The Good of Boredom

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Abstract. I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.

1. Boredom: a tale of two constructs

In recent years, boredom has become the topic of an active interdisciplinary research program. What is, at least partly, responsible for this surge of interest in boredom research is the development and validation of various ways of conceptualizing and measuring boredom. Two such measures focus on job boredom (Grubb, 1975; Lee, 1986), one examines the ability to cope with boredom (Hamilton et al., 1984), one assesses leisure or boredom during free time (Iso-Ahola & Weissinger, 1990; Ragheb & Merydith, 2001), one appraises sexual boredom (Watt & Ewing, 1996), one investigates academic boredom (Acee et al., 2010), and yet another considers purposelessness, under-stimulation, and boredom in cancer patients (Passik et al., 2003). Despite the availability of such measures, most of them are limited in scope: they measure boredom only in specific contexts. Two existing measures that are not subject to such a shortcoming are the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and the Boredom Susceptibility Scale (ZBS) (Zuckerman, 1979). Out of these two scales, only BPS is a full-scale measure of boredom; ZBS is a subscale of the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979; Zuckerman et al., 1978). On account of its full-scale character, BPS is to date the most commonly used measure of boredom.

BPS is designed to “assess one’s proneness toward experiencing boredom” and as such it is a measure of trait boredom — viz., the propensity to experience boredom frequently and in a wide range of situations (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986, p.5). Its use has allowed researchers to study the correlates of boredom proneness (i.e., the construct that BPS operationalizes and measures
and which is thought to correspond to trait boredom) and to document its profoundly harmful effects. For example, boredom proneness has been found to be positively correlated with anger and aggression (Gana & Akremi, 1998; Gordon et al., 1997; Mercer-Lynn et al., 2011; Rupp & Vodanovich, 1997), depression (Ahmed, 1990; Goldberg et al., 2011; Malkovsky et al., 2012; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), anxiety (Fahlman et al., 2009; Fahlman et al., 2013), hostility (Dahlen et al., 2004; Vodanovich et al., 1991), apathy (Goldberg et al., 2011), loneliness (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), and hopelessness (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Within an educational context, boredom proneness has been linked to poor grades (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993) and early dropout rates (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Larson & Richards, 1995). Within the workplace, boredom has been associated with lower job satisfaction (Abdolahi et al, 2011; Kass et al., 2001) and job involvement (Seib & Vodanovich, 1998), increased accident rates (Kass et al., 2010; O’Hanlon, 1981; Weinger, 1999), and increased job stress (Wan et al., 2014). In everyday life, boredom proneness is related to poor performance on tasks that require sustained attention (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Seib & Vodanovich, 1998; Watt & Blanchard, 1994). It is also related to a propensity to make mistakes in completing common tasks (Carriere et al., 2008).

In turn, boredom proneness has been found to lead to poor interpersonal and social relationships (Leong & Schneller, 1999; Tolor, 1989; Watt & Vodanovich, 1999). It is also associated with a lower life satisfaction (Famer & Sundberg, 1986) and boredom prone individuals have a harder time finding meaning in life than those who are not prone to boredom (Fahlman et al., 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011; Vodanovich & Watt, 1999; Watt & Vodanovich, 1999; Weinstein et al., 1995). What is more, boredom prone individuals experience impulse control deficits (Dahlen et al., 2004; Leong & Schneller, 1993). Looking for something to excite them, they are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior, such as reckless driving (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010), and are more prone to binge eating (Stickney & Miltenberger, 1999; see also Ganley, 1989), drug and alcohol abuse (Lee et al., 2007; LePera, 2011; Paulson et al., 1990), and problem gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1990; Mercer & Eastwood, 2010).

Much of boredom research can thus be seen as an attempt, on the one hand, to understand the nature of trait boredom and its correlates and, on the other hand, to explore ways in which the effects of trait boredom can be mitigated. Still, not all of boredom research concerns itself with trait boredom and it would be a mistake to suggest so. Recently, boredom researchers have begun to explore the nature of the state of boredom, a construct distinct from trait boredom.
Unlike trait boredom, which is a personality trait, the state of boredom is a transitory, aversive experience that signals a failure to engage with one’s environment in a desired manner despite one’s desire to do so (e.g., Danckert & Merrifield, 2016; Eastwood et al., 2012).

An adequate account of the state of boredom—viz., a description of its antecedents, effects, experiential profile, and its neurophysiological correlates—turns out to be crucial for our understanding of the phenomenon of boredom. First, the idea of the state of boredom is conceptually prior to the idea of trait boredom. That is, the actual experience of boredom is presupposed both by our notion of trait boredom (after all, trait boredom is a propensity to frequently experience boredom) and by the manner in which trait boredom is being measured (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; see also Fahlman et al., 2013). Thus, without an adequate understanding of state boredom (to which I will subsequently refer simply by the term “boredom”), it is unclear whether we can have a good grasp of the notion of trait boredom.

Second, as a transitory affective state, boredom appears to be ever-present. It affects both healthy individuals and patient populations (Binemma, 2004; Eastwood et al., 2007; Hamilton et al., 1984; Newell et al., 2011; Seel & Kreutzer, 2003; Vodanovich, 2003). It affects individuals of all genders and from all cultures (see, e.g., Musharbash, 2007; Ng et al., 2015; Sundberg et al., 1991; Vodanovich et al., 1997; Weinstein et al., 1995). And it is also experienced in a wide range of situations (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007; Fisher, 1993; Game, 2007; Grassian, 2006; Grubb, 1975; Iso-Ahola & Weissinger, 1990; Larson & Richards, 1991). Therefore, any attempt to come to terms with our affective existence needs to study and understand the state of boredom.

Third, there is strong evidence in support of the claim that boredom is an emotion (or at least, an affective state) in its own right and as such ought to be distinguished from other related affective states. For example, Van Tilburg and Igou (2012) found that boredom has a unique experiential content (study 1) and that manipulation of the state of boredom did not affect other emotional states (anger, sadness, or frustration) (study 4). Furthermore, using structural equation modeling, Goldberg and colleagues found that boredom is distinct from apathy, anhedonia, and depression—all of which are taken to be phenomenologically akin to boredom (Goldberg et al., 2011).

Last, it has been recently proposed that the state of boredom could serve an important function in our mental economy. Specifically, it has been suggested that boredom acts as a regulatory state that keeps one in line with one’s projects (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014).
and 2015a; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; Pekrun et al., 2010; Van Tilburg & Igou 2012). The state of boredom can motivate one to pursue a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. As such, boredom can help to promote the restoration of the perception that one's activities are meaningful and congruent with one's overall projects.

In this paper, my aim is to offer an in-depth and critical examination of boredom’s role as a regulatory state and present both its nature and its potentially beneficial effects. Although the present article is not the first study to propose a relationship between boredom and self-regulation, it goes beyond the findings and claims of extant articles in at least two important respects. First, it articulates clearly the relationship between the state of boredom and self-regulation. It does so by emphasizing boredom’s distinctive capacity to move us out of uninteresting, unfulfilling, or meaningless situations and relates this capacity to the locomotion aspect of the Regulatory Mode Theory (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Second, it makes a novel case for the importance of boredom in our lives. Whereas extant studies on boredom and self-regulation conclude by defending, proposing, or simply noting a link between boredom and self-regulation, the present article takes a further step: it shows how boredom’s capacity to keep us in motion is beneficial to our well-being. To put it rather simply and in a manner that passes over many of the complexities that will be addressed later on, this article makes the following argument: boredom promotes movement; movement is essential to well-being; ergo, boredom promotes well-being. As agents with projects, goals, and interpersonal relationships, we are much better off having the capacity to be bored than lacking it.

2. Caution!

This article does not argue that our well-being is promoted by the chronic or frequent experience of boredom. Nor does it, in any way, suggest that we should strive to be bored. I have already presented some of the many detrimental effects (or at least, correlates) of boredom proneness. Still, there is value in boredom when it is experienced occasionally by healthy individuals. To see where its value lies, it is instructive to draw a parallel between pain and boredom. Although the sensation of pain is unpleasant, the capacity to feel pain is good for us. Just consider what happens in cases where the capacity to feel pain is missing. Subjects with congenital insensitivity to pain live difficult and often short lives. Their lives contain harmful and dangerous stimuli and their bodies become injured easily and often severely (Bar-On et al., 2002; Baxter & Olszewski, 1960; Nagasako et al., 2010; Swanson, 1963; Thrush, 1973). Yet, they cannot sense harm done to them
and thus cannot protect themselves. Pain is a mechanism that both signals the presence of harm and motivates us to change our behavior in order to protect ourselves (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Koster et al., 2014; Van Damme et al., 2007). As such, pain is valuable to us.

Something similar holds for boredom. Or so this article will show. Boredom protects us from certain situations. It does so by informing us of the presence of situations that are not in line with our interests and desires, and by motivating us to do something else. If we were to lack the capacity to be bored, we would not notice when we are faced with an unsatisfying, non-stimulating, or monotonous situation. Nor would we do something to get out of it. So, the main claim that this article will defend is that boredom (in its non-pathological, state form) is valuable to us precisely because its presence helps us to keep moving and in doing so, it brings us closer to what is in line with our desires and goals. It is not news to state that there is a place for negative emotions and affective states in our well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2002). It is news, however, to propose that boredom can be an element of the good life.

3. Describing boredom

What is state boredom? Here is not the place to provide a systematic and exhaustive review of the literature on the state of boredom—others and I have done so elsewhere. Still, in order to be in a position to argue for the claim that boredom is a regulatory state that has the potential to benefit us I need to present, at least in broad outline, the character of boredom. For ease of explication, I follow a component processes account of emotions (e.g., Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1991; Scherer, 1984) and hold (a) that emotions consist of a set of interrelated components and (b) that the task of characterizing a given emotion amounts to that of specifying its different components. Thus, in order to describe boredom and to separate it from other related affective states, we have to present its affective, cognitive, physiological, and volitional components.

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1 Most emotions involve an affective component that amounts to the phenomenology or felt quality of the emotion; a cognitive component that consists of the effects of the emotional state on perceptual and cognitive processes and vice versa; a physiological or somatic component that includes the physiological and neurological correlates of the emotional state; an expressive component that consists of the associated facial and bodily expressions; and lastly a volitional component that is composed of the actions, thoughts, and desires prompted by the presence of the emotion.

2 In my presentation, I ignore the expressive component of boredom. This is a topic that has received very little attention. In one of the few investigations on this topic, Wallbott (1998) reported that bored individuals tend to lean their head backwards (i.e., to raise their chin), to collapse their bodies, and to restrain from movement.
**Affective character:** Boredom is an aversive state (Harris, 2000; Hartocollis, 1972; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Pekrun et al., 2010; Todman, 2003). It does not feel good to be bored. Bored individuals report feelings of constraint or a perceived lack of agency (Eastwood et al., 2012; Fahlman et al., 2011; Fenichel, 1951; Geitwitz, 1986; Hill & Perkins, 1985; Todman, 2013; Vodanovich & Kass, 1990a). Furthermore, individuals who find themselves in a state of boredom comment both that they feel tired and lethargic and also that they experience feelings of restlessness and irritability (Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2014).

**Cognitive character:** It is integral to the experience of boredom that one is both disengaged and dissatisfied with one’s environment (Anderson, 2007; Fahlman et al., 2009; Fenichel, 1951; Goldberg et al., 2011; Greenson, 1953; Passik et al., 2003). Bored individuals experience difficulties in concentrating and maintaining attention (Ahmed, 1990; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1984; Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; Eastwood et al., 2012; Fisher, 1993; Gordon et al., 1997; Harris, 2000) and they often engage in mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006).

Furthermore, qualitative studies have found that bored individuals experience an altered passage of time (Martin et al., 2006): during a state of boredom, time appears to move more slowly (Gabriel, 1998; Greenson, 1953; Hartocollis, 1972; Tze et al., 2013; Wangh, 1975). When completing a tedious task high boredom prone individuals perceived time as passing more slowly than low boredom prone individuals (Watt, 1991). This finding is consistent with a recent study by Danckert & Allman (2005) which reports that individuals who are prone to boredom are likely to make mistakes in judging the duration of perceptual events.

Finally, boring situations are ones that are perceived as being non-optimal for the subject (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; De Chenne, 1988; Mann & Robinson, 2009; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993). Often subjects report that boring situations are meaningless or trite (Barbalet, 1999; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Perkins & Hall, 1985; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), that they lack a sense of challenge (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even that they are too challenging (Daschmann et al. 2011; Goetz et al., 2006; cf. Pattyn et al., 2008).

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3 Attentional failures seem to be an important mechanism of boredom (Eastwood et al., 2012; cf. Leary et al., 1986; Skowronski, 2012). Such a judgment is corroborated by findings that show that manipulation of attention can affect the experience of boredom (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989). Furthermore, it has also been reported that tasks that require sustained attention are often perceived as boring (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Pattyn et al., 2008; Scerbo et al., 1992).
Physiological character: Currently, there is no agreement as to whether boredom is a state of low or high arousal. Indeed, in the literature one finds proposals that describe boredom as a state of low arousal (Hebb, 1955; Mikulas & Vadanovich, 1993; Russell, 1980), as a state of high arousal (Bench and Lench, 2013; Berlyne, 1960; Fisher, 1993; Harris, 2000; Hill & Perkins, 1985; London et al., 1972), or even as a state that can be both (Bernstein, 1975; Eastwood et al. 2012; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1953; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; O’Brien, 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Qualitative studies on the phenomenological character of boredom and studies on the physiological correlates of boredom are consistent with all three proposals.

For instance, bored individuals not only describe boredom as a low-energy or apathetic state, but also as one that contains feelings of restlessness, anxiety, and irritability (Goetz & Frenzel, 2006; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006). Furthermore, boredom has been associated with both a decrease and an increase of physiological arousal (Barmack, 1937; Braby et al., 1992; Geiwitz, 1966; London et al., 1972; Lundberg et al., 1993; Pattyn et al., 2008). London et al. (1972) reported that a boring task can yield an increase in levels of galvanic skin potential (Study I) and heart rate (Study II). However, in a different study, Pattyn and colleagues observed that during a prolonged target detection task—a task that is often described as boring—participants’ heart rate decreased over time (Pattyn et al., 2008; see also Merrifield & Danckert, 2014).

Although we do not have an adequate picture of the neurological underpinnings of boredom, the following findings are noteworthy. First, Oswald (1962) has reported the presence of alpha waves during the experience of boredom. This finding relates boredom to mental fatigue insofar as studies of the neural correlates of the latter show similar brain activation (Barwick et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2015; Lal & Craig, 2002; Phipps-Nelson, et al., 2011; Schier, 2000; Zhao et al., 2012). Second, there is evidence suggesting that boredom might be correlated with lower beta activity in the left Dorso-Lateral Prefrontal Cortex area (DLPFC) (Tabatabaie et al., 2014). Such a finding about the neurological correlates of boredom, coupled with the observation that a similar activity reduction in DLPFC has been observed in ADHD children (Sangal & Sangal, 2015), provides further support for the claim that attention is an important mechanism of boredom (Eastwood et al., 2012). Third, Danckert and Merrifield (2016) undertook a comparative study of fMRI scans of individuals in three different conditions: during resting state, during boredom mood induction, and during a sustained attention task. A comparison of the scans showed that in all three conditions there is common activation of components of the default mode network.
(DMN). Such commonality supports the claim that boredom is similar both to the resting state and to the sustained attention task insofar as it is state of disengagement from one’s environment. Having said that, Danckert and Merrifield noted that despite similarities, observed brain activation in the resting state differs from that of boredom in one important respect: only during boredom was there anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex. Danckert and Merrifield propose that activity in that region may indicate a failed attempt to engage with the situation and in this way, the state of boredom differs from the resting state. Even though both are states of disengagement, only the former is one in which individuals were motivated to try to engage with their situation.

**Volitional character:** The state of boredom is marked by a strong desire to engage in a task other than the one with which one is currently engaged. A state of boredom is a negative, aversive state of discontent. As such, bored individuals wish to be doing something else and will try, when it is possible, to escape a boring situation (Bench & Lench, 2013 Berlyne, 1960; De Chenne, 1988; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1953; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Greenson, 1953; Hebb, 1966; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Todman, 2003; Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012). The motivational power of the unpleasantness of boredom is strong. In fact, studies that have found that boredom proneness is correlated with risk-taking activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010) are indications of the ability of boredom to motivate individuals to search for situations that will alleviate boredom, even if such situations are harmful to them.

4. **Boredom and self-regulation**

Some authors have suggested that boredom should be understood as a self-regulatory state (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014 and 2015a; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; Pekrun et al., 2010; Struk et al., 2015b; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). Given the summary of boredom’s character that I just offered, such a proposal is not only reasonable, but also warranted by what we know about the experiential profile of boredom. Boredom is an aversive state from which one seeks escape. During boredom one experiences feelings of weariness and frustration. One is disengaged from and dissatisfied with one’s situation. The situation does not capture the attention of, nor does it interest, the individual. Instead, the individual is moved to consider alternative situations, goals, and actions (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014 Fahlman et al., 2013; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Lastly, through its physiological features—
increase in arousal and the presence of anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex—boredom can facilitate the pursuit of alternative goals and situations.

A synthesis of the above characteristics of boredom strongly suggests that boredom is both an informative and motivational state: it signals that we need to change something about ourselves or about our environment and it motivates us to do so. Specifically, what boredom does is to promote the pursuit of alternative situations (physical or mental) when the current situation ceases to be interesting, engaging, or meaningful. Boredom strives to get us unstuck when we find ourselves stuck (Fahlman et al. 2013, p. 68). It moves us out of non-interesting situations and into interesting ones. For that reason, boredom is best understood as a regulatory state that helps to keep us in line with what we finding interesting and meaningful. Boredom’s function is movement, and through movement, it promotes self-regulation.

4.1. Boredom’s relationship to movement and self-regulation

Self-regulation can be understood to be the set of processes that aim to minimize the discrepancy between an individual’s current state and a desired state. Through self-regulatory processes one becomes aware of such a discrepancy and utilizes the needed resources in order to achieve the desired state (Carver & Scheier 1990; Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1985). Self-regulation contributes to the completion of goals and allows individuals to act, think, and even feel in a way that is consistent with their standards and desires (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003). Self-regulation is often hard and requires the exertion of effort (Baumeister et al., 1994) but success in self-regulation has been shown to be associated with positive psychological adjustment, positive interpersonal relations, lower anger, better grades, and fewer impulse control problems (Tangney et al., 2004). Furthermore, in a longitudinal study that followed a cohort of 1000 children from birth to the age of 32, Moffitt and colleagues (2010) found that poor self-control in childhood can lead to poor health, financial issues, and even criminal convictions.

According to Regulatory Mode Theory, a specific model of self-regulation, human behavior is guided by two largely independent components: assessment and locomotion (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kruglanski et al., 2013). Assessment constitutes the comparative aspect of self-regulation (Higgins et al., 2003). It involves the critical evaluation and comparison of different entities (e.g., means and goals) in order to determine which one is most worthy of pursuing. In contrast, locomotion is the aspect of self-regulation that involves the commitment of one’s psychological resources in order to initiate and maintain goal-directed activity.
Locomotion is not characterized by a specific end state but rather by movement itself (Higgins et al., 2003; Pierro et al., 2006), where movement is understood to be any change from one state (psychological or behavioral) to another (Higgins et al., 2003, p.295).

A large body of evidence supports the claim that locomotion is a unique construct. For example, locomotion is conceptually distinct from promotion (Higgins, 2012; Kruglanski, 2016), implementation (Gollwitzer 1990; Scholer & Higgins 2012), and action orientation (Kuhl 1985). Furthermore, studies have obtained significant locomotion effects while controlling for the Big Five personality factors (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro et al., 2011). Locomotion, just like assessment, is a dimension: it varies from low to high, and both individuals or situations can be characterized as low or high in locomotion. It is measured by the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire (Kruglanski et al., 2000) and can be induced experimentally (Avnet & Higgins 2003; Mauro et al. 2009).

There are conceptual reasons to think that the state of boredom and locomotion are related. Given its affective, cognitive, volitional, and physiological aspects, boredom is a psychological state that has the capacity to help us achieve movement. Boredom not only signals a dissatisfaction with our current situation, it also acts as a push that motivates us to get out of uninteresting or meaningless situations. As such, the state of boredom contributes to the exercise of locomotion. In line with the characterization of movement assumed by Regulatory Mode Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2013), the movement that boredom calls for and promotes does not have to be physical or behavioral; it can also be mental. That is, in order to alleviate boredom an individual might be motivated to change her situation or she might engage in a different mental activity, such as mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006).

I should be quick to point out that although boredom promotes locomotion, its proposed function is not movement pure and simple. Boredom aims not simply to move us from one situation to another but to facilitate a type of goal-directed motion—viz., one that takes us from an uninteresting or meaningless situation into one that is interesting or meaningful. Indeed, boredom would be incapable of playing an integral role in self-regulation if its aim were not this type of goal-directed movement. But why suppose that boredom plays this self-regulatory role by promoting goal-directed movement? I offer three reasons.

First, such a proposal is supported both by phenomenological descriptions of the experience of boredom (Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012) and by what we know about the affective, volitional, and cognitive aspects of boredom. Although bored
individuals have a strong desire to escape their current situation, they do not simply wish to replace their situation with any alternative situation. Clearly, they do not want to move from one boring situation to another. Instead, in a state of boredom, one wishes both to stop doing what one is currently doing and to engage in a more satisfactory task (Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). The latter aspect of the volitional content of boredom is necessary because without a desire to engage in some other task, the experienced state would not be one of boredom but perhaps one of apathy. Furthermore, even if the volitional content of boredom is not fully specified, it is still “thicker” than a mere “do something else!” That is to say, even if bored individuals do not know precisely what they want to do, they do know that they want to be doing something that is interesting, exciting, or meaningful (Fahlman et al., 2013). On account of this volitional content, boredom will motivate individuals to seek out a more fulfilling task.

Second, the proposed function of boredom is consistent with the commonplace observation that mere movement is not always capable of alleviating boredom. The act of flipping through channels, for example, constitutes both some type of movement and change—at the very least, we have changed our immediate sensory environment and we are directing our attention to something else. Yet, such a change does not guarantee that boredom will be removed. The same holds for certain types of physical movement. Truck drivers driving through a monotonous desert road experience boredom (Drory, 1982) despite the fact that they are clearly moving and experience some kind of change. If boredom aimed merely to move us, then any state of change or movement would be the result of the proper exercise of boredom’s function. But such a claim opposes what we seem to know about the function of other (negative) emotions. Disgust and fear, for example, dissipate once their function has been fulfilled. More importantly, if boredom’s function were simply motion, it would be hard to make sense of boredom within a functional account of emotions (e.g., Keltner, Haidt, and Shiota, 2006; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides 2008). According to such an account, emotions are solutions to problems of physical or social survival. Pure movement, however, does not seem sufficient in offering such solutions for complex organisms like us. Or, alternatively, if pure movement is capable of solving problems pertaining to physical or social survival, then the need for boredom as a distinct affective state becomes hard to discern. Other affective states or physiological states

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4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I discuss in more detail the volitional content of boredom.
could serve the same function and do so more efficiently.

Third, the proposed claim about the function of boredom has the additional, theoretical benefit that it allows us to make sense of boredom proneness as the result of a dysfunction of the state of boredom. Boredom may fail to fulfill its function either because it fails to move us or because it moves us into situations that fail to alleviate our boredom—that is, it moves us into situations which are not meaningful or interesting to us. In either case, such a failure of boredom’s function could lead—if it is systematic—to the more frequent or prolonged experience of boredom (i.e., boredom proneness).

In making such a claim about the function and dysfunction of boredom, the proposal leads to empirically testable predictions. For one, it predicts that lack of movement will be a good indicator of boredom proneness—either because one is incapable of moving out of uninteresting situations when such situations arise, or because by remaining stuck in the same situation for a prolonged period of time, one ceases to be interested in the situation. Additionally, the proposal also predicts that having the ability to move from one situation to another will decrease the likelihood of being stuck in unsatisfactory situations and consequently decrease the frequency by which one experiences boredom. The latter prediction is in fact supported by evidence that shows that high locomotion is strongly negatively correlated with boredom proneness (Struk et al., 2015b).

In turn, it has been shown that high boredom prone individuals are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than low boredom prone individuals. Such a finding is prima facie puzzling. If high boredom prone individuals tend to engage in risky behavior, shouldn’t then that tendency reduce the frequency of their experience of boredom? After all, isn’t risky behavior exciting and as such not boring? Unfortunately, this is not an issue that has received sustained attention in the literature. Still, the proposed account of the function (and dysfunction) of boredom allows us to

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5 To be clear, the claim that boredom proneness is the result of a dysfunction of the state of boredom does not mean that the mere disposition to experience boredom is dysfunctional. Sometimes the disposition to experience boredom can have salutary effects. For example, it can promote escape from an unsatisfactory situation (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014), help to establish a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even bolster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood, 2014; Mann & Cadman, 2014). At the same time, however, if one is disposed to experience boredom often and in a wide range of situations, as this is the case for individuals who score high on BPS, then such a disposition will be harmful. Understanding boredom as a functional emotional state that may malfunction allows us to make sense of how boredom can be both good and bad for us. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helping me see the value of distinguishing between state boredom, boredom proneness, and the disposition to experience boredom.
make some progress in accounting for it. Boredom functions optimally when it (a) informs us of the presence of a boring situation and (b) successfully motivates us to pursue a more interesting, fulfilling, or meaningful situation. Boredom proneness could thus be the result of a lack of motion, but it could also be the result of a failure to properly direct the motivating force of boredom. In the case of high boredom prone individuals who engage in risky behavior, it is more reasonable to maintain that boredom proneness is the product of the latter type of failure. In their attempts to escape boredom, such individuals may rely on what situations most readily afford them or on quick fixes of boredom instead of trying to find activities that are in line with their personal interests. Engaging in risky activities is the easy solution and one that in all likelihood will temporarily assuage one’s feelings of boredom. But if such an activity is not one that is in some sense meaningful to the agent and does not promote the agent’s interests, boredom will return.

All in all, we have strong reasons to accept the claim that boredom is a functional emotion. Not only is this conclusion supported by what we know about the character of boredom — its affective, cognitive, and motivational aspects — but it also carries a number of important theoretical advantages. It permits us to account for boredom proneness in terms of the function or dysfunction of the state of boredom; it gives rise to empirically testable predictions; and lastly, it is in line with functional accounts of emotions. By promoting movement, boredom contributes to locomotion. But boredom does more than that. Due to its affective, cognitive, and volitional character, boredom can, when it functions optimally, facilitate goal-directed movement and moves us closer to what we find interesting and meaningful.

4.2. The limits of boredom
The fact that boredom can promote the pursuit of more interesting, stimulating, or meaningful situations does not render it a psychological panacea. Most emotional states are ones that have both beneficial and harmful consequences — fear, for example, protects us from threats and dangers, yet it often forecloses opportunities and possibilities for action. Boredom is no exception and, in this section, I highlight three potential issues with boredom: i.e., three ways in

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6 Boredom does not seek merely to promote movement but to contribute to the realization of goal-directed movement. This aspect of the function of boredom is reflected, I suggested, in its volitional character: boredom motivates one to engage in a task that is more stimulating, interesting, or meaningful than the current one. Thus, boredom would not be alleviated unless one succeeds in finding and engaging with such a task.
which boredom may cease to be beneficial to us. I argue, however, that the fact that boredom does not always play a salutary role in our lives does not mean that it is not valuable. An understanding of the limitations of boredom is not a demonstration of its uselessness, but a necessary step in seeing more clearly how boredom can be used optimally and to our own advantage.

**From boredom to boredom:** Boredom, I argued, serves a two-fold function. First, it informs us of a mismatch between what we desire and what is being offered to us; in doing so, it signals the presence of an unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation. Second, boredom acts as a motivational force that helps us to move out of such unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situations. It should be noted that the very state of boredom does not always carry information of what would alleviate our boredom. It is common among bored individuals to have a strong desire to do something other than what they are currently doing without however knowing exactly what that alternative is (e.g., Fahlman et al., 2013). Still, boredom’s motivational force is not aimless: even if boredom itself does not specify what we should be doing, it does motivate us to seek out a more interesting or fulfilling task. However, our pursuit for an interesting or fulfilling task need not always be successful. In an attempt to escape boredom, it is possible that we find ourselves in yet another unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation—one that did not appear to us to be so beforehand. Of course, if boredom is successful in promoting movement, then it should motivate us once again to do something else and, hopefully, this time we will be more successful in finding something that satisfies our need for stimulation and engagement. Having said that, the very possibility that boredom may lead to another boring state highlights the need both for self-knowledge and for knowledge of our possibilities. Motion is good but not when it is purposeless. In order to fulfill its potential, boredom needs our guidance.

**The interesting isn’t always beneficial:** Boredom may be successful in moving us both out of unsatisfactory and uninteresting situations and into situations that are perceived by us to be interesting, engaging, and stimulating. Nonetheless, the fact that boredom has the ability to do so does not guarantee that the new interesting, engaging, or stimulating situation is one that is beneficial to us. As it was already discussed, individuals who score high on BPS are more likely than low boredom prone individuals to engage in potentially unsafe and dangerous activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010). Such risky behavior is exciting but one that may either
harm individuals or fail to promote their well-being.

**The boring shouldn’t always be avoided:** A subject may experience a situation as boring for a variety of reasons. Often, such a reaction is deemed to be appropriate insofar as it correctly represents features of the situation. Consider, for example, waiting in line to pay for groceries, attending a lecture on a topic that is utterly familiar to us, or having the same conversation over and over again. Such situations are not only boring from the perspective of the agent (insofar as they fail to stimulate her) but they are appropriately boring: we recognize that these are situations in which the agent is not afforded with meaningful or engaging opportunities. However, not all situations that are experienced as boring are appropriate in this sense.

Consider for instance the experience of boredom within an academic context. Students often experience boredom when they are attending lectures or when completing challenging assignments (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007; Mann & Robinson, 2009). In one sense, such an experience is a fitting reaction to the situation insofar as the situation is one that has failed to engage the subject. In another sense, however, boredom can be said to be an inappropriate reaction. Assuming that the class is important for the subject, the experience of boredom does not allow the subject to focus on the material, leading potentially to a bad outcome. Classes maybe boring, but often they should not.

If I am correct to emphasize the motivational and aversive character of boredom, the onset of boredom will motivate the individual to do something that alleviates the experience of boredom. In doing so, boredom could lead to harmful results. If one is bored during class, boredom could lead to irrelevant mind-wandering or motivate the individual to engage in an activity that is unrelated to the class. While such actions are often employed as means to alleviate boredom, they are not the only ones available to the agent. For example, there is some preliminary evidence that suggests that boredom can foster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood, 2014; Mann & Cadman, 2014). Thus, as a response to the experience of boredom, individuals could engage in creative thinking about the material at hand or attempt creative or novel solutions to questions or exercises. Furthermore, a number of studies have found that boredom promotes the reestablishment of a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). Such an attempt to find meaning could allow a student to engage with the material in a different way or to discover something that was not immediately evident to her. Lastly, it is important to emphasize that the fact that boredom promotes movement does not necessarily entail that
boredom will promote movement away from the task at hand. Indeed, even though individuals high on locomotion have a preference for multi-tasking, they are capable of remaining focused on a given task (Pierro et al., 2011): They can secure sustained attention on a task by moving from one state of knowledge or understanding to another while engaging in that task.

**Lesson:** What do the above limitations tell us about boredom and its value? They underline that boredom will not by itself solve our problems. It needs direction and a kind of know-how that allows us to use boredom in the right way. In other words, we need to have the ability to know how to read the situation and how to respond to it. Thus, listening to what boredom tells us when it arises, and being able to use its motivational power in order to promote movement, can help not only to reduce the duration of our current boring experience but also to increase the chances of later finding ourselves in situations that are congruent with our desires and in line with our interests. Such a conclusion might seem to suggest that what is beneficial for us is not boredom itself but knowledge about boredom and its uses. Such a reaction underestimates—severely, I believe—the motivational power of boredom. Boredom is a powerful emotional state that can at once disengage us from uninteresting or meaningless situations and move us away from them. It has been reported, for example, that individuals who are left alone in a room with their thoughts (a situation that is considered to be boring) are willing to shock themselves as a way to stimulate themselves and escape the monotony of their situation (Wilson et al., 2014).

Clearly, on account of its motivational character, boredom differs from apathy and other states of disengagement. But it also differs from other related negative states, e.g., frustration. Whereas frustration (at least sometimes) can be understood as a call to persist in what we are doing (Amsel, 1992), boredom can be understood as a call to switch our activity. Boredom disengages us from our current situation, makes salient to us our alternative possibilities, and motivates us to do something else. As such, boredom plays a unique and useful role in our mental economy.

5. **Boredom and well-being**

So far, I have argued that an important part of boredom’s function is to move us: on account of its character, boredom can move us out of uninteresting situations and into ones that are closer to our desires, goals, and projects. As such, it can regulate our behavior. But if boredom has the capacity to promote motion and in doing so to bring us closer to what can be important, relevant, or exciting to us, doesn’t it also, at least sometimes, have the capacity to promote well-being? In
this section, I shall argue precisely for that claim. We do not want boredom to arise. We do not like it when it does arise. Still, its presence informs us that our current situation is not satisfactory to us. More importantly, boredom also offers us an affective force that can motivate us to pursue our goals. Hence, boredom can be valuable even if it is unpleasant.

5.1. Beyond happiness

There is more to living a good life than living a life that is mostly devoid of pain, distress, and physical and mental illnesses. Although this point has been acknowledged for decades now (Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 2002; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998), the precise nature of the good life still remains a matter of debate (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2001). If the absence of pain, distress, and illnesses is not sufficient for well-being, then what is needed in order for an individual to achieve well-being? Current empirical psychology on well-being is divided into two broad camps. On the one hand, theorists who espouse a hedonic view of well-being (Kahneman et al., 1999) hold that well-being consists in pleasure or happiness (e.g., Diener et al., 1998; Diener, 2000). On the other hand, theorists committed to a eudaimonic account of well-being insist that well-being requires more than pleasure and happiness: to live well an individual must be capable of realizing one’s true potential, or, at the very least, an individual must be capable of exercising certain human capacities (e.g., Aristotle, 1925; Fromm, 1981; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998 and 2000; Waterman, 1993).

Ryan and Deci (2001) note that there are findings that suggest that well-being is a multidimensional construct and as such includes aspects of both views of well-being (e.g., Compton et al., 1996; King & Napa, 1998; McGregor & Little, 1998). For example, King & Napa (1998) surveyed lay people about the character of the good life and found that both happy and meaningful lives were desirable. McGregor and Little (1998) conducted factor analyses of a number of diverse well-being measures and found two distinct factors—one for happiness and one for meaningfulness—suggesting that happiness might be disconnected or independent from meaningfulness and that well-being is composed of both.

A conceptual investigation into the notion of well-being favors the eudaimonic view. That is to say, it supports the claim that even though happiness is an important—perhaps even a necessary—component of well-being, it is not sufficient. A vicious and immoral life that is nevertheless filled with pleasure and happiness is not a good life. The same goes for a simulated life such as a life in the matrix. Although such a life might be infused with positive affect and
experiences, it is not a good life (Nozick, 1974). It lacks grounding in reality and it is devoid of autonomy, one’s choices and decisions are not one’s own. Whatever else a good life is, it has to be a life that is our own.

Other theoretical articulations of mental health and well-being also support the conclusion that happiness is not the be all and end all of the good life (e.g., Allport, 1961; Fromm, 1981; Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 1998; Rogers, 1961; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). A good life is one that contains not just happiness or positive affects but also the determination and pursuit of goals. In living the good life one discovers and exercises one’s talents. One grows as a person. One builds his or her social and physical environment. There is no denying that happiness is good and beneficial to us (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). But happiness is not equivalent to well-being: the latter requires the former (a good life is a happy life), but the former does not guarantee the latter (a happy life is not necessarily a good life).

5.2. Boredom and psychological well-being

In developing their eudaimonic account of well-being, Ryff and Singer articulated six dimensions of psychological well-being: positive relations with others, environmental mastery, autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, and purpose in life (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998). Accordingly, individuals flourish in life when they have trusting and loving relationships with others; when they are in the position to shape their environment in order to satisfy their desires and accomplish their goals; when they can make their own independent decisions and are internally motivated; when they see themselves as developing and growing; when they are satisfied with most aspects of themselves; and when they perceive their lives to have meaning, coherence, and direction. What such an account makes clear is that living well is a multidimensional dynamic process. It involves movement and progress. It involves the taking up of interests. It requires the expression and exercise of a number of human capacities.

Reflecting on Ryff and Singer’s (1998) psychological well-being account—specifically, on personal growth and purpose in life—allows us to see how boredom can contribute towards our well-being. According to Ryff and Singer, what it means to flourish is to continue to develop one’s potential. A good life is one that is marked by a certain kind of progression: in living such a life one gets better (intellectually, socially, and even morally). One grows as a person by realizing one’s opportunities and talents and by being open to new experiences and challenges (Ryff, 1989; Ryff and Singer, 1998).
The state of boredom can promote personal growth. By moving us out of uninteresting situations, boredom motivates us to pursue what we already find interesting (Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). As such, it can help us to realize and practice our talents. By helping us to get unstuck and by promoting movement, boredom can also contribute to the development of our projects and to the achievement of our pre-established goals. Furthermore, boredom promotes the pursuit of interest, and the experience of interest leads to openness to new situations and activities (Cohn et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 2013; cf. Bench & Lench, 2013). Being bored is not good in and of itself. It is an aversive experience that signifies lack of interest and engagement. Yet precisely because of its aversive nature, boredom can help us to get back on track by invigorating interest in one’s projects (Elpidorou, 2014). Although boredom itself is a form of stagnation, it can promote movement if we know how, and are able, to utilize its potential.

In addition to contributing to personal growth, boredom can also help in the construction of a meaningful life. Individuals with personal projects that are consistent with elements of their self-identity report higher levels of meaning than those whose projects are not in line with their self-identity (McGregor & Little, 1998). Such coherence and meaningfulness in one’s life has been shown to be associated with certain aspects of well-being such as self-actualization and vitality (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon et al., 1996). Furthermore, a meaningful life is not only a consistent or coherent life, but also one that possesses a sense of direction or purpose (Ryff, 1989).

If boredom signals a lack of meaning (Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012) and at the same time promotes the pursuit of meaningful activities (Barbalet, 1999; Elpidorou, 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012), then boredom can contribute to the buildup of personal meaning. It does that not by being itself a meaningful experience, but by providing the agent with information about her situation and by motivating her to pursue alternative projects when the current projects lose their meaning and significance. Boredom has the capacity to trigger certain self-regulatory processes and such processes are capable of causing a change in one’s behavior (e.g., Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Ultimately, the state of boredom can help one to establish or reestablish a sense of meaningfulness and coherence, when such a sense is missing (Barbalet, 1999; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2011).
6. Connections and further directions

Either in passing remarks or in sustained articulations of its nature, boredom figures in the works of authors such as Dante, Pascal, Novalis, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Pessoa, Heidegger, Russell, and Brodsky. Indeed, discussions of boredom can be traced at least all the way back to the writings of early Christian fathers who were concerned with a type of spiritual boredom (acedia) responsible for neglecting one’s religious duties. Despite its long and intricate history, philosophical and literary discussions of boredom have tended to emphasize its negative character. Although not everyone would agree with Kierkegaard’s pronouncement that “boredom is the root of all evil,” many have argued that boredom is a problem (Kierkegaard 1843/1987, p. 285). Understood as a short-lived state, boredom is a burdensome distraction, unbecoming of our goal-orientated lives. Understood as a prolonged condition, boredom is an existential malaise: a source of unhappiness and an obstacle to the development of one’s capacities.

By synthesizing recent work from the psychology of boredom, I have offered a complementary perspective to predominantly negative articulations of boredom’s character. I have argued that through an investigation of the experiential profile of boredom we can begin to understand boredom’s function. Specifically, I have suggested that boredom is a self-regulatory state capable both of informing us of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and of pushing us out of such a situation and into one that is deemed to be more interesting, meaningful, or fulfilling. In this respect, the current article is in agreement with a recent trend in boredom literature that takes boredom to be an emotional or affective state that serves a purpose in our everyday lives. However, it differs from existing literature in at least two crucial ways. First, the present account articulates boredom’s function by relating it to a specific aspect of self-regulation (namely, locomotion) and by emphasizing its capacity to move us. Second, it makes a novel case for boredom’s value by describing the ways in which the state of boredom can promote aspects of eudaimonic well-being. As far as I know, no other work on boredom has suggested that boredom can play a role in our well-being.

Although research on boredom is witnessing a growing popularity, many issues regarding

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7 The history of boredom does contain some dissenting voices. Most notably, these include Russell (1996), Heidegger (1983/2001), and Brodsky (1997). Brief and sometimes enigmatic remarks about the value of boredom can also be found in Nietzsche (2001, p. 57), Sontag (2012), Higgins (1981) and in novels by D.F. Wallace (The Pale King) and E. Levé (Suicide). Elpidorou (2015b) uses Sartre’s theory of emotions to propose a function for boredom.
its nature, antecedents and effects remain unresolved. For instance, the neurological and somatic correlates of boredom have not been isolated, its connection to mind-wandering, attention, and perception of meaningfulness is still explored, and its potential effects on morality is a topic that only very recently has received empirical attention (e.g., Elpidorou, 2017; Van Tilburg and Igou, 2016). There is even disagreement about the factor structure of the BPS (e.g., Melton & Schulenberg, 2009; Vodanovich et al., 2005; Struk et al., 2015a).

Perhaps the most pressing issue within the psychology literature on boredom is the question of how to alleviate the harms associated with boredom proneness. The relationship between locomotion and the function of boredom as proposed in this article has the potential to help. A suggestion that naturally emerges out of the present discussion is that the effects of repetitive induction of locomotion on boredom ought to be experimentally investigated (Struk et al., 2015b). Specifically, it is expected that if boredom proneness is low when locomotion is high, then the repetitive induction of a locomotion orientation should reduce scores on BPS (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Such a suggestion is consistent with findings that show that high boredom prone individuals are unable to initiate action (e.g., Blunt & Plychyl 1998; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; McGiboney & Carter 1988;) and feel stuck in their situations (Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenchel, 1951; Todman, 2003). Given boredom’s relationship to attentional difficulties (Eastwood et al., 2012), the suggestion is also in line with studies showing that high locomotors can stay focused and resist distractions (Pierro et al., 2011).

7. Conclusion: the value of negativity

There is much discussion about the benefits of positive states (e.g., Cohn et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 1998, 2000, and 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Garland et al., 2000; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013) but very little mention of how negative states have the capacity to enhance our lives and help us to flourish. This is unfortunate. To restrict our attention to positive states and feelings (e.g., pleasure, joy, interest, hope, trust) would be to miss out on the full potential that lies within our rich psychological worlds. States of discontent might be unpleasant, but they are powerful, moving, and instructive.

There is a place for negative emotions in well-being (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Diener & Seligman 2002). Such an assertion does not mean that we should pursue negative emotions. Well-being is not being promoted by the chronic or frequent experience of those negative emotions. Still, the ability to have those emotions and the fact that we can react to them in the
right way is valuable to us. Negative experiences and emotions are unavoidable. Yet, how we are going to react to them depends to a certain extent on us. Articulating boredom’s function allows us to discover what it can do for us. And knowing what boredom can do for us is the first step in being able to use boredom to our advantage.
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