ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Husserl and the normativity of logic

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Abstract
In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on
the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes
in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially,
in the *Prolegomena*, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure
logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a re-
sult of application. Later, however, he revised this posi-
tion and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and
normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for
attributing such a change of position to Husserl, which
is not generally acknowledged in the literature. Section 3
critically examines Husserl's early position, with spe-
cific attention to the model of instantiation. Sections 4–6
identify three key stages in the development of Husserl's
theory of judgment that lead to the normative concep-
tion of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of
ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the
instantiation model of proposition and the development
of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic-
phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the
elaboration of the three-layer structure of pure logic.

1 | PURE LOGIC: IDEALITY AND NORMATIVITY

One of the distinctive features of Husserl's extended and relentless critique of psychologism (in
the philosophy of logic) in the *Prolegomena* is his sharp distinction between the ideal and the
normative. He takes to task not only philosophers who ground logical laws essentially on psy-
chology, understood as the empirical study of the (human) mind, but also fellow critics of
psychologism (mostly neo-Kantians) who believe to have refuted psychologism by pointing to
the normative character of logic (Hua XVIII, pp. 49ff, 65ff, 167ff.). For these "Kantianizing"
philosophers (Hua XVIII, p. 102),[1] the crucial distinction is that between laws of nature
[*Naturgesetze*] and normative laws [*Normalgesetze*]. Psychology is supposed to search for laws
of nature stating how we in fact think, while logic is supposed to establish prescriptions or
norms to which our thinking must conform in its reasoning in order to arrive at true results
(p. 49). Just as one cannot—so a "Kantianizing" thinker would argue—derive moral laws from

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[1]When quoting from Husserl I have, as a rule, consulted existing translations and modified them when necessary.

facts concerning our psychological dispositions, so logic, as the "ethic of thought," can in no way be founded on psychology (pp. 65–68).

For Husserl (of the *Prolegomena*), this view misrepresents the nature of pure logic. Logic is certainly *also* a normative discipline and a technology [*Kunstlehre*]. Indeed, no advocate of psychologism would dream of denying this. Husserl takes this to indicate that emphasizing the normative character of logic does not settle the dispute with psychologistic logicians, who have no difficulty accommodating this character (Hua XVIII, pp. 50ff, 66ff.). To get to the point of contention, we must press the question concerning the *theoretical foundation* of the normative laws prescribed by logic as technology. At this point, it would be a grave mistake to claim that the theoretical discipline underlying logical prescriptions is intrinsically normative. Such a position would be corrupted by, if not fall back upon, the very "psychological motives and confusions" that it seeks to free itself from (p. 168). For if logical laws were intrinsically and fundamentally norms for particular mental events in particular minds, then (1) they would assert or at least presuppose the existence of such events. From this it is a small step to the further claim that (2) logical laws are *essentially about* particular mental events in particular minds. Once this is conceded, the still further claim seems irresistible that (3) such laws must draw their evidence from the examination of such particular mental events, that is, from psychology. Now we have full-blown psychologism.

According to Husserl, the "Kantianizing" thinkers want to avoid psychologism by resisting the final move. For Husserl, on the other hand, the second and the third claims are inseparable; together they form the core tenets of logical psychologism (cf. Willard, 1984, p. 149), while the first claim is a symptom or consequence of these core tenets (Hua XVIII, pp. 80ff.). Thus, Husserl categorically denies the normative status of pure logic (i.e., the discipline that is the theoretical foundation of logical prescriptions): the logical laws could *serve as norms* by way of a transformation [*Wendung*], but they are not by themselves "rules which include normativity in their thought-content" (p. 159). Correspondingly, what constitutes the counterpoint to a law of nature is not a normative law, but "an ideal law [*Idealgesetz*], in the sense of a law based purely on concepts, ideas, purely conceived essences, and so not empirical" (p. 168).

In the case of pure logical laws, the concepts on which they are based are "the concept of truth" and "concepts essentially related to this concept" (Hua XVIII, p. 190).[2] Thus, the concept of *truth*, as a logical predicate of judgment in the sense of ideal content, is purely ideal and nonnormative, although it is correlative with the normative predicate of *correctness* [*Richtigkeit*], which applies to judgment in the sense of mental activity (Hua XVIII, pp. 179–180n).

This unmitigated separation of the ideal and the normative seems, however, to have been fundamentally revised and largely taken back in Husserl's later works. With regard to the status of pure logic, a clear statement of his late position can be found in his lectures on ethics from the years 1920 and 1924. The context itself is revealing. While in the *Prolegomena* Husserl regards the ("Kantianizing") conception of pure logic as an "ethics, not a physics of thought" as an unreliable half-truth [*Halbheit*] and makes heavy use of the analogy between pure logic and pure mathematics (§§45–46), his approach in the 1920/1924 lectures seems at first sight to be the complete opposite. Here he criticized philosophers[3] who overstretch the parallelism between ethical laws and mathematical laws (§§28–29). In a move reminiscent of the neo-Kantian position he used to criticize, he aligns logical laws with ethical laws because of their common *normative* character (Hua XXXVII, pp. 268–271, 278–283). The central distinction is

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[2]Such essentially related concepts include "proposition, subject, predicated, object, property, ground and consequent, relation and relatum, etc." (Hua XVIII, p. 164; see also pp. 129, 169, 187, 189, 248).

[3]The targets are Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729).

no longer between laws of nature and ideal laws, but between descriptive laws [*Sachgesetze*] and normative laws [*Normalgesetze*].

This may seem to be a downright reversal to the distinction, criticized by him in the *Prolegomena*, between laws of nature and normative laws, but there is a difference. In Husserl's view, the deepest problem with the latter distinction is its blindness to the dimension of ideality. The two sides of Husserl's new distinction, however, range over both reality and ideality. It cuts across the old distinction between laws of nature and ideal laws, but it does not ignore it. In the case of pure logic, what we have are *ideal and normative* laws. Thus, Husserl's trademark insistence on the ideality of pure logic is fully retained, but now it is no longer seen as in conflict with normativity. The "Platonizing" and the "Kantianizing" tendencies in the philosophy of logic are reconciled in Husserl's middle period.

This article tells the story of this reconciliation, focusing on Husserl's evolving phenomenological analysis of judgment that makes it possible. While primarily historical in nature, this study is motivated by the conviction that a closer look at Husserl's actual view can contribute to our philosophical understanding of the normativity of logic. It should be noted that this question is by no means a peripheral issue in the tradition of philosophical logic. Before the dominance of the contemporary "schematic" conception of formal logic,[4] the universal normativity of logic—the fact that it provides constitutive norms for thought as such—is closely linked to the very demarcation of subject. Both Kant and Frege, according to MacFarlane (2002), share this basic understanding of logic in terms of universal normativity, which provides the common ground for their fundamental disagreements about logic to be about the same subject.[5] In comparison with Kant and Frege, Husserl's position on the normativity of logic remains understudied. His shift of position on this issue, in particular, seems to have escaped the notice of commentators.[6] Starting with the registration of this shift, this article will look into the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that makes this shift possible and necessary. Given the centrality of logical concerns in the inception and evolvement of Husserl's phenomenology, our topic will also have important implications for the understanding of his philosophical project in general, especially with regard to the status of normativity in his thought.[7]

This article consists of six sections. Section 2 continues the endeavor of this first section to gather textual evidence for attributing to Husserl a shift in position on our topic. Section 3 then critically examines his early position. The main action takes place in Sections 4–6, which trace three major steps in Husserl's developing analysis of judgment and proposition that ultimately lead to the normative conception of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the instantiation model of proposition and the development of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic-phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the elaboration of the three-layer structure of pure logic.

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[4]On how the contemporary, schematic view of logic differs in fundamental ways from the universalist conception held by Frege and Russell, see Goldfarb (1979, 2001).

[5]MacFarlane's reading of Kant and Frege is controversial. On Kant, see Tolley (2006) and Lu-Adler (2017). For an overview of the literature on Frege and the normativity of logic, see Mezzadri (2015).

[6]This is the case with two recent studies that address Husserl's view on the normativity of logic: Hartimo (2019) and Kinkaid (2020).

[7]In Hopp's (2019) critique of Crowell's normative interpretation of the concepts of truth, knowledge, and intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology, he relies heavily on Husserl's statements about the nonnormative status of pure logic in the *Prolegomena*. Crowell in his response concedes this reading as it applies to the early Husserl and points instead to the difference made by the transcendental turn (Crowell, 2019, pp. 331–332). By arguing for a shift in Husserl's thinking, this article constitutes a limited defense of Crowell's approach.

2 | LOGIC AS NORMATIVE SCIENCE IN *Formal and Transcendental Logic*

In claiming that Husserl develops a normative conception of pure logic in his middle period, I do not mean to suggest that he thereby rejects the nonnormative conception vigorously defended in the *Prolegomena*. He does not. Instead, the old conception is given its due, as we shall see, in the three-layered view of pure logic in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (hereafter as *FTL*), which convincingly articulates the relationship between the normative and the nonnormative versions/layers.

Still, my claim that Husserl endorses a normative conception of pure logic in *FTL* may be seen by some as surprising, if not downright false. For, in an early passage from this book Husserl appears to have returned to the earlier position of the *Prolegomena*, rejecting the view that pure logic is per se normative:

> Logic *becomes* normative, it becomes practical; with a suitable change of attitude, one can convert it into a normative-technological discipline. But intrinsically it is itself not a normative discipline but precisely a science in the pregnant sense, a work of purely theoretical reason. (Hua XVII, p. 35)

Let us tread carefully here. This passage affirms the right of pure logic to be a science in the pregnant sense, and not merely a normative-technological discipline. This does not directly contradict the new position from the 1920/1924 lectures on ethics. This new position does not deny the distinction between theoretical-ideal science and normative-technological discipline; it draws a further distinction, within the former, between descriptive sciences [*Sachwissenschaften*] and normative sciences. This new distinction is missing from the quoted passage—but it is not dismissed.

In fact, a few lines after the quoted passage, Husserl tells us that he no longer sees the division as sharp as he did in the *Prolegomena*: "To be sure, the distinction is after all a relative one: because even purely theoretical activity is indeed activity—that is to say, a practice (when the concept of practice is accorded its natural breadth)" (Hua XVII, p. 36). On the face of it, this statement contains nothing that will not be readily accepted by the author of the *Prolegomena*. On a closer look, it turns out to be the beginning of a line of thought that will quickly point beyond the scope of that early work. This line of thought, however, is not further pursued in the "Preparatory Considerations" of *FTL* from which we quote. Its continuation can be found in the aforementioned lectures on ethics. Here, instead of simply taking for granted the distinction between theoretical science and technology as elaborated in the *Prolegonema*, Husserl subjects the issue to a renewed examination. According to the *Prolegomena*, a normative discipline or a technology[8] derives its unity from its relation to a "basic norm," which "provides the definition of what shall count as 'good' in such a discipline" (Hua XVIII, p. 58). Subjectively phrased, a technology is constituted by the "central reference" of all its research "to a fundamental valuation [*Werthaltung*] as the source of a dominant normative interest" (p. 58/86). A theoretical science, on the other hand, does not have this constitutive reference to a valuation; the unity of its research "is determined exclusively by a theoretical interest" (p. 59/86).

However, this prima facie clear distinction between the theoretical interest and the normative/valuative interest becomes questionable when we recall the obvious fact, recorded in

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[8]Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between the two. A normative discipline deals with evaluation, with the differentiation between good and bad, right or wrong, etc., while a technology is an aid for the practical realization of what is good, right, etc. A normative discipline that excludes the possibility of the corresponding technology is conceivable, and Husserl cites Schopenhauer's ethics as an example (Hua XVIII, p. 59; Hua XXIV, pp. 27–28). As this distinction plays next to no role in Husserl's philosophy of logic, I will use the two terms interchangeably in this article.

the above quote from *FTL*, that pure theoretical activity is also a practice. As a practice, it is, like any other practice, guided by a valuative interest—be it an interest in truth for the sake of truth—and pursues a goal, that is, the actualization [*Verwirklichung*] of truth (Hua XXXVII, p. 16). Hence, "in every science we move within a realm of practice"; "every science is also an art [*Kunst*]" (p. 17). But if this is the case, "the unclarity of the concept of technology [*Kunstlehre*] in contrast to science" springs to the eye (p. 18); the distinction in terms of theoretical and valuative interests does not suffice. Husserl goes on to remark that the concept of technology is ambiguous, and it is an ambiguity [*Doppelsinn*] with "great consequence for the correct framing of philosophy" (p. 19).

Technology in the usual sense—which is the only one recognized in the *Prolegomena*—is that of a discipline that issues scientifically grounded prescriptions with respect to a given goal (cf. Hua XVIII, p. 50n). Such a discipline moves within the practical attitude. Its propositions are practically unified in relation to the given goal, and they do not "form a system of truth" (Hua XXXVII, p. 21). Over against this, Husserl now recognizes the possibility and legitimacy of a "technology in a new sense," that of a purely scientific discipline pursued in a purely theoretical attitude (pp. 23, 25). It is called technology because its thematic sphere is related to practice in the widest sense, which is essentially susceptible to normative questions, that is, to questions of rational justification (p. 23). In other words, Husserl needs this new sense of technology precisely to demarcate a group of sciences for which the idea of normativity [*Normierung*] or regulation [*Regelung*] is essential; technology in this sense is just another name for the normative science. Again, Husserl assures us that bringing in the idea of normativity in no way impairs its status as an ideal science: "When we are talking about regulation in the sense of reason, ideal principles rule and a priori disciplines open up" (p. 28).

As soon as we take into consideration the ambiguity of the concept of technology, it becomes clear that the passage from *FTL*, which appears to speak against the view of pure logic as a normative science, is in fact no counterevidence. What it says pure logic cannot be is obviously technology in the usual sense, and the relativization of the science-technology distinction that immediately follows clearly points to the new conception of technology as a normative science developed in the 1920/1924 lectures on ethics.

I assume that these considerations are sufficient, in terms of philological plausibility, to ascribe to Husserl a change of opinion concerning the nature of logic.[9] However, the philosophical motivation and justification for this change has yet to be unraveled, and its significance has yet to be explored. We have already pointed to the insufficiency of demarcating the theoretical sciences in terms of the theoretical attitude. In the *Prolegomena*, however, this demarcation is only preliminary. In the definitive version of this demarcation, to be found toward the end of the book, the question as it relates to the act of knowing is subordinated to the question as it relates to the ideal content of knowledge (§§ 65–66; cf. Willard, 1984, pp. 166, 170ff.). Obviously, the unclarity regarding the notion of the theoretical interest concerns only the act side of the question; it does not cut deep enough. In order to unearth the motivation and justification for Husserl's later change of mind, we will have to look closer at the theory of pure logic and its normative transformation in the *Prolegomena*.

3 | THE EARLY MODEL OF INSTANTIATION AND ITS PROBLEM

We have already seen how Husserl in the *Prolegomena* sharply divided pure logic as an ideal-theoretical science from applied logic as a practical-normative discipline or technology. The latter is defined by the constitutive reference to a basic norm or a fundamental valuation,

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[9]For more textual evidence in *FTL* for Husserl's change of position, see Section 6.

whereas the former is not. However, Husserl is certainly not blind to their intimate connection; after all, the former serves as the theoretical foundation for the latter. It is worthwhile to delve into his account of this relationship.

Every well-grounded technology must have a theoretical foundation, which is to say that

> it must have a theoretical content free from all normativity [*Normierung*], which as such has its natural location in certain theoretical sciences, whether these are already marked off or yet to be constituted. (Hua XVIII, pp. 59–60)

The claim is a priori. Husserl is not making the historical claim that every technology is built upon the basis of an existing theoretical science, but the logical claim that every well-grounded practical proposition has a nonnormative theoretical content as its foundation. According to Husserl, every normative proposition may be analyzed into a prescriptive part and an essentially descriptive part.[10] The prescriptive part expresses the "general thought of measurement in terms of a basic norm," and it is the unifying relation to this basic norm that "imports the thought of normativity [*Normierung*]" into all propositions belonging to a normative discipline. The other part expresses "the thought of a measuring relation between norm and what it is a norm for," and this part is essentially descriptive because its proper content can be exhaustively characterized in an objective, nonnormative manner "as a relation between condition and the conditioned" (Hua XVIII, p. 60). To use Husserl's example, every normative proposition of the form "an A should be B" "implies the theoretical proposition 'only an A which is B has the properties C,'" where C stands for the "constitutive content" of the basic norm (p. 60/88). This constitutive content is in turn "the metric units [*die messende Einheiten*] in terms of which objects of the relevant sphere are measured" (p. 57/85). In the case of applied (i.e., normative) logic, the property C would be truth-aptness, and A would be a concrete act of thinking. Hence, a normative proposition stating that one's thinking should have such and such a form has its "essential theoretical foundation" (p. 62/89) in the proposition to the effect that only the thinking of such a form is truth-apt; this proposition is "purely theoretical" and "contains no trace of the thought of normativity" (p. 60/88).

However, this purely theoretical proposition is still not a proposition in pure logic, because it has the wrong subject matter. This proposition is *about* an act of thinking, that is, a particular mental event, whereas according to Husserl pure logic can only be about ideal meanings, if it is not to fall victim to psychologism. Thus, the above account falls short of a full account of how pure logic becomes normative.

This shortcoming is an expression of what Dallas Willard (1984) calls "the paradox of logical psychologism." This alleged paradox is the combined effect of Husserl's rejection of psychologism (or any rejection that similarly insists upon the ideality of meaning, proposition, and truth) and the obvious fact that pure logic has normative significance for our actual thinking. The crucial point pertains to the subject matter of pure logic. The rejection of psychologism requires that pure logic be concerned only with ideal meanings and propositions. Considerations of normative relevance, on the other hand, seem to require that a normative proposition has the same subject matter (the A in our example above) as its theoretical foundation. Now, since the subject matter of a normative proposition is, supposedly, concrete acts of thinking, which are real happenings in the real world, it would seem to follow that the subject matter of pure logic must also be the same. This goes against the requirement of the rejection of psychologism. Hence the paradox.

Husserl's solution is to think of ideal meanings and propositions as being connected to concrete acts of thinking in the way that a quality-species (e.g., the species red) is connected to its

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[10]Husserl's position here comes close to the so-called prescriptivist or two-components theory of value.

instances (e.g., the redness *in* this book cover here), that is, in the manner of instantiation or exemplification.[11] Accordingly, the theoretical proposition to the effect that only a belief which has such and such a form is truth-apt is not yet a proposition in pure logic; it is an instantiation of such a proposition. The latter does not deal with beliefs or judgments, but with ideal propositions, which are judgments *in specie*. Therefore, the normative transformation of a pure logical proposition consists of two steps: the first being an instantiation that generates a theoretical proposition with mental happenings as its subject matter, followed by the normative transformation proper, which produces a normative proposition through the introduction of a basic norm.[12]

On this model, ideal meanings and propositions are, in Willard's words, "complex reference qualities" which may or may not be instantiated in concrete acts of thinking and knowing (Willard, 1984, p. 183), and which, when instantiated, become essential constituents of the *epistemological essence* of the acts in question, just as the species of redness, when instantiated in a book cover, makes it into a red book cover (cf. Hopp, 2020, pp. 71–73). Instantiated ideal meanings and propositions are thus *essentially constitutive* of concrete acts of thinking and knowing; they are the noetic conditions of the possibility of proper thought and knowledge. According to the instantiation model, these noetic conditions are transformations of the objective-logical conditions of possibility that are grounded purely in the ideal contents of knowledge (Hua XVIII, pp. 240–241).

Now, the laws of pure logic, being "grounded purely in the concept of truth and concepts essentially related to this concept" (p. 190), constitute the formal core of the objective-logical conditions of possibility of knowledge. The logical norms that are their application can justifiably claim to be *the* norms of thought: they cannot be violated, as the acts that violate them would cease to be acts of thinking and knowing with epistemic relevance. Thus, logical norms derive their special status from their constitutive character.[13] Pure logical laws are *constitutive of* (i.e., the conditions of possibility for) proper thought, and they become *the* norms of thought upon transformation [*Wendung*] and application [*Anwendung*].

Note that this view of how logical laws *become* normative is importantly different from the view of logical laws as constitutive rules. Constitutive rules, such as the rules of chess, are constitutive of the phenomena they govern, and they perform this constitutive function *as rules, that is, as normative* (cf. MacFarlane, 2002, p. 37). In the early Husserlian picture, on the other hand, logical laws are first constitutive of proper thought in a descriptive way. They then acquire a normative sense in a process of transformation and application. The constitutive function and the normative role are dissociated, located on two different levels. Call this the two-level model of logical normativity. Can this model do justice to the unique status of logical norms?[14]

Note that this two-level model is not exclusively intended for logical laws (Hua XVIII, p. 161). Rather, the way in which the laws of pure logic *become* normative is no different from the way in which, say, laws of physics do so. What does it mean to say that I *should* think in

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[11]See, e.g., Hua XVIII, pp. 108–109, 135–136, as well as Hua XIX, §§31, 34. See also Husserl's clear exposition of this model in his reply to Palágyi, in Mohanty (1977, p. 37). Willard speaks of Husserl's model of instantiation/exemplification as "an intelligible and plausible" way out of the paradox of psychologism (Willard, 1984, p. 185).

[12]The distinction between the two steps is needed because they are different in nature, and this, in turn, is because the "distance" between an ideal-theoretical proposition and a real-normative one lies, so to speak, in two orthogonal directions. Husserl seems to have these two steps in mind when he speaks of a *noetic* transformation of the objective-logical conditions of possibility of theoretical knowledge and distinguishes it from the *normative* transformation proper (Hua XVIII, pp. 241/233–234).

[13]Is there not a tension between the constitutive status of logical laws and their normativity? It seems that what precludes the possibility of violation cannot be a norm. Thus, where illogical thought is deemed impossible, the laws of logic would lose the status of normative laws. Husserl's response to this problem lies in his distinction between proper and improper thought (Hua XIX, p. 722). I will return to this issue in Section 6.

[14]Frege holds—or seems to hold in certain texts—a similar view regarding the normativity of the logical laws. He also seems to claim that the normative status of logical laws is consequent upon their status as general descriptive truths. Taschek (2008, pp. 383–388) provides an illuminating analysis of the difficulties arising from this view. The following diagnosis of the parallel problem in Husserl is indebted to Taschek's analysis.

accordance with the law of gravitation? It means that I *should* judge as true those propositions expressing this law and judge as false those that are incompatible with it, that I *should* accept as physically possible those instances falling under this law and reject as physically impossible those imaginary scenarios violating this law, etc. Now these prescriptions derived from the law of gravitation express the *logical obligation* to ensure the consistency of my other judgments with my endorsement of that law. But what are logical obligations if not norms of thinking in operation? Hence, logical norms must already be in effect to allow for the normative transformation of ideal laws. It would thus be question-begging to suppose that the laws of pure logic only *become* normative in the same way.[15]

The crux of the matter is: the transformation-cum-application operation by means of which the laws of pure logic are supposed to become normative is itself an act of thinking. As such, it must already be under the jurisdiction of logical norms in order to be truth-apt and epistemically relevant. It is simply not in the capacity to bring normativity to bear where it previously had no bearing.

4 | IDEAL CONTENT AND ASSERTIVE FORCE

Normativity is too intimately tied to the very idea of logic to be relegated to its mere application. Ideality is essential to pure logic, for which the overcoming of psychologism is its *conditio* sine qua non. The model of instantiation, with the corresponding operation of transformation-cum-application, is not able to satisfy both desiderata and to establish pure logic as an ideal *and* normative science. What does it take to recognize the original normativity of pure logic? Obviously, a new account of what makes up the subject matter of pure logic, in other words, a new account of judgment and proposition to replace the instantiation model.[16]

Recall that the instantiation model is meant to resolve the problem of how pure logic, which is supposed to be about ideal propositions, can have normative implications for how we actually think. Now there is such a problem in the first place because ideal propositions are thought to be unsuitable candidates for *normative* evaluation. Ideal propositions can be true or not, they can have "ideal existence" or not, but truth and ideal existence are not normative notions. But why? Presumably, the idea is that normative evaluation applies only to responsible agents and their achievements. Only when someone or something makes a claim, takes a position, or gives something a try do questions of normative assessment arise. Since propositions are supposed to have an ideal existence "in itself," "to which being thought or being expressed are alike contingent" (Hua XVIII, 110), and since they relate to concrete acts of judging as species relate to their instances, there is nothing in a proposition that resembles, corresponds to, or reflects the making of a claim and the taking of a stand (cf. Hua XIX, p. 49–50). On the instantiation model, proposition in itself does not have assertive force. If logic is to be originally normative, what we need is a new conception of proposition that incorporates the assertive force as an essential moment.

While the instantiation model favors a conception of proposition in itself without intrinsic assertive force, Husserl's critique of Brentano's thesis in the *5th Logical Investigations* (*LI*) points in the opposite direction.[17] Brentano's thesis—as applied to judgment—is an heir to the

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[16]My approach to a Husserlian account of the normativity of logic thus differs importantly from Kinkaid (2020). Kinkaid frames his discussion as a response to Gilbert Harmann's (1984) skeptical challenge to logic's normative role in reasoning. Kinkaid largely accepts the way Harmann sets up the divide between nonpsychological propositions and psychological acts and mobilizes Husserlian resources to show that there is a normative link between the two after all. My approach is to show that the later Husserl would question the way Harmann sets up the divide in the first place.

[17]See chapters 3–5 of the 5th *LI*, esp. §§28–29 (Hua XIX, pp. 461–468).

Cartesian dissociation of propositional content and assertive force.[18] According to Brentano's thesis, "every intentional experience is either a presentation or is based on an underlying presentation" (Brentano, 2009, p. 65), and judgment, which belongs to the second class, is defined as an act of "acceptance (as true)" or "rejection (as false)" directed at some presentation. It follows that the ideal content of a judgment, or a proposition, is given prior to the judgmental act proper, which consists in either acceptance or rejection; or, as Husserl puts it, "what makes it the judgment of a given state of affairs lies in an underlying act of presentation," which is void of assertive/positing force (Hua XIX, p. 462). Husserl's critique, which I cannot and need not discuss in detail now,[19] commits him to the opposite view that ideal content is not separable from assertive force (or its modification). The crux of the matter concerns how to think about the relation between a judgment "S is *p*!" and the mere presentation of the "same content," such as when we understand the judgment of another person without either assenting to it or disagree with it. According to Brentano, judgment is the more complicated structure, as it involves an acceptance or rejection directed at a mere presentation. For Husserl, on the other hand, mere presentation (or content without force) is essentially a modification that arises from a specific motivational nexus, while judgment (or content with intrinsic force) is the original mode. Thus, judgment, as the living performance of predication (*lebendige Prädikation*), is inseparably an assertion and the categorial articulation of a state of affairs; it "brings the state of affairs to appearance" and it does so in an assertive manner (Hua XL, pp. 136, 125). The appearance of the content and the assertion of being do not fall on two levels or in two steps, as Brentano's thesis suggests (Hua XIX, pp. 461–463); they are inseparably moments in the same "living performance of predication."[20]

It is a consequence of this critique of Brentano that the ideal content of a judgment, or a proposition, has intrinsic assertive force. "The proposition asserts/posits the state of affairs" (Hua XL, p. 134). In other words, the ideal content of a judgment and the ideal content of an act of mere thought or mere presentation are different. The position-taking, which is present in judgment but absent in a mere thought, has something corresponding to it in the ideal content. In the language of the instantiation model, Husserl expresses this insight by saying that a proposition is a "judgment *in specie*," rather than a neutral content that is common to "the presentations, judgments, wishes, doubts, etc. that relate to the same state of affairs" (Hua XL, pp. 138–139). Moreover, it is the proposition, rather than the corresponding neutral content, that, as the assertive appearance of a state of affairs, intends or lays claim to truth.[21] Since the laws of pure logic are grounded in "the concept of truth" (and "concepts essentially related to this concept") (Hua XVIII, p. 190), Husserl concludes that the primary subject matter of pure logic is proposition as judgment *in specie* (Hua XL, p. 138).[22]

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[18]For a discussion of Brentano's theory of judgment and its relation to Descartes (among other historically important positions, including Frege's), see Cobb-Stevens (1990, pp. 102–112).

[19]See Mayer and Erhard (2019) for a detailed analysis of Husserl's argument. See also Cobb-Stevens (1998, pp. 202–205). For a discussion of how Husserl's critique prepares for a normative conception of intentionality, see Huang (2022).

[20]The prominent of the notion of "appearance" (*Erscheinung*) in Husserl's account of judgment contrasts with that of the notions of "acceptance" and "rejection" in Brentano's, and this contrast nicely captures the philosophical difference between them. In a short text from the late 1890s, which Husserl marked as "totally correct" in 1910, Husserl defines judgment as the "appearance that it is so" (Hua XL, p. 113). He notes that when we *talk about* judgment, we have in mind the relation of the appearance of being (*Seinserscheinung*) to some ego (*irgendeinem Ich*), but when we *live in* judgment, we do not think about this relation; "only the appearance 'It is S(*p*)!' exists (*besteht*)" (p. 113). Later in the same text he characterizes what comes to appearance in a judgment as a state of affairs. A state of affairs comes to appearance in a judgment in an assertive manner, and this is its original manner of appearance. One can certainly "merely represent" the "same" state of affairs. That would involve a judgment-in-phantasy; it is thus parasitic upon the original assertive appearance.

[21]Cf. "Die Wahrheit is primär die Eigenschaft des Satzes, des Urteils in specie" (Hua XL, p. 135).

[22]See also Hua XL, pp. 155, 158, 194–195. In these later texts (probably written in 1910), Husserl says that the laws of pure logic are primarily concerned with proposition in the sense of the intended state of affairs ("*vermeinte Sachverhalte*"). Here the instantiation model (i.e., the conception of proposition as judgment *in specie*) is replaced by the identificatory conception, but the idea that pure logic is concerned with propositions remains.

As noted above, the instantiation model by itself favors a conception of "proposition in itself" without intrinsic force. It is thus in tension with the fundamental insight resulting from Husserl's critique of Brentano's thesis, despite Husserl's effort to express this insight in terms of the model. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that a judgment *in specie* cannot have intrinsic assertive/positing force; to say that an eidos makes a claim or takes a stand would be to commit a categorical mistake, as is the attempt to submit an eidos to normative assessment. For an eidos/species is given or constituted in ideation, and ideation is a form of abstraction that is insensitive to the presence and absence of assertive force. Ideation is, as Husserl already notes in the terse discussion of this topic in the 6th *LI*[23]

> quite unaffected by the assertive [*setzende*] or non-assertive character of such underlying acts, or by their perceptual or imaginative character. The Red, the Triangle exemplified in mere phantasy is specifically the same as the Red, the Triangle exemplified in our percepts. (Hua XIX, p. 691/800–1)

As judgment *in specie*, proposition can be "retrieved from actual judgment and from modified judgment in the same way"[24] ;it is thus equally well instantiated in each. Now a modified judgment or a judgment in phantasy "does not judge in the actual sense like an actual judgment" (Hua XL, p. 180); it does not genuinely take a position and subject itself to the "jurisdiction of reason" (Hua III/1, p. 249). One can imagine producing all sorts of absurd statements, one can imagine making judgments that would contradict each other when made by the same speaker in actuality. But in pure phantasy there is nothing "wrong" about this, for judgments-in-pure-phantasy do not automatically make a claim true, they do not automatically "call for" fulfillment and "ask for" normative assessment. Of course, it is always possible to use phantasy for cognitive purposes, that is, to transform a judgment-in-phantasy to an assumption or a presupposition (such as in the production of a hypothetical proposition), but this is always a transformation that adds normative commitment where there is none before.

Since judgment *in specie* is equally retrievable and equally instantiated in actual judgment and judgment-in-phantasy, it has no necessary relation to actual position-taking and contains no actual assertive force (cf. Bernet, 1979, p. 49). Of course, as judgment *in specie* it has assertive force *in specie*. But it is only apparently paradoxical to say that the assertive force *in specie* makes no assertion, posits nothing. For assertion or positing is "the actual intending of a state of affairs," and this is "inseparable from judging and from the judging subject" (Hua XL, p. 182) or "the living performance of predication." This inseparability cannot be provided for by the conception of proposition (i.e., the ideal content of judgment) as judgment *in specie*, for an eidos—even of judgment—enjoys an ideal existence "in itself," "to which being thought or being expressed are alike contingent" (Hua XVIII, p. 110). Proposition as judgment *in specie* has assertive force *in specie*, but it is not the right kind of entity to have actual assertive force.

According to the instantiation model, the assertive force (or positing character) of a proposition is instantiated in a concrete act of judgment as part of its act-quality,[25] while the ideal content of a proposition is instantiated as the act-matter. These two, matter and quality, together constitute the "semantic essence" of an act of judgment. This division does not render

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[23]This aspect, i.e., the dependence of ideation on imaginary modification, becomes more manifest when Husserl later clarifies ideation in terms of eidetic variation.

[24]"das aus aktuellem Urteil und evenso modifiziertem Urteil Zu-entnehmende" (Hua XXVI, p. 196).

[25]In *LI*, act-quality is taken to exhibit several dimensions of variation. Not only the contrast between assertive and neutralized acts is a variation of act-quality, but also that between objectifying and nonobjectifying acts as well as the various doxic modifications. Act-quality is thus basically a bag-term in *LI*, merely negatively circumscribed over against matter and fullness and lacking an internal unity. Husserl expresses his dissatisfaction with this notion in footnotes added in the second edition (see Hua XIX, pp. 473, 508), and in *Ideas I* he separates out what is lumped together under this title in *LI* (see Hua III/1, pp. 298, 305).

transparent the intimate, interpenetrating relationship between the content and the force of a proposition intended by a judgment. Thus, despite Husserl's critique of Brentano's dissociation of content and force (or matter and quality) and his acknowledgement that proposition (with intrinsic assertive force) is the proper subject matter of pure logic, he tends, in *LI* (even in the 5th and the 6th Investigations), to minimalize the role of position-taking (on the act side) and assertive force (on the content side) in his account of our logical insight and the mode of givenness of logical truth. He tends, in other words, to ignore the study of act-quality and to focus almost exclusively on act-matter.[26]

5 | INTERPLAY OF THE PROPER AND THE IMPROPER: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF PROPOSITION

This oversight, however, squares badly with his major insight concerning the phenomenological source of our logical knowledge—his account of categorial intuition. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into the details of this account, especially that of the problematic theory of categorial representation; suffice it to note, following the lead of Tugendhat (1970, pp. 122–123), the theory Husserl actually employs in his account of analytic truth in chapter 8 of the *6th LI* is quite simple (and convincing). It consists in the insight that "the genuine decisive mark of the intuitiveness of categorial act" is nothing but the "(sensorially conditioned) actual performance (*aktuelle Vollzug*) of the synthesis" (p. 123). Thus, the general contrast between empty intention and intuitive fulfillment becomes, in the case of pure categorial acts, the contrast between "thinking in the sense of mere signification" and "actually performing"—on the basis of sensory foundation—the synthesis in question (Hua XIX, p. 717). In mere signification, we enjoy almost complete freedom, limited only by the laws of pure logical grammar; when it comes to the actual performance of the relevant synthesis, however, we experience "a certain bounded character (*Gebundenheit*)," our freedom meets with "lawful limits" (*gesetzliche Schranken*; p. 717).

Now—and this is what Husserl fails to emphasize in *LI*—a certain boundedness *can* be experienced, "lawful limits" to our freedom *can* be encountered only in *actual* performance, that is, only when we actually *try* to carry out the required synthesis. The ideal limits to our freedom as expressed in the laws of pure logic are not externally *imposed* like the walls of a prison cell; they show themselves as such—and indeed as *enabling* limits—only when we *actively* engage ourselves. When, on the other hand, we think playfully and carelessly, when we wander in thought, or when we daydream—we may exceed the logical limits without noticing, but then we are not thinking properly, clearly, and effectively. We are carried along by chains of association and carried beyond the bounds of logical laws, without these bounds showing themselves as such. Thus, the phenomenon of the "bounded character" of thinking is inseparable from the phenomenon of *trying* or *active engagement*. And of course, the engagement here is an engagement for the sake of truth, or a commitment that opens itself to normative evaluation; it is none other than what Husserl calls position-taking.

Although in the *LI* Husserl generally tends to play down the essential role of position-taking in logical thought, there are texts in which this insight shines through. In the often-neglected chapter 4 of the 6th *LI*, the givenness of the "incompatibility" of contents is claimed to be inseparable from the "intention" of actually thinking the contents together in an intuitive whole:

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[26]See, e.g., Hua XIX, pp. 581, 596, 599, 607, 617–618, 681,702, for repeated announcements that the study of positing act-quality is irrelevant for his interest and/or will be set aside. In one of these places, Husserl acknowledges that as a consequence of this omission, his analyses "will be defective if regarded as an analysis of judgment" (p. 681).

> A content of the sort *q* is never simply incompatible with a content of the sort *p*: talk of their incompatibility always relates to a definite sort of combination of contents W(*a, b . . . p*) which includes *p*, and should now include *q* as well. The word 'should' certainly indicates an intention, a presentative and generally also a voluntary intention. (Hua XIX, p. 638)

There are two related claims here. First, the incompatibility of contents is never given in isolation, but always experienced in a certain context. To use Husserl's own example, the contents "red" and "green" are not incompatible per se, but only when thought of as covering the same surface at the same time (p. 641). Second, the context is specified by our "direction of interest," that is, by our "intention" to bring together the contents in question, to actually think of them as united in a certain intuitive whole. It is "the intention to such a unity" that "brings out a conflict *instead of* such a unity" (p. 639/254)—no intention of unity, no experience of conflict, no givenness of incompatibility.[27]

The intention of unity is inseparable from positing or assertive acts. As Husserl puts it: "talk of intention, of directed aiming, really only seems to suit assertive acts" (p. 650/262). Hence, "every actual identification or differentiation"—since it always involves an intention of unity—"is an assertive act" (p. 650/262). Now every categorial intuition that reveals the ideal possibility of certain categorial forms performs an actual identification in which an empty significative act is fulfilled; similarly, every categorial intuition that reveals the ideal impossibility or incompatibility of certain categorial forms performs an actual differentiation in which a synthesis intended by an empty significative act is shown to be in conflict with itself. It follows that pure logical possibility or impossibility is originally given only in assertive acts.

This account of categorial intuition and how it constitutes authentic logical insight suggests a different view of the normativity of logical laws than the two-level view implied by the instantiation model. For if the lawful limits of proper thinking are given through the possibility or impossibility of actually performing certain tasks of synthesis, and this possibility or impossibility can in turn only be properly given in our actual attempts at the required synthesis, which enjoys a much larger degree of freedom than the actual performance, then those lawful limits naturally take on a normative significance for these attempts. In other words, normativity emerges in the dynamic tension between actual trying and actual performance; the logical truth constituted in the latter (intuitive) acts is *immediately* normative for the former (significative) acts without having to go through transformation and application.

Thus, Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition already suggests a more promising account of the normativity of logic. However, such a view is not explicitly developed in the *LI*, although some formulations in chapter 8 seem to point in this direction.[28] The overall tenor of the text is dominated by the instantiation model,[29] and as long as he clings to this model, it is only consistent that he would deny the normative status of pure logic.

It is not until after 1908 that Husserl gradually sees the phenomenological untenability of the instantiation model as an account of the relation between acts of judgment and their ideal content (cf. Bernet et al., 1996, p. 159ff.). If the (prereflective) performance of judgment is inseparable from the implicit presence of its ideal content, and if this ideal content, as eidos, is the correlate of an act of ideation, then the very performance of judgment is *eo ipso* an implicit ideation, that is, an implicit ideating abstraction. This is hardly plausible as

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[27]Immediately after pointing out the indispensability of the intention, however, Husserl says that he will "ignore" this aspect in his account of the compatibility and incompatibility of contents (Hua XIX, p. 638/254).

[28]E.g.: "Und eben darum werden die apriorischen Gesetze des eigentlichen Denkens und des eigentlichen Ausdrückens zu Normen des bloß vermeinenden und uneigentlichen Denkens bzw. Ausdrückens" (Hua XIX, p. 727). See also Hua XIX, p. 720.

[29]See Hua XIX, pp. 717–718, 725–728. The instantiation model can allow that the laws of proper thinking "become norms for" our improper thinking, but this is a "psychological meaning" they receive as a result of the transformation-cum-application described in Section 1 (Hua XIX, p. 727/315–316).

a phenomenological description.[30] There is an undeniable phenomenological difference between ideating abstraction as the mode of givenness of eidos and categorial reflection as the mode of givenness of proposition. In the first case, we have a "consciousness of many individual particularities, out of which a generality stands out" (Hua XXVI, p. 201); more precisely, we compare these particularities, and necessarily subject them to an imagined variation and then grasp the ideal generality as that in which these exemplars coincide (Hua XXXVII, pp. 265–266). None of these is to be found in the categorial reflection that grasps a proposition. Here "we do not have to perform a generalizing abstraction"; "every judgment by itself means a proposition, and what is meant is from the start an ideality [*das Ideal*]" (p. 266).

To say that a judgment from the start contains its ideal meaning is not to say, however, that it suffices in that task all by itself. It "contains" its meaning only in the form of *intending* it, and it intends something ideal-identical only insofar as it is performed in the horizon-consciousness that this ideal-identical meaning *can* be meant by indefinitely many other acts of judgment, which are bound to itself by a synthesis of identification.[31] In a synthesis of identification, the many acts in correlation with an identical proposition are often not merely numerically different (due to differences in time, place, and person), but also characterized by differences in evidence (cf. Hua XIX, p. 614). Moreover, these acts with different degrees and levels of evidence are normally not held together haphazardly, but by an internal teleology, animated by our cognitive interest in optimal evidence (Hua XVII, p. 66).[32]

Of particular importance for our topic is the difference between vagueness (*Verworrenheit*) and distinctness (pp. 61–65). A proposition can be vaguely intended and then distinctively articulated, and it can show itself as identical across these different modes of givenness. In this transition from vagueness to distinctiveness, we make distinct to ourselves what we meant in an act of vague judgment, or what someone else vaguely said. A distinct judgment *explicates* the true intention of a vague judgment with "a fundamental type of 'evidence,'" which, like any other, "has its degrees of perfection" and "ideal limit of perfection" (pp. 73–74). "Explication," then, is a peculiar type of fulfillment: "vague judging bears within itself . . . an aiming, which is directed to the distinct judgment and which, if it attains this, becomes fulfilled therein" (p. 74/69).

Vague judging is thus an important type of empty intention; in fact, it is *the* type of empty significative act that is crucial to our understanding of the normativity of pure logic. As we have suggested above, normativity emerges in the dynamic tension between actual trying and

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[30]Beyond its phenomenological implausibility, it also leads to absurd consequences in the conceptual framework of the *LI*. See Sowa (2005, pp. 183) for a penetrating analysis of this point.

[31]"The proposition is for all these acts . . . something identical as the correlate of an identification, and not something general as the correlate of a coinciding by comparison" (Hua XXXVII, p. 266).

[32]We have argued that the instantiation model of proposition cannot preserve the crucial difference between actual judgment and judgment-in-phantasy. The new conception of proposition avoids this problem. It is totally unclear whether a judgment in pure phantasy can intend the same "proposition" and thereby "coincide" with my actual judgment that, e.g., "Water is H_2O." The problem is that the phantasy world can be totally unconnected to the real world, and the question whether what one feels like calling "water" in this phantasy world is the *same* as what we call water in the real world may have no determinate meaning at all. In that case, the judgment "Water is H_2O" in pure phantasy will not have the same meaning as an actual judgment made using the same words; the two will not form a synthesis of identification in the strict sense. Of course, there is some kind of synthesis of coincidence between an actual judgment and a judgment-in-phantasy, which allows us to speak of them as having the same "content." This same "content" is, however, not the full proposition each intends; it is the (mere) propositional content (*Satzinhalt, propositionale Inhalt*) or propositional matter (Hua XXX, p. 56; Hua XL pp. 153, 179).

The point here is that the "identificatory" conception of noematic meaning is more fine-tuned than its "ideational" predecessor. It allows us to mark the important distinction between the logical meanings of actual judgment and judgment-in-phantasy while also recognizing their commonality. In this way, the "identificatory" conception of noematic meaning is in a better position than the "ideational" version to express the insight that assertive force is essential to proposition in the logical sense. See Hua XXVI, pp. 202–219, esp. 210–214, on which the above clarification is based. For a detailed analysis of Husserl's critique of the species-conception of meaning as applied to "empirical meaning," see Sowa (2005, pp. 198). For a defense of the species-conception, see Hopp (2020, pp. 74–77).

actual performance; what is constituted in the actual and successful performance of logical synthesis (or "proper [*eigentlich*] thinking") presents itself as immediately normative for the attempts at such synthesis (or "improper [*uneigentlich*] thinking"). If a new account of the normativity of logic is to be built upon this idea, we must consider the proper and the improper as equally fundamental to logical thinking. On the instantiation model, however, the epistemic standing of the improper thinking[33] is far from clear. As far as I can see, it can only be understood as the imperfect instantiation of a particular judgment *in specie* that finds its perfect instantiation in the corresponding proper thinking (unless we are to tolerate the existence of vague judgment *in specie*!). If this is correct, improper thinking would have no logical or epistemological significance whatsoever; it would be nothing but a psychological indication of the weakness of the human mind.

On the new conception of proposition in terms of identification, on the other hand, the epistemic standing and significance of vague thinking is secured. A proposition is constituted as an ideal entity in the transition from vagueness to distinctness (and back). It is optimally given as itself in distinct judgments, but a distinct judgment is normally an articulation and explication of the vague intention(s) from which it emerges.[34] As Sokolowski puts it: "Our thoughts, the categorial objects we constitute, do not come finished and polished from the start"; "they are brought to distinctness out of the matrix of vagueness, which is a sort of basement and source for categoriality" (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 108, 111).[35] Vagueness is thus the permanent situation in which our logical thinking finds itself and from which it never definitively departs; as such, it codetermines the very meaning of the categorial objectivities that are constituted in our logical thinking. In particular, it enters into the sense-determination of the laws of logic as both ideal and normative.

6 | *SINNGENESIS* AND A NEW ARTICULATION OF LOGIC

The "identificatory" conception of proposition is a natural companion to the doctrine of categorial intuition. Together, they make it possible to think of pure logic as a normative discipline. As we have seen, the 1920/24 lectures on ethics endorses this view, though all the necessary conceptual preparations are already present in the 1917/18 lectures *Logic and General Theory of Science* (Hua XXX). Both lectures distinguish between a noematic science of propositions from a noetic science of acts. In the 1917/18 lectures, only the noetic science is explicitly characterized in normative terms. In the 1920/24 lectures, on the other hand, normativity is supposed to pertain *in the first place* to noematic entities. "The specifically normative predicates"—including truth and falsity—are such that, according to their essence, "only senses, concretely speaking, only propositions can be their subjects" (Hua XXXVII, p. 268; see also Hua XXVI, p. 195). These normative predicates can also, in a modified form, be applied to intentional acts, but only in a derivative [*übertragen*] sense: the act that judges a true proposition judges correctly (Hua XXXVII, pp. 271–272). Here, finally, we arrive at the position that appears to be diametrically opposed to that of the *Prolegomena*: the laws of pure logic, as ideal laws based on the concept of truth (and other essentially related concepts), have normativity in their content,

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[33]To be exact, I am talking only about the improper in the sense of vagueness. On the many guises of the improper in Husserl's thought and the source of this idea in Brentano, see Majolino (2008).

[34]The "transcendental" tenor of this new account of proposition is unmistakable, though it is not always explicitly stated as such in the Husserlian texts on which our discussion is based. For example, § 16 and § 21 of *FTL*, on which our discussion of vagueness is based, are located in the first part of the book, on formal, rather than transcendental, logic. However, in the second part, on transcendental logic, Husserl repeatedly revisits the same discussion and retrospectively recognizes its implicit transcendental character (see Hua XVII, pp. 186–187, 191–200, 223 f.).

[35]On the general significance of vagueness, not only in issues of logic, but also in the ordinary use of language and political life, see Sokolowski ([1978] 2017, pp. 79–86).

and this is because the very notion of proposition—and of truth as it figures in the domain of propositions—brings in the element of normativity.

But one may wonder whether the appearance of such a polar opposition does not boil down to a mere terminological difference. Can we not just say that Husserl now *defines* the term "pure logic" differently? In an important sense the difference is indeed definitional, but the redefinition is based on an essential insight concerning the internal articulation of pure logic. In fact, the old idea of a nonnormative science of ideal meaning is not discarded; it is retained under a reinterpretation. It is no longer considered as pure *logic* in the full and proper sense, but is reconceived under the title of "pure theory of senses" (*reine Sinneslehre*), as an underlayer of logic in the proper sense (Hua XVII, p. 142).

In *LI* (as well as in the 1906/1907 lectures *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge*), Husserl thinks of pure apophantic logic as consisting of two layers: a pure grammar and a theory of validity (Hua XIX, pp. 723–724; Hua XXIV, pp. 71–73). The former establishes the laws of minimal meaningfulness, the outer limit of improper thinking, while the latter deals with the properly logical laws that demarcate possible truths from formal and real absurdities. In *FTL*, however, Husserl introduces a new definition of logic as consisting of three layers. On top of the previous two layers, which together form "the pure theory of senses," he now introduces truth-logic [*Wahrheitslogik*] as a third layer, and the second layer is correspondingly reinterpreted as consequence-logic [*Konsequenzlogik*]. The concepts of truth and falsity are excluded from the second layer and assigned to the third. Consequence-logic is concerned with formal apophantic structures, which is considered as a domain on its own, without reference to how the world really is. It studies the relations of compatibility and contradiction among such propositional forms on the basis of a specific kind of evidence: the evidence of distinctness. Truth-logic transforms these laws of compatibility or noncontradiction into laws of possible truth by (re)connecting the sphere of propositional forms with what "the judger wants to attain 'by way of' his judgment," that is, how the world really is; it thus appeals to a different kind of evidence: the evidence of clarity (Hua XVII, p. 65).

This static view of the three-layer structure of pure logic (based on chapter 1 of *FTL*) gives the impression that truth-logic arises by the subsequent addition of the concept of truth to consequence-logic. This is misleading, in that it makes the introduction of the concept of truth seem like a mysterious operation. One is left wondering "how it ever brings this 'true' into its formal generalities" (Hua XVII, p. 199), and we seem to find ourselves in the neighborhood of the ominous epistemological problem of how a self-enclosed realm of meaning is supposed to map onto reality. But of course, Husserl's phenomenology is meant precisely to defuse questions like this, and this becomes manifest in the second, genetic account of the relation between consequence-logic and truth-logic (in chapters 4 and 5 of *FTL*). In this genetic view, Husserl makes it clear that only the third, crowning layer of logic (i.e., truth-logic) is logic in the original and proper sense, to which the character of normativity inseparably belongs. Consequence-logic, which does not include normativity in its content, can only be established later, by abstracting from "the specifically logical aim" of truth-logic and thereby excluding questions about truth and the concept of truth itself (p. 145; cf. Pradelle, 2012, pp. 359–360).

Truth-logic (with its normative character) enjoys the original status vis-à-vis consequence-logic, because it is the normative interest in truth that is responsible for the original givenness of the dimension of the apophantic, which consequence-logic then investigates as a domain closed in itself, cut off from its relation to truth (and the world). It is only apparently paradoxical that consequence-logic, by restricting itself to "the constituent properties belonging to them *as* judgments" and including "nothing that goes beyond what appertains to their own essentiality" (Hua XVII, pp. 68, 142–143), misses precisely what is most characteristic of judgment as a form of intentionality, that is, its intentional relation to states of affairs and its teleological orientation toward truth. The paradox is only apparent, because it belongs to the

essence of intentionality in general that it points beyond itself. In the present case, this means that a judgment-as-act is not primarily directed at "what pertains to its own essentiality" but at states of affairs in the world. In a sense, a judgment does contain a proposition as what is proper to itself, whether or not the intended state of affairs actually obtains. However, propositions do not constitute a separate domain, isolated from states of affairs, waiting to be mapped onto the latter. Rather, they are originally states of affairs *as supposed.*[36]

According to Husserl, the differentiation of propositions and states of affairs—and thus the original givenness of the dimension of the apophantic—is an achievement of the critical attitude. Prior to the adoption of the critical attitude, the judging subject is directed at the objects that engage her (cognitive or practical) interest. She lives through her activity of judging, and though a philosophical observer may "find" a proposition implied in her judgment, this proposition is in no way present to her in her first-person perspective. She may address her judgment (e.g., "The bus will be here in 10 minutes") to another person, and if that second person simply accepts what she says, he will simply register the fact, and a proposition is no more present in his first-person experience. Something new appears if this second person has reason to be skeptical and adopts a critical attitude toward what the first person says. He will then take the fact reported by the first person with caution; he will take it as supposed by the other person. He is now dealing with a proposition, to be verified or falsified. One may also adopt a critical attitude toward one's own judgment; experiences of past failures and disappointments in one's own judgments or of purported facts that were disconnected from the world and discarded as unacceptable provide ample motivation. In the critical attitude, we focus on the supposed, intended fact as supposed, distinguished from the actually existing objectivity, that is, the state of affairs (in truth).[37]

Thus, whether in oneself or vis-à-vis another, it is the adoption of the critical attitude, animated by "an epistemic striving directed at truth" (Husserl, 1999, p. 341), that brings the dimension of the apophantic to its original givenness. The apophantic and the ontological domains are thus distinguished as two *moments* within the critical horizon dominated by our interest in truth; they should not be treated as two separate pieces, each existing independently in itself, thereby creating the problem of how the one relates to the other. The apophantic dimension is thus essentially oriented toward the ontological as its measure; it is, as Sokolowski writes, "teleologically oriented to being brought back to the domain of objects and facts, they are meant to match registered things and facts, and even when they are canceled and abandoned they have this sense of abandonment because they fail to match the way things are" (Sokolowski, 1974, p. 729).

In short, the apophantic dimension, originating as it does in the critical attitude, is essentially a normative dimension. Truth-logic, as the science of the apophantic, inherits the essentially normative orientation of its subject matter, its task being "to lay down eidetic laws of possibility" for putative knowledge and theories "in advance and *as norms*" (Hua XVII, p. 144; emphasis added; see also pp. 199, 208). Consequence-logic, on the other hand, is characterized by a different attitude. Taking over the apophantic domain as constituted in the critical attitude, it reverses the original normative interest and takes a matter-of-fact [*sachlich*] interest in the internal structure of this domain (Hua XXXVII, pp. 267ff.). This change of attitude deprives propositions of their assertive force and reduces them to pure senses. Hence the emergence of a nonnormative "pure theory of senses."

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[36]Husserl's genetic/genealogical account of the relation between propositions and states of affairs is developed in §§ 41–44 of *FTL*; §§ 66–71 of *Experience and Judgment* are also relevant. For a concise and insightful commentary, see Sokolowski (1974, pp. 43–56, 271–283).

[37]Husserl himself does not highlight the essentially intersubjective context of the genesis of the apophantic domain. I have followed Sokolowski in locating this genesis primarily in the exchange of words between two or more speakers. See, apart from the passages from the previous note, also Sokolowski (2008, pp. 177–181).

The genetic approach teaches us to see the pure senses not as an isolated and self-sufficient domain of timeless ideality, but as having a sense-genesis (*Sinngenesis*; Hua XVII, p. 215). This fits well with the "identificational" conception of propositions discussed earlier, according to which propositions are constituted as ideal entities in the transition from vagueness to distinctness. Together they remind us of a "fundamental presupposition" of pure logic: "it relates to the openly infinite range of possible judgments and *presupposes their ideal identity*" (p. 191).

Becoming aware of this fundamental presupposition clarifies an otherwise puzzling question about the normativity of logical laws. Husserl tells us that the theme of consequence-logic is the genus "distinct judgment" activity (Hua XVII, p. 67). In other words, the domain of consequence-logic is determined by the concept of proper judgment, that is, that which is constituted in the explicit and proper performance of judging. The question it raises while remaining in this domain concerns the "*universal* forms pertaining to the performing of a distinct judging," that is, the formal relations constitutive of the unity of one judgment that can be properly performed (p. 69). Consequence-logic, then, seems to be a purely descriptive project to establish the laws of compossibility and incompatibility that define the structure of the apophantic domain. Truth-logic, which transforms these formal laws of noncontradiction into conditions for the possibility of truth, introduces "no new discipline, but only the specifically logical function" (p. 198). Its domain is then proper judgments considered as candidates for truth, while its laws describe the structure of this domain. If this is so, how *can* the laws of truth-logic be normative? What can they be normative *for*?

Husserl's answer, as we have seen, appeals to the existence of improper, that is, vague, judgments. Logical laws are normative for improper judgments. This presupposes that proper and improper judgments, *in their mutual inseparability*, constitute the domain of truth-logic. In Husserl's initial, static account of the three-layered structure of pure logic, however, the broadest concept of judgment, which includes both the proper and the improper, is said to be the domain of pure logical grammar, that is, the first layer of logic (Hua XVII, p. 75). In other words, the improper and the proper are assigned separately to two different layers of pure logic, as if to separate regions in the sky of idealities. Genetic phenomenology, by reminding us of the "fundamental presupposition" of pure logic, allows us to see that this initial impression is misleading. Pure apophantic analysis takes for granted the ideal identity of the propositions with which it deals. It presupposes, in other words, that "an identity extends through all rightly performed thinking" and that the identity has been properly accomplished (pp. 193–194). Now, the accomplishment of an identical proposition consists crucially in bringing it to distinctness out of the matrix of vagueness, that is, in carrying out, with evidence, the transitional synthesis from improper to proper judgment. Thus, the proper and the improper are not separate domains belonging to different layers of logic, but inseparable moments in the accomplishment of identical propositions, which is logic's fundamental presupposition.

Moreover, the transition from improper to proper, from vagueness to distinctness, is not achieved once and for all. A distinct judgment, once attained, inevitably falls back into vagueness due to the mechanism of sedimentation, thus necessitating constant restitution, which then gives rise to the task of assuring that the restituted is indeed the same as the original evidence (Hua XVII, p. 192; cf. Sokolowski, 2000, p. 166). Thus, logic's fundamental presupposition points to accomplishments and tasks that are often not fully realized as required. What genetic reflection reveals as a fundamental presupposition is in fact "an ideal, which has never been fulfilled in practice and which presumably can never be fulfilled" (Hua XVII, p. 195). What distinguishes an ideal from a mere fiction? Nothing but its normative force. Hence, this ideal at the basis of logic must be considered "an *effective fundamental norm* (*wirkliche Grundnorm*) pertaining inseparably to the possibility of genuine science" (p. 195). The fundamental *presupposition* of logic turns out to be a fundamental *norm* for all science—always to ensure the ideal identity of one's propositions, always to carry out and to renew the transition from vagueness to distinctness. This fundamental norm infuses the descriptive laws of

consequence-logic with a normative sense, making it possible for truth-logic to be a science that is at once ideal and normative.[38]

7 | CONCLUSION

We have identified three steps in Husserl's evolving analysis of judgment and proposition leading to the normative conception of pure logic.[39] *Firstly*, Husserl rejects the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force that is implied by "Brentano's thesis" as applied to judgment. Against Brentano, Husserl proposes a conception of judgment according to which assertion and categorial articulation are inseparable moments in the manifestation of states of affairs. This conception aligns with Husserl's account of categorial intuition, which contains his fundamental insight into the phenomenological source of our logical knowledge. However, the instantiation model in *LI* stands in the way of a consistent development of this insight. The *second* step, then, is to replace the instantiation model with a new conception of proposition as the correlate of identification. This new conception secures the epistemic standing of improper (or vague) thinking and, combined with the doctrine of categorial intuition, makes possible a normative understanding of the ideal laws of proper (or distinct) thinking. *Finally*, the genetic approach uncovers the sense-genesis of ideal propositions and pure logic. By highlighting the epistemic interest implicit in the synthesis of identification, it brings out the normative character of the apophantic dimension. By drawing attention to the different directions of interest and possible changes of attitude, it clarifies the relation between truth-logic as a normative science and consequence-logic as a descriptive science.

The genetic approach integrates the preceding stages' insights to round out Husserl's account of the normativity of logic. By exposing the fundamental presupposition of logic that consists in taking for granted the ideal identity of propositions, it carries forward the account of proposition in terms of identification. The interplay of the vague and the distinct is essential to the accomplishment of identical propositions, the accomplishment which is shown to be a fundamental norm that determines the very meaning of logical laws. Pure logic is normative, because the achievement of distinctness is an ideal with normative force.[40]

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[38]The discussion of logic's fundamental presupposition in the last paragraphs belongs to "transcendental logic" (it is textually based on chapter 3 of part 2 of *FTL*), but it clearly takes up many themes and threads of our earlier discussion (on formal logic), with which it is more or less continuous. Again, we see that in Husserl's writings on logic, the formal and the transcendental are often not clearly separated. Reflections on formal logic gradually move into the transcendental register, which appears as a deepening repetition of the initial formal reflections.

[39]This can be seen as a development of Cobb-Stevens's (1998) illuminating account of the "two stages in Husserl's critique of Brentano's theory of judgment." By focusing on the issue of normativity, my account highlights aspects of the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that go unnoticed in Cobb-Stevens's account.

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