Heidegger’s 1937 reading of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* argues that two narrative episodes mysteriously correspond. In pursuit of this internal connection, one notices a particular emphasis on *awakening* the thought, and correspondingly the thinker, of eternal return.¹ Should we further pursue the emphasis on awakening, i.e., beyond the parameters of Heidegger’s explicit Nietzsche “interpretation” or “confrontation” (*Auseinandersetzung*), we would discover a conceptual space in which Heidegger’s own call to awaken betrays a certain intimacy with Nietzsche’s. Curiously, this newly discovered space not only predates but also prefigures the *Auseinandersetzung* to come, as Heidegger himself cryptically insists.² My remarks in this paper will focus chiefly on this space, that is to say, on the masterful 1929–30 lecture course in which the awakening of a fundamental attunement takes center stage: *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*.

In order to specify precisely the scope and parameters of the present engagement with *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* — doubtlessly a difficult and complex lecture course whose treatment of finitude and ambiguity has a dizzying effect on the execution of its central argument(s) — I begin with a single claim: Heidegger’s call to awaken a fundamental attunement should be read as analogous to the Nietzschean awakening of the thought of eternal return.

At first glance, such a claim may appear all too ambitious. Even if one
granted the analogy between the theme of awakening in the thought of
Nietzsche and Heidegger, does extension from the theme to the object(s)
thereof have any justifiable basis? To these initial objections I offer a
twofold response: first, if it were possible and even plausible to locate Niet-
sche’s thought of eternal return in Heidegger’s exhortation to awaken a
fundamental attunement, then the analogy would be more sound; and
second, assuming a basic possibility and plausibility, the function of the
analogy would be better secured by identifying a key text in *Fundament-
als Concepts of Metaphysics* that strategically indicates a Nietzschean
inspiration in Heidegger’s call to awaken a fundamental attunement in
his own name. And, while we cannot entirely circumvent the difficulty
surrounding Heidegger’s reticence as regards his interlocutors in the
work of the late 1920s, 3 when he transitions in §§17–18 from the positive
characterization of attunement toward the question of precisely which
attunement we are to awaken, Nietzsche comes explicitly and indispu-
tably into play.

In this key text, Heidegger intriguingly passes from what I would
argue are tacit invocations of Nietzsche to an *explicit* reference, the
likes of which we do not see in his corpus until the lecture courses of
the mid to late 1930s, which are delivered in Nietzsche’s name but
with rare exception remain marked by a certain critical distance. 4 By
contrast, here in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, three consecu-
tive pages are dedicated in large part to block quotations of Nietzsche’s
“final interpretation” of the opposition between the Dionysian and
Apollonian — block quotations, not incidentally, from *Der Wille zur
Macht*. 5 This text of Nietzsche’s, we know, is a posthumous collection
of aphorisms from his considerably vast Nachlaß, but it is also one
that Heidegger in *Fundamental Concepts* refers to as “decisive and
major,” and later, in the eponymous lecture courses, calls Nietzsche’s
*Hauptwerk* — his masterwork. 6

Much may be gained by noting the structure of Heidegger’s pre-
sentation. This striking series of block quotations, for which he offers
uncharacteristically little interpretation, is secured in two principal
moves. First, Heidegger justifies their inclusion by linking analysis of the “contemporary situation” to the question of which attunement to awaken. Second, having furnished the link, he insists that all prior considerations of the contemporary situation by the four select philosophers of culture have a common source: in Nietzsche. Thus it is Nietzsche who indicates the place and source “where the confrontation proper [eigentliche Auseinandersetzung] must occur” if we are to decide which fundamental attunement to awaken (GA 29/30: 107/71).

Therefore, if it is interpretation of the contemporary situation that decides which attunement to awaken and Nietzsche lies at the source of all such interpretation, his thinking more than satisfies Heidegger’s condition of existentiell fidelity to the contingencies of the historical moment. To wit, the Nietzschean necessity that Zarathustra awaken and fully incorporate the thought of return so as to overcome nihilism, and the urgency of Heidegger’s call to awaken a fundamental attunement from out of which to decide the fate of the West, may have more in common than initially meets the eye.

This commonality of urgency, call, preparation, and decision is no coincidence. I argue (elsewhere and at length) that it results from Heidegger’s effort to fully digest the debt of gratitude his youthful thinking owes to a Nietzschean horizontality of time. To briefly recapitulate: it is the concept of horizon on sharpest display in, but not exclusive to, the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations that motivates the ekstatic temporality of Heidegger’s Being and Time to turn on what he calls the “enigmatic,” and I call the elliptical, movedness (Bewegtheit) of Dasein. This is to say that it is horizon that furnishes both the open expanse and the closure that are the conditions for the possibility of the travel and transport distinctive of Dasein’s temporality, i.e., of Dasein’s Being.

And yet a conceptual insufficiency with respect to horizon plagues the existential analytic. While certainly not unaware of the problem, Heidegger himself seems unsure as to how to deploy horizon, on the one hand, formally, i.e., in terms of the Kantian conditions of possibility that secure for phenomenological ontology its status as first philosophy (and
here some of the difficulties surrounding the Husserlian legacy show themselves; and, on the other hand, temporally-constitutively, i.e., in terms of what makes Dasein's particular way of Being — *existing* — possible.⁹ The complexities of inspiration and appropriation may have, in other words, kept Heidegger quiet about Nietzsche.

Regardless of how we read Heidegger's silence, however, by explicitly addressing this insufficiency in and through a consistent and programmatic pursuit of horizon *qua* temporal making possible, the thinking of the period immediately following the publication of *Being and Time* (to which *Fundamental Concepts* no doubt belongs), demonstrates a provocative tendency. Heidegger's intimacy with Nietzsche, far from waning, only intensifies. It is even arguable that Heidegger's interest in Nietzsche's final interpretation of the Dionysian/Archaic opposition in its "most beautiful and decisive form" is inseparable from a conceptual stake in the (temporal) function of horizon. This is to say that for the Heidegger of *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, the "urge for unity" (*Drang zur Einheit*) expressed by the Dionysian, opposed to the "urge for complete-being-oneself" (*der Drang zur vollkommnen Für-sich-sein*) expressed by the Apollonian, in a peculiar way maps onto the temporalizing of the ekstases of Dasein's *Zeitlichkeit*. While the Apollonian is expressed by the ekstases themselves in their articulate individuality and as temporally productive of individuals, the Dionysian is expressed by the conditional stipulation that these individuals emerge *from out of a single unifying horizon* — a horizon not of lateral distances traversed and transgressed, but of depth. This is to say, at the root of the riddle of time may be a Dionysian source.

It is not, however, my intention to use the space of this paper to provide proof of Heidegger's renewed engagement with horizon and with making more precise the notion of its temporal function. Rather, I ask that you allow me a provisional and summative gesture meant to get at the crux of the problem. In its farthest or perhaps deepest range, horizon implies a robust notion of possibility that grants the coming into being of finite individuals who then negotiate their intrinsic duality *and* their relations with other such individuals across horizonal thresholds.
In other words, horizon has a double function: as *unifying*, it grants the very possibility of a manifest double, originally binning a two into a third (as *one*); and as the (plastic) *between*, it regulates negotiation in all of its manifestations.\textsuperscript{16} If Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* work on the concept of horizon can be said to evince a more profound intimacy with Nietzsche, and if the awakening of a fundamental attunement can be understood as analogous to the Nietzschean awakening of the thought of eternal return, then the task that remains is to locate and articulate the connection between such Nietzschean horizontality and the Heideggerian phenomenon of attunement. As we shall soon see, in the very phenomenon of attunement itself the force of the problem of horizon in its double function is demonstrable, and, with it, the extent to which Heidegger’s thinking is inspired by Nietzsche.

II

In order to make plain that attunement is not simply one among many such demonstrable possibilities but rather one of a few axial phenomena around which thought-constellations specific to this period of Heidegger’s thinking turn, one must acknowledge the methodological shift in Heidegger’s thinking post-*Being and Time*. By the summer semester of 1929–30, Heidegger advanced from fundamental ontology through metontology, and finally to the full conception of metaphysics, characterized as such because it welcomes what was bracketed in *Being and Time*: those Nietzschean questions concerning “man” and “life.”

Consequently, once the exclusionary wall between Dasein and (human) life collapses, and with it the reliance of first philosophy on Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction, metaphysics withdraws into what Heidegger calls “the obscurity of the essence of man” (GA 29/30: 107). If we are to sharpen our metaphysical questions against the whetstone of such withdrawal, it therefore becomes of the utmost necessity that we be gripped by (or in the grip of) a fundamental attunement. Owing to this necessity, attunement becomes the vehicle of the special methodology of *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, i.e., of the undertaking of
metaphysics properly conceived; attunement becomes (quite literally) fundamental to the advance of the metaphysical project as a whole.

And yet attunement, both at the level of whether we are attuned and at the level of precisely how we are attuned at any given moment, can neither be chosen nor willed. What is more, fundamental attunements, i.e., attunements of the type we are here tasked with awakening, are neither readily accessible nor commonly experienced. In fact, we must accede to the demand that a fundamental attunement be awakened precisely because of our primary tendency to be and to fall asleep: to forget. Acknowledging the vast and polyvalent plane that charts the concept of forgetting for both Nietzsche and Heidegger without opening it fully to examination, I would draw attention to the way in which forgetting is figuratively rendered for both thinkers in terms of sleep: that sleep that is necessary for survival, for function, for life — that sleep that we cannot do without but that is nevertheless not awake. Thus to a primordial forgetting that is rendered figuratively by sleep is opposed not remembering but awakening.\textsuperscript{11}

In \textit{Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics}, §6, Heidegger refers awakening contra forgetting to the concept of the “fundamental stance” (\textit{Grundh\upt{a}ltung}) the attainment of which proves to be complicated. It is, however, no coincidence that Pierre Klossowski — arguably the best commentator on the pivotal role of forgetting in the experience of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence — is in profound agreement with Heidegger: to the realization of the limit-experience, rare as it is profound, \textit{Stimmung} is the key.\textsuperscript{12} A “certain tonality of the soul” emplaces the human being who, if ready — i.e. vigilant, prepared, awake — can experience a sudden revelation, the opening of which is subject to near immediate closure.\textsuperscript{15} Thus the attunement that emplaces the human being into sudden revelation hearkens to the aperture of the \textit{Augenblick}, the Moment, the finite glance of the eye.\textsuperscript{14} Anticipating, and perhaps even inspiring, Heidegger’s characterization of the awakening of a fundamental stance as revealed in the testimonial pain of a hangover, Nietzsche writes:
Rather as one divinely preoccupied (Göttlich Zerstreuer) and immersed in himself into whose ear the bell has just boomed with all its strength the twelve beats of noon suddenly awakens [aufwacht] and asks himself: “what really was that which just struck?” so we sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, “what really was that which we have just experienced?” and moreover: “who are we really?” and, afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas! miscount them. — So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves [wir verstehen uns nicht], we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law “Each is furthest from himself!” (“Jeder ist sich selbst der Fernste”) applies to all eternity—we are not “men of knowledge” with respect to ourselves.  

Indeed, there is no better offer of sensuous imagery for Klossowski’s tonality, for the tuning in Heidegger’s attunement (or the stimmen in Stimmung) than the tolling of the bells, the striking of which transports (us) by seizure rather than by way of some voluntaristic will. Equally notable is Nietzsche’s use of the language of “dispersion” (Zerstreung) to speak to the preoccupation of our self-immersion, our absorption in a present that without forgetting would not be possible, and from which, as though we had been sleeping, we occasionally and suddenly awaken.  

Nevertheless, the awakening Nietzsche describes in On the Genealogy of Morals and that Heidegger reprises in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is an awakening to the present moment that comes after, i.e. after the experience of (sudden) transport and removal — ekstasis, Entrückung. For a moment bewildered and uncomfortable, we ask after who we ourselves really are, but only while we are still reeling from that basso profundo of the depths from which we have only just returned. In our reeling we do not rightly know where we have been. We do not know “that which just struck.”
Up upon waking the only things of which we may be certain are: first, that the person whom we identify as "we ourselves" had been transported elsewhere, removed unto an alternate locale; and second, whatever it is "we" saw and wherever it is "we" were — these phenomena, like attunement itself — defy capture by the logic of our waking sensibilities. In the present moment of the limit-experience, the experience that can only be articulated in plain and coherent language after the fact, our waking selves who bow to the law of logic and the rule of what is present-at-hand have gone to sleep. And yet as they drift off — already a metaphor of transport — something else or, perhaps better, someone else, awakens. This "other" awakens within transport to the depths, where the hour is midnight, where the boom of the bells is no jubilant sunny noontime refrain. Nietzsche calls such "transport" _Untergang_, or "down going," and Heidegger, I would argue, insists this is underway as the selected attunement of boredom grows ever more profound.\(^\text{17}\)

Once returned, the familiar "we" awaken as though from a nightmare, but the implicit suggestion is that only in the nightmare are we, the remote but true selves, in fact awake. Whether "we," with Nietzsche, rub our ears in surprise or, with Heidegger, rub our temples from the hangover, our "awakening" after is only ever derivative, is _a posteriori_ in the fullest sense. Thus the multiple valences of forgetting find analogues in those of awakening, and it is with a primordial awakening of our true selves _in_ the moment of transport — as opposed to a derivative awakening after it — that we must concern ourselves. But the question remains: how do we wake the sleeping, particularly if we are at once the one who arouses and the one who sleeps?

While provocatively commensurate with Zarathustra's need to awaken his sleeping "other" who, if left to sleep will choke on the black snake of nihilism, this problem more broadly serves to underscore the curious constitution of the human in Heidegger's metaphysical schematic: human beings are creatures of the double, _at once_ both there and yet not — i.e., _finite_.\(^\text{18}\) Furthermore, Heidegger's insistence that awakening a fundamental attunement involves _both_ making
wakeful and letting be wakeful – both assertion and relinquishment – evinces the oscillation between extremes he aligns with the “unrest” (Unruhe) of finitude. While this suggests that attunement uniquely attests to finitude, this is not all, for that which is sleeping is, in a peculiar way, absent and yet there. Awakening is thus the awakening of something that is already there (and yet not there...i.e., asleep), and thereby enacts the attestation to finitude in ways that mere remembering cannot.

However, just as Heidegger attempts to make this clear, he immediately forecloses the question of what sleep properly is “in order not to make the problem all too complicated here at the outset” (GA 29/50: 93/62). He instead stresses that a clarification of sleep or awakening per se is not the way. What we need, by contrast, and in anticipation of the much attended comparative analysis of Part Two, is a “fundamental conception of how a being must be structurally determined such that it can sleep or be awake” (GA 29/50: 93/62). Running through the main players of the comparative analysis to come, Heidegger demonstrates the force of the problem: a stone cannot sleep (nor can it therefore be awake), but the plant? Things are getting a little shaky there. Advancing a step in the traditional hierarchy of beings (according to medieval onto-theology), we are certain that the animal sleeps, but is its sleep the same as that of the human being? Emphasizing the need for a structural determination vis-à-vis the possibility of sleep and awakening, Heidegger concludes, “This problem is intimately bound up with the question concerning the structure of Being pertaining to these various kinds of beings: stone, plant, animal, man” (GA 29/50: 94/62).

Certainly modernity has mischaracterized sleep many times over. Yet in antiquity, Heidegger notes, its fundamental character has been grasped in a manner “much more elementary and immediate” (GA 29/50: 94/62). Aristotle, while also the author of the principle of non-contradiction to be shattered in its very foundations (GA 29/50: 91/61), has nevertheless noticed something remarkable in his treatise
on sleep: sleep is an akinésia, a movement, alpha-privatively negated. Heidegger explains:

he says that sleep is a desmos, a being bound, a peculiar way in which aesthesis is bound. It is not only a way in which perception is bound, but also our essence, in that it cannot take in other beings which it itself is not. This characterization of sleep is more than an image [Bild], and opens up a broad perspective which has by no means been grasped in its metaphysical intent. (GA 29/30: 94/62–63)

Let us note simply that the binding here in question, the peculiar binding of perception and the binding of the human essence, seems to belie a negotiation between sleep and awakening, the metaphysical intent of which remains mysterious. Could this be because the binding of one self, the “waking” self for example when asleep, is the liberation of the other self, viz. Dasein? And conversely, when Dasein goes to sleep, i.e., is bound, does not the “waking” self regain the ability to move about? With the closing of one and the opening of the other, what is at stake here is a negotiation I would, after Nietzsche, call horizontal: one (or the other) may move this far (and not farther), for this long (and not longer), and so on. But there is more. Horizontal negotiation also means that a question is opened, a question that asks after how far, how long, and even how much, implying that the range of motion is — in spite of our utter lack of control over its distribution or dispensation — quantifiable. And, the extent to which one or the other (or in extremely rare cases both) of the selves who together comprise a singular human being is awake, resounds to the tune of this quantum. Thus does our mood, the unique and singular expression of our finitude, at any moment express the music of our personal spheres.
Indeed, this is precisely what Heidegger, drawing ever closer to Nietzsche and ever more carefully distantiating attunement from the subjective phenomenon of emotion or feeling, expresses in the examples he selects to present. Programmatically following Heidegger, at this stage we venture beyond the limits of his extensive preliminary and privative analyses of attunement—thorough as they are to combat the profound entrenchment of the traditionally metaphysical conception of the human being—so as to accompany Heidegger on the first steps of his positive characterization.

Our first step is to note that the examples of attunement themselves—viz. grief and good humor—are opposites. In fact, they are opposites not far off from joy and woe, the extremes unified in tragic insight and celebrated by Zarathustra in their intrinsic connection throughout his journey of becoming. What is more, Heidegger speaks not of grief or cheerfulness per se, but of people who are attuned in these ways, people we—the listeners in the lecture hall—are hypothetically with. To be sure, this emphasizes that attunements are not present-at-hand psychological states, flashing and disappearing in the mental vacuum of the subject’s mind, but it likewise stresses how attunements complicate the very notion of the interiority and exteriority of the self. They are at once felt uniquely and incommunicably by the one attuned, and felt “infectiously” by the others in her company.

In other words, attunements negotiate the horizons of already delimited “selves,” and furthermore have a role to play in the delimitation of those “selves” (as, for example, in the Angst through which the authentic self is individuated in Being and Time). Heidegger thus speaks of grief as making the grieving one whose company we share “inaccessible,” as though proximity to the death of one cherished enough to incite grief would narrow a horizon, force one into a space altogether je meines, a space that remains closed to those who do not grieve. That good humor that brings a lively atmosphere, by contrast, can broaden horizon so much so that collective enjoyment threatens the distinction between self and other—this is that festival spirit of Dionysus that so
fascinated Nietzsche. In either case, attunement is no mere emotional experience that is transmitted from one isolated ego to another as though a mood were an infectious germ— even though we speak in the common parlance of mood in these terms. Rather, Heidegger stipulates, moods are infectious because they are already there, determining us in advance, like “an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through” (GA 29/30: 100/67). Heidegger continues:

It is a matter of seeing and saying what is happening here... Attunements are ways of the being-there of Da-sein and thus ways of being-away [Sie sind Weisen des Da-seins und damit solche des Weg-seins]. An attunement is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way [Weise]— in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e. attunes and determines the manner and way [Art und Wie] of his being. (GA 29/30: 101/67)

The way of Being that is attunement is both a how (Wie) as opposed to a what (opting for praxis over the object speculation of theory), and a Weise, a “tune.” Accordingly we know this tune, this Weise that is both how and refrain from the third book of Nietzsche’s Gay Science, a central text in Heidegger’s later readings of, and lectures on, Nietzsche. In §109, foreshadowing the advent of the “thought of thoughts,” Nietzsche cautions us against treating the world as though it (too) were a living thing. He argues:

The astral order in which we live is an exception; this order and the relative duration that depends on it have again made possible an exception of exceptions: the formation of the organic. The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos— in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there
are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms. Judged from the point of view of our reason, unsuccessful attempts are by all odds the rule, the exceptions are not the secret aim, and the whole music box repeats eternally its tune [und das ganze Spielwerk wiederholt ewig seine Weise],…  

Recognizing that this tune is an image for the “thought of thoughts,” i.e. that it sonorously expresses recurrence and its differential principle of motion, then the two things that follow don’t strike us as the least bit surprising. First, attunement is not itself a particular being but the “fundamental way” (Grundweise) that Dasein is (as Dasein). Dasein is quite literally tuned; this is its way of Being, its how – its existence. Given due consideration of Heidegger’s later argument in the 1957 lecture course The Eternal Return of the Same (GA 6.1), that eternal recurrence is precisely the how, the way, the manner, the existentia of Nietzsche’s fundamental metaphysical position, this first positive characterization is quite striking. Second, once we acknowledge that in the third book of The Gay Science Nietzsche offers a metaphor for eternal recurrence in the ganze Spielwerk that repeats eternally its Weise, its “tune,” we are poised to grasp the alignment of the tuning of attunement and eternal recurrence, sonorously expressed. For if attunements transport and in so doing horizontally negotiate – i.e. resound to a particular tone – then fundamental attunements may intimate or gesture toward that ganze Spielwerk from which they issue. They may, for the vigilant and awake, gesture toward the constitutive possibility that is the Abgrund, or deep horizon, of the human being. Thus Heidegger concludes, and with him so shall we:

attunement is not something inconstant, fleeting, merely subjective. Rather because attunement is the originary way [ursprüngliche Wie] in which every Dasein is as it is, it is not what is most inconstant, but that which gives Dasein its subsistence and possibility in its very ground. (GA 29/30: 101/67; em)
NOTES

1 The two episodes issue from Part Three of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, but are separated by several sections: the first ("The Convalescent") is the episode that indicates that Zarathustra has not yet incorporated the thought of eternal return; Zarathustra awakes from the shock of his newly commenced downgoing to discover that beside him in bed lies a sluggish worm, or the thought of return projected and incarnated as a figure to be awakened and incorporated. The second, and that to which the first episode corresponds ("On the Vision and the Riddle"), indicates what would happen should Zarathustra awaken the thought of return: a full confrontation with the black snake of nihilism, with the experience of choking and the necessity of the decisive bite. In this instance it is not the thought itself that must be awakened, but the one who is choking — the thinker who, having fallen asleep and had the snake crawl down his gullet, must somehow rouse himself to bite. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, eds., *Kritische Studienausgabe* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), henceforth "KSA," vol. 4: 270–77, 197–202. English translation: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 527–53, 267–72.

2 That Heidegger was already considering an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche in the summer of 1930 is in itself astonishing. But that he was already considering it in light of the philosophy of culture's diagnosis of the decline of the West that somehow involve a return to life (whether by rejecting spirit or by balancing it with life), i.e., that he was considering it in terms of Nietzsche's prognosis that nihilism was inevitable, is an even more powerful suggestion that the seed of Heidegger's mature reflections on Nietzsche (and perhaps more) first germinates here in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*.

3 For example, it is widely considered to be the case that Nietzsche is something of a secret source and resource for the temporal
structuration of the existential analytic of Dasein in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, and yet his name is only explicitly mentioned twice: in §53 and §76. One is a reference to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the other to the second of his *Untimely Meditations*. Taken in isolation, each of these references give precious little to the inquisitive reader to consider, but when taken together as their temporal co-implication would appear to demand: §53 freedom for death: *future*; §76 historicity: *having-been*, it becomes clear that Nietzsche has thoroughly inspired Heidegger in spite of the near lack of direct acknowledgment in prose.

In the expanded space of my dissertation I argue at length that Nietzsche inflects, in turn, each of the three fundamentally metaphysical questions, viz. those that ask after: world, finitude, and solitude.


To be sure, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche knew the Dionysian/Apollonian distinction sustained and guided his philosophizing from early on — and with this he is likely referring to Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*. But this is not all. Nietzsche also knew, Heidegger insists, that the opposition became transformed in his philosophizing; in fact Nietzsche furthermore knew (the third time Heidegger uses the same formulation in the span of just a few sentences) that “Only whoever transforms himself is related to me” (quoted by Heidegger: *GA* 29/30: 108/702). Thus it is with the transformed conception of the opposition that Heidegger is here most concerned. On masterwork, cf. the 1956 lecture course *The Will to Power as Art*, §2, *GA* 6:1: 5–9; *N1*: 7–11.


In *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, Nietzsche describes horizon as a dynamic threshold that negotiates what, and how much, may be incorporated and forgotten before an
individual, a culture, or a species falls ill – potentially fatally ill. The mysterious negotiation pertains, of course, to the past. The question becomes: how much past, that is, how much remembering as invocation and preservation of the past, is conducive to health when forgetting is essential, Nietzsche argues, to both action and to life? To remember to too great a degree, to take in too great a dose of history, is comparable to being forcibly deprived of sleep, that necessary darkness that brings respite from illumination and in which everything organic properly gestates. 

KSA 1: 250. English translation: Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62. The pursuit of this dynamic threshold, culminates in Nietzsche’s statement of a universal law: “a living thing can be healthy, strong, and productive only within a horizon; if it is unable to draw a horizon around itself...it will feebly waste away or hasten to a timely decline.” KSA 1: 251, Untimely, 65, tm. When considered in light of Dasein’s “stretching along” (Erstreckung) in Being and Time §72, and the extent to which Dasein must incorporate birth, death, and the between as the temporal stretch that it is should it succeed in the historical self-retrieval and “eventual” appropriation that determines it as authentic, these Nietzschean considerations of horizon seem not only less alien to the logic of Dasein’s temporality but altogether indispensable to it.

Consider, for example, §7 of the second “Introduction” to Being and Time in which philosophy is characterized as “universal phenomenological ontology,” as the “science of the Being of entities.” Therein, Being itself is emphatically characterized as “the transcendens pure and simple,” and every disclosure thereof as “transcendental knowledge,” such that “phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis” (GA 2: 51/ sz 62).

It would be fascinating to explore in greater depth the connection between this double function of horizon and the Dionysian/Apollonian opposition in which Heidegger is so interested in GA 29/30,
§18b. He explores it precisely in terms of the tension between unity and individuation, such that the granting of possibility would belong to the Dionysian component, and the negotiation of distinction, i.e., the limning of individuals by horizontally governing the between, would belong to the Apollonian. (Hence the plasticity of horizontal negotiation as opposed to something like the more rigid or static exchange across boundaries). Thus, posing the question as to whether for Heidegger there is a Dionysian source for the riddle of time is a way of asking after the unifying horizon of time's manifold appearances and manifestations.

Without fully opening the Pandora's Box relative to the thematic of forgetting in Being and Time, it suffices to say that in the discussion of the temporality of "understanding" (Verstehen) and, correspondingly, of "situatedness" (Befindlichkeit) in §68 a) and b), forgetting plays a pivotal role. When understanding (futurally) is determined as authentic, the having-been which corresponds thereto is in the mode of "retrieval" (Wiederholung). However, when understanding is determined as inauthentic, i.e. when possibilities are projected so as to make the objects of concern present, the having-been that corresponds to it is "forgetting" (Vergessen). Heidegger stipulates that this forgetting is not nothing, "nor is it a failure to remember; it is rather a 'positive' ecstatic mode of one's having been...[the ekstasis (rapture) of which] has the character of backing away in the face of one's ownmost 'been'...in a manner which is closed off from itself" (GA 2: 448/sz 539). We do well to note the analogue in the first section of the "Second Essay" of Nietzsche's On The Genealogy of Morals: "Forgetting [Vergesslichkeit] is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process 'inpsychation') as does the thousandfold process, involved in physical nourishment – so-called 'incorporation'. To close the doors and windows of consciousness...
for a time; to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs working with and against one another; a little quietness, a little *tabula rasa* of the consciousness, to make room for new things...that is the purpose of active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette: so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present [*Gegenwart*], without forgetfulness.” KSA 5: 291-92. English translation: *On The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 57-58, em.

Having juxtaposed Nietzsche to Heidegger, we are left to wonder what repression is, if not the (inevitable) backing away in the face of that which is closest — perhaps too close — i.e., one’s ownmost “been,” or, to put a Nietzschean spin on it, that “it was” that “gives conflict, suffering, and satiety access to man so as to remind him what his existence [sein Dasein] fundamentally is — an imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one.” KSA 1: 249, *Untimely*, 61. Furthermore, should we take the positive characterization of forgetting seriously — for both Nietzsche and Heidegger — we would conclude that it is only on the basis of the rapture pertaining to forgetting, i.e. only on the basis of the sudden transport away from ourselves — away from our having been, our having undergone the tragic contingency of our thrownness such that we may function (with a little quietness) in the world of our concern, in the present — that anything like ‘remembering’ is possible. And it is only against the backdrop of the remembering enabled by primordial forgetting that “forgetting” in the quotational and purely derivative sense emerges. To be sure, these passages in *Being and Time* and in Nietzsche’s *Genealogy* extend — to use Jacques Taminiaux’s expression — to a plane that stretches *ad infinitum*. Consider the following: first, the “forgottenness of Being” (*Seinsvergessenheit*) that comes to play a central role in Heidegger’s diagnosis of the legacy of metaphysics
in the late 1930s and beyond; and second, as in Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense," for example, the extent to which our entire relationship with language and truth is based upon our having forgotten that words are metaphors, insufficient to capture that of which they are metaphors. Above all, the parenthetical recollection of this infinite plane, while acknowledging that we could never speak to the whole of the problem it invokes, is to emphasize that the counterpoint to primordial forgetting is rarely remembering, but awakening. This counterposition thus implies that primordial forgetting, the forgetting that for Heidegger entrances us and, that for Nietzsche heals us, is akin to a kind of sleep.


13 By "emplacement" I mean to refer to the connection between Befindlichkeit (situatedness), sich befinden (finding oneself), and Stimmung (attunement).

14 There is no better commentator on this point than William McNeill, who dedicates an entire book to its relation to the kairos—the opportune moment for decisive action in Aristotle (and eventually in the Christian temporality of grace) — whose importance cannot be emphasized enough. See The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). Heidegger's focus in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics on the confrontational thinking that is decisive for action cannot be divorced from his understanding of the Augenblick and the thereby form of the ekstasis of the present.


17 See for example, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, §§19 and 20, in which Heidegger characterizes a certain species of boredom
as deadly; in §24 he then reprises this theme in analysis of the third, and most profound form, of boredom. These examples are consistent with a conception of “down going” (Untergang) as accession to death, de-actualization unto possibility, or being-towards-death authentically determined.

Cf. Derrida, *Lanimal que donc je suis* (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2006). English translation: *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). There, on the heels of a masterful reading of the connection between the problem of world (as seen through a threefold lens: of history in the 1928 “On the Essence of Ground,” of our everyday being-in-the-world in *Being and Time*, and of the human being characterized as “world-forming” [Weltbilden]) and the problem of animality, that is to say, the problem of living versus existing and thus the problem of the animality of the human, Derrida calls for our continued interest in “the question of the animality of Dasein, which Heidegger naturally leaves aside or in suspense – I would say from one end to the other of his life and thinking.” He continues, and I quote this passage at length: “I would have liked [had there been more time in the day’s seminar session] to comment on the moments of vertigo and circularity in this text. That’s what would take time: taking an interest in the difficult moments, admitted to and made explicit by Heidegger, regarding what he calls the circularity of his manner of proceeding, the vertigo – and he insists a lot on that word (Schwindel): turning round and round. He notices that these comparative considerations are caught in a circle, and that circle makes one dizzy. He insists a lot on this dizziness, which, he says, is unheimlich: ‘Schwindel ist unheimlich.’ And there are many moments in the text, which I would have liked to point out, where one’s head spins and where Heidegger confesses that the vertigo is unheimlich but that it is necessary. This vertigo is that of an interrogation into the animal, and finally, it’s the concept.
of world itself that becomes problematic and fragile" (Derrida, Animal, 155).

19 It is worth noting that Derrida was also drawn to this intriguing citation, and quoted it at length. But at this point in the quotation, Derrida opens one of his famed parentheses and inserts: "[the question of binding is going to come back regularly, the stricture also, and subjection by means of the animal’s narrowing (reserrement) – I am anticipating enormously in saying this – the animal is finally, in comparison to man, simply caught in tighter networks of constraint, ‘a ring,’ Heidegger will say, tighter rings; it is a problematic binding]." Derrida, Animal, 149.

20 An explicit reflection on the repetition of “atmosphere” in a context so attuned to the concept of horizon as it finds expression in Nietzsche’s second “Un timely Meditation” would, I think, make an interesting contribution to the argument here. Nietzsche there characterizes the unhistorical as an “atmosphere,” as a vaporous cloud in which we are immersed, which we breathe (a primordial negotiation of horizons that goes both in and out, no less), and that enables us to live. The question of attunement and the unhistorical as the giving of possibility, as Heidegger will soon claim of the former and Nietzsche argues of the latter, is something I hope to take up as future work.

KSA 3: 468, English translation: The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 68. The pronouncement concerning world as “chaos” is taken up by Heidegger in the 1939 lecture course The Will to Power as Knowledge (§§10–13) such that chaos as world becomes the “truly actual” harmony that weds – no matter how hidden – to truth as homoidis. It is also worth noting that Heidegger takes Nietzsche’s pronouncement as to the character of the world to hold to beings as a whole (consistent with the Heideggerian definition of “world”), thus making the Nietzschean conception thoroughly metaphysical in its deciding for the predominance of beings (the bodying forth of life, in this case) over being. GA 6.1: 493–519/N3: 64–89.