THE TRIBALISATION OF LOGIC

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Abstract

There exists a relationship between logic and world-views. Why are there different world-views, even of the same subject-matter? Why would two different persons analyse a particular subject-matter and come-up with different results of the analysis? In attempting to answer the aforementioned posers, some scholars have maintained that it is only normal and expected that two different persons analysing the same subject-matter should come-up with different analysis-results of the subject-matter. This class of scholars hold this view because, as they maintain, each "tribe", as it were, is naturally endowed by nature with its unique and peculiar logic with which it grapples with its own idiosyncratic issues confronting it. Therefore, the logic with which "A" grapples with a particular subject-matter is essentially unique to "A" and different from the logic with which "B" confronts the same subject-matter. It is because of the use of these unique and subjective "logics", the reasoning goes, that the end-results of the analyses of the same subject-matter would usually, if not necessarily, be different. The thesis of this paper, however, is that logic *qua* logic, cannot be tribalised, much less manufactured to suit different peoples from different tribes. Logic is the given tools with which wo/man grapples with the realities that confront and surround her/him. The tribalization and/or manufacture of "logics" is an unwholesome venture, and an unholy exercise which carries with it massive and catastrophic consequences identified within this work.

Introduction

There are various branches of philosophy. These include epistemology, metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, ethics, jurisprudence, philosophy of science, axiology, philosophy of mathematics, etc. These branches of philosophy are legitimate areas of study/investigation appertaining to their subject-matters. Epistemology is the study of the theories of knowledge, metaphysics is the study of Being. What then is aesthetics? Aesthetics is the study of theories of beauty, while ethics is the study of theories of rightness and wrongness of human actions. For jurisprudence, it is the philosophical study of legal concepts and theories, philosophy of science is the philosophical study of the concepts and theories of science, philosophy of mathematics is the philosophical study of the concepts and theories of mathematics, while axiology is the study of theories of values. As it is with the aforementioned branches of philosophy, so is it with the other branches of philosophy that are not mentioned here, that they all have their legitimate and independent subject-matters. By independent subject-matters here I mean unique and peculiar approaches to study or investigate a particular subject-matter for the purpose relevant to the branch of philosophy.

It is not uncommon nor is it anymore strange to go through published books and find some helpless resignation to fate on the inability to find universally accepted definitions of most disciplines. For example, law is variously defined by different scholars. Let us take an example of the definition of *international law*. G. I. Tunkin, for example, has defined *international law* as:

> The aggregate of norms which are created by agreement between states of different social systems, reflecting the concordant wills of states and have a generally democratic character, regulate relations between them in the process of struggle and co-operation in the direction of ensuring peace and peaceful co-existence and freedom and independence of peoples, and are secured when necessary by coercion effectuated by states individually or collectively (251).

In a manner obviously radically contradictory to professor Tunkin's definition of *international law*: Prof. Kozhevnikov, a Russian and one time Justice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in his book *International law* maintains that:

> International law can be defined as the aggregate of rules governing relations between states in the process of their conflict and co-operation, designed to safeguard their peaceful co-existence, expressing the will of the ruling classes of these states and defended in case of need by coercion applied by states individually or collectively (7).

While professor Tunkin's definition of international law presents it as a concept that is essentially democratic in character, Professor Kozhevnikov presents a somewhat oppressive character of international law whereby the rest of the world is politically, economically, socially, religiously, held hostage by the will of the ruling classes. As mentioned earlier, these disciplinary variations are not essentially peculiar to such a discipline as jurisprudence. In fact, it does appear to me that there is hardly any such discipline that is not susceptible to this fate as it concerns definitional variations.

Though this scandal of definitional variations persists, every discipline enjoys a substantial degree of residual thematic content. This residual thematic content makes intra-disciplinary discourses, debates and engagements possible, thereby circumventing the wild goose chase pretentions that the scandal of disciplinary definitional variations would plunge us into. Again, this residual disciplinary thematic content comes like a ray of light in a tunnel of impenetrable darkness conferring legitimacy to questions as to the definitions of various disciplines. Therefore, to ask the question, "what is logic?" would no longer appear as preposterous as it would at first glance appear.

The Nature of Logic

As has already been alluded to, an homogeneous definition of logic has proven a daunting task (Frank Harrisons, 2). To some, logic is a science that studies the relations

that exist between and among realities. A major proponent of this relational character of logic, Professor Okezie Ijiomah maintains as follows:

> This is why we can define logic, as the science that seeks to find what should be the correct relationships between and among realities through human reason and by the aid of this knowledge, principles of argument, hence correct judgment can be reached. By realities we mean those propositions or statements which are representations of things or state of affairs (1995, 11-12).

In a recent book published in 2014, Ijomah has not shifted grounds on this definition of logic(14). To him then, logic is essentially the study of the relationships that hold between and among realities. On his part, Ben Dupré evinces that:

> Logic is the science of analyzing argument and of establishing principles or foundations on which sound inferences can be made. As such its concern is not with the particular content of arguments but with their general structure (108).

Clarifying his point further, Ben Dupré continued:

> So, given an argument such as 'All birds are feathered; the robin is a bird; therefore the robin is feathered', the logician abstracts the form 'All *Fs* are *G*; *a* is an *F*; so *a* is *G'*, in which the particular terms are replaced by symbols and the strength of the inference can be determined independently of the subject matter (108-109).

Irving Copi, in his own stead, conceives logic as the study of the rules and principles used to distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning (3). In this view that logic essentially deals with the rules and art of distinguishing correct, from incorrect, arguments, Copi is supported by Robert Sharvey (1-2), and Nancy Simco and Gene James (1). The conception of logic as a science of argumentation is all the more strengthened by D.N. Ucheaga as she upholds that "in adducing proofs or evidence for the beliefs we hold, we need to test them to ascertain whether or not they are well grounded. Logic is this test… the position herein is that arguments are central to the study of logic..."(15). The

trio of Schagrin, Rapapart and Dipert in their book *Logic: A Computer Approach* have defined logic in a manner that probably only permits me to describe them as relativists in matters logical. Of logic, they espouse:

> Logic, in its broadest sense, is the study of correct reasoning. It produces and examines methods for identifying good reasoning, as well as bad reasoning, in all places: in our own thought, in the writings of others, and in the conversation of our friends. Logic provides rules for determining how we should move from one belief to another. Seen in this way, logic gives us the standards for determining which beliefs are acceptable on the basis of other beliefs… To produce the standards of "correct reasoning" in all fields - everyday life, psychology, history, physics, and mathematics – would obviously be a very tall order. In different areas, and in different circumstances, there are varying standards of "correct reasoning" (1).

Carney and Scheer define logic as "…the study of arguments and of methods to determine whether arguments are correct or incorrect (3).

Having considered some popular definitions of logic, what can one say is the common thread that runs through all, or most, of those definitions? Put otherwise, in the parlance I have adopted in this paper, what is the residual disciplinary (or definitional) thematic content of logic? We can safely say:

(1)   That argumentation is central to logic.

(2)   That the study of the rules/techniques/principles used in distinguishing a good from a bad argument falls within the domain of logic.

I am afraid, if I go further, I may trigger resistance. I rather stop short there. The claim supported by the thesis above of residual disciplinary/definitional thematic content is that it would not be repugnant to any definition of logic to hold that it appertains to argumentation, and rules/techniques/principles employed to discriminate between good and bad arguments. The relativist, the pluralist, the universalist, the African, the

European, the Caribbean, etc. would readily find the thematic contents expounded above congenial with whatever view she may hold of logic. Having said this, it is left to be considered in this paper whether logic, given its nature afore-described herein, can be fragmented according as tribes of peoples differ. Couched differently, is there any justification for the view that each tribe of a people is naturally endowed with its own idiosyncratic and peculiar rules/techniques/principles for determining which argument, in their various milieux, is good and which is bad? Or is anything else meant by logical relativity? Probably! May be, I should not have said 'naturally endowed with'. Okay! Expunging the phrase 'naturally endowed with' from the posers above, it would now read: *is there any justification for the view that each tribe of a people is entitled to the creation/manufacture of its own idiosyncratic and peculiar rules/techniques/principles for determining which argument, in their various milieux, is good and which is bad?* The rendition of the problematique of the relativity of logic presented above may appear alarming to some, then an exaggeration to others, yet a disservice to many. But how else would you interpret the following:

> To produce the standards of "correct reasoning" in all fields – everyday life, psychology, history, physics, and mathematics – would obviously be a very tall order. In different areas, and in different circumstances, there are varying standards of "correct reasoning" (Schagrin, Rapapont and Dipert, 1).

By the phraseology "To produce the standards of 'correct reasoning'..." used by the authors immediately quoted above, *ipso facto,* logic, in their conception, is to be created or manufactured for every tribe and, as a matter of course, every field of endeavour. This, certainly and ultimately, calls to question their understanding of logic. Is it not yet another scandal to suppose that the laws of thought which are essentially the rules/techniques/principles used for determining good, from bad argument are to be created/invented/manufactured? The *creationist theory* of logic is enjoying a somewhat significant popularity in 21st century Africa. We shall later return to this point. For now, let us focus further on the nature of logic.

Aprioristic, and Formalistic Conceptions Logic

Most of the quagmire bedeviling scholarship today as regards the true nature of logic is necessarily connected with the discrimination between *aprioristic conception* of logic and *formalistic conception* of logic. This separation of logic into the *aprioristic* and the *formalistic* types is inextricably connected with the question of the origin of logic.

The *aprioristic conception* of logic espouses the view that the rules/techniques/principles used for separating good, from bad, arguments are naturally embedded in a human person from birth. Seen this way these rules/techniques/principles are substantially synonymous with the laws of thought. Elaborating on this point, Hans Reichenbach submits:

> In the history of philosophy, there are two interpretations of logic which have played dominant roles, and which have endured to form the main subject matter of discussions on logic in our own day. For the first interpretation, which we may call the *aprioristic interpretation*, logic is a science with its own authority, whether it is founded in the *a priori* nature of reason, or in the psychological nature of thought, or in intellectual intuition or evidence – philosophers have provided us with many phrases, the task of which is to express that we simply have to submit to logic as a kind of superior command (334).

Reichenbach places within this class of logicians such philosophers as Plato, most scholastic philosophers, Rene Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Boole, Venn, Keynes, etc. For this class of scholars, logic, in the sense of laws of thought, is a given. The creationist/manufacturist account of the nature of logic would amount to a repulsive endeavour to the aprioristic logicians.

The other school of thought as regards the origin of logic is the *formalistic conception* of logic. In the view of this class of scholars, logic is an invention by people. Speaking of this group, Reichenbach writes:

The second interpretation does not acknowledge logic as a material science and may be called the *formalistic interpretation* of logic. The adherents of this interpretation do not believe in an *a priori* character of logic. They refuse even to talk of the "laws of logic", this term suggesting that there is something in the nature of an authority in logic which we have to obey. For them logic is a system of rules which by no means determines the content of science, and which do nothing but furnishing a transformation of one proposition into another any addition to intension (335).

In this class of logicians, Hans Reichenbach places such philosophers as the nominalists of the middle ages, David Hume, Hilbert, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc. Reichenbach clarified that he used the term "formalistic" in a sense somewhat wider than the sense in use within the discussion of modern logistic, where the formalists are represented by the narrower group centering around Hilbert (335). Logic, from the formalistic conception, is simply a matter of internal coherence of a set/unit of propositions in their relationship one with anther based primarily, and exclusively, on a set of rules/techniques/principles hitherto agreed upon within a universe of discourse. Logic has got nothing to do with the human nature, they would say. The game of chess, for instance, is a universe of discourse with its own artificially created/invented rules/techniques/principles of the game. Such is logic.

The Ontologico-Pluralistic Conception of Logic

There is a third interpretation or conception of logic which Reichenbach did not identify. It is for any of the following three reasons that Reichenbach did not identify this third group of logicians:

(1)   He probably simply refrained from identifying it.

(2)   He probably simply was not exposed to sufficient African literature on the subject-matter, or

(3)   His failure to identify this third school may simply be due to the relatively recent development of the *ontologico-pluralistic* conception of logic.

To have a bird's eye view of this conception of logic, consider the following passages:

> …at any time discussions centre on logic, reality issues are assumed. If ontology from our discussion is relative and it correlates with logic and the function is a connectivity exercise, then logic is correctly defined by twentieth century analytic philosophers as the science of relation between realities from where correct thinking, argumentation and hence valid and sound conclusions can be reached (Ijiomah, 2014,59-60).

Another prolific writer and commentator on this issue avers as follows:

> Indeed, why can't there be an Africa logic? What will be the reasons for its non-existence as for its existence?...if logic, like philosophy, is culture based as some agree, then Africans would have logic or they would not have culture (Okeke, 143).

Again, Ozumba and Chimakonam explicitly say:

> We may define a thought system as the aggregate of a people's basic belief which determine their norms and judgment on what is acceptable or unacceptable in accordance with established consensus. It determines the rules within which a people's reflection on realities is organized. In other words, a thought system consists of (but not only) the perspectives through which a people rationally look at reality, i.e. it is the aggregate of beliefs, assumptions, and norms which have become basic in a given society and which define a people's reasoning and understanding of realities around them. We want to posit in this work that Africa has a peculiar thought system which is trivalent in structure. In other words, it is different from the Western thought system which is bivalent, hence obeying the law of contradiction (18).

From the passages considered above, there is clearly a trend developing among some African scholars (this is not say that scholars from other continental regions may not adopt a similar line of reasoning). The above perspective is clearly a perspective on the nature of logic. But it is different from the *aprioristic conception of logic* and the *formalistic conception of logic*. Then, the question is: *where does the difference lie?* The *aprioristic conception* of logic holds the view that logic is a *given*, the laws of thought are naturally embedded in every normal human person. Because of the uniform distribution of the laws of thought to every normal human person, they are universal in nature. From the passages quoted above, those ardent and consummate African philosophers hold fastidiously to a different view; the view that logic is relative to all tribes, as it were. Again, the perspective of logic as deducible from the passages under consideration is also different from the *formalistic conception* of logic. The difference lies in the fact that the *formalistic conception* maintains that for each subject-matter, every discipline, every context, every topic, every theory, probably at each material time, a logic is *created* for each and every circumstance. What matters, they say, is the internal coherence of the particular logic adopted for the handling of the issue. The rules/techniques/principles of the   game of chess, they reason, are designed by the creator of chess. The passages from the African scholars under consideration rather maintain that each reality, i.e. each ontology *imposes* a logic on the perceiving cognitive agent for its understanding. Logic, therefore, is ontology-specific. Since world-views, realities, ontologies, differ from place to place, from clime to clime, from time to time, so too do 'logics' differ. For this reason, we couch this conception of logic as the *ontologico-plurlistic conception of logic*.

The *ontologico-pluralistic conception* of logic upholds that logic does not have an absolutist or universal coloration whereby every normal human person is naturally embedded with given rules/techniques/principles for dealing with each and every problem in every circumstance, nor is logic artificially created for resolution or dissolution of problems or wonders. Logic is ontology-specific, therefore relative. 'Logics' vary, therefore pluralistic. Making the point portentously clear, Ijiomah writes:

> …every logic is a science of relation between or among realities.
> And since every culture has its particular view of any reality and
> since as a matter of course, the view of a people on the nature of
> realities affects whatever relationships the people may perceive as
> existing between the realities, the ethnorationlists maintain that *a*
> *people's logic is bound to be unique to their culture [tribe]*
> (Emphasis mine, 2000, 142).

Reasons for the Tribalisation of Logic

I have left the treatment of the defects of the formalistic conception of logic for another occasion. As for the *ontologico-pluralistic conception* of logic, the question is: *is there any justification for the espousal of its view?* It does appear to me that the positing of this saccharine species of logic is reactionary. Some Western scholars like Hegel and Levy-Bruhl had made unguarded, unjustifiable, sardonic, unscholarly and irresponsible comments about the cognitive capacities of Africans. While Hegel says Africa is a-historical, Levy-Bruhl says Africa is pre-logical (17). These remarks are absolutely uncanny, generalistic and hyperbolic. Those unfounded statements tumultuously stirred the gentle and calm African waters. Responding to Uduma's article entitled "Can there be an African Logic", Jonathan Chima Okeke reacts:

> His (Uduma) was a hypothetical question based on the condition of
> inability. Hence, can there be an African logic where Africans are pre-
> logical? (Levy-Bruhl, 17) pre-logicality meaning anything from lack of
> super culture to mental deficiency (2011, 142).

In his recent book entitled *Harmonious Monism: A Philosophical Logic of Explanation for Ontological Issues in Supernaturalism in African Thought*, Ijiomah identified that Levy-Bruhl – in his book *Primitive Mentality* - accused Africans of being mystically-oriented, lacking objectivity in their analysis of issues, being participatory (maintaining the simultaneous cogency of both the material and the spiritual), and that Africans do not demarcate between the objects and the subjects that investigate the world of object (2-3). Now, Ijiomah lands:

The consequence of the above and the final onslaught of Levy-Bruhl against third-world which includes Africa is that the third world has a pre-logical mentality. To be pre-logical means to stand or exist prior to logic, it means to be outside the universe of discourse or the operational influence of logic (3).

What again do you need to identify the burden, the pain and the challenge of the "African logician"? Levy-Bruhl's insult and his final onslaught must be arrested, arraigned, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to death, not through any decent means like lethal injection, but by firing squared in public glare. After the execution of the insult and final onslaught, its place must be taken by another, thus arose the *manufacture* of "African logic". "African logic" therefore is both a reactionary logic and an apologetic logic. It is reactionary because its invention/manufacture is a reaction to some Western scholar's uncanny, unwitty and derogatory remarks about Africans' mental capability, and apologetic because it is basically and primarily an exercise in defence of the African's mental capability. The reactionary and apologetic character of the origin of the ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic has been further elaborated on in an article entitled: Why Play into their Hands: A Rejoinder to the Attempts at Manufacturing African Logics (Edor, 174-183). But, are the above the reasons why we consider the creation/manufacture of "African logic" implausible? No!

Against the Tribalisation of Logic

Logic is the study of the rules/techniques/principles used in discriminating between good arguments from bad arguments and the application of those rules/techniques/principles. These rules/techniques/principles are essentially and necessarily within the domain of the *laws of thought.* The laws of thought are *given.* They are a common heritage of all mankind. They are a universal blessing to every normal human person. They are not created, they are not invented, they are not manufactured by man. The laws of thought are a cogno-mental capacity, they are like farming tools with which the farmer engages the forest. The tools here were not acquired by the farmer, they were donated to the farmer, in this instance, by nature. The *ontologico-pluralistic* conception of logic would have us believe that the justification for

the espousal of pluralistic "logics" is that realties differ, from subject-matter to subject-matter, from place to place, from time to time, from culture to culture. The adherents of ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic seem to be saying that the "logic" of physics is different from the "logic" of chemistry, the "logic" of law is different from the "logic" of philosophy, the "logic" of polygamy is different from the "logic" of monogamy, the "logic" of football is different from the "logic" of chess, therefore, the "logic" of man is different from the "logic" of a woman. By implication, to grapple with the problem of corruption requires an essentially unique and peculiar "logic" different from the "logic" that would be required to confront the problem of environmental pollution. Even for the same subject-matter like environmental pollution, the ontologico-pluralist would have us maintain that the Asian needs a different "logic", from the European, to confront it. Logic, they say, is infinitesimally relative to subject-matters, cultures, times, tribes and ethnic groups of persons. The Mbaise man's "logic" in dealing with the problem of the political marginalization of the Igbo region in Nigeria must be, or better still, ought be, different from the Arochukwu_ man's "logic" in grappling with the same issue. Logic would then be so incurably relativistic that it becomes infinitesimally pluralistic. In fact, this line of argument, when extended further according to the requirement of ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic, it will ultimately lead to *logical nihilism.* To suppose that one needs to attack uncanny Eurocentric posture by deliberating attempting to create a lacuna, where it does not exist, in logic, in order to legitimize the bonafide membership of the African in the comity of scholars, carries with it catastrophic and massive consequences. To me, any prefix to the term logic is a misnomer. It is true that cultures vary, even the advocates of the *aprioristic conception* of logic would hardly deny this (Asiegbu 42). Cultural relativity means

> …that culture situates a philosopher, limiting him to a specifically designed group and experience, problems, difficulties and presuppositions of a particular people. In addition, culture gives an orientation to his philosophy in so far as he seeks to provide ultimate answers to questions, and solutions to problems of a people of a particular culture. Since all philosophical discourse involves seeking answers to problems and issues, which a culture raises, then culture is

determinative of philosophy. As different and varied as cultures are, so also are the questions, answers and philosophies they generate. Culture, however significant it is, remains limited to a specific region. The Western culture is different from the African, American, or Asiatic cultures, for instance. The geographic particularity of culture raises the issue of relativism of a philosophy tied to a particular culture. The different cultures, into which philosophies are inserted, imbue the various philosophies with a relativistic character. These cultures individualize those philosophies (Uduma, 2015, 88).

Will it not be foolhardy to ignore, talk less deny, the existence of cultural variations, therefore relativity? We accept cultural relativity. But does cultural relativity entail (imply) logical relativity? Does the existence of tribe require the tribalization of logic? Does pan-African patriotism (Etuk 99-100) necessarily lead us to logical relativism? Obviously not! Environments are different, subject-matters are different, peoples are different, and therefore cultures are different. Yet, logic is logic, logic is one. The uniqueness of the identity of a people does not confer veracity to somewhat obvious exercise of manufacture of tribal "logics". Uduma, as has been shown above, accepts cultural relativity, yet maintains:

However, I maintain that there is real need to rise above the identity problem and the attendant lure into jingoism and come to the realization that logic is universal, that there is no cultural or regional logic; the call for African logic is thus at best only tendentious (89).

In an earlier work which he entitled *Can there be an African Logic?* Uduma succinctly articulates the position thus:

For such jingoistic philosophers, from the assertion that there exists African philosophy, it became necessary that there is a peculiar African logic. We reject this position in this essay

because we hold that logic is universal with no continental boundaries (281).

Though Georg Hegel, Levy-Bruhl, Robin Horton (65) disparage and sardonically disdain the African's cogno-mental cum intellectual capacities, to tribalize, then manufacture, logic is not the way to answer the clarion call of pan-Africanism. This sort of show of intellectual patriotism carries with it attendant boomerang consequences (Edor, Against the Attempts, 160-172). Again we re-state: *logic is one.* As for the exponents of *ontologico-pluralistic conception* of logic, their "African logician" counterparts have variously described the versions of their "logics" as *affective* (Etuk), *emotive* (Leopold Senghor), integrativisit (Ozumba), *harmonious monistic* (Ijiomah), *Customary* (Chimakonam 2011,148), *ezumezu* (Chimakenam 2015, 115 -121), etc. I dare you to pick a text of their very rich and enormous literature, pick sporadically or randomly any passage from their works, consider if it will be repulsive to the so-called Aristotelian traditional logic's laws of thought. In all their works, not even a sentence is resistant/repugnant to the traditional laws of thought. But unfortunately, as it were, I have never read even a paragraph from them that has adopted or implemented the requirements of their "logics". Write a little article or monograph, beginning with the rules/techniques/principles of *ezumezu* logic and end with same, then we take you serious. Not even the ingenious work on logic of modalities confers legitimacy on proliferation and tribalization of logic. Logic is one!

Conclusion

We find no merit in the, not small, amount of intellectual, and physical energies dedicated to the invention, creation, manufacture and eventual tribalization of logic. Africa is already ridden with an oasis of cancers as to generate cosmetic and saccharin ones, adding salt to injury. These consummate African scholars should therefore redirect their impeccable physical and intellectual resources to the resolution of African problems that make life expectancy in Africa shorter than anywhere else, that make Africa parade currencies with the lowest value in the comity of nations, that make maternal and infant mortality rates in Africa highest in the world, that make the literacy and numeracy levels in Africa appalling, etc. Can *emotive logic* solve the problem of corruption in Africa? Can *integrativist logic* confront the problem of HIV/AIDS? Can *affective logic* grapple with

the problem of shortage of power supply in Africa? Can *harmonious monistic* logic tackle the problem of unemployment? Can *customary logic* obliterate the problem of decay and poor infrastructural amenities? Can *ezumezu logic* bid farewell to the problem of insecurity in Africa? It does not appear so. In fact, logic is one! I have argued in a work I entitled *The Un-necessity of the Existence of African Logic as a Criterion for the Existence of African Philosophy* that:

> …only one logic exist and that all of humanity participates in this one logic. Various attempt at manufacturing/creating/inventing various species of logic for Africa are unpatriotic attempt that are insincere and are devoid of any epistemic basis. Going through the version or species of logic as canvassed by Ijiomah, Udo Etuk, Ozumba and Chimakonma betrays insincerity in those adventures. The truth is that African philosophy can still be done within, and without violating the stipulations of, classical Aristotelian logic. African philosophy does not need 'African logic' to exist both as a discipline and as an activity among the Africans (212).

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