰ δὲ οὐδεῖς κτλ.*’), which would be how we got ‘*εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδεῖς*’ in K^bP^bC^c and O^b. Besides, this would also explain why L reads ‘*εἰ δὲ οὐδεῖς,*’ whereas O^b reads ‘*εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδεῖς,*’ although both L and O^b most probably depend on the same exemplar according to Loungi’s *stemma*. As a matter of fact, it seems that this would be another case in which the reading from O^b agrees with K^b against L, which may be taken as suggesting that O^b also depends on some ms. that has ‘*εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδεῖς*’⁶²² and that it would be using it as a corrective exemplar.

Similarly, one could argue that B^{95sup.}, a ms. that reads ‘*εἰ δὲ μηδεῖς,*’ but which has ‘*οὐ*’ above the line (above the ‘*μη-*’ from *μηδεῖς*), reads ‘*εἰ δὲ μηδεῖς*’ due to contamination from L^b (as expected given Loungi’s *stemma*), in which case the variant it is reporting when it writes ‘*οὐ*’ above the line is either that of its exemplar (i.e., sub-hyperarchetype *β*2, which probably had ‘*οὐδεῖς*’—as can be inferred from the reading of L) or else that of K^b (which reads ‘*εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐδεῖς*’ and also contaminates B^{95sup.} in other passages).

⁶²⁰ I owe this point to Professor Paulo Ferreira.

⁶²¹ Cf., for instance, the ligature for ‘*μηδ-*’ in Gardthausen (1911-1913, vol. 2, Taf. 4a), in which the ‘*-η-*’ is written in a way that comes strikingly close to how ‘*ου-*’ was written. I shall come back to this below in footnote 623.

⁶²² Be it K^b itself, K^b’s original, or a copy of K^b that has been lost. As I have observed above in section 0.3.2, a decision in this regard depends on further study of O^b. Moreover, it is also possible that *μῆ* just as a result of intervention on the part of the copyist. More evidence must be taken into account to determine what the most plausible explanation is.

In sum: there is good reason for assuming that we should read ‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς’ rather than ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς.’⁶²³ Accordingly, the argument from 1114^b3-13 would aim at showing to people that hold the asymmetry thesis that, given their own assumptions, both the virtues and the vices turn out to be involuntary.

Now, although this may suffice to dissuade an objector like Plato, who would not accept the conclusion that virtue is involuntary, nothing in the objection as formulated here in T 50 forces one to claim that the virtues are voluntary. So, conceding that there is no asymmetry between the virtues and the vices, the objector can still deny that we are cause of our character disposition, and thus of how the end appear to us (as someone like Gorgias probably would). Thus, Aristotle needs to provide us with substantive arguments for showing that i) we are indeed in some sense cause of our character disposition and ii) both virtue and the vice are voluntary. In other words, Aristotle needs to deny that the conditional from 1114^b3ff is satisfied.

This is precisely what Aristotle does in the second part of his argument, namely 1114^b13-21.⁶²⁴

⁶²³ No doubt it is also possible to argue that the corruption went the other way around, i.e., that ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς’ was corrupted into ‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς.’ However, I take the agreement between the Arabic translation and the witnesses of the β family to have more weight here, especially because Alexander also has ‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς.’ Moreover, the fact that the Arabic translation depends on an exemplar in uncials makes it unpalatable to think that it supposing ‘εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς’ is something due to the translator misreading the Greek ms.

A remaining problem that I cannot address here is the fact that the Latin version of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary* seems to have ‘*si autem non, non erit aliquis homini etc.*’ and that this supposes ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς κτλ.’ This may indeed suggest that the text of the Arabic translation preserved in the Fez ms. is corrupted here, and that Averroes is relying on a text of the Arabic translation that is free of this corruption. Yet the fact that we still do not have a critical edition of this part of Averroes’ text makes this to some extent inconclusive, and one would also need to take into account the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary*. In any case, the Arabic translation renders other occurrences of ‘εἰ δὲ μὴ’ as ‘وَالَا’ (*wa-illā*), so that while the Fez ms. has ‘وَأَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَحَدٌ مِنَ النَّاسِ’ (*wa-in lam yakun aḥadun min al-nāsi*), the Latin translation of Averroes (as printed in Felicianus *et alli*) would suppose something like ‘وَالَا لَمْ يَكُنْ أَحَدٌ مِنَ النَّاسِ’ (*wa-illā lam yakun aḥadun min al-nāsi*). However, not only is it uncertain whether Averroes really has ‘*si autem non, non erit aliquis homini etc.*’—we would need a critical edition of this part of his commentary to be sure—, but also nothing hinders the possibility that the corrupted text is the one transmitted by Averroes. In any case, I think that a decision between the different alternatives should depend, in this particular case, on what makes better sense of Aristotle’s argument as a whole.

⁶²⁴ In construing the argument in this way, I am taking my cue from Zingano (2008, pp. 205-206).

The fundamental move behind the response to the objection that Aristotle advances in lines 1114^b13–21 lies in the idea ends do not necessitate actions that contribute to their attainment, which is the claim that Aristotle needs in order to show that we are in some sense cause of our character disposition and to deny that virtues and vices are voluntary.

As Natali (2023, p. 45) points out, the objection relies on a thesis that Aristotle discussed earlier in *EN* III.1 1110^b9–15, namely the claim that everything is forced (*βίαια*) in that i) fine and pleasant things are forced (since, because they are external, they would constrain us)⁶²⁵ and ii) we do everything for the sake of fine and pleasant things. In *EN* III.1 1110^b9–15, this claim was put aside on the grounds that people who act being forced and involuntarily act experiencing pain (*λυπηρωσ*), whereas people who act due to what is pleasant or fine act experiencing pleasure (*μεθ' ἡδονῆς*). After this, Aristotle adds that it is ridiculous i) to hold external things, and not oneself, responsible for being easy prey to such things, and ii) to hold oneself responsible for fine things and to hold pleasant things responsible for base things (this later claim being the very thing that people who hold the asymmetry thesis claim).

That being said, Aristotle can safely assume that our ends do not constrain us to do the things necessary to attain them, a claim whereby he can defuse the two versions of the objection presented in lines 1114^a31–^b13.

A feature of Aristotle's response to the objection that is relevant for my purposes is that this response is seemingly formulated in a way that is neutral as to whether the end appears and is established by nature or in some other way. In fact, in 1114^b13–21, Aristotle begins saying that 'the end, either by nature or in some other way, appears to and is fixed for both the good and the bad person in a similar way,' but that they do 'the remaining things'

⁶²⁵ This claim expresses a position that is strikingly close to the view expressed by Gorgias in his *Encomium* that I have mentioned above.

(i.e., things that are not ends) making reference to the end *in some other way*. In other words, even if it turns out that the end is established by nature, the things we do for the sake of the end are not established by nature. Accordingly, irrespective of how our ends appear to us and are established, both virtue and vice are voluntary in so far as our doing ‘the remaining things’ is also voluntary.

Now, although Aristotle’s formulation of the argument is noncommittal, it has been argued that, in considering the hypothesis that our ends appear to us and are established by nature, Aristotle is not expressing something he agrees with, but is making a concession to his objector for the sake of the argument.⁶²⁶ Accordingly, Aristotle’s own view on the matter would be that the end appears and is established not by nature, but in some other way.

What is striking, however, is that even if this is correct, Aristotle nevertheless appears to conclude (in 1114^b22-24) not only that we are, in some sense, auxiliary causes of our dispositions (*καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν*), but also that it is by being of a certain quality that we establish the end as being of a corresponding quality (*τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα*).

If we take this second claim of Aristotle’s literally and without making any restrictions as to its application, then we have a hard time in making sense of how the character disposition of some intermediate agents conditions the ends they aim at.

Before getting into this issue, let me make two things clear:

⁶²⁶ In his reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument, Aspasius adds ‘ὡς λέγουσιν’ to the premise stating that the end appears to each person by nature (*CAG*. XIX.1, 79.22). Similarly, the anonymous scholiast says ‘εἰ τὸ μὲν τέλος φύσει, τὸ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέροντα πράσσειν ἐκουσίως τὸν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκούσιον λέγουσιν’ (*CAG*. XX, 158.20–21). More recently, Irwin (1999, pp. 210–211) claimed that Aristotle is here conceding a point to his opponent and showing that even if it turns out that we are not responsible for the appearance of the end, it still follows that both virtue and vice are voluntary. Similarly, Frede (2020, p. 492) considers the possibility that Aristotle is granting to his opponent the truth of the claim that we are not responsible for the appearance of the end in order to show that, even so, we are to a certain extent responsible for our character disposition. Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol. 3., pp. 216–217) seems to hold a similar view, since he thinks that in 1114^b12–16 and in 1114^b17–19 Aristotle is simply advancing an *ad hominem* response to his objector, and that Aristotle’s real answer is to be found in 1114^b17–19.

First, that there is no doubt that Aristotle is talking of ends₃ throughout **T 50**, for otherwise one cannot make sense of the idea, which underlies Aristotle's answer to his objector, that our ends do not necessitate our actions, which appears to concern ends₃.⁶²⁷

Second, that with talk of being of a certain quality, Aristotle has in mind a certain *ἔξις* that qualifies the agent. Aristotle talks of people being of a certain quality in two other places in the *EN*, both in book III. In *EN* III.4 [=Bywater III.2] 1112^a1–2, he explains why no one says that *προαίρεσις* is the same as a sort of opinion by saying 'for we are of a certain quality by deciding on good or bad things, and not due to having an opinion about good or bad things' (τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ). Then, later in book III, in *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1117^a27–28, after distinguishing courage from five dispositions that seem like courage but are not courage, Aristotle says the following: 'it was said then what the courageous are like and what those who seem to be courageous are like' (οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρείοι εἴρηνται ποιοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρείοι). We came across similar claims in the *EE*. Above in **T 32**, in 1228^a2–3, Aristotle says that 'we judge what one is like from their decision' (ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις), and then in 1228^a15–17, he adds that 'because it is not easy to see what one's decision is like, for that reason we are constrained to judge what one is like from their deeds' (ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις). Later in the *EE*, in the discussion of *εὐτυχία* in *EE* VIII.2, Aristotle discusses a view about why some people are successful that not only throws further light on what sort of thing he has in mind with talk of 'being of a certain quality,' but also comes strikingly close to the

⁶²⁷ Besides, although one could still argue that it also concerns ends pursued by non-rational desires—e.g., pleasure, which is the end pursued by *ἐπιθυμία*, the fact that Aristotle talks of an *ἔφεσις* of the end (as I emphasised in footnotes 612 and 617) and that he characterises *βούλησις* as a desire for the end (cf. *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a15 and III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1113^b3) seems to make a strong case for thinking that only ends₃ are in question here.

position of the objector he is responding to here in **T 50**. The passages I have in mind are *EE*

VIII.2 1247^a7-12 and 1247^a35-37:

T 51 – *EE* VIII.2 1247^a7–12

1247a7 πότερον οὖν ἀπό τινος ἕξεως οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οὐ τῶ
 | αὐτοὶ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων;| νῦν
 10 μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἢ δὲ || φύσις
 ποιούς τινας ποιεί, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν,| ὥσπερ
 οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόμματοι τῶ τοδὶ | τοιονδὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω
 καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς.

|| a11–12 τῶ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν Solomon (1915, *EE* VII.14 1247a12, n.4)
 Rackham (1935, pp. 456, 456n5) Kyrgiopoulos Rowe: τῶ τὸ δεῖν τοιον
 δεῖ ἔχειν PB: τῶ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν B: τῶ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ ἔχειν L: *eo quod*
tale secundum esse tale oportet et habere BF: τῶ τὸ δεῖν <τοδὶ> τοιονδὶ ἔχειν
 ci. Spengel: τῶ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ <κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιονδὶ> ἔχειν Susemihl:
 τῶ {τὸ} δεῖν τοιονδὶ <κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιονδὶ> ἔχειν Dirlmeier (1963, p.
 481): τῶ τοιοῦτο εἶναι τοιονδὶ καὶ τονδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν Jackson

So, do these persons experience episodes of good fortune from a certain disposition, or not due being of a certain quality? As things are now, people believe that some people <are so> by nature, and nature makes <these persons> of a certain quality, and they excel right from the moment they are born: just like some people have blue eyes and other people have black eyes due to having this part of a certain quality,⁶²⁸ so too the fortunate and the unfortunate <are so due to being of a certain quality by nature>.

T 52 – *EE* VIII.2 1247^a35–37

1247a35 ἔτι |
 εἰ ἢ⁶²⁹ τοιοσδὶ ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει ὥσπερ, ὅτι {ὁ}
 γλαυκὸς,⁶³⁰ οὐκ ὀξὺ ὄρα,| οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα
 ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς ἀλλ' | οἶον εὐφυῆς.

|| a36 εἰ Bekker Susemihl Walzer & Mingay Rowe: *si BF*: ἢ PCBL |
 ἢ Langerbeck: *quia BF*: ὅτι suppl. Fritzsche (1851, p. 250) Susemihl
 Walzer & Mingay Rowe | τοιοσδὶ Chalc.: τοῖος δεῖ P: τοῖος δὴ L: om.
 B: *talis oportet BF*: τοιοσδὶ <δεῖ> Fritzsche (1851, p. 250) | ὥσπερ, ὅτι
 L: *sicut quia BF*: ὅτι ὥσπερ PCB | ὁ om. M^b Neap., secl. Bussemaker
 et al. (1850, p. 111): PCBL

⁶²⁸ The readings found in the mss. cannot stand and must be corrected. Both the correction proposed by Dirlmeier and the correction proposed by Solomon (adopted by Rackham, Kyrgiopoulos, and Rowe) make good sense of the text (I cannot make sense of the text with the correction proposed by Susemihl and with the correction proposed by Spengel) and can be justified paleographically. Jackson's correction also makes good sense of text, but at the cost being unpalatable, as was already observed by Dirlmeier (1963, p. 481). If one adopts Dirlmeier's text (which is basically the same as Spengel's, with the difference that he deletes the 'τὸ' after 'τῶ' on the grounds that it would be the result of dittography), Aristotle would be saying instead that 'some people have blue eyes and other people have black eyes *due to the fact that <a person> of a certain quality by nature (κατὰ τὸ εἶναι) must have <a part> of a certain quality*' (Dirlmeier's own translation does not clearly capture what is said by the text he adopts: indem sie eine individuelle Qualität haben müssen).

Furthermore, if one is successful or fails in so far as <one is> of a certain sort just like one does not see sharply because <one is> blue-eyed, the cause is not chance, but nature. Therefore, one is not lucky, but, so to speak, naturally-gifted.

All this seems to suggest two things: first, that in order to assess what people are like one must take into account both what people do and their decision, and that being of a certain quality amounts to having a certain *ἔξις* (as suggested by the contrast at the question that opens **T 51**). However, it seems that one can be said of a certain quality in two importantly different senses: either locally—in that one has a particular *ἔξις* in a particular domain of one’s life (as in the case of the person who is courageous or who has one of the five dispositions that resemble courage but still falls short of being virtuous)—or overall—in that, taken as a whole, one’s character disposition allows of being described as such and such.

Now, if in saying that it is by being of a certain quality that we establish the ends as being of a corresponding quality Aristotle has in mind qualities one has in a particular domain of one’s life, then it is not easy to make sense of agents such as those who are incontinent or ‘inverse akratics.’

Although incontinent agents are ultimately described by Aristotle as being half-wicked (*ἡμιπόνηρος*—cf. *EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.10] 1152^a15ff), Aristotle claims that, in gratifying their shameful appetites, incontinent agents are not acting on the basis of decision, nor thinking that they should always pursue what is pleasant (see *EN* VII.4 [=Bywater VII.3] 1146^b19–24), but are acting in opposition to their decision and thought (see *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a4–17), in which respect they are to be distinguished from intemperate agents. Moreover, as we saw in footnote 8, Aristotle describes incontinent agents as acting

⁶²⁹ I have here favoured Langerbeck’s proposal despite the fact that *BF* have *quia*, which would seemingly justify inserting the *ὅτι*. As a matter of fact, not only could *quia* also be translating ‘ἦ’, but also the omission of ‘ἦ’ is easier to justify paleographically given that PCBL write ἦ instead of εἶ (which is a correction by Bekker—see the *apparatus*).

⁶³⁰ For clarity’s sake, I retain here the commas printed by Walzer & Mingay around ‘ὅτι {ὁ} γλαυκὸς’.

against their *βούλησις* and as not doing the things they think they should do (cf. *EN* V.11 [=Bywater V.9] 1136^b5–8). In other words, incontinent agents have appetites conflicting with their *βουλήσεις*, and thus with what they take to be good (cf. *EN* IX.4 1166^b7–10).

Things are not so clear about how ‘inverse akractics’ should be characterised (more on this below), but it may seem that they are agents who despite aiming for an end that is bad, end up doing the right thing due to their good character disposition.

Accordingly, if the claim that we establish our ends as being of a quality that corresponds to what we are like is to be read as applying to character dispositions such as those that characterise one as incontinent or as an ‘inverse akractic,’ then it would seem that incontinent agents would aim for ends that are half-wicked, and that ‘inverse akrasia’ (as characterised above at least) would not be possible. Yet incontinent agents seem to aim for ends that are fine, and ‘inverse akrasia,’ although it is not really akrasia according to Aristotle, is a very real phenomenon that he countenances in his *Ethics*.

There is, however, a way out of this difficulty:

In what concerns incontinent agents, a response is possible if we say that Aristotle does not have in mind, in the conclusion of **T 50**, what one is like in a particular domain of one’s life, but what one is like *as a whole*. In that case, one could argue that incontinent agents are, as a whole, good, which is why they aim for fine ends even in the domain of their lives in which they are such as to experience incontinence). To put it differently, albeit it is true that the incontinent falls short of full virtue, there is good reason for thinking that they are at least continent (qualifiedly, of course)⁶³¹ or naturally virtuous in other domains of their lives, and that perhaps (as I have suggested in the **Introduction**) that their aiming at fine ends is

⁶³¹ This caveat is necessary because, for Aristotle, the unqualified sort of continence concerns bodily pleasures with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. So, if we are to describe one as continent in respect to some other object, that agent should be called continent in respect to that object, and not continent without qualification.

dependent upon their having a character that is good in some sense.

In what concerns ‘inverse akratics,’ in turn, there is a way out of the difficulty presented above if we refrain from saying that such agents are characterised as having *βουλήσεις* for bad ends. As a matter of fact, Aristotle never explicitly characterises ‘inverse akratics’ as having bad *βουλήσεις*. In his *ex professo* treatment of ‘inverse akrasia’ in *EN* VII, Aristotle first says, in raising an *aporia* about how incontinence is to be characterised (as concerning any sort of opinion or not), that Neoptolemus (Aristotle’s example of what would be a good sort of akrasia) is praiseworthy due to not standing by the things he was convinced of by Odysseus (cf. *EN* VII.3 [=Bywater VII.2] 1146^a18–21), and then says that Neoptolemus is an example of someone who does not stand by their opinions not due to incontinence, but due to a fine pleasure (cf. *EN* VII.10 [=Bywater VII.9]). What is relevant for my current purposes is that Aristotle never says that the so-called inverse akratics have *βουλήσεις* for bad ends, but talks only of their acting against their opinions, which is compatible with the idea that their mistake lies not in the ends they aim at, but in things they are convinced they must do in order to pursue ends that, taken by themselves, are not morally bad.⁶³²

If this is correct, we are in conditions of making sense of Aristotle’s conclusion in **T 50** without qualifying it in any way: it is indeed by being of a certain quality that we establish the end as being of a corresponding quality. One must be *overall* good if one is to aim for ends that are good, even if one still falls short of being fully virtuous. But if, *overall*, one’s character disposition is bad, then one’s end is bad and one is thus vicious. Moreover, in so far as agents who are *overall* good may still be good in different senses, there is reason for thinking that the ends aimed at by fully virtuous agents is qualitatively different from the end aimed at by

⁶³² In that case, the so-called inverse akratics would be quite similar to the foolish lucky agents Aristotle discusses in *EN* VII.2, since both are agents who hold the wrong views about what they should do in a particular circumstance, but nevertheless end up doing the right thing due to their good character disposition.

agents who, despite being good *overall*, are not fully virtuous.⁶³³

Now, although I think that this captures what Aristotle thinks about the relationship between one's character disposition and one's end, I concede that this is perhaps an overreading of the conclusion advanced by Aristotle in **T 50**.

Perhaps, then, a more deflationary route is to be preferred, for the claim that it is by being of a certain quality that we establish the end as being of a corresponding quality was introduced merely to explain the claim that the virtues are voluntary. Accordingly, Aristotle may have in mind here only virtues, and thus may be only claiming that virtuous agents establish their ends as being of a quality that corresponds to what they are like.

No doubt this is compatible with the stronger idea that people with character dispositions that differ overall will aim for ends differ in quality accordingly, but this will not be what Aristotle is saying in the conclusion of **T 50**. As a matter of fact, on this reading, Aristotle would be establishing an *ἴδιον* relatively to vicious agents (see above the objection presented in **pages 348 to 349** resorting to *Top.* I.5 102^b20–26), which is compatible both with it being and not being an *ἴδιον* without qualifications that virtuous agents have.

At any rate, I think there is reason for rejecting other deflationary readings of this conclusion.

First, there is no reason for thinking that this conclusion does not represent Aristotle's final position on the matter, which is something one could argue on the grounds that all Aristotle is concerned with in the passage is rejecting the so-called asymmetry thesis—i.e., the thesis according to which virtue is voluntary, whilst vice is not—, so that the arguments advanced in this passage would only be meant to show the unattainability of this thesis, and would not represent Aristotle's own views on how our ends are determined. Accordingly, on

⁶³³ Accordingly, one may also distinguish between different degrees of vice, but I shall leave this aside here.

this reading, Aristotle may after all reject that our ends are determined by nature, in which case the conclusion drawn by Aristotle at lines ^b16-25 may then be replaced by one which is not compatible with our ends being determined by nature.

The problem with this is that nowhere in the *Ethics* Aristotle seems to present an alternative to the view advanced at ^b16-25 (quite the contrary: as I shall argue below, Aristotle seems to corroborate the conclusion drawn in these lines in *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20-24). Besides, even if it is indeed true that Aristotle thinks that our ends are not determined by nature (and I think it is correct to say that this is true), he still seems to hold that we establish them in a way that corresponds to how we are⁶³⁴—and this is the claim that was problematic in the first place.

A second, and more promising, alternative would be to understand the verb ‘τιθέμεθα’ with double accusative as meaning ‘to conceive of something as being such and such,’ so that the idea would be that we conceive of our end as being of a quality that corresponds to how we are. In that case, Aristotle’s conclusion could be read as implying that differences in character do not necessarily imply differences in the quality of the ends aimed for, but rather ‘in the ways and occasions of particular pursuit, or, we might say, in the pursuit of ends particularised by our occasions and ways of pursuing them’ (Broadie, 1991, p. 246).⁶³⁵ In other words, Aristotle’s conclusion would be talking of how we conceive of our ends. In that case, if we construe the ends of action as situation-specific goals, the main difference between the different sorts of agent would manifest itself mostly not in the ends they pursue (say, health, honour etc.), but

⁶³⁴ This poses some problems for Loening’s view of this passage. Loening thinks that this matter is here left undecided by Aristotle just like in *EN* VIII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151^a14–19 (see note 332). In any case, Loening’s view on how exactly virtue makes the end right will turn out to be relevant for interpreting this passage in a way that is compatible with all intermediate agent being able to aim for morally good ends, for he thinks that virtue makes the end right by securing that one’s *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός* aim for what is really good as well, but not by determining the good one should aim for as an end (Loening, 1903, p. 90), although, as I have already commented, he seems to hold that desire can be impeded from desiring what reason determines as its object, as it happens in episodes of *ἀκρασία* (see footnote 411).

⁶³⁵ Note, however, that this is not offered by Broadie as an explanation of 1114^b16-25.

in the way they pursue these ends, i.e., in the things they are willing to do in order to pursue these ends.

There is no doubt that T 50 also implies that our character dispositions determine how our ends appear to us, since it also suggest that we are not in control of the *φαντασία* of the end, but that it manifests itself to us in a way that corresponds to what we are like (1114^a32–^b1: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ), a claim that, if we are in some sense cause of our moral disposition, also implies that we are in some sense cause of how the end appear to us (1114^b2–3: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστὶ πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος). Yet later Aristotle shifts to talking of the end manifesting itself and being set either by nature or in some other way (cf. 1114^b14–15: τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κείται), which suggests that by saying that we *τιθέμεθα* our ends he intends to be of talking of us not merely experiencing the end to be such and such, but also assuming it to be so. Thus, 1114^b23–24 appears to imply that there is indeed some qualitative difference between the ends assumed by agents that are qualitatively different as well.

In sum: EN III.7 [=Bywater III.5] 1114^a31–^b25 (T 50) not only offers no difficulty in the case of intermediate agents, but may also be interpreted as giving further evidence to the idea that intermediate agents, despite aiming for fine ends, aim for ends that are to be distinguished from the ends aimed at by fully virtuous agents.

3.2.2 Aristotle and the thesis that there are fine and pleasant things exclusive to each character disposition

Even if it turns out that a more deflationary interpretation of the conclusion of T 50 is to be preferred, I would like argue that, in the *Ethica Nicomachea*, there is indeed positive evidence

for thinking that Aristotle does hold after all that there are differences in the ends aimed by fully virtuous agents and other agents who aim for fine ends but who fall short of being fully virtuous, and that he does indeed think that only fully virtuous agents are in condition of grasping the intrinsic fineness of fine things.

To show this, I would like to first analyse three connected passages about how for different character dispositions different things are fine, pleasant, honourable, and choice-worthy, and then, in section 3.2.2.1, analyse a passage from Aristotle's discussion of courage that strongly suggests that activities brought about on the basis of different character dispositions (i.e., activities that count as actualisations of different character dispositions) differ in that their ends are relative to that character disposition on which basis they are brought about (i.e., are relative to the character disposition of which they are actualisations). Accordingly, virtuous actions voluntarily performed by fully virtuous agents and virtuous actions voluntarily performed by agents who are not fully virtuous should be motivated by ends that are different somehow.

Let me begin with *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a22-36:

T 53 – *EN* III.6 [=Bywater III.4] 1113^a22–36

1113a22

εἰ δὲ δὴ |

ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθ|θειαν
 25 βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; || τῷ μὲν
 οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ | τὸ τυχόν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εἶδ' δια|κειμένοις ὑγιεινά
 ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς | δ' ἐπιπόσοις ἕτερα,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ | θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν
 30 ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ || ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν
 ἐκάστοις τὰληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνε|ται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά
 ἐστὶν καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ | διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος
 τῷ τὰληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις | ὄραν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐ-
 τῶν ὄν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς | δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε
 35 γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὐσα || ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ
 ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ | λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

|| a24–25 τὰγαθόν ... εἶναι om. L || a27 τοιαῦτα ὄντα
 K^bP^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}.V: ὄντα τοιαῦτα L || a28 post ἐπιπόσοις add. οὐ-

σιν LO^b || a29 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ P^bC^cL^bV: ὁ σπουδαῖος B^{95sup}: ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος L: τὸν σπουδαῖον γὰρ K^b || a30 κρίνει P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: || a31 ante καλὰ add. καὶ P^bC^c mg.V || a32 ὁ σπουδαῖος P^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup}.V: || a33 ὧν LO^bV: ὧν K^b: om. P^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}. | ἐν om. LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || a33–34 τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ K^bP^bC^cLL^bV: τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς B^{95sup}: τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς δὲ O^b || a34 οὐ K^bP^bC^cLi.r. L^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: καὶ La.r. || a35 οὖν K^bP^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}.V: δὲ LO^b

But if these things are not acceptable, should we say that, without qualifications and in truth, the object of wish is the good, but for each person what appears to be good? [25] Now, for the virtuous person, <we should say that the object of wish> is what is truly good, whereas for the vicious person <that it is> any chance thing, just like in the case of the bodies, for the person well disposed healthy things are those things that are truly so, whereas for unhealthy persons <healthy things> are different, and it is similar also in respect to bitter and sweet things, hot things, heavy things, and each of the remaining cases, for the virtuous person [30] judges each thing correctly, and, in each case, what is true shows itself to them, **for there are fine and pleasant things particular to each character disposition**, and the virtuous person certainly excels much by seeing what is true in each case, as if he were a rule and measure. But among the many, the mistake seems to occur due to pleasure, for although it is not [35] a good, it appears <so>. Then, they choose what is pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as something bad.

This passage is at the centre of Aristotle's discussion βούλησις. It comes immediately after Aristotle showed that two ways of conceiving of βούλησις—one that goes back to views expressed by Plato in the *Gorgias* and another one that is perhaps Protagorean—⁶³⁶ prove to be inadequate. Here in T 53 Aristotle advances what seems to be a middle way between these two proposals, according to which although there is a sense in which Plato is right in saying that the object of βούλησις is what is truly good, this is only true when we think of the object of βούλησις without qualification, for it turns out that for each person the object of βούλησις is what appears good to them.

As has been shown in detail by Zingano (2008, pp. 194–197), with talk of 'τὸ φαινόμενον [sc. ἀγαθόν]' Aristotle does not mean to establish a contrast between what is truly good and what merely appears to be good, but is rather saying that being a φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν is a condition that anything must satisfy in order to be an object of βούλησις, irrespective of whether we are dealing with what is truly good or with something that merely appears to be

⁶³⁶ As the pun Aristotle makes in saying that the virtuous person is the measure leaves no doubt. For a discussion of the Protagorean background in this passage, see Gottlieb (1991).

good. In other words, if what is truly good is to be an object of *βούλησις* for someone it must first be cognised as a good.

This is not all, however. Aristotle goes on to compare the ‘appearance’ of goodness that underlies *βούλησις* with what happens in the case of qualities that are, in a way, relative to how people are disposed. Just like, in the case of bodily things, the things that are healthy to well-disposed persons are those that are truly healthy, whereas those that are healthy to those who are sick are different, and, similarly, in the case of sweet things, the things that are sweet to the person who has their perceptive apparatus in a good condition are those things that are truly sweet, whereas those things that are sweet to those who have their perceptive apparatus in a bad condition (e.g., because they are sick) are not the truly sweet things, so too in the case of the good: what is good to the virtuous person is what is truly good, whereas what is good to the base person is any chance thing (*τὸ τύχον*).

In so arguing, Aristotle seems to be countenancing the strong thesis that not only our having a *βούλησις* for something depends on us cognising this object as a good, but also our cognising an object as a good is relative to our character disposition, similar to how a thing showing itself as bitter or sweet is relative to the condition of our perceptive apparatus. Moreover, as Aristotle makes clear, the person who is in a good condition occupies a normative place, since they are such that they can adequately experience things as they are. People who are in a good physical condition are those for whom truly healthy things are healthy; people whose perceptive apparatus is in a good condition are those for whom perceptive qualities are perceived in the way they really are; and finally, virtuous people experience things that are truly good as good.

No doubt this is compatible with people who are not in a good condition being able to experience things as they really are. However, Aristotle’s argument does not stop here.

After explaining the claims about how our cognising things as good is dependent on our character dispositions by saying that the virtuous person cognises (*κρίνει*) each thing correctly (or, alternatively, judges things correctly in each case) and is someone for whom, in each case, true things manifest themselves, Aristotle offers the following justification (in bold in the text): there are fine and pleasant things particular to each character disposition (*καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιω ἰδιά ἐστὶν καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα*).

If this claim is read as being widely applicable, then it could be taken as making a point similar to one made by Aristotle in *EE* VIII.3. As a matter of fact, in 1249^a3-5 (in T 39), for instance, fine-and-good agents are described as those for whom both those things that are fine by nature and those that are not fine by nature are fine, in contrast to merely good agents, for whom what is fine by nature is only good, but not fine. Accordingly, 1113^a31 would seem to be making the more general claim that the different character dispositions can be distinguished by means of the things that are fine and pleasant only to their possessors, i.e., which are particular (*ἰδία*) to each of them.

As a result, if it is indeed true that our ends correspond in quality to how we are like (as stated in 1114^b23-24), and if, consequently, intermediate agents are to be distinguished from fully virtuous agents in regard to their ends, there are reasons for thinking that the things that are fine for fully virtuous agents are not the same as those that are fine for intermediate agents.

Notwithstanding this, one may argue that it is better to read this passage differently, to the effect that 'each character disposition' here picks up the particular virtues possessed by a virtuous person. In that case, the point would be that each of the particular virtues is characterised by things that are fine and pleasant for each of them, that is, each of the particular virtues would be characterised by a domain of fine and pleasant things that are fine

for its possessor.⁶³⁷ This is a perfectly feasible claim, and provides us with a solid explanation for why virtuous agents judge each thing correctly and are persons to whom the truth shows itself on a case by case basis. I mean, in so far as each of the particular virtues is characterised by things that are fine and pleasant only for its possessor, then someone who has all the particular virtues would be able to judge correctly in the domain of each of these virtues, and, moreover, would be someone who can experience what is truly pleasant in each of these domains and for whom the fine things that characterise these domains show themselves as fine.

Yet even if we concede to the objector that Aristotle means to talk only of virtuous character dispositions here, it would be still be the case that these dispositions are characterised by fine and pleasant things that are *ἴδια* to them, and unless Aristotle is not using the term *ἴδιον* in its technical sense here (and there is no reason for supposing that he not is using it in its technical sense), this entails that the fine and pleasant things Aristotle is talking about here are only fine and pleasant to fully virtuous agents. Besides, although it is reasonable to suppose that there may be some sort of overlap between the things that are fine and the things that are pleasant to fully virtuous agents and the things that are fine and the things that are pleasant to agents who fall short of full virtue (I shall come back to this below), it will still be true that some of the things that are fine and some of the things that are pleasant for fully virtuous agents are not fine for agents who fall short of full virtue, and, conversely, that some things that are fine and some things that are pleasant for agents who fall short of full virtue are not fine for fully virtuous agents.

Some theses established by Aristotle in T 53 come up again in three other places in the *Ethics*. First, in the discussion of self-love in *EN* IX.4 1166^a12–13, Aristotle picks up the idea that virtue and the virtuous person are measures of each thing (*ἔοικε δὲ, καθάπερ*

⁶³⁷ This is a point made by Frede (2020, pp. 483–485).

εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι). Later in book IX, Aristotle then picks up the idea that things that are really good are good to the virtuous person:

T 54 – EN IX.9 1170^a14–16

1170a14 τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει
 15 || ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν καθ' αὐτό.
 || a15 ὅτι K^b s.l.C²LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: om. P^bC^c | ἀγαθὸν καὶ P^bC^cLL^b
 mg.O^bcorr: om. K^bO^b: καὶ B^{95sup}.

For, regarding what is good by nature, it was said that it is good and pleasant to the virtuous person on its own account.

A first issue here is what exactly Aristotle means by ‘τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν.’ As we saw in the previous chapter, with talk of natural goods, Aristotle normally has external goods in mind. But if this is the case, and if **T 54** is read as saying that what is good by nature is only good to the fully virtuous person, then what Aristotle is saying here may seem to be directly at odds with what he said in *EE* VIII.3. In this chapter of the *EE*, as we saw, Aristotle seems to concede that natural goods are good for merely good agents who fail to be fully virtuous (unless one interprets the text as Irwin proposes, in which case Aristotle would rather deny that natural goods are good to merely good agents).

The context of **T 54** seems to suggest a way out of this difficulty, for this passage is meant to give an explanation to the claim that a virtuous friend is, by nature, choiceworthy to the virtuous person (1170a13-14: εἰκεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι). Friends are among the external goods (e.g. *EN* I.9 [=Bywater I.8] 1099^a31–^b8), and thus there is no doubt that Aristotle means to talk of external goods when he talks of things that are good by nature. However, it seems that Aristotle’s point is not merely saying that friends are good to the virtuous person, but that they are choiceworthy in a particular way: by nature. If this is correct, then perhaps the ‘καθ’ αὐτό’ at the end of **T 54** changes the meaning of his claim in an important way: Aristotle is not merely saying that natural goods

are good and pleasant to the virtuous person (in which case, given that he is here explicitly resuming the argument from T 53, it would be reasonable to conclude that they are only good to virtuous agents), but he is rather saying that natural goods are good and pleasant ‘καθ’ αὐτό’ to the virtuous person, which is compatible with their being good and pleasant to agents who are not virtuous, except that they would not be so ‘καθ’ αὐτό’, but, in some sense, ‘κατὰ συμβεβηκός.’

This is a reasonable claim, since the friendship due to pleasure and the friendship due to utility are distinguished from character friendship precisely by reference to the fact that they are κατὰ συμβεβηκός in the sense that they are due to some accidental feature of the friend, whereas character friendship (which is only possible among virtuous agents) is due to some intrinsic feature of the friend.⁶³⁸

What all this suggests is that the claim made in T 53 that there are fine and pleasant things particular (ἴδια) to each character disposition can indeed be used to distinguish between virtuous agents and agents who are not fully virtuous. This suspicion is strengthened by the third passage in which Aristotle avails himself of theses established in T 53:

T 55 – EN X.6 1176^b23–27

1176b23 εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαί|νεται
25 τίμα, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν || πολλάκις
ἐῖρηται, καὶ τίμα καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ | τοιαῦτα
ὄντα· ἐκάστω δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔξιν αἰρετω|τάτη ἐνέργεια,
καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν.

|| b23–24 φαίνεται P^bC^cLO^bVM^b: φαίνονται L^b || b26 δὲ
P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b: δὴ Par. 1417 (*pace* Susemihl and Bywater,
who report that it gives δὴ for the following line) || b27 δὴ ἢ L Arab.
(555.13: ‘وَعِنْدَ الْفَضِيلِ أَيْضًا’ [wa-’inda l-fadili ayḍan]—‘and in the case of
excellent person too,’ cf. Akasoy&Fidora [2005, p. 554n139], compare
1178^a21, where the δὴ from καὶ ... δὴ is rendered in the same way, and
1178^a5 and 1178^a30, where it is rendered as ‘likewise’[كَذَلِكَ]): δὲ ἢ
O^ba.r. Par. 1417: δὲ P^bC^cL^bB^{95sup}.VM^b Bekker

Therefore, it is reasonable that, just like different things appear to be honourable to children and to grown men, so too <different things appear to be honourable> both

⁶³⁸ For a discussion of the καθ’ αὐτό/κατὰ συμβεβηκός contrast in the *Nicomachean* discussion of friendship, see Zingano (2015a, pp. 199ff.).

to base persons and to decent persons. Thus, as [25] was said many times, honourable and pleasant are those things that are so to the virtuous person, and to each person the <activity> on the basis of their own disposition is the most choiceworthy activity, and to the virtuous person, finally, the <activity> on the basis of virtue <is the most choiceworthy activity>.

This passage, which begins by saying that it is reasonable that different things seem honourable to vicious and to decent persons just like the things that seem honourable to children and grown men are different, introduces something that is seemingly an almost literal parallel to T 53. In lines 1176^b24-26, Aristotle says that, as was said many times, honourable and pleasant are those things that are so to the virtuous person (*καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα*), and, as we saw, in 1113^a26-27 (in T 53), Aristotle said that, to the person well-disposed, healthy are those things that are truly so (*τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα*).

The idea in 1113^a26-27 is that being in a good physical condition makes it so that the things that are healthy to one are those things that are truly healthy. For someone who is sick, for instance, medicine or surgery may be healthy, but such things are certainly not healthy to the person who is in a good physical condition. In so arguing, Aristotle appears to be introducing a normative conception of healthy: healthy *sans phrase* are those things that are healthy to the person who is in a good physical condition, which is compatible, however, with other things being healthy, except that they are only qualifiedly healthy in that they are healthy to people in a given physical condition. Similarly, when Aristotle said in 1113^a23-24 that, without qualification and in truth, the object of *βούλησις* is the good, but for each person it is what they apprehend as good, Aristotle may also be taken as introducing a normative notion of the *βουλητόν*, to the effect that although whatever is cognised as good by someone is an object of *βούλησις*, it only counts as an object of *βούλησις* without qualification if it also happens to be what is truly good.

In light of this, it is reasonable to assume that in 1176^b23-26 Aristotle is also operating with a normative conception of honour and pleasure. Although many things can be honourable and pleasant, only those that are also honourable and pleasant to the virtuous person are honourable and pleasant without qualification.

All this seems to be quite straightforward. What is most unclear, however, is whether here in T 55 Aristotle is also willing to take the further step that he takes in T 53. Merely saying that the person in a good physical condition or that the virtuous person functions as a sort of measuring instrument for healthy things or for fine and pleasant things respectively is compatible with people who are not in a good physical condition and people who are not virtuous being persons for whom truly healthy things can be healthy and truly fine and pleasant things can be fine. However, in T 53, as we saw, Aristotle takes a further step, for he argues that there are pleasant and fine things that are particular (*ἰδία*) to each character disposition. Thus, even though there may be some overlap between the things that are fine and pleasant to the virtuous person and the things that are so to agents who are not virtuous, it is still the case that some things are fine and pleasant *only* to people who are virtuous.

Although in 1176^b23-26 Aristotle seems to be only making the weaker claim that the virtuous person is the one for whom truly honourable things and truly pleasant things are honourable and pleasant (respectively), in the immediate sequence he seems to be taking a further step in saying that, for each person, the most choiceworthy activity is the one on the basis of the corresponding character disposition.

But before delving into the meaning of this claim, let me say a few things about honourable things that will be relevant for the discussion of civic courage in the next section of this chapter (i.e., **section 3.3**).

As I have indicated already in a few places, Marta Jimenez holds a view according to

which acting for the sake of honour is a way of acting for the sake of the fine, since honour is something fine.

In contrast to Jimenez, I think that, in saying that civic courage is due to a desire for something fine (see the discussion of T 59, T 60, and T 62 below), Aristotle may be interpreted as pointing out only that it is due to a desire that has as its object something that happens to be fine, but which is not desired *as something fine*.⁶³⁹

I shall present my substantive arguments in favour of this view below in section 3.3. For now, I would only like to make the following observation:

Of course fineness and honourableness are very close notions. Aristotle describes honourableness as a notion that ‘seems to neighbour’ (δοκεῖ γειτνιάειν) fineness (cf. *Rh.* I.9 1367^b11–12). Yet this suggests that fineness and honourableness are *different* despite being closely tied.

A promising way of making sense of this is to say that fine things are proper objects of honour: although things that are not fine can be honoured, only fine things really deserve being honoured, similar to how fine things are proper objects of pleasure (in fact, they are the true objects of pleasure or objects of pleasure without qualification according to Aristotle).⁶⁴⁰ If this is the case, then it becomes clear why, as we shall see, Aristotle can explain the claim that the civic courage due to shame is due to a desire for something fine by saying that it is due to a desire for honour, for he would have in mind a normative conception of honour (that of

⁶³⁹ Similarly, by the end of the discussion of temperance in *EN* III.15 [=Bywater III.12] 1119^b15–18, Aristotle says that the appetitive part of the soul of the temperate person agrees with their reason in that both have fineness as their goal. However, properly speaking, fine things are not, *as such*, object of appetite, since appetite is defined as a desire for pleasure. Yet nothing hinders the pleasant things one has an appetite for from being fine in some cases, and, in this sense, one’s appetite may be described as being for something fine (cf. *EN* X.5 1175^b28–29, where Aristotle talks of appetites for fine things as being praiseworthy, and appetites for base things as being blameworthy, which can only be made sense of in light of Aristotle’s conception of appetitive desire if taken as not describing the intentional objects of appetite).

⁶⁴⁰ See *EE* III.1 1228^b19–21, VII.2 1235^b31–33, 1236^a10–11, VIII.3 1249^a18–19, *EN* VII.13 [=Bywater VII.12] 1152^b31–33, 1153^a6–7, X.5 1176^a17–29, X.6 1176^b23–26, and X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b15–16.

what is honourable without qualification) according to which only fine things deserve honour. Accordingly, even though honour (conceived of in normative terms) may be coextensive with fineness,⁶⁴¹ they would still be distinct and should not be identified, especially when we think of agents acting for the sake of honour in comparison to agents acting for the sake of the fine.⁶⁴²

Thus, in saying ‘honourable things’ in T 55 Aristotle is not making a claim about fine things as he made in T 53, although the honourable things picked up by the normative notion of honourableness operating in T 55 are indeed fine.

That being said, I can now focus on the final lines of T 55.

Aristotle first makes the general claim that for each person the activity on the basis of their own character disposition is the most choiceworthy activity, and then applies it to the case of the virtuous person, to the effect that, for the virtuous person, the activity on the basis of virtue is the most choiceworthy activity.

The fact that Aristotle first presents a general formulation of the claim and then shows how it operates in a particular case (as evinced by his use of the particle cluster ‘καὶ ... διή’) makes a strong case for thinking that we should not impose any restriction on the general claim made by Aristotle. Nothing in the context suggests that it applies only to virtuous and vicious agents, or only to children and grown-up people. In fact, nothing hinders us from thinking that it is indeed the case that the most choiceworthy activity for an agent, whoever

⁶⁴¹ For a discussion of some limits of Aristotle’s account of shame, including possible shortcomings of being motivated by the pursuit of honour, see Raymond (2017, pp. 151ff) and Alexander’s 21st Ethical Problem (*Supplementum Aristotelicum* II.2, pp. 141.14-142.21). As I take it, the main issue is whether agents who are not fully virtuous can conceive of honour properly. If they cannot, they do not conceive of honour in a way that it is coextensive with fineness, and, as a result, their pursuit of honour, despite being able to track fineness with some consistency, may lead them astray in some circumstances.

⁶⁴² In other words, the ‘for the sake of ...’ operator creates a hyperintensional position in a sentence, to the effect that even if ‘the fine’ and ‘honour’ are necessarily equivalent in that they are coextensive, their substitution is not guaranteed to preserve truth value. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that there is no world in which ‘the fine’ in ‘acting for the sake of the fine’ can be substituted for ‘honour’ without change in truth value when this is describing the motive of one and the same action.

they are, is the activity on the basis of the disposition by which that agent is characterised.

There are, however, at least two different ways of understanding this claim, depending on how we cash out the notion of choiceworthiness operating in it. A first alternative is to say with talk of the *αἰρετωτάτη* activity, Aristotle means to talk about the activity one is most strongly inclined to pursue: i.e., as a motivational notion. In that case, it would seem that, if we think of incontinent agents, for instance, they are most inclined to pursue the pleasure that leads them to act incontinently. However, if we describe that same agent in domains of their lives in which they are not such as to experience incontinence, it would seem that they would be described by a different character disposition, to the effect that, in that domain, the most choiceworthy activity to them would be different.

A potential problem for this reading is that to make sense of this proposal, we must distinguish between different aspects of one's character, to the effect that, depending on the aspect of one's character we have in view, we would give different answers to the question of what the most choiceworthy activity to them is.

In the face of this, one may come up with a second alternative. It consists in thinking of choiceworthiness as being restricted to things one values as good in the narrow sense of the word 'good' (such that valuing something as pleasant, for instance, is not included), to the effect that the most choiceworthy activity for an agent would be that activity they think best to pursue in the circumstances (even if it is not the activity they are most strongly inclined to pursue in the circumstances they are faced with). Accordingly, although incontinent agents, *qua* incontinent, are indeed most inclined to pursue the incontinent activity they end up bringing about in episodes of incontinence, this would not be the activity that is most choiceworthy to them, since they actually think something different from that activity is the best.

Yet it seems that if this is to be the case, the *οἰκεία ἔξις* that characterises the most choiceworthy activity in the case of incontinent agents is not incontinence itself, but the character disposition that characterises these agents in all domains of their lives taken together (and not only in the domain in which they are such as to experience incontinence).

As we saw above in **section 3.2.1**, one may argue that intermediate agents like the incontinent are able to aim for fine ends precisely because, overall, they are good (despite the fact of being half-bad in the domain in which they are incontinent). Besides, the fact that Aristotle applies his general claim to someone who is virtuous *sans phrase*, and not to someone who is temperate, just, or generous, may perhaps be a sign that he has in mind not, so to say, parts of one's character disposition, but the character disposition by reference to which one is said to be such and such *overall*.

In any case, it seems that on both readings **T 55** is saying something congenial to my claim: if the idea is that what one thinks the best thing to do is the activity on the basis of their overall character disposition, then what we have is a clear claim to the effect that the way in which intermediate agents and fully virtuous agents value virtuous actions is to be distinguished, since their overall character disposition also differs. As a result, there is good reason for thinking that these agents are engaging in activities that are fundamentally different and that are valued on different grounds, and thus for thinking that, albeit intermediate agents aim for fine ends, the way in which they aim for such ends is to be distinguished from the way in which fully virtuous agents aim for fine ends (as I propose).

If, in turn, the idea is that what one is most inclined to pursue is the activity on the basis of a particular character disposition that characterises the agent in a given domain of their lives, then it seems that there are clear differences in how intermediate agents and fully virtuous agents are motivated. As a matter of fact, even though the most choiceworthy activity

in the case of continent agents happens to be a virtuous action, the activity they are engaged in is not the same activity as the activity that is the most choiceworthy to fully virtuous agents. This may be taken as suggesting that the way in which intermediate agents and fully virtuous agents aim for fine ends is different. However, so construed and taken by itself the argument from T 55 is inconclusive in this regard. Yet if it is read together with the next passage I would like to analyse (*EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20–24), then I think we can safely claim that intermediate agents are to be distinguished from fully virtuous agents not only in the activities in which they are engaged, but also in regard to the ends that motivate them to engage in these activities.

3.2.2.1 ARISTOTLE AND THE THESIS THAT OUR ENDS ARE RELATIVE TO OUR CHARACTER DISPOSITION

To show that Aristotle holds that the ends that motivate the activities that are actualisations of different character dispositions are different, let me begin analysing *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20–^b24:

T 56 – *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b20–24

1115^b20 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα |
 ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ | καὶ
 θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος (κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, | πάσχει
 καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας | ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ
 25 τὴν ἕξι. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. || τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ
 τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. | καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ
 ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ | τὴν ἀνδρείαν)

|| b21 καὶ om. L^b || b22 κατ' ἀξίαν K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: καθ' ἕξι
 Arab. (217.9: 'عَلَى مَا تُؤَدِّيهِ الْحَالُ' [*'alā mā tū'addīhi l-hāl*])—cf. Schmidt &
 Ullmann [2012, pp. 34-35]) || b24 καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν
 K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V Arab.: καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ· ἡ <δ> ἀνδρεία καλόν
 Rassow (1874, p. 90) Susemihl: καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ· ἡ <δ> ἀνδρεία καλόν
 Zingano (2020, pp. 145-146) || b26 δὲ P^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.: δὲ K^bL^bV |
 ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρείος B^{95sup}. |
 τὰ om. K^b

The person who withstands and fears the things they should and for the sake of what <they should>, and as they should and when they should, and is also bold in a similar way, is courageous (for the courageous suffers and acts as the situation merits, i.e., as

reason would <prescribe>, and the end of every activity is <the end> on the basis of the disposition <on which basis that activity is carried out>. Well, then,⁶⁴³ courage is fine to the courageous person. [25] Therefore, such is its end as well, for everything is defined by its end. Therefore,⁶⁴⁴ the courageous person resists and does courageous things for the sake of the fine)

In this passage, Aristotle provides us with an explanation for the claim that courageous is the person who resists and fears the things one should, as one should, when one should, *and* for the sake of what one should, and, in the same way, is confident about the things one should, as one should, when one should, *and* for the sake of what one should.

The first part of the explanation (lines 19-20) consists in saying that the courageous person suffers and acts *as the situation merits* (κατ' ἀξίαν),⁶⁴⁵ that is, as reason prescribes, which appears to explain why the courageous person is someone who resists and fears and is confident about (i) *the things one should* (ii) *as one should* (iii) *when one should*, i.e., in a way that hits the mean in action.

The second part of the explanation (lines 20-24) aims at explaining why the courageous person is someone who resists and fears and is confident about the things one should *for the sake of the fine* (as is clear from its conclusion—1115^b23-24).⁶⁴⁶ In this sense, this text

⁶⁴³ I take 'καὶ ... δε' here to be introducing a minor premise.

⁶⁴⁴ I take this δὲ here to be introducing a second conclusion of the inference. That the δὲ here and the one from the line 22 must have connective meaning (see Denniston, 1954, s.v. δὲ, IV.(2), pp. 238-240) is evinced by the absence of other particles. That it is has a logical force (and not merely temporal or progressive force) is made clear by the context.

⁶⁴⁵ This is the text transmitted by the mss. Yet, in the Arabic version of the *EN*, one reads something equivalent to 'καθ' ἔξιν' (عَلَى مَا تُوَعِّدِيهِ الْحَالُ), in which case this passage would be explaining the actions performed by the courageous person not only by pointing out that they are as reason prescribes, but by also indicating that these actions correspond to their character disposition (in that case, there would be no comma before the καὶ in 'καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,' which would not be exegetical). But perhaps this is a case in which the ancient translator could not make sense of the original 'κατ' ἀξίαν.' Rowe renders 'κατ' ἀξίαν' as 'as the occasion merits,' in which case it would be emphasised that the correctness of one's action is relative to the circumstances in which it is performed. The thought would be that it is because courageous agents act as the circumstances require that they resist and fear the things one should, as one should, when one should, and are confident about the things one should, as one should, when one should.

⁶⁴⁶ This conclusion makes clear that with 'for the sake of what one should' Aristotle does not have in mind the end constitutive of the action ignorance of which makes the performance of that action involuntary (cf. *EE* II.9 1225^b1-6, *EN* III.2 [=Bywater III.1] 1110^b30-1111^a6, and V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^b11-16). We have an end constitutive of the action when we think of someone who strikes someone else in such a

appears to parallel what is said in the lines that follow T 43, since in these lines too Aristotle gives a two-part explanation that first explains the sense in which generous actions are fine (which they are because they consist in giving money correctly: i.e., the amount one should, to whom should, etc.—in a way that hits the mean in action) and then explains the sense in which generous actions are for the sake of the fine. Let me quote T 43 with the lines that follow it:

T 57 – EN IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a23–27

1120a23 αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ |
 25 τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ||
 καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα | ἔπεται
 τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἠδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ | κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἠδὲν ἢ ἄλυπον, ἤκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν.
 || a24 οὖν K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: δὲ L^b

The actions on the basis of virtue⁶⁴⁷ are fine and for the sake of the fine. And, in fact, the generous agent gives for the sake of the fine [25] and <gives> correctly, for <they give> to the persons they should, how much <they should>, when <they should>, and all other things that follow from giving correctly, and <they do> this gladly or painlessly, for what is on the basis of virtue is either pleasant, painless, or minimally painful.

Two things are particularly unclear in this passage. First, what Aristotle means by ‘the actions on the basis of virtue’ (*αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις*). Second, whether an action being fine is really dependent upon its being performed *for the sake of the fine*.

The first issue is due to an ambiguity in the Greek. The phrase ‘αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις’ can be understood in two different ways. A first alternative—which is the one I favoured

way as to prick them, but ignores that striking them in such a way amounts to wounding them instead, so that they are not wounding voluntarily (cf. EN V.10 [=Bywater V.8] 1135^b15–16—see T 8 above). For a discussion of the idea that, for Aristotle, action possesses some sort of double teleology, to the effect that the end constitutive of the action is to be distinguished from its motive, see Price (2013, p. 30).

⁶⁴⁷ By ‘the actions on the basis of virtue’ (*αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις*), Aristotle appears to be referring to those virtuous actions performed by virtuous agents, for, as it seems, only such actions are not only fine, but also performed for the sake of the fine. As already indicated above in footnote 115, there seem to be other instances in which *κατα* + accusative phrases such as this make reference to the regulative role of virtue, such that agents can do things that are *κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς* or *κατ' ἀρετὴν* without thereby being virtuous. I talked about this in more detail above in discussing T 48. At any rate, it is telling that here in T 57 Aristotle talks of *actions* (*πράξεις*) that are on the basis of virtue, and not simply of things or states-of-affairs that are *κατ' ἀρετὴν* or *κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς*.

in my translation above—is to say that Aristotle is referring to those actions performed by (fully) virtuous agents (i.e., *virtuous activities*).⁶⁴⁸ In that case, Aristotle would be saying that actions performed on the basis of virtue are both fine and for the sake of the fine, but would be silent about whether actions performed by agents who are not (fully) virtuous can be fine and/or for the sake of the fine.

This is not, however, the only way of interpreting this phrase. *κατά* + accusative phrases such as this can also make reference to the regulative role of virtue,⁶⁴⁹ in which case a better translation would be ‘the actions in accordance with virtue.’ In that case, Aristotle would be explicitly saying that any action that is in accordance with virtue is fine and is performed for the sake of the fine,⁶⁵⁰ which is compatible with agents who are not fully virtuous being able to do things that are in accordance with virtue and that are thereby fine.

A first problem with saying that only those actions performed on the basis of virtue (and thus by agents who are fully virtuous) are fine is that Aristotle explicitly admits in other places that agents who are not fully virtuous can do fine things, and, in at least one passage, that one can do fine things without acting *for the sake of the fine*. In *EE* VII.10 1243^a38, for instance, Aristotle says that the many pursue what is fine superfluously, that is, only when they have what is necessary at their disposal.⁶⁵¹ Given that Aristotle thinks that ‘the many’ are not virtuous (cf. *EN* X.10 [=Bywater X.9] 1179^b10–16 and *EN* VII.8 [=Bywater VII.7] 1150^a15–16), *EE* VII.10 1243^a38 is clearly indicating that people who are not fully virtuous can do fine things. Moreover, in *EE* VIII.3 1249^a14–16 (in **T 39** above), Aristotle describes certain agents who think that they must have the virtues for the sake of the external goods as

⁶⁴⁸ On this, see footnote 103.

⁶⁴⁹ See footnote 108.

⁶⁵⁰ For the idea that Aristotle is here saying that every action that counts as a moral action (and thus as morally worthy) is done for the sake of the fine, see Zingano (2022, p. 60).

⁶⁵¹ As we saw in footnote 454, the opposition between superfluous things (*τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας*) and necessary things (*τὰ ἀναγκαῖα*) is found in *Top.* III.2 118^a6–15, and Dirlmeier (1963, p. 448) proposes in his commentary that 1243^a38 should be read in light of this passage from the *Topics*.

doing fine things *accidentally*,⁶⁵² by which he means that they do not do fine things *motivated by what makes them fine*, but for some other reason (cf. *EE* VIII.3 1248^b34-36, 1249^a3-4). As a result, there is reason for thinking that one's actions can be fine even if one is not fully virtuous and even if one does not perform them for the sake of the fine. Accordingly, if T 57 is to be consistent with these passages, the claim made by Aristotle there must be restricted to those actions performed on the basis of virtue. Otherwise, fine actions that are not done for the sake of the fine would not count as actions in accordance with virtue—which is implausible. This is not conclusive, however, since Aristotle is not explicit in this regard in the *EN*, but only in the *EE*, and one may object by claiming that he holds a different view in the *EN*.

At any rate, it is worth noting that, in T 57, after claiming in lines 23-24 that actions *κατ' ἀρετήν* are fine and for the sake of the fine, Aristotle proceeds to apply this claim to the case of the generous agent. He first says that generous agents give money for the sake of the fine and give money correctly, and then appears to offer a twofold explanation for this claim. In his explanation, Aristotle begins by saying that generous agents give money 'to the persons they should, how much <they should>, when <they should>, and all other things that follow from giving <money> correctly,' and then he adds that they do these things 'gladly or painlessly.'

Now, it is reasonable to think that the explanation Aristotle gives in T 57 has a chiasmic structure (and this becomes even more pressing if one accepts beforehand that agents who are not virtuous can do fine things even if they are not acting *for the sake of the fine*): the claim that generous agents give money for the sake of the fine would be explained by the fact that they do it gladly or painlessly, whereas the claim that generous agents give money correctly would be explained by the fact that they give money 'to the persons they should, how much

⁶⁵² See T 39 and the discussion that follows it.

<they should>, when <they should>, and all other things that follow from giving <money> correctly.’

If this is correct, an action’s being fine is tantamount to its being the right thing to do given the circumstances, i.e., to its being in accordance with virtue. Furthermore, giving money to whom one should, how much one should etc. is tantamount to saying that one is giving money in a way that *hits the mean in action*. Thus, we have good reasons for thinking that an action is fine *because it hits the mean in action*. To put it in Aristotelian jargon, since an action that hits the mean in action is fine because it hits the means in action, being fine allows of being described in terms of a *per se*₄ predicate of actions that hit the mean in action.⁶⁵³ And, if this is so, being fine is something that can be determined in the case of an action on the basis of a purely objective description of what the agent does (irrespective of their motives, of their awareness or unawareness of what they are doing, and of their being forced or constrained to act in the way they are acting).

Notwithstanding this, it is unclear how exactly being in an emotional outlook such that one acts gladly or painlessly explains why one acts for the sake of the fine. At any rate, although the explanation Aristotle provides in **T 56** for the claim that courageous activities are for the sake of the fine differs importantly from the explanation offered here in **T 57** to the claim that generous activities are for the sake of the fine, I think that getting clear on the explanation offered in **T 56** will allow us to think more clearly about how acting for the sake of the fine is dependent upon one’s being in a certain emotional outlook when one performs virtuous actions.

⁶⁵³ Cf. *APo* I.4 73^b10–16 for Aristotle’s characterisation of the *per se*₄ and of what may be called an accident₄. There is some controversy about whether the *per se*₄ concerns the relationship between subjects and predicates as the other senses of *per se* or if it concerns rather the relationship between events (as is suggested by Aristotle’s examples in *APo* I.4 73^b10–16)—see McKirahan (1992, p. 92), Barnes (1993, p. 117), and Mignucci (2007, p. 165). I cannot discuss this issue here, but it is nevertheless reasonable to think that *per se*₄ apply both to the relationship between subjects and predicates and to the relationship between events, as is suggested by Terra (2014, p. 41n20).

Now, what is most obscure in the second part of the explanation advanced in T 56 (i.e., the part of the explanation that concerns the claim that the courageous agent acts for the sake of the fine) is the meaning of the major premise of the argument: ‘the end of every activity is <the end> on the basis of the disposition <on which basis that activity is carried out>’ (τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω). Two things should be made clear here: I) what exactly ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω’ means; and II) which sort of activities Aristotle is talking about.

An intuitive way of making sense of ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω’ is to supply ‘τέλος’ (end), in which case Aristotle would be saying that the end of every activity is the end on the basis of the corresponding disposition (see Rowe’s translation for this construal [in Broadie and Rowe, 2002, pp. 323-324]).⁶⁵⁴

But what does that mean exactly? Is Aristotle merely saying that the end of every activity is in *accordance* with (κατά + acc.) that disposition on which basis that activity is brought about (which is compatible with activities brought about on the basis of different dispositions sharing the same end), or is he making the stronger claim that the end of every activity is something *on the basis of* (κατά + acc.) that disposition on which basis that activity is brought about?

The parallel with *EN* III.12 [=Bywater III.9] 1117^b1 (see footnote 654) suggests that he means the latter (since, in this passage, Aristotle is characterising the end that motivates truly courageous agents—and not agents who are merely thought to be courageous). Besides, I would like to propose that ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω’ should be understood as being closely related to

⁶⁵⁴ Rowe (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002, pp. 323-324) translates ‘τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω’ as ‘in every case, an activity’s end is the one that accords with the corresponding disposition.’ ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω’ would then be short for ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιω τέλος.’ Accordingly, this would be a more general and concise instance of an expression such as ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος’ (cf. *EN* III.12 [=Bywater III.9] 1117^b1), as is also suggested by the anonymous scholiast (see *CAG*. XX, 163.16–18).

expressions such as ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν λεγόμενον.’ The expression ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν λεγόμενον’ is found in *Top.* V.4 133^b24–31 and indicates something that is said (λεγόμενον) on the basis of a given disposition (a ἔξις).⁶⁵⁵ In this passage from the *Topics*, Aristotle describes a *topos* according to which the property that belongs to a certain disposition will also belong to what is said on the basis of that disposition and the property that belongs to what is said on the basis of a certain disposition will also belong to that disposition.⁶⁵⁶ To reproduce Aristotle’s own example: if knowledge is unchangeable by argument (ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου), the knower, who is qualified by knowledge (and is thus said ‘knower’ on the basis of knowledge), will also be unchangeable by argument.

Thus, if ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν’ refers to the end that is said on the basis of a given disposition,⁶⁵⁷ then the argument can be more easily construed. If we read the text of the mss. (as I propose), the argument would run as follows:

- (1) The end of every activity is <the end> that is said on the basis of the disposition on which basis that activity is carried out (1115^b20–21);
- (2) Courage is fine for the courageous person (1115^b21);⁶⁵⁸

⁶⁵⁵ This seems to be also how Zingano (2020, p. 145) understands ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν’ here in **T 56**.

⁶⁵⁶ This *topos* is useful to deny (sophistically) that a given property is an ἴδιον of something, since if one presents something as the ἴδιον of a given disposition, one may deny that it is an ἴδιον by distinguishing between the disposition and what is qualified by that disposition *qua* subjects, and by saying that if it is a property of the disposition it will also be a property of what is qualified by that disposition, and thereby it will not be an ἴδιον of that disposition, for it will also pertain to something different from it (even though they are not different without qualification and thus as subjects, for they differ rather by inflection—τῆ πτώσει—, cf. *Top.* V.4 133^b36–134^a4 and Alexander’s commentary [CAG . II.2, 398.22–25]). In spite of this, Aristotle seems to accept the principle according to which the property that belongs to a given disposition also belongs to what is said on the basis of that disposition (see footnote 659 for some examples), and it seems that it can be used sophistically not because of some internal flaw of this *topos*, but because ‘the same’ and ‘different’ are said in many ways (cf. *Top.* V.5 133^b15). For an intricate discussion of this *topos*, see Reinhardt (2000, pp. 189–200).

⁶⁵⁷ ‘τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν’ can also indicate the qualification by which something is qualified, which is distinct from the quality on which basis something is qualified, as is clear from *APr* I.34 48^a8–15 and 48^a26–28. However, I shall leave this option aside because I can hardly see how the major premise understood in light of these passages could be construed as a premise by means of which Aristotle concludes, in the argument as we have it, that courageous agents withstand fearful things (i.e., perform courageous actions) for the sake of the fine.

⁶⁵⁸ One may object that the role of (2) in this argument is not so clear (as Zingano [2020, p. 145] contends),

- (3) Each thing is defined by its end (1115^b22);
- (4) Therefore [from (2), and (3)], the end of courage too is fine for the courageous person (1115^b22);
- (5) Therefore [from (1) and (4)], the courageous person performs courageous actions for the sake of the fine (1115^b23-24).

As put by Burnet (1900, p. 144, §6), the idea behind (1) is basically that the end of an activity that is brought about on the basis of a given disposition is relative somehow to the disposition from which it proceeds. As a matter of fact, if in (1) Aristotle is indeed saying that the end of every activity is the end that is qualified by the disposition on which basis that activity is brought about, Aristotle's argument has two clear steps: first he shows (4) that the end of courage is fine for the courageous person because (2) courage is fine to the courageous agent and (3) courage is defined by its end—which premises can lead to conclusion (4) in that a property that belongs to courage (namely, being fine to the courageous person) is said to belong to the end by which courage is defined (which is an end said on the basis of courage, as described in [1]); then, on the basis of this conclusion, Aristotle can show that the activity brought about on the basis of courage (which is said on the basis of courage) should be defined by an end that is fine to the agent who performs it (since the end of courage is fine). Accordingly, he can draw the conclusion that activities on the basis of courage are for the sake of the fine. This conclusion also seems to depend on the principle presented in *Top.* V.4 133^b24–31: if an end that is fine to the courageous agent belongs to courage (as shown by [4]), an action that is said on the basis of courage will also have as its end an end that is

so that we should emend the text after Rasso (1874, p. 90), as is done in Susemihl-Apelt's edition. In that case, the role of (2) in the argument would be performed by two premises instead. But because this other construal does not affect my point, I shall leave it aside. In favour of retaining the text of the mss. here, see, for instance, White (1992, p. 163n37).

fine to the courageous person (as in [5]). In other words, a property that belongs to courage (namely, having an end that is fine to the courageous person) will also belong to what is said on the basis of courage (namely, to the action performed on the basis of courage).⁶⁵⁹

As a result, people who act on the basis of different character dispositions should be engaging in activities characterised by different ends. To put it differently, someone who engages in a *virtuous activity* (and thus performs virtuous actions *for the right reasons*—i.e., for their own sakes) is motivated by an end different from the end that motivates someone who is not fully virtuous but who does nevertheless perform virtuous actions, for their activities should be different in so far as they are actualisations of different capacities.⁶⁶⁰ In fact, there is no reason to deny that other virtues are fine for virtuous agents, and, if this is so, it is safe to generalise what Aristotle says here in T 56 as applying to all the virtues (and perhaps even as grounding the claim, that Aristotle will make later, that the for the sake of the fine is a

⁶⁵⁹ It is no surprise that Aristotle can rely on this principle here. In *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b12–14, for instance, Aristotle says that there is no *ἔργον* of the human being that has as much stability (*βεβαιότης*) as the activities on the basis of virtue, for these seem to be more permanent than those of the *ἐπιστήμαι*. And it seems that the activities on the basis of virtue are stable precisely because Aristotle is also assuming that the virtues are stable. Similarly, in *EN* VIII.3 1156^b9–12, Aristotle argues that those who want good to their friends for their friends' own sakes are most of all friends, for they are so related (i.e., are friends) on their own account, and not *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Thus, their friendship remains as long as they are virtuous, and virtue is something permanent (*μόνιμον*). The implicit conclusion of this argument—namely, that the friendship based on virtue is something permanent as well—is then used in VIII.8 [=Bywater VIII.6] 1158^b8–11 to distinguish this friendship from the other two friendships, which change quickly. In both these cases, Aristotle assumes that properties that belong to virtue (like stability and being permanent) will also belong to things that are in some sense said on the basis of virtue (like the friendship due to virtue and the activities on the basis of virtue). Moreover, that in these passages Aristotle is relying on a *topos* he discusses in the *Topics* does not seem to have any implications as to whether the Method of the *EN* can be described as being dialectical in some sense, for Aristotle admits that *topoi* can be used in the philosophical investigation without thereby implying that one is doing dialectics (cf. *Top.* VIII.1 155^b7–14).

⁶⁶⁰ Of course there is a sense in which what they do coincides, otherwise moral habituation would not be possible. In *EN* II.1 1103^b6ff, for instance, Aristotle says that every virtue comes into being and is destroyed by the same things to the effect that we become (e.g.) good housebuilders by building houses well, and bad housebuilders by building houses badly (*ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί*). Similarly, in *Met.* Θ.8 1049^b29–1050^a2, Aristotle says that the learner must possess something of the science they are learning, in which case it would seem that, in order to become virtuous, one must exercise a condition that has something of virtue already. All this strongly suggest that learners and fully virtuous agents engage in activities that are the same *in some sense*. My only contention here is that they are not the same *qua* activities, although their activities overlap somehow in that (e.g.) they involve doing the same thing (although in ways that may be considerably different if we take into account their agential perspectives).

common feature of the virtues—cf. *EN* IV.4 [=Bywater IV.2] 1122^b6–7 [i.e., T 44]).

Accordingly, the major premise from the second part of the explanation that is marshalled in T 56 (i.e., [1]) is at the very least saying that the end of every activity is relative to the disposition on which basis that activity is carried out.

But what sort of activity Aristotle is talking about exactly?

Some commentators⁶⁶¹ hold that this passage is saying that the ends aimed by virtuous activities are relative to the virtues on which basis these activities are performed, which would be compatible with the possibility of activities that are not accomplished on the basis of virtue being motivated by the same end as these activities.

However, nothing in the context suggests that by ‘activities’ Aristotle means to talk only of virtuous actions. Of course Aristotle mobilises premise (1) to explain why courageous actions performed by courageous agents are performed for the right reasons, but this is not a reason to deny that (1) also applies to activities brought about on the basis of dispositions that do not count as fully virtuous (which should include even vicious dispositions). In fact, its hard to account for the general formulation Aristotle gives to his argument if it is not meant to hold generally, but only in the contrast between full courage and *some* non-courageous character dispositions that seem like courage, especially in light of the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of the dispositions that are similar to real courage but are not thereby courage appears to be exhaustive.

In sum: Aristotle not only countenances the claim that the end of every activity (including the ends that motivate the performance of our actions) is relative to the disposition of which that activity is an actualisation, but he also mobilises this claim to explain the fact

⁶⁶¹ See Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia Ethic.* L III, 15 95–117), the anonymous paraphrasis (*CAG.* XIX.2, 54.37–55.1), and the commentaries from van Giphén [Giphanius] (1608, p. 217) and Grant (1885, vol. 2, pp. 35–36, §6).

that activities that count as exercises of virtues such as courage are for the sake of the fine, an argument that can only be made sense of if *only* activities that count as actualisations of virtue are for the sake of the fine.

If this is correct, then it seems that in the *EN* too we have strong reasons to distinguish the end that motivates fully virtuous agents to perform virtuous actions and the end that motivates agents who are not fully virtuous to perform virtuous actions. Moreover, given what Aristotle says in the conclusion of T 50, in T 53, and in T 55, it is reasonable to say that it is not only the ends₁ of fully virtuous agents that should be distinguished from the ends of agents who are not fully virtuous. Rather, it seems that they should also be distinguished by reference to their ends₃₋₂. Accordingly, because there is also reason for thinking that there is a sense in which agents who fall short of full virtue like intermediate agents do indeed aim for fine ends, an intuitive way of making sense of the difference between the ends aimed for by intermediate agents and the ends aimed for by fully virtuous agents is to say that intermediate agents are not committed to fine ends *on their own account*, as I have suggested is the case in the common books and in the *Ethica Eudemia*.

3.3 Τὸ καλόν in the *EN*

As we saw, ‘finess’ (τὸ καλόν) is a central, albeit obscure notion in Aristotle’s *Ethicae*. Aristotle not only characterises virtuous agents as performing virtuous actions for the sake of the fine (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), due to their fineness (διὰ τὸ καλόν), and because they are fine (ὅτι καλόν),⁶⁶² but also, as we saw above, explicitly claims that the for the sake of the fine is an end

⁶⁶² Performing virtuous actions *because they are fine* (ὅτι καλόν) or *due to their fineness* (διὰ τὸ καλόν) are the preferred expressions in the *EE* (cf. *EE* III.3 1229^a4 and III.3 1230^a32), and this seems to be equivalent to performing virtuous actions for the sake of the fine (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), which is the preferred expression in the *EN* (cf. *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b10–13 [T 42], *EN* IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a23–25 [see T 57], 1120^a27–29 [in T 64], 4 [=Bywater IV.2] 1122^b6–7 [T 44], 6 [=Bywater IV.2] 1123^a24–25 [in T 67]). As a matter of fact, Aristotle also talks in the *EN* of performing virtuous actions *due to their fineness* (διὰ τὸ καλόν) and *because they are fine* (ὅτι καλόν), which suggests that these three expressions

that belongs (*εἶναι* + genitive) to virtue (cf. *EN* III.10 [=Bywater III.7] 1115^b13—in **T 42**) and that it is a *κοινόν*, that is, a common feature, of the virtues (cf. *EN* IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a23–24—**T 43** and **T 57**).

Yet, despite the centrality ‘finess’ enjoys in Aristotle’s analysis of the particular virtues (most notably in the *EN*),⁶⁶³ he never explains what he means by it.⁶⁶⁴ Different from what we see in *EE* VIII.3, nowhere in the *EN* does Aristotle attempt to describe what he means by τὸ καλόν or what is implied by acting τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. Yet the widespread use of these notions in the *EN* appears to give some indications as to what they mean in this treatise.

Besides pointing out that the ‘for the sake of the fine’ is the end of virtue and is a common feature of the virtues (in **T 42** and **T 44**), and that actions on the basis of virtue are fine and for the sake of the fine (in **T 43**), Aristotle also holds in the *EN* that doing things that are fine and virtuous is choiceworthy for its own sake:

T 58 – *EN* X.6 1176^b6–9

1176b6 καθ’ αὐτὰς δ’ εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ’ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται |
παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν
πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι’ αὐτὰ
αἰρετῶν.

|| **b7** παρὰ P^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.VM^b: περὶ C^c || **b8** καλὰ καὶ om. L^b

Choiceworthy in themselves are those things from which nothing is sought after besides their activity. Such seem to be the actions on the basis of virtue, for doing fine and virtuous things is among the things that are choiceworthy in themselves.

This passage suggests that in the *EN* too fine things ‘are a proper subset of non-

are interchangeable (cf. *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.7] 1116^a10–12 [**T 45**], 1116^a14–15, 11 [=Bywater 3.8] 1116^b2–3 [in **T 62**], 1116^b30–31 [in **T 63**], 1117^a8–9 [in **T 63**], 1117^a16–17 [**T 46**], IV.12 [=Bywater IV.9] 1117^b9, X.8 1178^b13). Moreover, although Aristotle never uses the expression ‘τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα’ in the *EE*, he comes quite close to that in *EE* III.1 1230^a28–29 (in **T 34**) (ἕνεκα τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ [sc. πᾶσα ἀρετῇ], καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν) and in *EE* VIII.3 1249^a5–6 (in **T 39**) (καλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶν [sc. τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει] ὅταν οὐ ἕνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἰροῦνται καλόν).

⁶⁶³ In the *Eudemian* treatment of the particular virtues, this notion only comes up in the discussion of courage, and does not recur in the discussion of the other particular virtues. In the *EN*, in turn, it is employed in a number of passages (see footnotes 560 and 662).

⁶⁶⁴ Similarly, see Lear (2006, p. 118: ‘Aristotle never explains in the *NE* what to kalon is’) and Zingano (2020, pp. 27, 141–142), who claims that the concept of τὸ καλόν is used, but not analysed in the *EN*.

instrumental goods' (Irwin, 2011, p. 244).⁶⁶⁵ Moreover, like in the *EE*, the virtues are also said to be object of praise by issuing in fine things in the *EN* (see *EN* I.12 1101^b31–32: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης). Yet Aristotle does not say explicitly in the *EN* that the virtues are fine (unless we read 1115^b21 emended as Rassow proposes [see the discussion of **T 56** above], which then becomes a claim to the effect that courage is fine), and, more importantly, he does not present us with the specific requirements that a good must satisfy if it is also fine.

At any rate, as we saw in *EE* VIII.3, virtuous actions seem to be praiseworthy and fine due to the fine ends that constitute them: i.e., giving money to someone is fine when doing so amounts to performing a generous action, which it does when it hits the mean, i.e., amounts to giving money to whom one should, in the quantity in which one should, from the sources one should etc. Similarly, in **T 57**, actions are qualified as fine when they turn out to be the right thing to do given the circumstances: an act of giving money to someone proves to be a generous action when one gives money to whom one should, from the sources one should, in the quantity one should etc. As Aristotle puts it in **T 56** an action counts as the right thing to do when it is performed as the occasion merits (*κατ' ἀξίαν*).

Moreover, because fine actions explain why virtues are praiseworthy (see *EN* I.12 1101^b15–16 and 1101^b31–32), and because actions performed on the basis of virtue are voluntary (which makes them things that are liable to praise and blame, which depend on voluntariness—see *EN* III.1 1109^b31), there are good grounds for thinking that, in the *EN*, fine things are praiseworthy.

Although both the virtues and capacities like strength are praised due to being of a

⁶⁶⁵ That is, fine things are among the things that are choiceworthy for their own sakes. That this is Aristotle's position in general is also suggested by *Met.* Λ.7 1072^a34–^b1, where Aristotle says that what is fine and what is choiceworthy for its own sake are in the same *συστοιχία*.

certain quality and to standing in relation to something (see *EN* I.12 1101^b12–18), it might be argued that they are not praised in the same way, for while the virtues are praised due to what they enable us to do—namely, fine actions—, capacities seem to be praised by standing in relation to some fine and virtuous thing (see 1101^b14–18) that seems to be over and above them, and is not intrinsically connected to them. As a result, just like in *EE* VIII.3, it would seem that in the *EN* too fine things are worthy of praise due to an intrinsic feature they have, whereas other good things are only worthy of praise when connected to things that are fine in a way that is accidental somehow.

Furthermore, that Aristotle holds that fine things are not merely good things, but a class of goods is made clear when he presents, in *EN* II.2 [=Bywater II.3] 1104^b30–31, the fine as an object of pursuit beside the advantageous and the pleasant, since by the advantageous (*συμφέρον*) he seems to mean goods that are choiceworthy for their own sakes such as health (on that, see Cooper, 1996/1999b, pp. 265n21, 265–266, 266n22).⁶⁶⁶ Accordingly, the fine would be a good that is choiceworthy for its own sake that it still different from other good things such as those that are said to be merely advantageous or pleasant.

Now, although no positive account of what the fine is and what acting *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα* means can found in the *EN*, Aristotle has something to say about what acting *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα* is *not*, and this negative account is instructive about the requirements that must be met if an action is to be performed for the sake of the fine, and it appears to confirm the outline presented above in T 49. Moreover, this account of what acting *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα* is *not* seems to confirm that actions are fine when they hit the mean, that is, when they are performed as they should be performed and when they should be performed (i.e., in the

⁶⁶⁶ Yet, as should be clear, I do not agree with Cooper's contention that the fine is the correlate object of *θυμός* in the specific case of the virtuous person, whereas the good is the object of *βούλησις* and pleasure, of *ἐπιθυμία*.

|| a28 διὰ om. P^bC^cO^b

This is most like the <courage> mentioned previously because it comes from a virtue (since it is due to shame), i.e., from a desire for something fine (for it is <a desire> for honour), or from an avoidance of reproach, for <reproach> is something base.

It seems that, according to T 59, civically courageous agents are led to perform courageous actions due to external incentives established by the law: to the extent that the law attributes honours to those who perform courageous actions and penalise some who do not (for instance, those who act cowardly instead) citizens are said to be motivated to perform courageous actions. Taken by itself, this argument would seem to be sufficient to distinguish civic courage from actual courage, since persons who are really courageous perform courageous actions not because of external incentives, but rather because it is fine to do so.

Yet T 60 takes the argument a step further, examining in detail how civically courageous agents are motivated, and, in doing so, it shows that this is not quite how Aristotle conceives of civic courage. According to this text, civic courage seems to be a disposition to perform courageous actions due to shame (δι' αἰδῶ), which may involve either a desire for honour or an avoidance of reproach.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁸ Pace Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 84.4–6), whose position is seemingly that Aristotle would be thinking of three cases: the person who performs courageous actions due to shame, the person who performs courageous actions due to a desire for honour, and the person who performs courageous actions due to an avoidance of reproach.

In the reading I am proposing, the description of civic courage found in T 60 would be similar to the ones found in the *MM* and in the *EE*. In fact, the *MM* only describes civic courage as being due to shame (see *MM* A.XX.8 1191^a6–8), whereas the *EE*, besides describing civic courage as being due to shame (in III.1 1229^a17 and 1230^a23–24), just says that it is due to convention (in III.1 1229^a29–30), in contrast to the courage due to spirit (*θυμός*), which is the most natural courage.

Now, it is not hard to see how prospective shame (on the distinction between prospective and retrospective shame, see footnote 679 below), for instance, may involve an avoidance of reproach, since, if defined as fear of disrepute (in truth, as a fear of sorts—*φόβος τις*—, see III.15 [=Bywater III.9] 1128^b11–14), shame will in many cases consist in an avoidance of reproach. The same seems to be true about honour, since there are cases in which avoiding disrepute amounts to pursuing honours, although this might not always be the case. Thus, depending on the case, shame will motivate one to perform courageous actions in a way that will be equivalent either to the pursuance of honour or to the avoidance of reproach.

Alternatively, in saying that civic courage may be due either to shame (which is understood as a virtue in a loose sense) or to a desire for honour or to an avoidance of reproach, Aristotle might also be pointing out that civically courageous actions can be explained either by external incentives (honour or reproach) or by internal standards (shame), in which case his position in the *EN* will be slightly different

This is not conclusive, however, for this passage could also be construed as saying rather that civic courage is either due to a virtue or due to a desire for something fine or due to an avoidance of reproach. No doubt the text may be read, as I proposed, as justifying the claim that civic courage is due to a virtue by saying that it is due to shame, and, moreover, as specifying the sense in which it is due to a desire for something fine by saying that it is due to a desire for honour. However, a problem for this reading is that shame is not a virtue, and nor would honour seem to be something that is fine in itself. Besides, Aristotle explains the claim that civic courage may be due to the avoidance of reproach by pointing out that reproach is something base (*αἰσχρός*), which is puzzling as well, since reproach, in itself, does not seem to be base.

I have already touched on these issues above in footnote 527: the question of civic courage being due to a virtue might be settled if it is taken to be an imprecision of Aristotle's, whose point would be that civic courage may be due to shame, which is praiseworthy and held to be a virtue by some, but which is not properly speaking a virtue, as was already said in *EN* II.7 1108^a31–32. It seems that a similar imprecision can be found in *EE* II.7 1223^b10–12, a passage in which Aristotle says that the continent person will perform just acts (*δικαιοπραγήσει*), and will do so more than the incontinent person (literally, more than incontinence), *for continence is a virtue, and virtue makes people more just* (ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἢ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ).⁶⁶⁹ Now, the thought conveyed in this passage clearly does not represent Aristotle's

from the one found in the *MM* and in the *EE*. Yet, as I shall suggest below, in discussing the second sort of civic courage, Aristotle contrasts it with the first sort by saying only that the second sort is not due to shame, but due to fear, which suggests that shame embraces both the pursuit of honour and the avoidance of reproach. As a matter of fact, in making this contrast, Aristotle appears to be contrasting the sort of avoidance involved in the civic courage due to fear—which is an avoidance of what is fearful—with the sort of avoidance involved in the civic courage due to shame—which is an avoidance of something base—, which suggests that the sort of avoidance involved in shame is an avoidance of reproach, which was said earlier to be something base.

⁶⁶⁹ This is the text printed by Susemihl (1884), which corresponds to the text transmitted by the ex-

position in the *EE* (nor, for that matter, in the *EN*). As a matter of fact, in *EE* II.11 1227^b16 Aristotle denies that continence is a virtue,⁶⁷⁰ and if the common books are to be read as pertaining to or as having originated in the *EE*, it is even clearer that continence should not be conflated with virtue, for not only is continence *simpliciter* distinct from temperance, but virtuous agents have no need of continence whatsoever: although there is indeed a sense in which they seem to be self-controlled, their self-control is not continence properly speaking, though it is similar to it (*EN* VII.11 [=Bywater VII.9] 1151^b32–1152^a3). Thus, if we do not emend *EE* II.7 1223^b10–12 (see footnote 669), this passage would be imprecise in the same way as 1116^a27–28 would be,⁶⁷¹ since both call virtues things that, properly speaking, are not so.

Concerning honour and reproach, we seemingly come across a similar imprecision in *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a28–31, a passage in which Aristotle mentions those who devote themselves to honour more than to what they should as an example of people who, against reason, are overcome by or pursue something that is fine and good by nature (*παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν*), which suggests that Aristotle is counting honour among things that are fine by nature. This passage follows a tripartition of pleasant things that is reminiscent of (and may be taken as a second version of)

tant manuscripts. Alternatively, Rowe (2023b) reads ‘ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. ἢ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἢ δ’ ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ,’ following a correction proposed by Ross, changing ‘τῆς ἀκρασίας’ into ‘τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.’ Now, although Ross’ correction makes the text more straightforward, one may argue that it is not necessary (cf. Dirlmeier, 1963, p. 273), since it is easy to make sense of what is in the mss. as a metonymy. Walzer & Mingay, in turn, read ‘ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ <γὰρ> μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας ἢ {γὰρ} ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἢ δ’ ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ,’ which is due to a suggestion made by Allan (see Walzer & Mingay [1991, p. xi, n. 3, and p. 35]). With the text from Walzer & Mingay, Aristotle would be saying rather that ‘Moreover, the continent person will perform just acts, for continence is more of a virtue than incontinence, and virtue makes people more just.’

⁶⁷⁰ Pace Callard (2017), who argues that continence is compatible with practical wisdom, in which case it could be viewed as a virtue, and that *EE* II.11 1227^b16 is not saying that continence is not a virtue, but only that it is different from moral virtue. Similarly, she takes *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater IV.9] 1128^b33–34 as denying that continence is a virtue on the grounds that it is a type of virtue that is mixed with something else, in which case it involves virtue nevertheless. For a response to Callard, see Price (2021).

⁶⁷¹ On this, see Cairns (1993, p. 420n235) and Raymond (2017, p. 140n85).

EN VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1147^b23–31,⁶⁷² a passage in which Aristotle presents a bipartition of pleasant things, and places honour among those pleasant things that are choiceworthy in themselves but admit of excess. This tripartition spans lines 1148^a22–28 and may be understood in different ways depending on how one punctuates the text. Following Stewart’s proposal (1892, vol. 2, pp. 175–176), the text would run as follows:⁶⁷³

T 61 – *EN* VII.6 [=Bywater VII.4] 1148^a22–28

1148a22 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν
αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν τῶν⁶⁷⁴ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ |
25 ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ || μεταξύ,
καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον), οἷον χρήματα καὶ | κέρδος καὶ
νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα | καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ
οὐ τῶ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν | ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῶ
πῶς ὑπερβάλλειν κτλ.
|| a23 τῶν τῶν Rassow (1864, pp. 78–79): τῶ K^bLL^bO^bVB^{95sup.}: τῶν
P^bC^c Cook Wilson (1907, p. 106) || a24 τούτων K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V:
τούτοις L || a26 ἅπαντα K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V: πάντα P^bC^c | δὲ καὶ
K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V: δὲ L: δὴ s.l.L² || a27 καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν om. P^bC^c
|| a28 ante ὑπερβάλλειν P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V

⁶⁷² On this, see Frede (2020, pp. 746–748, 750–751).

⁶⁷³ Besides Stewart’s proposal (which is also adopted in Burnet’s edition, which prints ‘τῶν γὰρ ... πρότερον’ between em dashes [—]), there are three other ways the editors punctuate the text. Bekker prints ‘ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῶ τῶ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῶ πῶς ὑπερβάλλειν’ (in which he is followed by Grant [1885, vol. 2, p. 211] and by Ramsauer [1878, pp. 447–448]) (This punctuation is first found in the Aldine edition [p. 133]); Susemihl prints ‘ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι <τῶν> τῶ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῶ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῶ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν)’—and this punctuation is maintained by Apelt in the third edition of Susemihl’s text (Susemihl & Apelt, 1912); Bywater, in turn, prints ‘ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι <τῶν> τῶ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά), τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῶ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῶ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν’ (which is the text as first printed by Zwinger [1566, pp. 300–301]).

The problem with all these texts is that they suggest that ‘οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή’ is an example of ‘τὰ δὲ μεταξύ.’ Yet, if what is being said in this tripartition is not much different from the bipartition of 1147^b23–31, it seems better to think of ‘τὰ μεταξύ’ as identifying necessary pleasant things, which, in themselves, are neither good nor bad, as rightly suggested by Gauthier (in Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, pp. 623–624). In that case, possessions, profit, victory, and honour would be examples of things that are really good, and not of τὰ μεταξύ. As a result, the punctuation proposed by Stewart makes better sense of the text, for it makes ‘οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή’ an example of the things Aristotle says are fine and virtuous (although not an example of the pleasures and appetites Aristotle places among these things in this passage).

Since some of the appetites and pleasures are among things that are fine and virtuous by their genus (for some pleasant things are choiceworthy by nature, others are contrary to those, and others still are in between, as we divided earlier), for instance, possessions, profit, victory, and honour; and <since>⁶⁷⁵ one is blamed in regard to every such thing and in regard to every intermediate thing not by experiencing <them>, by having appetites <for them>, or by loving <them>, but by exceeding somehow [...]

So understood, this passage seems to be equating things that are choiceworthy by nature with things that are fine and virtuous. The external goods are presented as an example of things that are fine and virtuous, which suggests that they constitute a class of fine things.

One may object that this is at odds with the account of the fine found in *EE* VIII.3. Yet I do not think that the two passages are incompatible, provided we recognise that fine things in the sense of *EE* VIII.3 are species of fine things in the sense of 1148^a23, in which case we would have a homonymy. In counting honour as something fine both in 1148^a22–28 and in 1148^a28–31, Aristotle should be understood as using the word in a transferred sense⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷⁴ One may object against adding the article as Rasso does here, or against changing ‘τῶν’ into ‘τῶν’ as Cook Wilson proposes (which is actually the reading of P^b and C^c). Rasso mentions a similar passage in *EE* II.8 1224^b29, where the mss. have ‘καὶ ὁ λόγος φύσει ἀρχῶν κτλ.’ for which, more recently, Dodds suggested ‘καὶ ὁ λόγος <τῶν> φύσει ἀρχῶν κτλ.’ (see Walzer & Mingay, 1991, pp. 39, xvii), a correction whose necessity is arguable.

If one accepts Rasso’s correction, the text would be saying that ‘of the appetites and pleasures some are among things that are fine and virtuous by their genus.’ The same meaning would be afforded by the reading of P^b and C^c by Cook Wilson’s proposal, with the advantage that this has mss. support.

Cook Wilson suggests that γένοι is used here in the sense of φύσει (as it appears to be used in *Resp.* IV 442b2, which is parallel to *Resp.* V 474c1, in which Plato writes φύσει instead). In that case, Aristotle would be saying that external goods are not only cases of fine and virtuous things *by their genus* (i.e., metaphorically), but that they are examples of things that are, *by nature*, fine and virtuous. If this is to make sense, however, the idea must be not that these things are intrinsically fine, but that they are fine only to people who are in a good condition, just like things that are good by nature are not those that are intrinsically good, but those that are good to people who are virtuous. Yet the fact that Aristotle immediately talks of pleasant things that are choiceworthy by nature and appears to be talking of pleasant things that are intrinsically choiceworthy makes this move unpalatable.

Accordingly, I have favoured Rasso’s proposal so as to avoid this issue. Besides, the fact that mss. P^b and C^c have ‘τῶν’ instead of ‘τῶν’ may also be taken as supporting this choice, for it may be the case that both ‘τῶν’ and ‘τῶν’ are corruptions of an original ‘τῶν τῶν.’

⁶⁷⁵ I do not think that the apodosis of the ἐπεὶ clause that begins at 1148^a22 is located in 1148^a26, which I take instead to introduce a second condition. As Stewart (1892, vol. 2, p. 176) rightly notices, this would be an undesired consequence of following punctuation found in Bekker’s edition (which is also found in Zell’s and Ramsauer’s editions), since it is clear that the apodosis begins with ‘μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κτλ.’ in 1148^b2ff.

⁶⁷⁶ The kind of metaphor here would be one that transfers the name of a species to the genus (see *Po.* I.21 1457^b6–9).

to indicate the genus of things that are said to be fine in the proper sense of the word.⁶⁷⁷ T 58 seems to confirm that this is so in the context of the *EN*, since it says that fine and virtuous things pertain to the class of things choiceworthy in themselves. Accordingly, in calling things that are choiceworthy in themselves fine and virtuous, 1148^a22-28 and 1148^a28-31 may be using the name of a species to name the genus, and is thus using it homonymously.⁶⁷⁸

As a result, there is no issue in saying that civically courageous persons perform courageous actions due to a desire for something fine. As I have already suggested above in section 3.2.2, this need not mean that they actually aim for something fine in the proper sense of the word when they perform courageous actions and that they aim for it *qua* something fine, but only that they aim for something that may happen to be fine in the proper sense of the word and which is, moreover, fine in a wider sense in so far as it is choiceworthy for its own sake. For this reason, civic courage is close to, but still fundamentally different from actual courage.⁶⁷⁹ In the immediate sequence to T 60, Aristotle then discusses what could be seem

⁶⁷⁷ This argument gains even more support if one emends the text with Rasso (see footnote 674) as I did, in which case Aristotle would be saying that the external goods are examples of things that are fine and virtuous by their genus. Thus, both fine things in the strict sense and external goods would be species of the fine things referred to in 1148a23. Yet, as already indicated in footnote 674, the same idea is not necessarily secured if we read τῶν γένει instead of τῶν τῶ γένει, for, in that case, γένει may have the same meaning as φύσει, which causes difficulties.

⁶⁷⁸ If am right, the homonymy here would be of the same sort one as the one between justice in the particular and in the universal sense, since particular justice is a species of universal justice.

⁶⁷⁹ A further issue that may be pointed out is that the sort of shame that motivates civic courageous persons is prospective rather than retrospective, which may be a problem depending on how one interprets *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater III.9]. As a matter of fact, both Irwin (1999, p. 227) and Taylor (2006, pp. 235-236) think that *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater III.9] does not present arguments for rejecting prospective or anticipatory shame as something virtuous (in which they are in accordance with the anonymous commentary [*CAG*. XX, 204.7-11], according to which Aristotle fails to account for prospective shame due to shifting from discussing αἰδώς to discussing αἰσχύνη). In particular, Irwin argues that Aristotle 'need not be rejecting that type of shame here [i.e. prospective shame], since it will apparently be a motive for the virtuous person (though not one of his virtues),' a claim that Irwin takes to be confirmed by 1115^a9-15, a passage which he understands as suggesting that there is a sort of shame that motivates virtuous agents, in so far as Aristotle says that fearing disrepute, for instance, is something fine and which one should do. If this turns out to be true, it may be argued that courageous actions performed due to prospective shame can be indicative that one is really courageous, and not merely civically courageous. Yet I do not think that this is true of *EN* IV.15 [=Bywater III.9]. As both Cairns (1993, p. 416) and Raymond (2017, p. 137) argue, Aristotle seems to consider prospective and retrospective shame as different aspects of a single disposition (as Cairns puts it: 'susceptibility to prospective αἰδῶς entails a susceptibility to retrospective αἰσχυνῆ'), in which case Aristotle would be allowed to shift from discussing prospective shame to discussing retrospective shame, since in the

as a second and inferior sort of civic courage:

T 62 – EN III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1116^a29–^b3

1116a29 τάξαι δ' ἄν τις
 30 || καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό· | χεί-
 ρους δ' ὅσοι οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσιν, | καὶ φεύ-
 γοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ
 κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ |
 35 ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω, ||
 οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας. |
 καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κὰν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες,⁶⁸⁰ ταυτό
 1116b1 || δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρα-
 τάτ|τοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκη
 ἀν|δρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.
 || a31 ὅσοι K^bP^bLO^b Arab.? (cf. Akasoy & Fidora, 2005, p. 220n131):
 ὅσω C^c s.I.L L^bB^{95sup}.V || a36 προστάττοντες K^bP^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup}.V:
 προστάσσοντες G^aM^b Susemihl: προτάττοντες cod. Amioti Vettori
 (in the margin of his copy of the Aldine edition, p. 24f). | ταυτό
 K^bP^bC^cLO^b: τὸ αὐτὸ L^bB^{95sup}.

Someone might place those persons who are constrained by those who command them in the same group as well, and all those who do not do this [i.e., courageous actions] due to shame, but due to fear, and are not avoiding something base, but something painful are worse, for those in command constrain them, like Hector:

*Whomsoever I see cowering away from battle
 will have no hope of escaping the dogs*

And those who command (and strike <their soldiers> if they withdraw from battle) do the same thing [as Hector], as well as those who post <their soldiers> in front of ditches and of such things, since they are all constraining them. But one must be courageous not due to necessity, but because it is fine.

Two things should interest us in this passage: first, that it seems to corroborate the claim I made that the first sort of civic courage is due to shame, since it presents this second sort of civic courage as being worse than the first sort on the grounds that it is due to fear rather than shame (see also the end of footnote 668). Second, that civically courageous agents of this second sort perform courageous actions under constraint, which leads Aristotle to the

end his arguments would concern the same disposition. This is not saying, though, that Aristotle's account of shame is not, in some respects, unsatisfactory. See Raymond (2017, pp. 151ff) for a discussion of the limits of Aristotle's account of shame, among which are those pointed out in Alexander's 21st Ethical Problem (*Supplementum Aristotelicum* II.2, pp. 141.14-142.21).

⁶⁸⁰ I follow Bywater in placing a comma here.

conclusion that this cannot be courage as well, since one must be courageous not because it is necessary, but rather because it is fine.

Now, the second courage-like disposition that should interest us is the courage due to *θυμός*, which Aristotle says is the most natural sort of courage:

T 63 – EN III.10 [=Bywater III.8] 1116^b23–1117^a9

1116b23 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν |
 25 φέρουσιν· ἀνδρείοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν || ὥσπερ
 τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ | ἀνδρείοι
 θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς | κινδύνους,
 ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος “σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῶ” καὶ | “μένος καὶ θυμὸν
 ἔγειρε” καὶ “δρμὴν δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος” | καὶ “ἔξεσεν αἷμα.”
 30 πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαί||νευ τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν
 καὶ ὄρμην.
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι | διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ
 δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ | θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην, διὰ γὰρ τὸ
 πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, | ἐπεὶ εἴαν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἦ,
 οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δὴ | ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνας
 35 καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα || πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὄρμᾶν, οὐδὲν τῶν
 δεινῶν προσορῶντα, ἐπεὶ | οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἶεν
 1117a1 πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ || οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ
 μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπι|θυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. {οὐ δὴ
 ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ | δι' ἀλγηδόνας ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς
 τὸν κίνδυνον}.⁶⁸¹ | φυσικώτατη δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι,
 5 καὶ προσ||λαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.
 καὶ οἱ | ἀνθρωποὶ δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ'
 ἡδον|ται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀν|δρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ
 διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ | διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλή-
 σιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.

|| **b24** φέρουσιν K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup.}: ἐπιφέρουσιν V Susemihl: ἀναφέ-
 ρουσιν L^b || **b25** φερόμενα K^bP^bC^cL^b: φερόμενοι LO^bB^{95sup.}V | καὶ
 om. P^bC^c: || **b26** ἰτητικώτατον K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V: ἰτητικώτερον
 L || **b28** καὶ om. P^bC^c || **b31** ante διὰ add. καὶ P^bC^c || **b32** διὰ
 τὸ om. L^bV || **b33** alterum ἐν om. L^b || **b33–35** οὐ δὴ ... ὄρμᾶν om.
 O^b || **b34** διὰ K^bP^bi.r. LL^bB^{95sup.}V: καὶ C^c | τὸ om. C^c || **b36**
 κἂν P^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup.}V: καὶ K^bL^b | ἀνδρείοι εἶεν K^bP^bC^cO^bB^{95sup.}:
 ἀνδρείοι ἀν εἶεν L^bV: εἶεν ἀνδρείοι L 1117a1 δὲ om. L || **a2–3** οὐ δὴ
 ... κίνδυνον om. K^bLO^b Arab. (cf. Akasoy & Fidora, 2005, p. 224n152):
 add. G^aM^b Bekker: οὐ δὴ οὖν ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνας ἢ θυ-
 μοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον P^bC^c s.l.LL^b s.l.B^{95sup.}V || **a6** δὴ
 K^bP^bC^cL^bV: δὲ LO^bB^{95sup.} || **a7** ante μάχιμοι add. μαχόμενοι L^bVa.r.

[1116b23] People assign spirit to courage as well, for those who <perform courageous actions> due to spirit [25], just like beasts that rush against those who have wounded them, seem to be courageous, since courageous persons too are spirited. In fact, spirit

⁶⁸¹ Although this bit of text is not printed by Susemihl, I have it here between braces in order to maintain Bekker's lineation. As I do not think it should be retained, I have not translated it below.

is most ready to face dangers, whence Homer's words: 'laid strength in their spirit,' 'aroused might and spirit,' 'piercing might rising up the nostrils,' and 'his blood boiled.' For all such things seem to indicate [30] the awakening and the impulse of spirit.

Now, the courageous person acts because of the fine, and spirit cooperates with them. But beasts act due to pain, for they <attack> due to having been beaten or due to being frightened (since they do not approach if they are in the forest or in the wetland). Therefore, they are not courageous because they [35] rush toward danger driven by distress and spirit, foreseeing nothing terrifying, since even asses would be courageous when hungry (for they [1117a1] do not leave the pasture because they are being beaten). And furthermore adulterers do many daring things due to their appetites. But the <courage> due to spirit seems to be the most natural <sort of courage>, and to be courage when it [5] takes hold of decision and of that for the sake of which. And people certainly suffer when enraged, and take pleasure when they take vengeance. And the persons <who rush toward danger> because of these things are pugnacious, but not courageous, for <they rush toward danger> not because of the fine, nor as reason <bids>, but because of emotion. Yet it has something that is analogous <to it [i.e. to actual courage]>.

Besides showing that people who perform courageous actions due to *θυμός* are not courageous, since they do not perform these actions due to the fine, this passage makes two connected claims that should interest us:

First, that in spite of not being sufficient for courage, *θυμός* cooperates with courage (1116b[30-31]). In other words, courageous actions performed by really courageous persons are not motivated by *θυμός*, but seem to involve *θυμός* nevertheless.

Second, that the courage of *θυμός* seems to be (or become) real courage if *προαίρεσις* and *τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα* are added to it (1117^a4-5).

What these two claims suggest is that the courage of *θυμός* is perhaps a natural virtue, which precedes real courage and that can be turned into real courage if one becomes *φρόνιμος*.⁶⁸² In that case, this passage tell us something important about fineness and about acting for the sake of the fine: it requires reason and is only possible by means of decision. Moreover, in saying that real courage requires *τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα* Aristotle appears to be speaking normatively, saying that real courage requires the end one should aim for, which suggests that

⁶⁸² This is also suggested by Lawrence (2011, p. 257).

natural courage is not sufficient for aiming for the right end. As I take it, this is further reason for saying that, in the context of the *EN* (like in the *EE*), we should answer Question (II)—the question about which virtue makes the end(s) right—by saying that the virtue that makes the end right is full virtue, not natural virtue.⁶⁸³

3.3.2 *Τὸ καλόν in the Nicomachean analysis of the remaining particular virtues and vices*

Now, although Aristotle's analysis of the other particular virtues is not as illuminating as his analysis of courage in what regards the fine as an end of action (as already pointed out), Aristotle appeals to the fine both as an end that can distinguish the other virtues from their corresponding vices, and as a value that should regulate one's relation to the external goods:

T 64 – *EN* IV.2 [=Bywater IV.1] 1120^a27–^b4

1120a27 οἷς δὲ διδοὺς |
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην | αἰτίαν,
30 οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς·
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς | πράξεως, τοῦτο
δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.
οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ | δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ
τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη | λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ
οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργε-
1120b1 τεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ || τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,
οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, | ὅπως ἔχη διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμε-
λήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε | διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν.
οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη | διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ
ὅπου⁶⁸⁴ καλόν.
|| a29–30 λυπηρῶς K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup.} s.l.V: λυπηρός P^bC^cV || a30
ἔλοιτ' K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup.} Vi.r.: αἰροῖτ' L^b || a31 δὲ K^bP^bC^cL^b s.l.V:
om. LO^bB^{95sup.}V || a32 οὐ K^bP^bC^cL: οὐδὲ L^bO^bB^{95sup.}V | μὴ om.
K^b | τὰ χρήματα P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.} mg.V (τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρή-
ματα λέγει): om. K^bV || a33 οὐδ' K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: οὐτ' V || b2
τῶν ἰδίων K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup.}V: τῶν οἰκείων L^bG^aM^b || b4 ὅτε καὶ
ὅπου P^bC^c: ὅτε καὶ οὐ L^bV: ὅπου K^bLO^bB^{95sup.}

⁶⁸³ Pace Moss, who, as we saw above in footnote 333, claims that it is natural virtue (or mere habituated virtue) that makes the end right, rather than full virtue, a claim that she takes to be supported by *EN* VII.9 [=Bywater VII.8] 1151a14–19 (in my T 20).

⁶⁸⁴ Although it is unclear whether the Arabic translation has 'ὅπου' or 'οὐ' here, it clearly has 'ὅτε καὶ'. In fact, it has 'وَفِي الْوَقْتِ الَّذِي يَنْبَغِي وَحَيْثُ يَكُونُ عَطِيَّةً جَمِيلَةً' (*wa-fi l-waqtin alladi yanbagi wa-haytu yakunu atiyatan gamilatan*) (241.3): 'and in the time in which one must and where <it> is a fine gift'. Besides, one may

[27] But the person who gives to whom they should not or not for the sake of the fine, but for some other reason will not be called generous, but some other thing. And nor will the [30] person <who gives> with pain <be called generous>, for they would prefer wealth over fine [31] action, and this is not proper to the generous person.

But nor will <the generous person> receive <things> from where they should not, for receiving in such a way is not proper to someone who does not honour wealth. And neither is <the generous person> fond of asking <for money>, for receiving benefits readily is not proper to the person who does good <to others>. But <the generous person> will receive from where they should—for instance, from [b1] private possessions—, and not because it is fine, but rather because it is necessary in order to be able to give. But they will not neglect their own possessions⁶⁸⁵ if they want to help people by means of it. And nor will they give to whomever it may be, so that they are able to give to whom they should, when <they should>, i.e., in the circumstances where it is fine to do so.

This first passage concerns generosity, and is striking in three regards.

First, because, in lines 1120^a27–29, it says that someone who does not give money for the sake of the fine should not be called generous, and, as it seems, this is so irrespective of whether one has given money to whom they should, as they should etc. I mean, although an action may be performed in a way that hits the mean in action, if it is not performed for the sake of the fine, it is not performed virtuously.⁶⁸⁶

argue that it is more probable that the text it translates agrees with that found in P^bC^c than with that found in L^bV, since both the Arabic translation and P^bC^c belong to the *α* family.

⁶⁸⁵ As Zingano (2020, p. 194) rightly observes, in 1120^b2 reading ‘οἰκείων’ makes the meaning of Aristotle’s text much clearer, besides showing that 1120^a34–^b1 is not meant to contrast taking money from one’s own possessions and from public funds, but is rather contrasting taking money from private sources (e.g., friends) with taking money from public sources (e.g., taxpayer’s money). The Arabic translation seemingly translates the two phrases in the same way, thus incurring in the confusion that Zingano points out: in 1120^a34–^b1, ‘ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων’ is rendered as ‘مِنْ أَمْلَاكِهِ’ (*min amlākīhi*) (p. 239.18), and the pronoun ‘-’ (-*hi*) is clearly translating ἰδίων, so that Aristotle would be talking of one’s own possessions; in 1120^b2, in turn, it gives ‘وَلِ يَضَيِّعَ أَيْضًا مَلَهُ’ (*wa-la yudayyi‘ aydan ma-lahu*) (p. 241.1–2), and ‘مَلَهُ’ (*ma-lahu*) clearly has the sense of what belongs to oneself. This strongly suggest that the Greek text the Arabic version is translating has ἰδίων in both cases and the Arabic translation understands this, in both cases, as making reference to what belongs to the agent. Now, it is only because Zingano came to the correct realisation that 1120^a34–^b1 is saying that the generous person must take money from *private possessions* in contrast to *public possessions* that 1120^b2 poses interpretative problems, since it cannot be saying that the generous person should not neglect the private possessions (which includes the possessions of other persons), but that the generous person should not neglect *their own possessions*. Thus, although ἰδίων and οἰκείων could have been easily mistaken for one another, given that from a certain point onwards they would only differ in pronunciation in regard to the -δ- and the -κ-, it is much more probable that οἰκείων was a gloss clarifying the meaning of ἰδίων in 1120^a36 that at some point became a correction. Thus, because ἰδίων is the *lectio difficilior*, it should be favoured here.

⁶⁸⁶ Similarly, see the anonymous scholiast on this passage (*CAG*. XX, 178.23–25): ‘and <the generous person will give> these things for the sake of the fine, for it is also possible for one who gives to whom

Second, because, after this, in lines 1120^a29–31, Aristotle points out that someone who is pained at performing generous actions values wealth more than they value the fine, which may be taken as suggesting that the actions they perform are not fine for them. In other words, the first part of this passage offers us further reason for thinking that any agent who is not fully virtuous but who does nevertheless perform virtuous actions does not perform such actions for the sake of the fine.

And third, inasmuch as, in its final lines—i.e., ^a31–^b4—, it details how the generous person is disposed to receive things from others: they ought not to receive money from just any source, nor should they be fond of asking favours. Generous persons, Aristotle goes on, should receive money from private sources, but this is something one should do not because it is fine, but rather because it is necessary. Receiving money from others, then, is something that generous persons do in order to be able to perform generous actions, and is thus not fine, but only necessary. After this, in the final lines of the passage, Aristotle then stresses that generous persons will not give money to just anyone, for this would make them unable to give money to whom they should and when they should, and Aristotle adds: *καὶ ὅπου καλόν*, i.e., *in the circumstances in which it is fine to do so*.⁶⁸⁷

Notwithstanding this, although merely acquiring external goods is not fine, but only necessary, the use of external goods can be fine, as Aristotle has already stressed in *EN* I:

T 65 – *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b22–33

one should not to give it for the sake of the fine, but for the sake of reputation, honour, or out of the eager pursuit of a greater profit, or due to fear' (*καὶ ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ οἷς <δεῖ> δίδοντα μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν δίδοναι ἀλλὰ δόξης ἢ τιμῆς ἢ θήρα μείζονός τινος κέρδους ἢ διὰ φόβον*).

⁶⁸⁷ This same idea can also be conveyed if we read 'οἷ' with L^b and V. As I take it, in using this genitive of place (οἷ) or the adverb ὅπου, Aristotle does not have in mind the actual physical place in which it is fine to perform a given action, but the more abstract idea of the circumstances in which it is fine to perform an action. Similarly, see the translations by Rowe (in Broadie & Rowe, 2002) and by Zingano (2020, p. 91).

1100b22 πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ δι-
 αφε|ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὖ-
 τυχη|μάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δηλον ὡς οὐ
 25 ποιεῖ || ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα
 μὲν | εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συν-
 επι|κοσμεῖν πέφυκε, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία |
 γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται | τὸ
 30 μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολ||λαῖς ἐν-
 εργεταῖς. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ κα|λόν, ἐπειδὰν
 φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυ|χίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλ-
 γησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλό|ψυχος.
 || b22 δὲ K^bP^bC^cV: δὴ LL^bO^bB^{95sup}. || b26 μακαριώτερον
 K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bVB^{95sup}: μακαριότερον L || b27 σπουδαία C^ci.r.
 LL^bVB^{95sup}: βεβαία K^bP^b || b31–32 εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας
 ἀτυχίας K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας εὐκόλως L

[22] There being many things that occur by chance and that differ in being major or minor, it is evident that the minor strokes of good fortune (and similarly their opposites as well) cause no [25] changes to the life <of the virtuous person>, whereas major and frequent <strokes of good fortune> make the life <of the virtuous person> more blessed (for they naturally adorn it, and their use is fine and virtuous), whereas if the opposite takes place, it afflicts and ruins the blessed <life>, for it brings pain and impedes [30] many activities. Nevertheless, even in these cases what is fine shines through, whenever someone calmly bears many significant misfortunes, not in virtue of insensibility, but by being noble and magnanimous.

Experiencing major strokes of good fortune—i.e., being well provided in regard to external goods—is said here to be something that makes the life of the virtuous person more blessed, and one of the explanations that Aristotle gives to this claim is that the use of these goods is fine and virtuous, presumably for the virtuous person. Thus, even though receiving money from the sources one should is not fine, but only necessary, using this money to perform generous actions, in turn, is fine and virtuous. As I take it, this claim is congenial to the idea expressed in *EE* VIII.3 1249^a13–14 (in T 39) that we perform many fine actions by means of things that are not fine by nature, although the reason because of which Aristotle says, in the *EN*, external goods may be fine is slightly different from the reason he presents in the *EE*, since in *EE* VIII.3 1249^a5–6 he said that things that are not fine by nature are fine when they are attained and preferred for the sake of something fine.

Now, even though major misfortunes can mar the happy life and impede the performance of many virtuous actions (to the extent that the performance of some actions depend on external goods), they do not completely impede virtuous behaviour, since, Aristotle says, ‘what is fine shines through, whenever someone calmly bears many significant misfortunes, not in virtue of insensibility, but by being noble and magnanimous.’

To put it differently, the way in which one deals with misfortunes may itself be fine: albeit many virtuous actions may not be an option anymore for an unfortunate agent, just as their happiness may have become impossible to attain due to the lack of external goods,⁶⁸⁸ there is still a way to act finely and to pursue the fine. Moreover, as Aristotle appears to suggest a few lines later, namely in 1101^a9-13, performing fine actions for a long period of time after experiencing major misfortunes may even lead them back to happiness.⁶⁸⁹

That being said, let me go back to generosity: the three roles I have ascribed to the fine—namely, as an end of action, as a value that poses and regulates the necessity for external goods, and as a feature of the circumstances in which one must do something if it is to be a fine action—appear to be mentioned again in Aristotle’s characterisation of prodigality, which is one of the two contraries of generosity:

T 66 – EN IV.3 [=Bywater IV.1] 1121^a30–^b12

1121a30 ἄλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ |
 εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
 | ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν
 ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ταχὺ γὰρ | ἐπιλείπει αὐ-
 1121b1 τοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν || πορίζειν.
 ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθεὶν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, | τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ
 πόθεν οὐθέν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ’ ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις

⁶⁸⁸ One may object that what the unfavourable external conditions hinders is not *εὐδαιμονία*, but rather *μακαρία*, since in the lines that follow (i.e., *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b33–1101^a13) Aristotle will talk of happy people who will not become unhappy, but will also not be blessed if they are faced with Priam’s destiny. However, 1101^a9-13 makes clear that external goods may also hinder the possibility of being happy. Similarly, see Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 30.5ff).

⁶⁸⁹ I cannot get into this here, but for a discussion of this claim, see Charles (2019).

5 αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ || ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς
 δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὖς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλου|σίους ποιοῦσιν,
 καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς | δὲ κόλαξιν
 ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ | ἀκόλαστοι αὐ-
 τῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες | καὶ εἰς τὰς
 10 ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσιν, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς || τὸ καλὸν ζῆν
 πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσω|τος ἀπαιδαγώ-
 γητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχῶν | δ' ἐπιμελείας
 εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφικοιτ' ἄν.

|| a33 τοῦτο ποιεῖν O^bB^{95sup}.V Arab. (cf. Akasoy & Fidora, 2005, p.
 244n30): μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν K^bP^bC^cL: τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι L^b mg.V
 || a34–b34 αὐτοῖς K^bL^bV: αὐτοῖς P^bC^cLP^bB^{95sup}. || b3 πῶς ἢ πόθεν
 K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: πόθεν ἢ πῶς L^b || b4 αὐτοῦ P^bC^cL^bVG^aM^b:
 om. K^bLO^bB^{95sup}. || b11 ante ἀπαιδαγωγῆτος add. καὶ LO^b || b12
 εἰς om. L^bV

[1121a30] However, most prodigal persons, as was said, also receive <money> from where they should not, and are, under this aspect, ungenerous. They become prone to accept <money> due to wanting to spend and <due to wanting> to do this [i.e., to spend money] heedlessly. In fact, they are quickly deprived of their possessions. Thus, they are compelled to obtain <money> from other sources. [b1] Moreover,⁶⁹⁰ due to also not having any regard for the fine they receive <money> carelessly and from every source, for they have an appetite for giving, and the way in which <one gives> or the source from which <one gives> makes no difference to them. For that very reason, their gifts are not generous, for they are not fine, nor are they for the sake of this very thing, [5] nor are they <done> as they should, but sometimes they make rich those who should be poor, and do not give anything to those who are moderate in their characters, but give many things to those who are flatterers or who provide them some other pleasure. For that reason, many of them are intemperate as well, for because they spend heedlessly, they spend enormous sums over intemperances, and due to living not regarding [10] the fine, they are inclined to pleasures. Thus, the profligate person, if left uneducated, changes into these things, but if they receive care, they might attain the mean and what should <be done>.

In this passage, which purports to show that prodigal persons are ungenerous in what concerns the sources they receive money from, Aristotle takes the disregard for the fine that characterises ungenerous persons as being explanatory of (i) their being unconcerned about the sources from which they obtain money (lines 1121^b1–3), of (ii) their gifts not being fine (1121^b3–4), and of (iii) their gifts not being for the sake of the fine (1121^b4–5). Thus, in addition to being the end for whose sake virtuous actions should be performed (i.e., [iii]), the fine also characterises how the agent should pursue the external goods necessary for these

⁶⁹⁰ For this sense of ἄμα δέ, see Bonitz (1870, s.v. ἄμα, p. 37a6–9).

actions (i.e., [i]), and the fineness of what one is doing (i.e., [ii]) (to the extent that it is virtuous or fine as result of it being something one does as one should and when one should, i.e., in those circumstances in which it is fine).

In the discussion of the vices opposed to magnificence, we come across something quite similar to (ii) and (iii):

T 67 – EN IV.6 [=Bywater IV.2] 1123^a19–31

1123a19 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον καὶ βάνουσος τῶ
 20 || παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκει ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν | γὰρ
 τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ | λαμ-
 πρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστῶν, | καὶ
 κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, | ὥσ-
 25 περ οἱ Μεγαροὶ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ || καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ | τὰ τοιαῦτα
 οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀνα|λῶσαι, ὀλίγα
 δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικρο|πρεπῆς περὶ πάντα
 ἐλλείπει καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν | μικρῶ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ,
 30 καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ || σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀνα-
 λῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, | καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν
 ἢ δεῖ.
 || a24 Μεγαροὶ K^b: Μεγαρεῖς P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V || a26 τὰ τοιαῦτα
 K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}: ταῦτα L^bV

[19] The person who exceeds and is vulgar exceeds in spending money [20] beyond what is due, as was said. In fact, they make much of their expenses on unimportant things, and make an inappropriate display of themselves. For instance, they contribute to shared feasts like in a wedding, and when bearing the costs of the chorus for a comedy, they make the chorus enter in scene in purple garments, like those at Megara. And they do all such things not [25] for the sake of the fine, but aiming for displaying wealth and because they intend to cause astonishment by means of such things, spending little in what one should spend much, and spending much in what one should spend little. The stingy person falls short in everything and, after making the greatest expenses on what is unimportant, they ruin what is fine, both delaying whatever they do and [30] looking for a way to spend the least possible; and they regret these things, and believe that, in everything, they are doing more than they should.

This passage begins with a description of how vulgar persons (*βάνουσοι*) make public expenses: they do it not for the sake of the fine, but with the intention of displaying wealth. Then, it turns to the other extreme, the stingy person (*μικροπρεπῆς*). Stingy persons, different from the vulgar, do not spend enough on what they should. They make great expenses on

unimportant things, but when it comes to those things on which they should actually make expenses, they look for ways to spend the least amount possible, and even though they end up spending less than they should on these things, they regret their expenses and believe they are doing more than they should. In doing so, Aristotle says, the stingy person ruins what is fine. As I take it, the idea is that because stingy persons do not spend in the way they should, their expenses are not fine. Thus, the stingy agent is someone who does things that are not fine. But vulgar persons also do not spend money in the way they should. In the opening lines of the passage (19ff), the vulgar are portrayed as making excessive expenses on unimportant things and as showing off their wealth inappropriately. And in saying that these sorts of person make expenses not for the sake of the fine, but ‘aiming for displaying wealth and believing to cause astonishment by means of it,’ Aristotle seems to give us an explanation of why they err: because they do not aim for the fine, but at displaying wealth, the expenses they decide to make are inadequate, for which reason their actions are not generous.

This raises some questions about intermediate agents, however. If, as I have argued, intermediate agents are also not motivated by the fineness of the actions they intend to perform, how can they be minimally consistent in performing virtuous actions?

Now, the fact that they do not perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine seems to account for why, ultimately, they may not be consistent in performing virtuous actions. The order of explanation is important here. Although it is true that intermediate agents may not be fully consistent in voluntarily performing virtuous actions and may be distinguished from fully virtuous agents in this regard, this is not *why* they are different from fully virtuous agents. As a matter of fact, their not being fully consistent in voluntarily performing virtuous actions is explained by the fact that they are not motivated by the fineness of the actions they perform, and thus are prone to err in some circumstances. Accordingly, what distinguishes

intermediate agents and fully virtuous agents is not merely the consistency with which the latter perform virtuous actions, but the motives by which each of these kinds of agents are motivated to perform virtuous actions.

Now, as I have suggested, it may be the case that intermediate agents are motivated to perform virtuous actions by the pursuit of honour and the avoidance of reproach, and honorableness and reproachability, rightly conceived, seem to be coextensive with what is fine and with what is base (respectively). If this is right and if intermediate agents can conceive of honour and reproach correctly, then there is reason for thinking that their motives may lead them to perform virtuous actions voluntarily as consistently as fully virtuous agents perform these actions.

Notwithstanding this, there is reason for thinking that they cannot conceive of honorableness and reproachability in the same way as fully virtuous agents, since for grasping these concepts they rely on how people in the society they are members of confer honour and reproach, or on how people on whose judgment they trust employ these concepts, different from fully virtuous agents, who due to grasping the intrinsic fineness of virtuous actions conceive of honour and reproach in terms of the virtuousness or baseness of the actions they assess, and not the other way around.

Accordingly, the motivation of intermediate agents is poised to lead them to error in some circumstances. Of course they may be saved from error in some instances due to their good character dispositions. As I have suggested in the discussion of **T 40**, there is reason for thinking that due to being virtuous to some extent, intermediate agents may experience episodes of good luck in which they act well despite having reasoned badly, and thus may be led to perform virtuous actions against their mistaken judgments. Yet this may not always save them from error, for which reason the fact that they are not motivated to perform virtuous

actions in the same way as fully virtuous agents may indeed lead them astray in some cases.

Now, before being mentioned in the discussion of truthfulness (T 47 above), ‘finess’ appears just once more in the analysis of the particular virtues, in the discussion of the virtue of friendliness:

T 68 – EN IV.12 [=Bywater IV.6] 1126^b28–1127^a11

1126b28 καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὀμιλήσει, |
 30 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται || τοῦ
 μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. εἶκοι μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ | λύπας
 εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὀμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ’ ὅσας | μὲν αὐτῶ
 ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερα|νεῖ, καὶ προ-
 αιρήσεται λυπεῖν. κὰν τῶ ποιῶντι δ’ ἀσχημο|σύνην φέρη, καὶ
 35 ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ’ ἐναν||τίωσις μικρὰν λύπην,
 οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ.⁶⁹¹ | διαφερόντως δ’ ὀμιλήσει
 1127a1 τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, || καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἦττον γνω-
 ρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς | ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἐκάστοις
 ἀπονέμων τὸ πρόπον, καὶ καθ’ | αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συν-
 ηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ’ εὐλαβούμενος, | τοῖς δ’ ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ
 5 μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ || τῶ καλῶ καὶ τῶ συμφέροντι.
 καὶ ἡδονῆς δ’ ἕνεκα τῆς | εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ
 μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός | ἐστίν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ δὲ συν-
 ηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδύς | εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διὰ τι ἄλλο
 ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ’ ὅπως τις ὠφέ|λειά αὐτῶ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ
 10 ὅσα διὰ χρημά||των, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι
 δύσκολος | καὶ δύσερις.

|| b28 οὖν om. C^cLO^bB^{95sup}. || b30 post ἢ add. μὴ L^b | συνηδύνειν
 P^bC^cLL^bi.r. O^bB^{95sup}.V Arab.: συνηδεῖν K^bL^ba.r. || b35 post δυσχε-
 ρανεῖ add. διαφερόντως K^bP^bC^c || a2 καὶ K^bP^bC^c s.l.LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V:
 οὐ L || a8 διὰ τι ἄλλο K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup}.V: δι’ ἄλλο L^b || a8–9
 τις ὠφέλεια K^bP^bC^cLO^b: ὠφέλειά τις L^bB^{95sup}.V || a9 γίνηται
 K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: γένηται L || a10–11 δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις
 K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V: δύσερις τις καὶ δύσκολος L

[28] It was said, in general, that one should have relations with people in the way one should, and that one should refer to the fine and the advantageous when aiming for [30] not causing displeasure or at pleasing someone.⁶⁹² In fact, it [i.e. friendliness] seems to be about pleasures and pains that take place in living together, and among these, they will avoid all those <pleasures> that are not fine or are harmful for them to give, and will decide to cause displeasure <instead>; and if <doing something> brings

⁶⁹¹ It is unclear whether the two *διαφερόντως* transmitted by K^bP^bC^c are the result of dittography, or if, on the contrary, the omission of one *διαφερόντως* by LL^bO^bB^{95sup}.V is the result of homeoteleuton or homoeoarcton. The decision we are faced with here is that between the *lectio difficilior* (reading two *διαφερόντως* in sequence that have different meanings) and the *lectio brevior* (reading only one *διαφερόντως*). The Arabic translation is not helpful here (it misunderstands the text), but it seemingly does not have two *διαφερόντως*, which suggests that the *lectio brevior* is indeed to be preferred.

⁶⁹² As I take it, the participial clause here conveys the leading thought, whilst the finite verb the subordinate thought (cf. Smyth §2147 and Kühner-Gerth 2.T., 2.Bd., §490, 2, p. 98).

disgrace (and this is not small) or harm to the person who does it, and [35] opposition to this brings small pain <to that person>, they will not approve of <what that person does>, but will object it.⁶⁹³ And they will associate themselves in different ways to people of repute and to any chance person, [1127a1] and to people who are more or less familiar, and in a similar fashion also according to other differences, assigning to each person what is fitting, and, in itself, preferring to please someone and refraining from causing displeasure; but they will observe the consequences whenever they are more important, I mean, [5] <they will observe> the fine and the advantageous. And they will cause a small displeasure for the sake of a greater pleasure afterwards. Thus, this intermediate person is such, but they do not have a name; of the persons who please others, the one who <does it> aiming for pleasure not due to something else is obsequious, while the one who <does it> to obtain some benefit in goods or in things that come from goods [10] is a flatterer. And it was said that the person who is disagreeable with everyone is intractable and contentious.

This passage deals with the unnamed virtue that Aristotle says is most similar to friendship (*EN* IV.12 [=Bywater IV.6] 1126^b19–20: ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ). For the sake of clarity, I shall call it friendliness, as it is usually referred to by the modern commentators. The first part of this passage (lines 1126^b28–35) fits well with the claims previously made about the fine:

In saying that the friendly person refers to the fine and the advantageous when they aim at not causing displeasure or at pleasing someone, Aristotle appears to be meaning that the friendly person pleases others or refrains from causing displeasure to others when doing so is fine or advantageous. Lines 31–35 give some support to that, since Aristotle says that, when pleasing someone, for instance, is not fine or is harmful, it is avoided by the friendly person, who, in such circumstances, will prefer to displease that person instead. Similarly, he goes on, if someone is doing something which will bring them disgrace (*ἀσχημοσύνη*), and if opposing that person will bring only a small displeasure to them, the friendly person will not tolerate their behaviour, but will object to it. Moreover, in the concluding lines of the passage (1127^a6–11), two vicious dispositions of the persons who please others (in contrast to

⁶⁹³ This excerpt spanning lines 31–35 (τούτων δ' [...] δυσχερανεῖ) is quite obscure. In translating it, I have based myself on how it is understood by the anonymous scholiast (*CAG*. XX, 79.30–36) and by Aspasius (*CAG*. XIX.1, 121.9–11).

the disposition of those who avoid pleasing others, and are thus intractable and contentious) are defined by reference to the things for whose sake the persons who possess them cause displeasure and please others: the obsequious person is someone who pleases others with no other aim than pleasure, whereas the flatterer is someone who pleases others not because it is fine to do so, but rather to obtain some benefit. As a result, being friendly amounts to pleasing or not pleasing others and to causing or not causing displeasure to others when it is fine to do so and *because it is fine to do so*, i.e., for the sake of the fine, a claim that is compatible with obsequious persons and flatterers performing friendly actions on some occasions, since they are not *eo ipso* friendly, for they do not perform these actions for the sake of the fine.

So far, so good. Lines 1127^a4-5, however, seemingly describe the friendly person as paying attention to the results (τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν ... συνεπόμενος) of what they are doing, and then identify these results with the fine and the advantageous. This may be an issue, for, as we saw, to be performed virtuously virtuous actions must be decided on on their own account. But if they are decided on on their own account, why are their results relevant for assessing whether they should or should not be performed? As I have mentioned already, Aristotle characterises things that are choiceworthy for their own sakes as things we would prefer even if nothing results from them (*EN* I.5 [=Bywater I.7] 1097^b3-4: μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος εἰλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν): their choiceworthiness is independent from their results.

In the face of this difficulty, I would like to suggest that this would only be an issue if pleasing or not pleasing others, or causing or not causing displeasure to others, were, in themselves, friendly actions. Yet talk of reference to the fine and to the advantageous seems to tell otherwise: it suggests rather that friendly actions are not reducible to pleasing or not pleasing others or to causing or not causing displeasure, but consists in doing these things when it is fine to do them, in which case friendly actions would be choiceworthy for their

own sakes regardless of things that may result from them, just like other virtuous actions.⁶⁹⁴

I think this claim can be generalised. As we saw, actions such as withstanding fearful things are not in themselves courageous. As a matter of fact, depending on the circumstances one is being faced with, the right thing to do is to run away, for withstanding fearful things turns out to be reckless. Similarly, giving money is not, in itself, generous, for depending on whom one gives money to, the sources from which one is giving money and etc., it may turn out that the right thing to do is not to give money, which, in some circumstances, may be profligate.

In other words, in the discussion of the particular virtues in the *EN*, Aristotle tends to describe how virtuous agents act by talking of actions that, in themselves, are morally neutral, but whose moral value is dependent upon the circumstances constitutive of their performance. Making public expenses, withstanding fearful things, giving money to someone, causing pleasure or displeasure, etc., are all actions that prove to be virtuous or vicious depending on how they are performed in a particular set of circumstances. If they are performed in a way that hits the mean in action, performing these actions counts as bringing about a virtuous state-of-affairs. If, in addition to that, one does this voluntarily, then one can be properly said to be performing a virtuous action. And, finally, if one's voluntary performance of such actions in a way that hits the mean is motivated by the intrinsic fineness of the act, then one's action will count as a virtuous activity.

We can safely conclude, then, that the views regarding my question (V) that Aristotle presents in the *EN* are not much different from those presented in the *EE*. Moreover, the way in which Aristotle distinguishes agents who have real courage from agents who have

⁶⁹⁴ Note that this still secures the possibility of flatterers and obsequious persons performing friendly actions on some occasions, but makes clear that they can only do so when their pleasing or displeasing others also happens to be fine (even though this is not what motivates them to do that).

quasi-courageous character dispositions (as we saw in **section 3.3.1**) strongly suggest that the arguments I advanced in the first part of this chapter are correct, and that Aristotle does indeed think that what fundamentally distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who fall short of full virtue such as intermediate agents is their motivation. Moreover, as we just saw in the present section (i.e., **section 3.3.2**), there is reason for thinking that the fact that intermediate agents are not motivated by the intrinsic fineness of the actions they think they should perform is explanatory of the fact that such agents are prone to commit mistakes. Thus, even though I have offered in this Dissertation strong reasons for thinking that reading (A'') captures how Aristotle distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who are not fully virtuous but who do nevertheless perform virtuous actions voluntarily, there is some truth to reading (B) after all: it is only if one becomes fully virtuous that one is completely safe from error, although, as I have objected against (B), there may be some lucky agents who remain free from error in course of their lives despite their proneness to err. Yet, different from (B), I do not think that the actual or counterfactual inconsistency of intermediate agents in performing virtuous actions is what distinguishes them from fully virtuous agents. Rather this is something that is to be explained by the different way in which these agents are motivated to perform virtuous actions.

CONCLUSION

This Conclusion consists of two parts. In the first part I shall take stock of how **Chapters 1 to 3** are meant to answer the End Question and revisit question (VII), which concerned the status of *βούλησις* as a rational desire. In the second part, I shall make very brief suggestions about some questions that are connected to the End Question but which I did not analyse in this Dissertation.

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As I proposed in the **Introduction**, to answer the End Question one has to answer three different questions: (a'')—which asks about the role of reason in determining one's ends₁—, (b)—which asks about the role of reason in determining one's ends₂—, and (c)—which asks about the role of reason in determining one's ends₃. Besides, each of these three questions can be formulated normatively as well, asking about the role of reason in making the ends of action *right*. As I have pointed out, the normative version of these questions is central in that it allows us to determine with more precision the reach of reason when it comes to determining the ends.

In the preceding chapters, I have focused mainly on the normative version of these questions in so far as I have mainly focused on answering questions (I)-(III) and questions (V)-(VI), which are questions I raised in order to clarify what is at issue in **C1** (the claim that virtue makes the ends right) and in **C2** (the claim that agents who are not fully virtuous can aim for ends that are right).

In **Chapter 1**, I have argued that, in the common books, Aristotle distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who fail to be fully virtuous by reference to their mo-

tivation, which claim implies that the ends₁ of fully virtuous agents should be distinguished from the right ends₁ of agents who are not fully virtuous. However, as we saw, there are at least three different ways of making sense of this in the case of intermediate agents, namely (A'), (A''), and (A''').

According to (A'), intermediate agents may aim for fine ends for their own sakes and even decide on virtuous actions on their own account, but they are not thereby sufficiently motivated to act accordingly, for their decision requires some sort of aid in order to be effective in motivating such agents to perform virtuous actions.

According to (A''), although intermediate agents may aim for fine ends for their own sakes, they cannot decide on virtuous actions on their own account (and thus cannot perform such actions motivated in the same way as fully virtuous agents), for they do not grasp and are not motivated by the intrinsic moral value of virtuous actions, because they are only motivated to perform such actions in so far as they contribute instrumentally to a fine end such as becoming virtuous, which is an end they desire for its own sake.

According to (A'''), in turn, intermediate agents can neither aim for fine ends for their own sakes, nor can they decide on fine actions on their own account (and thus cannot also perform such actions motivated in the same way as fully virtuous agents).

In **Chapter 1**, I offered some reasons for rejecting (A''), since there is an inconsistency in saying that intermediate agents can aim for fine things for their own sakes, but cannot grasp the intrinsic fineness of virtuous actions (an argument that recapitulates some things I said in my **Introduction**—cf. **pages 102 to 105**). Moreover, although I have offered some reasons for favouring (A'''), I concluded that the common books are ultimately inconclusive about whether we should favour (A''') or (A'), although I have argued that favouring (A''') provides us with a picture that is more appealing philosophically.

In addition to that, I have argued in **Chapter 1** that when Aristotle talks of virtue making the ends right in the common books, he intends to talk about how *full virtue* makes the ends right. Accordingly, in the common books, it seems that we should answer question (II) by saying that *full virtue* makes the ends right. However, depending on whether one favours (A''') or (A'), the answer to questions (I) and (III) will differ. But because I have given some reasons for adopting (A''')—although of course these reasons are not conclusive—, I think that we can safely say that, in the common books, (I) virtue makes the ends right by enabling one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes and to decide on virtuous actions on their own account, thus enabling one to perform virtuous actions for their own sakes (or due to having decided on them on their own account), and that (III) virtue is necessary for that.

If this is correct, in the common books Aristotle would answer question (VI) by saying that intermediate agents *cannot* aim for fine ends for their own sakes, although, of course, they can certainly aim for ends that are fine.

Regarding question (V), which concerns how Aristotle conceives of virtuous actions, I have offered a lengthy analysis of some problems connected to it in the discussions carried out in **sections 1.3.1** and **1.3.1.1**. In rough lines, I have argued that, for Aristotle, an action being fine is something that can be determined through a purely objective analysis of what one does, irrespective of whether one is acting voluntarily or not to begin with. Moreover, I have suggested that Aristotle recognises three different ways of describing virtuous actions: one that corresponds to describing them as states-of-affairs that happen to be virtuous; another one that corresponds to describing virtuous actions in terms of the *voluntary* bringing about of virtuous states-of-affairs; and another one that corresponds to the voluntary bringing about of such states-of-affairs *motivated by the intrinsic fineness of doing so* (i.e., due to having decided on it on its own account).

In **Chapter 2**, I have approached these same questions in the context of the *EE*. In **section 2.1**, I have shown that in the *EE* too Aristotle distinguishes between fully virtuous agents and agents who fail to be fully virtuous by reference to their motives for performing virtuous actions. However, the arguments advanced by Aristotle in *EE* II.11 (the text analysed in this section), taken by themselves, are not decisive about whether we should favour (A''') or (A').

In **section 2.2**, the results from my analysis of *EE* II.11 were articulated with what Aristotle has to say about virtue making the ends right in his treatment of the particular virtues. This allowed me to draw two further conclusions, namely that virtue makes the ends right by making the end of decision right, i.e., by making it be *the fine* (τὸ καλόν), and that in talking of virtue making the end right Aristotle means to talk of full virtue. Accordingly, it seems that in the *EE* too Aristotle would answer question (I) by saying that virtue makes one aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, and would answer question (II) by saying that *full virtue* makes the ends right. It remains to see, though, whether full virtue is indeed necessary for making the ends right in this way (i.e., question [III]).

In my **section 2.3**, I tried to answer precisely this question. If my reading of *EE* VIII.3 advanced in this section turns out to be correct, then it seems that there is good reason for thinking that Aristotle holds that agents who are not fully virtuous (and thus do not possess *καλοκἀγαθία*) cannot properly grasp the intrinsic fineness of fine things, since fine things are not fine to them. Aristotle would then be committed to a view according to which only fully virtuous agents are in condition of properly appreciating fineness (a suggestion I already made in **Chapter 1**, in **section 1.3.3.1**), and thus of being able to i) aim for fine ends for their own sakes, ii) decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and iii) perform virtuous actions

for their own sakes. In addition to that, the discussions carried out in **section 2.3** allowed me to confirm the results regarding question (V) reached in the previous chapter. Although in the *EE* Aristotle is not as clear as we would like him to be about habituation and about how virtuous actions should be conceived, I have argued that he conceives of virtuous actions in the same way as in the common books, and that *EE* VIII.3 provides us with a case in which he extends the use of the *per se*/accidentally distinction that was very productive in his analysis of action in *EN* V to the case of the virtuous actions performed by fully virtuous agents and the virtuous actions performed by agents who are not fully virtuous, for Aristotle says that agents who are not fully virtuous perform virtuous actions *accidentally* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) in that they are not motivated to perform these actions by their intrinsic fineness.

Finally, in **Chapter 3** I defended that, in the *EN*, Aristotle holds the same view I argued in **Chapters 1** and **2** he holds in the *EE* and in the common books. To show this, I have first presented some passages from the *Nicomachean* analysis of the particular virtues that suggest that the virtues make the ends right by making one act for the sake of the fine, which may be taken as suggesting that in the *EN* too the difference between fully virtuous agents and agents who are not fully virtuous but who nevertheless voluntarily perform virtuous actions lies in how they are motivated to perform these actions. After this, in **section 3.1** I fully analysed *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4]. In analysing this text, I have suggested that there is strong reason for thinking that, in the *EN* too, Aristotle favours (A'''), for otherwise his position in the *EN* will prove to be inconsistent with the position expressed in the common books. Moreover, the analysis of *EN* II.3 [=Bywater II.4] suggests that, in the *EN*, Aristotle would answer question (V) in a way that is quite similar to how he answered it in the *EE* and in the common books, with the difference that in the *EN* he does not avail himself of the *per se*/accidentally distinction anymore in his analyses of action.

Notwithstanding this, the reasons I presented for preferring (*A'''*) in this part of **Chapter 3** are not conclusive if taken by themselves, for which reason I have argued, in the second part of **Chapter 3** (sections 3.2 and 3.3), that Aristotle holds two theses that would commit him to the idea that *only* fully virtuous agents can aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. As a matter of fact, in **section 3.2.1** I have suggested that there is reason for thinking that Aristotle thinks that ends for whose sake we deliberate (i.e., our ends₃) are relative to our overall character disposition, to the effect that the ends for whose sake fully virtuous agents deliberate (their ends₃) should be distinguished somehow from the ends for whose sake agents who fail to be fully virtuous like intermediate agents deliberate; and in **section 3.2.2** I have argued that Aristotle thinks that the ends that motivate fully virtuous agents (their ends₁ widely conceived) are to be distinguished from the ends₁ that motivate agents who have different character dispositions, since Aristotle countenances a thesis according to which the end of an activity is relative to the disposition on which basis that activity is carried out. Accordingly, the activity in which fully virtuous agents are engaged, in so far as it is an actualisation of virtue, should differ in regard to its end from activities in which agents who are not fully virtuous may engage in when they perform virtuous actions voluntarily, albeit, of course, both activities involve performing virtuous actions voluntarily (which is the respect in which their activities can be said to be similar).

If this is correct, then there is a good case for thinking that in the *EN* too Aristotle would answer question (III) by saying that virtue is *necessary* for making the ends right. If this is so, and if, as I also argue, it is full virtue that makes the ends right in the *EN*, then we can safely say that virtue makes the ends right (i.e., question [I]) by *enabling* one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform

virtuous actions for their own sakes.

In my section **section 3.3**, I then go through a series of passage that strengthen this conclusion and which show more clearly the conception of action that is operational in the *EN*.

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But what about questions (IV) and (VII)?

In the **Introduction**, I have already offered reasons for favouring a particular way of answering question (IV). As a matter of fact, I have strongly objected to views which assume that ends₃ should be identified with our ultimate end. However, I have argued that this is not enough reason for taking conceptions of an ultimate end out of the deliberative process. If we think of conceiving of an ultimate end quite generously (so that even agents who do not have an articulated conception of their ultimate end have nevertheless such a conception in that the way in which they aim for situation-specific goals points to a particular way of conceiving their ultimate end in so far as the desirability characterisations behind their desires for these ends allow of being unified under a single end—see my arguments above in **pages 47 to 49**), then it seems that *εὐδαιμονία* (which is our ultimate end) has a central place in deliberation, in that it frames deliberation (since reasons for action would be fundamentally *εὐδαιμονία* regarding). For that reason, I have formulated my own reading assuming this particular way of answering question (IV). There are, however, some other ways of answering question (IV) that are compatible with the central claims I want to defend, but, as I have argued in the **Introduction**, I think there are some advantages to committing ourselves to this way of answering question (IV).

I have not said much about question (VII), however. In the **Introduction**, I have

expressed what sort of answer to this question is required if my central claims are to be true: *βούλησις* must be a rational desire in the sense that having a *βούλησις* for something requires being convinced that this thing one has a *βούλησις* for is a good in some sense (cf. footnote 612 for the claim that one can also have *βουλήσεις* for means to an end, provided these *βουλήσεις* are dependent upon a *βούλησις* one has for an end these things are a means to). Besides, above in **Chapter 3**, in **section 3.2.2**, I briefly discussed the central passage from the *EN* for determining Aristotle's views on *βούλησις* (my **T 53**).

There are, however, some unclarities about *βούλησις*'s status as a rational desire. In discussing **T 53**, we saw that, in the *EN*, *βούλησις* is for what appears good to oneself, to the effect that, for someone who is fully virtuous, in so far as what is truly good appears as good to them, their *βουλήσεις* will have truly good things as their objects, whilst the same is not true for vicious agents, and is also not always true for agents who fall short of full virtue.

Yet, although in that discussion I assumed that the way in which things must appear good to oneself if one is to have a *βούλησις* for it involves reason in a fundamental way, this is far from being uncontroversial: despite the fact that Aristotle explicitly characterises *βούλησις* as rational desire in some places in the *corpus*,⁶⁹⁵ it is far from clear whether it is rational in that it belongs to the rational part of the soul, or in that, in spite of not belonging to the rational part of the soul, it is still fundamentally dependent upon reason to be triggered.

A significant number of scholars think that *βούλησις* is a rational desire in that, in the division of the soul that Aristotle advances in *EN*, *βούλησις* is to be located in the rational part of the soul (and, as we shall see, some even argue that the same is true in the *DA* as well). Notwithstanding this, it has long been objected by Susemihl (1879, p. 743n17) (against Teichmüller's claim that *βούλησις* is a rational desire) that, in the *Politics*, Aristotle explicitly

⁶⁹⁵ Most notably, in the *Topics*, i.e., in *Top.* IV.5 126^a12–13.

says that children have *βουλήσεις* right from the moment they are born, although they do not yet possess reason.

The place of *βούλησις* in the soul and its status as a rational desire

To get clear on the issues concerning *βούλησις* that I raised above, I would like to analyse five passages. However, my analyses will be cursory, since I cannot go through these passages in detail in this conclusion. Accordingly, I do not intend to settle the issue about how exactly *βούλησις* is a rational desire, but only to give some indications to the effect that *even if βούλησις is not rational in that it belongs to the rational part of the soul, nevertheless it can still be argued that it is rational in the sense relevant to the answer to the End Question I defended in this Dissertation.*

To begin with, let me quote and translate *EN* I.13 1102^b13–1103^a3:

T 69 – *EN* I.13 1102^b13–1103^a3

1102b13 ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι,
 με|τέχουσα μέντοι πῆ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς
 15 τὸν || λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν. ὀρθῶς
 γὰρ | καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς |
 καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ | ἀντι-
 τείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ
 20 σώματος μόρια εἰς τα δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι || τούναν-
 τίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς | οὕτως·
ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὀρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν | τοῖς σώμασι
 μὲν ὀρώμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυ|χῆς οὐχ ὀρώμεν.
 ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομι|στέον εἶναί τι παρὰ
 25 τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι||βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτε-
 ρον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο | φαίνεται μετέχειν,
 ὥσπερ εἶπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ | τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς.
 ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος | καὶ ἀνδρείου·
 πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὲ | καὶ τὸ ἄλογον
 30 διττόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινω||νεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ'
ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὄλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει | πως, ἢ κατήκοόν
ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ | τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ
 τῶν φίλων φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ | ὥσπερ τῶν μαθημα-
 τικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου | τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ
 1103a1 νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις || καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρῆ καὶ
 τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, | διττόν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ

μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, | τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν
τι.

|| **b13** δὲ om. P^{b1}C^c | τῆς om. O^bB^{95sup.} || **b14** τοῦ γὰρ
ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς K^bP^bC^c: τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς
LL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V || **b15** τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον K^bP^bC^cL^bV: τῆς
ψυχῆς τὸν λόγον ἔχον B^{95sup.}: τὸ λόγον ἔχον τῆς ψυχῆς L | ὀρθῶς
P^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup.}V: ὀρθὸς K^b || **b17** τε om. P^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V ||
b18 γὰρ καθάπερ K^bLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: καθάπερ γὰρ P^bC^c || **b19** τοῦ
σώματος μόρια K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: τῶν μορίων τοῦ σώματος L ||
b20 παραφέρεται LL^bO^bB^{95sup.}V: προφέρεται K^b: περιφέρεται P^bC^c
|| **b22** τὸ παραφερόμενον K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bV: τὰ παραφερόμενα LB^{95sup.}
|| **b27** τὸ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: τῷ V | τὸ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: τῷ
V || **b29** φυτικὸν K^{b3}P^bC^cL²L^{b2}B^{95sup.}V: φυσικὸν K^bLL^bO^b || **b30**
ἐπιθυμητικὸν K^bP^bC^cL^bB^{95sup.}V: θυμητικὸν L || **b31** ante πειθαρχικόν
add. ὅλως L || **a2** ἔσται K^bP^bC^cV: ἄρα LL^bO^bB^{95sup.} || **a3** τι om.
K^bP^bC^c

And there seems to be some non-rational nature of the soul, but which takes part in reason in a way. As a matter of fact, [15] we praise the reason and the rational part of the soul of the incontinent and continent agent, for it does indeed correctly exhort towards the best things. However, there is in them also some other thing that naturally transgresses reason, which fights and opposes reason. For just like having decided to move the paralysed limbs of the body to the right they, [20] on the contrary, are carried away to the left, so too in the case of the soul, **for the impulses of the incontinent person go in contrary directions**. But we see what is moving in the wrong direction in the bodies, but we do not see it in the soul. But perhaps we must nevertheless suppose that there is in the soul too something that transgresses reason by being contrary to it and resisting it. [25] And how <this part> is different <from reason> makes no difference, but it also seems to take part in reason, as we said: at any rate, the one that belongs to the continent person is obedient to reason, and perhaps the one that belongs to the temperate and courageous person is even more inclined to give ear to reason, for it agrees with reason in everything. Then, the non-rational part is also twofold: the vegetative part in no way shares [30] in reason, **whereas the appetitive and, in general, desiderative part participates in reason somehow, in so far as it gives ear to it and is obedient**. Thus, in this way too we say that we have reason from our father and our friends, and not as <we say we have reason> from mathematics. And admonition, that is all censure and exhortation, shows that the non-rational part is somehow persuaded by reason. [1103a1] But if one ought to say that this too has reason, the rational part too will be twofold, one part being authoritatively rational and <having reason> in itself, and another part <having reason> as something inclined to hear a father.

This is a central passage for understanding Aristotle's moral psychology in the *EN*. As expected, it is also quite controversial. I cannot discuss it fully in detail as would be required to settle the issues surrounding its interpretation. Nevertheless, I would like to focus on two points in this passage.

To show that there is, in the soul, a non-rational element that is distinct from reason

and that, in the case of the continent and incontinent agents, naturally goes against reason, Aristotle resorts to the observation that the *ὀρμαί* of the incontinent person go in contrary directions (the first bit in bold in the text). If this is to be part of an argument to the effect that there are two distinct parts of the soul, then these *ὀρμαί* depend on different parts of the soul, so that Aristotle can distinguish between a rational and a non-rational part of the soul by distinguishing between an impulse (*ὀρμή*) of the rational part of the soul and an impulse (*ὀρμή*) of the non-rational part of the soul.

The argument is reminiscent of Plato's tripartition of the soul in the *Republic* in that Plato too resorts to motivational conflicts to distinguish between the rational, appetitive, and spirited parts. Cooper (1988/1999c, p. 241; 1996/1999b, p. 256) thinks that the impulse of the rational part of the soul is precisely *βούλησις*, and that Aristotle, like Plato before him, 'held what is for us the strange-seeming view that reason is *itself* the source of a certain sort of desire, of a certain sort of psychological impulse or movement toward action' (1988/1999c, p. 240). Accordingly, it seems natural to conclude that *βούλησις* does not belong to the non-rational part of the soul described here in **T 69**, but to the rational part of the soul.

This conclusion, only implicit in Cooper, is drawn explicitly by Irwin (2017, p. 40), who even takes a step further, saying that '[i]f Aristotle did not recognize desires of the rational part of the soul, he would have no account of how we can form our own passions in the way a virtuous person forms them.'⁶⁹⁶ Hence, if there is also reason for thinking that *βούλησις* belongs to the non-rational part of the soul (as Susemihl argues is the case), some interpretative work must be done to explain how *βούλησις* belonging to the non-rational part of the soul does not interfere with its status as a rational desire in the sense that it is triggered by thoughts about the goodness of something that one takes to be true.

⁶⁹⁶ The idea that *βούλησις* is rational in that it belongs to the rational part of the soul can already be found in Teichmüller's response to Walter (Teichmüller, 1879, p. 93n**).

Now, there is no doubt that Aristotle distinguishes in other places between impulses that come from reasoning and impulses that come from non-rational desire, as in **T 40** above (*ἀρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὀρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου κτλ.*). However, I do not think that this is sufficient to secure that these impulses *belong* to different parts of the soul. As a matter of fact, Aristotle's argument could be construed as going in a slightly different direction, so that all that is implied by these claims is that these contrary impulses *have their origin* in different parts of the soul. I mean, Aristotle could appeal to contrary impulses to show that there are two parts of the soul even if these contrary impulses belong to the non-rational part of the soul, provided that their contrariety is due to the fact that they are caused by different parts of the soul: some impulses come from the rational part of the soul in that they are triggered by reason, whereas other impulses are from non-rational desire in that they are triggered by non-rational forms of cognition (i.e., perception and *phantasia*).

There is no need, then, to understand Aristotle's description of the non-rational part of the soul as being 'τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν' (the second bit in bold in the text above) in such a way that he means to talk of the 'appetitive and *merely* desiderative part', as Irwin (1999, p. 192; 2017, p. 41) wants. Moreover, if one says that *βούλησις* belongs to the rational part of the soul, there is a difficulty in understanding the sense in which the non-rational part of the soul of the continent agent agrees with their reason, for, in the case of unqualified continence, the continent's appetites actually disagree with their reason, and nothing in Aristotle's discussion of continence suggests that the continent agent's *θυμός* must join forces with their reason in order to defeat their shameful appetites (as would be the case for Plato).⁶⁹⁷ Thus, assuming that *βούλησις* actually belongs to the *non-rational part of the*


⁶⁹⁷ This view seems to be implicit in von Fragstein (1967, p. 124), who proposes the following *διαίρεσις* of desire in light of the discussion of the *ἀκρασία* of *θυμός*:

soul provides us with another way of making sense of the claim that the non-rational part of the soul of the continent agrees with their reason, since the idea would be that their non-rational part agrees with reason in that, because *βούλησις* prevails in the psychological conflict characteristic of continence, the non-rational part collaborates with reason. But if *βούλησις* were located in the rational part of the soul, then the only alternatives would be assuming that the non-rational part of the soul of the continent agent collaborates with reason in that *θυμός* prevails over appetite thus allowing the non-rational part of the soul to join forces with reason (a conclusion we have no evidence of in Aristotle), or else assuming that it agrees with reason merely in the sense of not prevailing over reason (which is a bit far-fetched).

Now, there is a further passage that may be taken as supporting the claim that *βούλησις* is to be located in the rational part of the soul, namely *DA* III.9 432^a22–^b7:

T 70 – *DA* III.9 432^a22–^b7

432a22 ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν |
 εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. | τρόπον
 25 γὰρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες || λέγουσι δι-
 ορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἳ δὲ τὸ
 λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς | διαφορὰς δι' ἃς
 ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα φαίνεται | μόρια μείζω διάστασιν
 ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται, τό τε θρωπτικόν, ὃ
 30 καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ || πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητι-
 κόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε | ὡς λόγον ἔχον θεῖη ἂν τις ῥαδίως·
 432b1 ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, || ὃ τῶ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι
 δὲ τούτων ταῦτον ἢ ἕτερον ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει
 κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,
 ὃ καὶ λόγῳ | καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ



That von Fragstein's thinks that *βούλησις* belongs to the rational part of the soul, is confirmed by a later work of his (von Fragstein, 1974, p. 108n1), where he claims that *βούλησις* belongs to the rational part of the soul in that it belongs to a part of the rational part of the soul, namely the opinative part (τὸ δοξαστικόν).

5 ἄτοπον δὴ || τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν· ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἢ βού-
 λησις γίνεται, | καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός· εἰ δὲ
 τρία ἢ | ψυχῇ, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.

There is an *aporia* straightaway about the way in which it must be said that there are parts of the soul and <about> how many they are. In fact, in a certain way they seem to be infinite, and not only those that some people [25] say there are when they distinguish the rational, spirited, and the appetitive parts, whereas others distinguish the rational part and the non-rational part. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the differences because of which people separate these <parts> other parts too manifestly are more distinct than these that were also just mentioned, namely the vegetative <part>, which belongs both to plants and [30] to all animals, and the perceptive part, which someone could not easily establish as being non-rational or rational, and, moreover, the imaginative,[432b1] which is different in being from all <these>—but there is much difficulty about which of these it is the same as or different from if one intends to establish parts of the soul as being separate—, and, in addition to these, the desiderative part, which would also seem to be different in account and in function from all <these>. **Besides, it is absurd [5] to tear this asunder, for, otherwise, wish turns out to be in the rational part, and appetite and spirit in the non-rational part, and if the soul is threefold, there will be desire in each of them.**

In the way I am translating this passage, it poses no problem for the idea that βούλησις belongs to the non-rational part of the soul. There is, however, an alternative interpretation proposed by Rodier (1900, vol. 2, pp. 531-532) and by Corcilius (2008, pp. 50-51). The dispute centres on the bit in bold in the text. Two things are relevant here:

- (1) The meaning of the verb διασπᾶν; and
- (2) The way in which the γάρ from ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ κτλ.' is meant support the claim that it is absurd to διασπᾶν the desiderative part of the soul.

Above I have assumed that διασπᾶν means to divide something or to tear it apart.⁶⁹⁸ Rodier (1900, vol. 2, pp. 531-532) and Corcilius (2008, p. 50n48), in turn, taking their cue from Pseudo-Simplicius' commentary to this passage (cf. *CAG*. XI, 291.5–6),⁶⁹⁹ suggest that διασπᾶν means rather something like 'to detach.' In that case, Aristotle would be rather saying

⁶⁹⁸ Similarly, see Themistius' paraphrasis (*CAG*. V.3, 117.19-22), Hicks (1907, pp. 551-552), Siwek (1965, pp. 344-345), Shields (2016, p. 350), and Irwin (2017, p. 42).

⁶⁹⁹ 'Then, <Aristotle> correctly says that it is absurd to detach the desiderative part from the other parts' (ἄτοπον οὖν καλῶς ἀποφαίνεται τὸ διασπᾶν τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων).

that it is absurd to detach the desiderative part *from the other parts of the soul*, for βούλησις is *indeed* in the rational part of the soul, whereas ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are in the non-rational part of the soul, and, if the soul proves to be threefold, there will be desire in each of its parts. In that case, the thought would be that the desiderative part of the soul is not a part of the soul that can be detached from the other parts of the soul as if it were separate, for the different kinds of desire are located in different parts of the soul: if we adopt a bipartition of the soul, βούλησις would be located in the rational part, whereas ἐπιθυμία and θυμός would be located in the non-rational part of the soul.

This is a neat way of making sense of the γάρ clause from lines 5ff., since this clause would explain the absurdity of detaching the desiderative part of the soul from the other parts of the soul by pointing out that the different kinds of desire are located in these different parts of the soul. However, not only are the parts of the soul in which the different sorts of desire are said to be located in this argument *not* the parts of the soul that result from Aristotle's own division of the soul, but also it is not necessary to read γάρ in this way, for it may be also indicating that if it were not absurd to 'tear apart' the desiderative part of the soul, then there would be desire in each of the parts of the soul.⁷⁰⁰ Although 'γάρ' in the sense of 'for otherwise' is, in many cases, followed by ἄν + imperfect (as in *Pol.* III.9 1280^a31ff), this is not always the case, for there are clear examples of this construction in Aristotle using the present indicative without ἄν (e.g. *Pol.* III.9 1280^b8, just a couple of lines after the γάρ followed by ἄν + imperfect I just mentioned).⁷⁰¹

I do not deny that Rodier's and Corcilius' proposal is a possible reading of T 70. Yet

⁷⁰⁰ As a result, the objection raised by Rodier (1900, vol. 2, p. 531) that following Themistius interpretation is in tension with the sequence of the argument (i.e., the 'ἐν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γάρ κτλ.' clause) would not be really problematic, since, if γάρ is understood in the way I am proposing, the tension vanishes.

⁷⁰¹ For a discussion of this use of γάρ, see Denniston (1954, s.v. γάρ III.(3), pp. 62-63), from whom I took my examples.

there are no decisive reasons for favouring this reading, and it is perfectly reasonable to take this passage as actually presenting a critique to people who tear the desiderative part of the soul apart—either resorting to a bipartition the soul (as Plato does in the *Timaeus* and maybe Xenocrates also did)⁷⁰² or resorting to a tripartition of the soul (as Plato did in the *Respublica*)—, so that desire would be dispersed in different parts of the soul.

What I would like to suggest now is that thinking that βούλησις is a rational desire that *is not* located in the rational part of the soul has the advantage of not only making Aristotle's division of the soul in rational and non-rational importantly different from the bipartition that prevailed in the Academy, but of also making his claims in the *EN* and in the *DA* regarding βούλησις consistent with the picture we come across in the *Pol.*

But before getting into that, let me first present Aristotle's views on βούλησις and its place in the soul in the *EE*:

T 71 – *EE* II.1 1219^b27–1220^a1

1219^b27 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν |
 ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα, | οὐ
 30 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ || μὲν τῷ
 ἐπιτάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυ|κέναι· εἰ δέ τι
 ἐστὶν ἐτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μό|ριον. διαφέρει δ'
 οὐθὲν οὔτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ψυχὴ οὔτ' εἰ ἀμερῆς, | ἔχει μέντοι δυνά-
 μεις διαφόρους καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ | ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ
 35 κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, || καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευ-
 κόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, | ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ οὐκ
 οὐσία τῇ αὐτοῦ. ἀφήρηται | δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυ-
 χῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. ἀν|θρωπίνης δὲ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια
 ἴδια. διὸ οὐδ' αἰ | ἀρεταὶ αἰ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἀν-
 40 θρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ || ἢ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἀρχὴν
 1220^a1 καὶ πράξιν, ἄρ||χει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ
 παθημάτων
 || b37 φυτικόν Vettori (in the margin of his copy of the Aldine edition,
 f. 253v): φυσικόν PCBL || b39 καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL: secludenda ci.
 Susemihl: καὶ ἀξητικοῦ Bonitz Rowe: καὶ κινητικοῦ Broadie

Since we are investigating human virtue, let it be assumed as a principle that there

⁷⁰² See, Xenocrates fr. 206, and Isnardi Parente's commentary (2007, p. 398), who traces this bipartition back to *Ti.* 69c5–d6, where we come across a bipartition between a rational and immortal part of the soul and a non-rational and mortal part of the soul, and argues that dividing the soul in this way goes back to Archytas and Philolaus.

are two parts of the soul that take part in reason, but that they do not take part in reason in the same way, but one <takes part in reason> [30] by giving orders, whereas the other by being of such a nature as to obey and listen <to reason>. But if there is something which is non-rational in a different way, let us leave this part aside. And it makes no difference whether the soul is divisible in parts or if it is not divisible in parts. Notwithstanding this, it has different capacities, namely the ones mentioned, just like the concave and the convex in what is curved are inseparable, [35] and the straight and the white <are inseparable>. Although what is straight is not white but by accident, and not due to its own substance. Let us leave aside any other part of the soul such as the vegetative. The mentioned parts are proper to the human soul. For that reason, neither are the virtues of the vegetative and desiderative part <proper to> the human, for, if [40] one is human, it is necessary for reasoning, i.e., a principle, and action to be present,[1220a1] and reasoning does not command reasoning but desire and the passions.

This passage is parallel to T 69, and two things are noteworthy here. First that the non-rational part of the soul in humans is distinguished from the merely desiderative part of the soul shared by other animals (as is suggested by the fact that the virtue of the desiderative part of the soul is not proper to the human being). Second, that reasoning is described as commanding desire and the passions. Accordingly, unless Aristotle is talking of *ὄρεξις* in the narrow sense, making reference to *mere desires* (i.e., *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*), there is no reason for thinking that reasoning is not being described as ruling *βούλησις* as well. As a matter of fact, one could argue that what distinguishes the human desiderative part of the soul from the desiderative part had by other animals is not merely the fact that human non-rational desires such as *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are responsive to reason (provided one has not been corrupted by bad habits), but also the fact that it includes a type of desire that requires reason to be triggered, namely *βούλησις*.

It is worth noticing that, in the *EE*, Aristotle presents *βούλησις* in a way that is slightly different from how it is described in the *EN* (see T 53):

T 72 – *EE* II.10 1227^a18–31

1227a18 τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ |
 20 κατὰ μέρος βουλευόνται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλευσάιτο ἂν εἰ δάη ||
 φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσῃται, οἷς ἀγαθόν
 | τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄριστον ἐστίν. παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διὰ |
 στροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον |
 δ' ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' ἄλλω χρήσασθαι ἢ |
 25 || ὄψει, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ἀκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης |
 ποιῆσαι καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγείας
 | ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς | δὲ
 παρὰ φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἢ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ | ἀγαθοῦ
 30 ἐστί, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διὰ στροφὴν καὶ τὸ | κακόν.
 || a21–22 διὰ στροφὴν Jackson: διαστροφὴν PCBL: διαστροφῆ
 Fritzsche Rowe: <κατὰ> διαστροφὴν Sylburg || a30 διὰ στροφὴν
 Jackson: διαστροφὴν PCBL: διαστροφῆ Fritzsche Rowe: <κατὰ>
 διαστροφὴν Sylburg

By nature, the end is always good, even the one about which people for whom the unqualifiedly best end is good deliberate in particular matters. For instance, the physician would deliberate about whether he should give [20] medicine, the general about where he should be positioned. However, in contrariety to nature and due to a twisting <of nature>, <the end> is not the good, but the apparent good. And the cause is that it is not possible for some things to be used for something different from that for which they are by nature. For instance, sight: it is not possible to see that of which there is no [25] sight, nor <is it possible> to hear that of which there is no hearing. However, from science it is possible to do also that about which science is not. In fact, the same science is not in a similar way about health and disease, but it is, by nature, of the first and, in contrariety to nature, of the latter. Similarly, wish too is, by nature, of the good, and, in contrariety to nature, of the bad, and, by nature, one wishes [30] what is good, but in contrariety to nature and due to a twisting <of nature> one also wishes what is bad.

Different from what he does in T 53, Aristotle here does not characterise βούλησις as being for what one takes to be good, so that, in truth and without qualification, it is for what is really good, whereas for each person, for whatever they take to be good, to the effect that the fully virtuous person can be characterised as the one who correctly judges the goodness of things. Instead, Aristotle explains the way in which βούλησις can be either for something that is truly good or for something that merely appears to be good (but is not)—*contra* Plato—by making an analogy with the sciences and crafts: just as the crafts and sciences, despite being capacities for contraries, are, by nature, for one of the contraries,⁷⁰³ so too βούλησις, despite

⁷⁰³ An argument that goes back to Plato himself, in *Resp.* I.

being a desire that can be had both for things that are truly good and for things that are not truly good, is, by nature, of what is good and is of something bad only against nature.

However, it seems that we can find in the *EE* an account of *βούλησις* that, despite the differences in presentation, is basically the same as the one we come across in the *EN*. As a matter of fact, earlier in the *EE*, Aristotle not only says that no one has a *βούλησις* for what they believe is bad and characterises incontinent agents as not doing the things they have a *βούλησις* for, and thus as acting against their *βούλησις* (*EE* II.7 1223^b6–7), but also defines being incontinent as acting against what one believes is best. What is implicit here is the thought that *βούλησις* is a desire for what one *believes* to be good.

In that case, what is novel in the *Nicomachean* treatment of *βούλησις* is the idea that the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* encompasses not only things that appear to be good but are not really so, but whatever is *taken to be good*, irrespective of whether it is or not.

Now, the main reason I think we should take seriously the idea that *βούλησις* is a desire that belongs to the non-rational part of the soul comes from a puzzling passage from the *Politics* that is usually set aside in discussions of *βούλησις* precisely due to making poor sense of the assumption that *βούλησις* is a rational desire due to belonging to the rational part of the soul:⁷⁰⁴

T 73 – *Pol.* VII.15 1334^b12–28

1334b12 φανερόν δὴ τοῦτό
 | γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ |
 15 ἀρχῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ ἢ δὲ
 λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς | τούτους
 τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν | μελέτην·

⁷⁰⁴ This passage is treated as an exception by Pearson (2012, p. 170n1), for instance, who thinks that Aristotle consistently characterises *βούλησις* as a desire that is located in the rational part of the soul, and only in *Politics* says otherwise. Yet, given that the only other case in which Aristotle explicitly says that *βούλησις* is a desire of the rational part of the soul is in the *Topics* (see footnote 695), there is reason for thinking that Aristotle is just reporting views that were prevalent in his time (most probably in the Academy). Similarly, for the idea that Aristotle wavers between saying that *βούλησις* belongs to the rational part of the soul and that it belongs to the non-rational part of the soul, see Ramsauer (1878, p. 132).

ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δὴ ἐστίν, οὕτω | καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
 ὀρώμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ | λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς
 20 ἔξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ
 δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα | πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ | λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο·
 θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς
 ὑπάρχει τοῖς | παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊούσιν
 25 ἐγγίγνεσθαι || πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπι-
 μέλειαν | ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα
 τὴν | τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἔνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν
 δὲ | τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

Then, this at least is manifest, first, that, just like in the other cases, generation comes from a principle and that the end that comes from a principle of a particular sort <is the principle> of another end. Now, then,[15] reason and intelligence are the end of our nature. Therefore, the generation and the training of the habits must be prepared for them [sc. for reason and intelligence]. Second, <that> just like body and soul are two things, so too we see that there are two parts of the soul (the non-rational and the rational) and that the dispositions of these things [20](among which one is desire and the other is reason) are two in number, and <that> just like the body is prior to the soul in generation, **so too the non-rational part <is prior to> the rational part <in generation>.** And this is also manifest, for spirit, wish, and, moreover, appetite belong to children right when they are born as well, whereas reasoning and intelligence are natural to arise <in them> when they get older. [25] For that reason, first it is necessary for the training of the body to be prior to the training of the soul, and, **second, for the training of desire to be prior <to the training of reason>.** However, <it is necessary> for the training of desire to be for the sake of reason, and for the training of the body <to be for the sake of> the soul.

What is most striking in this passage is that, to show that the claim that the non-rational part of the soul is prior in generation to the rational part of the soul just as the body is prior in generation to the soul, Aristotle points out that *θυμὸς*, *βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία* belong to children right from the moment they are born, whereas reasoning and intelligence naturally arise only when children are older. There is no doubt that Aristotle here is implying that *βούλησις* belongs to the non-rational part of the soul, otherwise saying that it belongs to children right from the moment they are born would rather show that it is not true that the non-rational soul is prior in generation to the rational part of the soul: if *βούλησις* belonged to the rational part of soul, saying that it is present in children right from the moment they are born would actually be an argument *against* Aristotle's point here.

Thus, charity forces us to take this passage as making a claim to the effect that *βούλησις* does indeed belong to the non-rational part of the soul.

However, if *βούλησις* depends on being convinced about the goodness of an object to be triggered, how could it be present before one acquires the capability of being convinced of something?

A way out of this difficulty is to say that the non-rational part of the soul that is present right from the moment children are born is already potentially sensitive to reason. Although reason is not yet present, their *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* is such that it would be responsive to reason were it present. Accordingly, there is no issue in saying *βούλησις* is present right from the moment we are born provided this does not mean that it is possible to have occurrent or activated *βουλήσεις*, but merely the capacity to experience *βούλησις* in the sense that the agent will be able to experience *βούλησις* when reason becomes present in their soul.⁷⁰⁵ There is no reason, then, to think that T 73 represents an exception, for the thought that *βούλησις* belongs to the non-rational part of the soul can be made good sense of. If this is so, a *desideratum* is that what Aristotle has to say about *βούλησις* in his *Ethicae* should be consistent with what he says in the *Pol.*

If this is correct—and above I have suggested we can also make good sense of this idea in the *Ethicae*—, then Irwin's worries are ultimately unjustified. As a matter of fact, provided *βούλησις* is triggered by one's convictions about the good, there is no issue in making sense of how we can form our own passions in the way the virtuous agent forms them, for *βούλησις*

⁷⁰⁵ It may be objected that because one is not currently able to have a *βούλησις*, one does not really have that capacity. However, Aristotle seems to conceive of *δύναμις* in such a way that one can be said to have a given *δύναμις* even if one is not able to actualise it right now, provided one can do it *in the future*, so that a given *x* is possible in the Aristotelian sense if and only if $\diamond(x \vee Fx)$. For a discussion of this conception of *δύναμις* on the basis of *Met.* Θ.4 1047^b3–12, *Cael.* I.12 281^b2–12, and 283^b13–14, see my Master's thesis (de Sousa, 2018, pp. 107–117). Besides, for the idea that something may be said to have a given *δύναμις* not only in that it has this capacity right now, but also in that they may acquire this capacity in the future, see Angioni (2009a, p. 275).

would be directly responsive to reason.⁷⁰⁶

We can then safely answer question (VII) by saying that *βούλησις* is a rational desire in the sense required for the answer to the End Question I defended in this Dissertation.

Epilogue: practical truth revisited and ‘Aristotle’s moral philosophy’

If am right about how the End Question is to be answered, then it seems that we are in position to rethink four issues that are central to the interpretation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy.

I already touched upon two of them in the **Introduction**. As pointed out in **section 0.1.1**, an advantage of my answer to the End Question that I was not able to discuss in this Dissertation is that it implies that Aristotle is committed to a version of the unity of the virtues thesis that is quite close to the one we know Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed (see footnote 74), since *φρόνησις* would be a sort of knowledge that intermediates the reciprocity of the different virtues. There are, of course, a series of issues to be discussed if this is to be a philosophically palatable position to attribute to Aristotle,⁷⁰⁷ and there are, of course, different ways of formulating the unity of the virtues thesis, some of which are even compatible with one not having all possible virtues, but only those required if one is to be *εὐδαίμων* in the circumstances they are being faced with in their lives.⁷⁰⁸

A second issue I already touched upon in my **Introduction** concerns Aristotle’s eu-

⁷⁰⁶ *Contra* Walter (1874, p. 204), who despite thinking that *βούλησις* is rational in the sense of depending on reason, believes that it does not have something conceptual as its object.

⁷⁰⁷ For some of the different positions in this debate, see, for instance, Irwin (1988b), Kraut (1988), Irwin (1988c), Telfer (1989), Halper (1999), Sharples (2000), Gardiner (2001), Pakaluk (2002), and Lefebvre (2014).

⁷⁰⁸ For the idea that in *EN* VI.13 1145^b1–2 (in **T 17**) Aristotle does not mean that *φρόνησις* implies the presence of all the particular virtues, but only that every virtue one has is accompanied by *φρόνησις*, see Zingano (1993, pp. 277ff). In that case, it would be possible to argue that one can be fully virtuous without having all the virtues (provided that the virtues one has are sufficient for accomplishing *εὐδαιμονία* of the political sort).

daimonism and his conception of morality,⁷⁰⁹ and whether *εὐδαιμονία* is axiologically foundational for Aristotle, or whether not all our actions and desires are, in a sense, ultimately for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία* (see footnotes 39 and 61 and the discussion in pages 105 to 106). If my answer to the End Question is correct, then we have good reasons for thinking that *εὐδαιμονία* does indeed play a foundational role in Aristotle's moral system, such that, as Price puts it, reasons for action are fundamentally *εὐδαιμονία* regarding. Showing this, however, would require me to deal with a series of passages that scholars who deny that *εὐδαιμονία* fulfils this role usually resort to (esp. *Pol.* VII.13 1331^b24–1332^b11 and *EN* I.11 [=Bywater I.10] 1100^b22–1101^a13—I have briefly discussed part of this second passage in a different connection above when discussing T 65).⁷¹⁰

The third issue I think my answer to the End Question invites us to deal with is Aristotle's conception of moral worth. As a matter of fact, if I am right that only fully virtuous agents perform virtuous actions for their own sakes and decide on virtuous actions on their own account, then it seems that only fully virtuous agents act for the Aristotelian right reasons for action. Hence, if we think of moral worth as it is usually thought of, namely as requiring one to act for the right reasons, then it seems that Aristotle would conceive of moral worth in a way that is demanding to the point of being implausible: not only is this an implausible conception of moral worth (it is more demanding than Kant's conception even), but it is also not charitable to Aristotle to say that he held such a view.

In the face of this, there is reason for thinking that we should reconstruct Aristotle's

⁷⁰⁹ I am thereby proposing, following Anscombe (1958), that we cannot find, in Aristotle, something that corresponds to the modern way of talking about morality. This does not mean, however, that Aristotle does not conceive of morality in a way that is to be contrasted to what we find from Kant onwards, namely that he has an eudaimonistic conception of morality.

⁷¹⁰ I deal with an analogous problem in respect to Aristotle's *Politica* in another work (de Sousa, 2024a), in which I argue that *εὐδαιμονία* plays a foundational role in the method advanced by Aristotle in *Pol.* IV.1 and allows us to see the so-called three levels of the Aristotelian political science as unified, *pace* Jaeger (1923) and Rowe (1977).

conception of moral worth in a way that does not require one to act for what Aristotle takes to be the right reasons. No doubt a fundamental feature of the discussion of moral worth since Kant is that morally worthy actions are not performed accidentally, and that the connection between one's motives and one's actions should not be accidental. Notwithstanding this, although Aristotle would admit that virtuous actions that are not performed for their own sakes or for the sake of the fine are in some sense performed accidentally, there are different ways in which one may say that the performance of an action was accidental.

As I have indicated, a first way in which Aristotle would describe an action as accidental is when something is done involuntarily. In *EN* V.10 [=Bywater V.6] 1135^a8–23, for instance, Aristotle makes two distinctions: the one between a wrong (*τὸ ἀδίκημα*) and something that is unjust (*τὸ ἄδικον*), and the one between a just act (*δικαιοπράγημα*) and something that is just (*τὸ δίκαιον*). One does wrong (*ἀδικεῖ*) when one voluntarily does something that happens to be unjust; similarly, one performs a just act (*δικαιοπραγεῖ*) when one voluntarily does something that happens to be just. By contrast, if one involuntarily does things that happen to be just or unjust, one has not performed a just act (*δικαιοπράγημα*) or a wrong (*ἀδίκημα*) except accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*).

This is clearly a case in which even if one may end up doing something fine, there is no doubt one's action is not morally worthy. But what about the voluntary performance of fine things?

Agents who perform virtuous actions voluntarily are aware of the circumstances constitutive of their action (i.e., they are aware of what they are doing, how they are doing it, for the sake of what result they are doing it, etc.), and so they do what they do being aware of the right making features of their actions. Yet the connection between what they do and their motivation may still be accidental in some sense: not all agents who perform virtuous

actions voluntarily are motivated by the right making features of their actions alone or *qua* the right making features of their actions, otherwise all agents who voluntarily perform virtuous actions would act for the sake of the fine.

So, if we assume instead that, for Aristotle, an action is morally worthy if 1) it is fine in that it is the right thing to do in the circumstances and if 2) it is performed voluntarily, then Aristotle would hold a conception of moral worth that comes strikingly close to some proposals in the contemporary debate according to which even actions performed by agents experiencing inverse *akrasia* are morally worthy.⁷¹¹ There is a caveat, though: if Aristotle thinks that being fine and being done voluntarily is sufficient for moral worth, then his conception of moral worth is fundamentally at odds with the Kantian assumption, widespread in the contemporary debate, that the connection between one's acts rightness and one's motivation should be in no sense accidental, which is perfectly natural given the different senses in which Aristotle talks of accident.

Finally, to conclude, if my answer to the End Question is indeed correct, then I think it vindicates the central claim from my Master thesis to the effect that Aristotle would distinguish between two different sorts of practical truth: one characteristic of fully virtuous agents—i.e., that is the *ἔργον* of *φρόνησις*—, and another one characteristic of agents who are not fully virtuous but who do nevertheless voluntarily perform virtuous actions on the basis of decision—i.e., that is the *ἔργον* of practical reason—(see de Sousa, 2018, pp. 149-157). As a matter of fact, if it is indeed true that only fully virtuous agents perform virtuous actions for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and aim for fine ends for their own sakes, it seems that there is a fundamental difference in the knowledge about what one should do that is had by fully virtuous agents and by agents who are not fully virtuous.

⁷¹¹ For a defence of such a conception of moral worth, which is less demanding than the Kantian conception, see Arpaly (2002; 2003; 2015) and Markovits (2010).

Albeit agents who are not fully virtuous agents may be right about what they should do, they cannot be right about why they should act in that particular way. I mean, the reasons why they think they should perform virtuous actions does not correspond to the reason that justifies the performance of such actions, for it does not correspond to what makes such actions fine to perform in the circumstances they are being faced with: agents who are not fully virtuous are not motivated by the right making features of their actions, although they may be aware of such features (though of course not *qua* right making features) if they are to perform such actions voluntarily. Fully virtuous agents, in turn, not only are right about what they should do, but they think they should act in that way for the *right reasons*.

Thus, the practical truth attained by fully virtuous agents when they perform virtuous actions due to having decided on them on their own account differs importantly from the practical truth that may be attained by agents who are not fully virtuous and who do not perform virtuous actions in this particular way: the desires to which each of these two sorts of truth correspond are right in different senses. The truth about what should be done attained by fully virtuous agents is one that corresponds (*ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα*) to a desire that is right in that such agents aim for fine ends for their own sakes, whereas the truth about what should be done that may be attained by agents who are not fully virtuous corresponds to a desire that is right in that such agents aim for fine ends, albeit they do not aim for these ends for their own sakes.

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