

Transcendent mediocrity is the neutral position

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Esse est somniari.

1 Introduction

When Newton discovered the law of gravitation, he built on the strength of the *Copernican principle*: there is like here. When James Hutton formulated, and William Whewell named, the *principle of uniformity* (then is like now), they paved the way for Sir Charles Lyell to develop scientific geology – and Charles Darwin to develop his theory of common descent.

The *principle of statistical mediocrity* allowed the Allied forces to solve the German tank problem, and science makes good use of the assumption of a *uniform logarithmic prior* to model extreme uncertainty.

All of these are special cases of a more general *principle of mediocrity*, which is also being used in wider contexts – such as the assumption that, if there is a multiverse, we almost certainly inhabit a rather typical universe among those in which intelligent life is possible.²

Here we look into another possible generalisation of the principle of mediocrity, one that may inform us about ontology.

2 Worlds

The thing we can be most certain about is that there are **thoughts** (including feelings, wishes, and so on). Without going into the Hume vs. Descartes debate, let us simply define **I** as the total phaneron. There may be thoughts out there that I don't experience, but while those may be *your* thoughts or *their* thoughts, they are no part of me. Let us call any maximal bundle of experienced thoughts a **being** – so I am a being.

Among those thoughts I find **dreams** (including daydreams, conceived models, and so on)³ – thoughts that are worlds. Other thoughts tell me I am in a world myself – my **home world**. In my dreams, there may be other beings, and those other beings may dream other worlds again, and so on recursively. All of those (my dreams, dreams of beings in my dreams, and so on) are **dream worlds**.

If the home world really exists (i.e. I am not a solipse), that home world is special – it seems quite different from all those dream worlds. I have a special relationship to my dream worlds:

- I know everything about them, because in the end they are all my thoughts. I also cannot be wrong about them, because they are precisely what I think about them.
- I have great power over them, too: if I want something in a dream world to be different, I only have to decide it is so.
- Moreover, I am *transcendent* to them: I have no perspectival relationship to them unless I want to. If my dream contains space and time, I may dream of spatially and temporally widely separate parts of it in direct succession, and I may dream something temporally prior after dreaming something temporally posterior.⁴
- Finally, I am the final explanation, the total ground, of those worlds. They exist because of me, and are what they are because of me. If they contain matter or consciousness or order, or have a temporal beginning, that is because I think they do, and that is sufficient reason.

These worlds form a black-and-white tree, with beings as white nodes and dream worlds as black nodes, me as the root, the transcendence relation for white-to-black edges, and an immanence relation for black-to-white edges. If I dream author John in his office conceiving a story about Mary floating on a raft in the ocean, I am the white top node; a transcendence edge goes from me to the black office node, an

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2 This actually provides an argument against Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe: we live in a universe in which intelligent life is barely possible, and probably absent outside our planet (as he himself argues assuming a *uniform logarithmic prior*), in a level-2 multiverse in which nature constants allowing intelligent life are extremely improbable (the fine tuning argument). The *principle of statistical mediocrity* tells us that if his theory were correct, we'd almost certainly live in some universe teeming with intelligent life, in a level-2 multiverse where all kinds of variations would still allow intelligent life. Assuming all mathematical structures exist, including e.g. variants of John Conway's life game, such universes would exist. Therefore his theory is very unlikely to be correct.

3 It may be best to take *conceiving a novel* as an example, as we are for the moment ignoring here (1) our own finiteness, which constrains us strongly during sleep dreams, and even daydreams tend to share our time flow, and (2) ingression – the fact that we often appear in our own dreams.

4 In the terms of J. M. E. McTaggart, time (and space) of dream worlds can be a B series for us, but will be an A series for beings inside those worlds.

immanence edge from the office node to the white John node, a transcendence edge from the John node to the black ocean node, and an immanence edge from the ocean node to the white Mary node. If I were to dream of more people in that office, or John of adding an island with natives in the ocean, black nodes would branch. If John also worked on another story, his white node would branch.

My relationship to my home world is utterly different: there is much that I don't know, I may discover I am wrong about what I thought I knew, I am largely powerless to shape and change it, I live a here and now – a perspective –, and it demands explanations that I cannot provide – and that actually are deep problems for philosophy: the problems of existence, the one and the many, identity, knowledge, consciousness, freedom, morality, and so on⁵.

3 Transcendent mediocrity

Applying the principle of mediocrity to this situation, we see that the situation is not very different from that of Copernicus: in his time, people assumed the sublunar world was qualitatively different from the supralunar one. In fact, it seemed *obviously* so: the perfection of the heavenly spheres was incomparable to the mess down here. Here too, we assume, and believe it obvious, that our home world is qualitatively different from all those dream worlds. We seem to have a special place, being the roots of the dream world trees. This is the position of **transcendent exceptionalism**.

But what if it isn't? It seems a fact that we cannot look upwards along transcendence relations, but if all worlds that we *can* inspect (and there are many of them – we each dream lots of worlds daily) have a transcendent being dreaming them, shouldn't we assume the one we can't – our home world – also has one?⁶ That is the position of **transcendent mediocrity**.

Transcendent exceptionalism leaves us with very unpalatable situation of double explanations for everything: one explanation for dream worlds, and a completely different one for our home world. Our reality then is like a centaur – something that seems not implausible, until one starts wondering. What does his human bladder empty in? How do his horse lungs get air? Did he have two umbilical cords as a fetus?

We have good explanations for dream worlds – we understand consciousness, freedom, laws, and so on on the basis of the transcendent being. We can also freely experiment with transcendence relations, to try out things – they are *scientifically accessible* (for instance, my creating and causally influencing my dreams gives one possible model for a higher mind doing the same with our world). Assuming that our home world is *not* dreamt, on the other hand, leaves us with lots of irresolvable problems. Ockham's razor prescribes assuming uniformity, and having all those problems disappear, creating a vastly simpler description of the world.

Solipsism claims I am the top, common naturalism that our home world is.⁷ Of course it feels good to be (close to) the root of the tree, to be special – but that gives us no reason to believe it is true.

If we accept transcendental mediocrity, what happens farther up the tree?⁸ How many levels exist above us? Is there an end to them? And if there is, is the root a white or a black node? Transcendental mediocrity itself will not tell us – we shall need other means to find that out⁹.

Above, to avoid discussions, I defined beings simply as phanera. An argument could be made, however, that a being actually is a *unit* (a **mind**) *experiencing* a phaneron. If that is so, then having a being (a *one*) as the root would solve the problem of the one and the many, whereas having a world (a *many*) as the root would just move the centaur problem upwards. A white root would moreover give an explanation for order (lawfulness) and low entropy, and for intentionality (from which identity, moral laws, and much more could be derived). The question would then be: how simple is a mind *as such*? We shall need a good idealist account – one that takes thought as primary. Given that, explaining matter as dreamt by a mind is trivial.

5 Much more material, but badly organised and in Dutch, can be found in my [Apologetiek](#). A more coherent overview in English, but very basic, is my [Fundamentals of Philosophy](#).

6 Hume's Philo would agree: "*But there is another principle of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience: that where several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us.*" – Hume, *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*.

7 Actually, the tree model may give a more precise definition of those positions in their generality than the labels currently in use. We could define **transcendent naturalism** as the position that there is a black root, and **transcendent idealism** as the position that there is a white root which isn't me.

8 Lots of things may happen: for instance, it may well stop being an alternation of black and white nodes. We ignore that here for brevity. See my [Apologetiek](#) for more details.

9 My [How to Speak about a Supreme Being](#) looks into what, if there is a root and that root is a mind, one can say about that mind.

4 Arguments for transcendent mediocrity

Above I stated that some philosophical problems which are unsolvable under the assumption of transcendent exceptionalism find a solution under transcendent mediocrity. Such problems constitute arguments for transcendent mediocrity. Mind is inherited (doesn't need to form from matter), and as stated, dreaming matter is trivial. The intentionality of the dreaming mind explains such things as the one and the many, identity, universals, or morals¹⁰. In subsections I mention some more problems, with a sketch of the path along which transcendent mediocrity can solve them.

4.1 Quantum reality

Theoretical physicist Diederik Aerts (2010) has shown that the “mysterious” quantum world is not mysterious at all if we take not objects, but concepts as the fundamental building blocks of reality. This assumption very naturally leads to many quantum effects, such as Heisenberg uncertainty, interference, entanglement, and so on. Likewise, the assumption predicts relativistic effects such as time dilation and space contraction, as shown in Aerts (2017).

If our reality is thought by a transcendent mind, then its basic building blocks would naturally be concepts.

4.2 Absolute morality

Hume famously argued that *ought* cannot be derived from *is*. Under transcendent exceptionalism this is correct. However, under transcendent mediocrity, the world is as the transcendent mind thinks it. In other words, there is an unquotation rule (TMT = transcendent mind thinks):

$TMT('X') \Rightarrow X$.

This rule allows us to move from an *is* (It is the case that the transcendent mind believes “A ought to B”) to an *ought* (A ought to B)¹¹. Along those lines we can introduce absolute moral rules in our own dream worlds too – an example of the scientific accessibility I mentioned earlier.

4.3 Knowledge¹²

If there is no mind above ours, then we cannot know anything about our home world. For the solipsist this is no problem, as he claims there is no home world independent of his phaneron; common naturalists, however, posit such a world exists – but how could they ever know that? All I can know is my phaneron – by definition of phaneron. If there is a world apart from my phaneron, I have no access to it – and that is true for independent abstracts (such as the rules of logic) as much as for the physical world. Elements of my phaneron claim to inform me about this outside world, but I have no way of verifying that (and given certain naturalistic theories, it is *a priori* very unlikely that my phaneron is in any way representative of any outside world).

This is a form of the diallelus: any indirect information is at most as reliable as its path, and that leads to an infinite regression.

If this world is dreamt by a transcendent mind, however, it consists of (a subset of) his thoughts. I am part of that world, and my phaneron is again (part of) me – which means that my thoughts are actually thoughts of the transcendent mind. And those thoughts can be identically the same as his thoughts thinking the outside world, so that the path is zero and the diallelus doesn't obtain.

4.4 The final explanation

There is nothing constraining the solipse at the top of the transcendence hierarchy. He is the source of whatever fact is true in our world, including the facts of logic, and so on.

The facts of our world include information theoretic facts about explanations.

¹⁰ Since under transcendent mediocrity *what is the case* is precisely *what the transcendent mind thinks is the case*, not just in the sense the two have the same value, but in the more fundamental sense that both expressions describe the same notion, Alvin Plantinga's pro-Molinist argument as described in its A-form in Hunt (2002) would succeed. See my [Two Dozen Compossibles](#) for how Molinism can be true without transcendence.

¹¹ My [From “Is” to “Ought” in One Easy Step](#) describes this in more detail.

¹² I discuss the knowledge (diallelus) problem in my [Knowing in the Teeth of the Diallelus](#). There I sketch a proof of its unsolvability under transcendent exceptionalism and how it disappears under transcendent mediocrity.

1. An explanation is a shorter description. A law explains a set of phenomena if it plus some preconditions can provide the full description of those phenomena, and if it, plus the description of those initial conditions, is smaller than that full description.
2. The empty description either does not describe anything, or it describes “nothing”. In either case it is not a description of the whole of reality.
3. Any non-empty description is not a final explanation – the question “*Why?*” remains.

From these facts it follows that no immanent final explanation is possible – any immanent explanation will always be wrong, incomplete, or both.

Now if the world is not the root of the transcendence hierarchy, then the explanation for the world points upwards – but there the above rules may not hold, so the proof that no final explanation is possible does not translate to higher levels.

5 Weighing arguments for Transcendent exceptionalism

To defend transcendental exceptionalism some good argument seems required, because not only does the burden of proof lay with the party claiming an exception, but accepting transcendental exceptionalism also introduces a large number of aporias, and doubles the size of the description of the world. Here we describe two techniques for weighing such arguments, both based on the observation that sound arguments for transcendental exceptionalism must fail in dream worlds. The techniques exploit the scientific accessibility mentioned above.

5.1 The inverse criterion

The more general technique is the **inverse criterion**: in one’s imagination the argument should not be convincing. Suppose John presents to me an argument purporting to show that our home world is actually the root of the tree. Now if, when I mentally relive his presenting just that argument, the argument seems just as convincing, then it fails. After all, in the dream I created when reliving it, its conclusion would be wrong, for there neither the dreamed us, nor the dream world the relived debate takes place in would be the root – both are imagined by me.

This is a very strong criterion, but it is not total – it does not automatically refute *all* arguments against transcendental mediocrity. Arguments of the kind “*The world cannot have a creator of a certain nature*” will pass the criterion if we do not share that nature.

As an example, suppose John presents a religious argument based upon God’s necessary goodness and the evil in our home world. When I imagine him presenting this, I am imagining a world with evil in it – merely for the sake of testing an argument. That would surely make me an evil being in the eyes of the people in that dream world, which means that my dream world would not have a good creator, and John’s argument would not be applicable there¹³. And precisely the fact that that argument would fail means that it is not refuted by the inverse criterion: as far as that criterion is concerned, his argument might succeed in our home world.

5.2 The transcendent experiment

Conversely, certain arguments claim that “*A world of a certain nature cannot have a transcendent creator, and our universe is of that nature*”. If the first of those claims is true, then worlds of that nature must be inherently unimaginable, and that is a testable claim. For instance, Quentin Smith claims that there cannot be a creator, since the full causal explanation of any moment in the universe is in its immanent past. In successfully thinking a simple world with the causal structure Smith describes¹⁴, one shows that even if his dubious claim were true, it still would not exclude a creator – after all, we just *did* create a universe with those characteristics, and one that depends for its existence critically upon our (transcendent to it) minds¹⁵.

13 If the argument had been formulated differently, proving that a God of such a world cannot be good, it might even succeed in the dream world, and if it did not depend on features of my dream world that the actual world doesn’t share, it might in theory even succeed in the actual world.

14 One might object that the infinity of the backward series of intervals precludes successfully thinking such a world. But does one have to *imagine* it, or would a more abstract mental representation suffice? And if imagining is necessary, imagining an infinite sequence of alternating states may be deemed possible, because imagining one pair of states is identical to imagining another. Also, a finite time loop would provide the same properties that Smith claims are necessary: every state has a causal predecessor that fully explains its state. Finally, my successfully imagining two or three steps is proof that an actually infinite being could imagine the whole sequence.

15 In fact, Smith himself thought up this model before presenting it to the world. Possibly an argument could be made that *all* claims of that nature fail, since presenting one always requires thinking it first. Only a non-specific argument of the shape “*The universe has a nature that cannot even in principle be thought, and thus precludes a*

6 A German Tank argument

An example of an argument that would not be affected by either the inverse criterion or a transcendent experiment is the German tank argument.

The German tank problem could be used to argue for a root, and estimate its distance from us: if we only look vertically, we may assume ourselves to be about halfway up, and since most of our dreams are only one level deep, “about halfway up” may well be all the way up, in which case we would be the root.

This argument isn't strong, however, for two reasons:

1. For the statistical purposes on which mediocrity principles are based we certainly cannot ignore the – often huge – branching factor. Once we take it into account, we are likely to be almost at the bottom, and the tree might rise an arbitrarily high (yet finite) number of levels up.
2. Even if we ignore it, and look vertically only, it seems that by far most dreams have two levels: a world with minds in it. A few go deeper (authors working on a story that includes the dreams of their characters) or less deep (mathematicians contemplating the sterile world described by some axiom system). Most people, even if thinking of a world without minds, will still include a visual perspective point – an ingredient self observing that world. So if we are in the middle, we could expect one world above us (the home world), and one mind above that.

In either case the argument seems to make transcendent mediocrity more likely than transcendent exceptionalism.

7 References

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transcendent creator” would then be able to pass this sieve. Non-constructive reasons for this claim might then be given. After all, if a universe can be thought, there can be a mind thinking it – and thus there can be a creator of it.