

Cambridge University Press, 1999).

34. Government has been implementing various special programmes for eradicating poverty and generating employment among rural poor and Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe population. For instance *Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana* (SGSY), *Indira Awas Yojana* (IAY), *Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana* (JGSY), Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS), Kerala Rural Marketing Society (KERAMS) etc. (See Government of Kerala, *Economic Review 2000* (Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board, 2001) 176-199.
35. Affirmative action is aimed at extenuating disadvantages derived from socio-historical processes of an unjust social order.... Affirmative action is usually defined as that measure which is aimed at minimizing, if not doing away, with discrimination and deprivation. See Prakash Louis, "Scheduled Castes and Tribes: The Reservation Debate", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol-XXXVIII. No.25, June 21 (2003) 2475-78; Prabhaskar, *Affirmative Action and Social Change*.
36. Saradhamoni 4-5.
37. On the name of protection of hutment dwellers (*Kudikidappu rights*), the Government directed the landowners to give three cents of land in urban areas and ten cents in rural areas as site for dwelling to *kudikidappukars*, majority of them from the former slave castes. By 1979, about 42.1 lakhs *kudikidappukars* were provided with ownership rights to their homestead, 45302 acres of land were distributed to land-less persons. For more details see Mathew Kurian 25; B. A. Prakash, "Evolution of land tenures in Kerala: A review", P.P. Pillai, ed., *Agricultural Development in Kerala* (Delhi: Agricole Publishing Academy, 1982) 82; Abraham Vijayan, *Caste, Class and Agrarian Relations in Kerala* (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1998).
38. C. T. Kurian, "Kerala's Development Experience: Random Comments about the past and some considerations for the future", *Social Scientist*, Vol-2, Nos-1-3 (1995) 54.
39. Mathew Kurian 24.
40. As cited in *Economic Review 2000*, 170.
41. P. K. Michael Tharakan, "History of Development Experience Desegregated and Deconstructed analysis of Kerala", Ph. D Diss., School of Social Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University, 1997, 252.

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LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES: UNDERSTANDING CLASSICAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*

Devarakonda Balaganapathi

This paper attempts to articulate certain inadequacies that are involved in the traditional way of categorizing Indian philosophy and explores alternative approaches, some of which otherwise are not explicitly seen in the treatises of the history of Indian Philosophies. By categorization, I mean, classifying Indian Philosophy into two streams, which are traditionally called as *astika* and *nastika* or *orthodox* and *heterodox* systems. Further, these different schools in the *astika Darsanas* and *nastika Darsanas* are usually numbered into six and three respectively. Nyaya - Vaisesika, Sankhya - Yoga and Purva & Uttara Mimamsa are identified as *astika darsanas* and Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism are identified as *nastika darsanas* (6+3). It is my endeavour to critically analyze the usual *astika-nastika* distinction of 6+3 classification of Indian Philosophy so as to find out the meaning of such a rationale in this categorization. This general consensus is contested in this paper. What I am intended to support and strengthen such a critical analysis and exploration is to discuss these systems of India's philosophy within the general intellectual milieu of Indian cultural traditions, its orientations, presuppositions and preferences. In order to carry out such a task, I shall be taking recourse to the theories of different scholars, both traditional and modern, in approaching and appropriating Indian Philosophy from different perspectives and their critical-creative approaches shall be scrutinized.

The first part of the paper lays bare the inadequacy of the *astika-nastika* distinction and 6+3 distinction by showing the constant change of the basis of the distinction and the lack of unanimity regarding the number of schools in the treatises of history of Indian Philosophies. The second part of the paper explores the alternative approaches of Karl Potter (1961), Ninian Smart (1964), Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1975), Daya Krishna (1987), Amrtya Sen (2005) that came at a later stage in the history of Indian Philosophy.

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Let us look into the *astika-nastika* distinction carefully by giving a considerate perusal to the history of Indian philosophy. Historically, it is not known who made this distinction first, and why and when this distinction was made; and what forms the basis of such a distinction? These questions may look naive. But, an attempt to answer these questions is of crucial importance in understanding the problems that are involved in the traditional ways of the categorization of Indian philosophy. Let us begin our analysis with the *astika-nastika* distinction.

Astika and Nastika Distinction: History of Categorization

In the western intellectual and cultural tradition, an atheist is one who does not believe in God. But in the Indian tradition, an atheist or a *nastika* is one who does not accept the authority of the Vedas. The connotation of *nastika* as an atheist as accepted generally following the English translation raises serious speculation. Let us look into the history and find out how the terms *astika* and *nastika* were defined by different scholars in India through ages.

Manu's definition clearly states *nastika* as one who despises the Vedas (*nastico vedanindakah*), which implies that *astika* is the one who follows Vedas. Here, the basis of the *astika-nastika* distinction is the acceptance or rejection of the Vedas.

Bhimacharya's definition of *astika* differs from Manu and addresses a new portent. He describes *astika* in his *Nyayakosa* as one who accepts the existence of the other world (*paralokaadyastitva vadi*). Although the basis of this definition is difficult to understand, yet what is explicitly evident is that the focus of attention here has shifted from Vedas to the other world. Nevertheless, Bhimacharya's definition of *nastika* goes hand in hand with that of Manu. According to him, *nastika* is the one who does not follow the path prescribed by the Vedas (*Vedamaargam ananurundhanah*). Bhimacharya's definition is significant in the sense that the basis of *astika-nastika* distinction; for him, is not Vedas as it is with Manu. Conversely, Bhimacharya has postulated two distinct and separate categories, 'other- world and Veda', as the defining features of *astika* and *nastika* systems respectively. He excludes Samkhya and the Advaita Vedanta from the list of *astika* systems since they do not accept the existence of *paraloka* (*mayavadi vedanti api nastika eva paryavasane sampadyate*).

Interestingly, Radhakrishnan mentions the distinction that Panini made between *astika*, *nastika* and *daistica*. According to Radhakrishnan (1994:783), an *astika* is one who believes in a transcendental world (*asti paralokah*) and a *nastika* is the one who disbelieves it (*nasti paralokah*) and a *daistica* is a sort of fatalist.

In the Tamil work Manimekhalai, the systems like Lokayata, Baudha, Samkhya, Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa are regarded as Orthodox. (Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, Manimekhalai, P.xxi)

Further, Kumarila, a Mimamsaka who lived during seventh century A.D., in his *Tantravaartica* (which is a commentary on Sabara's commentary of Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini) regards the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Pancharatra and the Pasupata systems as being opposed to the Veda as much as Buddhism (i.3.4). This implies that Samkhya, Yoga, Pancharatra, and Pasupata systems, which are normally regarded as theistic, are also atheistic like Buddhism.

In contrast with this view, Vijnana Bhikshu, the great expounder of Samkhya who lived during 16th century considered that Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Vedanta, Pasupata and Pancharatra systems have their roots in the Vedas.

Madhusudana Saraswati, an advaitin of early 16th century, uses the term *nastika* referring to the one who denies the soul and after life (KS. Murty, 1991 :8). What we perceive here is a shift from 'Vedas' to 'soul' and 'after life' as the basis of *astika-nastika* distinctions. He includes Nyaya, Vaisesika, Karma mimamsa, Sariraka mimamsa, Patanjala, Pancharatra and Pasupati in the *astika* category and Buddhism (Four schools), Digambara school of Jainism and Carvaka in the *nastika* category.

Therefore, the task of understanding the basis of the *astika-nastika* distinction is a difficult one keeping in view of the philosophical crystallization and rational formulations of the systems and view points explained by the commentators of Indian philosophical systems. Moreover, even in recent times attempts have been made to show the inadequacy of *astika-nastika* distinctions as they are purely based on Vedic authority. Daya Krishna, for instance, calls the notion of 'Vedic authority as the criterion of *astika-nastika* distinction' as a myth (2000:369-383). According to Daya Krishna (1991:7-12), the bulk of the tenets of Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophies are not based on the teachings of the Vedas, which makes the very notion of the authority of the Vedas a difficult one to reckon with in the usual categorization of Indian philosophy as *astika* and *nastika*. It may be noted here that few systems of Indian philosophy accepted certain portions of the Vedas and few others accepted the remaining parts, which were rejected by the earlier people. Sutras, which form the foundation of the Orthodox schools, are viewed by scholars as holding a superior position of authority than the non-Upanishadic parts of the Vedas.

Number of Schools (6+3)

In the context of understanding Indian philosophy outside the *astika-nastika* distinction, it is necessary to question the 6+3 distinction itself. There are certain questions that require our attention. Where did the present day version of 6+3 categorization originate from? Are there other schools of philosophy along with the 6+3 in India? These questions obviate the necessity to reconsider the categorization of Indian philosophy in the previous and the bygone era. The distinction between *nastika* and *astika* was absent before the advent of Christian era.

^ Kautilya, the author of Arthashastra, who belong to 3rd century B.C. regarded *anvikshiki* or broadly philosophy (metaphysics) as one of the four sciences (the

other three being teachings of the three Vedas [*trayi*] (Rig, Sama and Yajur), agriculture [*varta*] and science of government [*dandaniti*] which lists only Samkhya, Yoga and Lokayata under this category.¹ He excludes other four orthodox and two heterodox schools. It seems hardly sensible to think that Kautilya was ignorant of these schools. Since Mimamsa and Vedanta were written between second century B.C. and second century A.D., Nyaya Viseshika definitely would have taken shape by the time as a fully developed system when *Arthashastra* was written. Therefore, the exclusion of these systems of philosophy by Kautilya is puzzling and difficult to comprehend.

Haribhadra,² a Jaina monk of 8th century A. D., in his *Saddarsana Samuchchaya* discusses Buddhism, Nyaya, Samkhya, the Jaina, the Vaisesika and the Jaiminiya systems and excludes Carvaka, Yoga and Uttaramimamsa from the list of Darsana.

The *Sarvadarsana Sidhanta Sangraha*, (Epitome of the doctrine of all the *Darsanas*) a 10th or 11th century text book, (whose author is not known) from the school of Advaita (Sankara) discusses the views of the Lokayakas, Jainas, four schools of Buddhism (Madhyamika, Yogachara, Sautrantika and Vaibhashika), Vaisesika, Nyaya, Purva-mimamsa (Kumarila and Prabhakara), Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta of Sankara and the philosophy of Vedavyasa (i.e., the philosophy of the Mahabharata). Interestingly, this list of 13 schools for the first time, includes philosophy of Mahabharata which was written by Vyasa as one of the philosophical schools of Indian philosophy.

A similarly particularistic but more inclusive view of Mallinadha, a Brahmanical writer, in his commentary on *Prataparudra Yasobhushana* of Vidyadhara, states Panini, Jaimini, Vyasa, Kapila, Akshapada and Kanada as the advocates of Saddarsanas.³ Jayanta Bhatta⁴(10th c. AD) in his *Nyaya Manjari* lists Mimamsa, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Buddha and Carvaka as Saddarsanas. (Quoted in History of Indian Logic.P.147)

The compiler of *Sarvamata Samgraha* classifies the schools of Indian Philosophy into *Vaidika* and *Avaidika* and includes Mimamsa, Samkhya and Tarka in the former and Bauddha, Arhata and Lokayata in the latter.

Pushpadanta argues for the existence of only four schools of philosophy viz., Samkhya, Yoga, Pasupatmata and Vaishnava.

The *Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha* attributed to Sri Sankaracarya mentions Lokayata, Arhata, Buddhism (Madhyamika, Yogacara, Sautrantika and Vaibhashika), Vaisesika, Nyaya, Purva mimamsa (Kumarila and Prabhakara) Samkhya, Patanjali, VedaVyasa and Vedanta.

Jinadatta Surin,⁵ (1220) a Jaina philosopher, includes Jaina, Mimamsa, Bauddha, Samkhya, Saiva and *Nastica* under six Darsanas.

Rajasekhara Surin (1348) another Jaina philosopher mentions Jaina, Samkhya, Mimamsa (Jaiminija) Yoga, Vaisesika and Sangala school of thought

in the list of Shaddarsanas.

Madhavacharya, an Advaita Vedantin, who belonged to the 14th century, in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* mentions 16 *Darsanas* viz., Carvaka, Bauddha, Arhata or Jaina, Ramanuja, Madhava (with the name of Purana Prajna), Panini's grammatical system followed by four Saivite schools, (Nakulisa, Saiva Sidhanta, Pratyabhijna and Raseswara) Akshapada, Aulukhya or Vaiseshika, Jaimini, Samkhya, Patanjala and Sankara.

In the light of the above analyses and explanations, we may summarize that, for Kautilya there are only three systems, whereas for Haribhadra there are six systems, which includes *nastica* systems along with the *astica darsanas*. The anonymous work *Sarvadarsana Sidhanta Sangraha* lists 13 schools and Madhavacharya mentions 16 *darsanas*. Comprehensively speaking, we do not find unanimity among the authors with regard to the number of schools or the basis on which the schools were listed. It is imperative to suggest here that the basis on which different schools were put together by Madhava, Haribhadra and Rajasekhara was not as per chronology. Madhava arranged the systems in a logical order. His presentation of a following system is prefaced with a criticism of the preceding one. One may, however, accept that the basis of Haribhadra's classification is an outcome of religion, the essential nature and means of liberation and the categories. (Pandey, 1999: 10) According to him, the difference of one system from another is either due to the deity by whom it was revealed or the conception of the categories involved therein. We may also note here that the times and the society, its values in which the author lived plays a significant role in his explication of different schools and exposition of their theories.

Number of Systems according to Standard Textbooks - Gopal Stavig

In view of what has been said before, we may categorically assert that there are more than nine (6+3) schools of philosophy in India. Gopal R Stavig's (1999:83-92) analysis of Indian Philosophy on the basis of the textbooks enumerates 36 systems. Stavig has examined 12 standard textbooks of history of Indian Philosophy in order to get a better idea of how many systems of Indian Philosophy are there. The findings of his 'empirical inductive scientific techniques' are especially significant in the present context. One of the disclosures of his study is 'that the classical nine-fold [6+3] enumeration of Indian systems of thought serves as a norm for the authors of the textbooks although it is doubtful as to how far these nine-fold enumerations are classical, especially in the context of the above discussion. However, it is deplorable that the nine-fold enumeration, which is baseless, is being taught to the students of Indian Philosophy, which otherwise can result in the negligence of the other systems that we have already expounded earlier. According to Stavig, 'the traditional listing of nine schools of philosophy is far too limited to encompass the wide range of Indian doctrines.' It amounts to saying that this nine-fold

listing is a narrow way of presenting Indian Philosophy. It is astonishing to note that there are only two text books out of twelve, which find it relevant to discuss all the thirty-six schools of Indian philosophy reviewed by Stavig. This shows again how narrow our representation of Indian Philosophy is. If philosophy is an indication of the intellectual bias of a culture, then we must admit that Indian philosophical and cultural traditions have not accorded due importance to other schools and systems of Indian Philosophy. The commentators or the historians have failed in placing these in the position they deserve.

II

Alternative Approaches to Indian Philosophy

It is not my contention here to suggest that the traditional classification and categorization of Indian philosophical schools are accepted absolutely by the scholars of Indian Philosophy. There were indeed attempts by different scholars not only to criticize the existing classification but also to emphasize the need to reflect over Indian Philosophy by going beyond this classification. However, these attempts did not get due prominence and follow up. The historians of Indian Philosophy have suggested that all systems of Indian philosophy are but different viewpoints of understanding the same ultimate reality from different points of view and frameworks of difference. Such an understanding tacitly acknowledges the fact that the human world is a pluralistic world and that there are multiple points of departure from which understanding of human experience can be approached.

Vachaspati Misra of 9th century A. D. the most versatile of Indian philosopher, wrote commentaries on each of the viewpoints except Mimamsa, composed commentaries on the Samkhya, Yoga, and Nyaya systems, despite the fact that his predominant interest was Vedantic. He provided an objective analysis with no prejudice against any of the systems. According to *Prabhodha Chandrodaya*, a philosophical drama, the six systems of Hindu philosophy are not mutually exclusive, but intended to establish the glory of God from different points of view.

Max Muller (1984:xiv), while supporting the view that there is one fundamental basis for all the schools of Indian Philosophy, states that "...the longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the truth of the view taken by Vijnana-Bhikshu and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy... from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes."

Vijnana Bhikshu, the 16th century theologian and thinker, in his *Sarvaagama Pramanya*, states that all systems are authoritative in character and reconciles them by distinguishing metaphysical truths from practical truths, but at the same time upholding Samkhya as the ultimate expression of truth.

Madhusudana Saraswati in his *Prasthanabheda* attempted to reconcile all systems of Indian philosophy by stating that the ultimate scope of all the authors of different systems was to establish the existence of one supreme God who is said to be the sole essence of the universe. The reasons that can be advanced for the explication of manifold theories lies in the fact that it was meant to prevent humanity, which is addicted to the pursuit of external objects, from falling into atheism. Such an outlook and argument is based on the view that truth is many sided and different viewpoints contain different aspects of truth, which no one could fully express. The rationale and arguments between different viewpoints were inspired by the desire to make others see the world from one's own point of view. It implies that multiplicity of viewpoints about ultimate reality could be drawn and it was accepted to be a legitimate activity by the seers and philosophers of India.

Ganganath Jha argued that the expression 'six systems of Indian Philosophy' is a misnomer. According to him, there is only one system in Indian Philosophy, which is the philosophy of Vedanta. Since all the six systems of Indian Philosophy are based on the Vedas and interpret the Vedas from their perspectives, all these systems can be categorized as the Philosophy of Vedanta. Nevertheless, such a viewpoint has got its own limitations and problems as systems like Purva Mimamsa propagates the *karmakanda* part of the Vedas than the Upanishadic portion (Which is usually named as Vedanta.) Further, Vedanta is generally understood as the single system of thought in Indian Philosophy comprising the schools of Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhava. What is required is a quest for an objective understanding of the systems of Indian Philosophy without showing prejudice towards a particular system. Only then, shall we be able to reconcile the systems of philosophy in a more fruitful way. Examples of this kind of perspective are traced out in our future discussion. Karl Potter (1961), Nigian Smart (1964), Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1975), Daya Krishna and Amartya Sen (2005) have made significant contributions in this direction. Let us discuss each of these contributions briefly while pointing out the distinctive perspective from which they approached the systems of Indian Philosophy.

Degree of Correspondence - Karl Potter

Karl Potter (1961) has made a significant contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy by analyzing the schools of Indian Philosophy in terms of the degree of correspondence between various philosophical systems. He has abstracted seven notable aspects, which he termed as variable, from Indian thought and analyzed the degree of correspondence between fifteen philosophical groups. Fifteen philosophical groups of Potter are: five Vedantic, three Budhistic and two Mimamsa schools, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya, Jainism, Carvaka and Ajivika systems. Seven variables that are used are: continuity Vs discontinuity in the path to liberation; theory of causation, relation between unity and diversity, the relation between the whole and its parts; nominalism,

conceptualism and universalism; theory of negation and the various explanations of perceptual error.

Similarities and Differences - Ninian Smart

Ninian Smart (1964), attempted to analyze the similarities and differences among various philosophical schools of India. While abstracting nine essential doctrines from 13 philosophical systems, he made a valuable contribution to Indian Philosophy by looking for the similarities and differences among the philosophical systems on the basis of their essential doctrines. Thirteen philosophical systems listed by Smart are: nine classical systems (combining Nyaya with Viseshika), three Vedanta schools, three Buddhist schools (Thevaravada, Yogachara and Madhyamika) and Saivism. Nine essential doctrines are acceptance or denial of an Absolute, a Personal God, reincarnation, liberation, meditative knowledge, the reality of the world, an eternal individual self and the efficacy of the path of devotion to bring liberation.

Dialectico-Historical Materialist Approach - Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya

There are a few attempts which drew inspiration from the West and was developed in India. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's (1964) Dialectico-historical Materialist approach is one of such kind. Chattopadhyaya's approach restores the view that philosophy cannot develop in vacuum or in isolation from the material conditions of its existence. Suman Gupta⁶ summarizes the contentions in the following way: "according to the above approach philosophy can be studied only in terms of its social origin. In other words, it is not an abstract thought; on the contrary, it reflects the cumulative effect of social development, which carries within itself contradictions insoluble at these particular levels. Philosophy is totality of systematized views and traditions of a society in a particular epoch of history" (1986: 125). Chattopadhyaya applied the dialectico-historical materialist laws of development in order to show as to how the transition of Indian society from primitive communism — with its pre-spiritual, proto-materialism - to a class divided society led to the development of an idealistic philosophy. Following this view, the classification of Indian Philosophy into *astica* and *nastica* cannot be approved, 'for, due to change in objective conditions, the various schools of Indian Philosophy underwent change and development.' (Sumangupta, 1986: 128).

Contextualizing Individual Philosophers: Daya Krishna

Another alternative model that we can see in the recent history of philosophy is that of Daya Krishna. In Daya Krishna (1987) argues that one should not try to understand the classical tradition on the basis of different systems of Indian Philosophy as it is projected in the usual textbooks. Rather, we should try 'to see if there is an implicit conceptual structure in the Indian tradition which can be brought to the surface and stated in modern terms' (1987: xxiv). Hence, Daya

Krishna suggests that dealing the traditional problems in the light of modern philosophy can make the tradition active and alive and can facilitate our understanding of the immense complexity of the different schools. Daya Krishna in his *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach* emphasizes the need to concentrate on the individual philosophers who held the well-known philosophical positions and also to study the historical development that occurred during the two millennia or more of their existence. (1997:3) He says "...the contribution of successive thinkers to the development of each position over a period of time and the changes that successively occurred in the position itself needs to be formulated in greater detail than has been done until now." He, further, states, "... the field defined by the problems that were engaging the philosophical mind of India from at least the sixth century BC, if not earlier, needs to be articulated independently of the different schools of Indian Philosophy as they should rather be seen as taking different positions in regard to the way these problems ought to be solved in their view" (1997: ix). In other words, a re-look of our tradition and philosophy can help us to appreciate how earlier systems of Indian Philosophy and individual philosophers have generated different positions, which are relevant, indicative and directive of our lives in the present circumstances.

Argumentative Indian: Amartya Sen

Amartya Sen, the noble laureate from India, has provided us with another alternative model, through, his work *Argumentative Indian* (2005). He argues that the argumentative tradition is suppressed by the traditional formulaic interpretations of the Indian Philosophical tradition. Argumentative tradition or the practice of dialectics is a part of public discourse in the Indian Philosophical tradition since the Upanishadic times. Argumentative combat of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad where two great women scholars Garghi and Maitryi participate in the discussion not only supports the above, but also highlights the place of women in the argumentative tradition. The nature and strength of the dialogic tradition is some times ignored, which resulted in suppression of large parts of Indian intellectual heritage. Sen argued that, we have to examine the reach and significance of many of the debates and altercations that have figured prominently in the Indian argumentative tradition. We have to take note not only of the opinions that won- or allegedly won-in the debates, but also of the other points of view that were presented and are recorded or remembered.

Further, Sen stresses, a defeated argument that refuses to be obliterated can remain very alive (2005:6). One of the earlier and the best examples of the tradition is Buddhists, who with their invention of Buddhist Councils opened the gates for public debates and reasoning. These councils, says Sen, were primarily concerned with resolving differences in religious principles and practices, but they evidently also addressed the demands of social and civic duties and further more helped, in a general way, to consolidate and promote the tradition of

open discussion or contentious issues. This way of locating pervasive yet undermined principle as the point of view from which Indian Philosophy can be seen places the Indian philosophical tradition outside the formulaic and archaic presentations.

Conclusion

Our discussion hitherto has been centred on the necessity to view the limitations of the traditional ways of presenting Indian Philosophy and to explore the alternative models that are existent in understanding the Indian Philosophy in the recent past. It has been my endeavour to argue that the traditional way of presenting Indian Philosophy is inadequate to represent the great antiquarian philosophical wisdom of India. There is ambiguity involved in understanding the traditional *astica-nastica* distinction as the existence of more than nine (6+3) schools of philosophy proves this ambiguity. It is necessary to appreciate different systems of Indian philosophy as different attempts to grasp the ultimate reality. Such an approach and attitude will lead us to see the similarities and differences among the systems of Indian Philosophy in addressing the issues of life (empirical, metaphysical, religious and spiritual) from different points of view based on their historical background and the different viewpoints that they upheld. It has been my objective to argue that Indian schools were viewpoints, which explored the nature of Reality from a particular angle or vision as related to a particular framework of interest and world-view yet each retained its own identity throughout the period of philosophical creativity. The fact that these viewpoints continued to exist and flourish side by side shows that Indian cultural and philosophical traditions have projected a multiplicity of viewpoints about their conceptions of the ultimate Reality, which was regarded as a legitimate philosophical and creative activity. Thus, we can see commentaries and sub-commentaries in the systems of Indian philosophical thought, which under-grades the idea that the worth of philosophy and philosophical ideas were not the opus magnum of a particular philosopher but they were independent of the authors who propounded them as commentaries and sub-commentaries were included in the text if it is found significant and valid. In other words, Indian philosophical and cultural traditions have postulated alternative ways of perceiving and living and have not claimed that a particular way of perceiving and acting are the only valid means and that all others should accept it. Thus, it has led to a relativistic epistemology, the doctrine that no conceptual schema can claim to constitute the TRUTH absolutely, its truth being relative to its proper framework of reference, which has led to a pluralistic methodology. No doubt, this cultural and philosophical tradition contained seeds of decadence within itself, in the form of caste, ritualism and the absence of a critical thinking in the social, political and moral values.

Notes and References

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 - 1. *anvikshiki trayi varta dandanitisceti vidyah I sankhyam yogah Lokayatamceti anvikshiki* II What does anvikshiki do? It helps people by testing the strengths of trayi, varta and dandaniti on the touchstone of reason. It stabilizes the mind both in good and bad times. It sharpens the skills of mind, speech and deeds. *Dhamadhaman trayyam. Arthananthan vartayam. Nayaapanayam dandanityam. Balaabale chaitasam hetubhiranvikshamana anvikshiki lokasyopakaroti, vyasane abhyudaye ca budhi mavasthapayati, prajnavakyakriyaavaisaradyam ca karoti.* (Arthasastra Chapter I.)
 - 2. *baudham naiyanikam sankhyam jainam vaisesikam tatha I jaiminiyanca namani darsana nama munayoh II* (1.3)
 - 3. *Paniner Jaiminescaiva Vyasaya Kapilasya ca Akshapadasya Kanadasya...* quoted from History of Indian Logic by Sundara Ramaiah (1982:7).
 - 4. Satishchandra Vidyabhuashana in his *A History of Indian Logic* (1978: 146-151) discusses about the life and contributions of Jayanta might have lived during 10th C.A.D.
 - 5. *Jainam, mainam mimamsakam baudham samkhyam saivamca nastikam svsvatarkavibhedanajaniyaddarsanani sat.* Quoted by Sundara Ramaiah (1982:6)
 - 6. Suman Gupta (1986) mentions two basic methodological approaches from which Indian Philosophy can be studied. One is Dialectico - Historical Materialist approach which follows the Marxist outlook and another one is the Metaphysical approach which abstracts an aspect of reality and absolutises it and sees it in a static form. Metaphysical approach is the traditional approach that the present paper has been discussing with *astica* (orthodox) and *nastica* (heterodox) distinctions. Suman Gupta argued that metaphysical approach is one sided and thus its application bestows a distorted view of reality; and the application of dialectico-historical methodology helps in comprehending the objective reality in terms of objective causal relations among various aspects of reality.
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WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE IN KARIVELLOOR VILLAGE

Sreevidhya

Feminist theory is based on a series of assumptions. First, it is assumed that men and women have different experiences, that the world is not same for men and women and that one task of this theory is to explain that difference. If women's experience is different from the experience of men, it is important to understand why. For a theoretical perspective to be politically useful to feminists, it should be able to recognize the importance of the subjective experience of women. It should not deny subjective experience since the ways in which people make sense of their lives is a necessary starting point for understanding how power relations structure society. The present paper discuss here the experience of some of the women in Karivelloor during 30's and 40's.

Karivelloor village is situated in the old Chirakkal taluk, about 40 km. north west of Cannanore. It shows that from very early period itself, this village was related to agricultural activities. The name itself is related to agriculture. It argues that in the earlier stage this may be a part of Velloor village and due to its prosperity in agriculture, the prefix *Kari*, which means agricultural land, was added to it. The socio-religious factors in this society also prove the agrarian character of this village. The worship of Annapurna and social dining are examples.¹

During the earlier period, this land was situated at the boundary of Chirakkal Raja and Neelaswaram Raja and later it came under the control of Chirakkal Raja. Kotoor Devaswam, Kutoor Vengayil, Puthoor Devaswam, Valiyeri and some Muslim *janmis* like Talayillattu, Nalupurappatil etc. were some of the *minor janmis* in this period.

This village is famous for weaving and from 1948 onwards, the weavers in this area formed their own organization. Most of them were settled in Karivelloor *teru*. During the earlier period, primary weaving process was tedious task and it

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