Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the Jain Theory of a Self

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Introduction

Śāntarakṣita was an important eighth century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher who introduced Indian Buddhism to Tibet and is believed by Tibetan scholars to have created what they call the Yogācāra-Svātantrika School of Madhyamaka Indian Buddhism. He composed (i) Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālāmākāra), in which he adopted (a) the Madhyamaka

1 An excellent introductory explanation of the philosophy of Śāntarakṣita is Blumenthal 2009. See his bibliography for further sources.

2 Madhyamaka philosophy was first systematically presented by Nāgārjuna (third century CE) in the Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakasāstra) on the basis of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Praṇīpamitāsūtra-s). The Yogācāra (also called Cittamātra) philosophy was first systematically presented in the fifth century by Vasubandhu and his brother, Asaṅga. The logical and epistemological ideas Śāntarakṣita incorporates into his philosophy were formulated by Dharmakīrti in the seventh century CE.

3 There are at the present time two translations of the Ornament of the Middle Way into English. The first is included in Blumenthal 2004 and the second is included in Doctor 2004.
theory when analyzing phenomena for their ultimate reality, (b) the Yogācāra theory when considering the conventional reality of phenomena; and (c) the approach to valid cognition (pramāṇa) presented by Dharmakīrti; (ii) Autocommentary on The Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti); (iii) Commentary on [Dharmakīrti’s] Debate Reasoning (Vādanyāya), Full Explanation of the Meaning (Vādanyāya-Śīkā Vipaścitārthā); and (iv) Compendium of Reality (Tattvasamgraha), which is a comprehensive critical examination of the major Indian philosophical theories in India. Kamalaśīla, Śāntarakṣita’s disciple, wrote a commentary on the Compendium of Reality entitled Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Compendium of Reality (Tattvasamgrahapāṇijikā), which we shall call the Commentary. Since the Commentary both includes and explains the verses of Śāntarakṣita’s Compendium of Reality, in what follows we translate and briefly comment upon the Commentary discussion of Śāntarakṣita’s examination of what he calls the Jain’s theory of a “self” (ātman). Our comments are for the most part concerned with clarifying the theses and arguments in the examination. On another occasion we plan to evaluate the theses and arguments. What evaluations we do offer are preliminary in character.

For our purposes, the differences between the Jain philosophy and Śāntarakṣita’s philosophy primarily concern

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4 There seems to be at the present no English translation of this commentary.
5 There seems to be at the present time no English translation of Dharmakīrti’s treatise and Śāntarakṣita’s commentary on it. The Sanskrit text for both is edited in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 2007.
6 A Sanskrit copy of this work was discovered in 1873 by Dr. G. Bühler in the Jain Dharma temple of Parshvanatha at Jaisalmer. This version contains also the commentary by Kamalaśīla. The only translation of the Commentary into English presently available is Jha 1939.
7 The Sanskrit text translated here is in Shastri 1968.
8 Our account of the Jain philosophy was initially based on many sources supplied to James Duerlinger by the International Summer School for Jain Studies in 2008. However, we have for the most part relied on Umāsvāte’s Tattvārthādhiṣṭhita Sūtra, along with the commentaries of Umāsvāte, Pujyapāda and Siddhasenagāni. See the bibliography for this and our other sources. Because of differences among the Jain philosophers about what exactly is said in Umāsvāte’s Tattvārthādhiṣṭhita Sūtra and other works by authoritative masters of the Jain tradition, citation of these works became so complicated that we have chosen to present a general account of the Jain theory of a self without including specific references. The result of the
epistemological and metaphysical theories used to justify practices on the path to liberation from “cyclic existence” (*samsāra*). Different epistemological and metaphysical theories appeal to practitioners of the paths of different Indian religions, and it is important that those who practice a path to liberation from cyclic existence have recourse to such theories (albeit without attachment to them) in order to understand the practices, which are explained on the basis of these theories. Consequently, we will restrict our discussion to these theories.

### The Jain theory of a self

The Jain theory of a self is that in the aspect of “substance” (*dravya*) a self’s essential “quality” (*guna*) is “consciousness” (*cit, caitanya, cetana*) and in the aspect of “modes” (*paryāyas*) of substance it is the successive states through which this substance passes because of its prior actions. Because Śāntarakṣita identifies the Jain self with consciousness, his examples of the kind of the successive states through which a self passes are pleasure, pain, and the like. The Jains teach that a self in the aspect of substance is a permanent substratum of its successive states, which are the same self when apprehended in the aspect of modes of substance. A self is said to be an agent of actions and enjoyer of the results of its actions; to have the size of the body it possesses at any given time, expanding and contracting according to the size of its body at that time; and to be known to exist by its awareness of the actions of body, speech, and mind for which it is responsible. In its pure form a self is without a body and is claimed to be beyond cognition. In his examination of the Jain theory of a self, Śāntarakṣita does not address this claim; his concern is only with their thesis that in the aspect of substance a self persists through changes it undergoes in the aspect of its successive states.

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9 The choice is a rather sketchy account; but in the end we deemed it sufficient, since a more detailed account was not needed for our purposes.

9 The term the Jains often use to refer to a self is *jīva*, which is, as used by the Jains, usually translated as “soul.”

10 However, typical Jain examples of the successive states through which a self passes because of its prior actions are a hell-being, an animal, a human being, and a celestial being.
The most distinctive part of the Jains’ epistemology is their “viewpoint theory” (*nayavāda*) and the most distinctive part of their logic is their “conditional predication theory” (*syādvāda*), both of which are based on their “multiple-aspect theory” (*anekāntvāda*). According to the multiple-aspect theory, every object of consciousness that exists has many different aspects, none of which is completely different from the object. The viewpoint theory is that ordinary human beings can apprehend only one aspect of an object at any given time because of the restricted nature of their apprehension of an object. A “viewpoint” (*naya*) is the apprehension of an aspect of an object that provides partial knowledge of the object. The most basic viewpoints are the apprehension of objects in the aspect of substance, in the aspect of a quality of substance and in the aspect of modes of substance. Objects in the aspect of substance and in the aspect of a quality of substance persist through time, while objects in the aspect of modes of substance do not persist through time. Conditional predication occurs when a term is predicated of an object in dependence upon the object’s being apprehended from a single viewpoint. If the term predicated of an object in fact applies to it, it is applicable to it only from the viewpoint from which the object is apprehended. For instance, “permanence” and “impermanence” can both be predicated of a self, provided that “permanence” is predicated from the viewpoint that a self is a substance and “impermanence” is predicated from the viewpoint that a self is the successive states of substance. So when Buddhists object that both “permanence” and “impermanence” cannot be predicated of a self, the Jains’ reply is that the objection is based on the failure to understand that these contradictory terms can be predicated of a self from different viewpoints.

The famous paradox of Theseus’ ship offers another example of how the theory is applied. Suppose Theseus’ ship leaves Athens. Before the ship comes back to Athens, every piece of the ship is replaced one-by-one. The question is whether the ship that left Athens is the same as the ship that comes back to Athens. The paradox is that the ship that left Athens and the ship that comes back to Athens appear to be the same ship and to be different ships.

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11 The Sanskrit terms are variously translated, and the theories have been variously explained. Our explanations we believe to best represent the theories as they are understood by Śántarakṣita.
If they are the same ship, the ship is unrelated to its material components, which is not true. If they are different ships, there are two ships rather than one, which is not true. The Jains would resolve this paradox by arguing that when the ship is apprehended from the viewpoint of its material components they are different ships, and that when the ship is apprehended from the general viewpoint of being a ship they are the same ship. This is the power of the conditional predication theory. The theory enables the Jains to make a number of distinctions that Śāntarakṣita rejects because it assumes that one object can have many aspects.\textsuperscript{12}

The Jains do not, of course, embrace the validity of all viewpoints, for they present a doctrine of “the means of knowledge” (pramāṇa), which for them is a doctrine of the proper ways to arrive at knowledge of objects according to their different aspects. An arbitrary choice of a viewpoint does not capture an aspect of an object, but an aspect of an object justifies the choice of a viewpoint. So the doctrine that the predication of terms must be relative to a viewpoint in no way implies that every predication of terms is correct. The Jains are not committed to an absurd version of the relativism embodied in the conditional predication theory. The Jains believe that Buddhists base their theories on the mistaken belief that one viewpoint from which an object can be apprehended encompasses the entire truth. The Jains do not of course consider their own philosophy to be one among many viable alternative viewpoints, but rather to be the only one that avoids mistaken theories by taking into account the different aspects of an object.

\textbf{Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla}

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are practitioners of Māhāyana Buddhism, according to which Buddhists strive to become Buddhas for the sake of helping all sentient forms of life become free from the sufferings of cyclic existence. For this purpose “wisdom” (prajñā) and “great compassion” (māhakārūṇa) for these suffering sentient forms of life are developed on the path to Buddhahood. For those who, like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, follow the Madhyamaka philosophy the wisdom developed is knowledge of “dependent origination” (pratītyasamutpāda), which

\textsuperscript{12} See especially Verses 316–318 and Verses 326–327 of this examination of the Jain theory of a self
is the middle way between the extremes of independent existence and no existence at all. Šāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla believed that the “ultimate reality” (paramārthasatya) of all phenomena is their “emptiness” (śūnyatā), which is their “essential nature” (svabhāva) of not existing by themselves, independent of anything else. It is the conceiving of phenomena that causes us to suffer in cyclic existence, because the conceiving of phenomena both creates as its object a self that falsely appears to exist by itself and causes us to cling to this false appearance. Freedom from suffering in cyclic existence is attained by the yogic realization of emptiness. The chief reasoning Šāntarakṣita used to establish that phenomena do not independently exist is the argument that they cannot be one or many. 

Buddhahood is attained when practitioners complete the nine stages of the path of meditation on emptiness as they are explained in the Discourse on the Ten States (Daśabhūmikasūtra).

Like his Mādhyamika predecessors, Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita avoided the thesis that phenomena do not exist at all by asserting that their dependent co-origination is their “conventional reality” (saṃvṛtisatya). But unlike his Mādhyamika predecessors he combined the Madhyamaka theory with the thesis that by convention dependently originating phenomena are “mind only” (cittamātra) in the sense that they are nothing but “consciousness” (vijñāna). Such phenomena are conventionally real, Šāntarakṣita believed, because they are objects of knowledge, causally efficacious, impermanent, and can be shown to lack independent existence. From the Yogācāras he accepted both the thesis that the objects of

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13 This is often called the neither-one-nor-many argument. In the first verse of the ninety-seven verse The Ornament of the Middle Way Šāntarakṣita in effect said that no phenomena independently exist because in reality they are, like a reflected image, neither one nor many, and in the next sixty verses he puts the phenomena asserted by his Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical opponents to the test of the neither-one-nor-many argument. The first verse may be translated as follows:

These entities spoken of by ourselves and others
are in reality devoid of any intrinsic nature,
since they possess neither a nature as one
nor as many, and are just like reflections.

14 By contrast the Yogācārins believed that phenomena that are only mind independently exist.

15 See verses sixty three and sixty four of the Ornament of the Middle Way.
consciousness are themselves consciousness and the thesis that consciousness is consciousness of itself being consciousness of an object.

In his examination of the Jain theory Śāntarakṣita usually referred to what Jains call a “soul” (jīva) as a “self” (ātman) because he believed that a soul, like what he calls a self, is the object of the first-person singular pronoun that is essentially consciousness, performs actions, and experiences the results produced by its actions. Hence, in our translation of Śāntarakṣita’s examination of the Jain theory of a self we shall for the sake of consistency of reference in English translate jīva, as we translate ātman, as “self.”

**Translations and Comments**

**Translation**

*Commentary*

The author now turns to a refutation of a self proposed by the Digambara Jains:

**Verse 311**

The Jains, like the Mīmāṃsakas, assert that the defining property of a self is consciousness, that in the aspect of substance it is inclusive, and that in the aspect of successive states it is exclusive.

*Commentary*

The Jains or Digambaras assert that the defining property of a self is just consciousness and that in the aspect of substance it remains the same through its states. As such it has an inclusive nature. But in the aspect of successive states, a self has an exclusive nature because its successive states are distinct. This two-fold character of a self is known [to exist] by means of direct perception. So it needs no other proofs. Therefore, consciousness is a substance that continues to exist through all of its successive states, even though these states of pleasure and the like are different. The successive states consist of different states that appear one after another. All of these are distinctly perceived. Such is the theory of the other party.
Comments

The five theses of the Jains’ theory of a self Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present are: (i) the defining property of a self is consciousness; (ii) a self in the aspect of substance has the inclusive nature of being the same through its successive states; (iii) a self in the aspect of successive states has the exclusive nature of its successive states being distinct from one another; (iv) a self in the aspect of substance and a self in the aspect of successive states are known to exist by means of direct perception; and (v) a self in the aspect of substance persists through its successive states. Absent from their presentation of the Jain theory is an account of what it means for a self to be in the aspect of substance and in the aspect of its successive states, as well as how a self, in these different forms, can be the same over time and different over time.

Translation

Commentary

The refutation of this theory is as follows:

Verse 312

Also in this theory even if the unmodified substance is connected to the successive states, there is no difference in it, in which case it cannot change [as the successive states do].

Commentary

There are two opinions possible. The substance that exists in the aspect of consciousness (i) may be connected to successive states in its unchanged aspect or (ii) it may be connected to successive states in its changed aspect. If (ii) is accepted, it follows that a self is not permanent, since according to this theory there would be no single entity that exists throughout a series of successive states. If (i) is accepted, it follows that there is no difference between the preceding and succeeding states. So consciousness could not change, since change is modification. And yet it is held to be changeable. The argument may be formulated as follows: when earlier and later states of a thing cannot be distinguished, like space it cannot be regarded as modifiable. Consciousness is not differentiated at all in any state. Since the wider character is absent, the narrower one must be denied.
Comments

In this Verse Śāntarakṣita objects that the Jain thesis—that in the aspect of substance a self is unchanging and in the aspect of successive states it changes—is inconsistent because what is unchanging cannot be different at different times and so change. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla ignore the implication of the Jain’s use of “in the aspect of” in the locutions “in the aspect of substance” and “in the aspect of successive states.” The implication is that a self has multiple aspects that can be apprehended from different viewpoints. However, they do discuss the multiple aspect and viewpoint theories of the Jains in Verses 1709–1785 of the Commentary, where they basically argue, as it is implied here they do, that the multiple-aspect theory is based on the contradiction that one object is many objects. To say that one object has different aspects, according to Śāntarakṣita, is just to say that it is many objects.

Translation

**Commentary**

In the following Verses it is said, from the Jain standpoint, that the reason just put forward [that an unmodified or permanent substance can contain no differences] is not established, in the sense that it is not admitted [by them].

*Verse 313*

When consciousness is said to be one, it is with reference to place,16 time, and nature.
When it is said to be different, it is with reference to number, property, name, and function.

*Verse 314*

When we speak of a jar and its color and the like, there is a difference in number and name.
There is also a difference in nature because inclusiveness is the nature of the substance, a jar, while exclusiveness is the nature of successive states in the aspect of color and the like.
There is also a difference of function, since the purposes served by the two are different.

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16 Literally, “space” rather than “place,” but the Sanskrit for “place” is later substituted for the Sanskrit for “space.”
Verse 315

Similarly, between the substance and its successive states [there is a difference in number, property, name, and function]. Therefore, the substance is not completely without difference, since it becomes different in the aspect of successive states.

Commentary

If a substance were completely different from successive states, then there could be no differences in it; because they are not different in place, time, and nature, the two are held to be one and the same [thing].

But in fact the two are different in number and with respect to other factors. For instance, the difference in number is that the substance is one and [its] successive states are many. In other words, the substance is characterized as being one in number, while the successive states, such as pleasure and the like, are characterized as being many in number. The nature of the two is also different, since the substance is comprehensive [or inclusive] in nature, while the successive states are distributed. . . . 17

It has been stated that there is no difference between what is qualified and what qualifies it because they are not different in their place, time, and nature, but they are different because they are different in number, name, property, 18 and function, as is found between a jar and its color and other properties. In other words, between a jar and its color and the like there is no difference in place and so on, while the jar is different in number and so on. For instance, a jar is one while its properties of color and the like are many. There is also a difference in name. While the one is called jar, the other is called color and so on. There is also difference in nature. While the substance in the shape of a jar is comprehensive in its nature, the successive states of color and the like are distributed. There is also a difference in their function. A jar serves the purpose of containing water, while color and the like serve the purpose of lending color to a cloth, and so on.

What has been said above [about a jar and its color and other properties] should be understood to hold for the substance, a self, which is of the nature of consciousness and the

17 We omit here references to the meanings of Sanskrit words.
18 Literally, the Sanskrit means "nature" rather than "property," but the Sanskrit for "property" is used in the verse.
successive states of pleasure, pain, and the like. In this case
the difference of function should be understood as follows:
the function performed by consciousness is the apprehension
of things, while that performed by pleasure, pain and the like
is happiness, unhappiness and the like. . .  

[In Verse 315] “Therefore, the substance…” sums up the
fallacy of the reason not being established. What is meant is
that, as shown above, the substance is not completely
without difference; in fact it becomes different through the
difference in the aspects of the successive states. And so,
substance not being completely different from the successive
states, the reason put forward [by the Buddhist in Verse 312],
“because there is no difference,” is not established in the
sense of not being true.

Comments

Śāntarakṣita’s objection in Verse 312 is that (i) if an
unmodified substance is one with its successive states, there is
difference in it; (ii) there is no difference in an unmodified
substance; (iii) so an unmodified substance is not one with its
successive states. The Jains reject this objection in Verse 312
because they do not assert, as the Buddhists do, that consciousness
is always different from moment to moment. Their rejection of the
objection is based, in fact, on their multiple-aspect theory,
according to which one and the same object possesses different
aspects; on their viewpoint theory, according to which the different
aspects of an object are apprehended from different viewpoints;
and on their conditional-predication theory, which enables them to
predicate incompatible terms of an object in dependence upon the
object being apprehended from different viewpoints.

As reported by Śāntarakṣita, the Jains believe that a
Buddhist says that there is no difference between what is qualified
and what qualifies it because they are not different in their place,
time, and nature, and he illustrates the lack of difference with the
example of a jar and its color. The Buddhist is represented as
believing that a jar is one with its color with respect to place and
time in the sense that it is in the same place as its color and at any
one time; a jar is one with its color with respect to nature in the
sense, we assume, that both—at least for Śāntarakṣita—are of the
nature of consciousness. The Jains are represented as replying that,

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19 I omit here an extended explanation of the Sanskrit words.
nonetheless, a jar and its color are different because they are different in number, name, property, and function. They differ in number because a jar is one and its properties of color and the like are many; in name because the one is called a jar and the other a color; in nature because a jar as a substance is comprehensive in nature and its color as a successive state is distributed; and in function because a jar has the function of holding liquids and its color a different function. Similarly, they are made to imply, a self is not without differences because as substance and successive states it is different in number, name, property, and function. As substance a self is one; as successive states it is many; as substance the properties of a self are different from its properties as successive states (apparently as substance it has the property of being comprehensive and as successive states it has the property of being distributive); as substance it has the function of apprehending things and as successive states it has, for instance, happiness, unhappiness, and the like.

Were the Jains given the chance to include a reply to Śāntarakṣita’s objection in Verse 312 they would add that the objection is based on an illicit shift between viewpoints, in which the fallacy of mistaking a viewpoint for the whole truth is committed. They would say that Śāntarakṣita plays on an ambiguity in viewpoint to charge their theory of a self with internal inconsistency. To be sure, Śāntaraksita rejects the Jain multiple-aspect, viewpoint, and conditional-predication theories, but if he claims in Verse 312 to be presenting a conclusive refutation, the objection should be something the Jains themselves could see as posing a problem for their theory of a self.

Translation

Commentary

The answer to the above argument of the Jains is given in what follows:

Verse 316

Being one consists in not being different in nature.
If there were this one, [therefore,] difference [in a self] would be hard to prove in any way;
as [it would be] in the case of the aspects of successive states themselves
Also if it is admitted that there is no difference between the substance and the successive states, their not being different should be complete. How then could there be difference between them? For being different contradicts not being different. It cannot be right to affirm and deny something. Affirmation and denial are mutually contradictory. For instance, when two things are said to be one, what is meant is that they are non-different in nature. This non-difference is inseparable from the negation of difference. Since there is such non-difference of character, how could there be, at the same time, difference, which is the negation of non-difference? This argument may be formulated as follows: when there is non-difference between two things, there can be no room for difference, which is the contradictory of non-difference, as for instance is found in the case of the same successive states and the substance with respect to the specific individuality of each, where there is non-difference of character, and between substance and successive states, non-difference is clearly [said to be] present.

So since there is no difference between the substance and the successive states, there cannot also be any difference of properties between them. This is what is shown in the following Verses:

**Verse 317**

Since the substance and the successive states being one is not figurative,
[i] the substance should also be distributed, like the aspects of the successive states,

**Verse 318**

or [ii] those successive states themselves should be comprehensive in their character,
like the substance, since it is duly established that they are one with the substance.

**Commentary**

When a thing is not different from another that is exclusive in its nature, the former also must be exclusive, as for

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This reference is to the substance said in *Verse 315* to be not completely without difference from its successive states.
example the \textit{aspect}s of the successive state themselves. And the substance is not different from the successive states, which are exclusive. So there is a natural reason \[for the substance also being exclusive\].

Or when a thing is not different from another that is inclusive in character, the former also must be inclusive. For instance the aspect of the substance and the successive states such as pleasure and the like are not different from the substance, which is inclusive. So this is a natural reason. If this were not so, then since the fate befalling them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as different.

There is also an argument that cancels the contrary of the conclusion in the form, “If things possessed of contradictory properties would be regarded as one, there would be an end to all business.”

Comments

When \textit{S\'antaraks\'ita} says in \textit{Verse 316} that “being one consists in not being different in nature” he means that one object cannot exist in two different aspects. He is rejecting the Jain claim in \textit{Verse 315} that a substance is not completely without difference “since it becomes different in the aspect of successive states.” He denies that if a self exists in the aspect of substance, it can exist in the aspect of successive states, since a self is one object, and one object cannot be many, substance, and successive states. He would also deny, for instance, that a jar in the aspect of substance persists over time and in the aspect of a mode of substance changes color. \textit{S\'antaraks\'ita} thinks that his Buddhist theory that all conventionally real objects are momentary and possess completely different properties rules out their persistence and identity over time, and the Jain multiple-aspect theory does not.

\textit{S\'antaraks\'ita} does not address the Jain theories upon which rest the reply he has them present in \textit{Verses 313–315} to his objection in \textit{Verse 312}. The Jains’ method of relativizing the predications of terms to viewpoints on an object is entirely foreign to his own logic and epistemology. From \textit{S\'antaraks\'ita}'s point of view, there is no need to relativize predications of terms to viewpoints, since the only logic of the predication of terms he accepts is that according to which they are based on the doctrine of excluding other viewpoints. Although \textit{S\'antaraks\'ita} rejects the Jains’ conditional predication and viewpoint theories, as well as
their multiple aspect theory, he has not, at least in this examination of their theory of a self, shown that these theories are flawed.

Kamalaśīla concludes his commentary by saying that if things possessed of contradictory properties could be regarded as one, “there would be an end to all business” in the sense, presumably, that discourse becomes meaningless. It is true, of course, that discourse becomes meaningless if things possessed of contradictory properties can be one thing, but do the Jains believe that things possessed of contradictory properties may be regarded as one?

**Translation**

*Verse 319*

From all this it follows that there are no lasting substances such as a self and the like, since they are not different from the successive states [they possess], like the aspect of the successive states themselves.

**Commentary**

The use of “and the like” is meant to include a jar, grains and other such things.

**Comments**

In *Verse 319* Śāntarakṣita summarizes the basic argument he presents in *Verses 312–318*. That argument may be summarized by saying that since the self posited by the Jains is not different from its successive states, just as the successive states are not different from themselves, the self posited by the Jains is not, as they claim it is, a permanent substance.

**Translation**

**Commentary**

The following *Verse* sets forth the implication of the second, indirect proof:

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21 The meaning of the last line seems to be “like the aspects of the successive states themselves [are not different from the successive states].” The aspects of the successive states are their essence, which is said not to be different from the successive states themselves.
Verse 320

In addition, none of the successive states can appear and disappear, since they are not different from the substance, like the permanent aspect of the substance.

Commentary

The Verse has added the clause “like the permanent form of the substance” because of the argument, “Since substance is also held to appear and disappear, the predicate-term ["can appear and disappear"] cannot not be attributed to the reason-term ["substance"].

Comments

The objection in Verse 320 is based on the supposed implication of the Jains’ theory that the successive states of a self are not different from a self that is permanent. The objection is that since the successive states of a self posited by the Jains are not

What we translate as “the predicate-term ["permanence"] cannot not be applied to the reason-term ["substance"]” literally means “there can be no absence of the predicate in the reason.” There are usually said to be three terms in an argument. The conclusion of a simple argument takes the form of a term being applied to its “subject term” (paksya, often translated as probans). The term applied to the subject-term of the conclusion is “the predicate-term” (sādhya, often translated as probundum). The term that justifies the predicate-term being applied to the subject-term is called the “reason-term” (hetu, often translated simply as “reason” or “cause”). The reason-term justifies the predicate-term being applied to the subject-term by being applied to the subject-term and the predicate-term being applied to it. The argument is that a predicate-term applies to a subject-term because the reason-term applies to the subject-term and the predicate-term applies to the reason-term. The predicate-term’s application to the reason-term is called the reason-term being pervaded (vyāpti) by the predicate-term. Here is an example:

A substance is permanent. [predicate-term being applied to the reason-term]

The successive states of an object are a substance. [reason-term being applied to the subject-term]

Therefore, the successive states of an object are permanent. [predicate-term being applied to the subject-term]

In this argument “A substance is permanent” expresses the pervasion (vyāpti) of the reason-term by the predicate-term. This is the meaning of “there can be no absence of the predicate in the reason.” We have omitted a sentence here that explains the grammatical form of a compounded expression in Sanskrit.
different from the permanent self they posit, just as a permanent self is not different from itself, the successive states posited by the Jains do not, as they claim it does, appear and disappear.

The “indirect proof” to which Kamalaśīla refers in his introductory commentary to Verse 320 is to the proof, in Verse 319, that there is no lasting self because it is not different from its successive states. The implication of this indirect proof is that the successive states of a self are not different from one another because they are not different from a self in the aspect of substance.

Translation

Commentary

The following verse clinches the argument:

Verse 321

For this reason it should be admitted either
that there is the complete destruction of everything23
or that everything is permanent24;
exclusiveness and inclusiveness could not exist in any one thing.

Comments

The argument in Verse 321 is that (i) if a self in the aspect of substance and a self in the aspect of successive states are one, then either what is permanent is one with what ceases to exist or what ceases to exist is one with what is permanent; (ii) if what is permanent is one with what ceases to exist, there is the complete destruction of everything, and if what ceases to exist is one with what is permanent, everything is permanent; (iii) so if a self in the aspect of substance and a self in the aspect of successive states are one, there is the complete destruction of everything or everything is permanent; (iv) it is not the case that there is the complete destruction of everything or that everything is permanent; (v) so a self in the aspect of substance and a self in the aspect of successive states are not one.

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23 There is the complete destruction of everything because what is permanent is one with what ceases to exist.

24 Everything is permanent because what ceases to exist becomes one with what is permanent.
The Jains would accuse Śāntarakṣita of committing in this argument the fallacy of mistaking a viewpoint for the complete truth. The Jains would deny that predicating “permanence” of a self, appropriately relativized to a viewpoint, involves a contradiction with predicating “impermanence” of a self, appropriately relativized to a viewpoint, unless, as Śāntarakṣita has done, viewpoints are ignored. So Śāntarakṣita’s attempt to impose in Verse 321 a destructive dilemma for the Jain theory of a self may be fairly said to fail in the sense that the Jains would not find his argument compelling.

Translation

Commentary

Any comprehensive entity such as a substance cannot be accepted, since not only is it not different in nature from the successive states, but also since it is not perceived separated from [the perception of] the successive states even when the conditions of its perception are present. So it should be treated as non-existent. This is what is explained in the following:

Verse 322

In fact there is no perception of a substance, which should be perceptible [by itself] as something that permeates the successive states. Therefore, like a sky-lotus it does not exist.

Commentary

This shows that it is not true that “a self in the aspect of substance permeating the successive states is apprehended by perception itself.” For in fact no substance such as a self is perceived to appear in that comprehensive form in any such [separate] cognition, as is admitted [by both of us] to be perception.

Comments

Śāntarakṣita’s objection is that (i) if a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states exists, a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states is perceived by itself when the conditions of its separate perception are present; (ii) a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states is not perceived by itself when the conditions of its separate
perception are present; (iii) so a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states does not exist; (iv) if a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states does not exist, a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states is like a sky-lotus, which does not exist; (v) so a self in the aspect of substance permeating its successive states is like a sky-lotus, which does not exist. We have added “by itself” to the translation of the verse and to our reconstruction of it because its use in the verse is implied by Kamalaśīla’s introductory commentary, when he says that “it is not perceived separately.”

Śaṇṭaraksīta is denying the truth of the thesis that a self in the aspect of substance is “distinctly perceived,” which is how Kamalaśīla expresses what he takes to be the Jain thesis in his commentary on Verse 311. The accounts Jains present of how a self is known to exist, however, are much more complicated; we may convey them generally by saying that a self is known to exist by reflection on the functions performed by a self. It seems that not all Jains claim that there is a perception of a self of the sort Śaṇṭaraksīta would count as a separate perception of a self.

Translation

Commentary

“If it is true that if there is no substance such as a self apart from the successive states, how do the distinctions of number and so on come about?” The answer is provided in the following:

Verse 323

In fact, things are capable of a variety of productive actions. They are causes of the ideas of similarity and the like. They are amenable to conventional verbal expressions connoting such things.

Commentary

The productive actions of successive states such as color and the like are of different kinds, distinguished as similar and dissimilar. Similar productive actions are the holding of

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25 In “the distinctions of number and so on,” the “and so on” includes place, time, nature, name, function, and nature, since these are the distinctions cited in Verse 313.
water and so on and dissimilar productive actions are the
coloring of cloth, the bringing about of visual perception,
and so on. Of these actions there can be successive states.\textsuperscript{26}
With respect to similar action, all the successive states are
used simultaneously [to produce an effect]. So in order to
indicate their common causal efficacy, even though there is
no common identical substance that permeates them, and
even though they are different from each other, they are said
to be one in number by means of [the use of] the single term
"jar." When there is the intention to refer to the dissimilar
specific actions of each of the successive states, words
expressive of the plural number are used to refer to them. It
is in this way that the difference in number and difference in
action [or purpose] is explained.

"How then is there difference of properties?"

[In Verse 323] the "causes of the ideas ...." [are], for
instance, things such as jars that become causes of the ideas
of similarity when under all conditions of baked, unbaked,
and the like they are conceived as jars and only as jars. They
are apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions. Even
though they are destroyed every moment, they are produced
at each succeeding moment as particular things of similar
shape. But when they become produced in the different
colors of dark, red, and the like, they become causes of the
ideas of dissimilarity. Thus, even in the absence of any
simple comprehensive entity permeating them, the things
become the causes of the ideas of similarity and
dissimilarity. And thereby they come to be regarded as
comprehensive and exclusive in character. And thus the
diversity of character becomes established.\textsuperscript{27}

The expression, "and the like" [in Verse 323] is meant to
include notions of dissimilarity.

"To what then is the difference in name due?"

[In Verse 323] "things amenable" are things like color,
which are capable of different productive actions and are
causes of the ideas of similarity and dissimilarity. Such
things form the object to which such conventional verbal

\textsuperscript{26} We omit here a sentence about the analysis of a Sanskrit compound.

\textsuperscript{27} We have omitted a sentence here that makes reference to the Sanskrit of the
verse.
expressions as “jar” and “color,” and the like refer, and said things are amenable to such verbal expressions.

Comments

The Jains contended in Verses 313–315 that a self in the aspect of substance and a self in the aspect of successive states are one with reference to place, time, and nature, but are different with respect to name, function, number, and nature. In Verse 323 Śāntarakṣita argues, without calling upon the idea of a lasting entity, that things are by convention said to be one and to be different because they causally produce the ideas of similarity and dissimilarity.

The argument of Verse 323 and its commentary may be divided into three parts. The first part is that (i) things are capable of similar and dissimilar productive actions; (ii) if things are capable of similar productive actions, things producing similar effects have common causal efficacy; (iii) if things producing similar effects have common causal efficacy, they provide the basis for using a single term to indicate that they have the same function and that they are one in number; (iv) so things producing similar effects provide the basis for using a single term to indicate that they have the same function and that they are one in number; (v) if things are capable of dissimilar productive actions, things producing dissimilar effects are said to be different in number and different in function; (vi) so things producing dissimilar effects are said to be different in number and different in function. The second part of the argument is that (vii) things that are apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions are capable of similar and dissimilar productive actions; (viii) if things that are apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions are capable of similar and dissimilar productive actions, things are regarded as inclusive in character when they produce similar effects and things are regarded as exclusive in character when they produce dissimilar effects; (ix) so things are regarded as inclusive in character when they produce similar effects and things are regarded as exclusive in character when they produce dissimilar effects. The third part of the argument is that (x) if things are capable of similar and dissimilar productive actions, things are amenable to conventional verbal expressions connoting similarity and dissimilarity; (xi) so things are amenable to conventional verbal expressions connoting similarity and dissimilarity.
Translation

Commentary

So what is proved by perception is that things are without a self. This is what, by way of recapitulation, is pointed out in the following:

Verse 324

In fact, only successive states characterized by appearance and disappearance are apprehended. So pure selflessness becomes clearly established.

Commentary

“Successive states” are things such as color and the like and pain and the like as felt in their own nature. [To say that it is] “only” [the successive states that are apprehended]” means [that they are apprehended] without any one substance not different from them [being apprehended]. [No substance not different from them is apprehended] because for a permanent entity any productive action, either simultaneous or consecutive, is incompatible [and only things capable of productive action are apprehended]. In fact, productive action in the case of things is possible only when they can appear and disappear. Thus, also through inference it becomes established that those things that are capable of productive action are selfless, this being indicated by their mere existence.

Comments

When Kamalaśīla introduces Verse 324 by saying that “what is proved by perception is that things are without a self,” what he seems to mean is that it is proved by perception that nothing is a permanent self or anything possessed by a permanent self, since in his commentary after the verse, he says that “only” is used because a permanent entity cannot engage in productive action. If this is correct, the meaning of “pure selflessness” in Verse 324 is the absence of the existence of a permanent self and of anything possessed by a permanent self. Then when it is said in Verse 324 that “only successive states characterized by appearance and disappearance are apprehended,” the meaning, according to Kamalaśīla, is that when we look among the phenomena in dependence upon which we conceive a self, only successive states characterized by appearance and disappearance are found, not any permanent substance the Jains claim is not different from them.
Hence, a permanent self does not exist. That to which reference is made in the Verse 324 as appearing and disappearing successive states Śāntarakṣita assumes to be the momentary phenomena in dependence upon which a self is conceived.

Śāntarakṣita believes that when we look for a self among the phenomena in dependence upon which a self is conceived, what is found is a subtle causal continuum of momentary mental consciousnesses. He also believes that this self is conventionally real and that the full realization that this conventionally real is not substantially real is what frees us from suffering in cyclic existence.

Kamalaśīla’s commentary adds the now familiar argument for that thesis that things capable of productive actions are selfless in the sense of not being permanent selves or things possessed by permanent selves.

Translation

Commentary

The author anticipates the following objection an opponent might present against what the Buddhist has said in Verse 322:

Verse 325

It might be claimed that what exists [as a self] is a mixed aspect of substance and successive states, since it is held to be dual in aspect, but partless like Narasimha

Commentary

“Mixed” means joined together. That is why even though it exists, the aspect of substance is not perceived. The next sentence explains the reason for its being mixed in character: “Since it is held to be . . .” means that because the self and other such things are dual in aspect, they are thought to be partless, like Narasimha. And since a self is partless, it therefore exists in the joint dual aspect, and so is not perceived separately.

Comments

In Verse 325 the Jains are represented as explaining why a self in the aspect of substance is not perceived apart from a self in the aspect of successive states being perceived. The explanation is
meant to be a reply to the objection in Verse 322, which was that a self in the aspect of substance does not exist because it is not perceived apart from a self in the aspect of successive states being perceived. According to the Jains a self is dual in aspect, but not composed of two distinct objects, which is, according to Śāntarakṣīta, the aspect they believe Narasimha, the man-lion avatar of Viṣṇu, to have. The idea is that Viṣṇu in the aspect of a human cannot be perceived without Viṣṇu in the aspect of a lion being perceived, since the perception of the one without the perception of the other is not a perception of Viṣṇu. Similarly, a self in the aspect of substance cannot be perceived without a self in the aspect of successive states being perceived, since the perception of the one without the perception of the other is not a perception of a self.

Translation

Commentary

That this assertion involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following:

Verse 326

The assertion that a certain thing has a dual aspect can be based on the existence of several things, since the term “aspect” means “nature.”

Commentary

It is a contradiction in terms to assert of a thing that is partless that it has a dual aspect. For such an assertion can only be based upon the existence of several things. When a thing is said to have a dual aspect what is meant is that it has two aspects or two natures. One and the same thing cannot have two natures. For that would deprive it of its unity. What you have proved is only that there are two aspects or characters, not that there is a single entity with two aspects, for the simple reason that the character of being one and the character of being many are mutually contradictory and preclude one another.

With respect to Narasimha, he is only one and is not regarded as of dual aspect. This is pointed out in the following:
Verse 327

Narasiṃha also cannot be one and have a dual nature, since he is perceived as such because he is an aggregate of many atoms.

Commentary

What is meant by “also” is that it is not only the thing under dispute that cannot have a dual aspect. Narasiṃha is “he” [who is perceived] “as such” through the different character of the parts of his body, and also through his occupying a larger space. Otherwise he would not appear as he does. If even a small part of his body—of the size of the fly’s leg—were concealed, he would be hidden to that extent.

This same argument also sets aside the fact of his having the color of an emerald.

All this we are going to explain in detail in the chapter on the refutation of [the existence of] a composite whole.

Comments

In Verses 326 and 327 Śāntarakṣita objects to the reply he attributed to the Jains in Verse 325. He first objects in Verse 326 that a partless object does not have a dual aspect, since what is said to have a dual aspect must be two in number. In Verse 327 he objects that Narasiṃha is not a partless object that has a dual aspect, since Narasiṃha is an aggregation of many atoms and is perceived as such. In his commentary on Verse 327 Kamalaśīla argues that Narasiṃha seems to be one entity with a dual aspect because two parts of his body have different characters, one part the character of a lion and the other the character of a human being. He adds that Narasiṃha is revealed not be of dual aspect because his lion and human part together occupy a larger space than just one of these parts does.

Final Comment

What our comments on Śāntarakṣita’s examination of the Jains’ theory of a self have at best shown, we believe, is that their theory is inconsistent with his Buddhist philosophical doctrines, not that he has conclusively refuted their theory, since the Jains reject these doctrines. It is clear to us, as well, that the Jains can both show that Śāntarakṣita’s objections to their theory are
inconsistent with Jain philosophical doctrines and that Śāntarakṣita’s own theory of a self is inconsistent with the Jains’ own philosophical doctrines. Hence, we conclude that the Jains can no more conclusively refute Śāntarakṣita’s theory of a self or his objections to their theory than he can conclusively refute their theory or their objections to his.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


