

Base values for the Statistical Resurrection Argument

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1 Introduction

Let the *credibility* $c(d)$ of a report d be the negative of the (hartley) logit under the null hypothesis (i.e. the hypothesis that the report is not founded in truth) of that report reaching us. Lots of false reports reach us every day, so, intuitively, for a report to be believable, the credibility should be high¹. McGrew & McGrew (2009) evaluates the resurrection report r , establishing a credibility $c(r) \gg 0$ ², leading to the conclusion that r (and thus the resurrection, and thus the gospel message) is reliable.

This article fills two holes in the argument given there.

2 Prior probability

A general problem with Bayesian evaluations is the need for a prior probability. We shall call the logit of the prior probability the *prior*. Whereas for repeatable experiments successful repetitions can overcome any prior³ (Dawid 2018), with unrepeatable events any attempt to establish believability can be frustrated if arbitrarily low prior may be chosen. It is therefore important to establish an objective minimum for the prior for Jesus' resurrection.

Here it is important to establish what kind of arguments do *not* count against the resurrection. A naturalist may claim that natural science has established some facts to such an extent that anything countering such facts (and both parties agree that Jesus' resurrection would probably counter them) has a negligible prior. That would be wrong, however, in the same way that a mathematical proof that $2+2=4$ will not set the prior probability of one marble lacking from a bag in which twice two marbles had been placed to zero: something not covered by the model behind the proof might have happened.

Likewise, something not covered by the naturalistic assumptions behind the scientific endeavour might have happened – and *that* probability is what needs to be established. The fact that we can, faithfully repeatedly, establish that no Big Bang takes place is no disproof of it having taken place in the past.

The main claim against the resurrection, is *dead people don't rise*. That claim is an inductive one, based on a limited number of observations – taking the whole world population through the ages is certainly an overestimation. That population is thought to be in the order of 10^{11} , so an argument based on that could never bring the prior below -11.

“But wait!”, one might object: the prior for *someone* rising might be that, but in all probability that person would not have been Jesus. Even *given* a resurrection, the prior for it being Jesus would be 10^{-11} , bringing the overall prior to 10^{-22} . But that objection commits the Texas sharpshooter fallacy: the claim is that *someone* rose, and that person happened to be Jesus. Admittedly there is a positive probability that, given a resurrection, it was someone else who rose⁴ while not being reported, while Jesus was falsely (but so convincingly) reported to be risen, but that probability is surely way less than $1-10^{-11}$.⁵

More importantly, it would defeat the induction that led to the prior of 10^{-11} in the first place: if of the world population through the ages more people may have risen, that population may not be used to establish the strength of the induction. The very possibility that resurrection does not imply a report drastically reduces the base population for the induction to those people for which a resurrection is virtually impossible – i.e. that part of the modern world population whose graves have recently been inspected and found occupied with the correct body. That number squared⁶ will surely be considerably smaller than 10^{11} .

If we restrict ourselves to induction showing that people rising *and convincingly reporting that fact* is low, we are back at our estimation of 10^{-11} , yielding a (hartley) logit $p(r)$ of -11.

- 1 To be precise, the report should also not be unlikely under the alternative hypothesis. We assume that here.
- 2 Their article uses probabilities, but using logits (log odds) makes the formulas simpler both in form and in content. For probabilities close to 0 or to 1, the logit is very close to the logarithm of the probability.
- 3 Other than $-\infty$.
- 4 Which in itself would refute naturalism, making the truth of Christianity more likely.
- 5 For one thing, it is lower than the probability of a genuine resurrection report being lost. Depending on the scenario (was it God who resurrected? A statistical quantum fluke?) such being lost may have a low probability itself.
- 6 To account for the objection that even if someone rose, it would have been unlikely to be Jesus.

McGrew & McGrew establish a credibility $c(r)$ for the resurrection report of 44 leading to an *intrinsic believability* $b(r)=p(r)+c(r)$ of 33.

3 Significance

It might seem that this high intrinsic believability would make the resurrection very likely. This is not correct, however. The claim that God used a credible report of an *a priori* very unlikely event to prove the truth of the gospel message defines a population R of possible highly intrinsically believable reports⁷ $r_i \in R$ with $\forall_i: b(r_i) \geq b(r)$ undergirding the gospel message. Jesus' resurrection is merely an after-the-fact recognition of how God proved His Gospel claim - He could have used one of any number of such events, and not taking that into account would be the base rate fallacy - after all, R being large, most of those reports would be false, and Bayesian testing *can* give false positives. Given $|R| \gg 0$, $\forall_i: p(r_i) \leq p(r)$ doesn't imply $b(R) \triangleq b(\exists_i: p(r_i) + c(r_i)) \gg 0$.

The way we found the prior covers all reports in R that include a resurrection, including e.g. reports of other women finding the empty grave or Jesus appearing to the High Priest, but also John the Baptist declaring himself the Son of God, dying and resurrecting or Jesus reappearing alive despite His dead body having been eaten by dogs. In fact, there is quite a bit of variation possible. The Christ might have appeared some generations earlier or later. Instead of the Israelites, an Indian tribe might have received what amounts m.m. to the Old Testament message, and the Saviour might have appeared there, with credible reports of His death and resurrection. Instead of appearing to His disciples after the resurrection, He might have left a message in the sky. As long as these variations include a resurrection, they are covered by our established prior. But what about other possibilities? Presumably, God could have used other ways to prove His point, such as Jesus *not* dying despite clearly being decapitated, or His disciples becoming invulnerable to knives plunged into their hearts.

All these potential reports $r_i \in R$ that are at least as believable as the actual one r form the (generalised) tail of the probability distribution, and to claim significance for r it must be shown that $b(R)$ is high. But how to prove such a thing? The world is such a rich and varied place, that computing the generalised tail of r seems impossible.

Fortunately, while the tail may be impossible to *compute*, it is quite possible to *bound* it. $|R| \ll |Q|$, where Q is the set of reports q_i at least as believable as the resurrection report that convince of any miracle whatsoever. $P(\text{false positive}) < P(R) = P(\exists_i: r_i) \ll P(\exists_i: q_i) = P(Q)$. And we have no other miracle-undergirding report m at all with $b(m) \geq b(r)$, so $P(Q)$ is not very high, and $P(R) \ll P(Q)$.

Even if we throw in all occurrences of not-so-coherent events (e.g. someone prophesying his death in the next week, yet living for several centuries, or levitating), which set of obviously many times the size of r , still none has occurred. From this we may confidently infer that $P(R) \leq \sum_i r_i \ll 1$, and thus that r is reliable.

4 References

McGrew, Timothy & McGrew, Lydia (2009). The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology*. Blackwell. pp. 593-662.

Dawid, Richard & Hartmann, Stephan (2018). *The No Miracles Argument without the Base Rate Fallacy*. In Synthese 195 (9). pp. 4063-4079.

⁷ Actually, the relevant metric would be *convincingness*, which consists of believability on the one hand, and gospel-provingness on the other. An exceedingly reliable report that someone ate an ice cream would not be convincing in that sense. Here I'll take convincingness to include (but be much more specific than) *convincingness that a miracle happened*.