**Freedom, Harmony & Moral Beauty**

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**Abstract:** Why are moral actions beautiful, when indeed they are? This paper assesses the view, found most notably in Schiller, that moral actions are beautiful just when they present the appearance of freedom by appearing to be the result of internal harmony (the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*). I argue that while this thesis can accommodate some of the beauty involved in contrasts of the ‘continent’ and the ‘fully’ virtuous, it cannot account for all of the beauty in such contrasts, and so needs to be weakened considerably (to the *Internal Harmony Thesis*). To account for the remaining beauty that cannot be fully accommodated even by this revised thesis, as well as the beauty contained in contrasts that involve agents who experience internal conflict as a result of being sensitive to different sources of moral value to an appropriate extent, a number of further theses need to be posited: namely, that the beauty of some moral actions is to be accommodated in terms of internal disharmony (the *Internal Disharmony Thesis*), and in terms of a felt harmony between the appreciator of the action and the executor of the action (the *Affective Harmony Thesis*). As such, in contrast to Schiller, I suggest that we need to take a pluralist and context-sensitive approach to accommodating the beauty of moral actions.

*§1. Introduction*

One important, but unjustly neglected, view in the history of philosophical aesthetics is that some moral actions are beautiful, and that their beauty can be accounted for by appealing to the appearance of internal harmony in the agent that commits the action.[[1]](#footnote-1)

In this paper, I undertake a number of tasks. In §2, I outline and clarify the most developed and potentially insightful account of this idea—Schiller’s account—noting that it has been thought to fall out of the view that beauty is essentially connected to the appearance of freedom (the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*). In the remaining sections, I determine the extent to which the ideas contained in this account can accommodate the beauty of moral actions.

In §3, I argue that there are pairs of contrasts of morally good actions—namely where the same moral action is executed with and without internal conflict stemming from self-interest (actions of so-called ‘continent’ versus ‘fully virtuous’ agents)—where some of the beauty can indeed be explained in terms of presenting the appearance of freedom by appearing to be the result of internal harmony. However, I argue that there are at least two main additional sources of beauty in these contrasts which cannot be accommodated in this way: there is beauty, first, in appearing to be the result of internal harmony independently of the extent to which this in turn presents the appearance of freedom; and second, in presenting the appearance of strength by appearing to be the result of internal *dis*harmony. As such, I propose that the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis* needs to be jettisoned in favour of a version which is quantified in an existential manner, and which dispenses with its exclusive focus on the appearance of freedom via internal harmony (which I label the *Internal Harmony Thesis*). In addition, I propose that the *Internal Harmony Thesis* needs to be supplemented by an additional thesis—according to which some moral actions are beautiful to the extent that they appear to be the result of internal *dis*harmony (the *Internal Disharmony Thesis*). I then turn to provide some novel empirical evidence in favour of these various claims.

In §4, I argue that there are other contrasts of moral actions whose beauty cannot be fully accommodated even by the *Internal Harmony Thesis* in conjunction with the supplementary *Internal Disharmony Thesis*. These contrasts involve cases where the same moral action is executed with and without conflict stemming from a sensitivity to things of moral value—namely, the suffering of others, even when such suffering is unavoidable. In these cases, the lack of internal conflict is antithetical to feelings of sympathy, unity and of being moved, and the presence of conflict is conducive to feelings of sympathy, unity and of being moved. To accommodate the beauty of those who are conflicted in this way, I argue that the notion of harmony does not need to be abandoned altogether, at least when it is understood in a sufficiently capacious manner; rather, it needs to be recognised that the beauty-making harmony is not located inside the agent. The beauty of these cases can be accounted for by appealing to a *felt harmony* between the appreciator of the action and the executor of the action (the *Affective Harmony Thesis*). I then turn to provide evidence in favour of this claim.

I conclude that univocal accounts of the beauty of moral actions—such as the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*—are inadequate, and that a pluralist and context-sensitive approach is required to do justice to the beauty of moral actions.

*§2. Freedom, Internal Harmony, & Beauty*

The beauty of moral actions has been thought to be intimately linked to the appearance of our psychological faculties working in a complementary fashion—where our affective, conative, rational, and agentive capacities appear to be *in harmony* with one another. The most prominent and full development of this idea is found in Schiller’s *Kallias* (1793/2003) and *On Grace & Dignity* (1793/2005, *K* and *GD* respectively hereafter)—which have been largely, and unjustly, neglected by contemporary philosophical aestheticians[[2]](#footnote-2)—and where this idea is said to follow from the idea that beauty and the appearance of freedom are constitutively connected.[[3]](#footnote-3) In this section, I outline and clarify Schiller’s account of the beauty of actions, with a view to revealing its important insight in §3.

According to Schiller, “the quality of things that we call beauty is one and the same with… freedom in appearance (*Freiheit in der Erscheinung*)” (*K*: 160, see also e.g. 152). What does Schiller mean by this, somewhat awkward, neologism—“freedom in appearance” (*Freiheit in der Erscheinung*)? What properties tend to make for “freedom in appearance,” and how do we come to recognise it? And how is this related to appearing to be internally harmonious, in particular?

To answer these questions satisfactorily, it is helpful to first know what freedom is for Schiller. Schiller follows Kant in suggesting that a free act is simply one which is chosen on the basis of reason, and indeed, reasoning in line with the moral law. He writes that it is “necessary that a free act agree with the form of practical reason” (*K*: 149), where “the *form* of practical reason is the immediate relation of the will to the representation of reason, that is, to the exclusion of every external principle of determination” (*K*: 150, Schiller’s emphasis, see also *K*: 151 and *GD*: 151). These external principles of determination include, for Schiller, being determined by things that are located outside of the agent—in the way that someone might be compelled to donate to charity as a result of a legal ruling; and being determined by causes located inside of the agent, but lying outside of the faculty of practical reason, such as our desires and emotions—in the way that someone could act in a moral manner purely from tender emotional dispositions.

With this clear, what is this beauty-making “freedom in appearance”? Here, it is helpful to draw a number of distinctions between closely related notions, and to examine Schiller’s texts closely. Two initial possibilities are, first, that Schiller intends “freedom in appearance” as “the sensory appearance is free”—that is, that the sensory appearance itself, rather than what it is an appearance of, is free; and second, that Schiller intends “freedom in appearance” to be understood as “freedom’s sensory appearance”—that is, the idea that freedom itself has a sensory appearance, and so we see freedom itself directly in things which display this sensory appearance. Neither of these possibilities seems to be what Schiller intends, as he notes that “freedom as such can never be given to the senses and nothing can be free other than what is supra-sensible” (*K*: 151). Since freedom is, as we have just seen, essentially a matter of the will being determined by practical reason in line with the moral law for Schiller, and nothing else, it is not something that has a sensory appearance in itself. Nor is freedom something that sensory appearances can possess themselves, in not having their own proprietary wills or faculties of practical reason.

Another possibility here is that Schiller intends “freedom in appearance” to be understood as “appearing to exercise freedom”—that is, as either referring to any perceivable effect of the actual exercise of freedom by a given agent, or as referring to at least those effects that tend to indicate the exercise of freedom. While these ideas are connected to “freedom in appearance,” as we will see below, this does not seem to be what Schiller intends, either.

Since only humans can act out of reason in line with the moral law and thereby act freely for Schiller, if “freedom in appearance” referred to any perceivable effect of the actual exercise of freedom, then only human actions and their effects would be able to be beautiful. Yet, Schiller notes that a number of non-human animals—such as birds in flight and Spanish palfreys (medieval horses noted for their light frame and smooth ambling gait)—can be beautiful (*K*: 164, 173). So, if Schiller intends any perceivable effect of the exercise of freedom by “freedom in appearance” then he cannot (consistently) maintain that non-human animals can be beautiful, and so this interpretation of “freedom in appearance” should be rejected.

But what of the less demanding idea that Schiller intends “appearing to exercise freedom” in the sense of merely having perceivable features that tend to indicate the actual exercise of freedom (at least in certain contexts)? Suppose that, by custom, a group of people had agreed to raise their pinkie finger whenever they acted purely from reason. In this case, a person from this group would indeed *appear* to be exercising freedom whenever they raised their pinkie finger—whether they were in fact exercising freedom or not—since they have a perceptible feature that tends to indicate the actual exercise of freedom. Yet such a person’s action would not have Schiller’s beauty-making “freedom in appearance.” For Schiller says that “freedom in appearance” is a matter of having “an analogy… with the form of pure will or freedom (*Analogie… mit der Form des r[einen] Willens oder der Freiheit*)” (*K*: 152). The “idea of self-determination resonates back at us (*Idee der Selbstbestimmung strahlt uns)”* from appearances which possess this analogy with freedom (*K*: 153), and these appearances are an “*exhibition (Darstellung) of freedom*” (*K*: 154) or serve as a “symbol (*Symbol*)” of freedom (*GD*: 131). As such, the action of the person who raised their finger when acting freely would appear to be exercising their freedom but would not, thereby, have “freedom in appearance” since their action does not have an appearance that seems to be of-a-piece with, or analogical with, or like, freedom *itself* in some way.

By “freedom in appearance,” then, Schiller is not referring to merely perceptible features that make it likely that something is exercising freedom. Rather, “freedom in appearance” refers to appearances that metaphorically present something like the essence or idea of freedom itself.

This idea is best expressed in ordinary language by the expressions “is expressive of freedom” and “presents the appearance of freedom.” Indeed, to further bring out the differences between the idea Schiller intends to express in his neologism “freedom in appearance” and the closely related idea of appearing to exercise freedom, it is helpful to compare the linguistic expressions “is expressive of freedom” and “presents the appearance of freedom,” on the one hand, and “appears to exercise freedom” on the other.

Considered in light of the appearance-reality distinction, “appears to exercise freedom” tends to prioritise reality rather than appearance, but the opposite is true of “presents the appearance of freedom” and “is expressive of freedom.” If I say that a bird “appears to be exercising freedom” in the way that it flies, I will typically be taken to be making a claim about the way the bird seems to be acting, as a matter of fact—namely that it seems to be truly *determining the actions it takes itself*. If I am reliably told that the bird is not in fact doing this, but rather being controlled by an external power, say, I will typically feel some pressure to revise my initial assertion to make it clear that the appearance is not serving this default underlying-reality-revealing function by saying that it *merely* appears to be, but is not *in fact*, exercising freedom. By contrast, if I say that the bird in flight “presents the appearance of freedom,” or “is expressive of freedom,” I will not typically be taken to be making such a claim about the way the bird acts as a matter of fact; and will typically not be motivated to revise my claim in light of any facts that suggest that it is not free.

This is not to say that appearing to exercise freedom and the appearance of freedom are not intimately linked. Features that contribute to appearing to exercise freedom may also contribute to the appearance of freedom. An action that is performed smoothly, fluidly, and lightly may appear to be committed freely, and this may contribute to its presenting the appearance of freedom.[[4]](#footnote-4) Indeed, as I turn to discuss shortly, and as Schiller rightly notes, appearing to be committed freely—and actually being committed freely—play an important role in helping to *determine* the appearance of freedom.

Which features tend to contribute to the appearance of freedom, and what allows these features to tend to present this beauty-making appearance of freedom, for Schiller? And what is the role of appearing to be internally harmonious in this?

Schiller suggests that, generally, the appearance of, for example, lightness, fineness, smoothness, fluidity, liveliness, and gentleness, tends to contribute to this beauty-making appearance of freedom (*GD*: 156, 146, *K*: 164). Specifically in the context of moral actions, Schiller claims that appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony is both necessary and sufficient for an action to present the appearance of freedom. Schiller writes, for example, that “a moral action can never be beautiful if we observe the operation through which it is won from the sensory world” (*K*: 159) and that “when the *mind expresses itself* in the *sensuous nature* that depends on it in such a way that nature faithfully carries out the will of the mind and expresses its sentiments clearly, *without contravening the demands that the senses make* upon them as upon appearances, then there will arise what we call grace [by which Schiller primarily means the beauty of moral actions involving bodily movement[[5]](#footnote-5)]” (*GD*: 146, Schiller’s emphasis; see also *GD:* 153). Such actions tend to appear as “light and gentle, and yet lively,” as having “no tension” or “constraint” (*GD*: 156), and appear to display ease (*GD*: 146), and to flow from the person (*GD*: 150), as a result of the fact that they combine “reason with joy” and “enjoyment with duty” (*GD*: 149), and due to the fact that “sensuousness and reason, duty and inclination are in harmony” (*GD*: 153; see also, *K*: 160, *GD*: 154).

While Schiller delays giving a full account of why such features are able to present “freedom in appearance” to a planned (but never undertaken) future work (see *GD*: 131), he can be taken to offer two reasons for this in his extant writings. One such reason can be gleaned from his comments about what it is for the appearance of an action to “represent (*repräsentiren*)” some capacity or state in this context (*GD*: 138). Schiller says that for “representation (*Darstellung*)” to occur, the appearance of the action concerned must not be “coincidentally” related to the target capacity or state, or be related “by custom” or convention. Rather, he suggests that the appearance of the action must be “necessarily tied to,” and tend to “directly flow from,” that state or capacity by “nature,” in the “way that cries of passion are associated with the passion itself” (*GD*: 138). As such, at least part of the reason that appearances of e.g. smoothness, fineness, fluidity, brightness and lightness in actions present the appearance of freedom (or are expressive of freedom) is that these properties tend to naturally co-vary with the development of our capacity for freedom, and tend to directly flow from it, in our experience of performing actions ourselves, and in our experience of other humans performing actions. Naturally, when an action increasingly comes under the control of what is freely willed—that is, when any conflicting determinants of our action are brought to heel, and as control of behavioural effectors is acquired in order to form our second nature from our first (to put it in neo-Aristotelian terms)—the fluidity, lightness and fineness of the appearance of the action tends to increase, as does the feeling of fluidity and lightness in performing the action as the action requires increasingly less effort to perform. It is partly for this reason that the individual who raised their pinkie finger whenever they acted in a free manner would appear to be acting freely, but would not thereby present the appearance of freedom.

Another reason that Schiller thinks that such features are able to present the appearance of freedom is that such appearances have the disposition to lead to, and indeed warrant, the imagination of freedom itself, where one of the features that distinguishes the imagination from perception is that it is subject to our will to a much greater extent (see e.g. Dorsch, 2012). In the context of non-human nature—such as birds of prey in flight and Spanish palfreys—Schiller suggests that such features are be able to sustain, and warrant, the imagining of freedom, even if it seems likely they only have a weak disposition to automatically give rise to such an imagining. In this context, Schiller notes that “[practical] reason lends the object… a power to determine itself, a will, and then examines the object under the form of that will” (*K*: 151), and that the appearance of certain things “simply necessitates us to produce the idea of freedom from within ourselves, and to apply it to the object” (*K*: 161). And even in the context of human actions, Schiller suggests that the perceiver’s mind *adds* the appearance of freedom (see *GD*: 130-1); though here it seems likely that features such as “smoothness” and “fluidity” may automatically, though not mandatorily, lead to the imagination of the appearance of freedom.[[6]](#footnote-6)

To focus in greater detail on what Schiller thinks needs to be the case for a moral action, in particular, to appear to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony, and as noted above, thereby present the appearance of freedom (or be expressive of freedom): Schiller claims that it is necessary for a moral action to be freely chosen in a certain sense, and to actually be the result of a high degree of internal harmony.

In the *Kallias*, Schiller asks us to imagine that someone has been robbed, stripped of his clothes, and wounded, and that six passers-by offer to help him. One offered to give him money, but didn’t want to help directly, as the robbed man revolted him; another offered to help if he would be compensated for what he would lose in helping; another, after some internal struggle, offered to help the man by denying his own needs (to e.g. stay warm when he himself is sick) out of a sense of duty; and two further passers-by recognised the robbed man as a man who had recently wronged them, and offered to help in order to show the robbed man that they were not like him (i.e. helping for a non-benevolent reason). Finally, a sixth man helps without being asked. This individual immediately recognises that the wounded man will bleed to death unless he receives medical attention, and spontaneously abandons the heavy load he is carrying, without concern for what will become of it, in order to carry the wounded man to the nearest village.

For Schiller, only this lattermost individual’s action is beautiful because only this individual’s action has the appearance of freedom, by appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony. Only this man “acted *without solicitation*, without considering the action, and disregarding the cost to himself” and “forgot himself in his action and ‘fulfilled his duty with the ease of someone acting out of mere instinct’” (*K*: 159, Schiller’s emphasis). While some of Schiller’s first four good Samaritans have a *degree* of internal harmony, insofar as their beliefs about what they should do are in harmony with some of their desires, and indeed, *appear to be acting freely*, they are not sufficiently internally harmonious to appear to have a high degree of internal harmony, and thereby have the appearance of freedom. The first and third Samaritans’ emotions and desires, for example, pull against them helping the man; and the second, fourth and fifth Samaritans’ desires and emotions do not appear to be pulling them to do the right thing, with their assent.

In further support of the idea that a high degree of internal harmony is required, Schiller suggests that although someone might try to train themselves to perform actions in a manner which has the appearance of freedom, even if they are internally conflicted, such actions would tend to appear to be forced and self-conscious and would fail to appear to flow from the person unbidden, and so would not, as a consequence, have the appearance of freedom (*GD*: 137-8).

In order for moral actions to appear to be the result of internal harmony to a sufficiently high degree to have the beauty-making appearance of freedom, Schiller holds that the exertion of freedom is required in two ways. First, it is required that freedom was exerted in the training of our sensory natures—that is, to put it in neo-Aristotelian terms again, in the creation of our second nature from the first nature we are given—so that no desires and emotions oppose the moral action, and so that the moral action flows from our “sensory natures.” Schiller notes that “grace is always only beauty of the physical that freedom sets in motion” (*GD*: 134, see also e.g. 133).

And second, it is required that freedom *supervises* in assenting to the direction in which this well-formed nature leads us in performing the moral action in question. Schiller suggests that “grace is *favour granted* to the sensuous by the ethical” (*GD*: 145, my emphasis), and that, in the case where this second nature has been successfully formed, reason “has *taken over* the inclinations and *only entrusted* sensuousness with the helm, it will take it back the moment that instinct tries to abuse its power” (*GD*: 158, Schiller’s emphasis). He likens such a state of affairs to a liberal monarchy in which “although everything proceeds in accordance with the will of one person, the individual citizen can still persuade himself that he is living according to his own lights and simply following his inclinations” (*GD*: 145-6).

With Schiller’s account of beauty, and particularly moral beauty, now outlined and clarified, the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis* can be formulated in the following way:

*Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis*: A moral action is beautiful if and only if it presents the appearance of freedom (or is expressive of freedom); where a moral action presents the appearance of freedom (or is expressive of freedom) if and only if it appears to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony. Moreover, any such action is only beautiful because it has the appearance of freedom (or is expressive of freedom).

In the next section, I want to suggest that the Schillerian account is not merely of historical interest, or of interest if one buys into Schiller’s broader views, but has a large grain of truth in it which allows us to accommodate *some* of the beauty of moral actions. Notwithstanding this qualified enthusiasm for the Schillerian view, I also want to show that the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis* is not true as it stands, and needs to be revised and supplemented by a number of other theses.

*§3. Continence & the Internal Harmony Thesis*

I want to suggest that there are a group of contrasts whose beauty can at least partially be accommodated by aspects of the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*. In these contrasts, the moral action is executed either by a ‘fully virtuous’ agent who does not possess a self-interested desire when undertaking the action, or by an agent who *does* possess a self-interested desire when undertaking the action, but keeps it in check, and so might be called merely ‘continent’ (or *enkratês*), following Aristotle (*NE*, c. 340 BC/1954: Book VII, 1-10). Imagine the following situation:

For as long as she can remember, Jennifer has dreamt about buying a small vacation home by the sea. At the end of every month, she puts what’s left of her pay check under a mattress in her house. After many years of saving, Jennifer has finally amassed $150,000 to buy her ideal vacation home. The day has finally arrived to buy the vacation home she’s chosen. She excitedly travels with her best friend, Stephanie, to the real estate agent. She pulls into the parking lot of the agent, and while she is checking for the final time that she has the correct number of packets of money to purchase the vacation home, her friend Stephanie receives an important call. Stephanie’s husband, who has been seriously ill with a rare disease, has been given the opportunity to take part in a trial for a new experimental treatment which could well save his life. To be able to participate, however, Stephanie and her husband must raise $150,000 dollars in the next 7 days. Jennifer knows perfectly well that there is no way that Stephanie and her husband could raise that kind of money; and she can tell from Stephanie’s sad expression that Stephanie herself knows this too.

And now imagine the following two ways in which Jennifer could respond to this situation:

(a) Jennifer doesn’t feel any conflict within herself. She believes that it’s right to help her friend, and in the face of Stephanie’s need, Jennifer’s desire to use the money to buy the vacation home spontaneously disappears. The only thing she wants in this moment is for her friend’s husband to get better. Without the slightest trace of tension in her body, she smoothly and fluidly pushes the bag with the packets of money into Stephanie’s lap, and instructs her to use the money to secure her husband’s place on the trial immediately.

(b) Jennifer feels a great deal of conflict within herself. She believes that it’s right to help her friend, and she wants to help her friend. But she still feels a pressing desire to use the money she has saved to buy the vacation home she has dreamt about for so long. Wincing slightly, she battles her desire to use the money to buy the vacation home, and with a great deal of effort, manages to get this desire in check. With a great deal of tension in her body, she pushes the bag with the packets of money into Stephanie’s lap, and instructs her to use the money to secure her husband’s place on the trial immediately.

What should we say about the beauty present in this contrast? And how should this beauty be accommodated? In line with some of the conditions specified in the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*, Jennifer (a)’s action seems to be beautiful to the extent that her action presents the appearance freedom (or is expressive of freedom) as a result of appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony.

Should it be unclear why this makes Jennifer (a)’s action *beautiful*, based on one’s intuitions, then the following might help to see some of the reasons why this is the case. Although there is disagreement about what beauty—in the broadest sense of mere positive aesthetic value—is, it is thought by many to be a matter of *the way things are*, and particularly how they appear, rather than merely *what they are*, and, connectedly, to be a matter of the *intrinsic*, rather than the *instrumental*, *value* of things. Beauty tends to please in itself, rather than as a result of being a means to a further end (see e.g. Lewis, 1946; Iseminger, 1981; and Livingston, 2005, among others; for a summary of discussion of this issue, see e.g. Shelley, 2022).

With this in mind, Jennifer (a)’s action has a value that Jennifer (b)’s action does not have, and this value is a matter of the *way* Jennifer (a)’s action is, and is, at least in part, intrinsic. For, *what* Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b) do is the same in each case—they both do a good deed by doing something generous and kind—yet Jennifer (a) does this act in a different way to Jennifer (b) in undertaking this action in a manner which presents the appearance of freedom by appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony.

Connectedly, the value of this difference in the way that Jennifer (a) does the kind action is, at least in part, intrinsic. Jennifer (b)’s action may express capacities that may be as likely to lead her to give away her money as Jennifer (a)—Jennifer (b) may manage to overcome her contrary desires in every case so that she would always do the kind and generous thing, just as Jennifer (a) would. That is to say, the instrumental value of the way that Jennifer (a) does the kind thing may be equal to the instrumental value of the way that Jennifer (b) does the kind thing. But, even if that were the case, Jennifer (a)’s action would still have additional sources of *intrinsic* value that are independent of this source of instrumental value. Jennifer (a)’s action would have greater intrinsic value than Jennifer (b)’s action in such a case at least in part because her action presents the appearance of freedom. In support of this, we might note, for example, that Jennifer (a)’s action would have a greater tendency to please in such a case to the extent that it presents such an appearance.[[7]](#footnote-7)

However, other aspects of this contrast suggest that the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis* is not true as it stands, and needs to be revised. One might think that Jennifer (a)’s action is beautiful because it appears to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony *independently* of the extent to which it thereby has the appearance of freedom.

To bring this possibility out clearly, we can exploit the fact that being seen as presenting the appearance of freedom is, as we have seen in §2, likely partly a matter of the imagination, and as such is not mandatory (even if it is automatic). As such, we can imagine Jennifer (a)’s action as appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony but not as presenting the appearance of freedom—perhaps aiding this construal by imagining that a mad scientist formed her with only moral desires against her will—and ask ourselves, does it still seem to truly have a beauty that Jennifer (b)’s action lacks?[[8]](#footnote-8) The answer seems to be affirmative. For even if Jennifer (a)’s action does not present the appearance of freedom, Jennifer (a)’s action appears to be the result of, and to be expressive of, a *finer* and *more harmonious* internal constitution than Jennifer (b)’s action, and so she commits the action in a more intrinsically valuable manner than Jennifer (b) to that extent. Indeed, fineness and harmony are two of the paradigmatic beauty-making properties.

This is not to say that the fact that Jennifer (a)’s action appears to be the result of internal harmony only seems to be able to contribute to the action’s beauty independently when we refuse to take up the invitation to see the appearance of freedom in Jennifer (a)’s action. For it seems plausible that, even when we permit ourselves to imagine that Jennifer (a)’s action presents the appearance of freedom as a result of Jennifer’s action appearing to be the result of internal harmony, the latter might still make an independent contribution to the beauty of her action.

Setting this source of additional beauty in Jennifer (a)’s action aside, it is not the case, as the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis* would have it, that Jennifer (b)’s action has no beauty. For Jennifer (b)’s action seems to have a good deal of beauty relative to Jennifer (a), stemming from the fact that her action expresses internal *dis*harmony.

To see this source of beauty in Jennifer (b)’s action clearly, it may be helpful to consider the following: While both Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b) may possess the same strength of will, Jennifer (a) does not express this in her action. Her action effortlessly flows from the structured harmony in her psychological capacities and their connection to the relevant behavioural effectors; at most, she merely seems to have to assent to the direction in which her well-formed desires pull her. By contrast, in the case of Jennifer (b)’s action, we are presented with a manifestation of her ability to exert effort to triumph over her recalcitrant desires; and insofar as the appearance of her action appears to be expressive of this, her action seems to have a kind of sublimity, or something approaching it.[[9]](#footnote-9)

 Here too, if any help were needed to recognise that this feature of Jennifer (b)’s action is *beauty*-making, it is helpful to return to the considerations that were appealed to above: namely, that beauty in the broadest sense of mere positive aesthetic value is often thought to concern *the way things are*, and not merely *what they are*, and, connectedly, that beauty is also a matter of the *intrinsic*, rather than *instrumental*, *value* of things. As I have noted above, both Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b) do the same thing—namely, they both do a good deed by acting generously. But each of them does this in a different *manner*, with Jennifer (a) manifesting the strength of her will, and presenting the appearance of such strength of will in the tense way in which she performs this action. And while such a *way* of acting may be valued because strength of will leads to good or right conduct in this particular context (and indeed, tends to do so generally in good, albeit flawed, people), strength does not seem to be solely valued for this reason. For strength is valued for itself: we admire power and strength in sublime nature, for example, where moral considerations do not seem to be in play.

These considerations suggest that the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis* needs to be weakened considerably. To wit, moral actions that appear to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony, and have the properties of being fluid and light can, in themselves, be beautiful irrespective of whether they present the appearance of freedom, and so it does not seem to be necessary for moral actions to present the appearance of freedom in order to be beautiful. And moral actions that appear to be the result of internal *dis*harmony in being committed in a tense and stiff fashion, may also be beautiful because they present the appearance of strength of will. As such, the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis* should be revised to:

*Internal Harmony Thesis*: At least some moral actions are beautiful to the extent that, and because:

1. they present the appearance of freedom (or are expressive of freedom) by appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony between the agent’s psychological capacities; or because,
2. they appear to be the result of internal harmony independently of the extent to which, and because, they present the appearance of freedom (or are expressive of freedom).

And an additional thesis needs to be posited:

*Internal Disharmony Thesis*: At least some moral actions are beautiful to the extent that, and because, they present the appearance of strength of will.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Rather than solely relying on my intuitions about this contrast, and the reasons I have identified for the beauty that I have argued is involved in these cases, we can gain additional confidence in this matter by drawing on the intuitions of the folk in a systematic manner, provided that they are competent users of the concept beauty, and that they have the requisite imaginative capacities and are not labouring under an epistemic defect. To begin to do this, a study was conducted on Prolific. Ethical approval for this study (and the study reported in §4) was granted by [redacted for anonymity].

*Method & Materials:* A gender-balanced sample of 500 participants was recruited from the United States, and 31 failed the attention check, leaving a final sample of 469 (Mean age = 42, 49% Women; for a justification of the sample size aimed at, see the *Supplementary Materials*). Participants were randomly assigned to read about Jennifer (a) (the internal harmony & low strength of will condition) or Jennifer (b) (the internal disharmony & high strength of will condition). Participants were asked to read the situation carefully and imagine it as vividly as they could. After indicating the extent to which they approved of what Jennifer did, to discourage participants from using the measures of interest to merely express their approbation (for a similar method, see e.g. Doran, 2021), participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following claims: (1) “Jennifer does not appear to experience any internal conflict at all. Her desires appear to be working to help her to give the money to Stephanie” (internal harmony), (2) “Jennifer appears to exert a great deal of effort to overcome any obstacles—such as a desire to use the money to buy her ideal vacation home—that may get in the way of her giving the money to Stephanie. As a result, Jennifer’s action presents the appearance of strength of will (or is expressive of strength of will)” (appearance of strength of will); (3) “Jennifer’s action presents the appearance of freedom (or is expressive of freedom)” (appearance of freedom); and (4) “Jennifer acts in a beautiful way in this situation” (beauty of action). Details of the randomisation of these questions are provided in the *Supplementary Materials*.

 In line with the above, I predicted that participants should, consistent with the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis* and the *Internal Harmony Thesis*, judge Jennifer (a)’s action to be beautiful overall, and more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action to the extent that they judge her to appear to be internally harmonious and as a result present the appearance of freedom. However, consistent with the *Internal Harmony Thesis*, but not the *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*,I also predict that Jennifer (a)’s action will be beautiful overall, and more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action to the extent that her action expresses internal harmony in itself (independently of the extent to which this is involved in her action expressing freedom). Finally, consistent with the *Internal Disharmony Thesis*, but not the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis*, I predict that Jennifer (b)’s action will be judged to be beautiful overall, and more beautiful than Jennifer (a)’s action to the extent that she is judged to appear to have overcome her self-focused desires through effort and thereby presents the appearance of strength of will.[[11]](#footnote-11)

*Results:* Descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVAs were used to assess whether there were any significant differences in judgements of Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b)’s actions on the measures of internal harmony, strength of will, freedom, and beauty.



Graph 1. A graph showing agreement with judgements of internal harmony, strength of will, freedom, and beauty by condition, where 4 is “Strongly agree,” -4 is “Strongly disagree” and 0 is “Neither agree nor disagree” and error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals

Participants found both Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b)’s actions to be beautiful, and these were not found to differ in their beauty (Mean-Jennifer-(a): 3.23, Mean-Jennifer-(b): 3.09; *F*(1, 467)= 1.08, *p*= .30, η2=.002). Participants judged that Jennifer (a)’s action appeared to be the result of internal harmony to a greater extent than Jennifer (b), with the mean judgement of Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b)’s actions falling well above and below the midpoint respectively (Mean-Jennifer-(a): 3.23, Mean-Jennifer-(b): -2.51; *F*(1, 467)= 1511.41, *p*<.001, η2=.76). Participants judged that Jennifer (b)’s action presented the appearance of strength of will more than Jennifer (a)’s action, with the mean judgement of Jennifer (b)’s action lying well above the midpoint and the mean of Jennifer (a) falling around the midpoint (Mean-Jennifer-(a): 0.56, Mean-Jennifer-(b): 2.70; *F*(1, 467)= 98.22, *p*<.001, η2=.17). Participants judged that Jennifer (a)’s action presented the appearance of freedom more than Jennifer (b)’s action, with the mean judgement of even Jennifer (b)’s action lying above the midpoint (Mean-Jennifer-(a): 2.63, Mean-Jennifer-(b): 1.44; *F*(1, 467)= 54.79, *p*<.001, η2=.11).[[12]](#footnote-12) [[13]](#footnote-13) In sum, as expected, Jennifer (a)’s action was found to appear to be the result of internal harmony and be expressive of freedom to a greater extent, and to present the appearance of strength of will less, than Jennifer (b)’s action. Moreover, overall, both Jennifer (a)’s and Jennifer (b)’s actions were found to be very beautiful.

To assess whether judgements of beauty are influenced by judgements of the appearance of strength of will, and by the extent to which each Jennifer’s action appeared to be the result of internal harmony in itself, and to the extent that this presents the appearance of freedom in turn, a multiple mediation analysis using ordinary least squares path analysis (Hayes, 2017) was conducted (see Figure 1.). The results suggest that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action to the extent that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to appear to be the result of greater internal harmony and in turn found to present the appearance of freedom to a greater extent (.25, 95% CI [.14, .38]). More specifically, these results suggest that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to be .25 units more beautiful, as a result of being judged to be caused by 5.25 units more internal harmony, and in turn being judged to be 1.09 units more expressive of freedom (in each case as measured in terms of agreement with statements expressing these constructs on a 9-unit scale, anchored at “-4 – Strongly disagree” and “4 – Strongly agree” with the midpoint as “0 – Neither agree nor disagree”). The results also suggest that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action to the extent that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to appear to be the result of greater internal harmony, independently of the extent to which her action was found to present the appearance of freedom (.58, 95% CI [.16, 1.05]). More specifically, these results suggest that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to be .58 units more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action as a result of being judged to be caused by 5.25 units more internal harmony, independently of the extent to which her action was found to present the appearance of freedom (in each case as measured in terms of agreement, as described above). The results also suggest that Jennifer (b)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (a)’s action to the extent that Jennifer (b)’s action was found to present the appearance of strength of will to a greater extent (.23, 95% CI [.09, .38]). More specifically, these results suggest that Jennifer (b)’s action was found to be .23 units more beautiful as a result of being judged to be caused by 2.14 units more strength of will (again, in each case as measured in terms of agreement, as described above).

Independently of these indirect effects, there may also be a direct effect of condition on judgements of beauty, with Jennifer (b)’s action being found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (a)’s action independently of the effect of condition on beauty via the appearance of strength of will, and via appearing to be internally harmonious in itself and in turn via appearances of freedom, though this only met the 90% significance level (.49, 95% CI [-.03, 1.00]).

Strength

.23\*\*\*

-2.14\*\*\*

.11\*\*\*

Internal Harmony

.10\*

Freedom

.19\*\*\*

5.75\*\*\*

Condition: Jennifer (a) vs. Jennifer (b)

Beauty

-.49†

Figure 1. A multiple mediation analysis showing the effect of condition on beauty via judgements of internal harmony, strength of will, and freedom by condition, where \*\*\* = *p*<.001, \*\* = *p*<.01, \* = *p*<.05, † = *p*<.1, ns = not significant

*Discussion*: These data provide support for the claims defended in this section. Contrary to the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis*, which claims that appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony is necessary for moral actions to be beautiful, these findings suggest that expressing internal harmony (let alone expressing a high degree of internal harmony) is not in fact necessary—since Jennifer (b)’s action was not found to display internal harmony, and yet her action was found to be beautiful. By contrast, consistent with *Internal Harmony Thesis* and as predicted, these results suggest that Jennifer (a)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (b)’s action to the extent that it appeared to be the result of greater internal harmony and thereby seemed to present the appearance of freedom to a greater extent (as per (i)), and to the extent that it appeared to be an expression of greater internal harmony in itself, independently of its effect via judgements of the appearance of freedom (as per (ii)). Consistent with *Internal Disharmony Thesis*, and as predicted, Jennifer (b)’s action seemed to be found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (a)’s action to the extent that she was found to appear to exert effort to overcome obstacles and thereby present the appearance of strength of will. The manipulation of the vignette between Jennifer (a) and (b) was estimated to have the largest effect on judgements of beauty via the resulting changes in the appearance of internal harmony in itself (namely, a .58 increase in judgements of beauty), followed by the effects of the manipulation of the vignettes on judgements of beauty via the resulting changes in the appearance of internal harmony and its effect on judgements of the appearance of freedom in turn, and on judgements of the appearance of strength of will (namely, a .25 and .23 increase in judgements of beauty respectively).

Finally, unexpectedly, Jennifer (b)’s action may have been found to be more beautiful than Jennifer (a)’s action independently of the effect of the manipulation of the vignette on judgements of beauty via judgements of internal harmony, and of the appearances of freedom and strength of will. What might explain this (if indeed it is true)? One possibility here, as I mention above, and which will be part of my focus in the next section, is that Jennifer (b)’s action has a greater disposition to give rise to the kind of affects that might themselves be able to contribute to beauty—in having a form, or narrative arc, that is more uplifting or moving. Indeed, given that both Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b) were found to be highly beautiful, and that judgements of internal harmony and of the appearances of freedom and strength of will only seem to collectively explain a portion of the beauty of each, it may be the case that both *share* other features that make important contributions to their beauty. One possibility here is that both are beautiful to the extent that they are moving. Another is that both are beautiful insofar as they act in a superogatory way: the person who does what is merely right in, say, not telling a lie, does not seem to be acting beautifully; but someone who transcends the ethical minimum to approach the human ideal for action in, say, acting selflessly (as Jennifer (a) and (b) do), may be acting beautifully to that extent. Indeed, this may even be a necessary condition for moral actions to be beautiful. I begin to examine some of these additional contributors in the next section.

*§4. The Affective Harmony Thesis*

I want to suggest that there are a number cases of moral actions whose beauty cannot be fully accommodated even by appealing to internal harmony, disharmony, and freedom, in the ways suggested above (in the *Internal Harmony Thesis* and *Internal Disharmony Thesis*); and that these cases provide further evidence that it is not necessary for a moral action to appear to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony in order to be beautiful (as per the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis*). Consider the following case, which has been adapted from Karen Stohr’s (2003) counterexample to what we might call the ‘*Moral Internal Harmony Thesis*’[[14]](#footnote-14):

Anna owns a business that employs 60 hard-working people. The business has been struggling for a few years. Anna has done everything she can to try to turn the business’s fortunes around without making layoffs. She has cut her own salary to a minimum, and used up all of her savings to support the business. But it isn’t enough. If she does not make 15 layoffs, the business will go under, and all of her employees will lose their jobs. If she wants to save the business, she doesn’t have any other choice.

And now imagine the following two ways in which Anna could respond to this situation:

(a) Immediately, Anna decides that she will make the 15 layoffs the following day and give each of the laid off employees the most she can afford to. She takes out the largest personal loan she is eligible for, which is for $45,000, allowing her to give $3,000 to each laid off employee. As a result of taking out this loan, she will personally face financial hardship for at least a year.

Anna doesn’t feel any conflict within her about what to do in this situation. She believes that it is right to make the small number of layoffs in order to save the majority of her employees’ jobs, and to give what she can to the laid off employees. All of her emotional responses lead her in the direction of making the layoffs and giving the laid off employees what she can. When she thinks about the fact that all of her employees will lose their jobs if she doesn’t make the layoffs, she feels bad; and when she thinks about the fact that she can save the majority of her employees’ jobs by making the layoffs and can provide the laid off employees with some financial help, she feels good.

The following morning, she makes the layoffs. With ease, and with dry eyes, she fluidly tells each of the 15 employees that they are being laid off in order to save the majority of the employees’ jobs. She smoothly hands each of them an envelope containing $3,000 to help them while they look for another job. The only thing she feels while making these layoffs is a deep happiness that the majority of her employees will be able to keep their jobs, and that the laid off employees have received financial support. She doesn’t feel any sadness, even though 15 of her employees are losing their jobs, as this was inevitable.

(b) Anna feels a great deal of conflict within her about what to do in this situation. On the one hand, she believes that it is right to make the 15 layoffs in order to save the majority of her employees’ jobs, and some of her emotional responses lead her in the direction of making the layoffs. When she thinks about the fact that all of her employees will lose their jobs if she doesn’t make the layoffs, she feels bad; and when she thinks about the fact that she can save the majority of her employees’ jobs, she feels good. On the other hand, some of her emotional reactions lead her in the direction of not making the layoffs. When she thinks about the 15 employees that will suffer if she makes the layoffs, she feels terrible.

Finally, she resolves that she will make the 15 layoffs the following day and give each of the laid off employees the most she can afford to. She takes out the largest personal loan she is eligible for, which is for $45,000, allowing her to give $3,000 to each laid off employee. As a result of taking out this loan, she will personally face financial hardship for at least a year.

The following morning, she makes the layoffs. With difficulty, and through tears, she haltingly tells each of the 15 employees that they are being laid off in order to save the majority of the employees’ jobs. Trembling with emotion, she shakily hands each of them an envelope containing $3,000 to help them while they look for another job. The only thing she feels while making these layoffs is a deep sadness that 15 of her employees are losing their jobs, in spite of the fact that this was inevitable. She doesn’t feel any happiness, even though the majority of her employees will be able to keep their jobs and the laid off employees have received financial support.

How should the beauty of the cases be accommodated? It seems that the theses defended in §3 might be able to accommodate *some* of the beauty in this contrast. In line with *Internal Harmony Thesis*, Anna (a)’s action might be more beautiful than Anna (b)’s action to the extent that it presents the appearance of freedom, as a result of appearing to be the result of internal harmony, and to the extent that it appears to be the result of greater internal harmony in itself (as per *Internal Harmony Thesis (i) and (ii)*). Notwithstanding this possibility, overall, it seems that Anna (b)’s action is more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action, and since Anna (b)’s action appears to be the result of internal *disharmony*, rather than internal harmony, the majority of the beauty does not seem to be able to be accounted for by the *Internal Harmony Thesis*.

Nor does it seem to be the case, in line with the *Internal Disharmony Thesis*, that all of the greater amount of beauty of Anna (b)’s action resides in the fact that her action is expressive of strength of will. While Anna (b)’s action might display the appearance of strength of will to a greater extent insofar as she overcomes her sensitivity to the suffering of the people who will be made redundant in order to do the right thing, and thereby be beautiful to some extent, this still wouldn’t account for all of the greater beauty of Anna (b)’s action. For Anna (b)’s sensitivity to the potential suffering of the small number of employees that will be made redundant, which pulls against her inclination to do the right thing in making the redundancies, *should not* be transcended entirely, and a large part of the greater beauty of Anna (b)’s action seems to be linked to the fact that it expresses that she is more emotionally sensitive to the conflicting sources of harm, rather than the fact that she transcends one of these sources of harm. She feels these harms more deeply; they make a greater impression on her, and she seems warmer as a consequence.

To get a clearer grip on this beauty, we first need to note that there are different kinds of beauty, and different concepts of beauty. beauty in a thin sense seems to refer to anything of positive aesthetic value. And as we have seen, although it is difficult to say precisely what positive aesthetic value is, this type of beauty is often thought to be a matter of the way things are and is of intrinsic, rather than instrumental, value. But there are other, thicker, concepts of beauty. Beauty, in one thick sense, is found in the smooth, small and delicate, such as greyhounds, rolling hills, meadows strewn with flowers, and meandering rivers (Kant, 1764/2011: 14-18; Burke, 1757/1990: 102-107); and in ‘warm’ traits such as compassion and kindness, and in moving events and melancholy poetry (Kant, 1764/2011: 22-26; Burke, 1757/1990: 143-4; Doran, 2023). This kind of beauty has been noted to be found more in the paintings of Constable[[15]](#footnote-15), but isn’t found in the paintings of Goya, even if the latter are at least equally (if not more) artistically and aesthetically valuable (Passmore, 1951: 331; Zangwill, 2001: 11). While this kind of beauty has largely been ignored or even disparaged by philosophers, with some good cause due to the fact that it often tends to veer towards sentimentality and for its associations with kitschness (see e.g. Saville, 1982: 136-7; Zangwill, 2001: 11), it is nonetheless a kind of beauty. What does this kind of beauty consist in?

As a number have rightly noted, these examples of this kind of beauty seem to have nothing in common with one another apart from the fact that they tend to give rise to a certain kind of response (Wordsworth, 1811-12/1974: 349; Burke, 1757/1990: 135-6; Doran, 2023). This response has variously been labelled ‘love,’ ‘sympathy,’ ‘elevation,’ ‘kama muta’ and ‘ecstasy’ (Burke, 1757/1990: 135-145; Kant, 1964/2011: e.g. 22-23; Wordsworth, 1811-2/1974; Savile, 1982; Laski, 1961; Landis et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2018; Cova & Deonna, 2014; Cova & Boudesseul, 2023; Doran, 2023), which in its most paradigmatic and extreme instances is characterised by, for example, tender and warm feelings, a sense of being inspired or uplifted, and of wanting to open oneself up to, or be unified with, the beautiful object. Burke (1757/1990: 135-6) and Wordsworth (1811-12/1974: 349), for example, characterise the emotion that is constitutive of beauty as ‘love,’ and describes this as involving, *inter alia*, melting and gentle feelings.

Recently, in an experiment, Doran (2023) found that people tend to think that a fully compassionate person is more beautiful on the inside than a fully just person—even though they are judged to be equally morally good—and that they tend to attribute greater beauty to the character of the compassionate person to the extent that it gives rise to the pleasant transformational aspects of this special state—where, for example, one has a sense of unity with the virtuous person, and warm feelings akin to sympathy and feeling moved. Indeed, in this particular case and cases like it, there appears to be a symmetry between the features of the beautiful object that realise the disposition to be beautiful in this sense—in this case a disposition to be warm, sympathetic, and to tend towards unity with others (and particularly with those who warrant such unity, such as vulnerable and kind people)—and the feelings which the disposition to be beautiful in this sense tends to give rise to in appreciators of this beauty—namely, warm feelings, and feelings akin to sympathy and of unity with the beautiful object. In light of this, Doran (2023) has suggested that we often “feel into” this kind of beauty (following the once popular, but now largely abandoned, empathy-based account of beauty; see e.g., Lipps, 1903; see also Burke, 1757/1990: 135-145).

Interestingly, even Schiller notes that beauty gives rise to a feeling of “love” (*GD*: 165) and “sympathy” (*GD:* 167) which he characterises as an emotion that “inclines towards its object” (*GD*: 165), and in its most extreme instances, allows us to “lose ourselves” (*GD*: 165), open our hearts (*GD:* 139), and “flow over into the object” (*GD:* 165), and causes our souls to surge upwards (GD: 139). It is clear, however, that he does not regard this emotion as constitutive of a certain sense of beauty, despite claiming that this is “a feeling that is inseparable from grace and beauty” (*GD*: 165).

It is important to stress, however, that this feeling is only constitutive of one kind of beauty; and that there will also likely be other kinds of feelings that beauty gives rise to. It has been suggested, for example, that beauty may give rise to a special, aesthetic, kind of pleasure (see, e.g. Kant, 1790/2000; and Matthen, 2017; though see Doran, 2017), and Doran (2023) has suggested that these feelings of unity and harmony may be but one determinate of this pleasure.

On this basis, I want to suggest that in the context of moral actions the beauty-making harmony can be located outside of the relationship between the internal dispositions that an action is the result of. Rather, the beauty-making harmony can be located in the *felt fit* between the appreciator of the action and the executor of the actions on the behalf of the appreciator of the action. With this in mind, one reason that Anna (b)’s action is more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action is that the former has a greater disposition to give rise to a sense of feeling harmoniously related to, or unified with, the agent and their action, and of warm, tender feelings akin to sympathy.[[16]](#footnote-16) Indeed, in line with the idea that we “feel into” this kind of beauty, Anna (b) seems to have this disposition to a greater extent in virtue of the fact that Anna (b)’s action itself tends to express the disposition to be warm, sympathetic, and to tend towards unity with others, to a greater extent. This is not to say that Anna (a) does not have this disposition to any extent: to the extent that she is faced with a tragic situation, and is sensitive enough to the suffering of the employees that will be made redundant to take out a personal loan at considerable personal cost, she *does*. But in not feeling the laid off employees’ suffering to such a great extent that she finds deciding to make the redundancies hard, and indeed, seems somewhat *cold*, she has this disposition to a lesser extent. In light of the foregoing, we might propose the following new moral beauty thesis:

*Affective Harmony Thesis*: Some actions are beautiful to an appreciator to the extent that and because the actions concerned have the disposition to give rise to a feeling of harmony or unity with the executor of the action in the appreciator of the action; a feeling which is often described as somehow ‘warm,’ ‘tender’ or ‘sympathy-like.’

As in §3, rather than solely relying on my intuitions about this case, and the reasons that I have claimed are involved in these cases, we can gain additional confidence in this matter by drawing on the intuitions of the folk in a systematic manner. To begin to do this, a study was conducted on Prolific.

 *Materials & Method:* A gender balanced sample of 500 participants from the United States were recruited to take part. 50 participants failed the attention check and so were excluded, leaving a final sample of 450 (48% women, mean age = 39). Participants were randomly assigned the text about Anna (a) (the low affective harmony & high internal harmony condition) or Anna (b) (the high affective harmony & low internal harmony condition). Participants were asked to read the situation carefully and imagine it as vividly as they can. After indicting to what extent they approved of Anna’s action, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following claims: (1) “Anna does not appear to experience any internal conflict at all. All of her feelings appear to be working to help her to make the layoffs in order to save the company” (internal harmony); (2) “Anna appears to exert a great deal of effort to overcome any obstacles—such as any inclination she may feel to not make the layoffs—that may get in the way of her making the layoffs in order to save the company. As a result, Anna’s action presents the appearance of strength of will (or is expressive of strength of will)” (appearance of strength of will); (3) “Anna’s action presents the appearance of freedom (or is expressive of freedom)” (appearance of freedom); and (4) “I feel a sense of warmth towards, or sympathy for, or unity with, Anna” (affective harmony). Finally, participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that “Anna acts in a beautiful way in this situation” (beauty). Details of how these items were randomised between participants is described in the *Supplementary Materials*.



Graph 2. A graph showing agreement with judgements of internal harmony, strength, freedom, affective harmony, and beauty by condition, where 4 is “Strongly agree,” -4 is “Strongly disagree” and 0 is “Neither agree nor disagree” and error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals

In line with the above, I predict that participants should judge Anna (b)’s action to be more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action overall, and that they should judge Anna (b)’s action to be more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action to the extent that that they feel more harmoniously related to, and unified with, Anna (b). I do not make strong predictions with respect to internal harmony, freedom and strength—in this context, it may be that Anna (b)’s action is more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action to the extent that she presents the appearance of strength of will (in line with *Internal Disharmony Thesis*), and that Anna (a) may be more beautiful than Anna (b) to the extent that she appears to be internally harmonious in itself, and to the extent that her action has the appearance of freedom (in line with *Internal Harmony Thesis*).

*Results:* Descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVAs were used to assess whether there were any significant differences in the judgements of Anna (a) and Anna (b)’s actions on the measures of internal harmony, strength of will, freedom, affective harmony, and beauty. Participants judged that Anna (a)’s action appeared to be the result of internal harmony to a greater extent than Anna (b), with the mean for Anna (a)’s action lying above the midpoint and the mean for Anna (b)’s action falling well below the midpoint (Mean-Anna-(a): 1.41, Mean-Anna-(b): -2.93; *F*(1, 448) = 449.95, *p*<.001, η2 = .50). Participants judged that both Anna (a) and Anna (b)’s actions presented the appearance of strength of will to a large extent, and these were not found to differ (Mean-Anna-(a): 2.49, Mean-Anna-(b): 2.46; *F*(1, 448) = .36, *p*=.85, ns). Participants judged that Anna (a) appeared to exhibit the appearance of freedom to a greater extent than Anna (b), with the mean for Anna (b) lying around the midpoint (Mean-Anna-(a): 1.11, Mean-Anna-(b): .24; *F*(1, 448) = 21.27, *p*<.001, η2 = .05). Participants judged that Anna (b) led to more affective harmony than Anna (a), with the means for both lying well above the midpoint (Mean-Anna-(a): 1.52, Mean-Anna-(b): 2.23; *F*(1, 448) = 38.90, *p*<.001, η2 = .08). Participants judged that Anna (b)’s action appeared to be more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action, with the means for both lying well above the midpoint (Mean-Anna-(a): 1.52, Mean-Anna-(b): 2.23; *F*(1, 448) = 15.97, *p*<.001, η2 = .03).[[17]](#footnote-17) In sum, as expected, Anna (a) was found to appear to be more internally harmonious than Anna (b); and Anna (b) was found to have a greater disposition to give rise to affective harmony than Anna (a), and was found to be more beautiful than Anna (a).[[18]](#footnote-18)

To assess whether judgements of beauty are influenced by judgements of the appearance of strength of will, affective harmony, and by the extent to which each Anna appeared to be internally harmonious in itself, and to the extent that this presents the appearance of freedom in turn, a multiple mediation analysis using ordinary least squares path analysis (Hayes, 2017) was conducted (see Figure 2.). The results of this analysis suggested that Anna (b)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action to the extent that she was found to be more affectively harmonious (.70, 95% CI [.44, .93]). More specifically, these results suggest that Anna (b)’s action was found to be .70 units more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action as a result of giving rise to .96 units more affective harmony (in each case as measured in terms of agreement with statements expressing these constructs on a 9-unit scale, anchored at “-4 – Strongly disagree” and “4 – Strongly agree” with the midpoint as “0 – Neither agree nor disagree”). The results also suggested that Anna (a)’s action was found to be beautiful to the extent that it was judged to appear to be the result of internal harmony to a greater extent, and in turn present the appearance of freedom (.08, 95% CI [.02, .16]). More specifically, these results suggest that Anna (a)’s action was found to be .08 units more beautiful as a result of being judged to be caused by 4.34 units more internal harmony, and in turn being .78 units more expressive of freedom (in each case as measured in terms of agreement, as described above). There were no other significant indirect effects or direct effects.

Freedom

.11\*\*\*

-4.34\*\*\*

Beauty

.18\*\*\*

Internal Harmony

.03, ns

Condition: Anna (b) vs. Anna (a)

.25, ns

.71\*\*\*

.17\*\*\*

-.03, ns

.96\*\*\*

Strength

Affective Harmony

Figure 2. A multiple mediation analysis showing the effect of condition on beauty via judgements of internal harmony, strength of will, freedom, affective harmony, and beauty by condition, where \*\*\* = *p*<.001, \*\* = *p*<.01, \* = *p*<.05, † = *p*<.1, and ns = not significant

*Discussion*: These data provide support for the idea that the theses proposed in §3 are not able to adequately accommodate the beauty involved in contrasts that involve a conflict that arises from a sensitivity to things of moral value—and specifically, the suffering of others, even when such suffering is unavoidable. While these data suggest that Anna (a)’s action seems to be *ever so slightly* more beautiful than Anna (b)’s action to the extent that Anna (a)’s action appears to be the result of internal harmony, and in turn presents the appearance of freedom (in line with the *Internal Harmony Thesis (i)*), Anna (b)’s action was more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action overall. As expected, the reason for this doesn’t seem to be that Anna (b)’s action was found to present the appearance of strength of will to a greater extent (as would be in line with the *Internal Disharmony Thesis*). Rather, in line with the *Affective Harmony Thesis*, Anna (b)’s action seems to have been found to be more beautiful because Anna (b)’s action has a greater disposition to give rise to sympathy-like feelings of being harmoniously related to, or unified with, Anna (b) than Anna (a)’s action has to give rise to such feelings towards Anna (a). The manipulation of the vignette between Anna (a) and (b) was estimated to have the largest effect on judgements of beauty via the resulting changes in affective harmony (namely, a .70 increase in judgements of beauty), followed by the effect of the manipulation of the vignettes on judgements of beauty via the resulting changes in the appearance of harmony and its effect on judgements of freedom in turn (namely, just a .08 increase in judgements of beauty). That is to say, in the context of this contrast at least, internal harmony seems to be playing a much more limited role in determining the perceived beauty of the actions; rather, *affective harmony* is doing most of the heavy lifting in determining the perceived beauty in this context.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Moreover, comparing the results of this study with those of study 1, the effect of the appearance of freedom was greatly reduced in this study, suggesting that the influence of the appearance of freedom is context-sensitive: in the context of Jennifer (a) and (b), every one-unit increase in the appearance of freedom was estimated to result in .23 units more beauty (see Figure 1.), but in the context of Anna (a) and Anna (b) every one-unit increase in the appearance of freedom was estimated to result in just .11 units more beauty (see Figure 2; in each case as measured in terms of agreement, as described above).

In addition to this, these findings also provide further support for the idea that the *Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis*, which claims that internal harmony is necessary for moral actions to be beautiful, is mistaken: these findings suggest that expressing internal harmony is not necessary—since Anna (b)’s action was not found to display internal harmony, and yet her action was found to be beautiful, and indeed, more beautiful than Anna (a)’s action.

*§5. Conclusion*

Despite a recent resurgence of interest in the existence and nature of moral beauty, no contemporary work has focused on the beauty of moral *actions*. In this paper, I have argued that Schiller’s neglected account of the beauty of moral actions points to an important source of beauty in contrasts of the actions of those who are ‘continent’ and ‘fully’ virtuous. Namely, some of the beauty of such contrasts lies in appearing to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony and in turn presenting the appearance of freedom. However, Schiller’s account cannot explain all of the beauty of such contrasts, or of certain other kinds of contrasts where there is internal conflict that arises from a sensitivity to things of moral value. In the case of the former contrasts, I have suggested that an important portion of the residual beauty can be accommodated by appealing to the idea that beauty lies in the appearance of internal *dis*harmony, and in appearing to be the result of internal harmony in itself. In the latter cases, I have argued that there is an important beauty-making harmony in the felt relationship between the appreciator and executor of the moral action. Taken together, the arguments laid out in this paper show, I submit, that while Schiller’s account of the beauty of actions is important, and should be re-discovered by philosophical aestheticians, we should not follow Schiller in trying to offer a univocal account of the beauty of moral actions. Rather, we need to take a pluralist, and context-sensitive, approach to do justice to the myriad beauties of different moral actions.

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*Supplementary Materials*

*Sample size for studies 1 and 2:*

The target sample size was determined based on the smallest effect size that would be of interest given resource constraints (e.g. Lakens, 2022), together with estimates of the sample sizes that would achieve that. Since guidelines for sample sizes for the parallel multiple mediation models that were planned are not available, Fritz & McKinnon’s (2007) guidelines for simple bias-corrected mediation models were used instead. It was anticipated that the α pathways from the condition to the first layer of mediators, at least, might be medium-to-large, and that the β pathways from the mediators to the outcome variable would be of interest even if they were small. Based on Fritz & McKinnon’s recommendation that around 400 participants would be required to have 80% chance of detecting such an indirect effect at the 95% confidence level, a final sample size of 400 after exclusions and withdrawals was aimed at. 500 participants were recruited to took part, to allow for exclusions. For study 1, 31 failed the attention checks, leaving a final sample size of 469. For study 2, 50 failed the attention checks, leaving a final sample of 450.

*Additional references*

Fritz, MS., & McKinnon, DP. (2007). Required sample size to detect the mediated effect. *Psychological Science*, 18: 233-239.

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*Details concerning randomisation for study 1:*

Participants were first presented with the question concerning the extent to which they approved of Jennifer’s action. The order in which participants received the questions concerning internal harmony, appearance of freedom, and appearance of strength of will was randomised between participants. However, since it was predicted that condition might affect judgements of beauty via judgements of internal harmony and freedom in turn, the question concerning the appearance of freedom always appeared *after* the question concerning internal harmony. For the same reason, participants always received the question concerning the beauty of the way Jennifer acted last.

*Details concerning the attention checks for study 1:*

At the end of the study, participants were asked the following question:

“Which of the following statements do you know to be true of the situation you read about? Please select **three**.”

The responses participants were able to pick from were as follows (responses occurred in a fixed order between participants):

* Jennifer wants to buy a new car.
* Jennifer goes to buy a vacation home. (T)
* Jennifer wants to go eat ice cream.
* Stephanie’s husband wants a vacation home.
* Stephanie’s husband is unwell. (T)
* Jennifer gives money to her friend Stephanie. (T)
* Jennifer gives money to her son.
* Jennifer’s husband wants to be the richest man in the world.

The three true responses are indicated with (T). Participants who did not select the three correct responses, and only the three correct responses, were excluded.

*Details concerning randomisation for study 2:*

Participants were first presented with the question concerning the extent to which they approved of Anna’s action. The order in which participants received the questions concerning internal harmony, strength of will, freedom, and affective harmony was randomised between participants, but participants always received the question concerning the appearance of freedom after having answered the questions concerning internal harmony. Participants received the question concerning the beauty of the action last.

*Details concerning the attention checks for study 2:*

At the end of the study, participants were asked the following question:

“Which of the following do you know to be true of the scenario described?

 Please select **three options**:”

The responses participants were able to pick from were as follows (responses occurred in a fixed order between participants):

* Anna fires all of her staff.
* Anna wants to buy a luxury yacht.
* Anna fires some of her staff. (T)
* Anna trained herself to play chess when she was growing up.
* Anna keeps her business afloat. (T)
* Anna decides to take her family on vacation.
* Anna takes out a loan. (T)
* Anna’s business launches a new product.

The three true responses are indicated with (T). Participants who did not select the three correct responses, and only the three correct responses, were excluded.

 *Additional analyses not reported in the paper*

Following a suggestion from one of the peer-reviewers for this paper, for which I am grateful, readers might wonder if the beauty that Anna (a)’s action possesses in appearing to be the result of internal harmony and in turn being expressive of freedom, might also give rise to the feelings picked out by Affective-Harmony-Thesis. Two additional analyses suggest that this does not seem to be the case.

*Additional analysis 1:*

Freedom

.13\*\*\*

-4.34\*\*\*

Judgements of Beauty

.18\*\*\*

Internal Harmony

.02, ns

Condition: Anna (b) vs. Anna (a)

.94\*\*\*

.55\*\*\*

-.03, ns

Strength

Indirect effects of condition on Judgements of Beauty (without Affective Harmony in the model at all):

Anna (a) vs. Anna (b) > Internal Harmony > Beauty = .10, 95% CI [-.18, .40]

Anna (a) vs Anna (b) > Strength > Beauty = .01 [-.14, 17]

Anna (a) vs Anna (b) > Internal Harmony > Freedom > Beauty = .10 [.03, .19]

So Anna (a) is .10 more beautiful than Anna (b) to the extent that her action is expressive of 4.34 units more internal harmony and in turn .48 units more expressive of freedom.

Again the direct effect is significant and large:

Anna (b) vs Anna (a) > Beauty = .94 [.51, 1.37] (*p*<.001)

So Anna (b) is .94 units more beautiful than Anna (a), in addition to the indirect effects.

*Additional Analysis 2:*

Freedom

.04, ns

-4.34\*\*\*

Affective Harmony

.18\*\*\*

Internal Harmony

-.01, ns

Condition: Anna (b) vs. Anna (a)

.98\*\*\*

.55\*\*\*

-.03, ns

Strength

Indirect effects of condition on Affective Harmony:

Anna (a) vs. Anna (b) > Internal Harmony > Affective Harmony = -.03 95% CI [-.28, .23]

Anna (a) vs Anna (b) > Strength > Affective Harmony = .01 [-.15, 16]

Anna (a) vs Anna (b) > Internal Harmony > Freedom > Affective Harmony = .03 [-.02, .09]

So all the indirect effects on Affective Harmony are not significant. Anna (a) does not give rise to more Affective Harmony via Internal Harmony, Strength, or Internal Harmony and Freedom.

But the direct effect is significant and large:

Anna (b) vs Anna (a) > Affective Harmony = .98 [.61, 1.35] (*p*<.001)

So Anna (b) gave rise to .98 units more Affective Harmony than Anna (a), in addition to the indirect effects.

*Correlations of interest:*

Indeed, Affective Harmony does not seem to be associated at all, or may even be negatively associated with, Internal Harmony and Freedom in the Anna (a) condition:

Correlation between Affective Harmony and Internal Harmony in Anna (a) condition: -.13 (*p=*.05)

Correlation between Affective Harmony and Freedom in Anna (a) condition: -.02 (ns)

Relatedly, following a suggestion from a reviewer of the article (for which I am grateful), a reader might also wonder whether Affective Harmony is very highly associated with the judgements of beauty, and so cannot be considered different constructs in Study 2. This is not the case.

Correlations between Affective Harmony and Judgements of Beauty:

Across both conditions: .71 (*p*<.001) (“High” according to standard rules of thumb, .70-.90)

In the Anna (a) condition: .57 (*p*<.001) (“Moderate” according to standard rules of thumb, .50-.70)

In the Anna (b) condition: .80 (*p*<.001) (“High” according to standard rules of thumb, .70-.90)

**Why do these analyses show that the beauty of Anna (a), such as it was, did not tend to give rise to the feelings picked out by Affective-Harmony-Thesis?**

*Additional Analysis 1*suggests that Anna (a)’s action was found to be more beautiful than Anna (b)’s action to the extent that it was found to be expressive of internal harmony and freedom, but *Additional Analysis 2*shows that Anna (a)’s action did not give rise to greater affective harmony compared to Anna (b)’s action to the extent that it was found to be expressive of internal harmony and freedom. This is borne out by the correlations between Affective Harmony and Internal Harmony and Freedom in the Anna (a) condition.

Now presumably, the beauty of Anna (a)’s action did give rise to some feeling, but it can’t have been “feelings of harmony.” It may, for example, have been mere aesthetic pleasure (see Kant, 1790/2000; and Matthen, 2017).

1. There are other forms of moral beauty. Most of the recent literature on moral beauty has focused on the beauty of internal dispositions—such as moral traits (e.g., Gaut, 2007; Paris, 2018; 2020; Doran, 2023; Doran, forthcoming 2024a), character (e.g. Doran, 2023; Doran, 2021; Doran, forthcoming 2024b), and physical appearances (e.g. Doran, 2021). No contemporary work, however, has focused on the beauty of actions, which is surprising given its important place for philosophers such as Schiller and Hegel. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The majority of contemporary work on Schiller in philosophical aesthetics has focused on his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, and its account of the relationship between aesthetics and political freedom (see e.g., Matherne & Riggle, 2020, 2021). Two particularly notable exceptions are Bieser (2005: ch. 1 & 2) and Houlgate (2008). The *Kallias* and *On Grace & Dignity* have, however, received more attention in moral philosophy at least, particularly by Anne Margaret Baxley, for the challenge they present to Kant’s ethics, and for the way they prefigure aspects of contemporary virtue ethics (see especially, e.g., Baxley, 2003 and 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Another seeming advocate of this idea is Hegel, whose views on this issue were greatly influenced by Schiller’s. However, since Hegel’s views on this are not as clear or developed as Schiller’s, they will not be discussed here. For an account of the grounds for thinking that Hegel offers a similar account of the beauty of actions, see Peters (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Indeed, at least in the case of human actions at least, appearing to be committed freely may be necessary for having the appearance of freedom. In other contexts, however, it is much less clear that such a necessary connection might hold: the shape of a tulip-necked vase may present the appearance of freedom in warranting the imagination of the vase triumphing over gravity and its mass (see *K*: 163), but it may not thereby appear to be free. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Schiller also says that certain fixed features, such as certain facial expressions, can have grace, but only to the extent that they are caused by, and so associated with, movements that, in themselves, have grace (*GD*: 134). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In these respects, Schiller anticipates, and would be in agreement with, the idea that co-variance helps to explain how certain appearances become expressive of emotional states, as per e.g. Tormey (1971: 44, 45), and Kivy (1980: 50); as well as the idea that the imagination is involved in some kinds of expression (e.g. Levinson, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. We might further support the idea that being expressive of freedom contributes to the beauty of Jennifer (a)’s action by noting that expressive properties are standardly taken to be able to contribute to beauty in the broad sense of mere aesthetic value (see e.g. Goldman, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. I noted in §2 that, for Schiller, it is not necessary to actually be exercising freedom in order to have the appearance of freedom (or be expressive of freedom)—rather, exercise of freedom in forming one’s second nature, as well as assent to the direction in which this second nature pulls us, is all that is required in the case of human actions (science fiction scenarios aside). But it also seems likely that knowledge of whether someone is exercising freedom or not can inhibit (at least partially) one’s ability to see their action as presenting the appearance of freedom (or as being expressive of freedom). Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this science fiction scenario in this context. This reviewer also points to an interesting adjacent issue: what is the bearing of an action being freely chosen on the beauty of that action (independently of the appearance of freedom)? One relevant issue here is whether the action is *attributable* to the person committing the action, and in what way. Doran (forthcoming 2024b) found that people tend to find the action of someone who performs a morally good action because their emotions and desires overcome their will not to act in a moral way to be beautiful; and that this is partly because they are thought to express who they *truly* are. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. While Schiller (*GD*: 159-60) doesn’t himself discuss sublimity, he does discuss a property which can sometimes accompany displays of strength—namely, “dignity,” which comes from raising oneself above one’s sensory nature, as in cases where we show forbearance of pain. Schiller does not think, however, that dignity is beautiful. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. These formulations are not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, in addition to the aforementioned reasons that Jennifer (b)’s action may be valued, the distinctive kind of affect that the overall form, or narrative arc, that Jennifer (b)’s action plausibly has the power to give rise to—such as feelings of upliftment, inspiration, or of being moved in the face of the transcendence of constraints—may itself be a source of beauty. As Scarre (2012) observes, somewhat paradoxically, for example, “while *becoming* virtuous is clearly praiseworthy, *being* virtuous may seem to be a curiously uninspiring condition, in which the now untroubled agent coasts through life on a kind of moral cruise-control” (13). This is part of the focus of §4. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. As metaphysical theses, *Schillerian* *Internal Harmony Thesis*, *Internal Harmony Thesis*, and *Internal Disharmony Thesis*, do not themselves say anything about the way people will respond; but, if they are true, then one might expect the folk to respond in a certain way, with certain assumptions in place, such as the idea that the folk are sufficiently accurate beauty-trackers, and have sufficiently developed imaginative capacities. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Given that the mean for the appearance of freedom is not at or below the midpoint for Jennifer (b), this finding may suggest that Schiller is incorrect to suggest that only moral actions that appear to be the result of a high degree of internal harmony can present the appearance of freedom. Other kinds of actions—such as those where someone appears to triumph in doing the right thing in the face of resistance—may also present the appearance of freedom (albeit to a lesser extent). One reason for this may be that people typically only *manifest*, in a way which is perceivable, their capacity for self-determination in committing an action against some internal resistance; and so the exercise of freedom and the appearance of internal resistance likely co-vary (see §2). Connectedly, triumphing in acting in line with what one wills may be all the more salient and piquant in having occurred against a backdrop of appearing to potentially be determined by recalcitrant self-interest. Indeed, Schiller himself may give some grounds for these thoughts in some of the less well-hoed aspects of the *Kallias* and *On Grace & Dignity*. Schiller notes that the appearance of freedom tends to appear in contexts when we are *expecting* that something will be determined from the outside (*K*: 161-2, 173). Schiller also suggests that “control of impulses through moral strength is *spiritual freedom*” (*GD:* 158, Schiller’s emphasis); and, in the context of the beauty of birds in flight, that “a victory over [gravity—a source of resistance and constraint] is… considered a good depiction of freedom” (*K*: 164). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. In addition, there was no difference in the extent to which participants approved of Jennifer (a) and Jennifer (b)’s actions, with both Jennifers’ actions being strongly approved of (Mean-Jennifer-(a): 2.43, Mean-Jennifer-(b): 2.28; *F*(1, 467) = .613, *p*=.43, ns). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The *Moral Internal Harmony Thesis* can be put as follows: If an agent is fully virtuous (i.e. has the most superior moral character), then they tend to experience no internal conflict in performing right and good actions. Such a view is widely held in virtue ethics (see e.g., Foot, 1978; Hursthouse, 1999: 92-3). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Think of the bucolic scene depicted in The Hay Wain (1821)—with its calm meandering river, jewel-like illumination of the tree canopy, deep plains that draw the viewer in, and diminutive cottage covered in delicate flowers. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Since feelings of warmth are clearly conceptually distinct from feelings of unity, one might wonder whether each might make an independent contribution to the beauty of an actions (and for different reasons). However, they are best thought of as aspects of the same response, since unitive experiences between people are often accompanied by feelings of warmth (hence the conceptual metaphor affection is warmth (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980)). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. In addition, there was no difference in the extent to which participants approved of Anna (a) and Anna (b)’s action, with both Annas’ actions being strongly approved of (Mean-Anna-(a): 2.62, Mean-Anna-(b): 2.80; *F*(1, 448) = 1.52, *p*=.22, ns). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Unexpectedly, Anna (b) was not found to display the appearance of strength of will to a greater extent than Anna (a). Anna (a) may have been thought to display the appearance of strength of will in not giving in to feelings of sympathy where making lay-offs was necessary. Moreover, the extent to which Anna (b) was thought to display strength of will may have been attenuated by the fact that she displays softness in the face of this necessity. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Following a suggestion from a reviewer, for which I am grateful, a reader might wonder whether the beauty of Anna (a)’s action, which resides in appearing to be the result of internal harmony and in turn being expressive of freedom, might also lead to affective harmony, especially given Schiller’s claim that beauty gives rise to “love.” It does not (see the additional analyses reported in the *Supplementary Materials*). Relatedly, the same reviewer notes that a reader might also worry that feelings of unity and harmony might correlate very highly with judgements of beauty, and so not be able to be considered different constructs. They are not “very highly” correlated according to the standard rules of thumb: in the Anna (b) condition, the correlation is in the middle of the “high” band, and in the Anna (a) condition, the correlation is in the lower half of the “moderate” band, as expected (see the *Supplementary Materials* for details). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)