Introduction: The Language of Experience

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Abstract: The introduction argues that nothing could be more natural than the phenomenological treatment of language; after all, its breakthrough in method consists in a renewed appreciation for the power of speech to unlock the truth of things. Interest in the phenomenology of language has increased in the last two decades due to the publication of new phenomenological texts and due to dialogue with other disciplines and approaches. At the same time, the phenomenological contribution cannot be fully appreciated apart from its transcendental method. Only in light of its unique approach do the properly phenomenological themes come to the fore; among these are presence and absence, the pre-predicative, and embodied intersubjectivity. Phenomenology’s analysis of language is a vital one within the philosophy of language; it shows that language belongs to experience, and it shows how language arises from and gives voice to joint experience.

Keywords: Method, intentionality, pre-predicative, intersubjectivity, philosophy of language

Sprache macht offenbar. —HEIDEGGER

The phrase, “philosophy of language,” immediately conjures up a variety of topics—reference, meaning, speech acts, etc.—and a variety of authors—Wittgenstein, Quine, Kripke, Davidson, and the like. By contrast, “phenomenology of language” initially appears empty. What does it entail? Who are its voices? While philosophy as conceptual analysis obviously involves a close interaction with language and problems of language, it is not at all clear that the same holds for philosophy as description of the structure of experience. What is the specifically phenomenological contribution to language?

Now the term “phenomenology” does express the rootedness of logos in the phenomena, of speech in the givenness of experience. The major contributions that inaugurate the phenomenological movement do so through contextualizing language. Husserl’s breakthrough work, Logical Investigations, discloses the logic of truth by exhibiting the interplay of language
and our experience of things: that which we speak about can be given to experience in the very same way in which it is said. Heidegger situates the Husserlian interplay of language and experience within the domain of world, and he relentlessly grapples with the problem of bringing that domain to adequate expression. Merleau-Ponty, working from Husserl’s later manuscripts, develops the intersubjective significance of the body in enabling the interplay of language and experience. Language leads us to recover the wealth of experience, the place of experience, and the embodied agency of experience. In its origins, phenomenology is not only a philosophy of truth and of perception; it is a philosophy of language. Etymologically and genealogically, then, the phrase “phenomenology of language” appears to be as pleonastic as the phrase “botany of plants.”¹

Despite this evident linkage of phenomenology and the philosophy of language, the character of the relation remains far from clear. There is in the first place a question of relative silence; as Gadamer observes, “It is astounding how little the problem of language is attended to at all in phenomenology—by Husserl or by Scheler” (Gadamer 1963/1976, 172).² Husserl, it is true, regularly sets language as such aside in order to simplify his genealogy of logic (Husserl 1973, §47, Husserl 1969, §§2 and 5). In this way, language seems to be of merely peripheral concern to phenomenology. There is in the second place the puzzling character of the remarks one does find phenomenologists making on the subject. Witness Heidegger’s bold assertion in *Being and Time*: “Philosophical research will have to dispense with the ‘philosophy of language’

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¹ The analogy is from Heidegger, who compares the philosophy of life to the botany of plants (Heidegger 1962, 72).

² He repeats and widens the criticism three decades later: “. . . most thinkers coming from the phenomenological tradition have difficulty holding on to the theme ‘language’ in their reflections” (Gadamer 1992/2000, 19).
if it is to inquire into the ‘things themselves’ and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually” (Heidegger 1962, 210). The aversion goes beyond the philosophy of language to concern language itself. That is, phenomenology fulfills its ambition to return to the things themselves only by resisting “the drift of ordinary language,” which all too easily inappropriately reifies: “Before words, before expressions, always the phenomena first, and then the concepts!” (Heidegger 1985, 248).

What are we to make of phenomenology’s relative silence and noted aversion regarding language? Merleau-Ponty suggests that Husserl’s reticence is the fruit of his giving language a priority heretofore unprecedented in the philosophical tradition; the tradition does not oblige him to be as explicit concerning language as he must be concerning epistemological and logical questions. Nonetheless, Husserl “moves it into a central position, and what little he says about it is both original and enigmatic” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 84). Derrida focuses his considerable intellectual energy on just this ambiguity between ordinary language and phenomenological language: Husserl remains narrowly focused only on those aspects of language relevant for the genealogy of logic, and he leaves unexplored ordinary language as a whole as well as the specific possibility of phenomenological language, which he employs but does not explain (Derrida 1973, 7–8). Behind the relative silence and indeed aversion to the problem of language, we find, inscribed into the heart of the phenomenological project, an implicit but unjustified commitment to the language of phenomenology. Language and phenomenology: the conjunction hides a question mark in search of a unifying principle.

Henry observes there is not so much a phenomenology of language (alongside a range of other possible objects of investigation) but rather a language of phenomenology insofar as “language belongs . . . to the internal conditions of this process of elucidation” (Henry 1999,
Phenomenology needs language in order to disclose the phenomena. Given this constitutive role of language in phenomenology, there remains a possibility of return, of going back from the language of phenomenology to the language of the everyday, and of thereby enriching the language of the everyday. Heidegger’s provisional characterization of the phenomenological method in section seven of Being and Time expresses the phenomenological rejuvenation of language as such: once again the Greek sense of logos as a matter of letting something be seen has come to light. The disclosive character of phenomenological language reveals the disclosive character of ordinary speech. As Derrida points out, “The unity of ordinary language (or the language of traditional metaphysics) and the language of phenomenology is never broken in spite of the precautions, the ‘brackets,’ the renovations or innovations” (Derrida 1973, 8). Perhaps the unity Derrida identifies is in fact an asset, inscribed into the nature of experience, that affords the possibility of a back and forth movement between ordinary and phenomenological language. As Sokolowski puts it, “The phenomenological attitude is the rigorous, systematic execution of what is already germinating in natural experience and discourse” (Sokolowski 1974, 254). We can experience and speak of things and we can experience and speak of the presence of things; language performs overlapping roles in helping to constitute the duality of experience. The term “phenomenology of language” would therefore name both a subjective and objective genitive: a manner of philosophizing opened up by language and an understanding of language opened up by that manner of research.

Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation recalibrates experience to match the structure resident in our speech about things. If I can say, “The apple is

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3. This remains true even if one does not accept his divorce of life and world.
tart,” then it is possible to experience the being-tart of the apple. Language enriches experience; it challenges us to widen experience beyond the perception of sensible qualities (e.g., red) to include perception of categorial relations (e.g., the being-sunburned of our skin). Experience enriches language by rooting its structures in the robust structures of perceived things (perceiving the skin as sunburned fills out the meaning of “My skin is sunburned”). Heidegger praises Husserl for subordinating thought to givenness, for transcending modern rationalism and recovering the Greek sense of logos as gathering. Experience takes the lead but it is an experience widened by speech. One can thereby identify a basic tension within the phenomenological treatment of language: on the one hand, phenomenology subordinates speech to experience; on the other, phenomenology identifies the reciprocity of speech and experience. Heidegger’s signature if enigmatic formula, “Language is the house of being,” expresses just this reciprocity (Heidegger 1998a, 39).

This collection of essays by leading and emerging scholars articulates the distinctively phenomenological contribution to language by examining two sets of questions. The first set of questions concerns the relatedness of language to experience. Studies exhibit the first-person character of language by focusing on lived experience, the issue of reference, and disclosive speech. The second set of questions concerns the relatedness of language to intersubjective experience. Studies exhibit the second-person character of language by focusing on language acquisition, culture, and conversation. Contributors draw from the insights of a variety of phenomenological authors, including Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, in order to advance the understanding of linguistic phenomena.
1. SEVERAL RECENT FOCI

In its first hundred years, phenomenology happened upon the relation of language and experience as one of its fundamental themes, a relation slowly widened beyond the logical to encompass the whole sphere of human experience, including the philosophical, and a relation slowly deepened to recognize the constitutive nature of language. In the first two decades of its second century, there has been a marked renewal of interest in this theme among phenomenologists, a renewal due principally to three contributing factors. First, the centenary of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* motivated scholars to celebrate this work and its interrelationship of language and experience. Second, the appearance of heretofore unpublished texts from both Husserl and Heidegger has led scholars to new insights. Third and most significantly, interactions with other traditions and disciplines, including analytic philosophy, developmental psychology, and linguistics, have led phenomenological authors to call upon the resources of phenomenology to address new questions and to approach old questions in new ways.

Focus on language allows us both to appropriate and to expand the experiential and intersubjective horizons of Husserlian phenomenology. Beyer (2017) details the contrast between Husserl and Frege concerning sense, a contrast that sets up the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Some phenomenologists productively question the analytic internalism–externalism debate concerning meaning (Kelly 2001); Zahavi (2008) and Crowell (2008) resist the characterization of Husserl as an internalist while also underscoring that the phenomenological breakthrough involves a recalibration of the terms of the debate: phenomenology shows that the mind is external and the world is internal. The most extended recent engagement with Husserl’s phenomenology of language comes from Romano (2015), who
develops Husserl’s attempts to return reason to sensibility in dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy of language. A first question for phenomenology and language concerns this cross-fertilization: “How can phenomenology’s experiential register help reshape contemporary debates in analytic philosophy?”

At the beginning of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl sets aside the social dimension of speech in order to focus on the relation of a solitary perceiver’s speech to the things of perception. The centenary of *Logical Investigations* in the year 2000 and the subsequent publication of Husserl’s attempted revisions to the Sixth Investigation (Husserl 2002, Husserl 2005) attracted considerable scholarly attention to Husserl’s phenomenology of language, its possibilities and its limits. Mattens’s edited volume (2008) includes a wide range of scholarly and speculative developments of Husserl’s thoughts on language, including the various focal points of Husserl’s repeated attempts to revise the Sixth Investigation, and Dodd (2012) considers these revisions in light of Derrida’s criticisms. Zahavi and Stjernfelt’s collection of essays on the *Logical Investigations* features a clear overview of Husserl’s phenomenology of language by Sokolowski (2002), who subsequently offers an intersubjective development of Husserl’s basic approach to language (Sokolowski 2008). A second question for phenomenology and language concerns this intersubjectivity: “To what extent can (Husserl’s) phenomenology of language make sense of the obviously social dimension of speech?”

Heidegger’s conception of language has been the subject of much recent scholarly activity, although not all of it approaches his conception as essentially phenomenological. Carman (2003), Inkpin (2016), and Hatab (2017) gravitate toward the powerful and evidently phenomenological analyses of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, which explores world as the domain of speech, and Campbell (2012) shows the way in which such themes are the fruit of his earlier
engagement with Aristotle’s ontological account of life. Taylor (2016) redeployes his earlier phenomenological investigations of language to speak of the constitutive role of language for human experience, and he does so in order to offer an alternative to the standard analytic approach to language.4 A third question for phenomenology and language concerns the peculiar status of language in Heidegger’s conception: “What role does language play in the phenomenological task of exhibition?”

Maly (2008), Ziarek (2013), and most of the contributors gathered by Powell (2013) exploit the resources in Heidegger’s late writings for making sense of language, focusing especially on Heidegger’s esoteric notebooks that began to be published only in 1989. Some of these studies treat Heidegger in terms of the poetic discourse of the late 1930s rather than in terms of a commitment to phenomenology. Hence, a fourth question for phenomenology and language focuses on his last writings: “To what extent can (Heidegger’s late) musings on poetic language be construed as a continuation and even a deepening of the phenomenological project?”

In this regard, Gosetti-Ferencei (2004) approaches Heidegger’s interest in poetic language as a development of phenomenological disclosure, and Wrathall (2011) explicates Heidegger’s later account of language as gathering in a way that is essentially phenomenological, and he does so in dialogue with such analytic authors as Putnam, Burge, and Dummett. The question of the relevance of phenomenology persists for post-Heideggerian authors. Culbertson (2019) examines the phenomenon of linguistic alienation in continental thinkers such as Kristeva and Derrida and brings out the normative significance of a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach to

4. Taylor earlier observes that the constitutive view of language he advocates is the fruit of a “hermeneutical view” explored by Heidegger and later Gadamer (Taylor 1985, 9–11).
language. She argues that feminist and post-colonial theory, far from compromising this normative significance, in fact underscores it.

Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl and Heidegger in making the question of language fundamental to the phenomenological enterprise (Apostolopoulos 2019). Unlike Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty exemplifies a way of doing phenomenology in dialogue with empirical research, and hence he remains especially instructive for the kind of conversation happening today between phenomenology and empirical inquiries. Engelland (2014) draws from Merleau-Ponty’s explorations of embodiment and child development as well as classical analytic authors such as Quine, Wittgenstein, and Davidson to elucidate the phenomenological role of bodily joint presence in making possible the learning of our mother tongue.\(^5\) Inkpin (2016) and Breitling (2017) find resources in Merleau-Ponty for articulating a conception of language as world-disclosing; Inkpin applies this conception to cognitive science and Breitling to the possibility of intercultural conversation. But the engagement with empirical and analytic approaches to language goes beyond an explicit invocation of Merleau-Ponty. In conversation with linguistics and psychologists, Sokolowski (2008) carefully maps the way speakers of language show up in experience as responsible for the truth of that experience as well as the way the structure of that shared experience informs the syntax of our speech; Stawarska (2015) provides a phenomenological reading of the founder of modern linguistics, Saussure; and Hatab (2017) raises questions arising from evolution and artificial intelligence. The engagement with the sciences affords empirical confirmations of many phenomenological claims, but at times it also exposes the need to reconfigure the frameworks operative in those sciences. A fifth

\(^5\) Schmidt (2013) finds similar themes at work in Gadamer.
question, then, for phenomenology and language concerns the question of method: “How might the method of phenomenology differ from other empirical procedures so that it can productively engage empirical sciences while remaining faithful to its own principles?” It is to this last question that we now turn.

2. THE QUESTION OF METHOD

One feature of the recent phenomenological authors is the awareness that phenomenology must be updated in some way in order that its riches might be made available to the contemporary conversation about language. Something of the obscurity of phenomenology is accidental and can be removed without loss. Contemporary phenomenology of language has endeavored to reformulate or even distance itself from Husserl’s vocabulary and infrastructure. Sokolowski recasts the shift from the natural attitude to the transcendental one in terms of a shift in philosophical speech (Sokolowski 2008, 3). Engelland (2014) deploys a streamlined phenomenology that avoids needless technical vocabulary, focuses on everyday experience, and learns from phenomenological insights available in historical figures such as Aristotle and Augustine. Other authors are likewise sensitive to accessibility but go further to question the relevance of the transcendental framework for the phenomenology of language. Inkpin for one calls for a “minimalist phenomenology” that seeks to exhibit directly the phenomena while avoiding the maximalist claims of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty about the being of subjectivity and things; Inkpin instead turns to 4E cognitive science (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) for filling out the context for his minimalist phenomenological analyses (Inkpin 2016, 21). Hatab similarly construes phenomenology in minimal terms under the heading “proto-phenomenology.” He wishes to avoid Husserl’s approach and instead begin with
everyday experience. But he also advocates what he calls “existential naturalism” according to which what’s real are the things that show up in everyday experience and nothing besides (Hatab 2017, 8–10). Both Inkin and Hatab find the Heidegger of Being and Time to be the authentic exemplar for this non-Husserlian version of phenomenology. Moreover, as I mentioned above, many commentators want to read Heidegger’s thoughts on language as being Heideggerian to the exclusion of being phenomenological or transcendental.

What understanding of phenomenology is necessary for making sense of language? Here there seem to be a bewildering variety of possibilities: the early or the late Husserl as well as the early and late Heidegger, just to name four contenders. Let me discuss Heidegger on the verge of his later thought, for rightly understanding his views does much to assuage the apparent tension between his thought and Husserl’s. Heidegger’s cardinal insight into language is that speech is essentially a matter of showing via gathering, that is, speech discloses by articulating the thing in question. He never makes this the focus of philosophical investigation; instead, he presses onwards to articulate the context or domain in which this showing–gathering takes place. In 1935, he makes clear that the connection of gathering (Sammlung) and context (Zusammenhang) is the choice fruit of the transcendental turn. He offers transcendental philosophy as the means to avoid segregating that which must be united in order to be understood. In particular, he thinks it undermines the attempt to set up mathematical logic as “the scientific logic of all sciences,” an attempt that misses the roots of the assertion in the logic of experience itself (Heidegger 1967, 6).

6. “Is not speaking, in what is most proper to it, a saying, a manifold showing of that which hearing, i.e., an obedient heeding of what appears, lets be said?” (Heidegger 1998b, 59).

7. Heidegger says his approach to language differs from analytic thought insofar as he endeavors to answer the question: “what is it that is to be experienced as the proper matter of philosophical thinking, and how is this matter (being as being) to be said?” (Heidegger 1998b, 56).
156). He also thinks it undermines the “idolization of facts” that marks contemporary reflection on science, an idolization that fails to appreciate the productive role of prejudices in making scientific inquiry into objects possible (Heidegger 1967, 60 and 180). Instead, he invites us to make the transcendental turn and conceive the more original belonging together of speech and thing from which the two sides have been artificially separated off. “The ball is underinflated,” we might say, when we notice that the basketball barely bounces. Logic offers one opportunity of interest: we attend to the statement, “The ball is underinflated,” and locate its truth conditions. Physics offers another opportunity of interest: we attend to the pressure of the air inside the ball relative to the air outside of the ball. The transcendental interest, Heidegger tells us, sees the assertion and the experienced thing in their original unity: the assertion articulates and presents the ball’s being-unable-to-be-bounced (Heidegger 1967, 178–9). Only the transcendental turn affords the possibility of understanding the being of language.

How can this commitment to the need of the transcendental turn be squared with Heidegger’s attempts, at the same time as these remarks, to distance himself from the terminology of transcendence? The answer is that the later Heidegger wishes to retain the transcendental turn even as he deepens it historically (Dahlstrom 2001, Crowell 2001, Crowell 2013, Golob 2016, Engelland 2017). He writes in 1964, “Language is a primal phenomenon which, in what is proper to it, is not amenable to factual proof but can be caught sight of only in an unprejudiced experience of language” (Heidegger 1998b, 57). Heidegger’s later thought requires first enacting, in a phenomenological rather than a Kantian mode, the transcendental experience of *Being and Time*:

But to disclose the *a priori* is not to make an ‘*a-prioristic*’ construction. Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical ‘empiricism’; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‘*A-priorism*’ is the
method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing
constructivistic about it. But for this very reason a priori research requires that the
phenomenal basis be properly prepared. The horizon which is closest to us, and which
must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness.
(Heidegger 1962, 490)

Heidegger’s focus on the everyday, which is on the forefront of consideration for the
contemporary phenomenology of language, is not opposed to Husserl and transcendental
philosophy; rather Heidegger understands it as the correct development of the Husserlian
breakthrough. Similarly, Heidegger’s later approach to language is for him the correct
development of Being and Time’s breakthrough. If we sidestep this breakthrough and
nonetheless try to retain the phenomenological return to the things themselves our analyses will
lack the significance of the apriori. They will appear to be psychological descriptions of how
things happen to be instead of philosophical elucidations of how things must be. Speech will
appear to be something that shows up in the field of manifestation, as a thing, event, or process,
rather than to be the medium of manifestation. In this connection, Ricoeur observes that
“phenomenology is worthy of its name only if it remains transcendental and not empirical”
(Ricoeur 1967, 27). Of course, phenomenology does well to lose its unnecessary baggage,
including the Husserlian obsession with transcendental subjectivity and the Heideggerian
penchant for mystification, in order to clear the way for the phenomenological elucidation of the
transcendental domain of experience.

What sort of methodological commitments are necessary for the phenomenology of
language? I have not sought to settle every question but only to indicate that those features
attractive about the phenomenology of language seem connected to methodological
commitments that are regrettably often regarded as unattractive. Phenomenology of language
does well to lead with the phenomena, minimizing talk of transcendence at the outset, and only
to make explicit the full methodological commitments after having first exhibited their fecundity. My suggestion is that phenomenologists of language might consider minimalist or proto-phenomenology as being a good place to start, and yet they have good reason to think that a transcendental phenomenology, intersubjectively and clearly developed, might be the most adequate account in the end. In particular, we may do well to take up Ricoeur’s rich suggestion that we think of the phenomenology of language and the transcendental task in tandem: “If phenomenological reduction is to be something other than the suspension of our links to the world, it must be the ‘beginning’ of a life of meaning, the simultaneous ‘birth’ of the spoken-being of the world and the speaking-being of man” (Ricoeur 1967, 30).

3. SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEMES
The phenomenological return to the things themselves happens upon several enduring themes in the philosophy of language. Among these are the play of presence and absence, the pre-predicative basis of judgment, and embodied intersubjectivity.

3.1 Presence and Absence
Husserl’s Logical Investigations develops the interplay of empty and filled intentions. One might be told about El Greco’s stunning painting “The Vision of St. John” and thereby intend it emptily. One might even imagine its seven twisting nudes or view a photo of it and thereby have a partial fulfillment of that empty intention. But one might also travel to New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art and see it in person and thereby have the empty intention completely filled. Through these graded fulfillments (intended as: absent, imagined, depicted, present in the flesh), it remains one and the same painting. We find Husserl emphasizing both the
independence of meaning from perception and the fulfilment of meaning in perception. That is, I can mean something without its being present in any way, without even a surrogate such as a mental image supporting that intention, but when I do see the meant thing, I experience that meaning as fulfilled by that sight: the very same thing before meant emptily in its absence is here meant fulfilled in its presence. Heidegger’s program reflected in the title, *Being and Time*, takes as its point of departure Husserl’s characterization of perception as a making-present, a term which he thinks suggests a fundamentally temporal process (Heidegger 1962, 498nxxii).

Heidegger develops the language of presence on the heels of *Being and Time* in the famous 1927 lecture course, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, in which he observes that “handiness and unavailability are specific variations of a single basic phenomenon, which we may characterize formally as presence and absence and in general as praesens” (Heidegger 1982, 305).

Sokolowski (1978/2017) has done more than any other interpreter to promote the importance of presence and absence for the philosophy of language. Derrida famously criticized Husserl for privileging presence over absence; one can grant Derrida the artificiality of some of Husserl’s abstractions in approaching language while nonetheless insisting that a concern for absence belongs to the very heart of Husserl’s breakthrough concerning language (Derrida 1973, Sokolowski 1980, Crowell 1996, Lee 2010).

### 3.2 The Pre-Predicative

As Husserl demonstrates in *Logical Investigations* and *Experience and Judgment*, experience involves passive syntheses of the various things that show up in its field. To speak involves singling out something and registering its part–whole relations. The statement, “There’s a bird in the store!” makes explicit the part–whole relation resident in the experience of bird and of store.
Predication (the apophantic *is* of S *is* p) remains founded on pre-predicative explication (the hermeneutic *as* of taking S *as* p). In his determined efforts to make manifest world, Heidegger takes isolated judgments, returns them to their pragmatic contexts, and roots these contexts first in human existence’s efforts to care for being and second in the contexture of time. We talk about things that are explicit and what is explicit happens against the backdrop of a general implicit understanding of things, an understanding rooted in our own projects. Heidegger returns the various things we might say to the pre-discursive grip we have on the world, but that grip is at the most basic level—alongside fundamental moods and projective understanding—linguistic. Everyday language (*Sprache*) is rooted in discourse.8

Both Husserl and Heidegger explore the pre-predicative, but Husserl focuses on contemplative experience (just looking around) and Heidegger focuses on practical experience (taking care of things). Heidegger says that his sense of pre-predicative is more basic than all looking around. Does Heidegger identify a more fundamental layer of the pre-predicative than does Husserl? Husserl tells us at the beginning of *Experience and Judgment* that he is giving an account of the genealogy of logic and he is accordingly going to attend only to contemplative interest (Husserl 1973, 65–6, 203). He does not deny that there is practical interest, which he explicitly mentions later; he says only that he will map the logic of this domain and not that one. Heidegger gives an account of how the practical interest can shift over to a theoretical one, how a

8. “The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness. *The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk*” (Heidegger 1962, 203). Despite this constitutive role for discourse, he later felt moved to write by hand in the margin of his personal copy of *Being and Time* that language is not founded on prelinguistic significations: “Language is not built up [*aufgestockt*], but *is* the original essence of truth as there [Da]” (Heidegger 2001, 442). See Inkpin (2017).
tool when missing or broken can attract attention to itself as a bearer of properties instead of as a means to an end. But Heidegger nowhere gives an account of an originally contemplative interest. Think of the sort of interest awakened by a seven-year-old boy at the beach, who discovers, in the roots of washed up seaweed, a live sea star, one that he contemplates intently before releasing into the water. Much of human life, including science, unfolds from just this contemplative interest (Soffer 1999). Husserl, rather than Heidegger, gives us an account of how it unfolds. It may be that we can think of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s pre-predicative as complementary rather than competing.9

3.3 Embodied Intersubjectivity

A conspicuous feature of ordinary language is the persistent use of personal pronouns, pronouns that not only pick out recipients and agents of action (“I gave you an ‘A’”) but also recipients and agents of thoughtful experience (“I think your work is excellent”). The discovery of intentionality recognizes the presence of the world of things to each one of us; this discovery entails the peculiarity that each of us, present to the world, is present to each other yet in a way essentially different from any other thing; we are present as agents of presence. Such an observation raises the question concerning how we show up in the field of experience. Husserl begins the First Logical Investigation by separating off the indications operative in conversation

9. Heidegger (1962) is not interested in mapping the prepredicative as such; rather he wants to lead attention from the traditional topic of things to the novel topic of the domain in which we encounter things. Heidegger’s idea seems to be that thinking about the contemplative interest can easily insinuate the false picture of a subject opposite an object. Thinking about the practical interest more easily suggests a subject immersed in a network of things anchored in the subject’s care for a future good. The same phenomenon of world could have been made manifest regarding care in theoretical interest, but doing so would have been considerably more difficult.
from the pure expression operative in soliloquy, but later in *Ideas II* and *Cartesian Meditations* he gives an account of the perception of others through the contexture of indications; Merleau-Ponty connects the dots between Husserl’s phenomenology of language and phenomenology of intersubjectivity. We are able to tap into the world of conventional language thanks to the prior world of perception, rooted as it is in our expressive bodies, revealing us to others as those to whom the world of experience stands open. The reciprocity of personal pronouns is grounded in the reciprocity of our bodies as agents of perception. Searle worries that appeals to the experiencing body cannot explain how they relate to the organic or physical body, comprised of such things as brains and central nervous systems (Searle 2005, 329). Sokolowski suggests that we regard such bodily structures as comprising a kind of “lens” that transparently makes the sensible world available to agents of experience; as a lens, it admits of two perspectives: it can be looked at in addition to be looked through (Sokolowski 2008, 193–237). The phenomenological and the scientific need not be thought of as mutually exclusive (Engelland 2014, 193–214).

4. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Socrates, dissatisfied with the Presocratic failure to account for the unity of phenomena, turns to speech about things to grasp them in their unity. Plato playfully exhibits the conventional character of etymologies in the *Cratylus* while underscoring the truth-character of speech in the *Sophist*. Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* sorts the conventional and the natural by rooting language in the publicness of our perception of things. Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana* distinguishes conventional and natural signs, a distinction that enables his account of language acquisition in the *Confessions* in terms of ostension; his *De Magistro* constitutes a rigorous exploration of the ambiguity of signs including every act of pointing. Subsequent medieval and modern thinkers
likewise wrestle with the philosophical problem of language. Among the many species falling under the genus, philosophy of language, one finds not only analytic philosophy and the phenomenology of language but ancient, medieval, and indeed modern species.

A figure that looms large in both analytic and phenomenological approaches to language is Wittgenstein. One takes him on board one’s own project only by leaving a lot of flotsam behind. Analytic authors do not by and large adopt his method even though they regard him as an important reference point; and phenomenological authors find his philosophizing to be phenomenologically suggestive despite the radical insufficiency of his own formulations concerning method. What is attractive about Wittgenstein is his return to the complexity of everyday language, experience, and being with others (Engelland 2014, 41–65, Inkpin 2016, 159–97). There’s also something in the infectious intensity with which he wrestles with issues. At first, one is rebuffed; but the more one reads the more one feels moved to philosophize for oneself.

Wittgenstein’s interest in Augustine at the start of the *Philosophical Investigations* opens up the possibility of reading back behind Frege to alternative approaches to the philosophy of language (Engelland 2014). Taylor develops phenomenological insights of German Romanticism, drawing on Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt, and he does so to counter the persistence of certain rationalist themes in analytic philosophy (Taylor 2016, ix). Sokolowski presents the phenomenology of language as achieving points of contact with the Aristotelian approach to language, a connection first promoted by Heidegger (Sokolowski 2008, 273–85). The phenomenology of language affords an opportunity to engage in the full breadth of philosophical approaches to languages, whether ancient, medieval, modern, or analytic. One can see everywhere anticipations of the phenomenological account, which presses the questions:
what are these anticipations, how can they be brought to fruition, and how can our understanding of phenomena thereby be enriched?

5. QUESTIONS FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

As this introduction has detailed, the important task of relating phenomenology to analytic philosophy of language is well underway, although much work must still be done. However, there are a number of ad intra questions for phenomenology that need clarification before a wholesale ad extra engagement can profitably be accomplished. Among these are the questions of the extension of the phenomenology of language: all too easily the phenomenology of language is restricted to Husserl, excluding Heidegger or at least the later Heidegger or the subsequent hermeneutical tradition; is such a restriction justifiable? Also, must we choose between an asocial phenomenology of language from Husserl and a social hermeneutics of language, or are there resources in Husserlian phenomenology for handling the social dimension of speech? Most importantly, are not the classical phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger hostile to language? Finally, what are some initial, critical points of contact between phenomenology and analytic philosophy of language? Addressing these questions in the way this volume does only serves to make the phenomenology of language a more formidable presence in the contemporary conversation concerning the philosophy of language.

Phenomenology will be most valuable in a discussion with analytic philosophy of language if it takes its bearings from its own method and interests; that is, part of what phenomenology has to contribute is a wider compass of what is interesting philosophically about language. Phenomenology is not an afterthought but the first thought for an approach to language that is mindful of the linguisticality of experience. Hence, a phenomenological approach to
language will think that something like poetry merits considerable attention whereas another
tradition might view it as philosophically uninteresting. Scheler observes:

> For by creating new forms of expression the poets soar above the prevailing network of ideas in which our experience is confined, as it were, by ordinary language; they enable the rest of us to see, for the first time, in our own experience, something which may answer to these new and richer forms of expression, and by so doing they actually extend the scope of our possible self-awareness. (Scheler 2008, 252–53).

In view of these considerations, the volume is entitled, *Language and Phenomenology* rather than *Philosophy of Language and Phenomenology* or even *Phenomenology of Language*. The volume seeks to raise the question and highlight the fruitful relation that obtains between language and phenomenology. The success of this volume invites subsequent more systematic approaches to the various themes in the phenomenology of language, additional comparisons to contemporary analytic discussions in the philosophy of language, and also explorations relative to texts in the history of philosophy, especially Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. Though it has some precedent in the history of philosophy and some overlap with contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, phenomenology alone thematizes the power of the first- and second-person perspectives, the power of an approach to language rooted in the logic of experience and its openness to truth.

6. THIS VOLUME

The two parts of the book reflect the phenomenological fact that language cannot adequately be treated from the third-person perspective. For language draws its life from the field of experience, and phenomenology shows that understanding language involves considerations unique to the first- and second-person perspectives: the phenomenology of language leads us to consider the world that is present to each of us, together. The first half of this volume deals with
issues that arise concerning language and experience; the second half deals with issues concerning language and explicitly *joint* experience.

Regarding the theme, language and experience, the first set of papers explores the phenomenological contribution to the study of language in terms of living experience, reference, and embodiment. **Daniel Dahlstrom** draws from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to examine the importance of the first-person for any investigation of language. **Taylor Carman** presents Merleau-Ponty’s account of reference as a function of the expressive body and argues that, despite the merits of this account of reference, it lacks the resources for explaining syntax. **Dominique Pradelle** challenges Merleau-Ponty’s “wild” interpretation of Husserl’s pre-predicative experience by investigating Husserl’s mature views on the relation of the predicative to the pre-predicative. **Jacob Rump** articulates the value of Husserl’s account of the normativity of meaning in relation to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, and Hannah Ginsborg.

The next set of papers turns to the relation of language to the theme of disclosure. **Scott Campbell** returns to Heidegger’s earliest lecture courses in order to argue that—contrary to what is often thought—language plays a central role in Heidegger’s hermeneutic development of phenomenology. **Leslie MacAvoy** details the way in which Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle in the mid-1920s allows him to bring out the linguistic character of perception and thereby develop the ontological significance of language. **Kate Withy** reads Heidegger’s ontological analysis of language in *Being and Time* in light of his later writings and provides a rigorous, synthetic account of language in his path of thinking. **Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei**, taking a cue from the language of disclosure in Heidegger and other phenomenologists, finds phenomenological insights at work among several notable poets: Rainer Maria Rilke, Robert Frost, and Wallace Stevens.
In the second half of the volume, contributors turn their attention to the second theme, namely, the interconnection of language and joint experience. In the first group of papers, questions concerning the communal character of language and the social character of its acquisition come to the fore. Andrew Inkpin draws on Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein to do justice to the way language use calls upon both individual resources and communal practices. In dialogue with psychology, Pol Vandevelde finds in Husserl’s revisions to the *Logical Investigations* resources for understanding how a natural language can help shape thought. Michele Averchi invokes several later texts of Husserl to press the case that Husserl has a rich account of how language allows us to appropriate the experiences of other people. Lawrence Hatab, inspired by Heidegger, engages a wide range of empirical studies in order to underscore the importance of language—and its acquisition—for world-disclosure.

The final group of papers concerns the interplay of speech in conversation. Carolyn Culbertson draws from Gadamer to analyze the reciprocal turn-taking at work in conversation; for her, the renewal implicit in the turn-taking gives life to conversational exchange. Richard Kearney demonstrates that Ricoeur locates the heart of conversation in the welcome of hospitality; speech thereby harbors an ineluctably ethical dimension. Chad Engelland replies to phenomenology’s critics by showing that the conversation of phenomenology has its origin in the “inflection” of ordinary linguistic terms such as “presence” and “absence”; in this way, phenomenology’s possibility is bound up with one of its specific discoveries, namely, the unity of language and experience.
REFERENCES


