

Chapter 2

Anger and Indignation

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Here is laid the body of
Jonathan Swift, Doctor of Divinity,
Dean of this cathedral Church,
Where fierce indignation can no longer
Lacerate his heart.
Go, traveller, and imitate if you can
This vigorous Champion of Liberty.

Epitaph of Jonathan Swift

Indignation seems a kind of anger, but what kind? Both anger and indignation are responses to offences, but what, if anything, makes the difference between them? I shall consider these two questions in the light of a view of the emotions for which I have previously argued (Drummond 2004, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2017). On this view, which is a modification of Edmund Husserl's account, the emotions involve feelings that can be considered in two respects. First, they are sensory states that register physiological changes in the body. Second, they are intentional feelings that (1) apprehend the affective or value-attribute of the thing or situation, which attribute is – to use language popularized by Anthony Kenny ([1963] 2003, 132) – the 'formal' object of the emotion, and (2) thereby grasp the 'material', that is, the concrete or particular, object of the emotion as positively or negatively valued or, perhaps, as indifferent. The emotion-type and its evaluative sense are founded on an underlying cognitive sense as grasped by a subject with a particular physiological constitution; a particular experiential history; and particular interests, concerns, and commitments. I distinguish mere intentional feelings from emotions in virtue of the degree of determination of the underlying

cognitive intentions; the more determinate the cognitive intention, the more clearly we can distinguish the type of emotion experienced.

Anger seems the easier emotion on which to get a grip, perhaps because it is widely considered one of the basic human emotions. Ever since Plato declared that anger was a manifestation of the spirited part (*θυμός*) of the soul and Aristotle defined anger as ‘a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friend’ (*Rhet.* 1378^a31–34), the basic outline of anger has remained more or less constant. There have been some changes, but they are not sufficient to alter our basic understanding. For example, while for Aristotle the notion of a ‘slight’ involved a ‘down-ranking’ in relation to the wrongdoer or to society as a whole (Nussbaum 2016, 5), by the time of the Stoics anger was defined more generally in terms of a ‘wrongful harm’ (Nussbaum 2016, 19–20). Therefore, in the contemporary world, Robert Roberts, for example, can still define anger as follows: ‘*S* has culpably offended in the important matter of *X* (action or omission) and is bad (is to some extent an enemy of what is good); I am in a moral position to condemn; *S* deserves (ought) to be hurt for *X*; may *S* be hurt for *X*’ (2003, 204). Notice the fundamental similarities with Aristotle’s view: (1) an agent *S* has wrongfully offended by doing or failing to do *X*, and (2) the one offended desires punishment or revenge in return.

One should not, however, lose sight of the important truth in Aristotle’s more limited notion of slight. At least in cases of moral wrongs, to do wrong to another entails a lack of respect for the other. As Aristotle put it, ‘A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior. . . . Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment’ (*Rhet.* 1378^b35–1379^a7). We can disagree with the details of the interpersonal and status aspects entailed by Aristotle’s view of the ties between respect and superiority; nevertheless, a fundamental truth remains. Wrongdoing violates our expectation of good treatment and thereby ‘slights’ us; it diminishes our relative status in the sense that it is a harm to our moral standing. Hence, when wronged, when our moral standing and our moral worth are diminished, ‘becoming angry with someone marks oneself as the person’s equal, as someone to be respected as a moral agent’ (Tessman 2005, 120).

While the definition of anger is more or less fixed, differences remain among the various views: Aristotle, for example, notes the feeling dimension – the pain at the wrong and the pleasure at the prospect of revenge – involved in anger, whereas both Roberts and Martha Nussbaum, denying that the feeling is part of the definition, do not. Aristotle leaves room for anger in cases where the offence is not a moral offence, as when a parent, on tripping over a toy left

on the floor in the middle of the room by her child or on finding her child's unmade bed in the morning, gets angry at the child, or when someone, construing his car as an agent, gets angry at the car for failing to start and starts pounding the dashboard (see Ben-Ze'ev 1992, 89, but cf. Nussbaum 2016, 18–19). Roberts and Nussbaum, by contrast, implicitly or explicitly identify anger as a *moral* emotion insofar as anger involves beliefs about wrongdoing in a moral sense. I say 'implicitly' because Nussbaum speaks of moral wrongdoing in anger only in rejecting views that distinguish resentment and indignation as differing from anger by virtue of their specific concern with moral wrongdoing (Nussbaum 2016, 262). Roberts is explicit: he notes that insofar as *S*'s offence is culpable, the one offended has the moral standing to condemn *S*.

In contrast to the more or less unified understanding of anger, there are significant differences among thinkers in the understanding of indignation. Aristotle thinks indignation the opposite of pity (*Rhet.* 1386^b1). Whereas pity is experiencing pain at an undeserved evil befalling someone, indignation is experiencing pain at someone's undeserved good fortune. The references to desert introduce notions of justice. Hence, indignation shares, at least in some respects, anger's object: indignation is aimed at a wrong of some kind, but it is a specifically moral wrong. For Aristotle, both pity and indignation involve the moral domain and are indicative of a person's good character insofar as 'it is our duty to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity' (*Rhet.* 1386^b12–15). Whereas Aristotle contrasts, and thereby ties together, pity and indignation, Roberts pairs indignation with anger: '*S* has very culpably and shockingly offended in the important matter of *X* (action or omission) and is bad (is an enemy of what is good); I am very confident of being in a moral position to condemn; and *S* deserves (ought) to be hurt for *X*' (Roberts 2003, 215). What distinguishes anger and indignation for Roberts is a matter of degree: indignation targets *S* as 'very' culpable and as having 'shockingly' offended. For Roberts, anger and indignation differ as a function of the severity of the offence motivating the emotional response and the culpability of the agent.

René Descartes, too, thinks indignation is directed towards those who do some evil to someone other than oneself (Descartes [1649] 1985, 397–99). Indignation on this view too is clearly a moral emotion in a way that anger, as suggested earlier, is not. At the same time, however, Descartes warns us that indignation is 'observed much more in those who wish to appear virtuous than in those who really are virtuous' (Descartes 1985, 398), a skeptical view of indignation later echoed by Friedrich Nietzsche:

For the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates himself with his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or society), may indeed,

morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied satyr, but in every other sense is the more ordinary, more indifferent, and less instructive case. And no one is such a *liar* as the indignant man. (Nietzsche 1954, 411–12)

In what follows and with these similarities and differences in mind, I shall sketch views of anger and indignation in such a way as to demarcate them and illustrate the significance of the demarcation. I claim that anger and indignation are different emotions in both their bodily and intentional aspects. I am less interested in deciding the question of whether indignation is a species of anger. I am interested instead in identifying the differences and then exploring the relations between them such that we can understand why people might think they do or do not stand in a genus-species relation.

ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND EMBODIMENT

When angered, a subject normally has intense feelings triggered by the offence against her, a member of her family, or a close associate. These feelings register a variety of physiological changes that are more pronounced in anger than in most other emotions. For example, the degree of the combination of the acceleration in heart rate and the increase in finger temperature seems unique to anger. The studies of Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen (1983) on the universality of basic emotions catalogued these differences in autonomic nervous system responses. Table 2.1 illustrates the point.

A subsequent study by Levenson et al. (1992) concluded that there were cross-cultural similarities in the responses of the autonomic nervous system and attributed this similarity to evolutionary results that remained constant across different cultural developments. While it is doubtful that responses in the autonomic nervous system are sufficient to distinguish one emotion from another, they do measure the arousal involved in different emotions (Mauss and Robinson 2009, 214). In this respect, then, anger is a ‘hot’ emotion that

Table 2.1. Heart Rate and Skin Temperature

<i>Specific Emotion</i>	<i>Change in Heart Rate (beats/minute)</i>	<i>Change in Finger Temperature (°C)</i>
Anger	+8.0	+1.6
Fear	+8.0	-.01
Distress	+6.5	+.01
Joy	+2.0	+.03
Surprise	+1.8	-.01
Disgust	-0.3	-.03

involves a greater degree of autonomic nervous system response than other basic emotions.

Other physiological changes associated with anger often involve a kind of contraction of the body, including that evidenced by a general tightening of the muscles in the body's trunk, the characteristic tendency to clench the hands, and the facial expressions of anger. The latter typically include pulling the eyebrows down and pulling the eyelids up, tightening the area around the eyes and the muscles in the jaw, a somewhat squared mouth with the lips rolled in and tightened or, when the mouth is open, a squarish shape. These autonomic nervous system changes, the facial changes, and the gross bodily changes are experienced in somaesthetic and kinaesthetic sensations, and these bodily feelings, insofar as the set of physiological changes are intense, contribute to the intensity of the felt anger.

If indignation were a kind of anger, we would expect similar physiological changes, even if with different intensity. However, there seem to be important differences. In indignation, the face manifests a set of changes similar to what we find in surprise or shock. The eyes widen with the eyebrows and eyelids pulled up, and the mouth opens in a more circular than squarish shape. But the surprise is negatively valenced; we experience a feeling of shock at an affront or brazen wrong of some kind, and we cannot quite believe that what we have witnessed (directly, through media, or through testimony) has in fact happened. We adopt a look that says 'How dare you. . .?' or 'How awful!' Moreover, the body opens up rather than contracts; we straighten ourselves, raising our shoulders and head.

Why are these ways in which indignation and anger differ in their expression at the physiological level important? It is because they suggest, even if they do not establish, more significant differences in how anger and indignation take their objects, in how their objects affect us. If nothing else, these differences make us reflect more carefully on the apparent similarity of anger and indignation.

ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND INTENTIONALITY

One might object to the claim that these physiological differences suggest that anger and indignation are different emotions by recalling the fact that the two emotions have the same 'formal' object. They grasp their material object – a person, action, situation, or event – as involving a harm, wrong, or injustice of some kind. Might it not be the case, then, that anger and indignation differ solely in the intensity of feelings involved and in their bodily expressions? I suggest, however, that these differences mark more fundamental differences between the two emotions in both their subjective

and objective dimensions. That is to say, anger and indignation differ both experientially and in their intentionality. The experiential differences are due not only to the already noted differences in their felt physiological changes but also to how they are directed to their objects. The intentional differences in how they are directed to their objects correlate with differences in their intended objects, that is, with how those objects display themselves in the emotion.

One possibility for distinguishing anger and indignation, as Descartes has suggested, is to say that anger involves a wrong done to me or to those relevant to my sense of well-being (e.g., my family members, colleagues), while indignation involves a wrong done to persons unconnected to me. Anger, in other words, would involve a (broadly conceived) self-targeted wrong, whereas indignation would involve an other-targeted wrong. This seems incorrect, however. There are cases where I might become intensely angry when wrongs are done to others. I think that such cases are often mixed with indignation or that there is another emotion in play that combines elements of anger and indignation. I shall return to this point later. For the moment, it suffices to say that there seems to be something very much like anger involved in such reactions.

Conversely, there are cases where I may become indignant, rather than angry, at wrongs done to me. Consider the case of someone's making an impertinent remark addressed to me. I do not become intensely angry, but I am nevertheless offended. Indeed, I am *morally* offended by the lack of respect indicated by the remark. Beyond physiological differences, this moral dimension of indignation, I believe, marks a second, fundamental difference from anger, and I shall return to this point later.

The previous example brings to mind yet a third difference between anger and indignation, one marked by the prepositions we use when speaking of them. We say that we are angry *at* someone for a wrong done or *at* something because it has harmed our well-being in some way. To use Roberts's example (2003, 60–64), I am angry *at* George *on account of* his remark at a faculty meeting. Or I might be angry *at* my car on account of its not starting and causing me to miss an important committee meeting (although in ordinary circumstances, that might make me happy). Our anger is directed at the agent of the wrongdoing or the cause of the harm. By contrast, I am indignant *about* something. We name not the wrongdoer or cause, but the harm, the wrong or offence, or the situation giving rise to the wrong or offence (Roberts 2003, 216, although Roberts does not acknowledge this in his defining proposition for indignation). We might, for example, be indignant *about* the slaughter of non-combatants in war zones, systemic racism or sexism, or a mean-spirited immigration policy. Our concern here has to do primarily with the offence or with social structures and institutions that perpetuate a wrongful situation and only secondarily with the agent(s) of the wrongdoing. There is a difference,

in other words, in how the two emotions take their objects and in the respect under which these objects are taken.

With these considerations in mind, I propose the following analysis of the intentional structure of anger:

A's anger is an intentional feeling of distress

- involving intensely felt (sensed) physiological changes and bodily expressions,
- grounded in the recognition (e.g., a perception, judgement, or belief) of *S*'s ϕ -ing *A* or a person or persons close to *A*,
- disclosing *S*'s ϕ -ing *A* or a person or persons close to *A* as a wrong or offence of some kind, and
- targeting
 - primarily *S* as the wrongdoer or offender, and
 - secondarily the offence.

For indignation, by contrast, I propose the following structure:

A's indignation is an intentional feeling of distress

- involving felt (sensed) physiological changes and bodily expressions,
- grounded in the recognition (e.g., a perception, judgement, or belief) of *S*'s ϕ -ing *P* (who can be, but need not be, identical to *A*),
- coupled with intentional feelings of moral superiority,
- disclosing (i) *S*'s ϕ -ing *P* as a wrong or an offence against *A*'s understanding of the social or moral order, or (ii) the social, moral, and political institutions, structures, systems (or systemic factors), and practices permissive of *S*'s ϕ -ing *P* as a wrong or an offence against *A*'s understanding of a deeper social or moral order [or (iii) both], and
- targeting
 - primarily the offence or institutions, structures, systems, and practices permissive of the offence, and
 - secondarily *S* as the agent of the wrongdoing or the institutions, structures, systems, and practices that allow or embody the offence.

We can now more clearly see what makes the difference between anger and indignation. Indignation is often a 'cooler' emotion than anger, lacking the intensity of feeling characteristic of anger. More important, indignation is a moral, social, and political emotion in a way that anger is not or, at least, is not necessarily. There are three aspects to the moral character of indignation. First, indignation discloses the wrong or offence as a *moral* wrong or offence,

whereas anger need not. Second, insofar as indignation discloses a moral offence, the subject experiencing indignation is also self-aware in a particular way. She is pre-reflectively – and in some cases reflectively – aware of herself as in a morally superior position. In recognizing *S*'s ϕ -ing *P* as *morally* wrong, in other words, *S* is aware of herself as in a position to pass moral judgement on the action or situation about which she is indignant. This does not mean that she actually frames an explicit judgement; she might just recognize – perceive as it were – the injustice of the action or situation about which she is indignant. But she is aware of her position as one from which such a judgement can be made. Third, given that indignation is a moral emotion, we think of those who fail to be indignant at social, economic, or political injustices as failing morally, whereas we do not think that of people who fail to be angry.

Indignation, then, differs from anger in that it is not in the first instance directed at the wrongdoer; it is directed at the situations, the contexts, the institutions, and the systemic features and practices of societies in which moral wrongs and injustices are embedded. Indignation has an irreducible socio-political character, even when the moral wrong is to be done to an individual. Whether the wrong is a harm to an individual – for example, stealing someone's tomatoes or making an impertinent remark – or a harm to a group arising from a social, economic, or political order embodying, say, systemic racism, the offence or situation permissive of the offence is a challenge to one's understanding (right or wrong) of what the social and moral order should be, and indignation is an appropriate response, both well motivated and epistemically justified.

In a recent episode of the television series *Downton Abbey*, the Dowager Countess of Grantham (Violet Crawley) scolds her maidservant (Gladys Denker) for what Crawley takes to be inappropriate and impertinent remarks to Dr. Clarkson. Crawley is both angry, punishing Denker for her impertinence, and indignant. However, I believe Crawley's indignation is the more fundamental emotion in this scene, in part, because her facial structure and bodily comportment express indignation more than anger and, more fundamentally, because it is indignation's recognition of the nature of the situation that motivates and justifies Crawley's anger. Denker's offence, on the surface, was an impertinent remark. But there was a deeper offence: Denker's action challenged the social order to which Crawley was devoted, an order in which maidservants did not criticize members of the upper class directly, that is, to their faces. The issue was not the truthfulness of what Denker said; the issue was the mere fact of her saying it to Clarkson. Crawley's remark in reprimanding Denker is telling: 'It is not your place even to have opinions about my acquaintance, let alone express them'. It is not Denker's place in the social order to express her views about the behaviour of someone superior to her rank, and by criticizing Clarkson, she had overstepped the boundaries of

what is permissible for someone in her station in the social order. Crawley's anger was predicated on and justified (in Crawley's own eyes) by the social and political character of the remark. Its impertinence carried social and political weight.

I earlier indicated that I was less interested in deciding the question of whether indignation is a species of anger. The characterizations presented earlier provide an indication of why this is so. Both anger and indignation are intentionally directed to both an agent – or an institution, structure, system, or set of practices, all of which can possess agential features insofar as they can cause harms to individuals – and an offence. But the primary foci of anger and indignation differ. If we take into account only their structures as described earlier, when I am angry, I am not indignant, and when I am indignant I am not angry. If the relation were a genus-species relation, when I experienced the specific emotion (say indignation), I would, by definition, also experience the generic emotion (anger). Nevertheless, their structures are such that it is easy to move back and forth between them. We can here invoke the familiar metaphor of a 'family of emotions'. This expression captures what is at stake in the relation between anger and indignation; they are best thought of as siblings sharing a family resemblance. They look quite a bit like one another, but a closer look reveals important differences.

Nussbaum, however, explicitly rejects this view in an appendix devoted to anger and its species. Anger, the genus, is, in Nussbaum's view, essentially characterized by its double directedness to a person (or people) and an act – more specifically, a 'wrongful harm' (2016, 16) – and by what Nussbaum calls the 'payback wish' (2016, 21–22, 261). Both characteristics have been evidenced earlier in the definitions provided by Aristotle and Roberts. The different species of anger, then – emotions such as indignation, resentment, and rage – cannot be characterized in ways that would sufficiently distinguish them as different emotions rather than as different variations of the same emotion. In this way, Nussbaum rejects views that would speak of an anger-family in which multiple relations exist among the siblings belonging to the family.

Nussbaum considers and rejects three kinds of claims that advance the view that the siblings are different emotions, two of which are relevant to our purposes.¹ The first claims that there are emotions, for example, resentment and indignation, comparable to anger but that are specifically moral. Nussbaum rejects this view on the grounds that she has argued that anger already contains a judgement of wrongfulness (Nussbaum 2016, 262), including anger rooted in moral grounds. However, she suggests, resentment and indignation do not differ in kind from anger since they too do not always contain specifically moral grounds. Indignation, for example, in her view, can arise in response to 'insults to status and rank, about nonmoral affronts

of many kinds' (2016, 262). The importance of the Crawley-Denker example is precisely that insults to status and rank are, in fact, moral offences to the extent that they involve explicit challenges to a social, political, and moral order. They challenge the target's sense of the proper moral order, and the indignant response is directed to that challenge. This is central to my claim that indignation is a moral emotion in a way that anger is not.

The second claim challenged by Nussbaum concerns the payback wish. This is the claim that indignation is a form of anger that does not include the characteristic desire for payback. Nussbaum admits that there is a borderline case of anger or 'quasi-anger' (2016, 262), which she calls 'Transition-Anger' (2016, 35), that is a 'major exception' to her view that anger always incorporates the desire for payback. Nussbaum's identification of this species extends her idea that one might become standardly angry when wronged and then, 'in a cooler moment, head for the transition' (2016, 35). To 'head for the transition' is to shift one's attention from paying back the target of one's anger to 'more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare' (2016, 6), that is, what can be done to correct the wrong rather than punish the wrongdoer. Transition-Anger extends this idea: it is a species of anger in which one is at the transition point from the very beginning: 'The entire content of one's emotion is, "How outrageous! Something must be done about this"' (2016, 35). Notice that Transition-Anger is focused from the beginning and entirely on the offence rather than the agent. In this respect, it seems much like indignation as I have outlined it, but Nussbaum explicitly rejects the name 'indignation' for it, since she thinks that

a lot of cases we call 'indignation' involve some thought of payback. So I prefer the clearly made-up term. Transition-Anger does not focus on status; nor does it, even briefly, want the suffering of the offender as a type of payback for the injury. It never gets involved at all in that type of magical thinking. It focuses on social welfare from the start. Saying, 'Something should be done about this', it commits itself to a search for strategies, but it remains an open question whether the suffering of the offender will be among the most appealing. (Nussbaum 2016, 35–36)

Notable is that Nussbaum has neither arguments nor examples to support the claim that there are cases of indignation that involve the desire for payback. And when, later in the appendix (2016, 262), she simply refers to this previous assertion to dispense with the claim that indignation is not related to anger as species to genus, she fails to establish that indignation is simply a species of anger. One could object that the difference between Nussbaum's and my position is merely terminological, but the difference is more than that. Nussbaum's own position is that anger is *essentially* characterized by

the payback wish. Yet, she claims, Transition-Anger is not so characterized. This suggests that Transition-Anger cannot simply be a species of anger in the way that indignation is. Indeed, I would argue that Transition-Anger cannot even be a borderline species of anger since its intentional structure is significantly different. Moreover, anger, Nussbaum claims, targets the person committing the offence that angers, but Transition-Anger does not target the person. If this is so, and if Transition-Anger might simply be another name for indignation, the point remains that anger and indignation could not be related as genus and species. Hence, I shall continue to consider them as siblings.

ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND ACTION

Nussbaum's accounts of anger and Transition-Anger differ from my accounts in another important respect. The payback wish present in anger and the 'something must be done about this' of Transition-Anger invoke the common view that an essential feature of the emotions is that they incline us to act in various ways. I want to make three points about the relation of the emotions in general and of anger and indignation in particular to action.

First, I do not think action belongs essentially to the emotive. We must be careful to distinguish mere physical performances from action. For example, bodily expressions of the emotions are physical enactments of the emotions they express, but they do not, properly speaking, constitute actions. An action, as I understand it, is a physical performance undertaken in the light of an end, and bodily expressions of emotions are not undertaken in the light of an end. In other words, the physical performance is not the key to action; its being undertaken in the light of an end is what qualifies it as an action (although not necessarily a deliberate action). Therefore, when a basketball coach throws a chair across the court in his fury about a call that goes against his team, we might say that he is acting *in* anger, although he might not be acting in the proper sense of the term at all. However, if in throwing the chair he intends to strike the referee's legs and cause him to fall and injure himself, then throwing the chair is not merely expressing anger or acting in anger. He is acting *from* anger for a certain purpose. Physiological changes and physical performances are intrinsic to emotions since we are embodied subjects, but actions in the proper sense of a physical performance undertaken in the light of an end are not.

Nor do I think, second, that desire with its inclination to action belongs essentially to the emotive. There are emotions whose 'performance dimension' seems to terminate in the expression of the emotion. Awe and wonder, for example, seem to be emotions that do not involve desires to act. They

involve bodily expressions similar to surprise reactions, but not desire. Joy too seems to terminate in bodily expressions, even exaggerated ones: jumping for joy, raising both arms after scoring a hockey goal, punching the air in delight while yelling ‘yes!’, and so forth. Nor does desire seem a component of emotion in the phenomenon of being ‘struck’ by value (Mulligan 2009). Such experiences are often expressed by an exclamation or interjection, such as ‘how sad that is’ on hearing of a colleague’s serious illness, ‘how vulgar’ on witnessing someone’s behaviour, or ‘such generosity’ on hearing that someone has made a magnificent gift to an institution. These clearly involve emotions such as sadness, disgust, and admiration, but they do not arouse desire and motivate actions that arise from the emotion itself. Another example might be when we think ‘that’s atrocious’ on seeing a film of innocent non-combatants killed by indiscriminate bombing (that expression might well be redundant; ‘surgical’ bombing too often turns out to be not very surgical). The emotion in this case is indignation about, say, rules of engagement in warfare that are permissive of actions within war that indiscriminately kill non-combatants or bombing raids wilfully undertaken in violation of laws of war (which might well be an oxymoronic expression).

Third, while desire and action are not essential components of emotion, I do want to consider how anger and indignation motivate action, when they do. Anger is often thought to have a close connection to action, inclining us, as we have seen, to act in such a way as to gain revenge or impose punishment. This was explicit in Aristotle’s definition of anger as well as in Roberts’s statement of the consequent concern of anger: ‘S deserves (ought) to be hurt for X; may S be hurt for X’. However, we also often think that, even when the anger is righteous, that is, well motivated and epistemically justified, the person offended *both* should control the bodily expression of anger – don’t punch a hole in the wallboard – and should not act *from* his anger. Controlling one’s angry outbursts – in other words, habituating oneself not to desire revenge or punishment – is often thought a sign of virtue.

Nussbaum’s view that anger is always ‘normatively problematic, whether in the personal or in the public realm’ (Nussbaum 2016, 5) is motivated by the fact that anger inclines us to act in ways that are signs of vice. Although it is possible that anger signals the presence of wrongdoing and motivates us to repair it, Nussbaum believes that obsessively focusing on the down-ranking of the offended one’s status is wrongheaded since questions of relative status should not take on such importance (2016, 15) and that payback is mistaken in thinking that punishing the wrongdoer repairs the wrong originally done (2016, 6). Nussbaum sums up her position as follows: ‘When anger makes sense, it is normatively problematic (focused narrowly on status); when it is normatively reasonable (focused on the injury), it doesn’t make good sense, and is normatively problematic in that different way’ (2016, 31).

These ideas underlie Nussbaum's discussion of the 'Transition' from thoughts of payback to 'more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare' (2016, 6) and of Transition-Anger which from the start is focused on reforms and reconciliation, whether this be in the domain of dealing with children or in our relation to political institutions. From my perspective, the close connection between anger and action is mitigated in indignation not only because it is a 'cooler' emotion but because those wronged are often – but not necessarily – at a distance from us, unknown to us, or related to us only through the mediation of the socio-economic and political features of the situation occasioning indignation. Given that indignation targets the offence or the conditions giving rise to the offence, the actions towards which it inclines us are different from the revenge or punishment aroused by anger – the 'getting even' (or better) with the offender. It is not that indignation, under the guise of Transition-Anger, is a borderline species of anger; it is that indignation has a different intentional structure that, insofar as it inclines us to act, is focused on different kinds of actions from anger proper.

Indignation can motivate a wide range of actions. When indignation is about a particular offence by a particular agent, any action motivated by indignation proper would be aimed at repairing or restoring the social or moral order disrupted by the offence, which action might or might not include punishment of the offender. When indignation recognizes the offence about which one is indignant as (i) conditioned by systemic situational factors and (ii) involving not merely individual agents operating independently but a pattern of interconnected systems and practices, it opens the space for political actions that seek to correct not the wrong directly but the institutions, structures, and systems permissive or constitutive of that wrong. The interconnections among these social systems and practices entail that many agents performing actions contributing to the offence are not conscious of acting so as to harm others – a fact confirmed, for example, by studies of implicit bias.² In this context, indignation, which presupposes that the indignant agent has achieved some reflective awareness of the effect of these systems and practices, underlies not revenge or punishment but social, economic, and political reforms and attempts to reconcile the offending and offended parties. This view is similar to Nussbaum's discussion of the practical implications of Transition-Anger, but, once again, in the face of important differences between anger and indignation, this similarity is insufficient to establish that indignation is a species of anger.

Indignant action can be more politically fruitful than angry action precisely because indignation is focused on the situation rather than the agents. It recognizes that systemic problems such as racism, sexism, discrimination based on sexual preference, poverty, homelessness, and hunger will not be adequately

addressed by punishing a few – or even many – politicians who vote, say, against food stamps. Even if the agents deserve punishment, punishing them, say, by not reelecting them, is insufficient to correct the systemic issues that permit – or fail to mitigate – such problems (cf. Swaine 1996, 270). In such contexts, indignation that is not self-righteous and that incorporates a correct understanding of the moral order can be a force for good.

The criticisms of indignation, however, should not be ignored. At one extreme, the indignant subject's self-awareness as morally superior becomes self-righteousness and motivates ineffectual condemnations of either or both the permissive systemic conditions or the offender without any attempts to right the wrongs produced by those systems or individuals. This excessive and unquestioning confidence in one's own moral superiority is the negative side of indignation and the reason many identify indignation as a bad emotion. At the other extreme, indignation, recognizing and despairing of the scope of the wrongs to which it is directed, can become a morally impotent indifference or nihilism. At either extreme, indignation loses its moral power. Indeed, it is one of those emotions whose name, in a sense, also identifies a virtue. Proper indignation is a mean between the vices of self-righteousness and moral indifference or nihilism. Proper indignation is a mark of virtue insofar as it is one of those ways in which the virtuous person has the right feelings.

What, then, should we make of the 'fierce indignation' referred to in Swift's epitaph? The intentional structures of anger and indignation target both the offender and the offence, albeit in a different order. Consequently, as previously mentioned, they can easily slide into one another: indignation aimed at the offence by an agent can slide into anger at the offender for his offence, while anger at the offender can slide into indignation at the offence. More important for present purposes, anger and indignation can cohabit the same experience; this occurs, for example, when indignation at the offence combines with the intensity of anger and becomes focused intensely and equally on the offender and the offence. The resulting emotion is rage or outrage. Enraged subjects experience an emotion that is intense in the manner of anger, and their attention is aimed equally at the offence or systemic wrongs to which indignation is directed as well as the agents who promote, or fail to impede, these offences and wrongs. The aim of any actions motivated by such rage or outrage is both the reform or complete overthrow of the wrongs and systemic features permissive or constitutive of injustice and the punishment of those who perpetuate them.

Whereas political indignation is reformist, political anger and rage are, we might say, revolutionary. Indignation, political anger, and rage can all motivate positive action, but each carries a danger. Political anger or rage can lead to chaos and perhaps even terror, as the presumed perpetrators and

defenders of the established order are punished. But political indignation can, in some contexts, be ineffectual in bringing about enough change to root out the systemic causes of injustice. In such cases, political anger or rage might be appropriate, even when the cost to the indignant agent is high. Political anger or rage against oppressors – even when righteous – requires of an agent character traits that are ordinarily not considered virtuous and that damage an agent's well-being. These are the kinds of situations that call forth what Tesman (2005) calls 'burdened virtues'.

In conclusion, considerations of these sorts reveal that anger and indignation are related emotions, but related as siblings rather than as genus to species. Anger and indignation differ in their embodiment, in their intentional structure, and in their moral, socio-economic and political implications. Anger can be a rational emotion in response to agents who have wronged one in certain – but not in all – ways; trivial offences, for example, one's car not starting or the child not making her bed in the morning, might be annoyances, but an angry response to them is not appropriate. Offences that harm important aspects of one's well-being, by contrast, might warrant an angry response. A virtuous agent will moderate her actions both in and from anger in proportion to the severity of the offence and her prudential judgements about the most effective ways to compensate for the wrong. Indignation, similarly, can be a rational and appropriate response to offences that challenge or hinder the establishment of a just social or moral order or to the systemic conditions, institutions, structures, and practices that cause unjust harm to individuals. For the virtuous person, indignation will motivate action, not angry attempts to return harm to individuals with harms to the offending persons but attempts to reform the systems that produce the harms to individuals or classes of individuals. In intractable cases, indignation will turn into political anger or rage. Once again, an agent must take care in determining how one is to act in and from political anger or rage. That, however, is a tale for another paper.

NOTES

1 The third pertains to the issue of whether there are types of anger that do not involve a judgement of wrongfulness (Nussbaum 2016, 262). While I have advanced the view that the emotions contain a cognitive content (cf. *supra*, pp. 1–2), I do not claim that the cognitive content must be a propositional sense, that is, that the cognition must be a judgement (cf. Drummond 2013, 245–56). Hence, my view would be that there are clearly types of anger – and indignation – that do not involve *judgements* of wrongfulness, although they would involve *recognitions* of wrongfulness.

2 An overview of the 'state of the science' concerning implicit bias can be found in Staats et al. (2016); a bibliography of recent studies is included therein, pp. 94–106.

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