

Nietzsche on Time and History

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Nietzsche on Time and History

Edited by
Manuel Dries

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If there is no goal in the whole of history of man's lot, then we must put one in: assuming, on the one hand, that we have need of a goal, and on the other that we've come to see through the illusion of an immanent goal and purpose. And the reason we have need of goals is that we have need of a will—which is the spine of us. 'Will' as the compensation of lost 'belief', i.e., for the idea that there is a divine will, one which has plans for us.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß Summer 1886–Spring 1887, KSA 12, 6[9]

We are still growing continually, our sense of time and place, etc., is still developing.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß April–June 1885, KSA 11, 34[124]
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'Timeless' to be rejected. At a particular moment of a force, an absolute conditionality of the redistribution of all forces is given: it cannot stand still. 'Change' is part of the essence, and therefore so is temporality—which, however, just amounts to one more conceptual positing of the necessity of change.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß May–July 1885, KSA 11, 35[55]

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The four excerpts of printed music of Wagner, Bizet, and Stravinsky in Jonathan R. Cohen's essay appear here with permission of Dover Publishing, Chester Music Limited (Music Sales) and Schott Music GmbH & Co. KG. Every effort has been made to trace and contact copyright holders. If there are any inadvertent omissions I apologize to those concerned and undertake to include suitable acknowledgements in future editions.

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Abbreviations and Translations

Friedrich Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings (Nachlaß) are quoted according to the following abbreviations:

- A *The Anti-Christ*, cited by section number.
- AOM 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims' (vol. 2, pt 1, of *Human, All Too Human*), cited by section number.
- BAW *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Werke*, ed. Hans Joachim Mette, 5 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1933–1940), cited by volume and page number.
- BAB *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefe*, ed. Hans Joachim Mette, 4 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1933–1940), cited by volume and page number.
- BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, cited by section number.
- BT *The Birth of Tragedy*, cited by section number and KSA page number.
- CV 'Five Prologues to Five Unwritten Books', cited by number and KSA page number.
- CW *The Case of Wagner*, cited by section number.
- D *Daybreak*, cited by section number.
- EH *Ecce Homo*, cited by section heading and (when applicable) number.
- EI 'On the Future of Our Educational Institutions', cited by section number.
- GM *On the Genealogy of Morality*, cited by essay and section number.
- GS *The Gay Science*, cited by section number.
- HA *Human, All Too Human*, cited by volume and section number.
- CV 'Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books', cited by preface number and KSA page number.
- KGB *Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975–), cited by volume and page number.
- KGW *Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, ed. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–), cited by volume, part, and page number.

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- KSA *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–), cited by volume and page number. The Nachlaß is cited by date, KSA volume, notebook section, and fragment number.
- KSB *Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe Briefe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986–), cited by volume and page number.
- NCW *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, cited by section heading.
- OTL ‘On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’, cited by KSA page number.
- PTAG ‘Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks’, cited by section number.
- TI *Twilight of the Idols*, cited by section heading and number.
- UM *Untimely Meditations*, cited by part and section number, and (when applicable) KSA page number.
- Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, cited by part, section heading, and (when applicable) number.

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Note on Translations of Nietzsche’s Works

The contributors to this volume have used different translations of Nietzsche’s texts, often modified by the individual contributor. At the end of each essay the reader will find a list of the translations used. Where no such list has been provided the contributor has relied exclusively on his or her own translations. All translations from Nietzsche’s Nachlaß are usually by the individual contributors, although other translations have been consulted whenever possible, notably *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), and *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Geschichte or *Historie*? Nietzsche's Second *Untimely Meditation* in the Context of Nineteenth-Century Philological Studies

Anthony K. Jensen

In the second *Untimely Meditation* 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life',¹ Nietzsche outlines three dominant trends in historiography: the 'critical', the 'antiquarian', and the 'monumental'. These designations were not wholly invented, but indicate a then significant debate in classical philology, which Nietzsche knew intimately.² Indeed, the dispute between the historical trends Nietzsche names in 'On the Uses and Disadvantages' 'was to become the most famous quarrel between philologists in the history of modern scholarship, and the exchange between Nietzsche and Wilamowitz furnished the concluding satyr play' (Müller 1990, p. 232). Throughout the nineteenth century, scholars such as Friedrich August Wolf, Gottfried Hermann, Karl Lachmann, and August Boeckh debated as to which of those trends should mark the proper impulse of the field they labelled *Altertumswissenschaft*, how philological pursuits should be carried out, and how their students might most properly be instructed. It was a feud seen rekindled by the politically unpopular actions of Nietzsche's teachers, Friedrich Ritschl and Otto Jahn. Nietzsche's meditations on that debate are manifest in a plain, if somewhat psychologistic and oversimplified, manner. His very selection of the borrowed academic term *Historie* over the more expected *Geschichte* in the title of his essay suggests that his aim was not simply to proffer a purely theoretical reflection on the nature or essence of history, but equally to expound on the current state and direction of the discipline.³ Thus, to understand the complicated turns of argu-

1 For a sampling of the consulted secondary literature on this essay, see Campioni 1975; Zuckert 1976; Salaquarda 1984; Gerhardt 1988; and Stambaugh 1987.

2 See Nietzsche's 'Encyclopädie der klassischen Philologie' for a more closely philological statement of many of the issues I read into UM II. See especially, KGW II.3, p. 365, pp. 366–376.

3 I owe the recognition of this point to Glenn Most, who was generous enough to share with me a draft that visits many of these same themes, but does so with an

ment in the second *Untimely Meditation* requires an acquaintance with that historical debate and Nietzsche's place within it.

Similarly, the content of 'On the Uses and Disadvantages' should not be considered in isolation from the well-known circumstances that surrounded the publication of the *Birth of Tragedy*. Now famous is the somewhat over-blown struggle between Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Nietzsche's friend Erwin Rohde. For his part Nietzsche never publicly commented on the *Zukunftsphilologie!* review, at least not in a philological fashion, but poured his labour into writing an essay on history and its value as a field of study within the German university. This essay will indicate how his remarks on the characteristic traits of historians was informed significantly by his lessons in classical studies and how the *Meditation* is itself partly an attempt to address the criticisms of Wilamowitz and to justify the manner of history Nietzsche believed himself to be doing in *The Birth of Tragedy*.⁴ I wish to contend that the second *Untimely Meditation* is a book about history, foremost, but also a book about a particular set of historians. I do not wish to contend that this was Nietzsche's only motivation for writing—certainly it was not—nor that the few philologists I can name here were the only historians Nietzsche was characterizing; but the backdrop of Nietzsche's philological environment has been underestimated in connection with his *Meditation* and so it is my purpose here to highlight and emphasize those theoretical aspects which have a tangible root in Nietzsche's own biography.

An Overview of Classical Studies in the Nineteenth Century

A generation after the matriculation of Friedrich August Wolf into the University of Göttingen in 1777 as a *Studiosus Philologiae*⁵ and his later lectures at Halle, which attracted the admiration of figures the likes of Goethe, von Humboldt, and the Schlegel brothers, the field known as *Al-*

eye more concentrated on the role Wilhelm von Humboldt played in the structuring of humanistic pedagogy.

- 4 This way of reading is given weight when we note how similar the language and themes between the two works are, and, moreover, the timing involved—the Wilamowitz pamphlet appeared 30 May 1872, while the manuscript of UM II was likely begun in early September 1873 (see Calder 1983, p. 228; also Salaquarda 1984, p. 5).
- 5 Of the day Wolf declared his ambition to study philology at Göttingen (8 April 1777), Nietzsche proclaims a 'birthday of philology' (Nachlaß March 1875, KSA 8, 3[2]).

tertumswissenschaft became divided along the widening breach between two pillars of the discipline. Gottfried Hermann and August Boeckh became heads of two rival schools, the first of which has sometimes been labelled ‘positive’, ‘critical’, or *Wort-Philologie*, approaching antiquity with the tools of textual emendation, codices, and literary criticism, while the second, being more concerned to effectively demonstrate the writ-large spirit of antiquity and to implant that ideal into the hearts and minds of their students, was variously named ‘hermeneutical’, ‘antiquarian’, ‘humanistic’, or *Sach-Philologie*.⁶ The antiquarians sought to construct classical world-views, while the critical philologists tried to tear down their speculative fancies in the name of philological certainty and interpretive precision. Nietzsche, as we shall see, was on the front lines of this debate during his education at both Bonn and Leipzig.

Turning first to Johann Gottfried Jakob Hermann, we find the precursor of what might now be called a philological positivist. His primary interest was the critical study of classical languages. In his grammar, the *De emendanda ratione Graecae Grammaticae*, in his dissertation on the term *αὐτός*, and in his ‘Four Books on the particle *ἄν*, Hermann insisted on the central importance of syntactical perfection as the prior condition of any knowledge of antiquity (Sandys 1908, vol. 3, p. 91). A hermeneutical rendering of classical texts without a grounded insight into the myriad uses and meanings of the words and grammar of those texts would prove empty. Not a fanciful construal of the ancient world—like something out of Hölderlin, Goethe, or Schiller⁷—but a certain, precise, and elemental philological method should be the aim of established scholars’ research, as well as their sole pedagogical goal. For how could an author such as Goethe say anything about the ‘spirit’ of Iphigenia or Prometheus without an adequate knowledge of Aeschylus’ grammar or the history of the emendations of Aeschylean texts? No, the aim of philology is, as Nietzsche quotes Hermann, *ut recte intellegantur scripta verterum* (BAW 4, p. 6). Among Hermann’s many respected students at Leipzig, of particular note are Moritz Haupt and Theodor Bergk, on whom Nietzsche relied for his own ‘On

6 I myself am inclined to believe that this division is too simplistic. However, this seems to be the picture Nietzsche inherited from his instructors and from the histories of philology composed at the time. So, whether or not the debate was as significant as I make it out to be here, my point is that Nietzsche himself thought it was—so much so that he spent several chapters of UM II discussing it, that he nearly completed a work that dealt explicitly with it (‘Wir Philologen’), and that his own inauguration lectures at Basel were caught up with it.

7 Among the best studies on these influences are those of Politycki 1981 and 1989, Siemens 2004, and Ulfers/Cohen 2004.

the History of the Collection of the Theognideian Anthology' (KGW II.1, pp. 3–58), and also, interestingly enough, Friedrich Ritschl (Sandys 1908, p. 95).

August Boeckh exemplified a methodology antithetical to that of Hermann. The student of Wolf and Schleiermacher, Boeckh sought to explain from the broad scope of a comprehensive *Weltanschauung* what he considered the most pedagogically important aspects of antiquity, rather than focusing on the grammatical or technical mastery of any particular text. His lectures stand as a profound application of previous generations of scholarship to holistic branches of classical learning: methods of inscription or household management. The aim of studying the classics was eventually to emulate the classical models; and to accomplish this task, one must sense the overarching spirit of the classics, something which a single-mindedly technical focus on individual words and phrases was likely to retard. Unlike Hermann and his later followers, Boeckh viewed grammatical and technical scholarship as a mere tool towards the more interesting and more pedagogically valuable portrayal of antiquity as a whole. Among his prize students at Berlin is Nietzsche's professor Otto Jahn. And though Ritschl studied under Hermann, the great historian of philology John Edwin Sandys categorizes him 'among the warmest admirers of Boeckh' (1908, vol. 3, pp. 100–101).

The generation of classical scholars that followed was effectively polarized into either the camp of Boeckh or else the school of Hermann. In the antiquarian group, we find Gottfried Bernhardt, after whom Nietzsche patterned his own attempt at a *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (KGW II.5, pp. 7–353) and at an *Encyclopädie der klassischen Philologie* (KGW II.3, pp. 339–437). Following the critical school of Hermann was Karl Lachmann, who largely codified textual criticism into a strict methodological discipline—something he believed was not much respected by those poets, artists, and musicians more concerned with generalizations about the 'true majesty of antiquity' (Bursian 1883, vol. 2, p. 789). Along with his close friend Moritz Haupt, Lachmann maintained an almost guard-dog attitude toward the teachings of Hermann. Among the most important students of this pair—one who actually obtained his doctorate under Haupt—was none other than Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.

Although this historical sketch is all too general, it is a fair summary of the two major opposing trends of philological scholarship with which Nietzsche was certainly familiar. The stage is now set for us to discuss the most important philologists with respect to Nietzsche: Friedrich Ritschl and Otto Jahn. Once the student of Boeckh, Otto Jahn was for a time employed as an archaeologist alongside the philology department of Hermann and his disciple turned son-in-law Moritz Haupt at Leipzig. Having devel-

oped a personal friendship with the pair, Jahn joined with Haupt in the 1849 political agitation for the maintenance of the imperial constitution, for which he was prosecuted for high treason and relieved of his professorship. Ritschl would later invite Jahn to join the ‘humanistic’ school at Bonn as the successor of F. G. Welcker, who had been an ardent critic of Hermann. All involved parties were apparently unaware of Jahn’s growing distaste for antiquarianism, initiated by his friendship with the Hermannians at Leipzig.⁸ Now, while Ritschl likely considered himself to be of the Hermannian ‘critical’ school—having written his dissertation under Hermann with the title *Schedae Criticae* and having even turned Hermann’s failed initiatives on Plautus into his own life’s work (Vogt 1990, p. 390)—his ties were becoming strained. Ritschl’s student and biographer Otto Ribbeck believed this was due to increasing political tensions during the 1850s between Ritschl and his Hermannian counterparts at Berlin: Lachmann, and now Haupt (Ribbeck 1879–1881, vol. 2, pp. 332–381).⁹ The first break likely occurred in 1839, when Ritschl secured the co-editorship of the *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* along with F. G. Welcker. The long-time Bonn journal had been founded there by Boeckh in 1827. As a former student of Hermann, though, Ritschl’s appointment to its helm would have raised some curious eyebrows, doubting Ritschl’s loyalty to the principles of his teacher.¹⁰ Now, when Ritschl split with Jahn,¹¹ he transferred the editorial offices of the journal to Leipzig. Rather than handing over the reigns of Boeckh’s journal to his colleague and Boeckh’s own student Jahn, Ritschl deprived his old university and one-

8 There was a further complication in the story. Jahn admits in his letters that he long aspired to be the successor to Welcker’s chair at Bonn, and when Ritschl issued the call in 1854 he found himself positively delighted (see Petersen 1913, nos. 91–92). However, it seems that Ritschl never informed Welcker, who had been on temporary leave at the time. Jahn reasonably assumed that Welcker himself was supportive of the appointment. Welcker, however, was deeply and justifiably insulted at being replaced without consultation after decades of excellent and loyal service at Bonn, though to his credit he did not direct his indignation towards Jahn. Ritschl was made the culprit, and, since he was then the senior scholar, the tensions around the department heightened proportionately (see Müller 1990, p. 231).

9 Haupt was professor at both Leipzig and Berlin. He taught at Leipzig from 1837 to 1850. After his forced resignation, he was invited to Berlin by Lachmann, where he taught from 1853 to 1874.

10 Ernst Vogt (1979, pp. 103–121) suggests that the impetus underlying the division between Jahn and Ritschl was in fact due to their opposing sides in the Hermann and Boeckh conflict. This view, however, reduces the complexity of Ritschl’s own professional standing.

11 There were several reasons for their break, which the author is presently exploring in a comprehensive treatment of the influence of Ritschl and Jahn on Nietzsche.

time friend of their most important publication. Moreover, Leipzig was the school of Hermann;¹² to have Boeckh's old journal published in the university of his great rival would have made something of a scene (Sandys 1908, vol. 3, p. 135). In short, Ritschl was a Hermannian with growing sympathies towards antiquarianism; Jahn was a student of Boeckh but became personally linked to the Hermannians. When Ritschl gave his commencement address at Leipzig in October 1865, with a young Nietzsche in tow, he entered the lecture hall as a conquering hero for the 'antiquarian' school. But in the eyes of Lachmann, Haupt, and now Jahn, Ritschl had conducted something of a coup; and any student who followed him from Bonn to Leipzig, much less one who was signalled out by Ritschl at his inaugural address, would have been cast in the same light.

What transpired politically affected the scholarly ideals held by all parties. Ritschl attempted but largely failed to embrace two traditions of scholarship that at the time were not to be commingled. Jahn, in the time he had left, moved closer to the Hermannians and impressed upon his students a definite distaste for the methodologies and personality of Ritschl—and among those students at Bonn was Wilamowitz. Nietzsche, whose motivations for following his teacher were more personal than philological,¹³ was at first hastily regarded in the same light as Ritschl. But Nietzsche would not remain a disciple for very long (a fact Ritschl recognized and lamented) but would in his first two books, with a powerful new voice, reject both traditions on the way to positing a third way of his own.

Nietzsche's Untimely Response to Wilamowitz

What in Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's now infamous *Zukunftphilologie!* review was labelled the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* [first falsehood] is Nietzsche's presumption that the music of Richard Wagner could contribute to our understanding of antiquity.¹⁴ As Hermann and Lachmann had argued a generation earlier, a comprehensive understanding of scholarly emendations and textual analyses was prerequisite for philological re-

12 Nietzsche understood well the significance of Hermann's influence at Leipzig. See Nietzsche to Hermann Mushacke, 30 August 1865, KSB 2, no. 478, p. 81.

13 See Nietzsche to Carl von Gersdorff, 25 May 1865, KSB 2, no. 467, p. 56.

14 'His [Nietzsche's] solution is to belittle the historical-critical method, to scold any aesthetic insight which deviates from his own, and to ascribe a 'complete misunderstanding of the study of antiquity' to the age in which philology in Germany, especially through the work of Gottfried Hermann and Karl Lachmann, was raised to an unprecedented height' (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 2000, p. 4).

search—what could a musician know of this? Nietzsche, it is further claimed, did not engage in any sustained source criticism; he was more concerned with his ‘intuitions’—*Anschauungen*—or ‘glorious experiences’ about the ‘inner truths’ of the tragic age. Completely unacceptable was his shamelessness, the arrogance of his self-proclaimed ‘certainty of something directly apprehended [*unmittelbaren Sicherheit der Anschauung*]’ (BT 1). Rather than a serious philological enquiry in the manner of Hermann, Nietzsche believed he could shortcut the scholarship for the sake of his ‘direct intuitive faculty’—something more often propounded by a Romantic poet or novelist than a university professor.

We might defend Nietzsche against some of Wilamowitz’s criticisms: for to say that Nietzsche did not engage in source criticism reveals that Wilamowitz could not have meant the works already published in *Rheinisches Museum*, one of which was even titled, *De Laertii Diogenis fontibus*, and a German version named, *Beiträge zur Quellenkunde und Kritik des Laertius Diogenes*. To say that Nietzsche was ignorant of the secondary scholarship completely overlooks the fact, which Wilamowitz surely knew, that Nietzsche himself was responsible for the creation of a 176-page catalogue indexing the first twenty-four volumes of the *Rheinisches Museum*.¹⁵ Contra Wilamowitz, Nietzsche was thoroughly acquainted with the sort of ‘critical scholarship’ Wilamowitz found lacking in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and was, moreover, proficient in the critical techniques.¹⁶ Yet this itself reveals that Nietzsche had consciously transferred his efforts *away* from a more critical philology in order to pursue a more magisterial pronouncement on the nature of tragedy—and it was especially this disengagement, from a chaired philologist no less, that attracted the

15 A commentary and publication history on this project can be found in Brobjer (2000, pp. 157–161).

16 Furthermore, the work of Hermann himself pervades Nietzsche’s *philologica*. Nietzsche’s ‘Griechische Rhythmik’ (KGW II.3, pp. 101–201), ‘Aufzeichnungen zur Metrik und Rhythmik’ (KGW II.3, pp. 205–261), ‘Zur Theorie der quantitativen Rhythmik’ (KGW II.3, pp. 267–280), and ‘Rhythmische Untersuchungen’ (KGW II.3, pp. 285–338) were each heavily indebted to Gottfried Hermann’s *De metris poetarum graecorum et latinorum* (Hermann 1796), *Elementa doctrinae metricae* (Hermann 1816), and *Epitome doctrinae metricae* (Hermann 1818). Hermann also edited most of the canonical editions of and commentaries on the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles that were available to Nietzsche at that time, and Nietzsche drew freely on their contents in his Basel lectures, ‘Prolegomena zu den Choephoren des Aeschylus’ (KGW II.2, pp. 1–30), and ‘Kommentar zu den Choephoren’ (KGW II.2, pp. 45–104).

young Wilamowitz's invective.¹⁷ In his eyes, Nietzsche's transformation was even worse than Ritschl's; for whereas Ritschl had tried to embrace two traditions, Nietzsche seemed to ignore the only one Wilamowitz regarded as valid. Whereas Wilamowitz—who was the last disciple of the then recently departed Jahn and who thereafter obtained his doctorate under Haupt—fancied himself at this time to be the defender of the critical school,¹⁸ Nietzsche—the favourite of the defector Ritschl—was *seen* as an apologist for the antiquarians. But for various reasons, the remaining antiquarian scholars did not embrace Nietzsche, nor would Nietzsche ever really embrace them. As a result, Nietzsche felt himself almost wholly shut out of both scholastic factions. Any adequate response to the 'conspiracy', I think Nietzsche believed, would require him to disclaim both sides and to effectively demarcate his own position on the proper aims of historiography.

While Rohde was induced into a published response, and while Richard Wagner eagerly sought to rebuff the 'Berlin bum' (Gründer 1969, pp. 57–65) for his 'literary Jewry',¹⁹ Ritschl urged Nietzsche to write a 'strict scholarly response' to Wilamowitz.²⁰ This never came: Ritschl and Nietz-

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17 'In any case, I want nothing to do with N, the metaphysician and apostle. Were he only this, I would not have bothered to appear as a "new Lycurgus" against this Dionysian prophet, because I would have then hardly encountered his revelations. Yet Mr. N is also Professor of Classical Philology. He engages some of the most important questions of Greek literature' (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 2000, p. 4). For a more complete evaluation of Wilamowitz's objections, see Porter 2000, pp. 225–288.

18 Wilamowitz himself would later realize the arrogance of this attitude, writing in his autobiography, 'Have I taken up this struggle because I had perverted conceptions, crude errors, all in all philological sins to reproach [Nietzsche's theory] with? Or was it a tendency, as may perhaps be believed of me, to turn my efforts against *Anschauung* of art as a whole, against the method of science? No, there yawns an unbridgeable gulf here. To me, the highest idea is the unfolding of the world according to regular laws, full of life and reason. Gratefully do I look upon the great minds who, proceeding from level to level, have wrested out the world's secrets: with wonder do I seek to draw nearer the light of the eternally beautiful which art, in every different instance of its appearance, expresses in its special way; and in the science which fills my life, I strive to follow the path of those who free my judgement, because I have willingly given myself to their charge.' The letter is preserved in Gründer 1969, p. 134.

19 This was a common phrase shared between members of the Wagner circle. See, for example, Carl von Gersdorff to Nietzsche, 31 May 1872, KGB II 4, no. 326, p. 9.

20 See Ritschl to Nietzsche, 7 February 1872, KGB II 4, no. 335, p. 33.

sche remained silent in the journals.²¹ Nevertheless, what I would like to suggest in what remains of this essay is that the opening chapters of 'On the Uses and Disadvantages' can at least in part be read as a specific type of response, that Nietzsche's criticisms of the critical and antiquarian schools, and his proposal of the perhaps fanciful 'monumental' mode of historicity, are to be viewed—again, at least in part—as a response to the indictment of Wilamowitz and to that whole tradition which he believed had spurned both himself and his teacher before him. Yet, if this is a response to specific scholarly trends, then it was intentionally not carried out as Ritschl had once advised—in a 'strict scholarly fashion'. Nietzsche never challenges Wilamowitz's many specific criticisms nor addresses any of his scholarly arguments. In fact, Wilamowitz is never once mentioned by name. Nietzsche's response is one that is both philosophical and psychological in one breath. It cuts more deeply because it targets the instincts and motivations of the historian, rather than simply those scholarly methods outlined here. It is in effect even more *ad hominem* than had been Wilamowitz's diatribe because it understands their methods as the practical extension of their character. For as Nietzsche believes, it was not just that Wilamowitz's criticism was misguided, but that the entire historical perspective from which it was issued was 'unhealthy', and the type of historian who was driven to it, 'degenerate'. This goes some ways towards explaining why Wilamowitz, Hermann, Boeckh, and even Ritschl and Jahn are not mentioned in the text of the second 'Untimely Meditation': Nietzsche feels compelled to reveal their advantages and disadvantages for life as psychological types rather than as scholars with the methodologies I have described here.

Even if these individuals are not singled out, they are present throughout Nietzsche's writing during the early 1870s. Turning to the critical historian, Nietzsche writes in 'On the Future of our Educational Institutions':

Others, again, pass their lives in counting the number of verses written by Greek and Roman poets, and are delighted with the proportions 7:13 = 14:26. Finally, one of them brings forward his solution to a question, such as the Homeric poems considered from the standpoint of prepositions, and thinks he has drawn the truth from the bottom of the well with *ἀνά* and *κατά*. All of them, however, with the most widely separated aims in view, dig and burrow in Greek soil with a restlessness and a blundering awkwardness that must surely be painful to a true friend of antiquity. (FEI 3, KSA 1, p. 702)

21 At least part of the reason, which has been overlooked, is that shortly after Wilamowitz wrote his pamphlet he undertook a long-planned pilgrimage to Italy and Greece. He did not return until 1874, when the anger on both sides of the debate had somewhat cooled (see Fowler 1990, p. 492).

Now, he who is said to consider the Homeric poems from the perspective of its prepositions is Gottfried Hermann, who wrote on the Homeric hymns in 1806, whose dissertation was on the word *αὐτός*, and who wrote four entire volumes on the particle *ἄν*. But, ‘What does the teaching of Greek particles have to do with the meaning of life?’ (Nachlaß March 1875, KSA 8, 3[63]). As for the type that takes joy in discovering the hidden proportions of Greek and Roman verses, it was Karl Lachmann who counted among his greatest achievements the discovery that the total number of lines assigned to chorus and actors in tragedy was invariably divisible by seven.²² Nietzsche labels them ‘pedantic micrologists’ (UM II 2, KSA 1, p. 258). Notice, however, that he does not quibble with any particular philological ‘fact’ here—he never disputes the numerical reductions or the applicability of *κατά*. It is ever only the spirit, drives, or intentions of these positivistic philologists that suffer his rancour: it comes down to their discipline’s efficacy within educational institutions to shape the future of culture and society, to their discipline’s value for life.

As Nietzsche says in the never-completed *Wir Philologen*, ‘Those who say, “But certainly classical culture survives as an object of pure scholarship, even if all its educational aims are disavowed,” deserve this reply: ‘Where is pure scholarship here? Achievements and qualities have to be assessed, and the assessor has to stand above what he assesses. So your first concern must be to surpass antiquity. Until you do that, your scholarship isn’t pure, but impure and limited’ (Nachlaß Beginning of 1875–Spring 1876, KSA 8, 5[53]). Every type of scholarship must recognize its pedagogical dimension; what distinguishes them rests on a certain quality of character. These critical philologists tend to exhibit a lack of that grand and majestic taste required of the true philologist to create new, similarly grand idols to overcome, and are, Nietzsche thinks, thereby unable to assess the greatness of the Greek culture. The critical historian only tears down what others have built up: ‘he does this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it’ (UM II 3, KSA 1, p. 269). Their destruction of the old antiquated world-views by means of source criticism and meticulous textual analysis is an advantage for life; their *Nachteil* is their ‘wanton analytic drive’ (UM II 6, KSA 1, p. 295) to reduce all philology to this destructive task. As Nietzsche writes in

22 Nietzsche certainly knew this, writing, ‘So profoundly and frequently oppressive is the uncertainty in prediction that it now and then becomes a morbid passion for believing at any price and a desire to be certain: e.g., as concerns Aristotle, or in discovering numerical necessities—almost a disease in Lachmann’ (Nachlaß Beginning of 1875–Spring 1876, KSA 8, 3[36]).

his *Encyclopädie*, ‘Criticism in itself cannot be goal, but only the means to the *full understanding* [Kritik selbst kann nicht Ziel sein, sondern nur Mittel für das *Volle Verständniß*]’ (KGW II.3, p. 375).

Unlike the critical type, who discredits the inherited constructions of antiquity for their lack of ‘objective’ critical analysis, the antiquarian scholar recognizes the interrelation of their personal world-views and their representations of historical topics. Their need or instinct to find and exposit a *Gesamttanschauung* is set in stark contrast to grammatical reductionism: theirs is an instinct towards artistic virtuosity, towards the production of a ‘plastic apprehensible portrait’ of the world. But reality, Nietzsche believes, especially the tangled web of history, does not allow representation of its comprehensive structuring without the intrusion of the artistic impulse of that active subject. More hermeneutically minded, they recognize the influence of their own ideals upon their historical presentations. ‘The history of his city becomes for him the history of himself; he reads its walls, its towered gate, its rules and regulations, its holidays, like an illuminated diary of his youth and in all this he finds again himself, his force, his industry, his joy, his judgement, his folly and vices’ (UM II 3, KSA 1, p. 265). This necessarily does ‘violence’ to what some call ‘the facts’, and affords us only a history that prohibits the designation ‘objective’ in the critical sense. But not only is this ‘violence’ a non-issue for Nietzsche, he endorses it with his stamp of ‘necessity’. The individual has never been born, he thinks, who could represent the world in itself, unencumbered by an already determined cluster of epistemological and, more importantly, psychological categories. ‘Thus man spins his web over the past and subdues it, thus he gives expression to his artistic drive—but not to his drive towards truth or justice’ (UM II 6, KSA 1, p. 290).

In UM II, Nietzsche maintains that the ‘antiquarian’ serves life by adding value to what is inherently valueless, and in this respect he is better off than his critical counterpart. No aspect of the past has value in and of itself; value is only bestowed by the legislating activity of the historian. ‘The small, truncated, decaying, and obsolete acquire their own dignity and inviolability through the fact that the preserving and revering soul of the antiquarian man has emigrated into them and made there a homely nest’ (UM II 3, KSA 1, p. 265). These scholars consciously or unconsciously value the noble, the tranquil, and the scholarly; it is therefore no wonder that the image of antiquity they construct tends to highlight these aspects of the past. It is a prejudiced account, to be sure, but an honest sort of prejudice since they admit the intuitional status of their accounts: they recognize that their world-views are really *their* world-views. This creative activity is the healthy aspect of the illusion these historians have created for themselves.

But Wolf, Boeckh, and the rest of the ‘antiquarian’ school are not spared Nietzsche’s venom either: they too have impulses that Nietzsche finds distasteful.²³ For the antiquarian type, present-day life stands in poor comparison with what he has elected to represent to himself of the past, and his turning back to some perceived ‘good old days’ (which, again, is the result of the philologist’s creative intuition) carries the effect of turning him away from the present. Frustrated by his inability to render the present at all palatable and incapable of creating new idols for the future, he devotes his efforts to frantically preserving the glories of the past. The past and dead become the *only* sources of value, while what is to come can only ever be of lesser worth. His ideal of the classical reveals what, to Nietzsche, is a thoroughgoing ‘mummification of life’ (UM II 3, KSA 1, p. 268). It is no longer inspired by the fresh air of the present, much less the hope for the future. Nietzsche quips, ‘For it knows only how to preserve life, not how to engender it; it always undervalues that which is becoming because it has no instinct for divining it—as does monumental history, for example’ (UM II 3, KSA 1, p. 268).

Though again this is but summary, we turn now briefly to the third type of historian characterized in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages’: the so-called monumental type. Note how Nietzsche, against the philological tradition, implicitly justifies the type of historicity already displayed in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest exertion of the vigour of the present: only when you put forth your noblest qualities in all their strength will you divine what is worth knowing and preserving in the past. Like to like! Otherwise, you will draw the past down to you. Do not believe historiography that does not spring from the head of the rarest minds. (UM II 6, KSA 1, pp. 293–294)

We see once again Nietzsche’s tendency to regard ‘types’ of life rather than specific scholarly conclusions. Statements such as these rarely inform us as to how we should carry out the work, but do tell us what sort of scholar we should or should not be: the historian must be such a ‘master’, who from his own salutary conglomeration of instincts can intuit what is worth knowing and preserving in the past. What separates the real philologist from the mere philological labourer is not a degree of technical apti-

23 For example, Nietzsche writes about Wolf, ‘Our terminology already indicates our tendency to misrepresent the ancients. For example, the exaggerated taste for literature —or Wolf, who, speaking of the “inner history of classical erudition”, calls it “the history of learned enlightenment”’ (Nachlaß Beginning of 1875–Spring 1876, KSA 8, 3[5]). Nietzsche’s quotation is to F. A. Wolf, *Kleine Schriften* (Wolf 2003, vol. 1, p. 844).

tude; rather, it is that essential quality—elusive in the extreme—which makes one ‘masterly’ or ‘great’ or ‘wise’ (Pöschl 1979, pp. 141–155). This is the high perspective, the *Distanz* from which the monumental philologist does his work, devises his world-view. If antiquity is to be interpreted as a grand idol of the past which can and must be repeated another time in the present—something necessary if it is to be employed in the education of the young—then only the grandest souls of the present are capable of assessing it. In order to evaluate the classical, one must have *surpassed* the classical models themselves: the assessor must stand above what he assesses. ‘[H]istory is written by the experienced and superior man. He who has not experienced greater and more exalted things than others will not know how to interpret the great and exalted things of the past’ (UM II 6, KSA 1, p. 294).

Just as the antiquarian scholar discovers in his antiquity the scholarly, the noble, and the tranquil, and is thereby trapped in that antiquity when all he sees around him is the worthlessness of the present, so too the ‘monumental’ historian artistically paints his own antiquity with a selective quality of judgement. ‘The past itself suffers harm: whole segments of it are forgotten, destroyed, and flow away in an uninterrupted colourless flood, and only individually exaggerated facts rise out of it like islands’ (UM II 2, KSA 1, p. 262). Like the antiquarian, too, the monumentalist finds nobility in the past, but only because he knows his evaluation was actually a legislation of that nobility. ‘[N]ow it would be right to say that only he who constructs the future has a right to judge the past. If you look ahead and set yourself a great goal, you at the same time restrain that wanton analytical drive’ (UM II 6, KSA 1, pp. 294–295). For even this young Nietzsche, still heavily indebted to Schopenhauer’s epistemology, the claim to represent ‘antiquity in itself’ is nonsense; facts of representation are never free from our evaluations. The past is only great ‘in fact’ because the great man has ‘evaluated’ it as such. Because he recognizes his interpreting as a creating, and that by interpreting the past as ‘great’ he has in fact created something ‘great’—‘a chain of moments in the struggle of the human individual which unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain peaks’ (UM II 2, KSA 1, p. 259)—the monumentalist becomes aware of the possibility of further creating such idols and exemplars for the future. He too discovers himself in his antiquity. The distinction drawn between the antiquarian and the monumentalist is thus not methodological but psychological, that is, not in their tendency to create holistic portraits of antiquity but in the manner in which they regard this picture. The present for the monumentalist leads not to the inescapable feeling of pessimism that characterizes the antiquarian whose optimism deserts him whenever he walks out of the library door, but to the cheerful

recognition that the eternally becoming allows for the perpetual revaluation of what is to be considered classical.

Instead of ‘mummifying’ life, the monumentalist engenders it by acknowledging that something great can once again return to the present through his own activity. ‘As long as the soul of historiography lies in the great stimuli that a man of power derives from it, as long as the past has to be described as worthy of imitation, as imitable and possible for a second time, it of course incurs the danger of becoming somewhat distorted, beautified, and coming close to free poetic invention’ (UM II 2, KSA 1, p. 262), but despite the danger, this is where the pedagogical value of historiography lies—how *Historie* and not just *Geschichte* can be used for *das Leben*, how historians themselves can engender life. Such was the value of Nietzsche’s own work in philology, a value misunderstood by both sides of the debate and by the then young Wilamowitz. As the last pages of the *The Birth of Tragedy* read, ‘Let no one believe that the German spirit has lost its mythical home for ever, if it can still understand so clearly the voices of the birds which tell of its homeland. One day it will find itself awake ... then it will slay dragons, destroy the treacherous dwarfs, and awaken Brünnhilde—and not even Wotan’s spear itself will be able to bar its path!’ (BT 24, KSA 1, p. 154). Only with ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ in mind can we rightly comprehend why a purportedly philological book about Greek tragedy should conclude with an exhortation to the German youth: this was a call to give rebirth to Nietzsche’s classical ideal through the spirit of music. Not only is such a statement consistent with the monumental ideal of 1874, that ideal demands such a call to rebirth. And should we ask who the model for this ‘reinvigorating’ historical impulse is, we would be once again confronted with Nietzsche’s other great ‘master’: Wagner—the same ‘scholar’ whom Wilamowitz jeered as the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of Nietzsche’s philology, the same Wagner who responded to Wilamowitz’s pamphlet with language all too familiar to that of the ‘monumental’ historian here. ‘We [Wagner and Nietzsche] by ourselves look out from the mountain top over the wide plain without disturbance from the scuffling peasants in the tavern below us’ (Gründer 1969, pp. 57–65). And so neither a Wolf, nor a Hermann, nor a Boeckh, nor even a Ritschl or a Jahn stand as the proper heirs to antiquity, but a Wagner, a Goethe, and ideally a Nietzsche himself—and these not for reasons of scholarly method nor styles of interpretation, but for psychological grounds, for the quality of character these are said to have, which are instinctually driven to value only the healthiest aspects of antiquity for the sake of reinvigorating culture.

There are both historical and philosophical problems with Nietzsche’s conception of ‘monumental historiography’, to say the least, and partial

solutions have now and again been proffered. I cannot address these issues here, and can only restate what I think is an important and overlooked aspect of Nietzsche's essay, namely, his engagement with the scholarly environment in which it was written. From what I have said, I hope it is clear that Nietzsche's account of the 'critical' and 'antiquarian' historians was not a purely theoretical construction, but was his attempt to outline a conflict with which he, as a prodigy scholar and philology professor, had up-close experience. Nietzsche never responded to the attack on his own philological work, but wrote an essay shortly after whose opening sections serve to critique both sides of the debate, not on philological grounds, but from the standpoint of his budding, psychology-laden philosophy. If true history is done by those who possess a certain greatness of character, as Nietzsche sought to demonstrate, then a Wilamowitz didn't qualify to contest a Nietzsche—or so at least he convinced himself.²⁴ By positing the rather fanciful ideal of the 'monumental' historian, I believe Nietzsche hoped to rise above the debate that ensnared his mentor, to thereby not only silence the grumblings of the petty 'conspiracy' against him, but to show both historians and philologists alike the sort of ends on which they should be focused. And if his ardour for these historical ideals waned with time, I think it is further evidence for my position to see that it did so in proportion to the growing distance that grew between him and his philological career. In the end, Nietzsche's resignation was plain: 'Wort- und Sach-Philologie—stupid quarrel!' (Nachlaß Spring–Summer 1875, KSA 8, 5[106]).

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24 Notes from this period testify to this point. 'Contemporary philologists have proven themselves unworthy of being permitted to consider me and my book as one of their own. It is hardly necessary to affirm that, in this case as well, I leave it up to them whether they want to learn anything or not. But I still do not feel in the least inclined to meet them half way. May that which now calls itself "philology" [*Philologie*, written without its definite article] (and which I designate only neutrally on purpose) ignore my book this time as well. For this book has a manly temperament and is of no value for castrati. It is more seemly for them to be seated at the loom of conjecture' (Nachlaß Summer 1872–Beginning of 1873, KSA 7, 19[58]).

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