ROUTLEDGE REVIVALS

The Greatest Happiness Principle

An Examination of Utilitarianism

Lanny Ebenstein

Routledge Revivals

The Greatest Happiness Principle

First published in 1991, *The Greatest Happiness Principle* traces the history of the theory of utility, starting with the Bible, and running through Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. It goes on to discuss the utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in detail, commenting on the latter's view of the Christianity of his day and his optimal socialist society. The book argues that the key theory of utility is fundamentally concerned with happiness, stating that happiness has largely been left out of discussions of utility. It also goes on to argue that utility can be used as a moral theory, ultimately posing the question, what is happiness?

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

The Greatest Happiness Principle

An Examination of Utilitarianism

by Lanny Ebenstein

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

First published in 1991
by Garland Publishing, Inc.

This edition first published in 2018 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 1991 Lanny O. Ebenstein

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Publisher's Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

Disclaimer
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact.

A Library of Congress record exists under LCCN: 91010263

ISBN 13: 978-0-8153-6234-0 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-1-351-11247-5 (ebk)

THE GREATEST HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE

An Examination of Utilitarianism

Alan O. Ebenstein

GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC.
New York ——— London
1991

Works by
ALAN O. EBENSTEIN

Great Political Thinkers (5th edition) (co-author)
Introduction to Political Thinkers (co-author)
The Greatest Happiness Principle: An Examination of Utilitarianism

Copyright © 1991 by Alan O. Ebenstein
All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ebenstein, Alan O.
The greatest happiness principle: an examination of utilitarianism/
Alan O. Ebenstein.
p. cm.—(Political theory and political philosophy)
Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)—London School of
Economics and Political Science, 1988.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8153-0134-0 (alk. paper)
1. Utilitarianism—History. 2. Happiness—History. I. Title. II. Series.
B843.E24 1991
171'.5—dc20 91-10263

To THOMAS S. SCHROCK,
Teacher and Friend

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Preface

Although of ancient origins, the theory of utility in modern times rose on the intellectual firmament in the late 1700s, and burst on it in the 1800s. Primarily and predominantly through the work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, but also through that of Henry Sidgwick, utilitarianism for a time enlightened the fields of morality and politics. The theory of utility was sufficiently well-known to allow Sidgwick to write in his 1874 *The Methods of Ethics*: "The term utilitarianism is, at the present day, in common use, and is supposed to designate a doctrine or method with which we are all familiar."[1]

Utilitarianism has seen, however, lesser days in the twentieth century. In this century it has become bogged down in the questions of teleologism vs. deontologism, act utilitarianism vs. rule utilitarianism, total utility vs. average utility, empirical hedonism vs. ethical hedonism, and consequentialism, among others. To the extent that these types of questions have dominated the discussion of the theory, it has faded from view. The important question, therefore, now facing utilitarianism is whether its sun has indeed set, or whether it has been but temporarily eclipsed, and will reappear to cast its light on ethical and empirical subjects.

Utilitarianism, in its classic form, is simple: maximization of happiness is the *summum bonum*; individuals act according to pleasure and pain. The purpose of this book is to examine the classical theory of utility as expounded by its principal English-speaking proponents and opponent, as well as to more briefly note some of the theory's history and discuss various issues connected with it.

Several individuals assisted in the writing of *The Greatest Happiness Principle: An Examination of Utilitarianism*, which served as the author's Ph.D. dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1988. Dr. Frederick Rosen gave valuable assistance in the original writing of the chapter on Bentham. Mr. John Charvet was the author's acting supervisor for a time, and reviewed an early paper on Bentham and Mill. Professor Maurice W. Cranston was the author's supervisor, and provided advice on all aspects of the dissertation, and much personal encouragement.

---

[1] Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 411.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Table of Contents

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

INTRODUCTION

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

The Declaration of Independence

Introduction

There are four great issues involved in the theory of utility as a moral theory: 1) what is its object, 2) does the theory enjoin men to consider only the consequences of actions, with little (if any) regard to actions themselves, 3) is the theory maximalist, in that it directs us to maximize "the good" -- whatever this may turn out to be, and 4) recognizing that the goal of the theory of utility is happiness, what, exactly, is happiness? As an empirical theory, there is one issue facing the theory of utility: is its psychological explanation of the motive behind all human actions, that we act according to our calculations of the happiness and unhappiness that actions bring to us personally, true; and its corollary, is this empirical theory consistent with the theory of utility as a moral theory?

My purpose here is to trace the history of the theory of utility, starting with the Bible, and running through Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus; to discuss the utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in great detail, commenting also on the latter's view of the Christianity of his day and his optimal, socialist society; to consider the non-utilitarian theory of John Rawls; and to offer views on a new theory of utility. In the appendices, I discuss the utility and justice, Henry Sidgwick's utilitarian contributions, various utilitarian writers, glimpses of a utilitarian future, free will and determinism, teleologism and deontologism and consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and why happiness.

Reading much modern utilitarian literature (for and against), one would think that the central concern of the theory of utility is consequences. This is far from the case. What the theory of utility is concerned with, in its classic variant, is happiness. This is its key issue, not whether actions should be performed for their consequences or themselves. So far has this latter issue taken over the theory of utility, in fact, that discussions of happiness are almost non-existent in many contemporary expositions or criticisms of the theory of utility. This dearth of discussion is a real shame, because the essential definition of utility as inerradicably relating to happiness is crystal-clear (or at least was, to the theory's founders),

and because discussions of happiness are more interesting and worthwhile, or so it seems to me, than those relating exclusively to means and ends.

Regarding consequences, a discussion of this topic is unquestionably a part of the theory of utility, although, as has just been stated, far too much attention has been paid to these, and not enough, recently, to happiness. The subject of consequences, despite the attention it has received, is a non-started. Obviously, actions are performed both for themselves and their consequences, with more stress laid on one of these components in some actions than in others (going on a picnic is an action likely to be done for itself; saving for retirement is more likely to be done for its consequences). Moreover and essentially, future consequences very often determine what present actions are. Consider, for example, the non-frivolous case of an attempt to kill Hitler during World War II: should such an attempt be considered as murder, a grave moral wrong, or as salvation, a way of saving millions of lives, a great moral right? Future consequences (or, at least, intended future consequences in terms of ascribing personal liability or credit for actions) affect what present actions should be considered. All attempts to rigidly split existing occurrences and their consequences are doomed to failure. Again, though, the central concern of the theory of utility is happiness.

Rawls' predominant criticism of the theory of utility is that it is teleological or maximalist, that it directs people to produce the maximum of the good, which it defines as happiness (or, in Rawls' terms, "the satisfaction of rational desire"[1]). This criticism, despite the prominence that Rawls gives to it, appears unsustainable to me. Assuming that the good, whatever it is considered to be -- happiness, justice, virtue, truth, some combination of these, etc. -- is capable of being considered in maximalist and minimalist terms, what should the correct end of ethics be: to minimize the good or consider it

irrelevant?* It may, of course be very difficult to measure the good, especially in such interpersonal intangibles as happiness; however, as Bentham argues, we have to do the best we systematically can when measuring happiness (or, for that matter, every other definition of the good), rather than being paralyzed in our actions.

The final great issue, identified here, involving the theory of utility as a moral theory, after what the object of the theory is, what the importance to the theory that consequences are, and the theory's maximalist edict, is, what exactly is happiness (recognizing that this is the goal of the theory of utility)? This question strikes, or should strike, at the root of the theory and discussions of it.

In Chapters I, II, III, the roles of happiness in the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus are considered. This discussion breaks genuinely new utilitarian ground, and shows an otherwise unsuspected thread running through much of our intellectual heritage. In chapters IV and V, Bentham's and Mill's Theories of Utility, respectively, the contributions of these two leaders in utilitarian thought are portrayed. One premise here is that little of value has been written on the theory of utility in this century. With all due respect to twentieth century proponents, opponents, and commentators on the subject, such as R. M. Hare, J. J. C. Smart, Bernard Williams, David Lyons, J. O. Urmson, and even such philosophical greats as George Edward Moore and F. H. Bradley, their writings simply do not capture the pith, nor convey the meaning of the theory of utility, as well or as clearly as Bentham's and Mill's works do. The great exception to this dearth of significant contributions to the theory of utility in the twentieth century would,

*Rawls does not consider the issue of maximalization to be related to that of consequences. In *A Theory of Justice*, he states: "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy," and "one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable."[2]

of course, appear to be the work of Rawls; however, as shall be seen, *A Theory of Justice* is worthy of notice to the theory of utility almost exclusively for negative reasons. The answers to most of the questions of most latter commentators can be found in Bentham and Mill. To the extent that they are not, it is usually because later commentators are barking up the wrong tree. The most may be learned about the theory of utility through a return to its seminal sources. After this, the theory may be proceeded to being viewed afresh.

The fundamental contributions of Bentham and Mill to ethical thought are three: 1) the insistence that any complete ethical theory be capable of being carried out, 2) the reassertion that happiness is the correct end of life, combined with the redefinition of happiness, and 3) moving the locus of moral justification from external acts to internal feelings. Each of these contributions was a breakthrough, and each will receive considerable amplification in the course of this dissertation. For now, it is appropriate to comment briefly on each one of these.

One of the great criticisms which has been made of Bentham's and Mill's ethical theories is that they postulate too low a conception of the moral equation -- that all that individuals should care about is their own pleasures and pains. This criticism is off the mark for at least two reasons. Firstly, the criticism is prima facie incorrect because both Bentham and Mill, especially Bentham, are quite careful to distinguish between how men do act, and how they should. Neither Bentham nor Mill holds that men should (in a moral sense) care only about themselves; rather, each man's theory of utility quite explicitly enjoins that each should produce the greatest amount of happiness possible, for others as well as one's self. Secondly, though, this criticism misses the target because both Bentham and Mill, in the premise of the question, are being blamed for trying to provide a workable ethic and for trying to explain how that ethic works. What other ethical system, apart from the theory of utility, has tried to show how, and explain why, it is practicable within the bounds of human nature? Furthermore, if it is important that this is done in regard to the theory of utility, then should it not be important for

other ethical systems to do this also? Finally, to the extent that no attempt is made to demonstrate how other ethical systems can be put into operation, or they are incapable of so being, how good or complete can these other ethical systems be considered to be? While Bentham's and Mill's reconciliation of Is and Should may not fully be agreed with, we should at least give them credit for identifying and trying to resolve this issue.

The second fundamental contribution of Bentham and Mill to ethical thought was their reassertion that happiness is the correct aim of life, combined with their redefinition of happiness. Bentham was not the first writer to build a system of morals on happiness. What he did, though, more than any other writer before him, was to carry the system through to its logical conclusions. Bentham's and Mill's essential message is that happiness, or (to them) the state in which pleasures exceed pains, is good, and the only good. They sought to free men from a dark age which not only often declared that happiness was irrelevant, but that it was bad. They sufficiently redirected moral discussion so that happiness, expressed in one way or another, has never been far from the forefront in ethical discussions and government actions. Moreover, Bentham and Mill sought to redefine happiness. They did not accept conventions of their day which called many pleasures, pains; and pains, pleasures. If happiness is all that matters, then it is of the utmost importance exactly how happiness is defined. Mill's and Bentham's redirection of ethical thought, combined with their belief that in measuring happiness, each one's happiness is of equal worth, leads us to see that their ideal of ultimate improvement for humanity is a world in which everyone is joyful.

The third, and final, fundamental contribution of Bentham and Mill to ethical thought was their switch of the locus of moral justification from external acts to internal feelings. While this point will require much clarification, it is adequate for now to call attention to it, and to comment that Bentham and Mill believed that internal feelings are all that ultimately matter (these are, after all, what pleasures and pains are). External actions, Bentham and Mill thought, are only important insofar as the internal feelings which

they cause are. Furthermore, Bentham and especially Mill thought that mental happiness states, such as friendship and morality, are a type of internal feeling of the highest sort.

The attempt will be made in chapter IV to explicate Bentham's theory of utility as revealed in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (with reference to other work) and to demonstrate that it is a more subtle and valuable doctrine than that which it is usually considered to be. Bentham's theories are still current. As Ronald Dworkin writes in *Taking Rights Seriously* (reffering to the prevailing, as opposed to his liberal theory of law), "Both parts of the ruling theory [of law] derive from the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham."[3] The major allegations which have historically been made against Bentham (in addition to that he is a moral infant, who believes we should care only about our own pleasures and pains) are: 1) that he does not discriminate between different pleasures and pains, and 2) that his conception of pleasure and pain is that of a Philistine's. These charges are rebutted, and Bentham's ethical theory, and theories of pleasure and pain, (presenting, for the first time, the two components -- intensity and duration -- of which Bentham thinks that pleasures and pains are composed) are explained. Bentham is also shown to have a more sympathetic conception of man than is usually considered, and not to rely over-excessively on calculation. It is essential to separate Bentham's ethical and empirical theories.

Mill's theory of utility is the best known variant of the theory. Since the publication of his essay *Utilitarianism* in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1861, his ideas have certainly impacted the ethical world. If they have not always carried the day, then they have at least established an intellectual framework within which ethical arguments have often been argued. Mill's theory of utility is at once more noble and, perhaps, less realistic than Bentham's -- more noble, because Mill has a greater vision of man's potential; less realistic, because it may be argued that Mill's vision of man exceeds our reach.

The crux of the theory of utility is this: men should promote the happiness of others, they do promote their own happiness. How are these two positions to be reconciled? The answer, Mill believes, is

that mankind are able to learn a more exalted view of pleasure -- that the happiness of each is solely found in the happiness of all. Mill attempts to cut the Gordian knot of Is and Should by stating that, ultimately, there should be no difference between the two.

In chapter V, Mill's theory of utility is shown as a more coherent and forceful teaching than what it is usually given credit for being. Further, that many commentators have not perceived the breadth of scope and richness of Mill's theory as a whole. The attempt is made here to demonstrate that because of misperception (and Mill's sometimes inadequate presentation in *Utilitarianism*), attacks on his theory may often be against ramparts which are in actuality well guarded. One of my endeavors, in this chapter, is to fill in some of the gaps in vision which Mill's presentation of his theory allows. This chapter begins with a presentation of Mill's largely disguised criticism of the Christianity of his day in *On Liberty*, and concludes with a description of the socialist system Mill believed would lead to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

One of the major arguments of chapter V is that what Mill roughly means by quality and quantity of pleasures Bentham designated by intensity and duration. Heretofore, Mill's conception of qualities in pleasure has been roughly criticized:

> A consistent utilitarian can scarcely hold the difference of *quality* in pleasure in any sense: for if they differ otherwise than in what, speaking largely, may be called *quantity*, they are not mutually comparable. [John Grote, *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*][4]
>
> another position which Mill maintains in opposition to Bentham: the recognition of differences of quality in pleasures distinct from and overriding differences of quantity. [*Henry Sidwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics*][5]
>
> Are pleasures, *as* pleasures, distinguishable by anything else than quality? [F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*][6]
>
> Mill also recognizes qualitative differences. Thus at one stroke, Mill destroys the whole basis of the felicific calculus. [R. P. Anschultz, *The Philosophy of J. S. Mill*][7]

> What, on a utilitarian view, can a *better* pleasure be other than a *greater* one? If it is better because nobler, then we have introduced nobility as an independant value -- unless we can return to quantities of pleasure by an indirect route, and claim that we maximize happiness in quantitative terms by by encouraging as many people as possible to aim at "higher" pleasures. [Alan Ryan, *J. S. Mill*][8]

The argument here, if correct, is a significant contribution to Mill scholarship.

John Rawls is the great modern expositor of the theory of utility. Although Rawls is against the theory, he clearly considers its maximalist directive to be the dominant modern mind-set (knowingly or otherwise) and contrary to justice. In chapter VI, effort is expended rebutting Rawls' theory of justice on its own, non-utilitarian, premises. Additionally, it is argued that the theory of utility would be chosen by the correct application of Rawls' premises.

A Theory of Justice is deep and vast. To attempt to challenge it in a single chapter is a daunting task. Nonetheless, this task is attempted, both because of the considerable importance of *A Theory of Justice* to utilitarian thinking and because of its highly questionable positions when it is closely read. Rawls' fundamental position is that, in society, some may not have their advantages cut for the greater gains of others. "It may be expedient," Rawls writes, "but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper."[9] Does Rawls really mean this? After all, in any circumstance other than that of universal plenty, it is the essential function of society to determine who gets less and who gets more, and some receiving less in order that others (hopefully, a greater number) receive more is an irremediable part of life. How, therefore, can Rawls make this his central tenant? Furthermore, the principle by which Rawls applies this position is the "difference principle."[10] This holds that a loss to a less fortunate person can never be compensated for by a gain to a more fortunate person. Once again, does Rawls really mean this? Are there no circumstances where a loss to the less-advantaged, no matter how tiny, cannot be

compensated by a greater gain to more-advantaged people? While Rawls states at one point in *A Theory of Justice* that cases such as the preceding cannot exist, [11] this is to beg the question, for it is precisely in the cases where moral or ethical systems produce different answers that they can be compared, and one system pronounced superior or inferior to another. Furthermore, when carefully examined, Rawls' positions on basic liberties, the family, eugenics, and redress approach the amazing. While, again, it can hardly be believed that Rawls means what he writes, if he realizes what he writes, this is no exculpation.

Chapter VII, "A New Theory of Utility" is isogetic. In it, I give my view of the justification of happiness as the moral end as it is an inner state, not an external attribute.

Appendix A, "Utility and Justice," and the other appendices are ancillary to the chapters of the thesis. In appendix A, I consider four notions of justice -- natural justice, justice as desert, justice as morality, and justice as equality. I try to show that the theory of utility is compatible with each of these conceptions.

Henry Sidgwick wrote when the theory of utility was at its greatest popular extent. Sidgwick raises some questions in utilitarian thought, namely -- average utility versus total utility, the distribution of happiness, and the rights of future generations -- which are not considered in depth by Bentham or Mill. In Appendix B, these subjects are discussed. Appendix C continues the thread started in the first three chapters by, very briefly, considering utilitarian writings of various philosophers, including twentieth century ones.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 25.

2. *Ibid.*, 30, 6.

3. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London : Duckworth , 1984), vii.

4. John Grote, An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy (Cambridge : Deighton, Bell, and Co., 1870), 52.

5. Henry Sidwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, with an additional chapter by Alban G. Widgery (London : MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), 247.

6. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1924), 116.

7. R. P. Anschultz, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1969), 18.

8. Alan Ryan, J. S. Mill (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 110-111.

9. *Ibid.*, 15.

10. *Ibid.*, 76.

11. *Ibid.*, 157-158.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albee, Ernest. *A History of English Utilitarianism.* New York: Collier Books, 1962.

Anschutz, R. P. *The Philosophy of J. S. Mill.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Aristotle. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (ed. Richard McKeon). New York: Random House, 1941.

Armstrong, D.M. *Bodily Sensations.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.

Atkinson, C.M. *Jeremy Bentham.* London: Methuen and Co., 1905.

Ayer, A.J. *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982.

Baumgardt, David. *Bentham and the Ethics of Today.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952.

Bentham, Jeremy. *A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (edited with an introduction by Wilfrid Harrison). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948.

_____. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart). Great Britain: The Athlone Press, 1970.

_____. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart). London and New York: Methuen, 1982.

_____. *Bentham Manuscript.* [stored in the University College, London Library]

_____. *Bentham's Political Thought* (ed. Bhikhu Parekh). London: Croom Helm, 1973.

_____. *Constitutional Code*, volume I (eds. F. Rosen and J. H. Burns). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

_____. *Deontoloty Together with a Table of the Springs of Action and the Article on Utilitarianism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

_____. *The Works of Jeremy Bentham,* volumes I, II, X, and XI (ed. John Bowring). Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843.

Berger, Fred R. *Happiness, Justice, and Freedom.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Berlin, Isaiah. *Four Essays on Liberty.* London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Blocker, H. G. and Smith, E.H. (ed.'s). *John Rawls's Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction.* Athens: Ohio University press, 1980.

Boralevi, Lea Campos. *Bentham and the Oppressed.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1984.

Bosanquet, Bernard. *The Philosophical Theory of the State.* London: MacMillan and Co., 1920.

Bouton, Clark W. "John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and History;" *The Western Political Quarterly,* XVIII (September, 1965), 569-578.

Bradley, F. H. *Ethical Studies.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.

Burke, Edmund. *Selected Writings and Speeches* (ed. Peter J. Stanlis). Chicago, Illinois: Regnery Gateway, 1963.

Carr, Robert. "The Religious Thought of John Stuart Mill: A Study in Reluctant Scepticism," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* XXIII (October, 1962), 475-495.

Church, George J. "Can the World Survive Economic Growth?," *Time,* vol. 99 (January 24, 1972).

Cranston, Maurice. *Freedom.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967.

_____. *John Locke: A biography.* New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957.

_____. *John Stuart Mill.* Great Britain: Unwin Brothers Ltd., 1958.

_____. "J. S. Mill as a Political Philosopher," *History Today*, 8 (1958), 38-41.

Cumming, Robert D. "Mill's History of His Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXV (April, 1964), 235-256.

Daniels, Norman (ed.). *Reading Rawls.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980.

de Crespigny, Anthony, and Minogue, Kenneth (eds.). *Contemporary Political Philosophers.* London: Methuen and Co., 1976.

Devlin, Patrick. *The Enforcement of Morals.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Ebenstein, Lanny. "Mill's Theory of Utility," *Philosophy*, LX (October, 1985), 539-543.

Ebenstein, William. *Great Political Thinkers.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969.

_____. *Political Thought in Perspective.* New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957.

_____. "John Stuart Mill: Democrat, Liberal, Socialist?," *Il Politico*, XXXIX (1974), 194-209.

_____. *The Pure Theory of Law.* South Hackensack, New Jersey: Rothman Reprints, Inc., 1969.

Everett, Charles W. *Jeremy Bentham.* New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966.

Frankl, Victor E. *Man's Search for Meaning.* New York: Pocket Books, 1963.

Fraser, Derek. *The Evolution of the British Welfare State.* Hong Kong: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982.

Friedman, Milton and Freidman, Rose D. *Free to Choose.* New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1980.

Friedman, Richard B. "A New Exploration of Mill's Essay on Liberty," Political Studies, XIV (October, 1966), 281-304.

Frohse, Franz, Brodel, Max, and Schlossberg, Leon. *Atlas of Human Anatomy*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1970.

Gorovitz, Samuel (ed.). Utilitarianism with Critical Essays. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971.

Gray, John N. "John Stuart Mill: *Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations*," Literature of Liberty, II (April, 1979), 7-37.

Grote, John. *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, and Co., 1870.

Halévy, Elie. *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (with a preface by A. D. Lindsay). London: Faber and Faber Ltds., 1934.

Halliday, R. J. *John Stuart Mill*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1976.

Hare, Richard Mervyn. *Freedom and Reason*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Harrison, Ross. *Bentham*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.

Hart, H. L. A. *Essays on Bentham*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

_____. *Law, Liberty, and Morality*. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Hitler, Adolph. *Mein Kampf*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil* (edited with an introduction by Michael Oakeshott). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.

Holloway, Harry. "Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XVIII (September, 1965), 569-576.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Joad, C.E.M. *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics.* London: Victor Golancz Ltd., 1938.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason.* New York: Dutton, 1978.

Koestler, Arthur. *Darkness at Noon.* New York: Time Inc. Book Division, 1962.

Lichtman, Richard. "The Surface and Substance of Mill's Defense of Freedom," *Social Research,* XXX (Winter, 1963), 469-494.

Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (collated and annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser). New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959.

Lyons, David. *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Mabbott, J. D. "Interpretations of Mill's 'Utilitarianism'," *Philosophical Quarterly,* VI (April, 1956), 115-120.

Mack, Mary P. *Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas.* London: Heineman, 1962.

Marx, Karl. *The Grundisse* , edited and translated by David McLellan. New York : Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971.

McCloskey, H. J. *John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study.* Great Britain: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press, Ltd.), 1971.

Mill, James. *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (with notes by Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, and George Grote; edited with additional notes by John Stuart Mill). London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1878.

_____. Essay on Government. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1977.

Mill, John Start. *A System of Logic.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1879

_____. *Autobiography* (with an introduction by Currin V. Shields. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1979.

_____. *Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. [v. X of the collected works]

_____. *Mills on Bentham and Coleridge* (introduction by F. R. Leavis). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

_____. *Mill's Essays on Literature and Society* (edited with and introduction by J. B. Schneewind). New York: Collier Books, 1965.

_____. *Nature and Utility of Religion* (edited with an introduction by George Nakhnikian). Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957.

_____. *On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government* (edited with an Introduction by R. B. McCallum). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.

_____. *On Liberty, Representative Government, and the Subjection of Women*. Great Britain: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press) Ltd., 1981.

_____. *Principles of Political Economy*. New York: The Colonial Press, 1900.

_____. *The Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography* (ed. Jack Stillinger). Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

_____. The Later Letters, 1849-1873 (ed.'s F. E. Mineka and D. N. Lindley). University of Toronto Press, 1972. [v. XVI of the collected works]

_____. *Theism* (edited with an introduction by Richard Taylor. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957.

_____. *Utilitarianism*, On Liberty, and Representative Government (ed. H. B. Acton). London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1980.

Miller, Harlan B. and Williams, William H. (eds.). *The Limits of Utilitarianism*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Miller, Kenneth E. "Mill on International Relations," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXII (October, 1961), 493-514.

Milne, A. J. M. *Freedom and Rights*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968.

Moore, George E. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Murray, Rosalind. *Time and the Timeless*. London: Centenary Press, 1942.

Naisbitt, John. *Megatrends*. London and Sydney: Macdonald and Co., 1984.

Nozick, Robert. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

Office of U. S. Management and Budget. *The Budget of the United States Government. Historical Tables*. 1986/87.

Pappé, H. O. "Mill and Tocqueville," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXV (April, 1964), 217-234.

Plamenatz, John. *The English Utilitarians*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

Plato. *Laws* (translated with notes and an interpretive essay by Thomas L. Pangle). New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980).

_____. *The Collected Dialogues* (eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (volume I). London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.

_____. *Unended Quest*. Great Britain: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1982.

Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Rees, J. C. "A Phase in the Development of Mill's Ideas on Liberty," *Political Studies,* VI (February, 1958), 33-44.

Robson, John M. *The Improvement of Mankind.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.

Rosen, Frederick. *Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Ross, W. D. *Aristotle.* London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923.

Ryan, Alan. *J. S. Mill.* London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.

Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Mill: *A Collection of Critical Essays.* Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1968.

Semmel, Bernard. *John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984.

Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (eds.). *Utilitarianism and Beyond.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Sidgwick, Henry. *Outlines of the History of Ethics* (with an additional chapter by Alban G. Widgery). London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1954.

_____. *The Methods of Ethics.* Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1981.

Skousen, W. Cleon. *The Five Thousand Year Leap.* Salt Lake City, Utah: The Freeman Institute, 1981.

Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard (eds.). *Utilitarianism: For and Against.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982.

Stephen, Leslie. *The English Utilitarians.* London Bradford. Lund Humphries, 1950.

Ten, C. L. *Mill on Liberty.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

The Constitution of the United States.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1986 (106th edition). Washington, D.C., 1985.

Warnock, Mary. *Ethics Since 1900* (third edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

West, E. G. "Liberty and Education: John Stuart Mill's Dilemma," *Philosophy*, XL (April, 1965), 115-120.

Wilkins, Burleigh T. "Intention and Criminal Responsibility," *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 2, No. 2, 1985.

_____ and Zelikovitz, Kelly M. "Principles for Individual Actions," *Philosophia*, December, 1984.

Willey, Basil. *Nineteenth Century Studies.* London: Chatto and Windus, 1949.