***Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation: Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism[[1]](#footnote-1)***

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**Abstract**

This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic-vice-rehabilitation. Like Cassam[[2]](#footnote-2), we remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike the aforementioned, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, we argue instead that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via exemplarist animated community of enquiry zetetic principles and defeasible-reasons-regulated deliberative processes.[[3]](#footnote-3)­­­ Our vice-reduction method is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (i) positive exemplarism on epistemic virtue (saints), (ii) negative exemplarism on epistemic vice (sinners), (iii) direct instruction/teaching, and (iv) cognitive apprenticeship. We argue this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non-ideal interpersonally-calibrated zetetic features[[4]](#footnote-4) integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents’ epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam’s obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism.

**Keywords: *Epistemic vice*, *rehabilitation*, *exemplarism*, *obstructivism, virtue & vice epistemology***.

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**1. Introductory Remarks**

Flawless epistemic agents are difficult to find. Let’s face it: ‘the spirit is willing but the flesh may be weak’. Arête in intellectual endeavors, while theoretically possible, has so many success conditions attached, it invariably ends up being the exception rather than the norm. Most of us have one or more vices[[5]](#footnote-5). It might be that we are constantly jealous of others’ success and find ourselves rooting for their failure or that we believe ourselves to be morally or intellectually superior by way of an inflated opinion of ourselves.[[6]](#footnote-6) Some of us are quite stubborn and reluctant to admit being wrong, even when faced with compelling counter-evidence.[[7]](#footnote-7) These are but a few examples of behaviors stemming from vices which we might have acquired and developed over the years. Enumerating typologies of vices, while useful, however, fails to address the central question: are we doomed to behave in a vicious manner for the rest of our lives, or is there hope for rehabilitation? In this paper, we focus on vices of the intellect, argue that vice rehabilitation is possible and propose a four-pronged educational approach we dub, ‘**Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism’**, specifically tailored to the alleviation and removal of epistemic vices [[8]](#footnote-8),[[9]](#footnote-9).

Quassim Cassam has recently developed a novel viewpoint on the nature of intellectual vice.[[10]](#footnote-10) For him, intellectual vices are traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking that “systematically obstruct the acquisition, transmission, and retention of knowledge.”[[11]](#footnote-11) In other words, for Cassam, intellectual vices have one distinctive characteristic that distinguish them from other kind of vices (such as civic and moral): they bring about negative epistemic consequences. This is a consequentialist approach (Cassam calls his theory obstructivism) to the concept of epistemic vice–viz., it characterizes epistemic vices in terms of their negative consequences for responsible and effective epistemic inquiry. For example, according to Cassam, the character trait of closed-mindedness is an epistemic vice because it systematically gets in the way of success in epistemic endeavors. The agent who possesses this trait is unwilling or unable “to engage [seriously] with relevant intellectual options,”[[12]](#footnote-12) and is thus liable to miss opportunities to acquire epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge.

Most importantly, for the purposes of this paper, Cassam maintains that, self-improvement in respect to epistemic vice is possible “as long as we know we have them, are motivated to tackle them, and are willing and able to make the necessary efforts of self-control.”[[13]](#footnote-13) He believes that there are some epistemic vices which are resistant to self-improvement strategies but contends that, in most cases, such vices can be bypassed or outsmarted.[[14]](#footnote-14) Despite his cautious optimism about the possibility of self-improvement, there has not yet been much targeted discussion in the literature regarding how we can go about alleviating epistemic vice.[[15]](#footnote-15) To remedy this, this paper proposes a *Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism Approach* (SSZE), aimed at the rehabilitation of epistemic vice. This method employs the principles of moral exemplarism[[16]](#footnote-16) and seeks to foreground the pedagogical value of exemplars to teach learners the value of epistemic virtues. What is new here, and as of yet to be discussed in the literature, is that the proposed method also employs *negative exemplars,* whose actions, and at times, corrupted ways of thinking, underscore the deleterious consequences of epistemic vices in real-world settings. In so doing, the emphasis is not exclusively on perfect epistemic agents (Saints) engaging in flawless inquiry, as is so often the case in virtue epistemology. On the contrary, we propose a community of enquiry regulated rehabilitative analysis of epistemic errors deriving from imperfect cognizers in non-ideal settings failing to live up to the norms governing responsible and effective inquiry. The proposed exemplarist method employs a cognitive apprenticeship approach within a community of enquiry setting, using direct instruction/teaching to demonstrate the nature and consequences of epistemic virtue and vice. Direct instruction/teaching[[17]](#footnote-17) allows us to be transparent about the targeted rehabilitation efforts focused on equipping students with the necessary cognitive tools to effectively combat epistemic vice and provides an additional motivation for vice rehabilitation.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Notably, the proposed educational method incorporates elements of social epistemology to enrich the study and amelioration of epistemic vice. Part of our aim is to question Cassam’s omission to determine and unpack the social influences on vice acquisition and rehabilitation.[[19]](#footnote-19) Throughout this paper, we maintain that epistemic vice cannot be studied outside the social contexts in which it is found – viz., vice acquisition and manifestation are contextualized social processes (or at least processes that cannot be meaningfully studied outside of the environment in which they take place). In addition, we maintain that ameliorating epistemic vice is not just a matter of the individual agent *looking inwards* (epistemic agent in isolation) but can also be (and in most cases, all-things-considered) brought about by *looking outwards* (epistemic agents using exemplars to emulate and/or regulate their epistemic practices). For this reason, a triangulated approach (looking *outwards and inwards* to regulate epistemic affairs) is optimal. To this end, contra Cassam, who puts the burden of minimizing and mitigating epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual,[[20]](#footnote-20) we believe that ameliorating and rehabilitating epistemic vice primarily constitutes a social process/endeavor, one best achieved through an exemplarist cognitive apprenticeship approach rooted in a community of enquiry setting.

In the following section we provide an overview of Cassam’s consequentialist viewpoint on vice. Despite its merits, we argue that one important limitation of the theory is that it seems to downplay the importance of environmental factors impacting vice acquisition and manifestation.[[21]](#footnote-21) This has important implications for the theory itself but also for educational approaches that seek to build on Cassam’s understanding of epistemic vice. In the third section, we proceed to propose our pedagogical vice-reduction method which is made up of four distinct but complementary components: (i) positive exemplarism on epistemic virtue, (ii) negative exemplarism on epistemic vice (iii) direct teaching and (iv) cognitive apprenticeship approaches rooted in the diagnosis and amelioration of epistemic virtue and vice. We highlight that the proposed educational approach to virtue rehabilitation takes into account the social aspects of knowledge acquisition as well as the societal influences on the development of agents’ epistemic character. It bridges scholarship on vice epistemology (Cassam’s obstructivist theory), social epistemology (significance of interpersonally-attuned paths to virtue rehabilitation), virtue epistemology and moral exemplarism (with a focus on the theory’s applications to education).

**II. Obstructivism and Self-Improvement**

Virtue responsibilism is one of main approaches to the study of intellectual virtues. Scholars working within vice responsibilism argue that intellectual virtues are *epistemically valuable traits of character* (such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage) that an agent comes to acquire through practice and experience.[[22]](#footnote-22),[[23]](#footnote-23),[[24]](#footnote-24) Such scholars maintain that agents are responsible for possessing these character-based virtues (hence the term r*esponsibilism*) given that one is not born possessing such traits, but one comes to acquire them through time. What is at the heart of character-based virtues, rendering them epistemically valuable traits to possess, is the agent’s strong desire to acquire epistemic goods (such as truth and knowledge). According to virtue responsibilists, one cannot possibly come to possess intellectual virtues if they are not ultimately driven to act from strong epistemic motives – i.e. from their desire to acquire epistemic goods.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Given the emphasis on good epistemic motivations, it followed somewhat naturally that virtue responsibilists, up until recently, agreed that (given that they can be seen as opposite to intellectual virtues) epistemic vices ought to be characterized in terms of bad epistemic motivations. The agent who possesses intellectual vice (such as closed-mindedness and intellectually cowardliness) is motivated to act by their explicit dislike of epistemic goods,[[26]](#footnote-26),[[27]](#footnote-27) or, at least, is characterized by their indifference for the acquisition of such goods.[[28]](#footnote-28),[[29]](#footnote-29) However, this understanding of intellectual vices as the oppositive of intellectual virtues was recently challenged by scholars such as Cassam[[30]](#footnote-30) and Crerar[[31]](#footnote-31) who formulate examples of agents possessing intellectual vices despite having a strong desire to acquire epistemic goods. Cassam’s own example is that of a gullible conspiracy theorist who possesses the vice of gullibility even though they are highly interested in acquiring truth and knowledge and are motivated to act by their epistemic desires.[[32]](#footnote-32)

Having challenged the view that intellectual vices ought to be understood as necessarily stemming from bad epistemic motivations, Cassam proceeds to develop a consequentialist approach to intellectual vice. As we have seen, on his view, intellectual vices are traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the acquisition, transmission, and retention of knowledge.[[33]](#footnote-33) For example, intellectual cowardliness is an intellectual vice because the agent who possesses this trait declines to act on opportunities to defend views that may be credible and openly refute or rationally oppose views that are untrue. Missing such opportunities has negative consequences for epistemic inquiry and distances one from epistemic goods. It is important to note that Cassam does not restrict his definition of intellectual vices to traits of character but expands his understanding of intellectual virtue to include attitudes and ways of thinking.[[34]](#footnote-34) An agent, for example, may adopt an epistemic cowardly attitude under certain circumstances (e.g. when talking to a strong-minded friend) or succumb to biased ways of thinking when they find themselves in a specific environment (e.g. when talking to a specific person who they dislike). Most importantly, however, such epistemically negative epistemic attitudes and ways of thinking differ from traits of character in that they are context-specific and do not essentialize or reductively characterize the agent.

As already noted in the introduction, Cassam believes that self-improvement in respect to intellectual vice is possible as long as we know we have them and are motivated to do something about them.[[35]](#footnote-35) The practical challenge, however, as Cassam notes it, is to identify strategies to improving one’s traits, attitudes and ways of thinking.[[36]](#footnote-36) In what follows, we proceed to identify and develop a strategy for vice rehabilitation. Notably, contra-Cassam,[[37]](#footnote-37) we do not place the burden of epistemic improvement solely (or mainly) on the individual but instead seek to develop an interpersonally-attuned path to vice amelioration that relies on shared resources (i.e. exemplars and cognitive apprenticeship) for developing students’ epistemic motivations and equipping them with the cognitive dispositions and abilities needed to overcome epistemic vice.

**ΙΙΙ. Vice Rehabilitation: Exemplarism & Direct Teaching**

In this section, we proceed to present and discuss our proposed exemplarist approach to vice rehabilitation. The approach has four distinct but closely interconnected components: i) positive exemplarism on epistemic virtue, (ii) negative exemplarism on epistemic vice (iii) direct teaching and (iv) cognitive apprenticeship. We discuss each component in turn and argue that all four are optimal for the approach to be successful. It should be noted that though the proposed approach is formulated in such a manner so as to be applied in formal educational settings, it would only require a few minor adjustments for it to be applicable in informal education settings too (since its core principles would remain the same). In addition, though the proposed account is based on an obstructivist understanding of epistemic vice, it does not require that one subscribes to the theory of obstructivism to employ our approach successfully. One could agree with the motivationalism viewpoint on vice and still find merit in the proposed approach. In other words, whether we characterize epistemic vices in terms of their consequences or understand them in terms of agents’ motivations, neither impact the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed approach. Also, as promised, our account takes into consideration the social elements that impact, and to a large extent, determine vice acquisition, manifestation, and rehabilitation. Throughout the account that follows we maintain that social influences play a crucial role in virtue education.

Lastly, our account is person-centered and context specific, taking certain limitations as not necessarily fixed in stone but rather hard to shift or overcome. Teachers of vice rehabilitation need to be mindful of the various constraints that different students’ experience, notably, limited cognitive processing power, entrenched attitudes, insouciance, corrupted epistemic environments and so forth, and carefully tailor the approach to the needs and capabilities of each student. We believe that a one-size-fits-all approach to vice rehabilitation is bound to fail. Let’s look at this claim more closely. Suppose Mary and John are both suffering from lower back pain. They go to the physiotherapist, who, (following a one-size-fits-all approach), prescribes them both two hours of physiotherapy per day. Being a professional athlete, Mary is more than happy to dedicate two hours a day, and her body responds well to the intensive programme prescribed to her since she is fit and supple. On the other hand, John, who is, let’s just say, not an elite athlete, does not have the time nor endurance to undergo two hours of physiotherapy a day. Therefore, the two-hour rehabilitation programme is clearly not fit for purpose. We believe the same to be the case for vice rehabilitation. Different people have different needs, capacities, capabilities, goals, desires, attitudes and assorted factive constraints, and these need to be taken into account for our proposed pedagogical approach to work.

*A) Positive Exemplarism*

Exemplarist approaches to education are not new. Moral exemplarism dates all the way back to ancient Greece and the philosophically-grounded educational arguments of Plato and Aristotle.[[38]](#footnote-38),[[39]](#footnote-39),[[40]](#footnote-40) For instance, exemplarism was one of the key features of the Platonic educational system. Plato believed that young children are easily influenced by their role models and quick to imitate their actions and behaviors despite the fact that some of these role models are not actually virtuous.[[41]](#footnote-41) Because of this, Plato figured that by controlling the stories that children would hear, and hence the heroes that they would admire and imitate, he would be leading them towards acquiring and developing virtues such as courage and temperance,[[42]](#footnote-42) and protect them from developing vice such as cowardliness,[[43]](#footnote-43) and disobedience.[[44]](#footnote-44) In a similar vein, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle proposes an exemplarist approach to virtue acquisition and development. In his most famous passage about virtue acquisition, he notes that that one becomes virtuous in the same way that one becomes a builder or a lyre-player: by imitating and emulating the acts of role-models.[[45]](#footnote-45)

Today, exemplarist theories in ethics and education are attracting the attention of scholars. This is partly due to the recent revival of virtue ethics,[[46]](#footnote-46),[[47]](#footnote-47),[[48]](#footnote-48) and the fact that exemplarism has been used to defend virtue ethics[[49]](#footnote-49) from the charge that it does not provide sufficient action guiding criteria.[[50]](#footnote-50) Linda Zagzebski’s recent work has also greatly influenced this renewed interest in moral exemplarism. Zagzebski has developed moral exemplarism from a supplementary feature of virtue ethics into a standalone distinct moral theory based on moral exemplars.[[51]](#footnote-51),[[52]](#footnote-52) Following these developments in ethics, the field of education has not remained unaffected. Scholars have written extensively on moral exemplarism and its value for moral education.[[53]](#footnote-53),[[54]](#footnote-54),[[55]](#footnote-55),[[56]](#footnote-56),[[57]](#footnote-57) Seeking to contribute to this growing literature on moral exemplarism, we propose here that exemplarism can be of great value not only for the acquisition and development of moral and intellectual virtues, but also for the rehabilitation of intellectual vices. As far as we are aware, we are the first to propose and develop such an approach.

Despite minor variations between different versions of moral exemplarism in education, the core principle remains the same: role-modelling has a positive impact on the formulation and development of a person’s character. This substantiates the view that character traits and dispositions are influenced by interpersonal relationships and environmental epistemic factors. Virtues and vices are not acquired and developed in vacuo. Should we have positive role models in our life, chances are that we are going to admire and imitate some of their virtuous behaviors and ‘inherit’ (catch) by osmosis or otherwise, some of their good characteristics. However, this works the other way too: if we are surrounded by non-virtuous agents, chances are that we are going to imitate non-virtuous behaviors and develop non-virtuous traits. Crucial here is the point that both virtuous and non-virtuous agents along with their respective behaviors present learning opportunities, some of which remain untapped in educational settings. Consider, for example, a child who grows up in an environment in which people value and exhibit closed-mindedness – in the sense that – they are not open to the viewpoints of outsiders and reluctant to entertain or test the cogency of new ideas. Growing up in such a social environment, there is a strong likelihood that the child in question will grow up to engage in closed-minded thinking more frequently than had they not been raised in these circumstances. Such individuals systematically think in ways that are insular, blinkered, inflexible, irrationally defensive, epistemically entrenched, and generally, unreceptive to evidence that “contravenes or threatens their views, irrespective of the objective merits of such.”[[58]](#footnote-58)

But are those who, for whatever reason, acquire and develop intellectual vice doomed to live with such vicious traits forever? Cassam is optimistic about the possibility of vice rehabilitation, and so too are we.[[59]](#footnote-59) We believe that positive exemplarism is an important element in bringing about this change to agents’ character traits. To illustrate how positive exemplarism can contribute to vice rehabilitation, consider the following case: Mary possesses the intellectual vice of irresoluteness. She abandons her intellectual projects whenever she is faced with even the smallest and most insignificant obstacle. According to obstructivism, this is a character vice that obstructs Mary from acquiring, retaining, and transmitting epistemic goods such as knowledge and truth. She readily abandons intellectual projects even when such projects could lead her to acquire intellectual ends. However, given the right social environment, Mary will come to admire and slowly start imitating the behavior of virtuous agents. This can lead her to eliminate some of her vices. For instance, imagine that Mary listens in class to Helen Taussig’s story and how Taussig exhibited remarkable intellectual perseverance and epistemic fortitude in her efforts to cure *blue babies’* potentially fatal heart defects.[[60]](#footnote-60) Among other obstacles, Taussig was not allowed to attend the medical schools of certain Universities due to being a woman (but did get an MD from John Hopkins University), worked in an unexplored field at the time and had to collect data from scratch, was starting to lose her hearing (could not hear patients’ heartbeats), and faced strong resistance from her male colleagues, many of whom publicly ridiculed her clinical determinations.[[61]](#footnote-61) These obstacles, however, did not deter her from curing heart defects and associated premature mortality in *blue babies*. Her unwavering passion and commitment to scientific principles and belief revision based on best evidence at time *t*, not just reputation or tired tradition, continue to offer hope for hundreds of thousands of infants. She persevered and did not abandon her project, even in the face of what appeared to be insurmountable obstacles. For Zagzebski,[[62]](#footnote-62) virtuous agents are highly admirable and because of this, “most deserving of emulation.”[[63]](#footnote-63) Having this influence from role models, such as Helen Taussig, whose stories are presented and discussed in the classroom, Mary will unconsciously start to move away from the vice of intellectual irresoluteness. She will slowly come to acquire the intellectual perseverance needed to overcome obstacles in her intellectual endeavors.

The above example shows how an admirable role-model can help us eliminate some of our vices and demonstrate how positive role-modelling on epistemic virtues can find pedagogically worthwhile applications in formal education settings. Notably, this exemplarist approach does not have to be a standalone course/module but can be incorporated as part of existing courses (e.g. science education, philosophy, liberal Arts, teacher education). This makes it more easily applied in current classrooms. Also, note that it is not the teachers who have to be the moral exemplars. Through fictional[[64]](#footnote-64) or real stories, children will be exposed to positive role-models that will help them alleviate some of their vices, while at the same time help them cultivate some good epistemic traits. This is the first key feature of our proposed exemplarist approach to vice rehabilitation.

*B) Negative Exemplarism*

We may be optimistic about the possibility of vice rehabilitation, but still maintain that the rehabilitation of intellectual vice is not an easy task (and in some cases not even feasible), given the fact that some of these epistemic vices may be deeply entrenched. Thus, we believe that for the approach to be as successful as possible, positive exemplarism on epistemic virtue must be accompanied by negative exemplarism on epistemic vice. It is not enough that learners come to be exposed to positive role-models – they must also come to experience negative emotions (e.g. frustration and aversion) towards epistemic vice and behaviors/consequences stemming from such traits[[65]](#footnote-65).

Most exemplarism approaches to education focus on positive exemplarism[[66]](#footnote-66) and tend to omit or discuss the value of negative exemplarism. What we mean by ‘negative exemplarism’ is an educational approach/intervention through which students come to learn from a forensic analysis of systematic intellectual errors perpetrated by negative role-models (i.e. agents who possess certain epistemic vices). Following Plato’s ideas,[[67]](#footnote-67) we believe that the best way to apply this negative exemplarism approach to education is again through real-world narratives and experiences. The ultimate goal of such pedagogical interventions is to educate students about the negative nature and consequences of epistemic vice. Consider the case of John who possesses the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness. Through listening to the stories of positive role models, John may come to behave in a more open-minded[[68]](#footnote-68) manner. Still, the vice of closed-mindedness may be so marooned in his character that positive exemplarism may prove insufficient to uproot it. Thus, in order to employ all educational tools at our disposal, positive exemplarism should be accompanied by negative exemplarism. For instance, while in school, John should not only be exposed to stories about open-minded agents but also to real-world narratives about closed-minded ones. And so, for example, when discussing Helen Taussig’s story in class, the focus should not only be on the open-mindedness of Dr Alfred Blalock who took Taussig’s idea seriously, but also the many doctors before Blalock who, due to their closed-mindedness, routinely dismissed an idea that would end up saving hundreds of thousands of lives.[[69]](#footnote-69) Similarly, students should also be exposed to the stories of negative exemplars such as Professor Sir Roy Meadow whose testimony wrongly convicted a woman of murdering her two sons because he was too closed-minded to entertain the possibility that he might be mistaken about his statistical inferences related to the likelihood of multiple cot deaths occurring in the same family[[70]](#footnote-70) and the stories of the closed-mindedness of “senior figures in Israel’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (AMAN) to take indications of an impending attack at face value” that almost cost Israel the Yom Kippur war.[[71]](#footnote-71)

The above links to Zagzebski’s exemplarism moral theory and her arguments for the value of the emotions in education.[[72]](#footnote-72) Zagzebski links positive moral exemplarism to the feeling of admiration: the individual is feeling a certain admiration for their role model, and it is this emotion of admiration that motivates her to act in accordance with her role model. In a similar vein, but with an opposite direction, negative exemplarism relies on emotions such as frustration and aversion. Through negative exemplarism, individuals come to experience negative feelings in response to intellectual vices and behaviors stemming from such traits. One of the advantages of negative exemplarism is accessibility, viz., negative exemplars are more accessible to students than perfect exemplars are. It is easier to compare oneself to an imperfect cognizer and to consider how this *person from the street* could have done things better than to compare oneself to a perfect person and continuously try to find ways to emulate them. Although of great pedagogical value, we argue that the latter approach can put students off if it is not accompanied by the former (which reminds them that not everyone is perfect, and that making mistakes is a learning opportunity).

*C) Direct Teaching*

Although relying on moral exemplarism is key to vice rehabilitation, it would be an omission not to discuss the role of direct teaching in intellectual character education and include it as part of our proposed approach. We believe that our exemplarist approach needs elements of direct teaching/instruction for it to be more successful and complete. Through direct teaching students will come to acquire a theoretical understanding of virtue and vice and be taught on the rationale, language, and tools they need to develop good character traits.[[73]](#footnote-73)

According to the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, good habits and dispositions are not only caught; they are also taught. In other words, habituation is not the only method for virtue acquisition and development – one can be taught the value of good character traits. We believe that direct teaching is of significant import to vice rehabilitation. It is of course possible that one might rehabilitate their vices through habit/practice alone but given that vices are often quite entrenched, we cannot afford not to employ all educational tools at our disposal. Direct teaching gives to the students the opportunity to acquire proper real-world understandings of key concepts such as virtue and vice.[[74]](#footnote-74),[[75]](#footnote-75),[[76]](#footnote-76) By understanding the nature and value (or lack of value) of such concepts, students will acquire an extra motivation to act in accordance with virtue and at the same time rehabilitate vice. Further benefits of a direct teaching approach are that it aligns with a strong evidential base, vis-à-vis, optimal modern pedagogy and practice.[[77]](#footnote-77),[[78]](#footnote-78),[[79]](#footnote-79)

To better illustrate this, consider the following example: John is a closed-minded individual. He is unwilling or reluctant to entertain the possibility that he might be wrong about something and rationally discuss beliefs that directly oppose his own. Through positive exemplarism, John will be exposed to role models that display open-mindedness and by admiring these role models, he will come to imitate their behavior. What’s more, through negative exemplarism, John will be exposed to role models that exhibit closed-mindedness, and he will come to feel certain negative feelings for such behaviors. Now, to consolidate this new acquired tendency to be open-minded, John should receive direct teaching on the nature of the virtue of open-mindedness and the vice of closed-mindedness. Through this direct teaching, John will come to understand what the virtue of open-mindedness entails and why it is valuable trait to possess. He will also come to understand why closed-mindedness is a vice and the implications of possessing it. This new-found understanding of civil open-mindedness, in the basic sense of listening to “others with knowledge of the possibility that they are right and we are wrong,”[[80]](#footnote-80) will embolden John with a sense of extra motivation to act in accordance with it. He will have a conscious and explicit understanding of open-mindedness, its value, and what this virtue entails. He will further have a conscious and explicit understanding of closed-mindedness, its costs, and what this vice entails. In other words, while the exemplarism approach motivates through emotions, the direct teaching approach motivates through knowledge and understanding. Having developed a motivation that has both emotional and rational origins our efforts for vice rehabilitation have a much more realistic chance of being successful.

Motivation is not the only benefit of direct teaching. Direct teaching enables students to understand concepts such as virtue and vice and to come to appreciate the aims of virtue education. Without this direct teaching, students would be in the uninformed, not knowing exactly what it is that they are being taught, and moreover, what the aims/goals of the virtue education are. This could jeopardize the exemplarist approach and its educational goals. It would be an approach that lacks transparency. It could even be accused of indoctrinating students because it would aim to help them develop good character traits but would be doing so without them being aware of this (and hence without them directly or indirectly consenting to it)[[81]](#footnote-81).

*D) Cognitive Apprenticeship*

So, how might cognitive apprenticeship be used to teach students to diagnose, mitigate or overcome epistemic vices that corrupt their attitudes, thinking and, reasoning? As we know, traditional apprenticeship focuses on specific methods imperative to the successful completion of set tasks. In many respects, the focus is on techne and not on phronesis. On this basis, we need to unpack how cognitive apprenticeship differ from traditional apprenticeship models.

First, since traditional apprenticeship is typically practised in workplace surroundings, with real-time observation, coaching and practice modeled by expert technocrats, workplace demands (a narrow set of propositions) tend to dictate the nature of the interrelated subskills and conceptual schema apprentices learn and subsequently employ in pursuit of their goals. Unlike traditional apprenticeships, cognitive apprenticeships seek to draw on specific real-world tasks and problems, utilizing the value-added learning gains derived from forensic analyzes of attitudes and thinking styles exhibited by positive/negative exemplars to present students with opportunities to apply their learning to diverse settings, and crucially, to increase the complexity of the tasks slowly, so that relevant component skills are properly integrated. Second, whereas traditional apprenticeship emphasizes teaching skills strictly within the context of their use, cognitive apprenticeship seeks to generalize knowledge, skills and principles to ensure they are used in a wide range of settings. The idea here is simple: since skills are key to successfully completing meaningful real-world tasks, optimal learning requires embedding tasks in fluid, context-specific, and what’s more, contemporary, sometimes messy, social and functional contexts, unlike decontextualized propositional knowledge found in curricula, where skills and knowledge tend to be abstracted from their use in the world.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Cognitive apprenticeship approaches typically draw on a range of three interrelated teaching methods. They comprise: (i) modelling, coaching and scaffolding, (ii) articulation and reflection, and (iii) exploration.[[83]](#footnote-83) The first method seeks to equip students with transdisciplinary transferrable principles and skills through modelling, observation and expert-guided practice. Articulation and reflection aim to help students harness and develop their understanding of inquiry processes (formulating questions, hypothesizing, thinking and reasoning, conceptual mapping, stress-testing reasons, formulating alternative explanations of phenomena and scrutinizing evidential claims) through public articulation strategies that require them to clearly stipulate and explicitly unpack the assumptions, principles and processes guiding their inquiry.[[84]](#footnote-84) This equips students with a greater understanding, and by extension, conscious awareness/control of their own problem-solving strategies. The final method (exploration) targets bolstering learner autonomy, not just in carrying out expert problem-solving processes, but also in formulating ampliative or tangentially-related objections or interrelated problems to be solved.

Modeling does exactly what is says on the tin. Here an expert performs a task so that students can critically examine and build a conceptual model of the processes required to undertake it correctly or at least to accomplish the putative optimum, that is, the very best that can be achieved in the given circumstances.[[85]](#footnote-85) Coaching involves observing students while they carry out set tasks, offering suggestions and hints, posing challenges, all the while making sure to include appropriate scaffolding (supports), timely reminders, formative feedback, and appropriate modeling strategies. The overarching purpose is that staged and careful tutelage edges students’ execution of established and novel tasks closer to expert performance. In summary, coaching troubleshoots specific problems that arise for students as they attempt to accomplish a task. It broadly refers to all the different ways that coaches foster learning, whereas scaffolding captures the supports provided to the learner. This brings us to articulation. Broadly speaking, this includes any method of successfully getting students to explicitly state their assumptions, knowledge, reasoning and/or problem-solving processes in a particular domain. In a nutshell, we need students to learn, *nihil sine ratione* (“nothing is without a reason/maintain nothing without substantive reason/evidence”), and *non fortiter catena quam anulus debilissimus*, “a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.”[[86]](#footnote-86) Reflexivity, meanwhile, empowers students to constructively compare and contrast their own assumptions, taken-for-granted-views and general problem-solving skills with those of other students and a given expert/s, and in so doing, refine and enhance a continuously-updating-based-on-best-evidence, internalized cognitive model of expertise.[[87]](#footnote-87),[[88]](#footnote-88) Finally, there is exploration. This moves the educative process to a more self-directed learning space where students learn to frame questions or problems that are novel and interesting, in the sense that, they do not always conform to predetermined formulaic configurations.

Though each of these teaching principles or methods are interesting, this section focuses on the social dimensions integral to cognitive apprenticeship models and how they might better prepare students to pursue epistemic virtues and overcome or avoid epistemic vices. Though there are some notable exceptions, few scholars have paid attention to the importance of sociologies of learning.[[89]](#footnote-89),[[90]](#footnote-90),[[91]](#footnote-91) We submit that both negative and positive exemplar pedagogies aimed at mitigating or overcoming vices need to incorporate situated learning approaches, where students collaboratively solve problems and carry out inquiry-based tasks in an environment that resembles real-world situations appropriate to their age, stage and interests.

Community of enquiry/practice (CoE) refers to the creation of a learning environment in which participants actively communicate about and meaningfully engage in refining individual and collective cognitive and affective skills required for expertise. Choreography is a nice example of capturing how this practice plays out in learning scenarios. In particular it apprehends the merits of the attitudinal shift from teachers being ‘sages on stages’ to being more comfortable, not always being ‘guides on the side’, per se, but rather being open to authentic learning arising from more than a narrow pre-determined series of learning outcomes. As Behrenbruch poetically points out:

I think teachers are like choreographers. They look for interesting, provocative and important ideas to explore that excite and challenge the dancers. They plan the steps and organise the rehearsals. They recognise when a performance is finally ready – when the dancers understand the message and can communicate it fluently. But choreographers don’t exist without the dancers. Dancers bring unique talents, interests and ideas. They change and improvise the steps. They challenge the choreographers’ own understandings and skills. As they rehearse together the dance becomes different and richer than the choreographer imagined. But in the end, at that culminating performance, the choreographer stands behind the curtain in darkness, watching the dancing in the light.[[92]](#footnote-92)

In this way, CoEs are situations where the potential of ‘the dance becoming different and richer than the choreographer imagined’ is tapped in a way that affixes meaningful agency to students, capable of hypothesizing, marshalling evidence, establishing context/point of view, stress-testing reasons, engaging in plausibility analyses based on the careful weighting and amalgamation of reasons, vigilantly testing inferences and so forth, resulting in the determination of provisional and justified undefeated, *a fortiori reasons*, as part of their role and duty as responsible and effective inquirers.[[93]](#footnote-93) What pedagogues are chasing is for students to hone their capacity to “to reflectively recognize and [appropriately] respond to reasons.”[[94]](#footnote-94) First up though, they must learn via our SSZE model to seek out and appropriately evaluate reasons, framed here as, a “consideration that counts in favour of [a belief or action].”[[95]](#footnote-95) Here they must learn to distinguish two kinds of defeaters: (i) *rebutting defeaters*, which are themselves “*prima facie* reasons for believing the negation of the conclusion”, and (ii) *undercutting defeaters*, which,“provide a reason for doubting that *q* provides any support, in the actual circumstances, for *r.*”[[96]](#footnote-96) Conceptually, the benefits of communities of practice are manifold; they promote a sense of ownership and embody a spirit of personal investment and mutual dependency, twin characteristics integral to meaningful learning activities. Shared experiences governed by CoE principles are useful tools in terms of pursuing meaningful inquiry and justified belief,[[97]](#footnote-97) understanding and/or truth.[[98]](#footnote-98) They also cultivate an intrinsic motivation for learning, one in which goal-directed activities are energized, directed, and sustained.

To align with some of these key learning principles, we adopt a ‘Social Cognitive Theory’ which, broadly speaking, emphasizes the idea that much human learning and behavior occurs in social environments, and that through interacting with others, people acquire, audit and share knowledge, skills, strategies, beliefs, rules, and attitudes.[[99]](#footnote-99) By means of observations and interactions with others, individuals also learn about the appropriateness, usefulness, and consequences of specific behaviors. Bandura likewise argues that human behavior operates within a framework of triadic reciprocity involving reciprocal interactions among three sets of influences: personal (e.g., cognitions, skills, beliefs, affect); behavioral; and social/environmental factors. Given the interdependent nature of inquiry and erotetics, exploiting cooperation so that it harnesses the richness and value-added of group inquiry is a welcome and necessary step in terms of improving student epistemic conduct, self-efficacy, and responsible and effective inquiry. Here students work together in a way that fosters cooperative problem solving. Learning through cooperative problem solving is both a powerful motivator and mechanism for extending learning resources.[[100]](#footnote-100) It is also the hallmark of a liberatory education, since the process throughout is based on authentic dialogue rooted in the giving, sharing and testing of reasons. As Freire writes,

Liberatory education is fundamentally a situation where the teacher and the students both have to be learners, both have to be cognitive subjects, in spite of their being different. This for me is the first test of liberating education, for teachers and students both to be critical agents in the act of knowing.[[101]](#footnote-101)

This hivemind approach, one where expertise is not, by any means, side-lined per se, but where teacher and student seek to engage in co-inquiry and co-learning, where possible, where continuous incremental and carefully calibrated peer feedback, (both formative and summative), under the expert tutelage of the pedagogue, is carefully curated and presented in meaningful and digestible formats to improve cognitive performance, taken together as a whole, exemplifies a novel, and arguably, positive learning intervention given the interdependent and complex nature of our epistemic agency and inquiry, individual and collective, in modern times. It also makes explicit the learnings derived from, not just positive exemplars (Saints), but also from those inquirers/epistemic agents in non-ideal situations, who have made various missteps (Sinners) in terms of their duties when it comes to conducting responsible and effective inquiry.

**IV. Concluding Remarks**

One of the benefits of rehabilitating vicious traits through exemplarism is that the agent does not need to be aware of their vices for the proposed educational method to work. For instance, one does not need to be aware of the fact that they are closed-minded for them to come to admire and imitate the actions of an open-minded agent. Also, experiencing emotions such as frustration and aversion for behaviors stemming from closed-mindedness does not require one being aware of the traits they possess. This is of significant value given that some virtues are stealthy[[102]](#footnote-102),[[103]](#footnote-103)  – i.e., the agent who possesses these stealthy vices is often unaware of the fact that they possess them. This leads us to the issue of motivation. If some of the learners are unaware of the fact that they possess certain vices where would the motivation to change such vices stem from? As already discussed in the paper, this motivation would be provided by the exemplarist approach and the emotional responses of students to virtuous and vicious behaviors. This will also be combined with the internal motivations fostered by the knowledge that students will acquire through direct teaching together with the cognitive skills and interpersonally-calibrated epistemic processes they continuously refine and hone through cognitive apprenticeship approaches. The primary goal of the proposed exemplarist approach is to cultivate and consolidate in learners the motivation to develop virtue. This is the first, and most crucial step in rehabilitating vice. Having this strong motivation to move towards virtue would, at the very least, help the agent safeguard against the manifestation of intellectual vice.

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1. We are grateful to Nicholas Burbules, Ian James Kidd, and Neil Levy for their comments, criticisms, and encouragement. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Quassim Cassam, *Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. John L. Pollock, “Epistemic Norms,” *Synthese* (1987): 61–95. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In using the term ‘features’ we include both motivational and epistemic exemplarist elements (positive and negative) impacting deliberation, rational judgement, and associated success conditions of virtue and vice. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. It should be noted that vices are facilitated and consolidated by various corrupting forces operating within the agent’s social environment. See Ian James Kidd, “Epistemic Corruption and Education,” *Episteme* 16, no. 2 (2019): 220–235. The two main corruptions, according to Kidd, are (a) absence or derogation of positive exemplars, and (b) presence and valorisation of negative exemplars. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Alessandra Tanesini, *The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology* (Oxford University Press, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Heather Battaly, “Can Closed-Mindedness Be an Intellectual Virtue?,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 84 (2018): 23–45. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. We have decided to call our approach ‘Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism’ to foreground that our vice-reduction method employs both virtuous and vicious agents. One could argue that this phrase includes terminology that has certain religious connotations. However, terms such as ‘moral saints and sinners’ are widely used in the exemplarism literature (see e.g. Lawrence A. Blum, “Moral Exemplars: Reflections on Schindler, the Trocmés, and Others,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13, no. 1 [1988]: 196–221; Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Michel Croce and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, “Educating through Exemplars: Alternative Paths to Virtue,” *Theory and Research in Education* 15, no. 1 [2017]: 5–19). We therefore do not assume nor require the reader to have a religious background or uphold certain religious beliefs. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Throughout this paper, we use the terms ‘intellectual vice’ and ‘epistemic vice’ interchangeably. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Quassim Cassam, “Vice Epistemology,” *The Monist* 99, no. 2 (2016): 159–180; and *Vices of the Mind*. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Cassam*, Vices of the Mind,* 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Battaly, “Can Closed-Mindedness Be an Intellectual Virtue?,” 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind*, 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind*, 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Jason Baehr, *The Structure of Intellectual Vices in “Vice Epistemology*” (London: Routledge, 2021), and Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano, and Boudewijn de Bruin, “The Development and Validation of the Epistemic Vice Scale,” *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* (2021): 1–28. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory*. See also Croce and Vaccarezza, “Educating through Exemplars”; Bart Engelen, Alan Thomas, Alfred Archer, and Niels van de Ven, “Exemplars and Nudges: Combining Two Strategies for Moral Education,” *Journal of Moral Education* 47, no. 3 (2018): 346–65; and Michel Croce, “Exemplarism in Moral Education: Problems with Applicability and Indoctrination,” *Journal of Moral Education* 48, no. 3 (2019): 291–302. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Here we subscribe to Barak Rosenshine’s principles for effective instruction: Barak Rosenshine, “Principles of Instruction: Research-Based Strategies That All Teachers Should Know,” *American Educator* 36, no. 1 (2012): 12–19. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Rosenshine, “Principles of Instruction.” [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind*. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind*, 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See Neil Levy and Mark Alfano, “Knowledge from Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology,” *Mind* 129, no. 515 (2020): 887–915. Note that the same objection can be raised against motivational models of vice. For more on motivationalism, see section II. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See James A. Montmarquet, *Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind*. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Heather Battaly, “Testimonial Injustice, Epistemic Vice, and Vice Epistemology,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. (London: Routledge Press, 2017), 223–231. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Tanesini, “Epistemic Vice and Motivation.” [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. James A. Montmarquet, “An ‘Internalist’ Conception of Virtue,” in *Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology*, ed. Guy Axtell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2000), 135–48. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind*. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Cassam, “Vice Epistemology”, and *Vices of the Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Charlie Crerar, “Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96, no, 4 (2018): 753–66. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Cassam, “Vice Epistemology.” [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind,* 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind,* 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind,* 168, 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, “Paths to Flourishing: Ancient Models of the Exemplary Life,” *Ethics & Education* 15, no. 2 (2020): 144–57. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Alkis Kotsonis, “On the Platonic Pedagogical Methodology: An Alternative to the Aristotelian Theory of Education,” *Ethics & Education* 16, no. 4 (2021a): 464–77. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. They are also to be found in non-Western philosophies. See Ian James Kidd: “Adversity, Wisdom, and Exemplarism,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 52, no. 4 (2018a): 379–93; “Confucianism, Curiosity, and Moral Self-Cultivation,” in *The Moral Psychology of Curiosity*, ed. Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Safiye Yigit, and Dennis Whitcomb (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018b), 97–116; and “‘Following the Way of Heaven’: Exemplarism, Emulation, and Daoism,” *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 6, no. 1 (2020): 1–15. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Republic*, II, 377b. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *Republic*, II, 377c. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Republic*, II, 386c. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *Republic*, II, 390a. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” *Philosophy* 33, no. 124 (1958): 1–19. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Indiana, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See Julia Annas, “Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing,” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 78, no. 2 (2004): 61–75. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. See Robert B. Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (1984): 227–36. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Ethics,” *Metaphilosophy* 41, no. 1/2 (2010): 41–57. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Michel Croce and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, “Educating through Exemplars: Alternative Paths to Virtue,” *Theory and Research in Education* 15, no. 1 (2017): 5–19. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
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56. Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, “Paths to Flourishing: Ancient Models of the Exemplary Life,” *Ethics & Education* 15, no. 2 (2020): 144–57. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Alkis Kotsonis, “On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism: Socio-Cultural Values and Gender,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 23, no. 1 (2020): 223–35, and “Moral Exemplarism as a Powerful Indoctrinating Tool,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (2021b): <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09844-8>. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Gerry Dunne, “Epistemic Vices and Vice Epistemology,” in *International Encyclopaedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022b). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Nathan L. King, *The Excellent Mind: Intellectual Virtues for Everyday Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 153–54. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. King, *The Excellent Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory,* 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory*, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. For more on the value of literature for cultivating virtues see Richard Rorty, “Redemption from Egotism: James and Proust as Spiritual Exercises,” in *The Rorty Reader*, ed. Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 389–406, and Martha Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge: Essay on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. It is important to note that we must safeguard against the weaponization of negative emotions from evil forces: see Alkis Kotsonis, “Moral Exemplarism as a Powerful Indoctrinating Tool,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (2021b): <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09844-8>. When employing negative exemplars, one must also make sure that students are not seduced by the dark side of such cases (and this is why experiencing negative emotions is crucial). Additionally, we posit that negative relevant exemplars (NREs) are more attainable for students since few of us are perfect epistemic agents. Adopting a constructive fallibilist CoE (community of enquiry) approach draws on the pedagogically strengths of epistemic agents working individually and collectively to ameliorate vice. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. One of the notable exceptions is Mark Alfano and Emily Sullivan, “Negative Epistemic Exemplars,” in *Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives,* ed. Benjamin R. Sherman and Stacey Goguen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 17–32. Another example is Kotsonsis and Dunne, “The Harms of Unattainable Pedagogical Exemplars on Social Media,” in *Journal of Moral Education*, (Routledge, forthcoming) [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. *Republic*, II, 377c. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Here we adopt the definition whereby an “open-minded person is characteristically: a) willing and (within limits) able to; b) transcend a default cognitive standpoint; c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of, d) a distinct cognitive standpoint”, from Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind*, 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. King, *The Excellent Mind.* [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Sarah Boseley, “Cot Death Expert Faces Disciplinary Hearing,” *The Guardian*, June 20, 2005, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/jun/20/childprotection?fbclid=IwAR35hlDgKuaHCpSwbYm1jM_M9EvvWKOakkuFs6Lfkwu_ouHIGDMbzHbsFEo> [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind,* 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Zagzebski, *Exemplarist Moral Theory.* [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, *The Jubilee Centre* *Framework for Character Education in Schools* (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2017), <https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/userfiles/jubileecentre/pdf/character-education/Framework%20for%20Character%20Education.pdf>, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, *The Jubilee Centre* *Framework*. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. James Arthur, Kristján Kristjánsson, Tom Harrison, Wouter Sanderse, and Daniel Wright, *Teaching Character and Virtue in Schools* (New York: Routledge, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. See Randall Curren and Ben Kotzee, “Can Virtue Be Measured?,” *Theory and Research in Education* 12, no. 3 (2014): 266–282. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Arthur C. Graesser, Diane F. Halpern, and Milton D. Hakel, *25 Principles of Learning* (Washington, DC: Task Force on Lifelong Learning at Work and at Home, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Harold Pashler, Patrice M. Bain, Brian A. Bottge, Arthur Graesser, Kenneth Koedinger, Mark McDaniel, and Janet Metcalfe, *Organizing Instruction and Study to Improve Student Learning* (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Research, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Barak Rosenshine, “Principles of Instruction: Research-Based Strategies That All Teachers Should Know,” *American Educator* 36, no. 1 (2012): 12–19. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Stephen Carter, *Civility: Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Arguably it could equally amount to an example of epistemic paternalism since it involves: (i) intentionally and significantly interfering with someone’s free inquiry; b) without consent or consultation; c) for their epistemic good. See Gerry Dunne, “Epistemic Paternalism,” in *International Encyclopaedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022a), 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
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84. See Gerry Dunne, “Epistemic Vices and Vice Epistemology,” in *International Encyclopaedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022b). [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
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86. Rescher, *Philosophical Dialectics,* 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See Donald Schön, *The Reflective Turn: Case Studies in and on Educational Practice*. Vol. 131. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. See Stephen D. Brookfield, *Becoming a Critically Reflective Teacher* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
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96. Scanlon, *Being Realistic,* 484. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
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98. Davidson, *Truth, Language and History.* Though the aims of inquiry are (i) question-settling and ii) knowledge and understanding, we prefer the more pragmatic account whereby one’s inquiry into whether p aims at coming to justifiably believe that p/not-p [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory.” [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed,* 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Battaly, “Developing Virtue and Rehabilitating Vice.” [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Cassam, *Vices of the Mind*. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)