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ANDREW LINZEY

SENTIENTISM

Sentientism, a term coined by Andrew Linzey in 1980, denotes an attitude that arbitrarily favors sentients over nonsentients. The term is historically parallel to that of “speciesism”^{*} coined by Richard Ryder in 1970. Although Linzey was one of the early advocates of sentience as the basis of rights, he subsequently warned against claiming too much for any one form of classification as the basis of moral standing^{*} or rights. Raymond Frey specifically argues that sentience as the basis of rights “condemns the whole of non-sentient creation, including the lower animals, at best to a much inferior status or . . . at worst possibly to a status completely beyond the moral pale.”

The issue is how to recognize the value and moral relevance of sentience as a criterion while avoiding falling into the error of previous generations who have isolated one characteristic or ability—for example, reason, language, culture, or friendship—and used it as a barrier to wider moral sensibility. There is a need to be aware that all moral categories and distinctions are themselves liable to change as our own moral sensibilities develop and our scientific understanding increases.

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ANDREW LINZEY

Individual Interests

Simply put, individual interests are individual stakes in life. More precisely, individual interests are defined as relationships between an individual and his or her opportunities to maximize positive experiences and to minimize negative experiences over his or her lifetime. Since the capacity for having positive or negative experiences is equivalent to being sentient, only sentient

beings have individual interests. It is in an individual's interest to use all present and future opportunities, whether he or she is aware of their existence or not. Individuals, whether human or nonhuman, are usually not aware and probably cannot be aware of all opportunities that would be in their interest to pursue. An individual may have interest in something without taking an interest in it. For example, a bored (*see* ANIMAL BOREDOM) individual does not take interest in anything but still has an interest in whatever would alleviate its boredom. The moral concept of having an (individual) interest ("A is in the interest of X") ought to be clearly distinguished from the psychological concept of taking an interest ("X is interested in A"). The ability to take interest is dependent upon individuals having wants and desires. While having an interest in something does not necessarily imply taking an interest in it, the converse is not true: wanting or desiring something does imply having an interest in obtaining or avoiding it. The scope of individual interests is, therefore, dependent on the diversity of psychological interests, which is, in turn, dependent on cognitive capacities.

A major step in the evolution of animal cognition* that led to an expansion of psychological and individual interests was the emergence of the capacity to form a value-laden mental representation of an external situation. This capacity is clearly present in many mammals and birds and probably in some other animals. Another major step in the evolution of individual interests was the emergence of reflective self-consciousness (*see* ANIMAL COGNITION, Conscious Experience) and self as a major source of positive and negative experiences.

There is a controversy over whether animals have an interest in life as opposed to interests in specific experiences. This controversy stems from the ambiguity of the terms "interest" (as discussed here), "self-consciousness" (or "self-awareness"), and "life." Perceptual self-consciousness implies an experiential awareness of one's own body and the distinction between the body and the environment. Reflective self-consciousness is an ability to reflect upon oneself, which implies having a *concept* of oneself. The basic, restrictive meaning of life is the life in itself, the very existence of an individual, which enables it to experience anything at all. The broad meaning of life includes individual existence and all that matters to the individual in its lifetime. Only a reflectively self-conscious individual can have some concept of, and thus take an interest in, one's own individual existence in itself, that is, may not want to die no matter what experience is to be expected. Since most animals (with a few exceptions, especially "higher" primates) do not appear to show evidence of reflective self-consciousness, they cannot take interest in life itself. However, a good life, which means an existence with predominantly positive experiences, is obviously in an animal's interest. Whether life in either sense is in an animal's interest depends, therefore, on its expected quality (*see* WELL-BEING OF ANIMALS).

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ANDRZEJ ELZANOWSKI

SEWELL, ANNA

Anna Sewell (1820–1878) was the author of *Black Beauty* (1877), the most influential anticruelty novel of all time. A lifelong invalid, Sewell wrote the book in her fifties, dictating it to her mother from her sickbed. She sold the book outright for a negligible amount and did not live to see its enormous success and impact. The popularity of *Black Beauty* has been linked to the abolition of the bearing rein and to the wider success of the humane movement worldwide. Within two weeks of receiving a copy in February 1890, Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA) founder George Angell* had arranged for a pirated edition. Soon the book was selling at the rate of 250,000 copies per year. New editions of the book continue to appear, and the story of *Black Beauty* has attracted the talents of a number of illustrators and cinematographers.

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BERNARD UNTI

SHAFTESBURY (7TH EARL OF), LORD ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury (1801–1885), was a British evangelical philanthropist active in many social causes, including factory reform, the abolition of child labor, and mental health. His animal advocacy is less well known. Together with Henry Manning,* Frances Power Cobbe,* and George Hoggan he founded the world's first antivivisection* society, the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, in 1875 and became its first president. Although he was an advocate of total abolition, he supported the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act because "while he believed restriction might be effective, he feared that abolition would be a dead letter" (*Hansard*, 1876, 1016). Although Shaftesbury subsequently spoke

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