“Kant’s Canon, Garve’s Cicero, and the Stoic Doctrine of the Highest Good”

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The concept of the highest good is an important but hardly uncontroversial piece of Kant’s moral philosophy. In the considerable literature on the topic, challenges are raised concerning its apparently heteronomous role in moral motivation, whether there is a distinct duty to promote it, and more broadly whether it is ultimately to be construed as a theological or merely secular ideal.[[1]](#footnote-1) Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the context of a doctrine that had enjoyed a place of prominence in the ethical systems of the ancients, where these systems provided a key critical foil for the development of Kant’s own conception of the highest good in terms of “happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality” (cf. 5:110).[[2]](#footnote-2) Indeed, these ethical systems prove important for Kant not only in his initial presentation of his account in the Canon of Pure Reason in the first *Critique*, where he sought to redress the errors of the Epicurean and Stoic conception in particular, but also and importantly in the course of his development towards the second *Critique*. As I will argue in this chapter, Christian Garve’s defense of a revised but recognizably Stoic conception of the highest good in his translation of and commentary on Cicero’s *De officiis* (*On Duties*), helps to account for Kant’s renewed attention to that doctrine, and specifically to the errors attending the Stoic version, in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.

 In order to show this, the present chapter will proceed in three sections. In the first, I will turn to Kant’s discussions in the handwritten *Nachlaß* and the student notes of his lectures on moral philosophy by way of supplying some broader context for his account of the highest good in the Canon. In the second, I will consider in some detail Garve’s reception of and augmentations to Cicero’s Stoicism, and in particular his discussion of the highest good. In the third and final section, I will look beyond Kant’s alleged reaction to Garve in the *Groundwork* and instead briefly consider the importance of Garve’s defense of Stoicism in motivating Kant’s renewed criticism of Stoicism in the Dialectic of the second *Critique*, with special attention to how this background helps to clarify somewhat the otherwise obscure role played by a distinctively practical illusion in that section.

1. Kant’s Canon of Pure Reason and the Ancients on the Highest Good

 In taking up the issue of the highest good in the second section of the Canon of Pure Reason, entitled “On the Ideal of the Highest Good,” Kant was well aware that he was engaging a topic that had been widely debated among the ancients, even if it appeared to have fallen into disuse by modern moral philosophers.[[3]](#footnote-3) And while these classical treatments are not mentioned in the published text itself, they clearly inform Kant’s treatment as is evidenced through his Reflexionen and student notes to his lectures on moral philosophy.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 A consideration of the highest good, understood as that good or end which “is such that everything else is a means to it, while it is itself not a means to anything,”[[5]](#footnote-5) was a typical prologue to ancient ethical investigations, involving the consideration of a distinctively human end on the basis of which specific virtues and corresponding duties might be adumbrated.[[6]](#footnote-6) In addition, Kant notes that most ancients schools considered two elements, or *requisita*, as belonging to the highest good, the first of which is identified as virtue or acting-well (*Tugend*, *Wohlverhalten*) and the second as happiness or well-being (*Glückseligkeit*, *Wohlbefinden*) (cf. K 16; P 27:101-2; C 27:249; HN 6876, 19:188-9). However, as Kant remarks in the presentation of the history of moral philosophy with which he typically began his lectures, the various ancients sects and schools differed dramatically when it came to the question of identifying the way in which these elements were related in their respective conceptions of the highest good. Here Kant distinguishes between those who contended that these constituted separate elements, and those who contended that they were in fact to be identified (cf. P 27:102). The former, presumably, contended that the elements of the highest good were to be obtained independently, and while Kant does not provide any examples of this group of thinkers, one might suppose that it includes Aristotle who takes happiness (*eudaimonia*) as our final end, for which the cultivation of virtue (rather than mere prudence) is required but not sufficient as other, external goods are also needed for the good life.[[7]](#footnote-7) In connection with those who identify virtue and happiness, Kant contrasts the Epicurean and Stoic views, where each school is taken to subordinate one element to the other, though as a result they understand these elements in rather divergent ways. So, the Epicureans are taken to prioritize happiness, understood as pleasure, as the highest good, with virtue accordingly being taken as the skill in attaining this end. By contrast, the Stoics took virtue itself to be the sole end worth pursuing, with happiness taken merely to be a bi-product of the attainment of virtue inasmuch as it simply consists in the “feeling of our own worth,” or our “consciousness of virtue [*Bewußtseyn der Tugend*]” as an awareness of our independence from determination by inclinations.[[8]](#footnote-8)

 A second question relating to the highest good considered by the ancients concerns how it was to be attained. Here, Kant broadens his discussion to include four different schools: the Epicureans and Stoics, but also the Cynics and Plato. An initial distinction between their positions consists in whether the condition or state of the highest good is attainable through the use of our own powers, or only possible through the influence of a supreme being.[[9]](#footnote-9) Plato is taken to represent the latter position inasmuch as he construes the highest good in terms of a “mystical union” with a hyper-physical being who is itself identified as the highest good.[[10]](#footnote-10) Among those in the former group, the Cynics, represented by Diogenes, contend that the highest good is “naturally” attainable, that is, it is attained by returning to a condition of natural innocence (“*Einfalt*”) and contentment with securing our barest necessities. For the Cynics, philosophical instruction was not necessary for the attainment of the highest good, but could at best offer a negative service by instructing us on how to avoid pain and vice.[[11]](#footnote-11) Suprisingly, on the issue of attainability, the Epicureans and Stoics actually find common ground as both are taken to hold that the highest good is not “naturally” attainable but only “artificially [*kunstlich*]” through philosophy which, in opposition to the Cynical view, must offer positive guidance that instruct us on how to attain it.[[12]](#footnote-12)

 Kant’s own conception of the highest good is framed in opposition to these classical positions, as he contends that the ancients erred both in terms of how the elements of the highest good were related and regarding its attainability. On the first question, relating to the Epicurean and Stoic attempts to unify the elements of the highest good, or to subordinate them one to the other,[[13]](#footnote-13) Kant charges that this conceptual unification is achieved at the expense of diluting one of the components. Epicurus sets happiness or pleasure as our chief end, and in defense of Epicurus, Kant emphasizes that ‘pleasure’ here is not to be taken as primarily bodily or sensual pleasure but rather pertains to the pleasures of the mind or soul, and that Epicurus’ own moderation speaks against the crude caricatures of his conception of pleasure popularized by his opponents.[[14]](#footnote-14) In any case, Epicurus succeeds in furnishing us with an incentive to be virtuous (since that incentive is pleasure itself), yet only at the cost of demoting virtue to mere prudence and as a consequence he leaves morality bereft of any inner worth.[[15]](#footnote-15) The Stoics, by contrast, appropriately recognize the worth of virtue, as something valuable and worthy of pursuit solely for itself, but correlatively diminish the element of happiness. This is because the Stoics reduce happiness to the contentment we feel in our own independence from affects, a state which Kant recognizes as pleasant but which nonetheless falls short of the title of happiness, as the satisfaction with one’s entire condition, which includes the fulfillment of desires pertaining to the senses: “The consciousness of a worthiness to be happy still does not silence the desires of man, and if a man does not fulfil his desire, even though he feels in himself that he is worthy, he is not yet happy” (C 27:250-1).[[16]](#footnote-16) In contrast with the Epicurean conception, then, the Stoic conception of the highest good accords virtue inner worth but with the cost that it removes any incentive to cultivate a moral disposition connected to genuine happiness: “Epicurus wanted to give virtue motives and no value [...]. Zeno extolled the inner value of virtue [...] and took away the motives to virtue” (C 27:250; cf. also K 18).

 Kant is similarly critical of ancient views regarding the attainability of the highest good, though here he more generally takes issue with the presupposition, which he takes to be prevalent among ancient thinkers, that the highest good was attainable (at least by some) through our own actions in this life.[[17]](#footnote-17) Kant does not spend much time discussing Plato’s hyper-physical view, which he rejects as “*schwärmerisch*” (P 27:105; cf. also M II 29:603) given that it takes the highest good to be achieved not through virtuous action but through esoteric means (HN 6894 19:197-8). With respect to the other views canvassed, however, Kant claims that the only reason why they can maintain that the highest good is attainable in this life is through accommodating their conception of moral perfection to human weakness (cf. K 20; C 27:251), that is, by suitably diminishing what morality requires of us so that we can be thought to possess and retain it. This applies, for instance, to the Cynics’ position where a state of natural simplicity might be attainable but it is any case not to be identified as a state of virtue, understood as “a moral preparedness to withstand all temptations to evil” (M II 29:604). Natural simplicity would rather be a state in which virtue never comes into play inasmuch as we have removed the artificial drives and desires that are taken to lead to evil acts.[[18]](#footnote-18) In any case, even if such a state were to be possible, without the experience of temptation and instruction on how to resist it, it would not be long-lived (P 27:103). A true, enduring state of virtue, then, is only obtainable through “artificial” means, and here the Epicurean view is at least not as innocent as the Cynical as it acknowledges a natural “*Hang*” to vice (K 16; C 27:249; M I 27:1402). Yet, even if Epicurus’ positive instruction, properly understood, might succeed in granting a “true and lasting” condition of satisfaction (P 27:100), it obviously falls short of securing virtue since, as we have seen, it succeeds only by reducing virtue to prudence.

 This would leave the Stoic account, and while it might seem strange to charge it with accommodating a conception of moral perfection to human weakness, Kant claims that this is in fact the case, though this only becomes clear when it is contrasted with the Christian moral ideal. The Stoic ideal of virtue is represented in the Sage (*Weise*), whose happiness is a function of his awareness that he has conquered his passions: “he is a king, in that he rules over himself and cannot be constrained in that he constrains himself” (C 27:250).[[19]](#footnote-19) The Sage has accordingly attained a state of durable and genuine virtue, apparently addressing the concerns Kant raised relating to the Cynic and Epicurean position, but Kant contends that in spite of setting the bar rather high for human moral action, it nonetheless falls short of representing morality in its complete purity. The reason for this is that the depiction of the Stoic Sage as mastering his affects is a conception of moral perfection that depends upon our limited natures—the fact that we are subject to sensible incentives and affects in the first place and with respect to which we can develop a capacity to resist. We can, however, conceive of a will that is not subject to these incentives at all, and it is this ideal of *holiness* that is presented in the figure of Christ: “The Christian ideal is that of holiness, and its pattern is Christ” (C 27:250). The ideal of holiness is *pure* inasmuch as it does not represent the moral law in its relation to our (finite) wills, as is the case with the Stoic ideal, but rather independently of any such relation.

 Kant’s charge that the Stoics accommodate their conception of moral perfection to human weakness thus amounts to the claim that they conflate virtue with moral perfection. Considered in light of the Christian ideal of holiness, the Stoic’s conception of virtue looks less estimable by comparison: it is only the “ideal of [holiness], as philosophy understands it, [that] is the most perfect ideal for it is an ideal of the greatest purely moral perfection” (C 27:251; cf. K 20; M I 27:1404). Moreover, even if the Stoic ideal is sufficiently demanding so as to be attainable only by the few, it still presents a comparatively flattering portrait of our moral vocation and, by appealing to our vanity and pride, misleads us into thinking moral perfection can be achieved in this life, and indeed through our own unaided efforts:

 The wise one [*Weise*] of the Gospels and the Sage [*Weise*] of the Stoics are very different from one another; the Stoic, who was capable of becoming perfect through his own powers and becomes perfectly equal to the ideal, swells up with vanity and pride—the Christian law is a holy law and from this humility naturally follows, in contrast with the Stoic doctrine from which pride springs forth (P 27:105)[[20]](#footnote-20)

It is only because the Stoics confuse virtue with moral perfection as such that they are able to contend that such perfection is attainable in this life.[[21]](#footnote-21) Taking the ideal of holiness as our standard of moral perfection, however, and recognizing that humans are inescapably subject to sensible incentives, it becomes clear that moral perfection properly understood is not attainable in this life through our own powers.

 Kant’s own positive account of the highest good presented in the Canon chapter of the first *Critique* is clearly informed by his consideration of these ancient views even if they are not mentioned explicitly. Without getting into the host of challenges presented by his own conception of the highest good, we can in any case see that Kant is intent on avoiding the ancient errors regarding the identity of the elements of the highest good and its attainability in this life. Kant’s discussion proceeds in fundamental agreement with his ancient predecessors, and against what he regards as the modern approach, inasmuch as it acknowledges the relevance of a philosophical account of the highest good for morality.[[22]](#footnote-22) He does depart from the ancients, however, by denying that the highest good is a purely ethical concept, such that it should be taken into account in the derivation of our duties, a departure signalled by the fact that Kant only turns to a consideration of it after the purely practical question of “what should I do?” has been settled (cf. A805-6/B833-4). Concerning the specific topics debated by the ancients, Kant maintains the fundamental difference between the two elements of the highest good, which he indicated through his clear distinction of *happiness* from the “*worthiness to be happy* [*Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein*]” (A806/B834). Not only have the ancients failed to account convincingly for their identity, but Kant argues for their distinction on the basis of the difference in the maxims that result from each motive for action. Thus he contrasts the “rule of prudence” which proceeds from the motive of happiness with the “moral law” which “has no other motive than the *worthiness to be happy*” (A806/B834); and whereas the former are “empirical principles,” the latter laws “command *absolutely*” (A806-7/B834-5). Happiness and the worthiness to be happy cannot, therefore, be reduced to one another in the manner contended by the Epicureans and the Stoics, yet Kant also points out that neither on its own constitutes the highest good:

 Happiness alone is far from the complete good for our reason. Reason does not approve of it [...] where it is not united with the worthiness to be happy, i.e., with morally good conduct. Yet morality alone, and with it, the mere *worthiness* to be happy, is also far from being the complete good. In order to complete the latter, he who has not conducted himself so as to be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope to partake of it. (A813/B841).[[23]](#footnote-23)

Accordingly, Kant contends that the highest (derived) good must be identified as a combination of worthiness and happiness, without reducing one to the other, and specifically as “happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings” (A814/B842), where happiness is a (causal) consequence of morality rather than in some way identical to it.

 This brings up the issue of attainability. Here Kant is clear that were it the case that the highest good were completely unattainable—that we could have no *hope* in enjoying happiness in proportion to our worthiness for it—the consequences for morality would be disastrous: “the majestic ideas of morality are [...] not incentives for resolve and realization” (A813/B841).[[24]](#footnote-24) Even so, Kant argues that the highest good is not something that can be attained in this life. *Were* it the case that we were purely intellectual beings without any subjective hindrances to following the moral law, then, Kant suggests, “such a system of happiness proportionately combined with morality” *would* be a consequence of our actions (A809/B837).[[25]](#footnote-25) However, such a world is only an “idea”and because in this (sensible) world rational beings are not reliably determined by the moral law, even if they remain subject to it, there is no basis for the expectation that happiness will be the result of morally worthy acts in this life: “how [the] consequences [of their actions] will be related to happiness is determined neither by the nature of things in the world, nor by the causality of actions themselves” (A810/B838). That happiness should be the consequence of virtuous conduct is thus only possible inasmuch as we presuppose a God who dispenses happiness in accordance with our worthiness of it, and a future life in which such a state obtains (A811/B839). In this way, the question of the attainability of the highest good ultimately requires that we venture into “moral theology” and cultivate a belief in God’s existence and the soul’s immortality, and it is this that ultimately distinguishes Kant’s account from the erroneous doctrines of the ancients. It was, namely, due to their reluctance to have recourse to religion in the context of morality that motivated their effort to accommodate virtue to human weakness: “[t]he error of the [ancient] philosophical sects was that they made morals independent of religion” (HN 6786, 19:188).

2. The Defense of the Stoic Doctrine in Christian Garve’s *Cicero*

 As might be expected, Kant’s treatment of the highest good in the Canon, with the positive role it reserves for the traditional objects of religious belief, attracted comparably less critical attention than his exposure of the illusion and errors lying behind speculative metaphysics. Even the notorious review published anonymously in 1782 but written by the “popular” philosopher Christian Garve (1742–98) and truncated and adulterated by J. G. H. Feder, demurred from saying anything on the topic.[[26]](#footnote-26)

 Significantly, however, Garve would engage with Kant’s discussion in the context of another project he was pursuing around the same time, namely his German translation of Cicero’s *De officiis* which was published in 1783 alongside three volumes of extensive commentary and supplemental essays.[[27]](#footnote-27) As it happens, Garve undertook the translation of Cicero at the behest of Friedrich II who made the request in 1779 while he was residing in Garve’s hometown of Breslau to negotiate a treaty.[[28]](#footnote-28) Friedrich took a personal interest in the translation as he regarded Cicero’s book as “*le meilleur ouvrage de morale qu’on ait écrit et qu’on puisse écrire*,”[[29]](#footnote-29) even suggesting the form that Garve’s remarks on the text should take.[[30]](#footnote-30) Garve was at first hesitant to accept the charge as he disapproved of Cicero’s imprecise “*philosophische Schreibart*” in *De officiis* and he was concerned that a publisher would not recoup their costs given that there were already two recent German translations. At one point, a friend recommended that Garve should propose a translation of the more interesting *De finibus* instead though Garve was wary of breaching protocol to make such a bold suggestion, and preferred *De officiis* as the less challenging text to work with.[[31]](#footnote-31) In any case, Garve completed the translation by April of 1780,[[32]](#footnote-32) after which he began working on the remarks and accompanying essays, a process that was drawn out over the next three years.[[33]](#footnote-33) After the translation and the commentary were published in 1783, Garve sent copies to Friedrich, which the king gratefully received.[[34]](#footnote-34) The edition would prove to be a critical and a commercial success, seeing four editions in Garve’s lifetime, and was ultimately Garve’s most successful book.[[35]](#footnote-35)

 Cicero himself was an influential figure in forming Garve’s own “popular” philosophical outlook. According to this view, which was heavily influenced by, among others, Locke and Hume, one should eschew abstract speculation in favour of the empirical study of the human being guided by common sense and directed towards the exigencies of ordinary life.[[36]](#footnote-36) Cicero’s own efforts to provoke his countrymen to philosophize in their native tongue, as well as his sceptically-motivated refusal to dogmatically adhere to a single philosophical system, were key inspirations for Garve.[[37]](#footnote-37) Even so, this latter virtue is notably absent from *De officiis*, in which Cicero models his presentation on an unfinished treatise by the prominent middle-Stoic thinker Panaetius of Rhodes (180–109BC). Cicero divides his discussion into three books, where the first treats the honourable (*honestum*), the second the beneficial (*utile*), and the third, which corresponds to an unwritten portion of Panaetius’ original treatment, considers how to adjudicate conflicts between the two. Abandoning his usual sceptical posture, Cicero defends Stoic positions regarding, for instance, the division of virtues (*Off.* I.15-17), the identity of the honourable and the beneficial (*Off.* II.10), and the denial that there is ever any genuine conflict between the demands of the honourable and the pursuit of the beneficial inasmuch as the honourable is the only true good (*Off.* III.12-13).

 One would expect that Garve’s own sympathies with Stoic thinking were limited, given his own eclecticism, and indeed Garve does take issue with central Stoic doctrines at the outset of his commentary (in addition to remarking on some of the defects of Cicero’s presentation). So, Garve notes that the ideal of self-sufficiency, that happiness can be attained through our own individual resources rather than depending on things beyond our control, can be a source of wisdom and calm insofar as it promotes patience in dealing with adversity; however, the Stoic elevation of this into a kind of complete self-sufficiency and a denial that any external goods or circumstances are required for happiness is “a vain pretense [*stolzes Vorgeben*] not truth” (cf. 1783b, I, p. 15-16). Likewise Garve objects to the Stoic contention that virtue “is something absolute” and does not admit of degrees (1783b, I, p. 20), a claim Garve takes to be reflected in the Stoic ideal of the Sage who has attained a condition of continuous virtue from which his good actions proceed, as opposed to the ordinary person who falls short of this and who only manages to act appropriately in certain circumstances (I, pp. 20-2).[[38]](#footnote-38) Against this, Garve contends that the absolutist conception of moral worth is a function of the Stoic focus on the individual: when, by contrast, one also takes into account the positive or negative consequences of actions and the circumstances under which they are undertaken, then estimations of moral worth can admit of varying degrees (1783b, I, pp. 25-7), a position that is moreover in accordance with our ordinary moral appraisals (I, p. 26).[[39]](#footnote-39) Garve likewise espouses the utility of imitation (*Nachahmung*) in moral improvement, which method Cicero had rejected on Stoic grounds, insisting that we should “follow our own nature” (*Off.* I.110); Garve, however, regards imitation, despite its risks, as “without a doubt that which most accelerates progress to human perfection in the course of one’s life [*in Absicht seines Laufes*] and which determines one in regard to their direction” (1783b, I, p. 185).[[40]](#footnote-40)

 In spite of these and other objections, Garve allows that in general the Stoic position defended by Cicero “contains the most, if not the whole, truth” (1783b, I, p. 14), and he endorses a number of Stoic positions, albeit not always in their unaugmented form. For instance, Garve elaborates on Cicero’s claim that there is no genuine conflict between the honourable and the beneficial, which claim Garve notes is tirelessly repeated by Cicero in the third book with little in the way of argument. By way of supplying the needed justification, Garve speculates that the beneficial and the honourable originally designated the goods of the body and those of the mind, respectively. Over time, however, the scope of beneficial came to include those mental skills and socially-useful qualities that pertained to the acquisition of these goods, while the scope of the honourable expanded slightly to include those qualities (rhetorical skill, taste) that were natural expressions of spiritual perfection. In this way, the two classes came to overlap such that some beneficial qualities were also recognized to be honourable (such as a sociable disposition), while the honourable was seen to be useful for the pleasure it affords on its own but also because the cultivation of the understanding and will aids in securing external goods to promote well-being (1783b, III, 17-23).[[41]](#footnote-41)

 More striking, and more important for our purposes, is Garve’s treatment of the Stoic doctrine of the highest good. Garve first makes clear that he endorses the ancient approach to ethics in assigning priority to the investigation of the highest good in the determination of specific virtues and duties. As Garve renders Cicero’s division of the main parts of ethics at the outset of the first book:

 The complete doctrine of duties falls into two principal parts. The first is theoretical and contains the investigation of the highest good [*höchsten Gute*; orig.: *finem bonorum*] and what is connected with it; the other is practical and contains prescriptions for human actions according to the various circumstances and requirements of human life (Garve 1783a, p. 7; cf. *Off*. I.7)

Commenting on this, Garve identifies this division not only as common among “all sects of ancient philosophers since Socrates,” but also claims that it is “grounded in the nature of things.” Garve goes on to claim that for Cicero this first, theoretical part is undertaken in his *De finibus*, where Cicero undertakes to investigate what is generally deserving of preference in order to be able to determine what human actions are to be preferred to others (1783b, I, 10-11).[[42]](#footnote-42) Garve likewise approves of the method the ancients adopted by way of settling this question, which method he characterizes as a sort of “natural history of human beings” designed to separate what is wrought in us artificially from that which is natural, and from there to identify what our distinctively human end might be (1783b, I, 11). With this in mind, Garve arrives at a familiar distinction between Stoic and Epicurean doctrines of the highest good. He distinguishes two sorts of final ends, namely, those that lie wholly in the human being itself and those that lie without it, and notes that the Stoics and Epicureans have “declared themselves exclusively for one or the other part”: the Stoics took our final end lie wholly within us insofar as we pursued our own perfection and the Epicureans opted for the latter whereby the pleasure occasioned in our bodies by external things is taken to constitute our end (cf. 1783b, I, 11-4).

 Significantly, in his comments on Cicero’s second book, Garve turns to a topic directly relevant to Kant’s discussion in the Canon. There, Garve addresses the conspicuous fact that in the entirety of *De officiis*, there is no substantive discussion of the role of religion, or indeed a mention of the divine (i.e., the gods), in connection with morality (cf. 1783b, II, 14-15). This inspires a historical consideration of the place of religion in philosophy for the ancients (1783b, II, 15-22), but also leads Garve to present his own thoughts concerning the relevance of religion for morality in a lengthy essay. In it, he engages in a series of considerations that amount to a defense of the Stoic conception of the highest good in light of the sort of challenges that informed Kant’s account. So, Garve allows that morality is independent of religion to the extent that the fact that we stand in certain relations of obligation to one another would obtain whether or not we presume that God created the world; yet morality requires religion both for our knowledge of those obligations and, importantly, to supply us with sufficient motivation to fulfill them (1783b, II, p. 23). He claims, as a matter of psychological fact, that it “is a great motivation [*Bewegungsgrund*] to work at something when one knows or believes [*weiß oder glaubt*] that something will come of it” (1783b, II, p. 24). While Garve allows that there is at least a weak natural inclination to virtue, he contends that this motive is considerably, and perhaps indispensably[[43]](#footnote-43) strengthened through the belief in God who has set an end for the world to which my own ends are subordinated, and who ensures that my contributions toward this end are not lost with my death (1783b, II, p. 24).[[44]](#footnote-44) Religion thus supplies “a motivation that is always effective,” as opposed to ordinary incentives that are only effective under certain circumstances, and through it “virtue and the execution of my duties becomes more worthy, more precious [*werther*, *schätzbarer*] to me” (1783b, II, p. 25).

 All this might suggest that Garve is departing from the Stoic conception of the highest good. In holding that the promise of happiness in a future life is required for the pursuit and acquisition of virtue in this life, he would seem to be taking happiness as consisting in something else than the simple consciousness of virtue, and indeed as something to which virtue might be considered as a means, and thus conceding that virtue and happiness are not in the end to be identified. However, here again Garve makes clear that he is only offering an amendment of the Stoic position while staying faithful to Stoic principles. So, Garve concedes that happiness is not necessarily the consequence of virtue in this life, though the reason for this is not that moral laws differ from the laws of nature such that pursuing virtue frequently requires us to forego what is pleasant.[[45]](#footnote-45) Rather, Garve claims that virtue *would* be a source of happiness in this life if it *were* the case that we could in fact be conscious that we possessed it; unfortunately, our insight into our own inner nature, is just as limited as our cognition into external nature so that we cannot ever be certain, through our own cognitive resources, that we have attained it:

 Virtue is its own reward: that is true. But only insofar as one is conscious of it, to the extent that one can say with conviction *I am virtuous*. And how many are there who can do this? Is our ability to judge concerning ourselves more reliable [*fester*] than that concerning other things? Is not the uncertainty in which we find ourselves with respect to our own worth one of the most secret evils that presses upon us; one of the most hidden causes of displeasure and discontentment? (1783b, II, p. 52)

It is here, Garve claims, that God and the prospect of a future life come into play. While we might attain to virtue in this life, we cannot overcome our cognitive limitations to become conscious of our own inner condition with sufficient clarity; it is therefore only through the presumption of the existence of a God who has perfect insight into our hearts, and a future life in which we will be provided with perfect certainty as to whether and to what extent we have attained to a virtuous condition, that virtue will be (proportionately) rewarded with happiness:

 The promise of the idea of God and the future to the friend of virtue is one of the greatest rewards that he could wish for, provided that he is but a thoughtful person: the reward of at some point being instructed about morality and virtue in general, and about the degree of his own. (1783b, II, pp. 53-4)

For Garve, then, the existence of God and the soul’s immortality underwrite the claim that virtue remains the highest good in spite of the fact that it is not necessarily accompanied with happiness in this life, and in so doing steels us in the pursuit of virtue now: “The understanding begins to bring both of the ideas—that of *virtue*, *duty*, and that of *pleasure*, *happiness*, closer to one another, even if they are often separated from one another in experience [*Empfindung*].”[[46]](#footnote-46)

3. Kant and Garve’s Neo-Stoicism

 If Garve’s discussion of the highest good reads like a direct response to the account outlined in the Canon of the first *Critique*, it is because it likely was. Garve was intensively engaged in his Cicero project during, and after, the period he undertook his review of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. In mid-1781, Garve had travelled to Göttingen in order to attend a collegium on Roman antiquity with the famous philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne.[[47]](#footnote-47) As he reports in a letter of July 24, 1781: “I go into the lectures with my book under my arm” (Garve 1804, p. 245), which may refer either to the translation, which had been finished the previous year, or to the ongoing *Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen*. During his three month stay in Göttingen, Garve lived with Feder, one of the editors of the *Göttingischen Anzeigen*, and when Kant’s first *Critique* was published during that time, Garve volunteered to review it. The review (written by Garve and edited by Feder) was published in the *Göttingischen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen* on January 19, 1782, at which point Garve had since returned to his home in Breslau. Garve evidently made his disappointment in the finished product clear soon thereafter in a letter to an intimate who, in a reply of April 4, 1782, expressed sympathy for Garve’s mistreatment but also reassurance of the value of his continuing “work on Cicero” (Garve 1804, pp. 251-2). Similarly, in his later letter to Kant of July 13, 1783, in which he admits his part in the review, Garve expressed his regret in undertaking the review given that, in addition to being on the road, distracted, and perennially in ill-health, he was “still busy with other work” (AA 10:329), the last undoubtedly a reference to his (still ongoing) Cicero project. Given all the overlap in Garve’s pursuit of these two projects, it is unsurprising that Garve’s reading of Kant would lay in the background of his elaboration of his neo-Stoic position; indeed, given that Garve was fairly advanced in his Cicero project at the time that he undertook his review, it would hardly be surprising should his work on Cicero already inform his review of Kant.

 Turning to the review itself, while the edited version published in 1782 passes over the Canon in silence,[[48]](#footnote-48) Garve’s full and unedited review, which was published in its original form in the Fall of 1783,[[49]](#footnote-49) has a little more to say, devoting three short paragraphs to the topic. After a first paragraph in which he claims Kant identifies the highest end of reason as “morality or the worthiness for happiness,”[[50]](#footnote-50) he considers Kant’s separation of worthiness and happiness itself in his conception of the highest good:

 That we recognize a certain conduct as absolutely worthy of happiness [*Glückseeligkeit*], and that this worthiness, more than happiness itself, is the final purpose of nature, will both be less evident to many readers than some of the propositions that the author’s critique has rejected.[[51]](#footnote-51)

Why this separation would fall short of being “evident” is not elaborated on, and Garve immediately proceeds to summarize without critical comment Kant’s position concerning God and immortality: the rules of moral conduct, he writes, “could not be true, or could at least not be motivating powers of our will, if there were no God and no afterlife.”[[52]](#footnote-52)

 Garve’s remarks are rather brief, a function of the fact that the review was already exceedingly lengthy but also that Kant devotes comparatively little space to these issues himself in the first *Critique*. Yet it is possible to elaborate on them in light of Garve’s subsequent presentation. Like Kant, Garve recognizes that happiness need not accompany virtue in this life, but Garve rejects the conclusion Kant draws from this, namely, that happiness and virtue are utterly distinct as elements of the highest good, such that one can only be the causal consequence of the other, in contrast with the Stoic (and Epicurean) position. Rather, as we have seen, the Stoic can uphold their claim that happiness is but the consciousness of virtue while allowing that happiness does not accompany virtue in this life inasmuch as our cognitive limitations inhibit the actual recognition of our inward state of virtue. It is presumably on account of this overlooked neo-Stoic alternative that Garve denies that Kant’s separation of the two is “evident.” Moreover, Garve’s neo-Stoic can accept that God and a future life play a crucial role in underwriting our moral practice by ensuring that happiness accompanies virtue in the life to come. In effect, then, Garve has offered a revised but recognizably Stoic account of the highest good, an account that now notably avoids the tendency Kant had claimed was common to ancient systems, namely, of “making morals independent of religion.”

 Situating the review in the context of Garve’s *Cicero* likewise helps to account for Kant’s resolution to take on a refutation of that text. Kant had received a copy of Garve’s full review on August 21, 1783, with the comments on the Canon, and his initial impressions were not wholly negative (cf. AA 10:349). In reading Garve’s review, Kant would have been particularly interested in Garve’s remarks on the Canon, given that he had previously noted the absence of any discussion of his thoughts on morality in the edited review.[[53]](#footnote-53) Garve’s translation had appeared earlier in August, with the remarks and essays following at the end of October.[[54]](#footnote-54) Kant came to think better of his initial assessment of the review: as is reported in a letter from Hamann on December 8, 1783, he complained of being treated as an “*imbecille*” though at that point Kant had only resolved to reply to the as yet unnamed editor of the review should he respond to the *Prolegomena* (Hamann 1965, p. 107). Soon after, however, Kant resolved, as is reported in a letter of February 8, 1784, to take up an “*anti-Kritik*” of Garve’s Cicero specifically (Hamann 1965, p. 123), and that Kant had recognized the related discussion in Garve’s commentary in the interim would certainly account for his choice of target. Kant continued working on this through March (cf. Hamann 1965, p. 134) though by the end of April this had transformed into a “*prodromo* to morals” which would nonetheless have a “relation to Garve’s Cicero” (Hamann 1965, p.141). This work rapidly developed into the *Groundwork*, and though Kant seems still to have planned to append some sort of critique of Garve to it, it was ultimately not included: as Hamann notes with evident surprise just before the *Groundwork* was due to appear, “nothing seems to have come of the appendix against Garve; rather [Kant] has shortened this work.”[[55]](#footnote-55) While the *Groundwork* undoubtedly still bears traces of Kant’s original intention,[[56]](#footnote-56) the fact that any substantive discussion of the highest good is entirely absent, in stark contrast with its place of prominence in the presentation in the Canon, might suggest that the (apparently) expunged appendix had treated just this topic, in light of Garve’s criticism and neo-Stoic alternative.

 For whatever reason,[[57]](#footnote-57) a Kantian reply to Garve’s defense of the Stoic position on the highest good would only come with the second *Critique* in 1788, in the context of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. Here we will have to be brief, but in the second chapter of that section, before the presentation of the Antinomy, Kant enumerates the now-familiar errors of the Epicurean and Stoic attempts to find an identity between the elements of the highest good:

 [a]ccording to the Epicurean the concept of virtue was already present in the maxim of promoting one’s happiness; according to the Stoic, on the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of one’s virtue. (KprV 5:112).

Kant notes that the Analytic of the second *Critique* has established the difference between virtue and happiness inasmuch as moral maxims are to be distinguished from maxims of happiness (5:112; cf. 5:35-6). The Stoics (and Epicureans) thus err in identifying the two elements, but when Kant returns to his discussion of the ancients after the resolution of the Antinomy, he claims that the Stoic version of this error consists in mistaking the satisfaction that attends the consciousness of virtue, as a consciousness of our independence from determination by inclinations, for happiness itself:

 Freedom, and the *consciousness of freedom* as an ability to follow the moral law with an unyielding disposition, is *independence from the inclinations*, at least as motives determining (if not as *affecting*) our desire, and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the sole source of an unchangeable contentment, necessarily combined with it and resting on no special feeling, and this can be called intellectual contentment. (5:117-18— my initial emphasis)

Kant allows that the intellectual contentment effected through the consciousness of virtue or freedom is a state of durable satisfaction, and he even claims that it is a state that is “analogous to the self-sufficiency that can be ascribed only to the supreme being” (5:119); however, he denies that it constitutes a (positive) state of fulfillment that might be substituted for happiness. Thus, he refers to it only as “an analogue of happiness” (5:117) since it is grounded in a satisfaction with one’s state insofar as one is not determined by inclinations and, therefore, does not involve the actual fulfillment of inclinations proper to happiness. The error on the part of the Stoics in general, then, is to mistake the merely negative satisfaction effected through the consciousness of virtue for the full-blooded happiness desired by the finite human being: the “consciousness of this ability of a pure practical reason (virtue) can in fact produce consciousness of mastery over one’s inclinations” but it would be a mistake to take this for “happiness because it does not depend upon the positive concurrence of a feeling” (5:119).

 The Stoics thus mistake the merely negative satisfaction with one’s own state in the consciousness of virtue and with a positive feeling of pleasure, and the egregious and persistent character of this conflation spurs Kant to inquire into how the Stoics might have been misled. Kant’s answer is that the Stoics fall prey to an illusion in accordance with which something that we *do*, namely determine the will through the “pure rational law” (5:117), appears as something that we *feel*, or a feeling of pleasure:

 there is always present here the ground of an error of subreption (*vitium subreptionis*) and, as it were, of an optical illusion [*optischen Illusion*] in the self-consciousness of what one *does* as distinguished from what one *feels* [*empfindet*]– an illusion that even the most practiced cannot altogether avoid. (5:116)

Presented as such this might hardly seem to be a tempting illusion, but Kant proceeds to explain that the illusion arises inasmuch as the determination of the will through the moral law produces an impulse to activity, which impulse resembles the sort of impulse to act that is effected through the feeling of agreeableness (5:116); as a result, we are tempted to suppose a (passively received) feeling of agreeableness as the ground of this impulse, despite its origin in reason. The Stoic—including the classical Stoic *and* the neo-Stoic position elaborated by Garve—falls prey to this temptation, and consequently mistakenly identifies the merely negative satisfaction that attends our consciousness of the determination of the will through the moral law with a positive enjoyment, and thus to mistake something that is only a presupposition of the happiness of finite rational beings for the genuine article (cf. 5:25). It is, thus irrelevant, whether one defers the satisfaction that accompanies the consciousness of virtue to the next life or take it to be realised in this one, since in both cases the identification of that satisfaction with happiness is the product of an illusion which is distinctly practical.[[58]](#footnote-58)

 Space does not remain to consider the effectiveness of Kant’s response to Garve. In any case Garve himself would subsequently raise a further objection to Kant’s attempted separation of the elements in the highest good in the guise of a more general defense of eudaimonism,[[59]](#footnote-59) an objection which we can now see is only the next salvo in a longstanding discussion between the two thinkers. It will suffice here to emphasize that considering these passages of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in light of this context succeeds in accounting for why Kant would think it necessary to return to addressing the error and underlying illusion afflicting the Stoic position. Indeed, as the practical illusion does not concern the *motive* to moral action but rather only whether the consciousness of the effect of moral determination is to be identified as happiness, it is narrowly concerned with diagnosing a *distinctively* Stoic error. Moreover, it is not surprising that it is only after the resolution of the Antinomy, through the introduction of the posit of an intelligent author and an intelligible world (cf. 5:115), that Kant would attempt to address Garve’s distinctive neo-Stoic alternative. It would therefore be too hasty to claim that merely architechtonic considerations are behind Kant’s introduction of the doctrine of illusion in the second *Critique*.[[60]](#footnote-60) Even though illusion plays a rather more diminished role in the second than it had in the first *Critique*, it could only be a reflection of the importance of disputing the Stoic conception of the highest good, particularly as it is revised and defended by Garve, that Kant devotes his account of illusion in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason to it.[[61]](#footnote-61)

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1. For representative discussions of these topics, see respectively: Denis 2005; Beck 1960, pp. 244-5 and Silber 1959; Reath 1988 and Pasternack 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Among the exceptions are Schmucker 1961 (pp. 313-16), Düsing 1971, and Chance and Pasternack 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See C 27:247; cf. M I 27:1400, and HN 6624 (19:116). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For a slightly different presentation of the ancient context for Kant’s discussion see Düsing 1971, pp. 7-14. Kant’s own presentation is (as Düsing also notes; cf. p. 7) informed throughout by Johann Jakob Brucker’s presentation in his *Historia critica philosophiae* (vol. 1) and likely also directly by Cicero’s discussion in *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, especially with respect to the consideration of the Epicurean and Stoic positions. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cf. Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum.* I, 29. (In what follows I will use the following abbreviations for Cicero’s texts, which are cited according to the Loeb Classical Library editions: *De finibus bonorum et malorum* [*Fin.*] and *De officiis* [*Off*.]). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Again, see *Fin.*: “Once, however, we understand the highest ends, once we know what the ultimate good and evil is, then we have a path through life, a model of all our duties, to which each of our actions can thereby be referred” (V.15-16). On this, compare K 10-11: “Man mus sich in allen Stukken zuerst ein Muster concipiren, wornach alles kann beurtheilt werden”; cf. also C 27:247 and M I 27:1400. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See NE 1099a31–b6. That Aristotle figures little in Kant’s discussion likely reflects Cicero’s own exclusion of him (and Plato) in his treatment of the topic in *De finibus*; see also Louden 2015, pp. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For these points, see P 27:104, 117; and HN 6874, 19:188. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See P 27:104-5, HN 6874, 19:188; and M II 29:603. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. On this, see K 17; P 27:105, 118; M I 27:1402; HN 6882, 19:191; HN 6894, 19:196-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. In addition to the citations in previous note, see HN 6583, 19:94; HN 6601, 19:104-5; K 14; and C 27:248-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Here, see C 27:249; M I 27:1402; HN 6874, 19:188; and M II 29:600. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. HN 6607, 19:106 and HN 6879, 19:189-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For Kant’s apology see K 18-19; P 27:100, 103-4; M I 27:1402; M II 29:604. Kant’s defense of Epicurus (against, among others’, Cicero’s objections in *Fin.* II) is probably indebted to Brucker’s; cf. Brucker 1742, vol. 1, pp. 1299-1302. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. M I 27:1403: “*Da er also die Sittlichkeit zum Mittel der Glückseeligkeit machte, so entriß er der Tugend den Werth*.” [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See also HN 6607, 19:106; K 19; M I 27:1403; and HN 6880, 19:190. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See HN 6872, 19:187: “Das *summum bonum* der philosophischen secten konte nur statt finden, wenn man annahm, der Mensch könne dem moralischen Gesetze adaeqvat seyn.” [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See K 15; P 27:103; C 27:249; M I 27:1402; M II 603-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Cf. also HN 6611, 19:109: “das stoische Ideal bestand in der Gewalt und Herrschaft über alle Neigungen.” [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. On the notion of a flattering ethics see C 27:302-3 and Dyck 2012, pp. 41-2, 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See HN 6584, 19:96: “Die Stoiker [machten eine Chimäre] aus ihrem Weisen, der als ein ideal richtig war, aber als eine wirkliche Vorschrift des Menschlichen Verhaltens thörigt.” [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See for instance Kant’s distinction between the ancients and the moderns on this question in HN 6624, 19:116. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See also HN 6876, 19:189. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See also HN 6838, 19:176; HN 6858, 19:181; and P 27:137. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. For discussion of this case, see Förster 2000, pp. 119-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See Feder/Garve 1782, pp. 45-6; Sassen 2000, p. 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The two works referred to here, both of which appeared in 1783, are the translation, published as *Abhandlung über die menschlichen Pflichten* (Garve 1783a), and the three-volume commentary *Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen zu Cicero’s Büchern von den Pflichten* (Garve 1783b [cited according to volume, page number]). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See van der Zande 1998, p. 75 for details. On Friedrich’s interest in the project, see Bonnell 1855, and Wölfel 1987, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Friedrich II 1780, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Garve 1802, p. 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See Garve 1803, pp. 327-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See Garve 1803, p. 331. See Bonnell 1855, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. On the twists and turns of this part of the project, see Wölfel 1987, xxxviii-xli. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. For the king’s remarks, see Garve 1804, p. 278-9. Friedrich was less interested in Garve’s voluminous and unsystematic commentary, which was a profound disappointment to Garve; cf. Wölfel 1987, pp. xli-xlii; and Zande 1998, p. 80 and n15. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See Bonnell 1855, p. 11; and van der Zande 1998, pp. 78-9, and n11. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. For this characterization of Garve’s brand of popular philosophy, and Cicero’s importance for it, see van der Zande 1995, pp. 424-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For other points of agreement, see von der Zande 1998, pp. 80-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See Cicero, *Fin*. III.48 and for discussion, IV.74-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Garve does not think that this makes considerations of character and the internal worth of actions irrelevant; rather he claims that character, and not our satisfaction with the effects of actions, remain the focus of moral appraisal (Garve 1783b I, p. 29) and that it remains one the principal truths of Stoicism that good actions have far more in common than their divergent effects in the world would suggest, even if this truth is “viel zu stark ausgedrückt” (I, p. 38). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. For Garve’s full discussion, see 1783b, I, pp. 184-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See also van der Zande 1998, pp. 89-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Interestingly, a later translator of Cicero’s text, C. G. Tilling, renders the title as *Über das höchste Gut und über das höchste Übel* (1789) citing Garve’s contention in this passage (as well as Kant’s remark that the highest good has been neglected by the moderns in the KprV; cf. 5:64-5) as his inspiration (see Tilling 1789, p. vii). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Garve’s discussion of whether religion is necessary or only useful for morality near the end of the essay; Garve 1783b, II, pp. 69-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. So he claims that “Der Glaube an einen Gott schafft nicht die Idee der Tugend: aber er fixirt sie” (Garve 1783b, II, p. 26), likewise that religion is not “die Grundlage der moralischen Gesinnungen” but nonetheless must be regarded as a “Begleiterin” (II, p. 48), and that religion strengthens “was schon von guten Neigungen da ist” (II, p. 75). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Garve does allow that, as a result of the fact that the moral laws (“nach welchen wir unsre Handlungen einrichten *sollen*”) are distinguished from the laws of physical nature (“wornach das Weltall *wirkt*” —Garve 1783b, II, p. 49 [my emphases]), virtue has only a small and weak foundation (“*Grundlage*”) and faces endless obstacles. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Garve 1783b, II, p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. See Bonnell 1855, 6-7 and van der Zande 1998, p. 77n6. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Cf. Feder/Garve 1782, p. 47; Sassen 2000, p. 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The full review was published in an appendix to vols. 37-52 (2. Abtheilung) in Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1783) pp. 838-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Garve 1783c, p. 856; cf. Sassen 2000, p. 73 (as Sassen notes, Garve erroneously refers to the ‘understanding [*Verstande*]’ here rather than to *reason*). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Garve 1783c p. 856; cf. Sassen 2000, p. 73 (translation amended). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Garve, review, p. 857; Sassen, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. On this, see the Vorarbeit to the *Prolegomena*, AA 23:60 and Baum 2020, p. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. See Garve 1803, p. 332 and p. 334. Kant owned copies of the first editions of each; see Warda 1922, p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Hamann to Herder, March 28, 1785: “Aus dem Anhang gegen Garve scheint nichts geworden zu seyn; vielmehr soll er dies Werk verkürzt haben” (Hamann 1965, p. 402). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. See for instance Allison 2011, pp. 80-6. The influence of Garve’s translation of Ciceroon the positive doctrine Kant elaborates in the *Groundwork* is widely debated; for discussion, see Reich 1939, Gilbert 1994, Wood 2006 (especially pp. 361-5), and Baum 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. One additional important circumstance to note, albeit one that is widely overlooked, is the personal involvement of Friedrich II (1740-86) in Garve’s Cicero project (which involvement is clearly outlined in Garve’s dedication at the outset of the translation itself). This could have been a factor in Kant’s final decision not to engage in direct criticism of Cicero’s *De officiis* or Garve himself in the *Groundwork*. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. On this, contrast Beck 1966, p. 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. For the objection, see Garve 1792, pp. 111-16, and for discussion see Walschots 2017, pp. 287-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Contrast Albrecht 1978, p. 119, and Sala 2004, pp. 269-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. My thanks to Stefanie Buchenau, Lawrence Pasternack, Michael Walschots, and Johan van der Zande for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)