COSMOPOLITANISM AND PLACE

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The Loss of Confidence in the World

Josep E. Corbí

In this chapter, I focus on the experience of torture and, more specifically, on Jean Améry’s account of it in his book *At the Mind’s Limits*. There he claims that the loss of confidence in the world is the most devastating effect he experienced as a victim of torture. I thus explore what cosmopolitan aspiration may be revealed by this loss and also discuss whether it is to be discredited as an irrational reaction on the victim’s side or instead as proportional to the facts and, consequently, as relevant to the conditions under which a certain cosmopolitan aspiration could be achieved or, at least, favored.

More specifically, the structure of this chapter goes as follows. In the first section, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, torture has three poles, namely: the victim, the torturer, and third agents. The notion of confidence in the world plays a central function in my line of argument and is expressed in terms of two expectations of protection, namely: (a) “Nobody will illegitimately hurt me” and (b) “If someone illegitimately hurts me (or I am in a state of need), someone else will come to help and protect me.” In the second section, I argue that these two expectations manifest a cosmopolitan aspiration insofar as they constitutively involve an appeal to third agents, and, in this respect, they constitutively address the world. Some people might object that these two expectations can hardly express a cosmopolitan aspiration because, even though they address the world, they are only concerned with the particular agent who bears them. In the third section, I motivate the use of “me” to characterize the content of such expectations, but argue that they go beyond the particular person who holds them to embrace everyone. And, yet, this projection onto everyone’s expectations departs from the sort of impartiality that a Kantian approach may demand, since our expectations of protection (and the corresponding cosmopolitan aspiration) are anchored to our identity in ways a Kantian approach can hardly allow for.

Once the content of our expectations of protection have thus been specified, I take up, in the two last sections, the issue about the rationality of their loss. Thus I argue that the loss of confidence in the world can hardly be regarded as an irrational sequel of a traumatic experience; on the contrary, I defend the rationality of the process by which the victim of serious harm may become deprived of this
confidence. I conclude that an attitude of confidence in the world rests on an illusion that third agents (and the torturer) cannot help being trapped by. This brings to light a profound sense in which the unredeemed victim feels exiled from the human world for only her life is being shaped by a most poignant truth: the impossibility of a world where a fundamental cosmopolitan aspiration is fulfilled, that is, a world that could be trusted.

The Three Poles of Torture and the Loss of Confidence in the World

Paradigmatically, torture takes place in an isolated cell. There, the victim suffers the pain inflicted by the torturer. Only two poles are apparently involved in such an act: after all, “every weapon has two ends.” Think then of a weapon pointing at you. You will inevitably sense the vulnerability of your flesh in front of the cutting edge, but what about the person who holds the handle? She experiences instead her own capacity to hurt. Some profound asymmetries seem to exist between the holder of the handle and whoever may face the cutting edge. From an epistemic perspective, the victim experiences her pain as the paradigm of the undeniable, whereas the torturer, despite being in the process of inflicting pain, regards it as something that can be doubted and even denied. From a metaphysical perspective, whoever is confronted with the injuring side of a weapon feels weak and powerless: she is someone who can only be hurt. And the mere fact that her life is being threatened by another human being already counts as harm. On the other hand, the torturer, the one who holds the weapon, is someone who has the power to hurt and kill; as when soldiers are displayed holding their guns or driving their tanks: we perceive their power and also the strength they are convinced they possess, while the injured bodies at the other end of their weapons are easily kept out of sight.

Torture seems then to reflect the bipolar structure of a weapon: the torturer holds the handle while the victim feels her flesh torn by the cutting edge. Yet the content itself of the victim’s experience, as well as the role that interrogation is supposed to play in that context, suggest that some other people may also be essentially involved. To motivate this point, I argue that an appeal to third agents lies at the core of both the victim’s experience and the torturer’s action. As a result, I conclude that, despite appearances to the contrary, torture has constitutively three poles: the torturer, the victim, and third agents. Let us look at the victim’s experience first.

As a victim of torture, Jean Améry claims that a crucial aspect of the harm experienced is *the loss of confidence in the world*:

Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses something we will perhaps temporarily call “trust in the world.” Trust in the world includes all sorts of things: the irrational and logically unjustifiable
belief in absolute causality perhaps, or the likewise blind belief in the validity of the inductive inference. But more important as an element of trust in the world, and in our context what is solely relevant, is the certainty that by reason of written or unwritten social contracts the other person will spare me—more precisely stated, that he will respect my physical, and with it my metaphysical being. The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my self. My skin surface shields me against the external world. If I am to have trust, I must feel on it only what I want to feel.§

Améry finds the concept of human dignity to be of no avail to understanding the psychological impact of the first blow, which he finally identifies as the loss of some expectations. He did not expect anyone to touch his skin unless he allowed them to. He trusted his neighbors to this extent, but suddenly his flesh is intentionally injured by another human being and, as a result, his initial expectation is seriously challenged.

Third agents may feel tempted to represent themselves as mere spectators of that attack, but this temptation goes against a second component of our confidence in the world. We expect nobody to touch our skin unless we would allow them to, but we also expect that someone would come and help us if that primary expectation failed or we were in a state of need. Whenever a person is injured in a traffic accident, she assumes that passersby will soon take care of her plight and call for an ambulance, which will speedily arrive and provide medical aid. Even in war conditions, the Red Cross is supposed to rescue the wounded and bring them to a hospital. It seems then that a response on the side of third agents is constitutive of the expectations that the victim (or the needy) has insofar as she may still trust the world and, thereby, regard it as a hospitable place to dwell in. The victim does not look upon third agents as mere spectators, but as people from whom she expects a certain response. Only on the assumption that such a response will take place, will the victim retain her confidence in the world once the primary expectation has failed. This suggests that third agents cannot coherently conceive of themselves as mere spectators and also preserve their confidence in the world. For the mere fact that they conceived of their own situation in that way, would undermine the conditions under which the world could reasonably be trusted. In the next section, we will see, however, that some robust motivations impel third agents to distance themselves from the victim and to believe instead what the torturer might say to justify her action.

Interrogation and Third Agents

Third agents are present in the torturer's experience in more than one way. Consider, for instance, those cases where torture involves a process of interrogation. Elaine Scarry analyzes the role of interrogation in such cases as follows:
Torture . . . consists of a primary physical act, the infliction of pain, and a primary verbal act, the interrogation. The verbal act, in turn, consists of two parts, “the question” and “the answer,” each with conventional connotations that wholly falsify it. “The question” is mistakenly understood to be “the motive”; “the answer” is mistakenly understood to be “the betrayal.” The first mistake credits the torturer, providing him with a justification, his cruelty with an explanation. The second discredits the prisoner, making him rather than the torturer, his voice rather than his pain, the cause of his loss of self and world. These two misinterpretations are neither accidental nor unrelated. The one is an absolution of responsibility; the other is a conferring of responsibility; the two together turn the moral reality of torture upside down."

The interrogation brings about, as we see, a reversal of the moral significance of torture. Such a reversal is fostered by the way the torturer conceives of her action, but also (and most importantly) by how such an action is perceived by third agents and, to some degree, by the victim herself. The question raised by the torturer is stereotypically regarded as providing the motive, the justification, for the infliction of pain; whereas the answer is interpreted as a betrayal and, consequently, as a symptom of the victim’s moral degradation. This interpretation easily induces third agents (as well as the torturer) to concluding that the victim actually deserves the pain she is being inflicted. For she is viewed as a threat to the hospitable world they and the torturer herself, are at pains to protect. By this means, torture, which was perceived at the outset as a disgusting and almost unintelligible action, emerges now as an urgent and inescapable maneuver of self-defense. But why is it that third agents are so inclined to endorse the torturer’s apology for her act? Why, in the absence of any specific evidence, do they regard the torturer as a defender of the human world and interpret the victim’s eventual answer as a betrayal? There are many mechanisms that allow third agents to look away from the victim’s suffering and side with the torturer’s discourse, but they all seem to be fueled by a fundamental passion: fear and our aversion to it.

Several kinds of fear are, nevertheless, involved. There is, to begin with, fear of being attacked and hurt, no matter whether the assailant is a human being or a tiger. Insofar as the torturer may have a specific reason to assault a certain agent, there is no reason why third agents should be afraid of the weapon eventually turning to them. So, they may dispel their initial anxiety at the perception of the torturer’s act by coming to think that the agent in question actually deserved it or, in general, that there was a reason for the attack that applies specifically to that agent. In the absence of such a reason, the attack would be regarded as arbitrary and unjustified, so that third agents would no longer feel protected from the torturer’s eventual attack.

This fear, as it stands, is entirely unrelated to the humanity of the torturer. Third agents may thus be afraid of the latter in the same sense in which they may
fear a tiger that has escaped the zoo or a bull grazing in the meadow. Yet third agents may feel specifically upset at the idea of regarding another human being (that is, the torturer) as an enemy, as someone who, instead of protecting them, may easily attack them. A certain kind of awareness of such a fact would render the primary expectation, “No one will hurt me,” untenable. This comes as a second fear, a kind of fear that another human being, but not a tiger or a rock, may arouse. This fear comes together with a third one, though. The fear that an agent may have in virtue of a certain kind of awareness of the following counterfactual: “if I were attacked by another human being, no one would come in my defense because everybody would, like myself at present, be paralyzed by fear and, thereby, strongly inclined to find virtue in the torturer’s act.” As a result, third agents will not only be terrified by their perception of the torturer’s arbitrariness, but by their awareness of the fact that, just by becoming a victim, they will appear as enemies to those who were supposed to protect them. This fear has then to do with the discovery that our confidence in the world is ungrounded and, therefore, that the world is, after all, a rather inhospitable place. Related to this, comes out a fourth fear, namely: the fear of guilt, since third agents may find it difficult to meet the demands that the victim legitimately makes upon them, and awareness of this failure would confirm her own contribution to the inhumanity of the world she dwells in.

Yet these four fears are easily exorcised by assuming that the interrogation was really justified and, consequently, that the victim poses an actual threat to the humanity of our world. By this simple procedure, the torturer’s attack, which initially appeared as a challenge to our confidence in the world, is finally perceived as an attempt to preserve this space of confidence. If, on the contrary, third agent dared look at the victim’s plight and listen to her claims, they would be haunted by fear. For this will induce them to perceive the torturer’s attack as arbitrary and illegitimate, so that the world could no longer be experienced as a hospitable place to dwell in. No wonder, then, that third agents are ready to accept the faintest declaration on the torturer’s side as a proper justification for her attack, since, by this means, they can easily identify themselves as inhabitants of a human world that the victim challenges and the torturer is meant to protect.

Identification of these four fears as lying at the bottom of third agents’ tendency to side with the torturer’s legitimizing discourse presupposes a certain conception of the self and its deliberative abilities. I have so far assumed that, at the outset, third agents tend to perceive the victim as helpless and the torturer, as well as the institutions that back up her actions, as a threat. The role of interrogation is thus designed to cover up that perception without fully canceling it out, so that third agents, at some level of awareness, may still sense the torturer as powerful and the victim as defenseless. For otherwise they wouldn’t feel inclined to endorse the torturer’s view in the absence of any evidence that might support it.
We may thus distinguish between what third agents may sincerely declare ("Torture is justified in order to preserve our human world from the victim's attack"), and what their behavioral dispositions reveal ("I am afraid of the torturer. She is so powerful, and the victim so weak"). We may thus say that there is a conflict between their declarative awareness of the significance of the torturer's act and the psychological attitudes that their behavior (linguistic and otherwise) may express or manifest, that is, their expressive awareness of that act. To be expressively aware of a situation S, involves, as we see, a disposition to act in a certain way, but what does this certain way consist of? To answer this question, I would like to introduce the notion of proportionality, namely, the idea that the agent's response must be proportional to the situation S. It is clear that third agents' expressive awareness of the torturer's arbitrariness leads them to deny that fact and, therefore, we can hardly regard their response as proportional to the situation at stake. This is why the kind of expressive awareness that third agents may have in those circumstances is to be described as biased or slanted. For their response may still be regarded as proportional, although not to the situation S in itself, but to that situation in combination with the agent's fears. Hence, we may say that a proper expressive awareness of a situation S by an agent A is such that A feels motivated to respond proportionally to S, whereas expressive awareness of S will come up as slanted or biased insofar as some idiosyncratic feature in the agent's character is to be mentioned in order to make sense of the way she feels motivated to respond. The latter must then be conceived of as a deviation for the kind of proportionality that is present in proper cases of expressive awareness.

Be that as it may, it is clear that some expectations of protection play a central role in the way the three poles of torture relate to each other. We may state those expectations as follows and call "human" a world where they are satisfied:

(PE) Primary Expectation: Nobody will illegitimately hurt me.
(SE) Secondary Expectation: If someone illegitimately hurts me (or I am in a state of need), someone else will come to help and protect me.

The victim certainly appeals to this notion of a human world to describe her plight; after all, it is the loss of the primary and the secondary expectations that Améry claims to have experienced with the first blow. But the torturer and third agents also rely on that notion to justify their respective actions and attitudes. For the most robust warrant for the torturer's act has to do, as we have seen, with the need to protect the humanity of our world from the threat that the victim may represent. Third agents are eager to grant that view, for this way they may still trust the torturer and thereby experience their world as a safe and comfortable place to dwell in. All this requires a certain complexity of mind, as we have seen. We must thus assume the possibility of a mismatch between an agent's declarative awareness of what the torturer is actually doing and her expressive awareness
of it. In light of this distinction, we may now examine a certain worry that the primary and secondary expectations will most likely raise.

The Human World: Egocentric vs. Impartial Expectations

Some may object that expectations (PE) and (SE) fall short of apprehending the nature of a world that might coherently be called ‘human’ and, therefore, that they could express an aspiration that qualifies as cosmopolitan. Inspired by some well-entrenched Kantian assumptions, they may insist that a human world (and the corresponding cosmopolitan aspiration) is to be conceived of as one where certain expectations are satisfied, though not just with regard to me, but to anyone. After all, a world may deserve to be called “human” only if it is moral, and it seems that the morality of a world is constitutively independent of the situation that any particular individual may occupy within it and, consequently, the expectations whose satisfaction are constitutive of a human (and, thereby, moral) world cannot be intelligibly individuated in egocentric terms. Thus, one might conclude that a world, a society, a culture, can be regarded as human if and only if the following expectations are met:

(IPE) Impartial Primary Expectation: Nobody will illegitimately hurt anyone.
(ISE) Impartial Secondary Expectation: If someone is illegitimately hurt by someone else (or if someone is in a state of need), other people will come to help and protect the hurt (or the needy).

It seems then that (IPE) and (ISE) express expectations that could properly be regarded as cosmopolitan, since to qualify as such an expectation must not only address the world but everyone must be equally entitled to bear it. Hence, a shift from an egocentric to an impartial perspective seems to follow from a conception of “human” and “cosmopolitan” inspired by the demands of morality as they are to be interpreted in virtue of some deeply ingrained Kantian assumptions.

Still, we must beware of projecting some Kantian assumptions onto our description of any particular moral experience we may eventually decide to examine, for, otherwise, we run the risk of distorting the moral significance of any such experience insofar as we may just approve of (or condemn) it in light of how much it fits or clashes with our previous assumptions about morality. To avert such a risk, I am inclined to favor a sort of investigation that heed the discernment of specific experiences of harm, so that some of our cultural stereotypes could be unearthed and eventually discarded as misleading. Hence we better examine at this stage whether the expectations, as Améry presents them (that is, in egocentric terms), do properly express the victim’s experience, so that later on we may discuss the significance of this analysis for our conception of morality. This proposal is indeed inspired by the demands of reflective equilibrium,
that is, by the methodological approach that John Rawls vindicates and I gladly underwrite.

In this respect, to determine the content of an agent’s expectations, we must again distinguish between what she may sincerely declare and what her behavioral dispositions must actually express or manifest. The latter must, indeed, be individuated in virtue of the conditions under which certain expectations are actually acquired and eventually abandoned or transformed. Thus, we cannot take it at face value what an agent sincerely claims to expect, since her avowals conflict with the kind of attitude that her behavior (linguistic and otherwise) may manifest in a number of different contexts. But, how do impartial expectations (IPE) and (ISE) (and the corresponding cosmopolitan aspiration) fare with regard to this methodological constraint?

Kantian views tend to conceive of these expectations neither as expectations that any particular person sincerely claims to have nor as expectations that are actually manifested in everyone’s behavior, but as expectations that any rational agent must have within a world that can legitimately be called “human.” Such expectations do thereby concern anyone and, consequently, they can hardly rely on any idiosyncratic feature that a particular agent might possess. It seems then that only rational considerations must figure in our deliberation as to whether such expectations ought to be either adopted or dropped. All this fits nicely with a Kantian approach like Rawls’s insofar as he assumes that, in the original position, we must abstract away from our specific traits of character and just rely on our rational capabilities, as they are commonly understood in decision theory (i.e., as merely instrumental), together with a few additional resources like a sense of justice and the idea of a conception of the good.17 The design itself of the original position is, in any case, assumed to guarantee the reasonableness of the principles that such deliberative process might eventually deliver. What are, however, the conditions under which a deliberator of this nature may actually lose or instead retain her impartial expectations (IPE) and (ISE)? It seems that any changes in this respect ought to track what she may justifiably believe about the world as a result of the evidence she has gathered about it. Hence, it seems that such expectations ought to be challenged or lost by mere knowledge of the fact that someone has actually been hurt and then abandoned in their distress.

Yet Améry’s experience suggests that an agent’s confidence in the world is not ruined by mere knowledge of those facts.18 For, even though she may access to a significant amount of evidence that manifestly challenges (IPE) and (ISE), her confidence in the world will still remain intact. This experience seems to conflict with the Kantian approach. We must then either revise the conception of reason and the self that this approach vindicates or discard those expectations as irrational inclinations and, consequently, as divested of any normative import to the detriment of the Kantian initial defense of them. They cannot be dismissed
as irrational, though, if the experience of harm is to be taken as the starting point of a philosophical reflection on morality. Hence, we must make room for some moral expectations to be anchored to our identity in ways that differ from both those of a mere irrational disposition and those of a sincere explicit endorsement. Our egocentric expectations seem to be ingrained in our lives in this alternative way, since they may easily resist the mere gathering of evidence to the contrary and still we have renounced to discard them as merely irrational. The depth our need to feel protected by our fellow creatures, to feel members of a hospitable world, is corroborated in the last sections by the fact that only quite a direct exposure to some experiences will really challenge her confidence in the world. A certain kind of awareness of some facts, deeper than mere knowledge of them, seems then to be required to account for the conditions under which our confidence in the world may be lost.

The question arises, however, as to whether expectations (PE) and (SE) would suffice to articulate a cosmopolitan aspiration, for they certainly address the world, but they are so focused on the bearer of such expectations that they could hardly express an aspiration that could qualify as cosmopolitan, that is, an aspiration to which everyone is entitled. It is true that these expectations fall short of meeting the Kantian standards of impartiality; this does not imply that they are egocentric to the point of being exclusively concerned with the fate of a particular person. In fact, the loss of such expectations expresses the victim’s plight in a way that she must project it beyond her particular case. For it seems constitutive of the sense of protection that (PE) and (SE) provide that they should be granted to her not in virtue of some idiosyncratic feature that she may happen to possess, but simply as a result of her human condition. For this seems to be the sort of the demand that (PE) and (SE) place on third agents: “I expect you not to hurt me, and also to help me in case of need, not in virtue of some specific, attractive traits of mine or some idiosyncrasy feature of yours, but just because I am your fellow creature.” So, it seems that there are elements in my confidence in the world that point in the direction of impartiality, but it would be quite misleading to claim that only impartial expectations are involved, at least if impartiality is to be construed as Kantian views understand it. Once the content of our primary and secondary expectations has been specified in terms that surpass the concern for the particular individual, it seems that their demands qualify as cosmopolitan, since they not only address the world but also entitle everyone to make them. Let us now examine whether the loss of such expectations on the victim’s side should be construed as an irrational reaction or instead as a proportional to the facts and, ultimately, as having a bearing on how anyone else should face the world. I discard that it could reasonably be interpreted as an irrational reaction, and I vindicate such a loss is an inescapable move within the realm of reasons. A consequence of this will be that the cosmopolitan aspiration
cannot be fulfilled. A few suggestions are finally made as to how it could at least be favored.

The Loss of Confidence in the World as an Irrational Reaction

Whenever a victim may lose her confidence in the world, she will lose it forever. This is, at least, what Améry claims at some point:

Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the world. The shame of destruction cannot be erased. Trust in the world, which already collapsed in part at the first blow, but in the end, under torture, fully, will not be regained. That one’s fellow man was experienced as the anti-man remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror. It blocks the view into a world in which the principle of hope rules. One who was martyred is a defenseless prisoner of fear. It is fear that henceforth reigns over him. Fear—and also what is called resentment. They remain, and have scarcely a chance to concentrate into a seething, purifying thirst of revenge.21

But is it really so? Is it true that the victim will under no circumstance be able to recover her confidence in the world?22 The specific way we may answer this question depends on how exactly this loss is to be interpreted. There is, for instance, a rather extended view according to which the victim’s loss is simply the sequel of a trauma that some therapeutic procedures will eventually be able to heal. From this perspective, Améry’s experience should be interpreted in light of those more ordinary cases where an agent may become extremely anxious as she enters a quiet place where she had been previously assaulted. Such a level of anxiety must thereby be dismissed as irrational insofar as it is disproportionate to the actual risk. The fact that a certain agent may feel that sort of tension will thereby emerge as purely idiosyncratic and, consequently, as providing no reason for us to respond similarly. It is clear that, from this perspective, the loss of confidence in the world could hardly be vindicated as irreversible, since the victim’s actual capacity to recover will depend on the efficiency of available therapies, which may significantly vary from one to another individual case. To challenge this therapeutic interpretation of the victim’s loss, let me briefly introduce a new case of harm, namely, that of Claude Eatherly, an American pilot directly involved in the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Clearly, we are not dealing here with a victim but with a perpetrator instead. A few years after his action, he was tormented by nightmares where figures of the injured appeared in his dreams and, in general, a deep sense of guilt haunted him. These emotional reactions, together with some outlandish actions that he may have done, were publicly interpreted as symptoms of a severe psychic impairment, badly in need of psychiatric treatment. As a result, he was soon confined to a military asylum, where he
ended up regarding his own anxieties as part of an attempt to articulate a more proportional response to his deed.

We may now examine some of the metaphysical and epistemic assumptions that lie behind the sort of psychiatric institution to which Eatherly was confined, that is, a kind of institution were the treatments provided were exclusively addressed to release the patient’s allegedly irrational anchorage to the past. This sort of institution may apparently find some philosophical ground in a subjectivist view about values, which may, in turn, be regarded as an implication of the disenchanted conception of world that the natural sciences supposedly favor. Hence, insofar as psychiatric institutions may like to inherit the social prestige of the natural sciences, they better adapt to this worldview and articulate their practices on the assumption that there are no moral or evaluative features in the world. Moreover, psychiatric institutions tend to assume that a subjectivist view about value can only be properly honored if their therapeutic practices put aside any moral aspects of the situation at stake, given that they do not exist from an objective point of view. As a result, issues such as whether a victim of torture may legitimately reject any therapeutic procedure before her moral damage had been properly repaired, or whether the torturer should carry the weight of her deed or instead be alleviated as efficiently as possible, will be systematically neglected. They will not even leave it for the patient to decide as a matter of personal choice. The institution simply operates on the assumption that moral matters are irrelevant to its purposes.

It is easy to see however that, even if the subjectivist view proclaims the need to be axiologically blind as we investigate the world as it is in itself, the actual practices and policies of any psychiatric institution that might subscribe to such a view will inexorably involve a number of morally significant commitments. The application of psychiatric treatment guided by the subjectivist view implies, for instance, that Eatherly’s guilt and Améry’s distrust are to be dispensed with as inappropriate, pathological reactions, that is, as reactions they must get rid of insofar as they may interfere with our natural orientation toward the future. These emotional attitudes are not thereby approached as part of a morally relevant (and rational) response to a certain experience of harm. Yet the choice of this interpretation presupposes a commitment to a certain view about the role that morality must play in our lives. For the fact that such a stance is adopted with regard to certain situations may be significant from a moral perspective. Thus, we may say that those psychiatric institutions that are inspired by the subjectivist view cannot legitimize their practices on the axiological neutrality that the latter view seems to impose. For, by choosing their therapies and practices to be morally blind, they express a particular moral attitude toward those morally significant situations they may actually confront, which as such conflicts with the alleged moral neutrality of that view.
It may be relevant to stress at this point that, in order to regard Etherly’s response as irrational and, thereby, as in need of some medical treatment, we cannot exclusively rely on the fact that his anxiety and fears were not under his control. For there are many psychological states that an agent may not control and, nevertheless, lie at the core of any significant notion of rationality. Think, for instance, of perceptual beliefs. Almost none of our perceptual beliefs are directly under our control, but nobody views this fact as a reason to dismiss them as inappropriate, just the opposite. For the idea itself of an agent that might modify her perceptual beliefs at will is almost unintelligible or, in other words, the mere fact that a certain psychological state could thus be modified counts as a most serious reason to discard it as a perceptual belief at all.55 But, more to the point, it is clear that a mother’s appalling sorrow for her daughter’s sudden death can hardly be regarded as irrational. It is instead a sign of the intensity of her motherly love that she may not be able to get rid of her grief at will and, consequently, that the latter may only (and partly) wane after a proper time of mourning. Hence, the concern about Etherly’s guilt (or Améry’s distrust or Levi’s shame) cannot just be that it escapes his control. The relevant issue should instead be whether his guilt (and the corresponding anxieties and fears) is proportional to his deed and, therefore, whether it appropriately contributes to shaping his life.

It follows, however, that, if Etherly’s response turned out to be relevantly proportional to his deed (and, mutatis mutandis, Améry’s and Levi’s, as well), then we would be forced to acknowledge that, contrary to what some therapeutic approaches appear to assume, the most meaningful life he could live is necessarily disfigured or misshaped. Moreover, we may end up acknowledging that the facts by which Etherly’s life has been legitimately disfigured ought to have an impact on the shape of our own lives as well. And, from this perspective, Améry’s loss could hardly be perceived as just a disgrace of his but as matter of concern everyone. Not only because it is a situation that calls for our care and consideration or because one might eventually fall into Améry’s position, but mainly because his predicament reveals that his loss is grounded on some serious reasons that apply to us all to the effect that, if Améry has reason to lose his confidence, everyone has. To motivate this view, I briefly argue that the question “Why does Améry lose his confidence in the world?” may legitimately be raised within the realm of reasons, that is, the why in that question points to facts that Améry has become (expressively) aware of, such that they make it reasonable for a person of his character to lose her confidence in the world. A further issue to be considered is whether the relevant aspects of his character are to be regarded as merely idiosyncratic or instead as constitutive of an agent’s humanity, so that his reasons will become anyone’s.26
The Realm of Reasons and the Faustian Ideal

As Améry and Bruno Bettelheim repeatedly emphasized, some victims of torture manage to make sense of their experience in such a way that their confidence in the world remains intact. This is the case of believers in a redemption plan. They try to make sense of the horrendous harm they may have suffered by interpreting every instance of it as a necessary step toward a better future whose particular details are, nevertheless, inscrutable. The believer often delegates to a superior mind, either God or Stalin, the ultimate significance of the facts she is facing and by these means her deepest hurt is averted. From this perspective, no matter how terrible and inhuman a situation might be, there is still the hope that humanity will in the end prevail and this may provide sufficient consolation. Faith in an inscrutable redemption plan may help the victim to make sense of her harm, but it often contributes to the production itself of harm. For massacres and genocides are often legitimized in such terms, that is, as a necessary action for a promising human future. Hence, the kind of representation that may, at some stage, comfort the victim is often the source of her own plight, as well.

Not all victims are able to retain their faith in a redemption plan; as Bettelheim emphasizes, people belonging to the German and Austrian middle class were especially vulnerable to the atrocities of the Nazi extermination camps. Even if they were active members of one or another religion, what deep in their minds made sense of their lives was some sort of Faustian ideal, that is, the conviction that our daily efforts contribute to a better future, that is, to the social, economic, and technological progress of our society and the humanity as a whole. From that perspective, their capacity to make sense of their own activities and endeavors was conditional on the assumption that they were contributing not only to their personal progress but to the overall advance of mankind as such. The relevance of keeping such overall progress in view, and not merely the furthering of one's own individual interests, indicates a bond with one's fellow creatures that goes beyond what a fair contract may deliver and may be adequately expressed by the dictum "no man is an island."

It seems, then, that torture has a devastating effect on the victim with a Faustian ideal only if it comes with the recognition that torture (and, in general, harm) is in a relevant sense inexorable. What such a victim may experience is: her flesh and soul is not only that scientific and technological development may turn out to be insufficient to protect her, but something more significantly disturbing than that. For she will painfully realize that technological development can be (and, thereby, will be) put to work in the opposite direction, namely: to increase our capacity to produce harm and devastation. One of the most frightening aspects of the Nazi's regime was precisely that it emerged as a highly innovative and efficient
machinery. Let me examine here just one of the psychological mechanisms that lies behind the efficiency of this machinery.\textsuperscript{32} “But then, almost amazingly, it dawns on one that the fellows not only have leather coats and pistols, but also faces: not ‘Gestapo faces’ with twisted noses, hypertrophied chins, pockmarks, and knife scars, as might appear in a book, but rather faces like anyone else’s. Plain, ordinary faces. And the enormous perception at a later stage, one that destroys all abstractive imagination, makes clear to us how the plain, ordinary faces become Gestapo faces after all.”\textsuperscript{32} As Améry points out, understanding these facts weakens the victim. It extracts from her any hope in a human future.\textsuperscript{33} If only so-called Gestapo faces were prepared to torture, then one might reasonably expect torture to take place rather exceptionally insofar as ordinary faces could easily outnumber and counteract them. By contrast, if everyday faces can easily be transformed into Gestapo faces, if anybody could readily torture (or actively cooperate with a torturer) in some circumstances, then the fact that a normal person does not actually torture (or does not actually cooperate with a torturer) turns out to be purely accidental. For, in some circumstances, almost anyone might easily be induced to torture. Recognition of this fact alters the victim’s perception of normal faces in everyday circumstances. It undercuts her capacity to trust the world. In the punishment cell, she realizes that Gestapo faces are ordinary ones, but, after her liberation, she tends to see Gestapo faces in the ordinary people whom she may daily encounter. The cruelty of the SS transcends the walls of the camp and transforms her view of mankind: the victim feels forced to accept as a basic aspect of our human condition that the elderly women who today so kindly welcomes her, may tomorrow report her presence to the Gestapo.

Some may surely reply that, no matter how moving Améry’s experience might be, his reaction is still irrational, given that, from the fact that normal people may torture in some exceptional circumstances, nothing follows as to whether a normal person may be prepared to torture in normal circumstances. Consequently, it sounds quite unreasonable that anyone might lose her confidence in expectation (PE) by the mere fact that, in some exceptional circumstances, such an expectation will likely fail. I would like to say, to begin with, that this objection neglects a crucial feature of the victim’s loss. The content of (PE) is not “In normal circumstances, I will not illegitimately be hurt,” but “I will not illegitimately be hurt, period.” For only the latter provides us with the need of protection and homeliness that gave rise to them in the first place. Even in normal circumstances, the victim may be incapable of trusting the world just because, in some other circumstances, the same people who are now kind to him, or even love him, may rather easily contribute to her destruction.\textsuperscript{34} It follows that whenever third agents are needed most, they tend to cooperate with the torturer, and, as a result, there is reason to deny expectation (SE) once expectation (PE) has been infringed. So we may conclude that, even though torturers and third
agents can’t help trusting the world, one should not trust it; this truth does shape the way in which some victims stand in the world, so that they can’t experience it, not even some privileged regions of it, like home.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined Améry’s elaboration of his experience of a victim of torture in order to identify a certain cosmopolitan aspiration. The loss of confidence in the world is the way he describes the impact that this experience had upon his life. He regards this confidence as composed of two expectations of protection, namely: (PE) “Nobody will illegitimately hurt me” and (SE) “If someone illegitimately hurts me (or I am in a state of need), someone else will come to help and protect me.”

I have argued, to begin with, that (PE) and (SE) constitutively involve the appeal to third agents as seems to be confirmed by the role of interrogation in some standard cases of torture. In general, we can say that third agents feel threatened by the act of torture and are inclined to interpret it in ways that may preserve their confidence in the world. Such a maneuver of self-deception comes to confirm the depth of our need to trust the world and, consequently, of the cosmopolitan aspiration associated with it.

Some people might object, however, to the fact that those expectations of protection as they stand, that is, stated in egocentric terms could properly express a cosmopolitan aspiration or, in other words, the idea of a human world. For to qualify as cosmopolitan an aspiration must not only address the world, as Améry’s expectations certainly do, but also entitle everyone to make it. And the fact that expectations (PE) and (SE) are stated in egocentric terms seems to be at odds with this constraint.

I have replied, however, that these two expectations do involve a projection beyond the particular individual to which “me” might refer, for it seems constitutive of the sense of protection that such expectations provide that they should be granted to any particular individual not in virtue of any specific trait but simply because of her condition. And, yet, this transition from the particular to the universal cannot coherently be construed in light of the Kantian approach, that is, as involving two impartial expectations (IPE) and (ISE). It is clear that an agent’s ability to shape her life in light of these impartial expectations could hardly depend on what might actually happen to her, that is, the kind of experience she might actually have faced, since, otherwise, we would have reason to identify her expectations as including an egocentric element. And, yet, I have argued that only the victim of torture, unlike the torturer and third agents, loses her confidence in the world. Hence, it seems that this egocentric element is constitutive of the experience of the victim of harm and the cosmopolitan aspiration
that is expressed by her loss of confidence in the world. It is an egocentric way of addressing the world that, nevertheless, includes a projection beyond oneself onto any other human being.

Once the content of the cosmopolitan aspiration involved in the experience of the victim of torture has been elucidated, I have examined the question as to whether her loss of confidence in the world belongs to the realm of reason or should instead be discarded as a disproportionate, irrational reaction. In this respect I have stressed that those therapeutic institutions that favor the latter can hardly rely on any sort of axiological impartiality. And once we accept that values are also involved in therapeutic response to harm, we are in a position to vindicate Claude Eatherly’s guilt as rational insofar as it may be proportionate to his deed. In other words, we can make sense of the idea that he could only preserve his humanity (and, in this sense, to honor a certain cosmopolitan aspiration) if he allowed his life to be disfigured by his expressive awareness of the moral significance of his deed. This is, however, a rare achievement. Third agents tend to side with the torturer’s view so that they may still trust the world. In some sense, we could say that their need to trust the world stands in the way of a world that could justifiably be trusted and, therefore, of a world where the cosmopolitan aspiration could be fulfilled. And this is precisely the fact the victim of torture becomes poignantly aware of.

The question arises, indeed, as to what could be done in these circumstances or, more specifically, how could the cosmopolitan aspiration be at least cultivated given that it cannot be fulfilled and, perhaps, not even advanced. This is not a question I meant to specifically address in this chapter and, yet, a few ideas have been suggested in this direction. First, it seems that this question will require different answers depending on one’s location with regard to the three poles of torture. Second, it has been stressed that, regarding the torturer and third agents, their ability to honor the cosmopolitan aspiration should be more a matter of becoming expressively aware of certain facts by being exposed to them than just becoming declaratively aware of them. Moreover, they should be ready to allow such expressive awareness to disfigure one’s life to a certain degree. And, yet, there is no way in which they could legitimately feel satisfied insofar as they are bound to preserve their confidence in the world and leave the victim alone with her loss.

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Notes

2. This claim is challenged by the fact that US soldiers in Abu Ghraib had not only tortured some Muslim prisoners but taken pictures of themselves in such circumstances in order to distribute them to their friends and relatives. This is certainly a novel and striking situation that seems to call for an explanation, as Susan Sontag has emphasized in “What Have We Done?,” Guardian, March 24, 2004. The need itself of an explanation seems to confirm the extent to which it is assumed that torture is to be kept out of sight and often denied.
4. As Scarry points out: “So, for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiable present is it that ‘having pain’ may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to ‘have certainty,’ while for the other person it is so elusive that ‘hearing about pain’ may exist as the primary model of what it is to ‘have doubt’” (ibid., 4). Relatedly: “How is it that one person can be in the presence of another person in pain and not know it—not know it to the point where he himself inflicts it, and goes on inflicting it?” (12). This perplexity seems to call for a distinction between two ways of being aware of the victim’s pain. For this purpose, I later on introduce the distinction a merely declarative awareness of a certain fact and an expressive awareness of it.
7. Some may object that Améry’s experience, like any other individual experience, is after all merely idiosyncratic, whereby nothing of significance could be derived from it into the nature of torture. This raises the rather general issue as to how the relevance of any particular experience is to be assessed. The first thing to be noticed is that this line of objection also applies (and, presumably, more severely) to the series of examples and counterexamples that are typically discussed in thought experiments, except, of course, if one is in the business of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain X. Once such a project is dropped, as it seems it should concerning any matters of importance, then examples and counterexamples are to be assessed for their respective relevance, and, from this perspective, some reason must be provided to justify why sketchy examples should generally be preferred to full-fledged experiences. In either case, it seems clear that what really matters is whether the examination of any particular example or experience sheds some light on the experience of harm or, in other words, contributes to making sense of one or another aspect of it. “Making sense” is, indeed, relative to a certain audience and involves a certain amount of circularity; cf. Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), chap. 10. For the precise boundaries of the “we” whose understanding is supposed to be significantly favored by Améry’s experience, must be fixed by an appeal to some common moral intuitions that, in turn, are closely connected to our capacity to perceive some experiences of harm as central or paradigmatic. The study of Améry’s experience will then appear as pertinent and justified only insofar as his reflections on torture may eventually shed some light on some other experiences of harm and the ways in which one should relate to them.
9. Noelle McAfee, in Chapter 2 of this volume, introduces the concept of addressing the world as central to her account of cosmopolitanism. As we shall soon see, Améry’s analysis of the experience of torture involves a similar invocation insofar as third agents are expected to
be not mere spectators of the victim's plight, but actively contribute to her recovery and reparation. Améry claims, however, that the notion of dignity can hardly make sense of the victim's experience, and vindicates the loss of confidence in the world as a more suitable concept. As we shall see in the third section of this chapter, this will diminish the capacity of a Kantian view to account for the normative aspects of the expectations of protection that, according to Améry, torture tends to undermine.

10. A normative demand certainly forms a part of the victim's expectations. She assumes that third agents owe her a certain response. Someone may think that the legitimacy of this demand is to be grounded on the fact that the expectations at stake are obviously reciprocal. But having reciprocal expectations fall short of imposing mutual demands. Something else must be added.

11. Scarry, The Body in Pain, 37. Scarry presents the interrogation as a constitutive aspect of torture, disregarding those cases of torture where the infliction of pain is not accompanied by this specific verbal act. In fact, article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture enumerates a significant number of modes of torture where interrogation is absent.

12. José Medina, in Chapter 7 of this volume, stresses the role of ignorance in our ability to feel comfortably at home in the world. As he forcefully argues, the denial of some truths is not a peripheral aspect of one's place within it, but lies at the core of it, as happens with white ignorance. An exercise of self-estrangement or disidentification (and therefore being ready to endure the discomfort that comes with it) seems required if such a bias is to be tempered and the cost that the victim has to pay for it partly repaired. This is an idea that not only Medina but JeF Edmonds (Chapter 8), Jennifer Hansen (Chapter 13), and Jessica Wahman (Chapter 12) stress here as well. The parallel notion of hospitality toward the stranger, the migrant, the other is vindicated by McAfee (Chapter 2).

13. "The expectation of help, the certainty of help, is indeed one of the fundamental experiences of human beings, and probably also of animals... The expectation of help is as much a constitutional psychic element as is the struggle for existence. Just a moment, the mother says to her child who is moaning from pain, a hot-water bottle, a cup of tea is coming right away, we won't let you suffer so! I'll prescribe you a medicine, the doctor assures, it will help you. Even on the battlefield, the Red Cross ambulances find their way to the wounded man. In almost all situations in life where there is bodily injury there is also the expectation of help; the former is compensated by the latter. But with the first blow from a policeman's fist, against which there can be no defense and which no helping hand will ward off, a part of our life ends and it can never again be revived" (Améry, At the Mind's Limit, 29).

14. It may be relevant to stress at this point that the loss of confidence in the world is not specific of torture, but may be the outcome of some other experiences of harm, such as war or rape. There is, besides, the more complex issue as to whether it may come in degrees or, perhaps, the more pertinent question as to how transient and deep such a loss may be in each case. A virtue of this question is that it allows us to apply Améry's notion to make sense of some less extreme experiences of harm like school-yard bullying.

15. Both the primary and the secondary expectations comprise a normative demand. So, whenever the primary expectation might fail, the secondary expectation involves a cosmopolitan address that, to put it in McAfee's terms, "is the announcement of the situation that ought to be other than the one that is" (see Chapter 2, page 29 of this volume). I argue however that, contrary to what she assumes, a Kantian approach can hardly account for the normative import that is constitutive of this cosmopolitan address.

or disidentification as a result not only of the exercise of one's imagination, which is prey to all sorts of misconceptions, but of one's exposure to some situations that shake one's homely space and highlight how much of it rests on the denial of some deeply upsetting facts. This idea is thoroughly explored in this volume: see Edmonds (Chapter 8), Hansen (Chapter 13), Medina (Chapter 7), and Wahman (Chapter 12).


19. See section 5.3 in my Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering.

20. Needless to say, the emphasis on impartiality is certainly associated with the normative import that both (PE) and (SE) certainly carry with them and whose legitimacy calls for some justification. Pressure in the direction of the impartial expectations may thus be regarded as part of an attempt to ground such normative import within the framework set by Kantian views. Hence, were we to stick to the egocentric expectations suggested by Améry, an alternative account of their legitimacy ought to be elaborated, although this task must be left for another occasion (cf. Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering, chaps. 5–6).


22. Megan Craig, in Chapter 9 of this volume, explores Emerson’s reflection on the impact that the death of his son had on his life Here, the worry is not that the sense of loss will last forever, but just the opposite, namely, that no loss is serious enough to stay for long and thus be acknowledged as part of one’s identity: “Two year on, the loss of his son has proved no more substantial or lasting than any other experience, no more real. Sobered by the meaninglessness of loss, Emerson articulates the melancholy realization that the loss of his child fails to become a point of contact with something real, or a lasting sense of something really having happened. The experience that should have altered everything, the death that should have meant the end of life, ends everything in some sense, and yet ends nothing” (145). Yet, in the case of a son’s death, his father's recovery does not constitutively depend on other people's attitudes, whereas the victim of torture (or so I argue, following up from Améry's view) can only legitimately recover her confidence in the world if third agents are ready to take care of her plight. So, we could conclude that the victim's recovery is anchored to someone else’s attitude in a way that a person's attitude toward the death of her son is not.


25. This is not to deny, of course, that an agent might intentionally engage in a certain process that could indirectly lead to a change in her beliefs on some specific matters.

26. Some may object, however, that after all the victim's loss of confidence is the outcome of a terrible situation and, therefore, her voice will necessarily be distorted by the emotional impact, so that it can hardly guide us in the articulation of a proper response to her plight. This reply sounds, though, just as a further manifestation of the conviction that emotional involvement distorts, whereas distance potentiates our deliberative capabilities. This is not, however, a conviction we could take for granted at this stage. For we are at a point in our search
of reflective equilibrium where our general views about moral deliberation are still to be examined in the light of some particular moral experiences.


28. The religious believer relies on the idea that he will be personally compensated for his present suffering and distress. Not so for the communist believer, who finds consolation in the idea that her action will contribute to the dawning of a human world, which she is, nevertheless, unlikely to enjoy personally. This second attitude apprehends the specific way in which the confidence in human progress may be consolatory.


31. For further discussion concerning the nature and power of this psychological mechanism, see sections 2.6, 5.4–5.6 in my *Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering*.


33. Hansen elaborates on the notion of hope in a very interesting manner. She regards hope as an emotion that includes a cognitive aspect within it. This is why hope is not a mere wish, but involves some sort engagement on the agent’s side to promote the state of affairs she hopes for. Moreover, Hansen stresses that our hopes must be anchored to a specific social space: “In this sense, our hopes are reasonable; they emerge out of a specific cultural localizedness. Our hopes emerge in response to specific needs that arise in specific contexts. And, those needs are intelligible to those who share a form of life with us. So too is hope intelligible as a response to those needs” (see Chapter 13, page 228 of this volume). Améry’s experience tends to confirm this point. After all, it is his situation as a victim of torture (that is, a very specific position within the social space) that makes him lose his confidence in the world and, thereby, give up a fundamental kind of hope. My line of argument has been that this loss, far from being an irrational reaction on his side, counts as a move within the space of reasons, and, as a result, the cognitive aspects of hope are acknowledged. This move, however, is unavailable to those who have not had their flesh torn by the cutting edge and, in this respect, a pluralistic epistemology (that is, the kind of epistemology that Hansen defends as fundamental for a cosmopolitan hope) may help reduce the deep epistemic asymmetries that are constitutive of the three poles of harm but will hardly cancel them out.

34. Moreover, it is not hard to demonstrate that those circumstances where normal people may easily be induced to torture are not as exceptional as they may seem, and also that they tend to overlap with those where third agents are most inclined to avert their eyes from the victim’s plight. See S. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Günther Anders, *Wir Eichmann Söhne* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988); Claude Eatherly, *Burning Conscience: The Case of the Hiroshima Pilot* (Saint Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1961); Corbi, *Morality, 2.6.*

35. For further discussion, see my *Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering*, chap. 7.

36. This chapter draws on materials published as part of chapter 2 in *Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering: An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World* (New York: Routledge, 2012). Credit is due to Routledge for authorizing partial reproduction in this volume. I must, finally, acknowledge that research for this chapter has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (BFI2003-08340-C03-01, HUM2006-08326, PR2008-0221, CSD2009-00056) and the Valencian Regional Ministry of Culture, Education and Sports (GRUPOS04/48, GV04B-251, ACOMPo6/13).