THE OCCAMIZATION OF ‘MEANING’:
RYLE AND BRENTANO

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Abstract

To Occamize a nominal expression $N$ is to show that, despite grammatical appearances, $N$ does not name, or denote, an entity. This article argues that the Occamization of ‘meaning,’ which was central to Gilbert Ryle’s meta-philosophy, had already been advanced by Franz Brentano. The core thesis of the article is that Brentano’s notion of ‘content,’ albeit different from that of linguistic rules, does a similar job of eliminating expendable entities. If the meaning of a linguistic expression is not an entity at all, then the question as to what kind of entity it is—what I shall call the Locke-Frege problem—turns out to be a pseudo-problem and is better dispensed with.

Keywords: History of analytic philosophy, Gilbert Ryle, Franz Brentano, Meaning, Analysis, Mental Phenomena

Introduction

To Occamize a nominal expression $N$ is to show that, despite grammatical appearances, $N$ does not name, or denote, an entity. This can be done by paraphrasing sentences which contain $N$ by means of other sentences which do not, or by ‘de-nominalizing’ $N$, i.e. switching it from the subject-place to the predicate-place.

Many ordinary words are good candidates for being Occamized. Typical examples include names of ficta (e.g. ‘unicorns’) and universals (e.g. ‘punctuality’). Thus, ‘unicorns do not exist’ may be paraphrased with ‘there are no creatures which are horse-like and have a horn’ and ‘punctuality is praiseworthy’ with ‘whoever is punctual, is praiseworthy.’ Interestingly, though, the Occamization program may also apply to terms commonly employed to characterize what some philosophical theories are about. For example, philosophical theories of value are (trivially) about value, but it is an open question whether the word ‘value’ denotes an entity of some kind or merely

1 This operation is named after William of Occam and his well-known principle of ontological parsimony, according to which entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.
seems to do so and should be Occamized. Similarly, twentieth-century logicians and analytic philosophers have been concerned with building up a theory of meaning (see e.g. Ryle 1956, 8) but it is an open question whether the word ‘meaning’ denotes an entity of some kind or should be Occamized.

This article addresses (what I shall call) the **Occamization of ‘Meaning’**—henceforth, OM—which arguably is a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy (more on that in Section 1). The central idea behind OM is as follows. Despite grammatical appearances, the substantive ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, no more than ‘unicorn’ or ‘punctuality.’ Therefore, sentences about meaning (e.g. ‘I know/understand the meaning of this idiomatic expression,’ ‘these two sentences have the same meaning,’ etc.) must be paraphrased to show that they are not about some queer entity. The thesis defended in this article is that OM, which was central to Gilbert Ryle’s meta-philosophy, can be traced to Franz Brentano, arguably the champion of Occamization in the early twentieth century.

Many studies have explored Ryle’s connection with the Austro-German phenomenological tradition, yet Brentano’s and Ryle’s shared efforts to Occamize the notion of meaning remained neglected so far. It is my goal to fill this gap. I shall not argue that Ryle’s Occamization of meaning is the direct outcome of Brentano’s influence, though. Although Ryle was familiar with some of Brentano’s writings and occasionally praised Brentano and Russell for their ‘de-nominalization’ program (Ryle 1973, 262), textual evidence is too sparse to establish any direct influence in this respect. Yet, I want to argue that Ryle’s Occamizing approach to meaning bears interesting similarities and dissimilarities to Brentano’s (although I will focus on similarities here, I believe that dissimilarities are no less important). More pointedly, I shall argue that Brentano’s notion of ‘content’ (Inhalt), albeit different from that of linguistic rules, does a similar job of eliminating expendable entities. The key interpretive idea behind this thesis is that Brentanian contents are not to be equated with Lockean ideas, for in Brentano’s view, the term ‘content’ itself is not a logical name and merely works as a shorthand expression for a complex state of affairs. I will provide textual evidence for this claim and explain it in greater detail in Section 3.

The article has four sections. Section 1 (‘The Locke-Frege Problem’) suggests that the problem of what kind of entity is named by the term ‘meaning’ was overarching in early analytic philosophy until proponents of OM downgraded it to a pseudo-problem. Section 2 (‘Ryle’s Argument

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2 See e.g. (Brandl 2002; Bourdeau 2003; Thomasson 2002; 2007; Vrahimis 2013, 110–59; Morran 2014, 254–59; Chase and Reynolds 2017; Dewalque 2021).

3 Ryle was in possession of Oskar Kraus’ edition of Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano 1924; 1925) and *Wahrheit und Evidenz* (Brentano 1930), two works which contain Brentanian thoughts on language. He also had (Srzednicki 1965), which contains further relevant material, including (Brentano 1965).
for OM’) offers a reconstruction of Ryle’s argument for OM. Section 3
(‘Brentano’s Argument for OM’) does the same with Brentano’s argument,
and Section 4 (‘Conclusion’) summarizes the main result of the proposed
reconstruction.

1. The Locke-Frege Problem

The mandate of this section is to set the stage for OM by introducing
(what I call) the Locke-Frege problem. The latter revolves around a simple
question, namely: what kind of entity is denoted by the noun ‘meaning’? To
be more precise, does ‘meaning’ denote (i) a physical entity, (ii) a mental
entity (a Lockean ‘idea in the head,’ say) or (iii) an abstract entity (a Fregean
‘sense’)? I offer a brief outline of the main arguments before suggesting that
the Locke-Frege problem turns out to be a pseudo-problem: if the noun
‘meaning’ is to be Occamized—as Brentano and Ryle both argue—then it
does not denote an entity at all, be it a mental or extramental entity.

Let me start with a fairly uncontroversial claim. For any linguistic expres-
sion $E$, to understand $E$ is to grasp its meaning. For example, understanding
the word ‘groom’ is to grasp the meaning of the word—or, perhaps, of more
complex expressions which contain the word (e.g. ‘the groom carried the
bride over the threshold’). But what is it to grasp the meaning of $E$? As
Frege famously pointed out (Frege [1892] 1993a), grasping the meaning of
$E$ is not the same than knowing what $E$ refers to. Plainly, you can understand
what the phrase ‘the taller man in this room’ means even if you do not know
who is the taller man in this room or whether there is indeed someone in
the room. But the same point can be made without referring to a thinking
or knowing subject. For one thing, some meaningful expressions do not
refer at all: they do not pick out anything in the world (e.g., ‘unicorns’, ‘and,’
etc.). For another, the same thing can be referred to by means of various
expressions with different meanings (e.g., ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’
both refer to Venus). None of that would be possible if the meaning of $E$
were identical to its reference. This is precisely what motivated Frege in intro-
ducing his distinction between ‘sense’ ($Sinn$) and ‘reference’ ($Bedeutung$) in
his 1892 path-breaking article.

Interestingly, two years later, Brentano’s student, Kasimierz Twardowski,
made a similar point in his habilitation thesis. ‘The city located at the site of
the Roman Juuvavum’ and ‘Mozart’s birthplace,’ he writes, both refer to the
city of Salzburg, and yet they clearly have a different meaning (Twardowski
[1894] 1982, p. 32; 1977, p. 29). Twardowski thereby seems to acknowl-
dge Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. Yet, interestingly, he
puts it in a Brentanian terminology. The two nominal expressions, he goes
on, express acts of presentations ($Vorstellungen$) which are directed at the
same ‘object’ (Gegenstand) but have a different ‘content’ (Inhalt). As we will see momentarily, this difference may not be merely verbal or terminological, for the talk of ‘content’ (which, as it happens, is not altogether absent from Frege’s writings) seems to invite the thought of something that exists within the mind of someone. Yet, for now, let us take for granted that understanding E amounts to grasping the meaning of E, which in turn amounts to grasping the ‘sense’ of E (Frege) or the ‘content’ of the mental act expressed by E (Brentano, Twardowski), and let us assume that the notions of sense and content can be used interchangeably. The talk of sense/content, however, is hardly illuminating in and of itself, for the ontological question arises again: what kind of entity is that?

A first option is to conceive of sense/content as a mental entity, something which exists in the mind of the one who understands E. On this view, the sense of E or the content of the related mental act is an ‘idea in the head’ in Locke’s sense. Thus, grasping the meaning of E would essentially be tantamount to grasping the idea which is expressed by E, and communicating would essentially be a process of making one’s ideas known to others. Locke arguably qualifies as an advocate of this view when he writes: “Words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer” (Locke, Essay 3.2.2; 1975, 405). Twardowski himself seems to lean toward this option when he equates the notion of ‘content’ with that of a ‘mental “picture”’ (psychisches Bild) which exists in the mind of the speaker/addressee (see, e.g., Twardowski [1894] 1892, p. 9; 1977, p. 7). On this interpretation, the content is a mental entity that exists as long as there is a related mental activity and then disappears when this activity is replaced with another. It is, as it were, a kind of mental reduplication of the intended object, something like an internal—or immanent—object which is present for a period of time in the mind of someone and then ceases to exist. The fact that Twardowski employs the notions of ‘content’ and ‘immanent object’ interchangeably is quite telling (as I shall argue in Section 3, this way of interpreting the notion of ‘content’ is not in line with Brentano’s own conception, according to which it is an error to regard the content of a mental act as an object endowed with some kind of diminished existence).
Now this way of understanding the notion of sense/content faces well-known difficulties. As Frege argued, the Lockean option (for want of a better label) cannot be right, for ideas and mental pictures—unlike senses/contents—are private to their owners. To mention Frege’s own example: “A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus’. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the individual mind” (Frege [1892] 1993a, p. 26). For the sake of illustration, suppose you utter the sentence ‘the groom carried the bride over the threshold’ in a communicational context. If the communication is successful, this utterance is accompanied by two distinct ideas: one is the idea of the bride-carrying groom which belongs to your stream of consciousness, and the other is the idea of the bride-carrying groom which belongs to your addressee’s stream of consciousness. The former is distinct from, and could very well exist without, the latter, as is the case when communication fails (perhaps your addressee was preoccupied by something else and heard what you said without forming the related idea). Similarly, when you meaningfully utter the sentence twice, the idea of the bride-carrying groom shows up twice in your stream of consciousness before vanishing again. And yet, arguably, it is not the meaning of the sentence that shows up twice and vanishes. Unlike ideas in the head, meaning itself has no duration and does not literally belong to the stream of consciousness of anyone. The moral, it seems, is that whatever is happening in the mind is not identical to the meaning of $E$.

There certainly are different ways of putting this argument. Interestingly, it is not at the level of names but at the level of complete assertive sentences that the impossibility of interpreting sense/content as a Lockean idea becomes overwhelming. In a letter to Jourdain, Frege bases his argument on the possibility that two language-users contradict each other. Very roughly, his line of reasoning is as follows: (1) if the sense of $E$ would be identical to a mental entity—a mental picture, say—that shows up in someone’s stream of consciousness, then it would be impossible for two language-users to contradict each other, since each of them would express his/her own mental picture; (2) it is not impossible for two language-users to contradict each other; therefore, (3) the sense of $E$ is not identical to a mental entity that shows up in someone’s stream of consciousness.⁶

conception of content is that of an internal object which is the term of an intentional relation that somehow reduplicates the intentional relation to the external object (when there is any). See (Taieb 2017, p. 42-43). Brentano’s own position is in strong opposition to this view, for he understands the notion of ‘content’ in a different way—or so I shall argue in Section 3.

⁶ See (Frege [undated] 1993b, 44–5): “If the sense of a name was something subjective, then the sense of the proposition in which the name occurs, and hence the thought, would also be something subjective, and the thought one man connects with this proposition would
From there, a fairly natural line of reasoning would be to conclude that, if meaning is neither a physical entity in the world nor a mental entity in the mind, then it is an abstract entity. This, arguably, is the option Frege himself endorses. In his view, the sense of a name is best conceived of as a constituent part of the meaning of an assertive sentence, which he terms a ‘thought’ (Gedanke). Yet, importantly, a Fregean thought is not to be conflated with the act of thinking or having a presentation/idea (Vorstellung). Rather, the thought is an objective correlate of some acts of thinking; it is that which is true or false and can be shared by several thinkers. As Frege puts it in his 1897 notes on logic: “The sense of a sentence [Der Sinn eines Satzes] is termed a ‘thought’ [Gedanke]. […] A thought is not an idea [Vorstellung] and is not composed of ideas. Thoughts and ideas are fundamentally different. By associating ideas, we never arrive at anything that could be true” (Frege [1897] 1979, 126; 2001, 35). This line of thought culminates in (Frege 1818), where he famously argues that “thoughts are neither things of the external world nor presentations. A third realm (drittes Reich) has to be acknowledged” (Frege 1918, 69; 1990, 353). This ‘third realm’ is one of abstract entities—entities which (like presentations/ideas) cannot be perceived by means of sensory organs but which (like material things) do not need any ‘owner’ (Träger) and are not sustained by any mental activity (id.).

Historically speaking, this view certainly was popular in early analytic philosophy. Indeed, it is probably not incorrect to say that early analytic philosophers, driven by the thought that the meaning of a linguistic expression is neither a physical nor a mental entity, came to think of it as a third kind of entity akin to Platonic Ideas. Thus, Russell and Moore, following Meinong (Meinong [1904] 1981), conceived of meanings as ideal entities which somehow are without existing (Moore [1910-11] 1953, 289 ff.; Russell [1912] 2001, 52 ff.). Accordingly, to know what a linguistic expression means ultimately amounts to ‘be acquainted with’ (Russell), or ‘grasp’ (Frege), the relevant extramental entity. This, in a nutshell, was the overarching strategy that early analytic philosophers employed against naturalism and psychologism. At stake was to secure a specific area of investigation for philosophy, thereby guaranteeing its autonomy towards the natural and the psychological sciences. As far as they are concerned with meanings, philosophers do not deal with physical or mental entities, but with a different kind of entities, namely, abstract entities—or so the story goes.

be different from the thought another man connects with it; a common store of thoughts, a common science, would be impossible. It would be impossible for something one man said to contradict what another man said, because the two would not express the same thought at all, but each his own.” See also (Frege 1918, 69; 1990, 353), where the same argument is employed.

7 See already (Frege [1892] 1993a, p. 28, fn.): “By a thought I understand not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers.”
In due course, however, analytic philosophers like Wittgenstein and Ryle broke with this conception and promoted a different strategy altogether against psychologism. They basically rejected as false the assumption—common to all arguments that I reconstructed so far—that meaning was an entity of some kind. They argued that the noun ‘meaning’ should be Occamized to the effect that it does not denote an entity at all (see Ryle 1932, 163; 2009a, 65; 1957; 2009a, 363–85). According to this Occamizing approach, to know what a linguistic expression means is not to be acquainted with some entity, mental or extramental. Rather, it is to know what can logically be said with it in various contexts. To put it in a slogan: it is to know the rules of the linguistic game (see Ryle 1957; 2009a, 376). To understand the novelty of this view, it is crucial to note that a linguistic rule is not an entity in any sense of the term; it is not something that exists above and beyond physical sets of syllables and mental goings-on. Acknowledging (the existence of) linguistic rules simply amounts to acknowledging that there are ways of employing words that yield a meaningful discourse, and others that do not. Accordingly, the view that philosophy would be concerned with investigating a specific set of entities—abstract entities—was rejected and a different meta-philosophy emerged, according to which what makes philosophy a distinctive discipline is not the kind of entities it deals with but the kind of activity it is (see e.g. Ryle 1957; 2009a, 379 ff.; see also 2009a, xx–xxi).

It should be clear that what I have called the Locke-Frege problem—namely: what kind of entity does the noun ‘meaning’ refer to?—does not hereby receive a novel solution. It is less solved than dissolved. Consequently, Ryle’s own writings draw a sharp opposition between meaning theorists (Meinong, Husserl, Moore, and the early Russell), who were still under the spell of the Locke-Frege problem, and supporters of OM (the later Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ryle himself), who deemed it a pseudo-problem. From this perspective, Ryle maintains, “preoccupation with the theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy” (Ryle 1957; 2009a, 363; my emphasis). He goes on: “Meinong in Austria and Frege in Germany, as well as Moore and Russell in this country, in their early days, […] maintained the objective existence or being of all sorts of abstract and fictional entia rationis” (Ryle 1957; 2009a, 373–74). Interestingly, though, two authors, Franz Brentano and Bertrand Russell, are credited with ground-breaking insights into the Occamization program and the rejection of entia rationis as mere fictions. The fact is, Ryle explicitly singles out Brentano and Russell as forerunners of OM. Not only did they feel the necessity to engage into the Occamization program, they basically did it for the same reason: to oppose Meinong’s object theory. As Ryle puts it: “Meinong’s own Pandora’s box of contrived logical subjects helped to drive Brentano himself and especially Russell into systematic and strategic de-nominalization” (Ryle 1973, 262).
The details of Brentano’s and Russell’s anti-Meinongianism do not need to concern us here. What supporters of OM need is an argument to the effect that the noun ‘meaning,’ despite grammatical appearances, is not a logical name (i.e. it does not denote anything). Very roughly, a somewhat indirect strategy available to them is as follows. First, they can argue that sentences about meaning are equivalent to sentences about something else yet to be discovered—call it ‘X.’ The next step is to argue that, if sentences about meaning are equivalent to sentences about X and ‘X’ is not a logical name, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either. Thus, the overall shape of (what I take to be) the master argument for OM is something like this: (1) sentences about meaning are equivalent to sentences about X; (2) ‘X’ is not a logical name; (3) if sentences about meaning are equivalent to sentences about X and ‘X’ is not a logical name, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either; therefore, (4) ‘meaning’ is not a logical name. The challenge for advocates of OM is to figure out what X is and provide support for the argument’s premises.

In the next section I spell out Ryle’s way of filling in the shape of the argument before turning, in Section 3, to Brentano’s own version of the argument.

2. Ryle’s Argument for OM

The goal of this section is to reconstruct Ryle’s version of the argument for the claim that ‘meaning’ is not a logical name. Ryle’s key idea, I submit, is that sentences about the meaning of E are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of E. This is the thought Ryle extracts from Wittgenstein’s dictum: “Don’t ask for the meaning; ask for the use” (Ryle 1957; 2009a, 377; 1961; 2009a, 425). If we inject this idea into the overall shape of the argument, we obtain the following line of reasoning: for any linguistic expression E,

1. sentences about the meaning of E are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of E;
2. ‘correct employment’ is not a logical name;
3. if sentences about the meaning of E are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of E and ‘correct employment’ is not a logical name, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either;
therefore,
4. ‘meaning’ is not a logical name.

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**Footnote:** Two sentences are equivalent if, and only if, the truth (resp., falsity) of one of them entails the truth (resp., falsity) of the other. Equivalence is not to be conflated with identity. For example, ‘this triangle is equilateral’ is equivalent to ‘this triangle is equiangled,’ although it is not identical to it, since being equilateral and being equiangled are different properties.
The argument is valid. The issue boils down to whether its premises should be accepted or not. I shall comment on each premise in turn.

According to premise 1, sentences about the meaning of $E$ are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of $E$. To make sense of this premise, it may be helpful to start by explaining why sentences about meaning are to be paraphrased in the first place. In point of fact, Ryle has it that sentences about meaning belong to the category of so-called systematically misleading sentences and that all systematically misleading sentences must be paraphrased to avoid philosophical mistakes. Let me spell out this point.

Ryle’s account of systematically misleading sentences was first presented in his speech to the meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London on 21 March 1932, and was published shortly after in the Proceedings of the Society (Ryle 1932; 2009a, 41–65). The notion of systematically misleading sentences applies to cases where a sentence looks as if it is about something while in fact it is about something else. For example, ‘Satan is not a reality’ has the same surface grammar as ‘Capone is not a philosopher,’ and yet, whereas the latter denies a certain property (namely, that of ‘being a philosopher’) to the individual called ‘Capone,’ it would be an error to say that the former denies a certain property (that of ‘being a reality’) to an individual called ‘Satan.’ Despite the grammatical appearances, ‘Satan is not a reality’ is not about Satan in the way in which ‘Capone is not a philosopher’ is about Capone (Ryle 1932, 148–49; 2009a, 48). It refers, if at all, to something else, namely the fact that there is no individual who is called ‘Satan’ and who exhibits the related features (is devilish, etc.). Similarly, ‘centaurs are fictional creatures’ is systematically misleading in that it has the same surface grammar as ‘whales are marine mammals’; however, whereas ‘whales are marine mammals’ ascribes the property of being marine mammals to whales, ‘centaurs are fictional creatures’ does not ascribe the property of being fictional creatures to centaurs, for the word ‘centaurs’ simply does not signify a “subject of attributes” (Ryle 1932, 144; 2009a, 45). Rather, ‘centaurs are fictional creatures’ should be considered a mere shorthand for what would be less conveniently, albeit less misleadingly, expressed by means of another sentence like ‘there is no creature in the non-fictional world which is half-man and half-horse’ (or whatever properties are taken to be definitional of centaurs).

Although Ryle himself does not give an explicit definition of systematically misleading sentences, I have suggested elsewhere (Dewalque 2021, 102–5) that a plausible definition requires us to distinguish between what a given sentence is about in virtue of its having a certain surface grammar (‘about$_{SG}$’) and what it is about in virtue of its having certain truth conditions (‘about$_{TC}$’). Ryle himself comes close to this distinction in his 1933

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9 See (Dewalque 2021) for a more extensive presentation.
article on ‘About,’ where he distinguishes (among other things) between ‘about-nominative’ and ‘about-referential’ (see Ryle [1933], 2009a, 86–8). This distinction puts him in a position to say that there is a sense in which ‘unicorns do not exist’ is about unicorns—since it has ‘unicorns’ as grammatical subject—although in another sense it is not about unicorns—since it does not actually refer to unicorns. It is about unicorns in a grammatical but not in a referential sense. Differently put: its truth does not depend on there being unicorns which, paradoxically, would have the property of being non-existing. My proposal is, first, to rephrase this distinction between different senses of ‘about’ in terms of surface grammar and truth conditions and, next, to employ it in order to define what is meant here by a systematically misleading sentence. The key idea is that a sentence is systematically misleading if what it is about\textsc{SG} is not identical to what it is about\textsc{TC}. More formally put:

\textit{Systematically Misleading Sentence}

For any sentence $S$, $S$ is systematically misleading if, and only if, (i) $S$ is about$\textsc{SG} \ x$ and (ii) $S$ is about$\textsc{TC} \ y$, and (iii) $x \neq y$.

The point of paraphrasing systematically misleading sentences is for philosophers or whoever “embarks on abstraction” (Ryle 1932, 146; 2009a, 46) to avoid being misled into multiplying entities beyond necessity—hence the whole idea of Occamization. The paraphrase strategy aims to make explicit what a misleading sentence really is about in virtue of its truth conditions (about$\textsc{TC}$). The overall principle underlying this strategy may be stated as follows: “Wherever possible, […] the contributions made to sentences by words and phrases must be shifted away from the [subject]-place and into the predicate-place” (Ryle 1973, 262).

For the sake of illustration, consider again sentences about \textit{ficta} and sentences about universals. Whereas the sentence ‘centaurs do not exist’ looks as if it is about centaurs, it actually is about something \textit{else}. This can be shown by considering the sentence’s truth conditions. Indeed, what is required for the sentence to be true is not that there are centaurs which have the property of being non-existent, for it would be self-contradictory to posit centaurs in order to deny their existence. What is required for the sentence to be true is that (say) whoever believes in creatures which are half-human and half-horse, is in error. Therefore, the sentence ‘centaurs do not exist’ is misleading, not just occasionally but in a systematic way: (i) it is about$\textsc{SG} \ \text{centaurs}$, (ii) it is about$\textsc{TC} \ \text{whoever believes that there are creatures which are half-human and half-horse}$, and (iii) centaurs are (obviously) not identical to people believing that there are creatures which are half-human and half-horse. Accordingly, ‘centaurs do not exist’ is best paraphrased by shifting the term ‘centaurs’ from the subject-place to the predicate-place.
As a result, the initial sentence turns out to be equivalent to ‘whoever believes that there are creatures which are half-human and half-horse, is in error,’ which no longer contains the noun ‘centaurs’ (Dewalque 2021, 112–13). The two sentences are equivalent in that they have the same truth conditions. Similarly, ‘unpunctuality is reprehensible’ is misleading for roughly the same reasons: (i) it is aboutSG unpunctuality, (ii) it is aboutTC whoever is unpunctual, and (iii) unpunctuality (i.e. the abstract notion) is not identical to someone who is unpunctual. Thus, ‘unpunctuality is reprehensible’ is best paraphrased by shifting the universal term ‘unpunctuality’ from the subject-place to the predicate-place. As a result, the initial sentence turns out to be equivalent to ‘whoever is unpunctual merits reproof,’ which does not contain the universal ‘unpunctuality’ anymore (Ryle 1932; 2009a, 50).

Now, the key to Ryle’s argument for OM is that a similar analysis holds true for sentences about meaning. Take the sentence ‘I know the meaning of E,’ where E stands for a meaningful linguistic expression. This sentence is aboutSG the meaning of E. Yet, for the sentence to be true, what is required is not that there is some queer entity called ‘the meaning of E’ with which I would be acquainted. To know the meaning of E is not to be acquainted with any kind of entity whatsoever. Rather, it is to know what E means. Yet, to know what E means, argues Ryle, simply is to know how to use E in a correct piece of discourse. The sentence ‘I know the meaning of E’ is true if I know how to employ E correctly or in the right linguistic context. Therefore, it can be (provisionally) paraphrased with ‘I know the correct employment of E,’ which does not contain the substantive ‘meaning’ anymore. Again, those sentences are equivalent in that they have the same truth conditions: whenever one of them is true, the other is true as well. Premise 1 of Ryle’s argument (as I reconstructed it) is a mere generalization of this point to the effect that, for any linguistic expression E, all sentences about the meaning of E are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of E. Thus, for example, a synonymy statement like ‘the meaning of E1 is identical to the meaning of E2’ can be paraphrased with ‘the correct employment of E1 is identical to the correct employment of E2,’ which no longer contains the substantive ‘meaning.’

This, however, only brings us halfway towards OM. What a supporter of OM must demonstrate, at present, is that ‘correct employment’ is not a logical name. This, I suggest, is the second premise in Ryle’s reconstructed argument. Consider ‘I know the correct employment of E.’ If the meaning of E is not an entity with which I could be acquainted, the same holds true a fortiori for E’s correct employment. This is already obvious from the fact that ‘I know the correct employment of E’ is equivalent to ‘I know how to employ E correctly’ (remember that, to paraphrase a misleading expression, one essential procedure is de-nominalization). This kind of knowing-how arguably is what we mean when we say that to know the meaning of a
linguistic expression is to know the rules of the linguistic game. Knowing the rules is not to be acquainted with an entity of some kind; it is to know how to play the game—full stop. When it comes to language, it is to know how to employ words in the relevant context.

This observation comes even more to the fore with Ryle’s analysis of synonymy statements such as ‘the meaning of $E_1$ is identical to the meaning of $E_2$.’ As I interpret him, this sentence should be considered equivalent to ‘$E_1$ and $E_2$ are (correctly) employed in the same way.’ As we have seen in Section 1, the main arguments for the claim that meaning is neither a physical nor a mental entity rely on the thought that two expressions with a different meaning can refer to the same thing, and that two different mental entities (e.g. two ideas) can capture the same meaning. Early analytic philosophers concluded that meaning was an abstract, non-physical and non-mental entity. Yet, the analysis of meaning in terms of correct employment blocks this conclusion, for ‘correct employment’ does not name an entity at all. Indeed, it would be wrong to think of the correct employment of $E$ as an abstract entity existing above and beyond $E$. Ryle writes: “A quite different set of syllables may have the same employment. It is not a non-physical, non-mental object—but not because it is either a physical or mental object, but because it is not an object” (Ryle 1957; 2009a, 384; my emphasis). ‘Correct employment’ does not denote any queer entity, which could be separated from the linguistic expression and the mental activity of the speaker.

Let me take stock. In Ryle’s view, ‘I know the meaning of $E$’ is equivalent to ‘I know the correct employment of $E$,’ which in turn is equivalent to ‘I know how to employ $E$ correctly.’ Now, arguably, this analysis can be generalized to the effect that all sentences about $SG$ meaning are not really about $TC$ meaning—that is, they are systematically misleading. What exactly are they about $TC$? Recall Ryle’s analysis of ‘unpunctuality is reprehensible’ in terms of ‘whoever is unpunctual merits reproof.’ It is tempting to argue that a similar analysis applies to sentences about meaning. Indeed, on the face of it, saying that employing $E$ thus-and-so is correct amounts to saying that whoever employs $E$ thus-and-so is employing it correctly. If this is so, then ‘the meaning of $E_1$ is identical to the meaning of $E_2$’ should be considered equivalent to ‘$E_1$ and $E_2$ are (correctly) employed in the same way.’

This paraphrase would have the advantage of making clear in what sense sentences about meaning are systematically misleading, namely: (i) they are about $SG$ the meaning of $E$, (ii) they are about $TC$ whoever employs $E$ thus-and-so, and (iii) the meaning of $E$ is not identical to whoever employs $E$ thus-and-so.$^{10}$

$^{10}$ Does this paraphrase hold true for ‘I know the meaning of $E$’? I think it does. This being said, one must be cautious not to overintellectualize the kind of knowledge which is involved in knowing the meaning of $E$. Ryle has it that knowing how to employ $E$ does not
Let me now return to Ryle’s argument, as I reconstructed it. Ryle has it that (1) sentences about the meaning of \( E \) are equivalent to sentences about the correct employment of \( E \), where (2) ‘correct employment’ is not a logical name. The third premise states that (3) if those two conditions obtain, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either. This premise was left implicit in Ryle’s writings. Yet, if the proposed analysis of systematically misleading sentences in terms of truth conditions is correct, it may be supported by the intuitive claim that if two sentences really have the same truth conditions, then endorsing one of them commits you to acknowledging exactly the same entities as endorsing the other, no more no less. Hence, your stating, ‘I know the meaning of \( E \)’ does not commit you to acknowledging some queer entity referred to by the noun ‘meaning.’ Ontologically speaking, it only commits you to the existence of \( E \), plus the conditional thought that if \( E \) is employed thus-and-so, then it is employed correctly.

Ryle concludes that (4) ‘meaning’ is not a logical name. In his own words: “The phrase ‘what such and such expression means’ does not describe a thing or a happening at all, and \textit{a fortiori} not an occult thing or happening” (Ryle 1949; 2009b, 270). ‘Meaning’ has thus been Occamized.

3. Brentano’s Argument for OM

In the previous section I offered a reconstruction of Ryle’s argument for OM. I now turn to Brentano’s own version of the argument. The key idea behind Brentano’s reasoning, as I understand it, is that sentences about the meaning of \( E \) are equivalent to sentences about the content of the mental phenomenon which is expressed by \( E \). I propose to reconstruct Brentano’s argument for OM as follows:

1. Sentences about the meaning of \( E \) are equivalent to sentences about the content of the mental phenomenon which is expressed by \( E \);
2. ‘content’ is not a logical name;

amount to having some tacit knowledge of linguistic rules; hence, it is not exhausted by knowing that whoever employs \( E \) in this or that particular way is correct. Not only can a competent speaker know how to employ \( E \) without being able to specify all the linguistic rules that apply to it, in Ryle’s view, there is no need to credit him/her with even a tacit propositional knowledge of the rules (see Tanney 2009 for a recent presentation of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism). Therefore, ‘I know how to employ \( E \) correctly’ may not strictly be equivalent to ‘I know that whoever employs \( E \) thus-and-so, is correct,’ if the phrase ‘thus-and-so’ refers to some specified use. However, this does not mean that sentences about \( E \) the meaning of \( E \) are not actually about \( E \) the ways \( E \) is correctly employed. All this shows is that the correct ways of employing \( E \) need not be fully specified in terms of propositional knowledge (that is, in terms of tacit or explicit rules) for you to know how to employ \( E \) correctly.
3. If sentences about the meaning of \( E \) are equivalent to sentences about the content of the mental phenomenon which is expressed by \( E \) and ‘content’ is not a logical name, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either;

therefore,

4. ‘meaning’ is not a logical name.

Again, the argument is valid. The issue boils down to whether its premises must be accepted or not.

To understand premise 1, it will be helpful to make a brief detour into Brentano’s conception of language and his theory of mental phenomena. First, the primary purpose of language is to communicate. In Brentano’s view, communication occurs when the speaker expresses his/her mental phenomena and influences the mental life of the addressee by arousing mental phenomena on his/her side.\(^{11}\) Central to this view is the thought that linguistic expressions are but external (or public) manifestations of some underlying mental phenomena (states, processes, etc.), which are innerly (or privately) perceived by their own.\(^{12}\) Communicating is a matter of making public one’s own mental happenings.

Next, mental phenomena exhibit a distinctive act-content-object structure, which is captured by the well-known notion of intentionality. All mental phenomena involve an object within themselves or are ‘directed at’ something, in the sense that it is not possible to have a presentation without having a presentation of something (e.g. a cat, a centaur), to judge without judging that something is or is not the case (e.g. that this animal sleeping on the mat is a cat or that a centaur does not exist), to desire without desiring something, or that something is the case, etc. Importantly, in addition to having an object, mental phenomena also have a ‘content’ (Inhalt).\(^{13}\) As already suggested in Section 1, the notion of content needs to be injected into the picture to account for the fact that one can refer to the same object in different ways. For example, Brentano writes: “If I judge, ‘A centaur does not exist,’ it is said that the object is a centaur, but that the content of the judgment is that a centaur does not exist, or the non-existence of a centaur” (Brentano 1995, 292). The overall idea behind Brentano’s approach to language is that it is not possible to analyse a linguistic expression without

\(^{11}\) Plainly, communication may be successful or not, but I will not dwell on that here.

\(^{12}\) It is common knowledge that Ryle disagrees with this picture. I will very briefly return to this difference in the concluding section.

\(^{13}\) Although it is sometimes argued that the content-object distinction was first introduced by Twardowski (see Twardowski [1894] 1982; 1977), there is evidence that Brentano had employed it in his Würzburg lecture course on logic. On the content-object distinction in Brentano, see (Fréchette 2013).
looking beneath its surface grammar, that is, without considering, describing and analysing the underlying mental phenomenon with its act-content-object structure. In sum, linguistic analysis, for Brentano, is inseparable from psychological analysis.\textsuperscript{14}

With this in mind, we can return to sentences about meaning. What exactly are we talking about when we talk about the meaning of a linguistic expression? Premise 1 of Brentano’s argument, as I reconstructed it, rests on the claim that the meaning of $E$ is nothing but the \textit{content} of the related mental activity, i.e. the mental activity which is expressed (respectively, aroused) by $E$. This claim derives from Brentano’s functional analysis of linguistic expressions, according to which every linguistic expression has three basic functions, namely: that of expressing the related mental \textit{act}, that of meaning the \textit{content} of the related act, and that of naming/indicating the \textit{object} of the related act (that is, picking it out there in the world, when it exists). This functional analysis mirrors the analysis of mental phenomena in terms of act-content-object structure, and it holds true, Brentano argues, for all linguistic expressions, no matter whether we are dealing with a ‘name’ (\textit{Name}, see \textit{fig. 1}) or a full sentence, i.e. what he calls a piece of discourse or ‘speech’ (\textit{Rede}, see \textit{fig. 2}).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1}
\caption{The three functions of a name\textsuperscript{15}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig2}
\caption{The three functions of a speech\textsuperscript{16}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} For a recent presentation of Brentano’s approach to language, see (Dewalque, Gauvry, and Richard 2021).
\textsuperscript{15} From (Dewalque 2021, 109).
\textsuperscript{16} From (Dewalque 2021, 110).
To illustrate, take the word ‘cat.’ In Brentano’s view, the act of uttering the word ‘cat’ expresses the act of having a presentation of a cat, means whatever is the content of this act of presentation, and names (or denotes), among others, the animal which was chasing birds in my garden this morning and is presently sleeping on the mat. Similarly, the act of using the sentence ‘the cat is sleeping on the mat’ in an assertion expresses (respectively, arouses) the related act of judging that the cat is sleeping on the mat, means the content of this act (i.e. what is judged/affirmed: the being-asleep of the cat), and indicates the object of this act (i.e. what is judged about, namely the cat itself). Thus, in his Würzburg logic course, Brentano writes: “The name designates [bezeichnet] in some way the content of a presentation as such, the immanent object. In some way, [it designates] what is presented by means of the content of a presentation. The former is the meaning of the name. The latter is what the name names [nennt]. We say about it that it has the name [es komme der Name ihm zu]. When it exists, it is an external object of presentation. One names through the mediation of meaning” (Brentano Ms. EL 80, 13.018(1)-(4)). Several thoughts could be extracted from this passage. Yet, for present purposes, suffice it to note that the meaning of a linguistic expression $E$ is whatever is the content of the underlying mental phenomenon. Therefore, all sentences about meaning are in fact sentences about the content of some mental phenomenon.

Now, according to premise 2 of Brentano’s argument (as I reconstructed it), one should refrain from taking the noun ‘content’ ($Inhalt$) as a logical name. In the ninth appendix (“On Genuine and Fictitious Objects”) to the 1911 partial re-edition of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano makes it clear that the content of a mental phenomenon is not the kind of thing that can literally become an object of presentation. In sum, contents are not objects. Why is that? The key to understanding Brentano’s point is his distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions. Many words we employ on a daily basis—‘and,’ ‘but,’ ‘or,’ ‘is,’ etc.—are syncategorematic terms in the sense that they do not name anything and they mean something only when they are suitably combined with other words (Brentano Ms. EL 80, 13.009(3) f.; Ryle 1957; 2009a, 369). It is plain that the word ‘and,’ for example, is not the name of anything. Brentano argues that, whereas your hearing the isolated word ‘squirrel’ (say) is likely to arouse some mental activity—for example, you can come to think of

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17 This view is sometimes associated with Brentano’s so-called ‘reist turn,’ according to which only an individual thing can become the true object of a mental act. Yet I will not address Brentano’s reism here. For a recent discussion, see (Sauer 2017).

18 Syncategoremata correspond to what Russell and Whitehead later called ‘incomplete symbols,’ where an incomplete symbol is “a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts” (Russell and Whitehead 1963, 1:66). See also (Ryle 1957; 2009a, 375).
(what you take to be) a squirrel or perhaps even form an imaginative presentation of a squirrel—your hearing the isolated word ‘and’ does not give rise to a similar mental activity. This is simply because the word ‘and,’ in and of itself, does not express (respectively, arouse) a mental activity. Yet, it is plain that ‘and’ can enter into meaningful word combinations, like in the phrase ‘Laurel and Hardy,’ which is categorematic—i.e. expresses (respectively, arouses) a mental activity, namely that of having a presentation of Laurel and Hardy.

Importantly, the distinction between categoremata and syncategoremata cuts across the class of substantives as well: “Not all grammatical nouns are words which truly name something” (Brentano 1952, 386). Some, indeed, are syncategorematic terms, too. Now, Brentano argues that this is the case of the word ‘content,’ which actually is not a name but a merely syncategorematic expression. He writes: “We deny that anything exists for which the word ‘content’ is a name, just as words like ‘of’ and ‘but,’ have no meaning by themselves and do not name anything” (Brentano 1911, 149; 1995, 294).

In fact, talking of the ‘content’ of a mental phenomenon is but a shorthand way of talking of the fact that someone is mentally active in such-and-such a way. For example, what is meant by ‘a centaur does not exist’ is the non-existence of a centaur, but the non-existence of a centaur—which is the content of the underlying judgment—is not itself an object which could be acknowledged or rejected, affirmed or denied. Why not? Because treating contents as queer objects, or objects that have a diminished form of existence, would lead to “the most disastrous complications” (Brentano 1911, 147; 1995, 292). Beside positing someone thinking of a creature which is half-human and half-horse, you would have to posit a centaur (a fictum), the non-existence of a centaur (a state-of-affairs), the subsistence of the non-existence of a centaur (a higher-order state-of-affairs), and so on.19

Brentano’s proposal, therefore, is to appeal to Occam’s razor and argue that contents of mental phenomena are not queer objects that could be presented, affirmed, denied, etc. The main moral is neatly put by Ernst Mally (who, paradoxically, was a former student of Meinong’s): “A content is not an object and does not become an object by the fact that one gives a name to it, which makes it possible to say something ‘of it’ and ‘about it’” (Mally 1971, p. 60). Again, grammatical appearances are deceptive and should not be taken at face value.

The upshot of Brentano’s analyses is this: (1) whenever we talk about the meaning of $E$, we are talking about the content of the related mental phenomenon, but (2) talking about the content of a mental phenomenon

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19 Brentano argues that the sentence ‘a centaur does not exist’ has a centaur as object only in modo obliquo, whereas it has ‘whoever acknowledges a creature which is half-human and half-horse’ as object in modo recto. On this distinction, see (Dewalque 2014).
does not amount to talking about some mental entity, which would exist ‘in
the head’ of the speaker (respectively, the addressee). In sum, Brentanian
contents are not Lockean ideas. Rather, there is textual evidence that, at
least in Brentano’s mature view, talking about contents simply amounts to
talking about some mentally active subjects: “A content is never presented
in the sense of being an object of presentation, nor is it ever affirmed [...].
But absolutely the only thing which is presented is a person who is making
the judgment concerned, and we judge that insofar as we are thinking of
such a person, we are thinking of someone who judges correctly” (Brentano
1911, 148; 1995, 293–94; my emphasis). Put in our previous terminology,
Brentano’s view is that sentences about $S_G$ meaning actually are about$_{TC}$
someone—some indeterminate subject—who is mentally active in such-and-
such a way, and whose mental activity may be deemed correct or incorrect.
Since the relevant mental activity is what Brentano calls an act of judging
(i.e. acknowledging-as-true or rejecting-as-false), sentences about meaning,
it seems, are best understood as higher-order judgments, viz. judgments about
judgments. For example, knowing the meaning of $E$ would be tantamount to
having a disposition to judge that whoever judges and says thus-and-so, is
correct or incorrect.

Like Ryle’s, Brentano’s argument includes a concealed premise, namely:
(3) if sentences about the meaning of $E$ are equivalent to sentences about
the content of the mental phenomenon which is expressed by $E$ and ‘content’
is not a logical name, then ‘meaning’ is not a logical name, either. Although
this premise is not explicitly argued for in Brentano’s texts, it certainly has
some plausibility for it.

Brentano concludes that ‘meaning’ is not a logical name. This conclusion
is explicitly stated in a letter to Anton Marty dated 18 September 1904:
“It seems that ‘meaning’ itself is not a name but a noun which denotes
something only in combination with other words [mitbezeichnendes Haupt-
wort]” (Brentano 1952, 113). In other words, ‘meaning’ has been Occamized.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that Ryle’s approach to linguistic meaning bears striking
similarities to Brentano’s insofar as they both argue that the noun ‘meaning’
does not name anything and must be Occamized. Like Ryle and unlike
Frege, Moore, and the early Russell, Brentano has it that to know the mean-
ing of a linguistic expression is not to be acquainted with any mental or
extramental entity. Rather, it involves a capacity of issuing higher-order judg-
ments to the effect that whoever is mentally active and expresses his/her
mental activity thus-and-so, is correct or incorrect. All it takes for a linguistic
expression $E$ to have a meaning is that there are thinking or judging subjects,
whose judgments may be deemed correct or incorrect (Brentano), or some language users, whose employment of $E$ may be deemed correct or incorrect (Ryle). No extra entity is needed. Accordingly, for Brentano, as for Ryle, the question of what kind of entity meaning is—what I have called the Locke-Frege problem—proves to be a pseudo-problem and is better dispensed with.

This being said, significant differences remain between Brentano and Ryle—differences which have only been touched upon in the proposed reconstruction. Let me close by mentioning one of them. I have argued that, for Brentano, knowing the meaning of some linguistic expression is tantamount to having a disposition to judge that whoever judges and says thus-and-so, is correct or incorrect. In short, judgments seemingly about $SG$ meaning actually are judgments about $TC$ other judgments—higher-order judgments. It is probable that Ryle would view this account as a form of the intellectualism that he rejects in his famous discussion of knowing-how. In his view, knowing the meaning of some linguistic expression is tantamount to knowing how to use the expression in the relevant context, and this knowing-how is not reducible to any (tacit or explicit) knowledge of linguistic rules. By contrast, there is nothing in Brentano’s view that comes close to Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. I suspect this contrast reflects deeper differences between their respective philosophical projects. Very roughly, where Ryle seeks to describe our linguistic practices for what they are, Brentano’s project is to understand linguistic expressions as the manifestation of the subject’s mental activity, which is privately accessible to the subject in some kind of inner awareness or inner perception. It would be hopeless, in Brentano’s view, to try and understand linguistic practices without relating them to the underlying mental phenomena, which somehow provide the bedrock of any sound analysis. Yet, for lack of space, I will not discuss this difference here.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this paper was presented at the 4th annual TiLPS History of Analytic Philosophy Workshop. I am grateful to the audience there, especially to Annapaola Ginammi, Jan Claas and Andreas Vrahimis. Many thanks also to Semir Badir, Davide Bordini, Charlotte Gauvry, Anna Giustina, Denis Seron, Sander Verhaegh and one anonymous referee for their helpful comments.

20 Brentano distinguishes between knowledge as a disposition to judge (see e.g. Brentano 1924; 1995, p. 79) and knowledge as an occurrent, conscious phenomenon, namely: a self-evident act of judging.

21 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this to me.
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