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ILLiad TN: 415498

Journal Title: The Philosophical Forum

Volume: 12

Issue: 2

Month/Year: 1980-1

Pages: 139-158

Article Author: Dilworth, John

Article Title: Representation and
Resemblance

Imprint:

Call #: B31 .P5

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19 Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," pp. 271-272.

20 Israel Scheffler, *The Anatomy of Inquiry* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 119.

21 Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," p. 273.

22 An exception is Richard Taylor, *Action and Purpose* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 231.

23 Jacques Monod, therefore, is incorrect when, in *Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971), p. 9, he says, "Every artifact is a product made by a living being which through it expresses, in a particularly conspicuous manner, one of the fundamental characteristics common to all living beings without exception: that of being *objects endowed with a purpose or project* . . ."

24 In my "Wimsatt on Function Statements," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 8 (1977), 341-347, I argue that a statement about purpose does not imply reference to consciousness. William C. Wimsatt, in his "Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function Statements," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 3 (1972), 12, sees such reference as a "detachable implication," whatever that is.

25 For sources relevant to this argument, see Monod and also Erwin Schrodinger, *What Is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell and Mind and Matter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

26 Monod, pp. 64-66.

27 Larry Wright, in *Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), adds, pp. 30-31, "Accordingly, we should view with suspicion any analysis that contends that goal-directedness consists in a relationship among parameters of which we are usually quite ignorant in the contexts of these reliable judgments."

REPRESENTATION AND RESEMBLANCE

JOHN B. DILWORTH

I

1. The concept of representation is a problematic one. So is that of resemblance or similarity. But both concepts can be clarified via a modification of Wittgenstein's notion of a "family-resemblance."¹ I shall introduce an extended version of that notion, specifically relevant to representational objects, after presenting some arguments which show the need for it.

My discussion will be confined to those central cases of representation or depiction which are such that a requirement for a picture to be *of X* (of a man, for instance) is that a normal observer can derive enough information just from perceiving it to describe or classify it in an X-related way.² I shall defend the view that what is involved in such X-related description is simply recognizing or seeing X (or, seeing the picture *as X*), and that reductive accounts of these intuitively natural locutions are wrong. A neglected complexity in the concept of resemblance or similarity as applied to pictures will be discussed: "looking like" must be distinguished from "objectively similar." I also go beyond the usual criticisms of similarity-criteria for representation in two ways, by showing that specific *dissimilarities* are often required, and that an implication of a similarity criterion — that a picture represents only those aspects of an object to which it is similar — is false. The extended notion of "family-resemblance" mentioned is then used to tie together my broadly non-conventionalist approach to picturing.

Consider the view that something can only be a *picture* of a man if one can see it *as* a man.³ Now, the notion "of seeing something as" is narrower than that of representation. It is not the case that whenever one looks at a

picture, and sees what it is a picture of, one must be seeing it *as* something. With many pictures, one just straightforwardly *sees* what it is a picture of, just as when one sees a fork one does not see it *as* a fork. I suggest that the explanation of this is to the effect that, whenever we ordinarily refer to a certain object by a word X, if this same word is to follow the "I see...", then no "as" is required. We only say "I see it *as* X" when "it" would not standardly be labelled "X."

This being so, a minimum requirement for at least some pictures of a man is that one should be able to see a man when one looks at them. Now, is the man whom one sees on these occasions in the picture, or on the picture? If it is a picture of some particular man X, it seems reasonable to say that one sees X, and that he is *in* the picture. But, a picture of X is of course not X himself; more strictly, those areas of paint on the canvas which represent X are not X himself. Yet it is these, and only these, on which in fact one's seeing is directed. So how can it be correct for one to assert that when one looks at the picture, one sees X?

It is no help to say that what one in fact sees is a picture of X, for it seems that often a minimum requirement for something to be a picture of X is that one can see X when one looks at it. So this is to say no more than that one sees X (plus perhaps some background, and a frame).

Those pictures of which it is reasonable to say that one could see certain areas of their paint *as* a man are not immune from this difficulty; for they are merely ones which require some sort of special effort, or nonstandard conditions of some kind, before one can see what it is possible for them to picture. One sees the man only intermittently, perhaps; or by paying special initial attention to certain configurations in the paint. But given that these special conditions are realized, one just *sees* the man, as one does in the standard cases.⁵

There are several ways in which one might attempt to resolve the difficulty. I shall state what I think to be the main ones, and show that none of them are satisfactory.

One would be to deny that the picture *does* here and now present one with the real man X. Instead, it shows one what the real X *would* look like if one were to look at him under certain conditions, or in certain situations.

This view has several failings. For instance, it only displaces the problem somewhat, from that of how just looking at some paint can show one the real man to how the same can show one what the real man would look like. Also, it only seems reasonable at all for extremely naturalistic pictures; it would commonly be simply false that the picture showed one what X would look like under *any* circumstances.

How could it show me what X would look like, if I were "there?" If I am to see something actual, and not merely something hypothetical, whatever

that would mean, it would seem that I have to *imagine* I am seeing X under those conditions; I have to surrender to the illusion that I am there, looking at X.⁶ But clearly this is unsatisfactory also. Just as one does not have to be deceived into thinking that X himself is in front of one before one can see that some object is a picture of X, so also one does not have to imagine that one is looking at X himself, before one can see X in the picture. Nor does one have to ignore the frame, the flat surface and the brushmarks; these may heighten one's appreciation of X as he is in this picture. There does not have to be something which one must be deceived about, or must succeed in deceiving oneself about, before one can see X.

Another objection would be that it is possible to have a picture of something which *could* not be an ordinary state of affairs, so that the picture could not show one what that state of affairs would look like. An example would be a picture showing one and the same man in two different places at once, for instance having a duel with himself.⁷ And there are probably other objections too.

2. An alternative way of resolving the difficulty might be thought to be that of explaining what it is for a picture to represent something in terms of its effect upon those who look at it. The problem is not how the paint surface can show us a man, such a view might run, but rather how it manages to produce a man-like effect upon us. The problem is not one of how the painting can have a man as part of its surface, but merely that of how we can be affected in ways which make us "think of" a man. It is not an object of perception, but a releaser of certain thoughts and feelings.

One form of this sort of view, that form which takes as its paradigms cases where we describe people, is open to a stock refutation. For instance, if a certain picture were described as "melancholy," this view would explain our applying this word to it by saying that we call it melancholy because it produces melancholy feelings in us. But of course, a melancholy picture need never cause such feelings in anyone. (It may cause delight in all who see it.) This obviously false view needs mentioning because it most probably underlies the more general form of this view: a picture is of something Y if it causes one to have thoughts or feelings about Y, or in general to engage in some sort of Y-centered activity. Put like this, it is vague enough to be not immediately rejected, and can avoid the problems of what it is for something to be a representation by transferring them to the realm of questions about the quirks of our psychology (questions which can more honorably be left unanswered.)

But this view does more than just shelve the question; it also begs it. For the question arose in the first place because there are certain objects which can be seen as X, etc., although they are not in fact X, etc.; these objects we

call pictures. Now according to the theory, to see an object as X (I take the "seeing as" case for convenience) is to have certain thoughts and feelings which are X-centered in the presence of that object. So, we call anything a picture of X when we have these X-feelings, etc., in its presence. But then the having of such feelings cannot explain *why* it is a picture of X, since the criterion for it being a picture of X just is our having these feelings, etc.

Hare makes a similar point about the word "good." Saying that certain pictures are good cannot be just a matter of saying that they arouse admiration from certain selected experts; for if we then wish to say that these experts have good taste in pictures, that they admire good pictures, we shall only succeed in saying that they admire those pictures which they admire, on *this* definition of "good."

The third main view which I shall consider is that a picture represents X, that we can apply the word "X" with its ordinary meaning to the picture, by virtue of certain characteristics which the picture and the real object have in common. That it is not sufficient to say that the picture *looks like* the object it depicts, or that *similarities* can be seen between them should be clear, for this is question-begging in the same sort of way as the view just considered. For it is probably because this object "looks like" X that we are prepared to call it a picture of X in the first place. Also, this sort of "similarity" is compatible with there being very little "objective similarity" between X and the picture of X. (By "*objective similarity*" I mean roughly those characteristics of each which give the same readings on an instrument used on both of them; for instance, areas of each are "objectively similar" in color if giving off light of the same frequency. This can be extended to simple relational characteristics; more complex ones present difficulties, some of which I shall detail later.) So for the third view to be an explanation of why or how the picture depicts, it is necessary that the characteristics alleged to be "similar" in both be objectively similar.⁹

3. Does a picture represent by virtue of certain objective similarities alone? I shall argue that certain dissimilarities, the specific kind depending on the objects in question, are also necessary, in most cases. Several things can be said against the view that objective similarities alone are enough. One is that two things may objectively resemble each other in certain ways, without our wanting to say that either is a picture of, or represents, the other. (Indeed, all physical objects resemble each other in *some* ways.) Another is that too many objectively similar characteristics in two objects debar either from representing the other, for there comes a state when each becomes of the *same* sort.

These two points being so, it is tempting to suppose that representations must lie somewhere within these limits, having enough objective similarities in common with their objects to avoid having just chance resemblance to

them, while not having so many objective similarities that they become merged in the same groups as their objects. Yet this alone will still not suffice, for there are plenty of quite similar things, not possessing all the defining characteristics of each other's groups, which yet are not (and would be hard to regard as) representations or models of each other. An example would be bowling pins, truncheons and baseball bats.

It must be admitted that *some* representations might be accountable for simply on the basis of similarity alone. For instance, objects having exactly the same shape can almost always represent one another, provided that they are sufficiently dissimilar in other ways so as not to be of the same sort as each other. But these cases are not standard ones, as can be seen from the fact that two objects of the same shape can presumably represent *each other*. Yet normally, if one object A can represent another B, it is not also the case that B can represent A.

Of course, if two objects only resemble each other in some respects, it is a necessary truth that there must be also some ways in which they do *not* objectively resemble each other. And for each of the two objects, there will be a more or less definite range of ways in which, while keeping the objective similarities to the other object, it may vary its "dissimilarities." Now I suggest that the central cases of representation are those where there is *not* entire freedom as to what dissimilarities are also part of each: the presence of certain specific dissimilarities is required. A good example is provided by the caricature. An important element of a caricature is that certain characteristics of the well-known person's face are exaggerated, so that the objective proportions of the drawing of the face are not the same as those of the original. Yet one point of this is just to make the drawing instantly recognizable as being of that person; the objective dissimilarities are what make it look more similar to him than to anybody else (and probably more so than a strictly accurate drawing would be able to).

In admitting above that not all representations might require more than some objective similarities, I am not committed to abandoning the hope of subsuming all cases of representation under one sort of explanation. For these special cases might be treated simply as a trivial case of the standard sort of representation, when the requirement concerning which particular dissimilarities must be present is relaxed to cover the presence of any dissimilarities which do not actually prevent that object from being an example of that sort of object.

To give teeth to my contention that more is required than some objective similarities between two objects for one to represent the other, consider a corollary of that view: that the representing object only represents *some* characteristics of the original, not all of them. This is a corollary, for the following reasons. If a representation has its objective similarities to the

original scattered over its surface, and each of these is enclosed in a small area surrounding it, the rest of the representation not thus surrounded will not contain any objective similarities to the original. Hence the rest cannot represent any part of the original, *ex hypothesi*. But if the representation has a rough similarity of shape to the original, there will be areas of the original which would have to be represented, if at all, in those areas not containing an objective similarity. Hence the representation cannot represent all characteristics of the original.

It could be objected to this that it is unfair to consider individual areas in isolation; all the objective similarities represent the whole man, but there is no reason why some of them should represent parts of him. This is implausible, for one can cover up all the parts of a drawing except the arm, and still correctly say that those lines represent an arm. But this view is still inadequate (that some objective similarities can represent all the characteristics of the original). For, the "characteristics" of the original which must be represented are the *objective* characteristics of the original; a picture of a man, for instance, is most commonly a picture of a real flesh-and-blood man, not just of some object which happens to look like a man. (It would be ridiculous to suggest that all pictures of men are pictures of very-cleverly-made fake men. In any case, such a suggestion would only push the problem back a stage; for in virtue of what does a fake man represent a real man so convincingly?) Yet it is hard to see how *all* of these can be represented just by the objective similarities. For if each of them represents more than one objective characteristic of the object, each of them is no longer objectively similar to what each represents, but only to part of what each represents. But this clearly makes nonsense of the notion of "objective similarity" (for anything could be allowed as the other part, breaking down the distinction between it and "ordinary" similarity).

Is this still unfair, using as it does a notion of correlating elements of each? But the argument will work just as well if all the objective similarities are considered as making up one complex object on the surface of the original. This would make nonsense of the notion of an objective similarity, as before, for the complex object would be correlated with something *in toto* not identical with itself. In any case this "scattered objective similarity" view would find it very difficult to explain why a given representation was "of" that particular sort of object, and not of any other possessing the same objective similarities. This is also a criticism of the objective similarity view in general, even when not coupled with the assertion that one object represents all the characteristics of the original. (And it can be a powerful criticism, for many representations have hardly any objective similarities to an original. Indeed, some have none at all, beyond perhaps complex relational ones themselves only arrived at by inter-

preting the measurements of each object in the light of some theory. Again, more of this later.)

Another case to be considered is that when the objective similarities amount to a whole "mode" of the representation, for instance, if the whole of the shape, or the color, is objectively similar to that of the original. Can the possession of some such modes represent all the contents of the other relevant modes in the original, whatever the actual contents of these non-represented modes happen to be in the representation? For instance, is the shape alone sufficient to represent all the characteristics of a man, whatever color or textures are enclosed within that shape? But as already seen, it is unlikely that this could represent a man at all, let alone all the characteristics of one (if this is indeed a further step), if anything is allowed to fill in the characteristics of "this."

For brevity I shall omit any consideration of cases with a much higher proportion of objective similarities; at least it is true that some representations which are so only by virtue of objective similarities could not represent all the characteristics of the original, as long as one is free to specify what dissimilarities they are to have (*viz.*, *not* those necessary to complete the object's qualifications for being a representation of that object). So this sort of view certainly cannot cover all cases of representation.

Is it a *failing* of the view which I have been attacking that it is unable to account for some object representing, in at least many cases, all the objective characteristics of the original? It might be held that in fact representations do no such thing as represent "all the characteristics of the original" (I assume throughout that by this is meant those characteristics of the original object which can be observed in it from a point of view the same as that in which the painting, e.g., represents it in.) For instance, how could a black-and-white photograph possibly show one the vivid redness of the beach ball, the blue of the sea?

But wanting to say this just shows the hypnotic attraction of the view I have been attacking: that an object could represent by virtue of objective similarities alone. Briefly, it construes representing as a *re-presenting* of the "object" itself: when this is plainly not entirely possible (when the representing object does not possess all the objective characteristics of the original) it falls back on saying that then only some of the characteristics are represented (or *could* be represented). But, a picture does not show me (in this use of "show") the object: it "shows" me a picture of the object. It is a picture of the object which I am presented with, not the object itself. And what the picture shows me (in another use of the word "show") is without much doubt ordinary colored sea, and the sand is fairly obviously of the ordinary buff-colored variety.

But is one entitled to say more in such cases than that it is a picture of a

monochrome beach scene? What right has one to infer (even automatically) that the sand in the picture is anything other than grey?

It could perhaps be accepted as being a picture of a grey landscape, if there were indications that it was morning or evening, overcast, and so on, but with the strong shadows and general sunbathing, it is clearly not so. Indeed (a clinching point), it could not count as a photograph of an *ordinary* beach at all if it were merely a picture of some monochrome objects. For ordinary beach scenes never are thus in our experience; and perhaps never could be thus. An even more clinching case would be a black-and-white photograph of a spectrum, because by definition a spectrum is an assortment of colored bands.

In a nutshell, this view confuses objective characteristics with representations of those characteristics. And it is representations of those characteristics which are under discussion.¹⁰

To summarize the conclusions of this section. When one looks at a picture of a man, one sees a man. One does not just see what the man would look like if one were to look at the man himself, nor need one be under any sort of illusion of doing some such thing. Conversely, one's seeing a man when one looks at a picture of one is not simply a matter of some effect that this object, ordinarily called "a picture," has on oneself; it is in some way connected with the characteristics of the picture-object (i.e., the frame, the canvas, and the paint on it) itself. When one sees the man, one need not compare this picture-object with anything; yet it is on this object, or certain areas of its paint, that one's attention is in fact directed.

Most representations, at least, represent not merely by virtue of some objective similarities to the original, but also by at least some (often fairly specific) dissimilarities. Yet although this is so, it is still the case that a picture-object (for instance) represents all the characteristics which one would expect to be able to observe from its perspective. One good reason for its doing this is that a necessary condition for a correct assertion that "it is a picture of X" is that it would represent all these characteristics of X.

Thus this section has in effect showed: that the word "man," presumably with its ordinary meaning (see next section) can correctly be applied to the picture-object itself, and also that the different use of the same word (since a picture of a man is not itself a man) is marked by the presence or absence of fairly specific dissimilarities, as well as of similarities; not any dissimilarities will do if *this* word is to be correctly applied here.

II

1. I suggested here at the beginning of the paper that Wittgenstein's notion of a "family resemblance"¹¹ could, in some extended form, be helpful to the present inquiry. Now that some more threads are available, I shall try to draw them all together with the aid of it.

Wittgenstein introduced the notion in the process of arguing against the view that there must be something in common in, something similar in, all the things which we call by the same name. Instead, "we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail."¹² (His "similarities" can be taken to be what I have been calling "objective similarities," for he of course agrees that games at least "have in common" the characteristic of being games, and it is this "non-objective similarity" as it might be called, which people try to explain by talk of a "similarity" common to all of them. It would not serve as an explanation, and he would not be able to insist that it was a false explanation, if "similarity," both in the view he is attacking and in his own retort, did not mean something fairly close to my "objective similarity.") He goes on: "I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances;' for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way. — And I shall say: 'games' form a family."

I want to use the notion much more for its suggestion of the possible complexity of the relations between things called by the same name, than for its covert suggestion that these might be accounted for in terms of resemblances, rather than similarities. Bambrough¹³ argued that Wittgenstein has in effect solved the traditional problem of "universals" with this notion; Aaron¹⁴ pointed out that if it is to be used for these purposes all the traditional arguments against resemblance theories (for instance, that resemblance is still always in some respect) apply to it. But it is enough for my purposes to let the notion rest upon the assertion of complex similarities (and, I would probably wish to add, dissimilarities). Nor do I wish to lay great emphasis on the supposed "inexhaustible complexity" of ordinary language; even games probably have a fairly well-defined skeleton, even if they do not possess a single backbone.

I want to consider a certain sort of addition to the ordinary family of a word: when a word like "dog," for instance, comes to be applied to objects which only represent, or are representations of, dogs; for instance to a china dog, or to a dog in a picture. Such objects I shall call "*adopted*" members of the family in question. When applied to them, the family name is typically only used in qualified form (a *china* dog; a man *made of marble*),

though it need not be so qualified when there is little danger of misunderstanding (the host is unlikely to meet with baffled incredulity when he remarks upon the elephant on his shelf). However, the predicates in these cases do not function like ordinary predicates; a china dog is not a sort of dog in the way that a small, wiry dog is. Which point can be put more generally as follows: a model dog is not a sort of dog, although it may be a model of some sort of dog. And hence any particular sort of model of a dog is not a sort of dog.

In logical terms, a relevant characteristic of words like "picture" is that they function "attributively," rather than "predicatively," to use Geach's terminology.¹⁵ That is, they do not denote any specific qualities, relations or properties independently of what it is that they are applied to: like "real" and other such words, they function in context as much to exclude certain properties as to include others. If I am right, "picture of" and similar phrases are special cases of "attributions," and may be able to throw some light on the rest.

Thus, one point of calling such an object an "adopted" member of the family of things which can have the word "dog" applied to them is to bring out that it is not in itself any sort of dog, but that it is capable of being treated as, or seen as, some sort of dog. I argued in the previous section that if a picture is of a man (and the same goes for: if the model is of a dog), then the word "man" can be correctly applied to the picture (or model) itself; it does not apply in some elliptical way to something else.

The kind of word being considered here has the grammatical characteristic of being able to take part in locutions either of the form "a model X," or "a model of X." The latter is by no means easy to analyze, for though a picture of X clearly is thus because of certain relations it bears to an ordinary X (I argued that this was a compound of similarities and dissimilarities in the previous section), one sees that something is a model of X not by comparing it with a real X but by recognizing it as an X. And even in cases where there is an overt comparison, either direct or via "mental images" or some such, it would seem that there must have been at least some prior recognition of the possibility of it being a model of X, for one to want to undertake such a comparison.

Another way of posing the issue concerning such phrases is to ask what the word "Skye," for instance, refers to in "a picture of Skye." The answer may be that it can "refer to" either the real place itself, or the place in the picture, when that picture is of Skye. But that this last is even a possible alternative is enough to throw doubt on whether "a picture of X" must be of overtly relational form. It is clear that it is possible, for on being asked what place is shown in a photograph one is exhibiting, one can say "that is Skye," meaning the place to be seen in that photograph. That is, it is some

parts of the photograph itself, interpreted in a certain way, which one is here referring to. This is backed up by certain other interchanges that might take place. If one says that this is Skye, pointing to the "contents" of the photograph, someone could quite naturally ask one whether Skye really looks like "this." (*Not*: whether this really looks like Skye.) But if one's "Skye," and "this" referred to the real place itself, it would be absurd for the questioner to ask whether Skye looked like "this"; for "Skye" in those circumstances *is* "this." I have also already argued against such an elliptical interpretation of things said about pictures.¹⁶

If we accept these points, our main question now becomes: what makes a given object a *picture* of X, rather than just an X (i.e., a sort of X)? The dissimilarities to most X's are not sufficient, for it might just be the case that the family of X is more loose-knit than one had realized. With a word like "real," one can at least think of specific sorts of occasion on which it would be used for certain specific purposes; for instance, real cream is that which among other things is not of the synthetic variety. And, there are tests for real cream. But what are the tests for an object being a picture of X, on any specific occasion or otherwise? On any specific occasion, what makes the relation which the picture-object has to some real object (when there is one) one of depicting *it*, rather than depicting something else, or not being a picture of it at all?

If "a picture of X" could be analyzed treating the "of" as stating the relation between some object called "a picture" and another object, a real X, the problem would not be so pressing; for there one could simply say that objects are called pictures if they are related to the real objects by virtue of possessing some similarities to them (and even admit that certain dissimilarities might be relevant too), taking it as read that the picture-object cannot properly have X applied to *it* on the grounds that it is only called a picture at all because of its external relations to some X. But this will not do, for reasons already given. Instead, on any particular occasion I must be able to recognize the "picturing" property of the picture-object *in* recognizing X when I look at the picture. For although when I see the X mentioned in "the picture of X," I am seeing that X in virtue of the fact that certain relations hold between this picture-object and a real X, I do not *infer* that this can be a picture from noticing any such relations. It is rather the other way round: it is because I recognize X in the way we call "seeing X in a picture" that I infer that some particular relations of a "picturing" type must hold between this object and the real object. But what is it for a relation to be of "a picturing type?" It can mean no more than that on specific occasions the relations are such that I can recognize that the sort of X I am seeing is in a picture of X. That is, it is (what could be called) my "*mode of recognition*" of it which tells me it is a picture, and that it possesses those

relations here necessary for this object to picture the real one.

2. What might it be to recognize a certain class of objects "in a different way" to the ordinary mode (if there is such an "ordinary mode")? I shall argue that it is roughly a matter of having or making certain presuppositions when looking at a picture (or model, etc.), these making a difference to the way one notices objective characteristics of the picture, and to the way one reports what one notices there.

It was argued at the end of the previous section that a picture represents not just some, but all, of the characteristics of the "object" it is a picture of. Yet, although a black-and-white photograph must represent the yellowness of the sand just as much as its wetness or shape, one nevertheless cannot notice the yellowness of the sand when looking at the sand in the picture (for the "elements" in the picture representing the sand are dissimilar in color to the real sand). One can notice "the yellow sand in the picture," if the "yellow" is taken as describing one of the characteristics of the real sand it is a picture of; but then the word "yellow" mentions a presupposition one makes about what real thing the picture is "of" prior to describing what one sees in the picture, rather than some actual characteristic of the silver salts and gelatin on the surface of the photograph. Of course, in another sense one can notice "the yellowness of the sand" in the photograph, too; for the photograph does represent that yellowness. But "X-ness" (e.g., yellowness) is primarily being used to denote objective properties of the picture-object, those which one could notice on its surface whether or not one had recognized, or realized that, it was a picture at all. "Notice" is an intensional verb, and sentences embodying reports of noticings meet with the typical problems of verbs of this type, particularly relevant here being that of referential opacity (as Quine has called it). If A notices "the yellow sand" in the picture, one cannot substitute *salva veritate* an expression such as "certain grey patches of gelatin." In general even expressions referring to objective similarities between the picture and the real "object" fail of substitutivity. But I think that the points I want to make can be made without falling foul of these difficulties.

One important point is that there are limits to what one can notice about anything, those immediately relevant here being those imposed by the presuppositions of one's describing of one's noticing in a certain way. For instance, for one to notice that a person is dying (for that to be a correct description of one's noticing,) one must already have noticed, or have assumed, that he is alive. One cannot notice both that he is dying, and that he is alive (though one could notice that he was *still* alive.) The point roughly is either that one cannot notice the same thing twice over (assuming that the first noticing is "not allowed to lapse," that is, that one continues

to have one's attention on that thing) or that one cannot notice what one has already assumed.

Now to notice some characteristic *of a person*, one must already have noticed some minimum group of characteristics sufficient for one to recognize that object as a person; or one must presuppose that the object has such a group of characteristics. (There is no reason why this group should not be differently constituted on different occasions, and of course one can always be mistaken in one's recognitions or assumptions.) Thus, recognizing a real man is a matter of noticing such a group of characteristics, or making such assumptions while noticing something else about him.

But, it would not be possible to recognize a man *in a picture* by noticing such a group of characteristics, in the general case; pictures and representations generally must have some dissimilarities to the original object to "represent" it at all, and may be very dissimilar indeed to the original. So in general a minimum group of characteristics required to recognize a picture as being "of" X (i.e., those required to recognize the X in the picture) will be differently constituted from any minimum group needed to recognize a real X. For such a minimum group of characteristics of the picture could not in general be composed of the objective similarities which the picture has in common with the real object, for it is usually these similarities which we notice (rather than presuppose) when noticing characteristics of the man in the picture whom we have already recognized as a man.

Could one perhaps instead *assume* that the picture has one of the ordinary minimum groups of characteristics for recognizing a man? However, this amounts to the case of someone mistakenly thinking that a picture of a man is itself a real man. But as already pointed out, it is hardly ever the case that when we look at a picture we are under the *illusion* of looking at the real thing. One does not have to forget, or not notice that it is a painting one is looking at, to see the man in the painting. And it is hard to see how such a view could accommodate the dissimilarities which one would be in constant danger of noticing (since none of *them* are being assumed, on this view). The noticing of these would make the assumed real man at the very best an unusual sort of man (I should be very startled to meet a monochrome man); yet in general the men we see in pictures have perfectly ordinary human characteristics. Indeed, it is arguable that it is only the making of such a different set of assumptions about the object on the canvas (e.g.) that makes one able to see a man on the canvas at all.

An outcome of the general line of argument above is that the demand for a criterion for when the X which one sees is in a picture, rather than just itself being a sort of X, can in fact be met. For it turns out that those objects ordinarily called pictures (etc.), some of whose properties have been investigated, require in general for the recognition of their "objects" different

groups of previously noticed, or assumed, characteristics from real specimens of those objects. That is, it is fair to assume that one recognizes that an object is a picture of X, rather than an X, by using a different "mode of recognition," as I called it, in each case. To put it in a nutshell, when one sees a picture of X, one does not see a sort of X; one sees, with certain presuppositions, an X. And to see a real X is to see an X without these presuppositions (but perhaps with different, standard ones).

What these non-standard presuppositions are will clearly vary in different sorts of cases; that is what makes "picture" a (rather special sort of) "attributive" word. But it should not be assumed from this that *anything* can be a picture (etc.) of some object X. Certainly not anything can be recognized as an X, however many properties of some such thing one "takes as read."

These points bring out some more reasons for calling words like "picture" and "model" *adopted members of the family* of what they picture. In the case of a real human family, there are certain standard criteria which the ordinary members (e.g., the children) satisfy: having been born of those parents, and so on. Any "object" not satisfying these criteria is *ipso facto* not a (what I am calling "standard") member of that family.

But what of adopted members of families? If one had to satisfy these criteria in order to count as a member of a family at all, there would be no such people as adopted members of families. Yet there clearly are. In fact, these "members" become members *on special terms*. It is not that it is assumed that they obey the ordinary rules for membership; rather it is presupposed that they do not. Their non-standard characteristics are accepted, in so far as the acceptance of these enables them to be regarded and treated as *ordinary members of the family*.

Not anything can be treated as an ordinary member of a family (one would have difficulty in legally adopting an elephant), but within reasonable bounds one could adopt persons differing in many ways from one's standard stock of progeny. Yet still an adopted person never becomes a "standard" member of the family (never himself becomes a sort of X), even though one can treat him as such, once one has accepted his differences.

There is clearly a close parallel between the points I have made about pictures, and the above. The reason for bringing in Wittgenstein's notion of "family-resemblance" is I hope also clear. For the different "mode of recognition" by which a picture of X is recognized as an X depends on quite complex relationships of similarity and dissimilarity between a standard member of a family and its adopted member, of a parallel sort to those Wittgenstein wanted to stress as occurring between things which we call by the same name. Indeed, the basic notion of "family resemblance" itself may receive some converse support from this extension of it, for it becomes

clearer why things, even though related to each other in complex ways, may yet still be called by the same name. For, "calling them by the same name X" depends primarily on being able to recognize each of them as an X, rather than on some objective similarity each possesses to the others. And recognition of something as an X usually depends on noticing several characteristics of that object, perhaps different ones on different occasions. That is, it admits of, and perhaps even requires, a certain complexity among the relationships of those things "called by the same name."

3. In the present section I have in effect been arguing that the ordinary rules for the use of a word like "man" are not adequate to explain our applying the word "man" to a certain part of the surface of a picture (which, having made certain assumptions, we can recognize as a man). For we can only recognize a man in a picture by virtue of certain objective dissimilarities "he" has to ordinary men (as well as perhaps some similarities too, though often there need not be any "objective similarities" as I defined them at all); so the "object" on the picture surface would fail to satisfy the ordinary rules for the use of "man." And this is not one of those cases mentioned where it is not clear whether the word "man" should be applied or not. It is simply that the ordinary rules cannot accommodate different "modes of recognition."

There are at least two possible replies to this: that if the rules are different, they nevertheless bear simple relations to the standard ones, so that their logical behavior will not be very different; or that even granted that representation requires some dissimilarities, nevertheless one still notices about the man in the picture some of the same objective characteristics as one would notice in a real man, so that some of the old rules apply. The last is worthless as it stands, for presumably the word "man" is not applicable unless the picture "obeys" all the rules necessary for the correct application of that word; but perhaps it could be re-interpreted to read: the word "man" is applicable according to the ordinary rules if, having made any necessary assumptions for recognizing the object in the picture, one can then notice only objective characteristics which would not conflict with its being a man if it were a real man.

To take the last reply first, it fails because there are examples where the condition in the latter formulation is not satisfied. In any given case there may be several groups of characteristics of a picture the noticing or assumption of which is a sufficient condition for recognizing what is in the picture. This being so, probably many of the dissimilarities of a painting, for instance, could be individually noticed without preventing one from thinking one was looking at an X, one having previously recognized an X there. That is, it is likely that there will be many dissimilarities which do not

individually necessarily form part of any minimum group of characteristics for noticing X. One could notice the flatness of the canvas where one was seeing X, or the brushstrokes; yet the noticing of such things as these would be sufficient to disqualify any object from being (a man, say) according to the ordinary rules. Or one could notice the monochromeness of a man in a photograph; noticing this in a real man would be to notice a quality which was inconsistent with his also being a pink-colored man (it is *some* sort of truth that something cannot be pink all over and grey all over at the same time), but is quite possible in a photograph since the grey represents the pink. Nor does one have to say that when one notices the grey, one can only be seeing a *grey* man. Certainly this would be one way of avoiding inconsistency if one were confronted with a real man who was grey; but it is unnecessary procedure for the man in the picture, since it is not a picture of some peculiar grey man but of an ordinary pink one. The point is even more obvious in the case of a pencil outline drawing of a man; one can notice that he has pencil lines drawn round him, yet one could only do this with a real man if he had been shrunk, squashed flat, and transmuted into paper — that is, if the rules for correct application of his common name to him had already been changed into those which govern the correct application of the word “man” to a drawing.

This last also throws some doubt on the first of the possible replies to my present thesis, that even if the rules are different, they nevertheless bear simple relations to the original ones. The following example should throw even more doubt upon it, as well as reinforcing my rebuttal of the second reply.

Suppose one is situated in a (real) stormy landscape, looking at a house in the middle distance, which one observes is being dominated by the stormy clouds. Now “dominated by” sounds a suspiciously “non-physical” phrase, one of those whose rules of use are likely to be outside our extensional powers of checking. But not all its rules need be thus; one could probably get reasonable agreement upon the rules for its use in some such situation as the above, when the use can be directly linked to observables. Suppose then that one wanted to paint a (representational) picture in which one could recognize that the house was being “dominated by” stormy clouds.

There are certain objective characteristics of any painting which become important here. It is flat, and relatively small; its colors can show only a relatively narrow objective range of brightness, and it is usually observed in an ordinary room (not out of doors). Because of these and other such features in an example such as the present one it is very likely indeed that certain specific dissimilarities would have to be introduced into the painting if the relation of the house “being dominated by” the sky is to be accurately

represented. For instance, it might be necessary to alter the dark grey of the real clouds to a sombre violet in the painted clouds, and to make the house relatively smaller than strict perspective would allow, as well as making it flatter and more shapeless.

This being so, the rules for the use of “the house is being dominated by the sky” in the case of the picture are going to differ from those for the same relation observed in the real landscape in very complicated ways indeed. It is not just that each type of feature in the picture (the color, the shape, the brightness, etc.) bears a non-simple relation to its parallel feature in the original by virtue of representing that feature; for the situation is further complicated by the fact that the different features have in this case to interact to produce the required effect.

If the relation were a fairly simple one, for instance of “triangularity” between three objects, then the rules for the correct use of the term to the real situation could bear a simple relation to the different rules required for the picture, the objects in the picture having their objective distances from each other as a simple ratio of these distances in the real case. And the objects between which the relation holds could be quite various, yet still enable one to recognize that relation. But in the example being considered these features are not possible; the “objects” in the picture have to be *altered* (in quite specific ways) to produce the required relation (of “being dominated by”), and yet not altered in such a way as *not* to be recognizable as representations of a house and some sky, respectively. That is, there is no longer any simple way of correlating objective characteristics of the real scene and the painting, and hence there are no longer any simple “linear” relations between the sets of rules for each; yet also one has to notice some specific dissimilarities to the original — in what is recognizable as the house and the sky — to be able to recognize the relation of “being dominated by” at all. But these dissimilarities of the painting could probably not be possessed by the real landscape without altering or destroying in it the effect which they are able to represent in the picture.¹⁷

I do not wish to imply that the rules for the use of the words when applied to the painting are not to some extent *dependent upon* the ordinary rules applying to the real situation,¹⁸ but merely that the two sets cannot in general be connected in any simple or trivial way. Indeed it may be that *any* unusual uses of words (such as metaphorical uses) should not be assumed without question to be brought about by ordinary “logical powers” of the words.¹⁹ Rules apply to particular uses of words in certain contexts, and when the context is different in important respects (when for instance one has to take it as a condition that the object to which one applies “man” is made of paint and canvas) the assumption that the rules remain the same needs arguing for. In the sort of example I have given, it is hard to see how

it could be argued for, unless "the rules" are reduced to something like: "apply the word 'man' to anything which you can recognize as a man," which is clearly useless. For the "correct use" of a word stands in need of objective criteria, and what objective criteria there are point to there being different rules in such cases.²⁰

My talk of "a different context" is legitimate, for not all differences of use of a word (when "man" is applied to the large, young or malformed varieties, for instance) amount to a difference of (this sort of) context; it probably arises when a very fundamental rule for the ordinary uses of the word (e.g., that the object should be solid rather than flat) is "violated." Nor need "different context" simply mean "this sort of different use of 'man,'" for it could be defined independently of those particular objects satisfying it which could be recognized as a man (e.g., not everything having at least the properties of being made of canvas and paint can be recognized as a man). That is, a "difference of context" as I here use the phrase is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the application of the same word with a different set of rules.²¹

In terms of the traditional "problem of universals," and speaking ontologically, my emerging thesis could be expressed as follows. It is wrong to think of properties or qualities as metaphysically pure, isolated entities; that only leads to sceptical problems — and impoverished views of representation. Instead we should recognize that the unity of a property or property-family through its many instances inseparably involves contextual elements (though these may be nothing more than appropriate ranges of other properties). Some such hypothesis seems unavoidable, if we are to explain the unity of real versus representational cases of a universal or family, where the differences are so extreme. It also promises more understanding of the standard or real instances themselves. As in the human case, it may be that it takes an adopted member to make one realize what a real family is like.²²

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NOTES

1 L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), Secs. 66-70.

2 Thus I ignore deviant cases where causal or intentional factors are relevant, such as when a totally blurred photograph might count as "of X" simply because the camera was pointing at X, or an unrecognizable painting be "of X" because the artist assures us that it was intended to be a portrait of X.

3 See Wittgenstein, *ibid.*, pp. 193-216, for a discussion of "seeing as" and how it relates to picturing.

4 Wittgenstein, *ibid.*, p. 206, makes this point.

5 Richard Wollheim discusses some connections between representation and seeing-as in his *Art and Its Objects: An Introduction to Aesthetics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), and *On Drawing an Object* (London: H.K. Lewis, 1965).

6 For a recent example of such a view see Eddy M. Zemach, "Description and Depiction," *Mind*, 84 (1975), 567-578.

7 The graphics of M. C. Escher are rich in such examples. These cases provide crucial counter-examples to "possible-worlds" theories of representation, such as that of Robert Howell in "The Logical Structure of Pictorial Representation," *Theoria*, 2 (1974), 76-109, which cannot handle "impossible worlds."

8 R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), pp. 84-5.

9 This point, and attendant distinction of "looking like" from "objective similarities" have been insufficiently appreciated, even though rejections of resemblance-criteria for representation have become common. For instance, Kendall I. Walton, in his "Pictures and Make-Believe," *The Philosophical Review*, 82 (1973), 283-319, equates "resembling" with "looking like" in his arguments against resemblance-criteria. I argued for the relevant points in my (unpublished) dissertation, "Metaphor and Representation" Diss. University of Bristol 1965, and Wollheim notes that "The attribution of resemblance occurs inside, and therefore cannot be used to explain, the language of representation" (*Art and Its Objects*, p. 16).

10 See Sec. II 2. for further discussion of these issues.

11 *Investigations*, Secs. 66-70.

12 *Ibid.*, Sec. 66.

13 R. Bambrough, "Universals and Family Resemblances," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 60 (1960-1).

14 R. I. Aaron, "Wittgenstein's Theory of Universals," *Mind*, 74 (1965), 249-51.

15 P. T. Geach, "Good and Evil," *Analysis*, 16 (1956), 33. In a logical formalism such terms should be represented as predicate *modifiers* or operators rather than as independent predicates. I develop this idea for terms such as "representational" and "real" in my "Modifier Existence," forthcoming.

16 I do not deny that *sometimes* talk about "a picture of X" is just about some real object X which the picture represents. The inadequacy of that view as a general account is also shown by the possibility of pictures of non-existent objects (such as unicorns). One might attempt, with Goodman, to take "X" in "picture of X" as a *predicate* rather than a referring term when the phrase is non-relational: "picture of X" is then read as classifying the picture as an X-picture. See Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), Sec. I. Thus where I say that (at least part of) a picture may itself be described as "X," he would not only allow that "X-picture" could be so used. My earlier arguments show the inadequacy of this: indeed, a picture is only classifiable as a *man-picture* as a *consequence* of one's being able to recognize part of it as a man.

17 The work of E. H. Gombrich provides much relevant evidence for my general point here. He argues that "making comes before matching," in that an artist cannot simply copy reality (i.e., there are no easy translation-rules), but must instead laboriously discover how to represent things in some specific medium. See, e.g., *Art and Illusion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), *passim*.

18 Only "to some extent," because it must not be forgotten that art can *originate* qualities as well as imitate them. There are even cases where the dependence goes the other way, such as when we see people as having (or lacking) qualities of beauty, elegance, toughness, etc., according to conceptions of those qualities derived from movies, photographs, or TV commercials.

19 One way of developing this suggestion is to analyse metaphor itself in terms of representation. I do this in my article, "A Representational Approach to Metaphor," *Journal of Aes-*

thetics and Art Criticism (Summer 1979), pp. 467-73.

20 A nice Wittgensteinian way of putting this point might be as follows. In the *Investigations* he is forced, through an analysis of ordinary language, to reject his earlier *Tractatus* picture theory of language, a central thesis of which is that picture and reality are bound together by an identity of logical and pictorial form. See L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge, 1961), Secs. 2.1-3.01. However, some of his own later remarks about pictures, along with his concept of family resemblance, can be developed (as I have done) to strongly suggest that the "identical logico-pictorial form" thesis is false *even for representational pictures*.

21 The idea of differing contexts, and corresponding modes of recognition, could be interestingly related to Elliot Sober's idea of "pictorial competence" (cf. the concept of "linguistic competence"), defined as the knowledge which users of any given system of pictorial representation have solely in virtue of the fact that they can use the system. See his "Mental Representations," *Synthese*, 33 (1976), 101-148.

22 My thanks to Andrew Harrison for stimulating discussions on representation, which helped to provoke the present view.

THE PLACES OF EXPERIENCE

E. V. WALTER

The rage for Copernicus dominates modern ideas about theoretical innovation. Kant thought of himself as the Copernicus of philosophy, Cassirer called Herder the Copernicus of history, and Freud claimed that the great paradigmatic revolutions associated with Darwinian biology and with psychoanalysis resembled the Copernican revolution. Today, inspired by Thomas Kuhn, every heuristic Columbus sails under the flag of Copernicus. However, I shall abandon the fashion by launching my own voyage through "strange seas of thought" under the banner of Ptolemy.

I am not suggesting that we return to the idea that the sun revolves around the earth, or to any other notions drawn from Ptolemy's astronomy. Instead, I am thinking of a certain perspective revealed in the *Geographic Guide* written by Claudius Ptolemy sometime during the second century A.D. The initial chapter of this book that figuratively shaped the earth for 1500 years opens with a distinction between geography and chorography, showing that the world and its places require two different, separate modes of representation.

Today, chorography simply means the technical description of a region, just as topography means a similar description of a place, and both fit comfortably inside the master science of geography. Chorography without geography makes no sense in the modern perspective. But in the very first sentence of his book, Ptolemy took pains to contrast the methods of geography and chorography. Geography, on the one hand, pictorially represented the earth as a whole, describing its nature, position, and general features. It showed the world through the perspective of unity and continuity, and this special task required mathematics. Chorography, on the other hand, set off a part of the world, exhibiting it separately, representing