There is an important difference between "value" and "valuation" in the value system developed by Robert S. Hartman. His formal definition of "value" is "the correspondence between the properties possessed by a subject and the predicates contained in the intension of the subject's concept." Alternatively, "A thing has value in the degree that it fulfills the intension of its concept." A value is thus a thing which fulfills a concept, the extension of an intension. "Valuation," on the other hand, is a human activity, or a personal activity if there are non-human persons such as God. It is a way of relating personally to values. The concept of "valuation" is defined as "the combinatorial arrangement of the thing's properties" and as "a play with properties." We are told that "Valuation thus arranges and re-arranges the properties of things." Seen in context, this means that valuation is the activity of measuring the properties of things by intensions (sets of predicates) to see if they fulfill or fail to fulfill their concepts. The things thus measured, the objects of valuations, are values.

The difference between value, as the thing being conceptually measured, and valuation, as the activity of making such measurements, becomes especially important in what Hartman terms "value exponetation." He introduces such formulae as $I_I$, "the intrinsic valuation of an intrinsic value" and $I_S$, "the systemic valuation of an intrinsic value." These formulae symbolize specific kinds of value and valuation. They are intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic values, and there are intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic valuations. In this paper, I shall explore only the intrinsic and the extrinsic primarily. Due to limitations of time and space, I shall have little to say about the systemic, though I am convinced that there are serious ambiguities here as well. I hope to show that Hartman actually packs a great deal more into his notions of intrinsic and extrinsic value and valuation than his formal de-
finitions suggest, and that considerable confusion results from his failure to keep track of his formal commitments.

First, let us look at the diversity of meanings of "intrinsic value" and "extrinsic value." Then we shall turn to "intrinsic valuation" and "extrinsic valuation." In my own symbolizing to follow, I shall use capital letters (I, E, S) for values, and lower case letters (i, e, s) for valuations.

I find at least four different meanings for the notion of an intrinsic value in Hartman's writings. To say that any given X is an intrinsic value might mean:

I1 that X is an entity with a non-denumerable infinity of properties, thereby fulfilling a concept with a non-denumerably rich intension (metaphors, uncepts).

I2 that X is a non-perceptible, non-spatio-temporal entity (such as the soul, creativity, the noumenal ego, God).

I3 that X is an individual or unique entity.

I4 that X is an end in itself, valuable for its own sake.

"A systemic value fulfills a connotation of at most n elements, an extrinsic value one of at most 2n elements, and an intrinsic value one of n elements." SV, p. 267. See also Footnote # 10 and SV pp. 113, 116-119, 258, 267, and 331, n. 40.

It is difficult to know for sure what Hartman meant by his denials of the perceptability and spatio-temporality of intrinsic values and valuations. In his Kantian moods, he seemed to believe that they were altogether beyond this world of process, but he does speak of "intrinsic space-time." Some relevant quotes are: "On the other hand, neither of the two (the empirical star, the star of astronomy) can be 'my good star,' for this is neither in empirical space and time nor in the physical space-time continuum, but in intrinsic space-time - the space which includes paradise, utopia, the Kingdom of God, and heaven (not the sky, 'theological space'; and the time which includes eternity, the millennium, the 'fullness of time,' Hochzeiten, honeymoons, vacations, gestations and births, Bergsonian durations." SV, p. 255. In VSC he treated creativity both as an intrinsic good and as a process ("Creativity is intrinsic process," p. 259) which suggests sequential change and temporality, while at the same time denying its temporality ("In a word, creativity as we have discussed it takes place essentially in a realm outside of space and time, outside the extrinsic, in the intrinsic," p. 265). One of Hartman's clearest statements concerning the non-spatio-temporality of intrinsic values is in "The Logic of Value," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1961). Hereafter referred to as LV. Here he wrote, p. 422, that: "The subject of intrinsic valuation are non-empirical things, or rather, empirical things in their non-empirical aspects. They are, as such, neither in time nor in space. When a thing is regarded as unique, all there is is this thing. Since time and space are defined as succession and interrelationship of things, where there is only one thing there is no time and no space in this sense. The thing itself is the world."

"Nondenumerably infinite sets of intensional predicates (descriptions or depictions) define singular concepts (also, as we have seen, axioms). Things corresponding to such concepts are unique. Uniqueness is the intensional counterpart to extensional singularity." SV, p. 113. "The individual is then defined as the extension of an intension with content χ₁. Such an extension must be singular for χ₁ signifies a nondenumerable continuum, that is, a Gestalt." SV, p. 331. "Uniqueness" is treated as the distinctive value term of the realm of intrinsic value in SV, pp. 113, 195, 199, 248, 308-309.

Hartman almost never employs the traditional definitions of an intrinsic value as something which is an end in itself or desirable for its own sake. This makes one wonder at times...