Chapter 3

(Non-)Human Identity and Radical Immanence

On Man-in-Person in François Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy

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1. NON-PHILOSOPHY AND THE RADICAL IMMANENCE OF MAN-IN-PERSON

One of François Laruelle’s key interventions has been to question the status of immanence in contemporary theoretical thought. Laruelle has argued that philosophy has always remained preoccupied with an ersatz immanence, repeatedly confusing immanence with the encompassing One-All or an object to be constructed and determined by thought.¹ In contrast to the philosophical drive to determine or “legislate” the radical immanence of the Real, Laruelle’s thought “holds itself in the radical immanence of the Real.”² As John Mullarkey has put it, “Non-philosophy is presented as an immanent thought precisely because it does not try to think of the Real but only alongside or ‘according to’ it.”³ Here, thought no longer takes immanence as its object, its result, or even its milieu, but as the foreclosed Real or the One from which it comes. Radical immanence names what precedes and remains foreclosed to philosophy as it produces the “World” or “Thought-World” in its own self-image, through first splitting the Real and then resynthesizing it or demanding that it be resynthesized. Laruelle’s non-philosophical practice seeks to undermine the production of doubles, the very structure of the Two needing to be made into One, which he has diagnosed as characteristic of philosophy and religious discourse across their varied attempts to legitimate themselves.⁴ The causation of radical immanence is that of determination-in-the-last-instance in which identity is asserted as that which indifferently precedes the various discursive splits produced by philosophy.⁵ This identity is not a synthesis of a duality, nor a transcendent point to be achieved, but is, like the “the Real” and “the One,” another name for a radical immanence
that affirms that nothing needs to be synthesized, united, or accomplished, because the destinations that tether us to labor are deactivated by being taken as hallucinatory products of theoretical discourses.

In Laruelle’s theoretical lexicon, however, radical immanence, which is foreclosed to the Thought-World, has another “first” name, that of “Man” or “Man-in-Person,” or, as he has sometimes written recently, Human-in-person. Insofar as Man-in-person mirrors the conceptual morphology of radical immanence, he is fundamentally a “being-separated or foreclosed” radical immanence, as he is a subject who relates to himself as a subject to himself. Taking the human as unilaterally separated from the World, following the logic of radical immanence, is what allows Laruelle to claim his thought to be general and human, but not humanist or philosophical. Whereas philosophical definitions of the human “insert man within the Whole or the horizon of the World, trying to find man a place that is generally subordinate,” the non-philosophical approach is a thought of man “as having lost all his attributes.” Indeed, “Non-philosophy does not know what or who man is, only that man is indefinite.”

Non-philosophy’s struggle against the reduction of Man-in-person to any philosophical definition constitutes its ethical directionality. Indeed, Laruelle’s thought is presented as human rather than humanist at least in part because rather than seeking to define the human as such, it invents the relation between discursive and philosophical materials and humanity. “Man-in-person is the condition under which philosophy and its ethics are placed.”

Philosophical, metaphysical, and religious traditions become mere materials, the products and functions for human use, a human who remains open and undefined. In Laruelle’s earlier work, this ethical trajectory of defending humans from the self-aggrandized powers of worldly discourses and their authorities was formulated as the protection of the “ordinary man” and the finite individual against harassment and persecution by the World. Here, the human is taken as fundamentally a kind of evanescent solitude, one that can never be fully exhausted or interpellated by the World and by philosophy, which try to identify or fix it with particular universal attributes and generalizations, making of it an object of knowledge and use. As Anthony Paul Smith explains, “There is a radical break between the Human-in-person (the structures and the authorities that determine the human as subject) and the human identity.”

The task from then on was to organize thought as coming from the human real, to render it “minoritarian,” one that thinks according to the structures of the World, Philosophy, and the Authorities. Stripped of all predicates and foreclosed to the World, Man-in-person puts in question the consistency and solidarity, but also the ultimate power, of not only the World, but the system of organization offered by theology, philosophy, and humanism. The intimate nudity of the human can underdetermine and render illusory transcendence in its various forms: it can “topple all transgressions, those of the earth and of the sky, into a more radical immanence.” Or, put differently: “Un-clean and un-worldly [Im-mondes], human beings defeat the main adversary, the coalition of God and Logic in transcendence, whose onto-theology is ultimately an idealist and Greek version.”

The figure of Man-in-person construed along the logic of radical immanence undermines the philosophical transcendence of the World, of being and logos as much as the religious transcendence of God. Laruelle critiques onto-theology neither to think of ontological difference (as does Heidegger), nor in order to uphold the transcendence of the Other (as does Levinas), but in order to affirm a radical immanence of the human as generic.

2. NON-HUMAN IMMANENCE

Having briefly described the contours of Laruelle’s human thought, I want to raise several questions. How can we be sure that once transcendence, be it worldly, philosophical, or religious, is debased, that out of the rubble of those authorities emerges something that indeed can be called Man-in-person? What if, by contrast, from the realm of radical immanence there emerges, or remains hidden within (or “insists in”) that immanence, something no longer easily recognizable by a familiar name, such as the human? In non-philosophy, we do not know what the human is at least in part because structures of recognizability and intelligibility themselves pertain to the epistemological apparatus of the World. We might say that we do not know what Man-in-person is because such knowledge, as Judith Butler has reminded us in other contexts, is always mediated by structures of appearing and intelligibility. In this respect at least, the One has the same problem as the Other; it cannot appear without some mediation and determination by the World. This is why, for Laruelle, we do not know what the human is, but only that it is, a quasi-apocalyptic and indexical gesture that equates the human with the immanence of the Real. The question remains, though, how can we still be sure of this naming as such? Simply, how do we know that what is foreclosed to the World should retain Man-in-person as the first name, which “symbolize[s] the Real and its modes according to its radical immanence or its identity”? If philosophy is always only concerned with abstract problems instead of human ones, are we certain that the Man-in-person of non-philosophy, even when stripped of his philosophical attributes, remains something concrete? Being radically without qualities, how does that X nevertheless remain a man without qualities? Or, slightly differently, what is it in the status of the human in particular that allows it to retain its somehow
concrete but identifiable form, or if not fully identifiable, then still one that can act as a name, as an indexical for a theoretical orientation?

To explore these questions, I want to turn to what will undoubtedly appear as a rather strange source, namely, to Clarice Lispector’s novel *The Passion According to G.H.* I want to do this because this text enacts a perspective that is uncannily close to the unilateral duality of radical immanence of Laruelle’s thought, which I have outlined earlier, and yet it does not retain the insistence on the human dimension of the theory. Indeed, I would suggest that the text enacts a thought of radical immanence and identity that is at one radically non-humanist and non-human. As we will see, in Lispector’s novel, the human is not allowed to name radical immanence at all, and it is this difference that will illuminate the stakes, the effects, and the limitations of the Laruellean coupling of radical immanence with the names of Man or Man-in-person. It will thus also put under a critical light Laruelle’s insistence that there are no other paths forward, found in such observations as: “We no longer have any other solution in the desert that man has become but to put him forward as the object of a prior-to-the-first axiom for a theory of the victim and a deduction of the intellectual’s acts of protection.” The tradition is no doubt ravaged, but it is still worth questioning whether there really are no other routes than to reactivate man as axiomatic, but stripped of attributes. I want to suggest that Lispector’s novel points toward a thought that decouples radical immanence from human names, while still upholding, albeit under a certain mutation, an ethical and minoritarian orientation. It thus allows us to ask what would happen to non-philosophical practice if there were a larger theoretical gap between radical immanence and identity of the Real, on the one hand, and Man as Man-in-person, on the other. Additionally, taking up Lispector’s novel has the benefit of at least temporarily sideling the polemics between philosophical and non-philosophical discourses and allowing us to explore the usefulness of thinking literary work in relation to non-philosophical practice.

*The Passion According to G.H.* is theoretically and formally complex, but narratively fundamentally minimal: a woman, “G.H.,” encounters a cockroach in her upscale Buenos Aires apartment, attempts to kill (and taste) it, and in the process undergoes a radical form of desubjectivation. In a multitude of forms and fragments, the novel gives voice and enacts the resulting ligibility of the world and her own personhood in that world are broken up: the voice of G.H. and a voice that increasingly loses all personhood, coming ever closer to becoming a vocalization of that identity of neutral life that it finds in the cockroach. The encounter with the cockroach opens up onto an immanence that is below the world as constructed and ordered, an indifference that can be said to come under and yet remain indifferent to that world. In other words, identity or radical immanence, in Lispector as in Laruelle, is something that challenges and breaks apart the sufficiency of the world, of the subject as enclosed in that world, and the hallucinatory relations that bind them, the subject and the world, together.

For Lispector, however, and this is key, humanity itself must ultimately be understood as partaking of this apparatus. As the novel declares, reflecting on the revelatory nature of the collapse that has occurred: “Before I lived in the humanized world, but did something purely alive collapse the morality I had?” The encounter with the cockroach is a moment of recognition, not of the mutual human recognition much debated in neo-Hegelian and neo-Frankfurt School discourse, but a unilateral recognition that breaks apart one’s personal identity, one’s human identity. It is a moment that breaks apart the field of recognition and representation, announcing, one could say, the very identity that disarticulates the human self as such. What predated humanity was not simply something outside of G.H., but that neutral immanence of life that made her and the cockroach, in-the-last-instance, identical. “Because I’d looked at the living roach and was discovering inside it the identity of my deepest life.” Or, encapsulating the strange logic of this common identity revealed in the encounter: “But if its eyes weren’t seeing me, its existence was existing me.” There is no reflexivity or reflection (no specular doubling of conceptual sight), but only a unilateral destitution of G.H.’s identity in the world and an assertion of identity that precedes and exceeds her own proper individuation and personalization. This immanence of life, of the living, collapses human identity, her identity as a person, as much as the stability of the world, by displaying its utter indifference to that world and to its histories and to her personal existence. But, and again in the context of Laruelle this is significant, identity itself is never given up on as a term; rather, it is seen as another name for radical immanence itself: “Identity—identity that is the first inherence—was that what I was surrendering to?” One could say that what is playing out here is a perspectival shift, from an existence in-the-world to an insistence or an inherence in the identity of the living indifferent to that world.

The immanence that shatters the enclosure of the world cannot be identified with the human on this account precisely because the human herself is formed historically and materially through and by, as Laruelle could say, the history-world. For Lispector, as for others like Georges Bataille, the human does not exist as such, but always partakes in an anthropogenetic process: the human is formed and transformed through the world and its moralities that human is formed and transformed through the world and its moralities that
never exhaustive or final. Within me, there remains a radical immanence not
enclosed by the subject that I have become in correlation with the world and
its processes of subjectivation. But though it remains in some sense within
me, this radical immanence is no longer identifiable with the human—it
escapes the humanity of man no less than the solidarity of the world.
After the encounter, once the radical immanence of neutral life that is “purely
“The world held alive” is revealed and affirmed, the impersonal voice speaks: “The world held
me, and man no longer had human meaning for me.”23 The world and its discourses, and the human interpellet by them, are
rendered, in the-last-instance, hallucinatory.

So, what is this radical immanence that collapses and thinks otherwise, and
perhaps determines-in-the-last instance, the world, its histories and gods, and
its humanities? What names are applicable to it, if it is severed from human
names, to which it is consistently linked in Laruelle’s non-philosophy? In
the first instance it is precisely that which rejects the operation of naming,
it is the unnamable: “That thing, whose name I do not know, was that thing
that, looking at the roach, I was now starting to call without a name. Contact
with that thing without qualities or attributes was disgusting to me, a living
ingredient without name, taste, or smell was repugnant.”24 And yet this material
immanence is not out there; without a name, without qualities, it is precisely
what, taken immanently, one has always been. “And I too have no name,
and that is my name. And because I depersonalize myself to the point of not
having my name. I reply whenever someone says: I.”25 But of course, the
unnamable does accrue names: to each apophasis, a kataphasis. It is called
identity and immanence, but also the inexpressive neutrality, the grandiose
indifference, the real, inhuman life. In Passion, the names that are offered for
radical immanence always remain linked to what is fundamentally nonhu-
man and nonworldly, the uncivil, the strange and foreign. Immanence is an
immanence of neutral life, which is radiated by the indifferent presence of the
cockroach. There is alien life in the human, but qua human, it is of the world;
it is only qua alien, strange life, that it is dualized and unworldly.

Taking up this line of thought, I would suggest that one can entertain
a different name for radical immanence than deployed standardly in non-
philosophy. If neutral life might be too philosophical for Laruelle’s approach,
name, the cockroach, or the slightly more poetic one offered by the novel, “I,
non-philosophy, by naming (and inhabiting) a radical immanence, indifferent
meant to produce another normative or metaphysical idea, but rather to offer
attempt to relate the animal to the human, or produce another philosophically
operable definition of human-animal relationality. The cockroach can name
the Real because it evokes a powerful resistance to the construction of defini-
tions and idealizations. Instead, it names the site of immanence that subverts
the self-standing nature of the world and history, of philosophy and the gods.

To understand what is at stake in the movement from the name “man”
to this name of the cockroach, let us return to the status of individuation in
relation to Man-in-person in Laruelle’s thought. Simply, how does one theo-
retically understand the relation between individuation and Man-in-person?
There seem to be two possible directions: individuation can be taken as a
product of the World and therefore not directly relating to the in-person. In
other words, the World individuates as it subjectivates and produces some-
thing like a symbolic grid populated by individualized life. As, Laruelle says:
“But it was, and always is, individuated by transcendence, by no means by
itself.”26 There is much in Laruelle’s thought that suggests an understand-
ing of generic humanity as preceding the domain of individuation enforced
by the World. But, alternatively, one can ask: Is the Man-in-person already
somehow individuated in itself, in a non-worldly way? The recurring stress
on the solitude of Man-in-person and perhaps the very name “Man-in-person”
in the singular pushes Laruelle’s thought in this direction. This is supported
by the fact that in past writings, Laruelle equates Man-in-person with the
individual, as the undivided and real one. Is there not a kind of apophatic,
indexical element lodged in the in-person, one that implies it is more than
mere abstraction, another concept, or phantom, pointing instead to the
most intimately real human, indifferent and unconquerable by philosophy?
Laruelle would insist that this entire question is philosophical, effacing
the very logic of radical immanence. And yet, I would suggest that Lispector’s
novel forces us to think about this tension more explicitly, and puts into doubt
the ability of thinking it away by fiat.

Passion is unequivocal: individuation pertains to the world alone. “But
that, as far as humans are concerned, would be destruction: living life instead
of living one’s own life is forbidden. It is a sin to enter the divine matter.
And that sin has an irremediable punishment: one who dares to enter this
secret, in losing individual life, disorganizes the human world.”27 To lose
one’s own proper individuated self is to abandon the very process of human-
ization, rendering it meaningless by depriving it both of its agent and of its
goal.28 Out of immanence arise modes of living free from grounds, reasons
or teloi, rather than individuated entities populating a world and seeking to
achieve something, to synthesize, to labor. Lispector forces a theoretical
choice: either we make radical immanence human and thereby individuate it
or we have to admit that what radical immanence reveals is no longer some-
thing that can easily be named human. There is a radical divide between the
perspective of human being-in-the-world and the radical immanence of living
life that indifferently undermines the order of the world and its subjects. The
immanence of the Real is always already there, preceding and exceeding the
logics of history and the ontological firmness of the world; the question is
only to cease to hallucinate it as transcendent from the position of the finite
subject, which has severed itself from that immanence and was convinced to
desire as absent what has been there anterior to the original act of interpellat-
ing subjectivation. “My whole fraudulent struggle came from my not wanting
to own up to the promise that is fulfilled: I did not want reality.”
Against all transcendent ideals that form life according to their image, there
remains only a vector of life that insists within immanence, without ever redoubling itself
or being specularly captured by the world. Passion and non-philosophy both
give voice to a form of living-in-immanence that erupts in the world while not
being of the world, a living no longer subjected to the machine of conversion
or produced as a new transcendent horizon.

What is revealed through this abandonment and subversion should not
(or not only), however, be equated with the mystical lexicon of darkness or the
desert. What Passion pushes us toward is something already known by
mythics like Eckhart and Poree, that the radical immanence, which subverts
the mechanism of futurity and hope, uncovers a joy in excess of all subjec-
tivity. “What was I struggling against was a vague first joy that I didn’t want
to perceive in myself because, even vague, it was already horrible: it was a
joy without redemption . . . a joy without the hope.” A horrible joy, one that
could be said to coincide with “the neutral and the inexpressive in me,” but
one no longer promised on the hope for a redemptive future, an (after)life.
For redemption to come is redemption rendered transcendent, which opens
up the gap in which the moral-economic apparatus of subjugation can func-
tion again. Rather, if there is redemption, it is an immanent redemption that
discloses the world’s hallucinatory objectivity by approaching it from the per-
spective of radical immanence of impersonal joyful living.
“I want to find redemption in today, in right now, in the reality that is being,
and not in the promise, I want to find joy in this instant—I want the God in whatever
comes out of the roach’s belly—even if that, in my former human terms, means the
worst, and, in human terms, the infernal.” What we see in Lispector is a
logic of radical immanence that is itself redemption, a joyful redemption of
the now without deferral or conversion—parallel to what elsewhere I have
articulated as Laruelle’s practice of immanent messianism.

Indeed, perhaps what Passion suggests as well is that radical immanence
carry a final indifference to naming, as long as the structures of transcen-
dence—of the ideal, norm, or the subjectifying teleology—are deactivated.
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3. A JOYFUL SUBVERSION OF HOPE

If non-philosophy is a variable practice of radical immanence, then I would
suggest that decoupling immanence from human names should not be mis-
taken for an external critique, but rather be seen as another, mutated trajectory
in the non-philosophical practice. This would, at least in part, be sup-
ported by John Ó Maoilearca’s recent suggestion that the non-philosophical
human has something fundamentally nonhuman about it. Indeed, while
diagnosing the human as implicated with the transcendent structures of the
world, Passion does not entail abandoning the ethical implications of non-
philosophy, but rather mutates and enriches them. After all, Lispector’s novel
upholds the logic of radical immanence as a way of subverting the mecha-
nisms and operations that subject life and exhaustively interpellate it into the
world, making it labor there for transcendent goals. The radical immanence
of neutral life suggests the necessity of not only extracting the human from
false metaphysical attributes, but also abandoning the structures of hope and
salvation that position her in relation to transcendence. More specifically, the
encounter with and the affirmation of radical immanence entails the subver-
sion of the logic of transcending as striving and self-overcoming and the
illusion of transcendence as a telos to be reached, as something to be labored
for and accomplished. “Because it was no longer about doing something:
the neutral gaze of the roach was telling me it wasn’t about that, and I knew
It only I couldn’t bear just sitting there and being, and so I wanted to do.
Doing would be transcending, transcending is an exit.” In other words, there
is a fundamental disjunction between hope for transcendence, which entails
a logic of labor and displacement, and the affirmation of the immanence of

life that indifferently undermines the order of the world and its subjects. The
immanence of the Real is always already there, preceding and exceeding the
logics of history and the ontological firmness of the world; the question is
only to cease to hallucinate it as transcendent from the position of the finite
subject, which has severed itself from that immanence and was convinced to
desire as absent what has been there anterior to the original act of interpellat-
ing subjectivation. “My whole fraudulent struggle came from my not wanting
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Of the ideal, norm, or the subjectifying teleology—are deactivated.
Radical immanence can retain the name human, but only if one radically decouples it from the process of transcendence and ideality, of humanization, a decoupling, however, is impossibly difficult to maintain—this is the reminder offered by Lispector. The novel enacts this reality in its powerful reminder arc within the novel of the humanized world. The near absence of a narrative arc within the novel of the world, precisely as Laruelle’s thought has repeatedly stressed. As a result, Passion should be seen as an aesthetic practice of thought and of writing from immanence and not simply about it. It singularly makes audible a voice coming from immanence rather than a language describing and theorizing it. To trace anew this trajectory of radical immanence through an encounter with Lispector’s Passion is to suggest, more generally, that there are hidden archives of texts—aesthetic, literary, religious—that have, in various times and under various conditions, thought according to radical immanence and that can be reactivated as sites of struggle and theoretical experimentation, thereby enriching what non-philosophy can do.

NOTES

1. For an exposition of the contrast between non-philosophy’s radical immanence and philosophical and phenomenological conceptions of immanence, see Anthony Paul Smith, “What Can Be Done with Religion? Non-Philosophy and the Future of Philosophy of Religion,” in After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, ed. Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler, 280–298 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010). Although I do not go into Laruelle’s reading of Deleuze here, suffice it to say there are less polemical ways of reading Deleuze’s so-called philosophy of immanence. For one such recent articulation of Deleuze’s thought that converges with my own, see Daniel Coacciolo Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-Secularism and the Future of Immanence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2014).


6. I agree with those, like Anthony Paul Smith, who have suggested that the human and its variants (like Human-in-person) are better terms than Man or Man-in-Person to designate what non-philosophical thought is getting at, which is an undefinable generic humanity. The status of Man-in-person and Human-in-person will be precisely what is at stake in what follows, but in elaborating on Laruelle’s thought, I will, for the most part, follow his own practice of using the various terms interchangeably. I do think, however, it would be productive to think of the category of the Man-in-person of non-philosophy in light of Sylvia Wynter’s discourse of the human. In differing ways, both discourses seek to resist the overrepresentation of the Western philosophical figures of “Man,” and critique the way that ideal definitions and models produce abjection and victims out of real humans. Moreover, both highlight the role and complicity of the intellectual in this project and try to think the specific modes of uprisings available to those victimized and subjected by imperial philosophical discourse. Although this reading is still to be done, I think it would not leave non-philosophical practice unchanged. On this topic, see especially François Laruelle, General Theory of Victims, trans. Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Sylvia Wynter, “Beyond the Word of Man: Glissant and the New Discourses of the Antilles,” World Literature Today 63.4 (1989): 637–648; and Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—an Argument,” CR: Centennial Review 3.3 (2003): 257–337.

7. Laruelle, General Theory, 125.


12. These elements have been particularly powerfully elucidated in Ó Maoilearca, *All Thoughts*.


14. As Laruelle puts it in the earlier *Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire: Des Autorités et des Minorités*: “What is necessary is to change the paradigm of thinking; to pass from the philosophical paradigm (from Being to Difference, from the Same to the Other) to a paradigm we call minoritarian or individual, and which is based on a transcendental but finite experience of the One as distinct from Being, the World and their attributes” (François Laruelle, *Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire: Des Autorités et des Minorités* [Paris: Aubier, 1985], 14). Jessie Hook and I are currently working on a translation of this text into English, to be published with Polity Press.


17. Ibid., xxvi.


21. Ibid., 51–52.

22. Ibid., 73.

23. Ibid., 100.

24. Ibid., 66.

25. Ibid., 84.

26. Ibid., 185.

27. Ibid., 60.


30. In fact Michel Peterson has suggested that G.H. may be read as standing for *dans sa totalité anonyme* (the figure of humankind in its anonymous totality); see Peterson, “Les cafaras de Clarice Lispector,” *Études françaises* 25.1 (1989): 39–50.


33. Ó Maoilearca, *All Thoughts*, 33.

34. Lispector, *Passion*, 83.

35. Ibid., 160.


37. For this stress in Laruelle’s work, see Eugene Thacker, “Notes on the Axiomatic of the Desert,” *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 19.2 (2014): 85–91; and Eugene Thacker et al., *Dark Nights of the Universe* (Miami: [Name] Publications, 2013). I would say that the impersonality of life, that neutral life of the cockroach, does indeed align with the desert and the color black in Laruelle’s vocabulary, but I would add that this dimension does not exhaust the morphology of radical immanence.


39. To prove this is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I would suggest that stripping immanence of its human names might also save non-philosophical practice from repeating, even if inadvertently and indirectly, the act of supercessionism, which has been recently located within the core of its practice by Daniel Colucciello Barber, “Meditation, Religion, and Non-Consistency In-One,” *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 19.2 (2014): 161–174.

40. This also suggests the breaking down of mediational apparatuses that subjudgete life and make it labor in order to get somewhere. Or, if the mediational apparatus remains, it does so only as a moment that subverts the necessity of mediation and futurity, and the subjects on which they rely. In the *Passion*, this is visible in a subversive baptism of tasting the cockroach: “I had put a roach’s matter into my mouth, and finally performed the tiniest act. Not the maximum act, as I had thought before, not heroism and sainthood. But at last the tiniest act that I had always been missing. I had always been incapable of the tiniest act. And with the tiniest act, I had dehumanized myself” (Lispector, *Passion*, 188). This dehumanization marks the subversion of one’s own proper human self, but also of the possibility of agency and self-possession that is so characteristic of liberal modernity. Not a great act of tragedy or epic, but a minimal passivity of radical immanence that undermines the characteristic that determines oneself as a subject in the world, as participating in “humanized life.” This miniaturization through “the tiniest act” undercuts the heroic tone of thought, which Laruelle has critiqued most recently in his discussion of philosophy’s glorification of heroes in *General Theory of Victims*.


42. Dubilet, “Neither God, Nor World: On the One Foreclosed to Transcendence.”

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