

## **Strategic Bombing, Causal Beliefs, and Double Effect**

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*Abstract* I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect's explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of terror bombing and strategic bombing which dominates this debate is underdetermined with regards to the agents' psychologies: (a) if Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, then why does Terror Bomber set out to kill the children? It may then be this unwarranted and immoral choice and not the Doctrine of Double Effect that explains the moral difference; (b) if the two have different causal beliefs, then we can't rule out the counterfactual that, had Strategic Bomber had the same beliefs as Terror Bomber, she would have also acted as Terror Bomber did.

Since even before WWII<sup>1</sup>, the discussion of the *Doctrine of Double Effect* (DDE<sup>2</sup>) has been intertwined with the discussion of *terror* bombing and *strategic* bombing.<sup>3</sup> The concepts of

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<sup>1</sup> For the earliest examples known to me, see Ryan 1933 and Ford 1944. Gury also talks about the killing of non-combatants in the context of his seminal discussion of double effect (see Boyle 1980: 528-29).

<sup>2</sup> Here I will just assume previous knowledge of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and restrict my discussion of the actual principle to this footnote with the following representative definitions:

- McIntyre in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "sometimes it is permissible to bring about as a merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring about intentionally" (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/>);
- Woodward in the Introduction to his standard anthology on DDE: "intentional production of evil... and foreseen but unintentional production of evil" (2001: 2);
- Aquinas, which is often credited with the first explicit version of DDE: "Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention" (Summa II-II, 64, 7);
- Gury: "It is licit to posit a cause which is either good or indifferent from which there follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the end of the agent is honourable – that is, if he does not intend the evil effect" (Boyle's translation 1980: 528);
- Mangan: „A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1) that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect“ (1949: 43).

I have discussed other aspects of double effect elsewhere: Di Nucci 2013a, Di Nucci 2013b, Di Nucci 2013c, Di Nucci 2014a, Di Nucci 2014b, Di Nucci 2014c, Di Nucci 2014d, Di Nucci 2014e, and Di Nucci 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Here the terminology is a bit confusing: in modern philosophical discussions, the talk is always of 'terror' bombing and 'strategic' or 'tactical' bombing. Some (such as for example Cavanaugh 2006: xii) distinguish between 'strategic' and 'tactical' on historical grounds, finding the latter more appropriate. Others (such as for example Ford 1944: 263) object to both 'strategic' and 'tactical' and opt for 'precision' bombing. Other terms

'terror bombing' and 'strategic bombing' are, both in historical and philosophical context, quickly clarified by looking at how the British changed their directives to their pilots sometime in late 1940. Frankland writes that in June 1940 British authorities still "specifically laid down that targets had to be identified and aimed at. Indiscriminate bombing was forbidden." (1970: 24<sup>4</sup>) Here indiscriminate bombing is what has come to be known in the literature as terror bombing. And it has presumably acquired that name because the British soon changed their fighting ways: already in November 1940 "Bomber Command was instructed simply to aim at the center of a city... the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories" (1970: 24) And built-up areas here means residential areas, as the British did not care to hide: Churchill spoke in the Commons of the "the systematic shattering of German cities." (July 1943<sup>5</sup>); "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." (joint British-American Casablanca conference); "To the RAF fell the task of destroying Germany's great cities, of silencing the iron heart-beat of the Ruhr, of dispossessing the working population, of breaking the morale of the people" (Target: Germany, an RAF official publication of that period). Finally they ended up calling it 'terror' bombing themselves: "Here, then, we have *terror* and devastation carried to the core of a warring nation." (Still from Target: Germany as quoted by Ford 1944: 294).

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for 'terror' bombing are 'obliteration' bombing, 'area' bombing, and 'indiscriminate' bombing (Walzer 1991: 11). To make matters more confusing, the adjective 'strategic' is sometimes used for 'terror' bombing as well. I stick to 'terror' bombing and 'strategic' bombing throughout because it is the most common usage in the literature (as a brief Google search revealed).

<sup>4</sup> Reference found in Walzer (1971: 11).

<sup>5</sup> This and the following quotes are taken from Ford 1944: 262 ff.

## I. The thought-experiment

The British started with what in contemporary literature we refer to as strategic bombing and then turned to so-called terror bombing. As we have seen (Ford 1944), the connection between these practices and the DDE was drawn already at the time. In the post-war period, the distinction between terror bombing and strategic bombing has evolved into a philosophical thought-experiment widely used to illustrate (and often also to defend) DDE. An influential example is Jonathan Bennett's discussion in his *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*:

In this lecture I shall exhibit some difficulties about a certain distinction which is thought important by many moralists - namely that between what you intend to come about as a means to your end and what you do not intend although you foresee that it will come about as a by-product of your means to your end. This has a role in most defences of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and is one source for the view that terror bombing is never permissible though tactical bombing may sometimes be - i.e., that it is never right to kill civilians as a means to demoralizing the enemy country, though it may sometimes be right to destroy a munitions factory as a means to reducing the enemy's military strength, knowing that the raid will also kill civilians. In the former case - so the story goes - the civilian deaths are intended as a means; in the latter they are not intended but merely foreseen as an inevitable by-product of the means; and that is supposed to make a moral difference, even if the probabilities are the same, the number of civilian deaths the same, and so on. (1980: 95)<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> To be sure: Bennett is a critic of DDE, but he has contributed decisively to the establishment of the thought-experiment as a standard one. See also Bennett 1995.

The similarity between Bennett's characterization of terror bombing and the British directives from WWII is striking: "to kill civilians as a means to demoralizing the enemy country" is offered as an example of terror bombing; strategic bombing is described as "to destroy a munitions factory as a means to reducing the enemy's military strength, knowing that the raid will also kill civilians". The case we are asked to imagine is, supposedly, one in which a pilot is ordered to bomb a munitions factory, so as to reduce the enemy's military strength; she is also informed that there is a very high probability of civilian casualties as a result of the bombing of the munitions factory. The day after the same pilot is ordered to bomb civilians as a means to demoralize the enemy; she is informed that there is a very high probability (the same very high probability as yesterday) that the numbers of civilian deaths will be the same as yesterday.<sup>7</sup> Now the idea that DDE is supposed to defend is that it is permissible on the first day but not on the second day for the pilot to drop her bombs.<sup>8</sup>

Michael Bratman develops this very scenario as follows:

Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the goal of promoting the war effort against Enemy. Each intends to pursue this goal by weakening Enemy, and each intends to do that by dropping bombs. Terror Bomber's plan is to bomb the school in Enemy's territory, thereby killing children of Enemy and terrorizing Enemy's population. Strategic Bomber's plan is different. He plans to bomb Enemy's munitions plant, thereby undermining Enemy's war effort. Strategic Bomber also knows, however, that next to the munitions plant is a school, and that when he bombs the plant he will also destroy the school, killing the children inside. Strategic Bomber has not ignored this

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<sup>7</sup> The epistemic characterization is here important, but it can vary: we can talk of certainty, high probability, or even just possibility, as long as there is no epistemic gap between the two cases.

<sup>8</sup> As I already said, here I will not get into issues of interpretation of DDE. Let me just say that moral permissibility is both the strongest and most common interpretation of DDE (see Boyle 1980 for an argument as to why we should interpret DDE this way); alternative interpretations may involve different attributions of responsibility, excuse as opposed to justification, or different sentencing. At the other end of the spectrum we find the claim that not even the action-theoretical distinction upon which DDE is found is a legitimate one (this last possibility is discussed here too).

fact. Indeed, he has worried a lot about it. Still, he has concluded that this cost, though significant, is outweighed by the contribution that would be made to the war effort by the destruction of the munitions plant. Now, Terror Bomber intends all of the features of his action just noted: he intends to drop the bombs, kill the children, terrorize the population, and thereby weaken Enemy. In contrast, it seems that Strategic Bomber only intends to drop the bombs, destroy the munitions plant, and weaken Enemy. Although he knows that by bombing the plant he will be killing the children, he does not, it seems, intend to kill them. Whereas killing the children is, for Terror Bomber, an intended means to his end of victory, it is, for Strategic Bomber, only something he knows he will do by bombing the munitions plant. Though Strategic Bomber has taken the deaths of the children quite seriously into account in his deliberation, these deaths are for him only an expected side effect; they are not – in contrast with Terror Bomber’s position – intended as a means... In saying this I do not deny that Strategic Bomber kills the children intentionally. (1987: 139-140)<sup>9</sup>

The philosophical discussion of terror bombing and strategic bombing starts with the intuition that there is a moral difference between them; indeed, the Doctrine of Double Effect is normally offered as an explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. Elsewhere (Di Nucci 2013a and Di Nucci 2014a), I have looked at this supposed moral intuition experimentally and found no evidence for it. Here I

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<sup>9</sup> From the point of view of military ethics in general and just war theory in particular, there is an important difference between talking about ‘civilian casualties’ in general, as Bennett does, and talking about school children, as Bratman does. The civilian casualties referred to by Bennett may very well be the munitions factory workers, and their moral status is controversial. On this, see debates on non-combatants, civilians-m, and civilians-w (where ‘m’ and ‘w’ distinguish between those civilians which provide military equipment such as munitions and those which provide welfare equipment such as food); in particular, see Fabre 2009 and McMahan 2009. While Bennett’s reference to ‘civilian casualties’ may be a reference to civilians-m who may actually turn out to be liable to attack, Bratman’s reference to school children simplifies the thought-experiment by providing a group (school children) which none of the contrasting views would consider liable to attack. That is why I shall stick to Bratman’s school children throughout, which help identify the DDE debate on terror bombing and strategic bombing as independent from the non-combatant debate.

concentrate on theoretical considerations: I show that, once the thought-experiment of terror bombing and strategic bombing is properly analysed, it should really be no surprise that there is no intuitive moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing: depending on how some crucial underdetermined aspects of the thought-experiment are interpreted, either the relevant differences around which the thought-experiment is constructed (such as intending/merely foreseeing and means/side-effects) do not explain the supposed moral differences or there are, indeed, no such moral differences – as the evidence from intuition suggests. This is because there is an important underdetermination as to the psychological differences between the two agents, which I discuss in the next two sections: it may be that Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs; or it may be that they have different causal beliefs. Let us begin with discussing the variant in which the two pilots have the same causal beliefs.

## **2. Same causal beliefs**

Let us suppose that the two agents, Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber, have the same causal beliefs<sup>10</sup>: of the sixteen possible permutations resulting from combining the two agents with the two beliefs ‘killing children will weaken enemy’ and ‘destroying munitions will weaken enemy’ (and their respective negations), twelve involve at least one of the two agents in some form of irrationality – I will therefore disregard those even though some of them are such that the two agents have the same causal beliefs.<sup>11</sup> Of the remaining four,

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<sup>10</sup> Here my talk of causal beliefs does not presuppose causalism about action-explanation: I say that the beliefs are ‘causal’ to refer to their being beliefs about the causal structures of the world, such as the causal effectiveness of different strategies. Elsewhere I have criticized causalism in action theory (Di Nucci 2008, Di Nucci 2011a, Di Nucci 2011b, and Di Nucci 2013d), but my argument here is supposed to be independent from the truth or falsity of causalism.

<sup>11</sup> Still, some of these irrational combinations may still play a role in the intuition that our moral judgement on Terror Bomber should be different from our moral judgement on Strategic Bomber. Take the following:

Terror Bomber does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy and she does believe that destroying munitions will weaken enemy. Strategic Bomber believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy.

three are such that the two agents have different causal beliefs. So there is only one permutation such that neither of the agents is irrational and the two agents have the same causal beliefs, the following:

Terror Bomber believes that killing children will weaken enemy and she believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy.

Strategic Bomber believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she believes that killing children will weaken enemy.

Here there is both a cognitive problem and a normative problem. In brief, the cognitive problem is how we get a difference in intention out of the same motivation and the same causal beliefs.<sup>12</sup> The normative problem is why Terror Bomber sets out to kill the children. Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber believe that killing the children will weaken enemy. Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber believe that destroying munitions will weaken enemy. Their instrumental beliefs are the same, then. And their motivation is the same too: they both want to promote the war effort by weakening enemy. That is, they have the same motivating reasons or, if you will, pro attitudes. And the same beliefs too: they both believe that 'killing children' will satisfy their pro attitude towards 'weakening enemy' and they both believe that 'destroying munitions' will satisfy their pro attitude towards 'weakening enemy'. They also both know that they cannot destroy munitions without killing children (and that they cannot kill children without destroying munitions). Where does the difference in intention come from?

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This is a permutation in which Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, but I have excluded it because it involves Terror Bomber in criticisable irrationality: why does she embark on the plan to kill the children in order to weaken enemy if she does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy? Still, maybe this possible combination of the two agents' beliefs may be at least a part of the intuition that Terror Bomber is morally criticisable while Strategic Bomber is not morally criticisable. But this would be seemingly unfair: the two, in such a case, have the same beliefs and cause the same amount of suffering. Can we possibly blame Terror Bomber more just because of her error of judgement? It seems not, because it was not an error of *moral* judgement (if it were, then Strategic Bomber would have committed the same error).

<sup>12</sup> This is, indeed, the core of Bratman's non-reductive planning theory of intention; and here I am not offering a general critique of Bratman's theory, which I have discussed at length elsewhere (Di Nucci 2008 and Di Nucci 2009).

What we have, here, is a kind of Buridan case: both 'killing children' and 'destroying munitions' satisfy the agent's pro attitude, and the agent does not seem to have distinctive reasons to do one over the other. Still, the agent has overwhelming reasons to do one, and therefore we may suppose that she just picks one because of her overwhelming reasons to do one of the two things. But here we may think that from the motivating perspective this may be like a Buridan case, but from the normative perspective it is outrageous to talk about *picking* between 'killing children' and 'destroying munitions'. There are strong normative reasons to *choose* 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children'. And since there are no instrumental reasons to choose 'killing children' over 'destroying munitions' or to not choose 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children', then the agent ought to choose 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children'. And so we have already come to the normative problem: starting from a cognitive identity, we get a duty to choose 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children'. And Terror Bomber violates this duty to choose 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children'. But then, and this is the crucial point here, it is not DDE, but Terror Bomber's violation of her duty to choose 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children' – duty which Strategic Bomber has not violated – which explains the moral difference between Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber.

The following plausible moral principle may be what is implicitly doing the work here: if you believe that both A and B satisfy your legitimate goal C, and you believe that A involves the death of no one while you believe that B involves the death of many children, then other things being equal you have a duty not to choose or do B. It is this very plausible moral principle, and not DDE, that may justify the distinction between Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber if the two have the same causal beliefs.

Here it may be objected that this principle does not apply because both agents choose or do both A and B: but whether or not one wants to talk about 'choosings' or 'doings' in cases of

merely foreseen side-effects (see next paragraph), the point stands: given that there is an obvious moral difference between A and B such that B is morally much worse than A, why does Terror Bomber settle on B instead of A when she believes that A would be just as effective in satisfying her goals? She may be ignorant of the obvious moral difference between A and B but then, given that Terror Bomber knows all too well what A and B are, her ignorance about their relative moral value would be itself a serious moral shortcoming on the part of Terror Bomber – and that moral shortcoming would be able to distinguish, morally, between what Terror Bomber does and what Strategic Bomber does. On the other hand, Terror Bomber may not be ignorant of the moral difference between A and B but just indifferent to it – but that’s as serious a moral shortcoming as the previous one.

Here it could still be objected that my critique depends on being able to say that Terror Bomber ‘settles’ on B or ‘chooses’ B or ‘does’ B but does not do A; and that, in turn, we need DDE to be able to distinguish between Terror Bomber’s attitude towards A and B. But that’s just not true: DDE contains a distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects which could be applied to distinguish between Terror Bomber’s attitudes towards A and B. But, crucially, that distinction need not exhaust the difference between Terror Bomber’s attitude to A and her attitude to B; and, more importantly, DDE claims that it is the distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects which is, itself, morally relevant; while here we have shown that the moral work is being done by other considerations. Notice, also, the advantage of my solution over the solution offered by DDE: DDE requires an is-ought gap in that it claims that a theoretical distinction in the psychology of the agent makes a moral difference; while my solution only appeals to normative distinctions, which are in themselves *basic* – as the simple moral principle I put forward.

Alternatively, it may be objected that we should not understand this interpretation of the thought-experiment as a Buridan case because the two agents may have different motivations despite having the same causal beliefs. The two agents may indeed be taken to have different moral motives in that they may be following different moral principles: but then, as in the argument already offered, it is the difference in the moral principles they are following and not the Doctrine of Double Effect that is doing the normative work: namely, nothing would depend on the difference between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects.

We have just shown that if we understand the thought-experiment in terms of same causal beliefs, then we can show why this thought-experiment does not support DDE – and this without even beginning to get into the usual arguments on DDE that dominate the literature (Di Nucci 2014a). This, it may be argued, is a reason to think that we should not understand the thought-experiment in terms of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber having the same causal beliefs – even though such an understanding is compatible with the standard versions of the thought-experiment (as those by Bennett and Bratman that we have been following here): in the next section I discuss the alternative interpretation of the agents' psychologies according to which the two agents have different causal beliefs.

### **3. Different causal beliefs**

Let us then look at the interpretations on which Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber do not have the same causal beliefs. There are three permutations which do not involve either of the two agents in criticisable irrationality where the two agents do not have the same causal beliefs:

- A) Terror Bomber believes that killing children will weaken enemy and she believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy.

Strategic Bomber believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy.

B) Terror Bomber believes that killing children will weaken enemy and she does not believe that destroying munitions will weaken enemy.

Strategic Bomber believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she believes that killing children will weaken enemy.

C) Terror Bomber believes that killing children will weaken enemy and she does not believe that destroying munitions will weaken enemy.

Strategic Bomber believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy.

Readings (A) and (B) share a problem with the interpretation on which Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs: namely, on (A) it is not clear why Terror Bomber chooses 'killing children' over 'destroying munitions' and on (B) it is not clear why Strategic Bomber chooses 'destroying munitions' over 'killing children'. The problem with (A) we have already discussed. The problem with (B) is symmetric, and may have a symmetric effect on morally preferring Strategic Bomber over Terror Bomber. Namely, we may morally prefer Strategic Bomber because, in the absence of instrumental reasons to choose between 'killing children' and 'destroying munitions', we assume that she must have had some moral reasons to prefer the morally superior alternative, namely 'destroying munitions'. But this need not be the case: maybe, in the spirit of Buridan, Strategic Bomber flipped a coin; and then it would be difficult to morally prefer Strategic Bomber over Terror Bomber, after such a show of indifference towards the moral difference between 'destroying munitions' and 'killing children'.

Let us then leave (A) and (B) aside and focus on (C), which has clear advantages over the interpretation on which Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs. (C) explains, namely, why Terror Bomber sets out to kill children and not to destroy munitions. And (C) explains, also, why Strategic Bomber sets out to destroy munitions and not to kill children. Terror Bomber opts for the plan of killing children over the plan of destroying munitions because she believes that killing children will weaken enemy and she does not believe that destroying munitions will weaken enemy. And Strategic Bomber opts for the plan of destroying munitions over the plan of killing children because she believes that destroying munitions will weaken enemy and she does not believe that killing children will weaken enemy. And this leaves open the crucial possibility that, had Strategic Bomber had the same beliefs as Terror Bomber, she would have also chosen as Terror Bomber (and *vice versa*). This counterfactual is importantly different from a different counterfactual – which is also discussed by Bratman (1987: 161-162) – about what Strategic Bomber would have done had she been presented with the same options as Terror Bomber. That counterfactual is about non-psychological options; this counterfactual is about the beliefs of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber, not the strategic options offered by their worlds.

Reading (C) leaves open both the possibility that Terror Bomber, had she had Strategic Bomber's beliefs, would have acted as Strategic Bomber did; and the possibility that Strategic Bomber, had she had Terror Bomber's beliefs, would have acted as Terror Bomber did. And one may think that this is going to be a problem for those who want to offer different moral judgements for what Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber did. On the other hand, it may be objected, what is at issue are moral judgements over actions (for example, the permissibility of killing the children in the case of Strategic Bomber) and not moral judgements over agents, and suggest that therefore not being able to distinguish, morally,

between the two agents does not imply that we will not be able to distinguish, morally, between the two actions.

The symmetrically opposite position is often put forward as a softer version or last resort of DDE: namely, that in the impossibility of distinguishing, morally, between the two actions, we may at least distinguish, morally, between the two agents – for example talk about differences in character between the two agents; or talk about “the way the agent went about deciding what to do” (Scanlon 2008: 36). Without discussing the merits of this position (for that, see Di Nucci 2014a), it illustrates the difficulties of its symmetrical opposite: if we can’t even find moral differences in the agents, where are the moral differences in the actions going to come from, given that what actually happens in the world is identical in both cases? So interpreting the thought-experiment as supposing that Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have different causal beliefs is problematic because then we can’t even distinguish, morally, between Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber as we do not have any reason to think that Strategic Bomber would have acted differently from Terror Bomber had she had her beliefs. There is another problem with tracing back the moral difference to a difference of belief, which I shall just mention here briefly: it exposes the normative judgement to too much luck, and agents should be judged for their actions and inclinations, and not for their causal beliefs.

Let us take stock: we have argued that the thought-experiment is underdetermined about the beliefs of the two agents. We have shown that there are important differences between interpreting the two agents as having the same causal beliefs and interpreting the two agents as having different causal beliefs. In both cases, though for different reasons, the thought-experiment is shown not to support DDE: in the former case because there is a much more basic moral principle which explains the moral difference; in the latter case because there is

no moral difference – which was also the problem with Bratman’s allowing for the two pilots being confronted with different options.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Summarizing, in this paper we have argued that the terror-strategic thought-experiment is underdetermined in a way which is crucial to its support of DDE: the thought-experiment is underdetermined as to whether the psychologies of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber are identical. We have shown that, whether or not we interpret Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber as having the same causal beliefs, DDE has a problem:

(a) if the two agents have the same causal beliefs, then why does Terror Bomber choose killing the children over destroying munitions? Terror Bomber’s choice is morally problematic in the absence of a difference in causal beliefs; but then it may be Terror Bomber’s dubious moral choice, and not DDE, that explains the moral difference between Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber.

(b) And if the two have different causal beliefs, then we can’t rule out the counterfactual that, had Strategic Bomber had the same beliefs as Terror Bomber, she would have also acted as Terror Bomber did. But then how are we to morally distinguish between the two? And if we can’t distinguish, morally, between the two agents, and the two worlds are identical, then where is the moral difference going to come from?

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